FBI file: Saddam Hussein (pre-released portions, part 1)

Obtained (via FOIA) and posted by AltGov2

www.altgov2.org
File Number 315E-HQ-1448534
Field Office Acquiring Evidence
Serial # of Originating Document
Date Received 6/29/04
From Saddam Hussein
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number: 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

Serial # of Originating Document

Date Received: 6/29/04

From: Saddam Hussein

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

Baghdad, Iraq

(City and State)

By

To Be Returned: No

Receipt Given: No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (c)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): No

Title: Operation Desert Spider

IT - IRAQ

Reference: EC-TR-CCE00292804

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of
Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ITOS II
SC M. Chris Briese
ASC
UC

From: Counterterrorism
Baghdad Operations Center

Contact: SSA

Approved By: Piro George

Drafted By: tmi

Case ID #: (U) 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending)

(U) Title: (S) DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

Synopsis:

Located at the High Value Detainee (HVD) Detention Facility, Camp Cropper, Baghdad, Iraq.

(U) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Details: (S/OR/NF)

SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN
To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism
Re: (U) 315E-HQ-1448534, 06/29/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON DC

(U) For information, read and clear.

★★
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Date Received</td>
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FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

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From Saddam Hussein

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

Baghdad, Iraq

(Qity and State)

By

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☑ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☑ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ☐ Yes ☑ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI) ☐ Yes ☑ No

Title: Operation Desert Spider

IT - IRAQ

Reference: (Communication Excluding Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of
File Number: 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence:

Serial # of Originating Document:

Date Received: 6/14/04

From: Saddam Hussein

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

Baghdad, Iraq

(City and State)

By:

To Be Returned: ☑ No

Receipt Given: ☑ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:

☑ Yes

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI):

☑ Yes

Title: Operation Desert Spider

IT - IRAQ

Reference: 315E-HQ-1448534 - 78

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☑ Original notes re interview of
DG 30 ORIGINAL NOTES RE INTERVIEW OF SADDAM HUSSEIN-HUA#1 ON 05/01/2004 BY SSA
File Number: 31SE-HQ-1442534-1430

Field Office Acquiring Evidence: FRHQ

Serial # of Originating Document: 

Date Received: 5/1/2024

From: SADDAM HUSSEIN

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(BAGHDAD, IRAQ)

(City and State)

By: SSA

To Be Returned: No

Receipt Given: No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e) Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): No

Title: OPERATIONAL DESIGN SPIDER

(INT-IRAQ)

Reference: SADDAM 05012004

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of

SADDAM HUSSEIN - HUA #1 on 5/1/2004
Int- Saddam Hussein

Observations

Re

(3)

All information contained herein is unclassified except where shown otherwise

DATE: 05-27-2009
CLASSIFIED BY uuc/baw 60324
REASON: 1.5(c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-27-2034

cross arms
digs nails
leans back
inhales
adjust clothes
cross legs
digs nails

listening intently

lifts hand, scratches neck

air of superiority

thinking - plays w/ nails

looking down
A: I think we have finished discussion on this issue.
only 1 almost hit her
sheik
who could I go to find
more details
laughing at me
my god.

A. Because we trouble
Q. How far related by
then?
A. Recall.

A. Who got lunch
same in a
nailed back and
couldn't hold.

END 11:30 pm
INTERVIEW OF DS

- SSA George Bird . SSA
- SA
- MIT TRAUMA

@ 1104 - DS presented with submenu reason.
- Discussed insulin, DS' current medication
- Consulted gastro interventional
- Discussed reason DS' current condition
  and usage of insulin
- Discussed reason for current weather conditions.

(5)
ORIGINAL NOTES RE INTERVIEW OF SADDAM HUSSEIN
BY GEORGE L PIRO
Session Number: 24
SSA George L. Piro

While engaging SSA George L. Piro in casual conversation in his detention cell, Saddam Hussein provided the following information:

Saddam Hussein stated on most days his work schedule consisted of meeting ordinary Iraqi citizens. Hussein preferred to meet them where they worked or lived instead of his office. Normally, Hussein tried to schedule time between 3:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. to interact with the Iraqi citizens. Hussein preferred to drive himself and would direct his protective detail to ride as passengers, which gave him the ability to stop whenever and wherever he wanted. Hussein took advantage of this time to address individual issues with citizens, which included discussions involving medical issues, personal grievances, etc.

Hussein enjoyed exchanging ideas with those around him for purposes of developing solutions. He encouraged those around him to discuss issues and exchange ideas amongst each other as well as with him. However, Hussein did not enjoy debating others, even though he considered himself an excellent debater, and superior to those around him. Whenever there were debates, Hussein stated he normally wouldn't take part, and would remain silent.

Hussein discussed individuals either related or close to him within the former Iraqi Government. Hussein stated Tariq Aziz (Black List #25) was very intelligent, and had the most knowledge regarding the West of all the Ba'ath Party officials. Aziz was an excellent speaker, as he was a former English teacher and former editor of the Ba'ath Party newspaper.

Hussein stated Ali Hasan Al-Majid (Black List #5) thought like an Arab. SSA Piro stated Al-Majid thought like a Bedouin, and Hussein stated that is what he meant to say. Al-Majid had limited experience outside of his tribe and his decisions were based on that limited experience. However,
Baghdad Operations Center

Al-Majid followed orders and carried out his duties as instructed.

[U] (X) Hussein described former Vice President, Taha Yasin Ramadan's (Black List #20) personality as open. Ramadan was the type of individual who continually talked about himself, which Hussein allowed him to do.

[U] (X) Hussein then discussed his two half brothers, Barzan Ibrahim Hasan (Black List #38) and Watban Ibrahim Hasan (Black List #37). Hussein stated Barzan was very intelligent, but had a closed personality. SSA Piro told Hussein that Barzan was not very friendly, and would not be the type of person with whom SSA Piro could develop a friendship. Hussein laughed, and stated that SSA Piro knew Barzan's personality. Hussein then stated Watban was the opposite of Barzan, friendly but simple. According to Hussein, Watban could not carry out his Ministerial duties and was not capable of handling political positions or issues.

[U] (X) SSA Piro inquired about Abid Hamid Mahmoud (Black List #4), Hussein's Presidential Secretary. Hussein stated Abid was a good and loyal employee who carried out his duties and orders well. Hussein then asked SSA Piro his opinion of Abid. SSA Piro described to Hussein the meaning of a "used car salesman." Hussein again laughed and stated SSA Piro was correct in his description of Abid.
File Number: 315 E-HQ - 1448534 - 1A 29
Field Office Acquiring Evidence: FBI HQ
Serial # of Originating Document:
Date Received: 06/17/2004
From:
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
(Address)
(City and State)

By:

To Be Returned: No
Receipt Given: No
Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: No
Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): No

Title: DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

Reference: (Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of SADDAM HUSSEIN
AZIZ - intelligent, excellent speaker. He was editor & teacher. Most knowledgeable about the West than anyone else.

Ali Hasan - thought like an Arab, Arab (Bedouin) limited education, decisions based on Arab mentality, but followed instructions well & completed his orders.

Tantis - Open personality, just tells it like it will tell everything, talks about himself.

Abdo - did job well, will follow instructions well, loyal, came to Iraq at 13, car salesman companion.

Barzan - intelligent, closed, reserved, not friendly.

Watson - simple, but friendly, can not handle political positions or issues. Did not have a military job.
His work schedule 3-6 would want to meet people (brought on by discussion of the heat & temp.) He preferred to go see them. He would drive and make the details of decisions so he could stop wherever he wanted, whenever. If his detail drove, it was hard for him to get to stop & let him just direct. Anyway as they would have the assembly around him.

Helped those who needed medical, tooth pain, christenings etc.

He talked about exchange of ideas. He enjoyed it & was encouraged those around him to do so in the form of developing solutions. Did not like to debate & would not do so even thought better than others. Would remain quiet in debate situations.

Talked about those around him.
On 02/24/2004, Fadil Sulfaij Muhammad Azzawi, date of birth, 07/01/1944, was interviewed at the military detention facility, Baghdad International Airport, Baghdad, Iraq. Azzawi was advised of the identities of interviewing agents as representatives of the United States Government. The interview was observed by DOD personnel. Azzawi provided the following information regarding his employment and education:

Azzawi was born on a farm in Iraq in 1944. He attended primary and secondary school in Iraq and became a member of the Ba'ath Party in 1963. He attended college in Baghdad between 1968-1972, graduating with a degree in Accounting. During the summer of 1968, he attended a summer course at Cambridge University in England. Between 1972-74, he was assigned to the Diplomatic Institute in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1974, he received training at the National Assembly of the United Nations in New York. This training was provided by Dr. Khatan, whom he described as an eminent Iraqi diplomat. Between 1975-78, he served as the Ba'ath Party's Counsel to Egypt. From 1978 to 1980, he worked as the First Secretary to the Iraqi mission in New York. During this assignment, he obtained a Master's degree in International Studies from Johns Hopkins University.

Azzawi then served as the Iraqi Ambassador to India from 1980-1982, and as the Ambassador to the Soviet Union between 1982-1984. It was while he was working in the Soviet Union that he learned from Abd Hamid, Saddam Hussein's personal secretary, that he had been selected to become the Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS). According to Azzawi, this selection was the result of his impressive work in the Soviet Union and to a recommendation made by Abd Hamid to Saddam Hussein. Since Azzawi did not feel qualified for this assignment, he was able to convince Saddam Hussein to let him assume the position of Deputy Director of Operations for M4 (External Intelligence) and M5 (Internal Intelligence). He served in this position between 1985-1989.

Between 1989-1991, Azzawi served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after which he served as the Governor of Salau-al-Din. In 1993, he was fired from the Ba'ath Party. Azzawi was arrested by the Special Security Organization (SSO) and was held in a high risk cell, secured by five doors each with two latches. He
was whipped 20 times each day and expected to be executed. However, as Hussein loved poetry, his family wrote a very nice flattering poem to Hussein, which Azzawi credits to improving his situation. Azzawi was not executed, and after eight months was released.

Each intelligence service in Iraq has its own prison, which house the various services' prisoners. For example, the Directorate of General Security's prison is located within its facility. The IIS' facility is an area known "52", the SSO was located behind the Abu Sind Hospital (phonetic). Abu Gharib Prison was one of several general prisons through the country. Others were located in Mosul, Diala, and Basra. When government officials were arrested, especially any associated with the various intelligence services, they would be housed in prisons they were not familiar with or associated with, so as not to get milder treatment. Since Azzawi was formerly a member of the IIS, he was arrested and imprisoned by the SSO.

On Azzawi's first day in the IIS, he requested to be taken to the IIS prison for a visit. Azzawi found the cells to be very small and some prisoners were being held for long periods of time without any disposition on their case. When he asked as the cause of the failure to resolve the outstanding cases, he was told it was due to lack intelligence officers. Azzawi noted an Iranian prisoner, who had been held in detention without any action on his case for over three years. The prisoner was detained for spying, as he crossed the border without a pass. The prisoner's wife turned out to be a famous person in the West German parliament and had previously spoken to the Iraqi Foreign Minister regarding the whereabouts of her husband. When Hussein became aware of the situation, he asked the IIS if the person was in their custody which the IIS denied, before confirming. Once the IIS realized he was in their custody, they told Azzawi he could not be released as it would demonstrate to Hussein they had lied to him. Azzawi demanded that the Iranian prisoner be immediately released and reunited with his wife, which he was.

Azzawi described Hussein as being nice, brave and good to his friends until 1988. Azzawi then noticed a change in Hussein, who became stubborn, power hungry, and domineering. This change was enhanced by the weak leadership around Hussein. According to Azzawi, Hussein only admired himself. Early example of this was in 1983, when Hussein celebrated his birthday as a national holiday. Azzawi disagreed with this and wrote Hussein a letter. Azzawi
criticizing him, stating that such action were expected of kings and not revolutionaries such as Hussein. Azzawi claimed to be the only person honest and open with Hussein. Azzawi did not regard Iraq as being open or democratic, but that it was a country being led by Hussein alone.

According to Azzawi, Hussein was threatened by his half brother, Barzan Ibrahim Hasan, which may have led to Barzan's removal as director of the IIS. When Barzan was the director, he controlled the service, thus making him very powerful within the government.
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Original notes re interview of

\textit{Ali Hasan Al-Majid Al-Tikriti}
Ali Hasan Al-Majid Al-Tikriti

vrk of Ba'ath Party - when facts tested
still believes in principle

humanitarian+democratic

part of same movement - Solidan,

brought character,

Party does not believe in excess killing, mass killing, gópautination

we are all brothers since Adam

individual acts of party members

promised to guarantee it not to happen. But in spite apparently 7 times with water & electricity

read twice on radio, once on TV

Jihad does not believe in violence or oppression as do

Ba'ath Party

Contradiction? => Agreed (between original & reality)

Change along the way => Agreed
起源

来自哪个民族/群体/塔利班

阿法拉格 - 塔利班首领

在赫拉特省的地区

无法解释这些条款

有人反对/不同意

家人 - 转让了女儿

部落/家族的规则

无法访问部落

部落首领的观点

必须支付赔偿金并包括遗产。

根据法典，转移到另一人

关于女士的停战协议

不能在法庭面前承认

不能与印度人战斗

你将被杀死

在战场
Jewish generally the "Sheikh" of the clan

Sometimes not able mentally or physically

Saddam - before collapse?

said to mean "Sheikh" Iam the Sheikh of this tribe

He became "Sheikh" after 3rd guy in line died或其他

and got to be respected elsewhere

Early Baath involvement
Mtg July 16, 1979

Invited to meeting

He was branch leader at the time of meeting

Director of Orita Branch

Russian naval camp attempt in party - continued until 1979

Non-political another plot - 1979

Adel Khairly Al-Saarrai - head of Baath

Nasser

Bob word - he had in 1979

"said if Saarrai lives, coup will continue"

1979

Investigation report Barzani - 1979

Others
People held participated
Barzan knew details
Al-Majid didn't know about execution or files
Heart in thing until that moment
Many were already marked
If some possibly wrongly accused
Hit by Saddam by Barzan Tibriti
Thinks they were all guilty
Views on Saddam
20 or more
Doesn't refer to him being Saddam
Grew apart over time until about 10 or so years ago
Planning at not leaving the country
Saw to cross roads
Saddam and dinked everyone and whatever
During last years
Refused to accept advice over form of writing
Behavior: Aggressive would leave party in 2004 Saddam
Wanted day of his life
That wrote w/Saddam not go to the party a party
does not disagree with the
but could not read the
Selbst, despite, would lose "placation."

\[ \checkmark \]

If Saddam's approval was going party would

\[ \checkmark \]

Wings have on further Saddam wasBritish

\[ \checkmark \]

At any circumstance would have been approved by Saddam

\[ \checkmark \]

At any circumstance before either Bright Act mostly

\[ \checkmark \]

asked Saddam "an I say to be a member"

\[ \checkmark \]

just wanted out of party but he said no

Saddam did not listen to anyone in party at all 8 years

\[ \checkmark \]

Majid not a volunteer for public service last 10 years

\[ \checkmark \]

because if Saddam

\[ \checkmark \]

Blame part of Saddam

\[ \checkmark \]

after Hussein and escaped Saddam didn't trust them anymore

\[ \checkmark \]

anyone will report in party Saddam particularly didn't trust

\[ \checkmark \]

a report on writer's knowledge, broadcast on TV

\[ \checkmark \]

didn't even call to tell him

\[ \checkmark \]

Saddam thought he would report Hussein Saddam

\[ \checkmark \]

may have had impression to come last year

\[ \checkmark \]

Saddam did not

\[ \checkmark \]

Iraqi will not be cleared with satisfaction of the US destruction

\[ \checkmark \]

majority of Baath wanted to let them in

\[ \checkmark \]

Still with Mary Haidar being fighter VS Saddam

\[ \checkmark \]
I'm not in front of (author's name) at Major said Fry will not return.

Are you?

Jim, um, Saddam is not

I've wanted to resign so he wouldn't have to take responsibility

for the action of one Saddam

I don't have chance to clear his name while here

"But it may be different up there. I tried to protect them."

I would like to see all leaders arrested, prominent Saddam's who visited as a spy.

I would have to talk to the Ceat

Saddam - dictatorship of one man

Way he was?

I sometimes Saddam would look like a king

I'd give all his money to someone who needed

I could not imagine

If someone came and asked Saddam would make deals quickly, briefly

Wouldn't even trust his son

Started believing those who praised him, made to respect

With pictures of him

Don't want him, didn't want him

Personality that, Stalin, I don't understand

Worst decision was, we, not war, 13 years before.


Since he was going to win war was prevented taken by Iraqis

Afterwards

At what human costs before war that they would lose

Why didn't Halaf die?

Would be considered traitor (and US side)

Spy or instrument of evil?

History will record at what fairly but probably an instrument

Saddam to blame others of tribes

past leadership (What the 30 years) vs Saddam

tribe will not fight on political things

Who helped Saddam to take responsibility? Crude leadership

Facing all facts

Return of ISIS inspectors, for example, had Saddam applied

Who discussed?

A couple, Jumana Kadhim, Taha Kamal, al-Ja'fi had

prayed him to say, "we don't have WMD" with Hague.

Saddam thing material would strike

Maghawir Saddam: "One chance will it be

Saddam: "Party you know."

Rajid: "No."

Saddam: "No."
Final thought:

Dear Mr. Smith,

I hope this letter finds you well. I am writing to express my gratitude for the opportunity to work with you on the project. Your leadership and guidance have been invaluable to me. I appreciate the time and effort you have invested in helping me grow professionally.

Please let me know if there is anything else I can assist you with. I look forward to our continued collaboration.

Sincerely,

[Your Name]
Dear Mr. Hashan Al-Majid Al-Tikrit

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-11-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/L3C

I still believe in the principles of the P.T. 
Hassan and that I should follow. 
My dear not believe in war.
I hope you'll take a look at the history.

As a Baath member and supporter.

The P.T. does not believe in killing or 
murder. It is a person who is only,
Does not believe in bad behavior.
There are good and some P.T. members.

Initially wanted to work in P.T. but was not
for 7 to 8 weeks. Considered no 8 months.

North Lebanon origin no Baath P.T. deed
behave in violence.
AC NASSIR

Paul II

ACI HSH1A

My father was always punctual. I had no problem with me.

8 scars

Are they a secret? I have kept a record of history of broken warrior's soul.

On what thing Army is

20 that brings shame to the face:
re: Event planning video

I was branch leader - I was director of one branch - both

Mrs. Hussein

Deevo was cool.

2 yrs and 6 mos.

Said: o

I remember everyone was in a

We were sad. We were sad.

Bargain my.

Don't take responsibility.

Thinks they are all guilty.

3. **SADAM** 10 yrs ago:

20 yrs ago - **SADAM** the closest to me

D'now to a crossroad - that's where dealing in every day

**SADAM**

Plans were for me to leave - not to resign.

Most heavy day in my life:

I slept

This document-Aug/Child
SADAM said there is no more shack—he was cutting to his own tike.
Dashed SADAM

Don’t lose your eyes. He didn’t listen to any more.

The last year my part with my Political Office appointment was just voluntary. When I found out I had been selected, I went and asked why S. said ble if I talked yes, you would have said no.

After Assaik’s family was gone, SADAM changed.

SADAM didn’t want to call Ali and ask if I’d take the job. He took the job only to have me turn it down.

Print 10 yrs ago, I had a good relationship with SADAM—Even asked his daughter’s hand in marriage for my

After weapon reports, SADAM worse.

I wanted to resign but I didn’t want to work for one person (SADAM).

If I’m released, I’ll not be able to finish

Bodul unlar.
SADAM HAD NO FRIENDS
Precedence: PRIORITY  

To: Counterterrorism  
Attn: ISLU/ITOS IT Room 4383 SSA  
Date: 03/09/2004  
IA

From: Philadelphia  
Squad 17, Joint Terrorism Task Force  
Contact: 

Approved By: 

Drafted By: jsm 

Case ID #: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending)  
(U) 66F-HQ-C1384970 (Pending)  
(U) 66F-HQ-C1384970 (Pending)  

Title: (X) DESERT SPIDER  
IT - IRAQ.

Synopsis: (S) To respond to lead set by Counterterrorism to provide information from logical sources relating to prosecution of Saddam Hussein.

(U) (X) Classified By: 11109, ITOS II/CTD  
Reason: 1-5(C)  
Declassify On: XI

Reference: (S) 315E-HQ1448534 Serial 9  

Details: (X) Referenced communication requested Philadelphia to review
Philadelphia canvassed logical sources to determine if any individuals could provide information relevant to the prosecution of Hussein. No positive information was developed as of the date of this communication. However, some sources could not be reached because they were traveling and were out of the area. Philadelphia will provide any positive information that is responsive to the referenced communication as it is received.

In addition, Philadelphia believes that a review of the interviewees by an FBIHQ analyst may produce results that are responsive to the request. Philadelphia considers this lead covered.
LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ISLU/ITOS II

FBIHQ analysts should review the above referenced file and serial numbers to determine if these serials meet the criteria as set out in the lead.

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<td>ALI HASAN AL MAFID</td>
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Universal Case File Number

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

Serial # of Originating Document

Date Received

From

(Name of Contributor)

(Address of Contributor)

By

To Be Returned

☑ Yes ☐ No

Receipt Given

☐ Yes ☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

☐ Yes ☐ No.

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☐ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☐ No

Title:

☐ Yes ☐ No

Reference: 

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

☐ Original notes re interview of

ALI HASAN AL-MAJDI; AL-TIKRITI

SECRET
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-11-2009 BY 60324 OC BAW/SAB/LSC

Fahad Al-Majid Al-Talibhi

Background of appointment in Kuwait
called to leadership party Aug 1980
Saddam + Leadership some moreStd

met with
Saddam Saddam + others go to Kuwait
within leadership here
in previous years
I don’t recall
as good

Saddam: "Oh, well see"

Meeting finished: putting men of time 2002-90 that
Saddam announced Ali to spend to Kuwait
Ali: said by orders "I go"
Saddam by the Saddam three abroad

Director of IFA
Security Committee Government
Ministry of Interior, police, military
My responsibility
organization between minister
Saddam, leader's leadership
authorized Ali + Saleem: responsible that
many in Kuwait
Gymnastics to Kuwait
Army, Saddam, National: and in security plan
Happiness to protect belonging: Kuwaiti people
Sever in performing my job

(2)

Zone: capture in Iraqi forces
military battle in front of store
in order to prevent to store that electronic things
when I heard, badly his arrest
to access an office requires Saddam or MD approval
comprehensive to investigate
intradue to die
Mojahed, one of Saddam's bodyguards
asked for approval to carry out
informal: approved security framework
execution in front of another of Al-Gharami?
Indira Gandhi, warship, released person
she enemies fight as căn

Terror is ugly, you must obey to the law of forces
is a right to a mad man or woman ever

Head of militant unit
committee investigated
sentenced to death

tal-assassination
asked execution at some place above a called woman

3rd one crime

individual style from warship, was assaulted alahman
sent to court, sentenced to die

not considered head of state place in warship. Sir has
promised to ask him to contact human unit lady to see it

objection to carry out execution at his home

extra at house

Only after the occasion of military nation

Minister of High Education

Minister of Agriculture

Dr. Shabab

Minister of Defence

Minister name?
Mr. Suryan
Minister of Defence

Who had overall responsibility? (For Katrina)

Both same, but 1 is older

George

Facts of international investigation of Katrina

\[ \text{Redacted text} \]

- 2,000 facials, 10,000 tattoos
- 300 magical rituals on spirit bodies
- Sensitive body parts
- 70% injured in war crimes
- 726 wounded after creation

- 1987: Variety civil deaths due to Left from troop withdrawal
- 59 mentally handicapped killed because of how they look

All in violation of Geneva Convention
3. Is there a significant additional amount of information available in this document?

4. Why is it important to gather additional information?

5. What steps should be taken to ensure that the information gathered is accurate and reliable?

6. How will the findings be used to improve the situation?

7. What potential risks or challenges should be considered when implementing the proposed solution?

8. Who will be responsible for monitoring the progress of the implementation?

9. What is the timeline for completing the implementation?

10. What resources will be required to complete the implementation?

11. How will success be measured?

12. What is the expected outcome of the implementation?
- Encourage
- Proclamation of Sharia - mass graves found
- Kurdish Arab Campaign
- Millions of documents found
- Detailed events/activities which took place
- Satellite photo of destroyed Shora Village

A group of Taliban in the north and other SGs fought with us
- Saddam was watching a wire start of taking land from us
- Sick in 1991
- Only thing is beer & drugs
- Did not go to Aqaba, went to Aqaba
- Where he thought he was not at time

Rearranged of Scaffolds in South
- Rearranged of Scaffolds in South
- He would be martyred or kill himself
- Better than living among others
- Died heroically (from morning through daylight)
With he was dead

Attend to US military to kill Saddam
His caravans is done on tribe

Protest now would 3 bring harm to tribe
History will judge Iraq under Saddam

Personal/professional perceived difference?

Don't see a big difference

Not a failure, except staying at Saddam's dinner but had to carry
Content totally because would shame to the
Would hurt them

If could talk to him, might be able to explain to them

Some people internal believe in Saddam as such as God
Saddam's brother as conclusion
Saddam not hard of tribe now - no power

End of Notes
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Universal Case File Number

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBI Baghdad Operations Center (BOC)

Serial # of Originating Document 19

Date Received 2/15/04

From FBI Baghdad Operations Center (BOC)

(Address of Contributor)

Baghdad, Iraq

Date Line

By

To Be Returned □ Yes □ No

Receipt Given □ Yes □ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure □ Yes □ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI) □ Yes □ No

Title:

(S)

Reference: (Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: □ Original notes re interview of

Khalid Najim Abdallah a.k.a. Al-Sa'ad, a.k.a.
Khalid Abdul Al-Majid a.k.a. Al-Tikriti

(S)
Idoleed Abdul Al-Majid Al-Tikriti
Idoleed Majid Abdul Salam Tikrit
Jan 30, 1964 Tikrit, Iraq
B.S. in Polsci, Baghdad, 1984, finished 1978-1984
Doctor of Law, Security of Iraq armed
Himaya 1982-2002 Program

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 05-11-2009 BY 60324 UC BAM/SAB/LSC

How got to be bodyguard
when student at University
Hassan耍ed relative - mother approached him
Faci them job L-mathy 86
Graduated 1983-84 Ch. geol

out first years not convicted maybe
1990s as a Military at time
Took a course military course
45 days "Physical training & Handic weapons"

Himaya after that
primary duties

protect Saddam

He would take orders from him of plans, didn't know details
Sitting, dining & Knowledge has going
Circle around soldier at Location
sometimes he would summon people around
Himaya would bring them to him

Muradig, Himaya, sometimes Regulation Guard
If long trip to Bara, for example, large category

1700 Bara, 1988-89 - Regulation Guard

Himaya

was in charge of Himaya

in 1986, 30 people, 66 total

in 1987 with Solaiman

Muradig

talks briefly with 2 people

left hang with Solaiman

Actions in First hand

Soldiers watched Himaya all the time

didn't want to see it done, something wrong

if did, wouldn't shit in prison
Example

1989

going to airport
in car-in back- wanted- will get put in jail

Saddam can’t furnish after long on street on opposite side of street
questions of why did Saddam act back- and act publicly?

Concenters

Saddam did not let anyone stand outside, 1500 or 1000 people.
Saddam was really weak.

Car was parked outside
Saddam again

No use of Iraq after 1990

or

Saddam forever after

prof’s oilfield would talk “so paranoid”

thinks satellite and Iraqi were played

Mins changed Hussian’s satellite投影 very advanced in 1980
Protection against Mitchell
Dick went here it
Only got to her home town, called my brother
Planted a henna as spies.
One of the characters were/and suspects
Thought person wanted
Some left henna
Some wanted it
Some wanted by others group of us letter in
1979 My brother never talk about
"Yes that there was long attempt, Mohammed Ali only
balded by you
Mohammad Ali"}

What makes him happy
When he meets one of his gate, brothers and neighbors
Sherwin S. Sahwidh with him before he joined in flood
S角落 far end 5 years
On his 5th year, engineer is 50
Went to Samir's house. When decided
Sage usually came to see them by his uncle
Some communication development
Since 1988-1991

Saddam stopped going home
sometimes brought family to him, for dinner, or two
then they even help
not close to wife or kids

Sam Qasem much more than living, not stranger almost

Was Qasem being groomed =

Saddam is safe, only loves himself

Would never think he’s going to die, not the way he’d be killed

Would like to stay 1000 years

He was afraid of Usay

Usay does not listen to Saddam, not scared, intimidate

Saddam, Qasem listened

Usay’s not dangerous

Not listening to Saddam

Ever see a crazy Saddam?

1984 car accident carjacked from Beira

In and Saddam one car to different doctors to him
to help victims - send to Baghdad to Europe if necessary

Tell them great cars for them
"Change间隔 to Work...&...\" 

in 90's never showed up to Washington 

after 90's became "like dead" 

paranoid fear of America's policy in Iraq,

re-in 93, instead of killing Muslims, weapons systems

all un-traceable, loser went ret. 

not mobile after 1990 

stayed in a "cocoon\" 

he brought this all on himself with violation of law, etc. 

never heard him say he 'exposed' 

Salomon (Fahim's brother) 

after that, stopped treating everyone, but 4, weekly, total treat

#4 trust #5 - neg in line after August

#5 in August - close to #4 

Any profit made dealt with Saddam

and 

Act of kindness by Saddam

in writing directly without testing

Witness camp at Saddam - House of Versailles prior to [illegible]

sent unit to Secretary of State, to handle

no other than two weeks
Date: Unknown

Saddam loved his birthday - it provided a private New Year.

With other celebrations, he banned and boycotted the girls and went with his close friends who came out with him.

Superstitious Saddam?

Never noticed.

Religious activity - Saddam?

1982 - never prayed that heavily or fasted from the Sun to Ramadan. To pray demagogically would be deemed "wrong" (1982-1984)

Why didn't Saddam have problems? Prettied probably in front of the God, he ignored it.

Wounded by similar thing abroad?

Unknown

60%

Wrote a novel, a nightmare, "The Hammoons," etc. Wrote in Iraq and other parts of the world.
1991

at the age of 70

leadership around him

leadership around him

leadership around him

leadership around him - President Karim - responsible for situation in Iraq

- Saddam Hussein - Head of government

- Qaddafi - party leadership, RCC, etc.

- National Command

- People's Congress - responsible

Rituals: sabbat

-生活 is driven by Tsvangirai and many, 1960s

- Soldier's duty, 1960s

- Daylight person

1970s - stayed on days in the camp, spent at trans attractive

1980s - by himself and family

Eating habits

- 3 standard meals a day: rice, lentils, vegetables, fish, meat, fruit, bread
Travelled a lot in 80's

Hunting (Fishing) Saddam

Ferry or land route also

Gas flares at time job or also didn't heat

Horselback

Recognition of Human or by Saddam?

At the age of what I was 20-25 years old

Recognition of Human or by Saddam?

No

Why didn't you leave before?

Left April 19th, leaving was to Syria

Came to give self-free, called Grand parents came to Jordan, didn't have passport came to Baghdad to train in self. Came on list

Came because had nothing left to lose.
Khalid Abdul al- A Majid al Tikrit
6-30-64 DOB Tikrit PDB

Response to greeting is "Alabahair"

Khalid Najim Abdul Sulam
6/30/64 DOB Tikrit
Baghdad - Law + PoliSci - 1996

Position in IDS 2002-2003
Dir. of Security for all the
building - (in our terms physical
security) - prior to this served in
HMS from 1982-2002

Pur - Dar al Seddiq in Tikrit
Studied in US

Obtained BS in

18 yrs old, lived in Tikrit
Great 83-84

Related to Usan Kanna:

- He was the 3rd boy
cousin but further away
than that.

Usan Kanna was in Muratagin

My mom spoke to Kanna's mom
about me getting a job

probably came for
up days - 26 came

- Physical Training
- Weapons

Continued working while going to school
in order to get his BS degree.
Kinsley TH 1982
- 84-88 to Baghdad
96-97 agree

Do not publish

Protokoll Statement

When Saddam goes somewhere,
we don't know where

We form foll 6 us - we get
in car and follow - when Saddam
gets out of vehicle

we make a circle around him
to protect him

not just moratorium
but

Sometimes Saddam personal guard
around him. As well

as Republican Guards

If gone overnight ... he takes a

100 Republican guards as well

On trip to Baghdad

8:00 local trip then @ 10:00 - 3:00 Republican

Guards of Saddam
Himmy had 2 shifts, 760 people - 38 on each shift. Each shift took 48 hours.

The workforce - 2 shifts of 70 or 80 people.

Changes:

- Mood
- Temperament
- People like:
- Dress
- Manners

Saddam was always watching us.
He would come into a room and then leave.

He would fire people.

Another example:

We were shoe polishers.
We were told to read something in class.
Spider put all 37 of them
"enter pressed for 2 weeks,"
not actually
not conveyed that it was

for cars/trucks

not let anyone in protest dated
stand a tube for seen satellite
take picture, never seen

is there,

or use phones

Preface (1991, Wiltwy)

GPS became much more
paranoid in very phone

I never reacted to anything,

we chatted among ourselves to
remember to think satellite

can read his transcriptions
we had a change because there was a certainty of 500's car + prototype cars.

Those study assistants had to

stamina under scrutiny
soon not to be seen

Any point out it

not doing this.

It was like hell —

we hated what we did

again we didn't like.

When he spoke with his friends

he felt safe as spoken.

He felt trusted.

Some 88-89 he'd not visit his family very often - once or twice a month, he would venture into town to dinner at one of his palaces for 1-2 hrs. and then all would leave.


May have been a stranger was he grooming

he was afraid of them

Selfish person - he'd

like to stay 2000 yr not be pres

Difficult to think of him as wanting to groom anyone for to be his successor

Usually wouldn't listen to Saddam

not intimidated by

Gaddafi did listen to his father.
Example of carrying 877 A.m.
They came upon an auto accident on highway - 12:30
Head 8:00 A.m. telling his secretaries,: ploy to doctor
for treatment, preparing
to send V to Europe & give them each a new car since their cars had been totaled.

Davy 1980's he never had another
his security detail.

After 1990 he became more
heart - sworn, and
dedicated security
his paranoia
Near satellites

Before 1990's he was very
mobile; but after Gulf War.
he was concerned about his own safety
& self (cocoon) - He bought this into himself by going into Kuwait.
After 5 km I led, he stopped trusting everyone except us.

This trust in others varied.

Ouray 1937
Mahmood just under 1937

Ever
Women
Act 3
Privity?

If upset I told with a
Tale "notice" his boy's
car's papers to
Security for
Arrangement
Perception

Les 3 weeks
For project
One Term
4th Anniversary
This 13th Day
The New Year

Public celebration
Modern, girlfriend
Most intercultural
But don't know what they did inside

Superstitious — no

83 - Prayed in NATO
Something to mosque
But he never performs
The Creed, etc.
Pray while he was standing

Not a religious person
Pretend to pray while in the middle
Of the streets. Pray in Florida
In a protected area.
Instead piled, lower head cross arm, turn
Based on his speeches and writings, 100% Saman thought he was one of the great kings like Nasser, Nasser and other great kings of the world.

(but) no sane person would go to war with France, Kuwait (World Coalition) and the latest contract.

Leadership around him were either liars or yes men.

Saman and his leaders were 'responsible' for what happened. Those below had no voice.

[Underlined] [Sultan-like fishing - especially in 80's]

Refused to shoot birds (migratory) from helicopter
Sleep
80's Stay Awake at Office
At 7 stay till Am
Watching bands
80's 80-71 to bed till 9-11 pm
And wake up earlier

Fatmy

3 x day

Regular Food

Morning - dairy products

Lunch - stew, fish

Dinner - Kabob, BBQ, Fish

Health

Wife

BP up

Alcohol

12 yr old

Was inside channel after 1981

In 80's he was ranch in WHYFORADO
Before the war, he fled to Spain. Then he returned to give myself up to Americans. My name was not among the SS - I was not wanted at that time. Wanted to see family.

End

12:00 p.m.
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<td>Hadi Hamid Muttalib Al-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Khayrb Al-Rasidi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Tikriti</td>
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</table>
Abd Hamid Muhammad Al-Tikriti (BL #4)
also Abd Hamid Muhammad Al- Khattab Al-Nasiri Al-Tikriti
DOB 7/11/56  POB Al-Anya, Tikrit, Iraq

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-11-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC

Masters Thesis 1st
Israel's Mossad and Effect on Israeli, Arab in Gaza
Israel military establishment and part in creating Israel
main result/conclusion
military organization controls Israel
4 parts
military establishment 3rd part
Leadership
made no moves into opinion of military
in any operation
began military would become essentially operations
Iraq, to奥迪, Audi
terrorist adopt generals army to military
in Israel who military provides input East
Professor Ramadam
Chaplain's work encouraged this
View based on analysis of military in Israel
military in occupied political-controlled country
Rate Israeli military
impressed by plans to call reservists
Israel's military is big but reserves
can be called fast and in big numbers
Well trained
Very good is infantry taking over to enemy
like Saddam was in Egypt
likely to make the small land and inevitable war elsewhere
likely to win

Draft of President's Secretary
Senior - Chief of Staff - Other
Abdel-Wahab Al-Tikriti - Military Secretary - other
Gen. Ahmad Al-Haikal - Secretary - other
Dr. Musa Al-Masri - Secretary - other
Dr. Ali Al-Masri - Secretary - other

#4 The Adelmann letter for President
mail from Secretary of Foreign & President
Duty is continued

E6: IJ is ready to approve anything

Security: Sometimes lack of communication &
Sudden requests sorting

- Foreign Cable consideration
- Approval of Ambassador
- Any directors to be appointed
- Anything for mainta
- Ministry of Defense requests

Asked about opening mail sometimes
He's open then not habitual

Chairman, IMA Security Council

Draft...

1983 no secretary for President, yes = yes

In established with Hama and in 1999 closure

9-10 employees
All military officers intelligence security
Transfer of Colosses approved by NSC
Except

Members
- President #1 - [Handwritten]
- Vice President [Handwritten]
- Secretary - #4
- M.D. - only [Handwritten]
- ITIS - head [Handwritten]
- Special Security [Handwritten]
- [Handwritten]
- [Handwritten]
- [Handwritten]
- [Handwritten]
- [Handwritten]

Budgets approved [Handwritten]

Most significant while Secretary of NSC? [Handwritten]

Told President no one would agree anything - Pres. never [Handwritten]

Did not serve a purpose
C. 1983

President attended NSC that morning

> 1983 after dinner?
Send tapes? - ?

Russin, Aliz, Duri, Majid, Samwani - -

> Made decisions

Saddan

Acknowledged having Saddam supplied
he was first to see Lipinsky decision

Things have gone to international -

Summarize the Iraq - responsibility of USA

potential changes

massive grain yard

d slick see Saddam in Chicago - no

identified

Examples of changes:

July 19, 1972 - MTS where Saddam told charge

bodyguard: only location second person on stage
I was on taking guard in hall theater
holds 723 people
2nd Floor Empty Stage
his duty was on 1st Floor

Red Cross, 1966 year, other 3 guards for call after

One Falls in to Suchan - May 25 banan
Birath Park there

Saddan tell me you to talk who's will you on the plot
tell about plot/father
Saddan said talk out

Humayra back to Midnight
Talked for hours and a half
2000 at hotel care

Head of Midnight
Barak, Tikrit, Ar, Saida, Shadad
Always around this time

~ 61 members fallen
Dont't know number

Know some of them

Did you believe me? - talking
Yes, grandad all from, not 7 but 8
5 leaves created
other country, required
half count
5 and death, Saddam killed? (Only one he knew)

military in 1971-after-war
Darq Al-Haj
Gen. Abud Luli - Special forces
other link

not
Drop a form military dealt a lot

haven't seenAlias Saddam is hunting someone

I'm not afraid of Saddam, I dare not arrest

She is very same, though same as Bush

In his behalf

Always with him in the office since 1991
When big decisions
Major is in charge of 'other - Southern party'  


 Hosni Mubarak - President of Egypt


 Subhan - Father's name


 Attyarishi in buralawat


 [Handwritten text not legible]


 [Handwritten text not legible]


 [Handwritten text not legible]


 [Handwritten text not legible]


 [Handwritten text not legible]


 [Handwritten text not legible]
I was there with Jesse claimed Taj Hidajatullah, deputy mukhtaraal, on Tuesday.

Hussein's brother careful not to show weakness
Once Hussein continued with aggression
I have was at Katra Intikhaab

#4 as president compared to Hussein

#1 Hussein has ambition

I have qualifications but not desire to become president,

1. Treats people with respect equally
2. Has in law I am just one for equal
3. Always fair, didn't cheat
4. Discovered 12 years ago

Want to get out of sport

Problems between Hussein's brother and Saddam's nephew

Hussein judged for his brother
Hussein was put in assistant to

Bashar Al-Assad as father's
treasurer and a friend of Hafez Al-Assad's daughters.

If they were being replaced,

they would point out things wrong.

Musem said, don't worry, self.

Decides to stop giving up and fight in 95.

Because secretary

Come after all ministers, even though they changed at Saddam

Worked for Saddam because

For protection of Baghdad

If Baghdad falls, Saddam falls

Saddam harmed ego

War, 1990-1993

invasion of Kuwait 1990

we are not convinced of the "national agenda"

Arab countries not trying to fight the country

Did Saddam harm himself

in war campaigns

Morally, still Saddam's people

Went to pray for دخلاء Others
Saddam's habits
exaggerated himself always to others
Saddam in prison
can't take承担责任 in prison before
Nothing I can be blamed for by Saddam
Saddam may blame others
Saddam
mentally-safe
personality not blended
if write back about doing smart things
will have to think about

Orders from Saddam to: direct to those in charged campaigns

Intelligence

Vaig, probably an order

Halliburton

Khalaf Nasief - Saddam's close

Requested holistic analysis for as + Saddam habits

End of notes
Duties as Personal Secretary:

1. Anything re: Baath Party
2. National
3. Council Ministers
4. All mail comes through him
   including cables to the President
5. Secretary of National Security Council
Q: WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO SST?
A: Takes to 2nd (or 3rd if possible) Court
He's a prime a war

Q: WHAT WILL HAPPEN
A: I don't know - I

Q: I was asked if I saw him kill anyone?
A: I haven't

1-
2- Shorty guy in green
Dipped into his correct name

Q: 1979 - I was a guard that day

Place holds 723 people - But a 2nd floor. My duties were on 2nd Fl.
Next to him was one 7 guys accused
Moshemori next to him. Bt told me not talk
First and foremost the people were
and tell us how you planned for the corp.
guys named stand up – we had order
to take them out to al mubarak.
we put them in a truck

At that time not sure if Bargan (possibly)
Sadur Shaker – one was director
one was assistant director – were there

Doesn’t know how many Ba’ath members
removed that day,
Clears not to have known any
personally – no curious to
his family – to be
But he can name some of the
coup leaders.
Q “What happened to those convicted?”
A 5 guards executed – Bargan
would know more – Bargan has a
book what these things.
Q Name 5 people ordered executed by Sft.
2.
3.
4.
5.

A - Elected bloc that did not perform their military duties right.

Q - Severe punishment?
A - The ones who did not perform in battle

Q - Why not exact similar soldiers who ran/retreated during Kuwait war including leaders
A - Agreed except they were not "ordered" to stay

Q - When we have a meeting
A - What do you know about Asia 1983-84?
WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO:

- How did you feel when Sinatra husband?
- Are you evil?
- How does it feel now about Sinatra today?
- Were there times you felt like it? Why?
- Did you ever fear him? How did you
  deal with it? What do you think will
  happen to?

DATES OF SIGNIFICANCE:

- Did you take part in any executions?

WHAT MADE ANGRY, HAPPY, SAD

SIT'S COMMUNICATIVE STYLE:

WHO DID S ADMIRE - How?

HOW DOES IT LIKE/USE HAND?

WHAT MAKES HIM HAPPY

DO YOU EVER DISAGREE W/ SADAM

HOW DID YOU PREVENT HIM FROM GETTING
UPSET WITH YOU,

YOU ARE A HIGH ENERGY GUY

DO YOU BELIEVE IT IS THE END

WHAT DOES HE THINK WILL HAPPEN TO HIM?
WHO IN HISTORY DREADED YOU THE MOST?

WHAT MATTERS MOST TO YOU?

WOULD YOU HAVE SAID WHAT WAS ON YOUR PHONE?

WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR THIS?

WHAT PERSONAL TRAITS DID YOU OBSERVE?

HOW DID YOU DEAL WITH THEM?

NAMES OF SONGS

SURELY YOU'VE BEEN IN 2 THINGS ON YOU.

WOULD HE EVER TAKE RESPONSIBILITY

FOR ANYTHING?

HOW DO YOU THINK IT'S TOLD?

CAPTIVITY?

HOW DID YOU FEEL?

DID SO MANY PEOPLE EXPECT IT?

HOW DID YOU LEARN IT?

WERE THERE HIDDEN PEOPLE YOU KNEW?

HOW DID YOU FEEL ABOUT THIS?

WHAT PERSONAL HABITS OR STH DID YOU NOTICE

S & ITS WIFE.
What do you think about America?
A. My answer is military events.

Q. Derived any knowledge that the admiral had to be hung in punishment of death.

you can ask Mr. Mazio, etc.

I was a bodyguard and didn't have the right to ask about such things.

Q. Did you know they were sexual US investigations?

A. I heard same thing in the media but I don't know for sure.

Q. Think allegations falsified?

A. No doubt about question but don't trust witnesses.
Q: Wania Camp?
A: -
Claim false identity

She hid her brother careful not to show mother work

She never went to movies with a
he to pave for the boss what to do whatever he wants. He took his orders from Saddam.

He was supposed to then communicate with Saddam. The response is the head that Saddam had by then was

was and by then was Saddam.
MAIN RESULT MILITARY ORG IS CONTROLLING
THE ISRAELI GOVT. ALL PARTS OF THE
MIIT ARE IN AFFILIATION.
THESE 4 PARTS - MIL AND
THE MILITARY WOULD NOT MAKE ANY
MOV. W/O OUT OPINION OF MIL. EXECUTIVE
PART OF OF GOVT.
OTHER COUNTRIES (DIFF) POLITICAL MAKES
DEC 8 THEN CARRIED OUT BY MIL. WHERE
IN ISL. MIL GUIDE POLITICAL DECISIONS.
THAT WTH HIS TENDENCY BASED ON
HIS RESEARCH.

ISRAELI MILITARY NOT BIG, BUT IMPRESSED
W THE RESERVE ORGANIZATION & TRAINING
PROVIDED AMONG 1. THEY ARE EFFICIENT
VERY GOOD @ HITTING TERRORISTS AWAY
FROM ISRAELI SOIL & THE ENEMY'S
HOME.
LIKE IRAN WILL STRIKE US IN IRAQ
INSTEAD ON US SO!!

#1
HASSEIN ZADEH SEJ FOR MILITARY
ABDANSALAM 11 BATTAL 73 COMD
ABDEL QADER MAHMOOD 11 NAT. COMM.
DR. KHALIL AL MA'MOURI 11 COUNCIL OF MINST.
AHMAD SAMATLI SEC. OF DIWAN
Duties:
Control mail but not included were mail from other SEC, DIWAN, etc.
App for II S, Dir of Gen Sec.
W/SUBSHE. Control of Quality did not cables from foreign min appointment of ambassadors, direct media.
Min. of Defense

Confidential letters from IZZAT, all
he would not open.

Before 83 there was not sec for Pres.
Just SEC, NSC. All of this was done
by HAMID HAMAD-83-91
He took over 3/91
NSC 9-10 officers from min
Service & Dir Gen Sec.
Transfers of officers are approved
by NSC. IZZAT presided over NSC
The Pres. never attended.

NSC: Pres.
VP: IZZAT
Sec A
The Minst of Interior 650 Dir
Dir. II S
Dir. AMN AL AM.
DIR. DMT
Ministers would attend only if it dealt with the DPC
Budget for all 3 services were approved by NSC 550 approved by Sec of Defense.

Discussions

It is not allowed to discuss its or
Ann at Kim's home
Ann at Ann only after approval
of Pres.

Although the most ambitious
Did not differentiate between the
leadership. Some liked hard
workers.

Read a lot

He thought he was fair in treating
everyone, but he saw different
which made him want to get out
of cont. Conflict between his nephews
and Sondy's nephews & he took his
nephews side.

Faults: Other than Jamal, Mustafa addressed
as D's Deputy to distance himself
D's TD eventually knew me out. Could
not kill him but because he had a
claim behind him
He could not get design but there were discussions of doing work who was his friend. He would speak out is point out - Saddam told Iraq not get involved in this. His oil but in reality should be behind the ministers.

Protecting Baghdad was the most important thing. His oil area is connected to the western power. Was critical. At the very end of America. We were opposed to war oil. Known as Arab countries, against Arab oil. We Arabs would never support blaming ourselves because he influenced before it came. Hand of reason.

Mentally normal, personality is not because of sure his decision.
HELD IN HILL AS WAS HUSAYN

ASSIGNED TO THE 2ID FAB

SADDAM WAS ON THE OFFICE NEXT TO

HIM MULTILE. SADDAM INSTRUCTED MULTILE

tELL ME HOW THE ORDER WAS PLANNED

MULTILE THE ORDER WOULD DECIDE EVENTS

APPROXIMATELY 3 PM. TAlk THE PERSON WOULD

STAND UP FROM THE WALK THEM OUT TO

IT S TURN THEM OVER. A TURCH WAS

WAITING. THE Dir COULD HAVE BEEN

BAZAR AS SADDAN SAYED, DIR & DS.

Dir.
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Field Office Acquiring Evidence: BAGHDAD OPERATIONS CTR - FBE

Serial # of Originating Document: 17

Date Received: 2/2/04

From: GEORGE PABA

(FBI BAGHDAD OPERATIONS CTR)

(Address of Contributor)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

(City and State)

By [Blank]

To Be Returned: [ ] Yes [ ] No

Receipt Given: [ ] Yes [ ] No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: [ ] Yes [ ] No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): [ ] Yes [ ] No

Title: TARIQ AZIZ

Reference: [Blank]

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: [ ] Original notes re interview of

TARIQ AZIZ

[Blank]
After 1975 reset, blue Iran became normal, Mottahedeh talked to blue Sha and made

C. 1978 - Khomeini started living in Iraq Sha asked Sadcam to hand over Khomeini over

Khomeini was being toyed with under statements.

Khomeini felt a grudge toward Patey,

but I'm not here to protest this,

but I don't think Khomeini

should have a grudge. He
didn't hand Khomeini

but Patey did get him to leave

Khomeini to Paris.
Khrushchev wrote about being read. He said it was all right to wait for an answer might take too long.

Other arrows—$A$ for formula caliphotography

From key to criticism

From an essential big an actual side

$\sum_{mm} set$ from documents rounded that of 1971

Clashes or heroes begin

$\sum_{mm}$ heretic small parts
At meeting in Addis Ababa
said that there were major problems
had to be dealt with.

Sent me to Moscow to talk to
the Russians, to tell them that since
we are friends we want Russian
support. Although usually not of heavy
support at this time. A cool reception.

Couple days later, I met another
official whose role was without

Frog found at that
Plymouth meeting read the Frog.

Used Algerian air to bring in
weapons

Soviets were pretty big of arms.

1985

Visit to Moscow

Air, Specially Grumgka

In 1985, I did not disagree
At Roc, we took write
We rarely had take vote
BT's man would make a decision
and wrote it also a book for marker
7 the Roc to sign

In 1990, the final decision rested
Wt Smtmn. No one in Roc protested.

Dr. Intiated hostlin, SADAM
with 1.0 Minister (com), SADAM Staff
With Chief 9 Staff

I decided to go to work.

Intel success in Wt, Dr.

Smtmn visited the first time.

1982 King House - Visit

1982 - Senior talk about replacement

Talk to keeping him to Scb
Chief 9 Staff...

L7 bit Smtmn sent him on
Ambass to Smtmn India.
War not going well. Iran targets

1984 - Iran used Scud missiles against Iraq - which they acquired from N Korea & Libya.

Iraq did not have long-range planes to attack Tehran.

1988 - Fry attacked Iran of Scud missiles.

Saddam began withdrawing military from the point I telling them deep

troops should be dug in.

Only a Stiller was a qualified officer but Saddam made

all the decisions.

1984 - Iraq used chemical weapons. We afraid the world lose.

Brances Howard sent me a letter saying it was not aproop to use

chemical weapon. BCC knew but didn't
protest. Saddam did not officially tell the NCC that he decided to use chemical weapons. It was common knowledge he didn't want to tell us at first. But now we in NCC still disagreed if it's use by our forces. That Iraq was going to lose the war.

The use of chemical weapons was not an issue in discussion of Pres. Bush et al.

I was told that that early on the frame was set that we were using chemical weapons on a smaller scale.

Actually, it was the most foolish decision both sides made.
To go to war.

After the Iran-Iraq war, BG’s spin
it as a victory & lived well.

After Gulf war, BG is found the
parts of their country destroyed. Despite
SADDAM’s claim of a victory, no one
in Iraq took their seriously.

Instead of war, it went into reconstruction
by giving doctors, experts, etc.
We could have become like
Switzerland.

Si wanted to take control back. To the
mountainous region to eliminate insurgency
he sent Ali MPM to north
and gave him executive powers
that were greater than the RCC
and this was not constitutional.
MPM was not even a member
of the RCC. It was very strange
It was a decision by SADDAM.
And printed circulated to me and other members.

Gradually the man sidelined the race.

Q: Who was made accountable to?

A Halimaj风波 began — kush were relocated.

The border areas between Iraq were seen as being a threat to Dayk bke Iran (occupied from

It was done in a harsh manner.

Those who made the decisions were idiots, i.e.:

1. Ali Matar

2. Governor of Herijin

RCE became a paper tiger
As foreign minister I heard from your side.

Regarding Kurds & Human Rights, I heard about what was happening in terms of atrocities committed against Kurds, especially internally.

I wasn't being asked to remember that was not my worry in any way.

It's not criminal but very harsh & badly bl. I've generated protests from the Kurds & the world.

Khrasgh, chief of state, would not have been the one making the decision.

On the western media, I saw a few corpses, men, women & children - not hundreds or thousands.

Draft of release begun in 1981.

I saw document — Pentagon sent to me by our embassy in NY.

Said Iran used chemical weapons first in Iraq war.
After returning from Paris, I asked

SPOONER said, in the war, Chem Wars
were in hands of Comm. y Chem. Chief (SPOONER)

Then, Deputy Min. of Defense asked for
authority to use Chem weapons in Iran.

Later, SPOONER realized they were chemical
weapons exceeding it, he said he withdrew his authority

Later, Deputy of President agreed
SPOONER to continue military power

to use Chem weapons + SAS

Chem weapons in HAWAB and

SPOONER said we didn't need to
use Chem weapons in HAWAB.

It wasn't that big.
After ceasefire was reached by Iran-Iraq, MAJID was put in charge of the north. He now grew the power of the RCC. After the ceasefire and after the use of chemical weapons on Kords, MAJID was to eliminate insurgents in the north.

By 1988, Saddam was using telephones to speak directly to his state but not after Aug 2, 1990.

Special telephone: Govt phone in home of high-ranking officials.

Saddam was trying to use chemical weapons to the command in chief. The command in chief, Defense (17th Defense) and Chief of Staff, both decide.

Retracted early 1988

Revised: HAJABJAG

Need that MAJID used flour to scare people in north.
He did punish reprimand them for using chemical weapons. Saddam did not think that the use of chemical weapons called for in ARA was tolerable. It was not \textit{a critical area.} He was upset by the world-wide repercussions.

Saddam was described as very brutal in the north. This and was known as a violent man.

If people made decisions Saddam did not like, he would punish or execute them. But he did not reprimand or punish those carrying out the chemical attack.
Tariq Aziz Interview #2

From George:

We're here for a specific purpose.

Not necessarily associated with Iraq/Saddam Hussein.

Related to another investigation.

He acknowledged understandings from today.

Iran-Iraq war (1980)

Iranian incursion into Iraq started.

After 1975

Relations between IKI became normal.

1978-79

Things changed - disarray - Khomeni in Iran.

Shah ordered Saddam to hang over Khomeni.

Saddam derailed traditional American national interest.

Shah was killed by his own army.

Khomeni agreed to leave.

Went to France, Paris.

Khomeni felt "guilty" against Iraq.

He was political "enemy," not supported the plan.

Plus 1985 agreement to let Iraqyah stations
1999

- Khomeini came to power in Iran
  - Iran's direct democracy is a system
  - 12th Imam: last disappeared for 4 years
  - His victory in 1979 is similar to Jesus

- Khomeini said he regretted to accept Imam
  - He said he regretted to accept Imam
  - Why would a country offer a Imam without a system
  - First Imam is Shietta, then all Muslims

- Therefore the first target of Khomeini was Iraq
  - For them, all of the important "shoarans" or religious sites are in Iraq
  - When Khomeini declared being the capital of the Imam, he

- Iran was targeting Iraq in 1979's opinion
  - A real Saddam was an illegitimate ruler who

- An exchange of communication restarted to no avail
  - Closer Sada, with Iran in Iraq, grand mode

- Treaty of 1975 - terminated
  - Iran declared press, security, finance
  - Saddam declared DEC. 1980, September

TA sent to Russia

To remind of Treaty of Friendship with Iraq

Was Iran in need of assistance by the USA

If so, why did the USA not support them?

If yes, the USA could say that Iran was at war

Meet with Deputy Foreign Minister - heard,

Russia said could support war

TA returned to Baghdad - war was on

Iraq takes over Iranian treatment until 1982

Bank sale transferred

Iran takes back same cities/territory

The Soviet had upper hand

Soviets thought Iran could be their ally, but wrong

Great Satan - USA

Soviets - second great Satan

Iran Islamic personified imperialism, accepted communism

in Iran

Israel is supported Iran at this time

Shadown an Argentine plane and Israel scores

Spanish war - relations improved
Saddam H. A. Ositoa Malla in 2005

- France paid for war that lasted for 10 years
- Bulgaria and Turkey & Egypt provided weapons
- USSR & China supported to this

**RCC details**
- Saddam instructed before Saddam war to
- according to Constitution, HCC had power to vote on decision
- but after changing, only Iran in vote
- National Assembly "vote for"
- war unwise by US history
- Saddam war was against US treaty
- Final decision rested in Saddam for war
- RCC did not protest war, no vote took place

- Saddam Wire 2005 Saddam's Letter
- Saddam could name a better than a president
- want to show powerful god like Christianity
The Iraqis bombarded times to the West troubled.

As a result, I was subjected to major losses.

The battle was a huge fiasco.

It was thought that had been unable to ask for

1987 significant talk about replacing Saddam

in Middle Eastern peace, not in Iraq

A major reason for his downfall

Chairman Khatami may SHAH (C), 60-year-old

ambassador to KSA at time

Attacked civilian areas in addition to Baghdad

Iraq attacked cities also on civilians. List of 1984-85.

Attacked Islamic, fall on war efforts.

Attacked area, limited range

Attacked place: The Khorasan, Iran.

Tried to destroy oil production

Syria had trouble reaching with Iran -Spray

Until 1986 plane & ships harassed with hit & run
Vera's War Lessons

- Iraq used chemical weapons at the beginning of the war.
- Underestimated cost of Iraq’s chemical weapons.
- Decision made by Hussein and Adnan Hanbullah.
- War ended in 1988.
- Considered a victory for Iraq by many.
- Iran’s size and population.
- Military better trained and equipped.
- Force Iran to negotiate.
- Iraq had adapted.
- Sep 1980 UN cease-fire, Iran defeat.

War: “Most tragic decision of two countries.”
- Tons of casualties, economic loss, horrendous.
- Iraq declared victory in 1988 - victory.
- Need major reforms going forward.
- If had not devoted time, money, to war, Iraq would have been very prosperous.
- Iran War.


- Kurds - 1987-88 - another serious problem
- Saddam kept watch over, had to take exceptional powers
- Hussein and Iraqis per "very strange"
- Other govt. members had previous direct or间接 involvement
- Al Qad joins RCD member
- McH and co-constituent

- Decision signed by Saddam given to RCC
- Written order RCC, no consultation, signed by Saddam
- Fatwa on paper, sent copy RCC member
- Negotiation, agreement, given power of RCC

- Al Qad reports to Saddam, but he departs
- Saddam sacked,MG from Murad, brand? Baath will try to reconcile
- Bought in Nazar, Nazar whatever later at Halabja

- Prayed to Allah

- Did not receive to Capital State. MC bombed Saddam
Relocation of Kurds occurred
in the Iraq, near Kurdish Iraq / Iran
waged well as the Kurd
RCC draft project
Relocation done in harsh manner
They are demanding to be located to do post to show
success
Mr. Hasan, Mr. Majid
Hasan Khadi?
Government reasons
Kirkuk not interested in asked opinion
Mr. Estefamich / Kassim
Heard details via media
Documents praised that on Kurdish from Turkish Kurds
just say I am not their official only media
At no big way of doing things, i.e., would have done this
of course
At times justified for security of nation
Kurd transport / subdued in nature
Hajja

☑ Worst incident occurred May 1988
☑ Used of chemical weapons on civilians
☑ They were attacked by the Iraqi army from land, air, and sea
☑ Fedayeen occupied part of Iranian regions
☑ 51,000 killed with few corpses - mainly women, children
☑ Institute of Defense, Pentagon, 1989 report
☑ "Infrared Team used chemical weapons First at Hadiya"
☑ Published in "Military Review"
☑ Says I was accused second
☑ Saddam admitted to use of chemical weapons based on evidence
☑ Kept chemical weapons hidden in desert (Sallahun)
☑ Former head of intelligence in Iraq (Sallahun)
☑ Former intelligence chief of the military staff (Sallahun)
☑ Asked Ghashgar to keep "team" informed
☑ Withdraw decision to Saddam alone in 1998 to keep "team"
☑ "I would never use it again"
☑ I used in Hadiya
☑ Saddam debriefed after chemical weapon attack
☑ End of note
Ali Hassan al-Majid

- Given power in Iraq after Iran-Iraq War
- Minister of Foreign Affairs before
-掌握了赫拉尼 - 占有最高级别的指挥官

1988: Still using planes (Saddam)
- Stopped when Gulf War broke out - Aug 2, 1990
- 1988 - regularly used plane from Iran - Iraq War

- Chem. weapons
-fielddelivere
- Then w/ Wadidah, Khaza'iji
- Then Saddam
- Then Wadidah, Khaza'iji - Helicopter
driver
- Later Ali Hassan (Armed campaign)
- Debated whether it was used
- American forces came - knew details
- Reports of Chernobyl
Saddam told TA not my decision. Halabja
in hands of Khadijah/Abdulraziq.

- did not punish Iraqis
  breach
- normally would have executed
- Saddam felt not necessary, especially due to international outcry

- Amful letter part of 1989
- after ceasefire, Aug 1989, Iran. "You may"
- Anbar had Majid appointed
- put down insurgency
- but was violent person; everyone known as sadman
- TA told him prisoners he was negotiating with Americans
- TA told other prisoners "He's a liar. It could have happened"
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Field Office Acquiring Evidence: PATNO
Serial # of Originating Document: 16
Date Received: 2/21/2004
From: (Name of Contributor)
(Address of Contributor)
By: GEORGE M. NO (Name of Special Agent)

To Be Returned: ☐ Yes □ No
Receipt Given: ☐ Yes □ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: ☐ Yes □ No

Title: (S)

Reference: (Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☑ Original notes re interview of

SA'DUN SHAKIR MAHMOOD AL-UDHAI
SADIR SHERIEF MAHAMUD
DOB: Baghdad

76 - Time here about 5. rec. Gulf War
led to resign & retire - Advisor to Dwan
EG More Ford

G2 fruit

CV Surg. - DORD
'TS Grad Medical Law - Bash
Reg. Mar + 7

Aug - made 7 ACC after Rwali

1987 - 90 Member R

79 - 87 Molt

S →

Ali Hassan al Masri →

Darr Ismail al Duri

Aziz Saleh al Almam
Muhammed Hamza al Zubaydi
Latif Nusayif al Jassim al Delaymi

Taha Yameen Ramada
Mizban Khathib Harar
Taha Nuhic - eldeh Yorouf

FA
Hi Kemal MBC
Fadil Ghanib
Khairallah

-1-
72
79 - July Nat appointed
77 Elefanto a member RCC - Barth - 87
87 left Nat
Nat is just since 70

12 - 79 IDS Dr

book orders Bk or Bk?
repeat to Prov VP

Regatta - last day 7 committee - Nat & Assembly
for Supporting larger P&F & Kent intense
for designation
My opinion was that shall be
sold & peace & loyalty
and voiced that opinion
Pro sq. come vsu.

she had tape recorder

conversation blur King Fahd - Emirat -

killing

Fahed I'm going to be telling to the Saudis
Fahed meeting Hussein
Stevan, played us an intercepted tape before flying. He told me that there was a conspiracy to blame and control against us.

After heavy tapes, he thought we didn’t need to hear it.

I commented, we don’t know the source of tape.

Sarvision’s emotions when playing tape =

was trying to show people conspiracy.

The day Mr. KIng Hussein arrived.

We all met next day at airport.

See him off. - called me
to say don’t go to airport.

I think president had some feelings.

Met my previous comments.

After King left, I wrote long

a letter to Sh re my points

Kuwait and on tape:

... "few more things I didn’t tell"
I knew my body was printing - I wasn't going to submit you.

Five days later, called to palace & was told to resign.

For yrs with that heat problem, needed surgery. Hossaen took me to hospital - he didn't have facility in Baghdad.

He told me good hospital in Amman. He sent me there, hospital & grant paid for it.

Operate at time the hospital went to Aden - personally postponed - he Hossaen would not let me go/ pay for Bill
Rain Hospital in Baghdad
Special Hospital for Elite + Their Families
A daily rpt as to which P. i. in hospital.

Still not holding a grudge.

Q. After '94, what about Saddam?
A. I rarely saw him.

One year after that @ '93-94
I went to hospital for check-up
I had submitted a request to
leave the country for medical
reasons. He called me to his
office + he put me on security
to arrest, passport so I couldn't

So to Amman.

All trips to Amman

Except trips to France for

with operation re: heart. @ 1996,
and again had to see Saddam again.
Change value in heart - new procedure +
Specialist in France. Stayed there 4 mos.
At first went to N. Embassy
On my symbolic staff or advisory
on gone = a symbolic position
we stay in service 7 got in
in order to get paid - pension
at my respect of to get paid

Eagle coyote 7 mos. 04 29 1970 Res.

Send us a r.p.t. to give our opinion in my
position as a full minute Intown. His
husband 1 or 2 times. Question the Admin
Internal Accounting issues:
Practically, they don't need my opinion.

Schedule 5:00Pm to 5:30Pm
1965 to 1960 - Marshall
Baith P7 Members

After 63, 2 brother
Acre -

Many Baith's were arrested
Smith with Al reaching London

Taji

NATaji - military camp - removed soldiers
turned it into a prison.

I heard about strange news he reptil
as very brave to att. assass.
Mata friendship - but a
prison relationship.

My escape from prison with about
Bark De difficult era
shooting made of them.
And her resolved by helping a
maid with the prison.

EA nemesis at B&B spoke to
me

Stay Summit accurate
But the mother was exaggerate
1. How describe his character
2. Change in Strait
3. What his greatest strength
   in weakness
4. Was he good/bad for country?
5. Is I a better wo th
6. Quiet Architect of
   one of the most
   brutal regimes
   Role in IDs
   Executing
   torture
   Did you ever inform
   on other RCC
   members
7. Sit and atrocities
   Vulnerability
   synchronized
8. What is the worst thing you
   ever survive
9. Was the Butcher of Baghdad
10. Do you respect him
11. What would say about him at tribunal
    Do you feel lucky to be alive?
prior to '68
shot 266 after prior + exchange
dinner at 'Mansoni'.

After '68 we were both busy + fewer meetings.

In '70's 5:45 hunting club
A social club - hunting
\[\text{*Pheasant\r
\[\text{\textit{Drake}}\r
\text{Drain was took a lot}\r\]}
\[\text{\textit{our time}}\r
\text{\textit{Most of that was not the most imp}}\r
\text{\textit{past + 5:45 time limited. Sit more of}}\r
\text{\textit{Miny Detol.}}\r

\[\text{\textit{79 Corp - I was present then}}\r
\text{\textit{Sharrir, Surrani,}}\r
\text{\textit{Wesharri}},
1st mtg was 1st leadership & ministers after resig y Baker, & we had mtg to decide what to do. Seminar stood up & said this is a conspiracy — I don't agree — Baker is not sick

Samsham said you are part of a coup, and we have a lot about you. He told Seminar to get out of meeting

Mohammed Aish was there.

Aish said it's not far to let's discuss this — so we sent Aish out as well having to know about your relative in Syria is not.

Aish, after mtg, took pill, and few hours later, died per Muratاغün.

Duri elected VP

Stand up name by name & those in coup.

Seen Seminar reading list.

Q: Did you believe that there was a plot?

A: Yes
Q: Why did this happen at the end?

A: Nobody knows for sure.

Do you think there was a plot before? A: It's not clear.

The government that was forming Remo about to cash in Adman etc.

It was later proven that this was sending a handful of troops to Syria. As you hold a hardware that corp.

I think this was the end of it. We removed threats from power.

I don't think so. There were people very close to him. D think he cried.

Don't know if Seth smiled.
Never thought anything would happen to me after my op in Kuwait.

Yes, I was afraid after I wrote my letter to sit. Might I might lose my job.

Thinks a way to settle Kuwait.

I know off in Kuwait could have negotiating

Q: Anyone else a duty sit not to go to Kuwait?
A: I don't think so.

Q: Feeling a bit down.
A:

Q: Was he a good leader in person?
His aloofness made mistakes
A foolish and in
Kuwait and
of USA

A fact of life it & EQ should have
been dealing of East West-
we should have been doing this.
not meaning to campaign against the world,

Q Who was resp. for that?
A The Rep & Leadership

Q Do you think leadership had input?
A A combined responsibility
1) No DIS - we started it.

There was an internal secrity

Q: if you were DIS Director
   + had sign to be in dry

A: did ya create the Director?

( pull-out papers, surprise
   been since '79)

It was about proving Marine Inferior

Q: significant asset in DIS

→ Conspiracies

→ big at top
   - protect the govt
   - deter plots against govt
   - counter Iranian threat

→ 2651st ST bros, nephews me
   after 17 July
Q: What steps to uncover plots?
A: No plan - took each case separately.
Q: Data was developed + I would like to leadership
Q: What investigation steps taken to uncover plots

- Watch
- Sources
- Monitor phones
- History special abilities at time were simple.

Q: How not know about it so soon before?
A: Details are by Barazani

3 BRANCHES
1. Political
2. Technical
3. Store

Q:
A: Device any details not.
As we've defined positions divided into 2

- Police
- Traffic control
- Security police
- Border patrol

Local administrator

His job

Q: Who makes decisions in PCC?
A: The President
Q: So what was the PCC about able to do?
1. Minimize
2. Blame others
3. Not your responsibility
4. Lapse of memory

1. Early fordyce JTS
2. Torture
   - Execute
   - Hide bodies
   - Hide weapons
   - Inform on others
   - Foreknowledge
   - 9'79 plan

---

3. You informed on others to Saddam

- Spy
- Monitor
- Rob source

4. Atrocities

5. Saddam took care of you
Q: Did not agree on use of chemical weapons.

A: wasn't asked for opinion. It's not a humanitarian thing. Acknowledged sympathies.

Q: As a citizen, you had a voice.

A: There was no discussion.

Premier used chemical weapons.

Q: Respond when you read word that U.S. might read authority for N. Yemen.

A: The Pres. gave his authority.

Q: You had opportunity to take action re:

A: U.S.

And full campaign.
10:16 HRs 2/21/2004

Sa'dun Shakir Mahmud Ahmad Al-
Ubaidi
7/11/1939 - Baghdad, Iraq

1972 - in political law baghdad - Univ.
after the rev appointed to RCC.

1977/Regional Comm.
07/1979-87 Minst of Interior

1990 - left the leadership Regional Comm.
before the invasion of Kuwait

94 or 95 - appointed as pres. advisor w/ Resp. to collet a salary

as IDB dir. due to orders from baar
of hussein reports went back to baar

when Minst. changed as pres. was also
Prime Minister so orders came from pres.
only.

resp. as leader in kuwait has none

a letter asked for his resignation from his position in one party.
Sit's emotion with tape played. Probably heard the tape before. 'I convince the conspiracy & wanted to play for others, people to understand. He spoke out against playing the tape.'

King Hussein was there visiting, all were to be at the airport to say goodbye - not called by President Diwan, not so, because Sit thinks upset by his comment.

He wrote a letter to Hussein & said tape. Suggested Hussein it is an old problem with oil disagreements et c. A couple days later called the palace while he was old, had to resign by Diwan. Soul sit & yes, later @ hospital, had heart problem. Sit visited him @ hospital. Iraqi did not have facilities for such procedure. Sit sent him to Jordan, where he was treated & visited by King. S King gave the Bill.

Initially @ special hospital, for heart issue. S visited by others and that is how Sit found out.

No, or little contact after that, year later 93 or 94. For medical check-up requested for authorization to travel outside Iraq without real presidential authorization.
Saw him in his office & spoke to him & he granted the travel.

Limited travel to Jordan only if exception I trip to France as his wife needed heart surgery from renowned specialist. Procedure was new & could not be done in Jordan except of mor. in France. Paid by Embassy in Paris all expenses.

As Pres. Omer he got & rep every other by of Pres. to give opinion
occurred 2 or 3 times as counties
Tenders, important matters done as a courtesy…

Friendship - 1064 met in prison for being Ba'athist. Omar Abdel Kassim & M.M. "I was arrested, security tried all quizzes (person #1) not in there.

He was known - many after his assassination attempt. Prosecution was released. Captured once with committed 8 sentences others.

Their relationship was detailed in 3 books which sit & found info & also (decision) gave an interview to an Iraqi newspaper.
The books accurate depictions of the events.

Was heard of hunting club (more social?) club & would visit in the early to go on hunting trips.

Held from helicopter but not seen. Have been shot once or twice "not a sport!"

Minst. of interior split into 1 - 1,000 & local gov. required the role of minst. of ins.

About sit. amred.

Speaking out reduced position.

Known by another name after the cap.

Name became Masoudi Roots in Iran.
TARIQ AZIZ (Blacklist #25) date of birth April 1, 1936, place of birth Mosul, Iraq, was interviewed at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Iraq. Also present at the interview was [US Army Representative. After being advised that the interviewing Agents were members of the United States Government from Washington, DC, AZIZ provided the following information in English:

AZIZ' grandfather's last name was Issa, which is Arabic for Jesus. He does not now nor has he ever used the name Mikhail. AZIZ stated that Iranian/pro-Iranian factions claimed this was once part of his name in order to emphasize or point out that AZIZ is Christian. AZIZ is a Chaldean Christian by religion. His father died when he was six or seven years old. Thereafter, his mother and uncle raised AZIZ in Baghdad.

AZIZ studied English while growing up and through college, obtaining a bachelor's degree from the College of Arts and Sciences in Baghdad in 1958. He continued to study English on his own thereafter.

AZIZ worked as a journalist for two months upon graduation from college. He served in the Army for approximately one year and a half in 1958-59. Later, AZIZ worked at times as an interpreter.

AZIZ joined the Ba'ath political party in the late 1950s. Michael Aflaq founded this political movement. The stated party platforms of freedom, socialism, and Arab Unity appealed to AZIZ. He felt the Ba'ath system would be good for Iraq.

The Ba'ath came to power in Iraq in February, 1963 in a bloody coup d'etat overthrowing then President Qassem. Qassem was a military dictator who persecuted members of the Ba'ath. This Ba'ath government lasted only nine months, however, with President Abd Al-Salam Aref assuming leadership of the country in November, 1963. After dying in a helicopter crash in 1966, President Aref's brother, Abd Al-Rahman Aref, assumed leadership.
After the previous government failed in November, 1963, many Ba'ath members, including AZIZ, were "chased" to Syria in 1964. AZIZ remained in Syria until 1967, having been jailed there in 1966-67. Upon release, he traveled back to Baghdad where he taught English from 1967-68. During the reign of the Aref brothers, the Ba'ath was virtually eliminated from Iraq.

In July, 1968, the Ba'ath came back to power in a bloodless coup, or "White Revolution", placing President Bakr in power. Saddam Hussein, a key Ba'ath member, enlisted the support of two of Aref's officials, the Director of Military Intelligence (Nayif) and the head of the Republican Guard (Da'ud), to effect the coup. These two individuals were promised high positions in the new government in exchange for their support. Within a matter of days after Bakr assumed the Presidency, however, both were removed from their "new" positions and given Ambassador posts outside Iraq. Nayif was later assassinated in London. AZIZ characterized his relationship with Bakr as "not strong." This was due to AZIZ' Christian beliefs.

AZIZ served as the editor of the Ba'ath newspaper in 1963 and 1969. He served three years as Minister of Information under the Ba'ath government in the 1970s. He became a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) member in 1977. Created in 1968, the RCC was designed to be the highest policy and decision-making body in Iraq. Saddam Hussein served as Vice Chairman of the RCC beginning in 1969. AZIZ stated Hussein "liked" AZIZ and supported his membership in the Ba'ath and positions he held within the party and government.

From 1969 forward, Hussein worked to eliminate threats to the Iraqi government, both inside and outside the country. These steps include the "March Manifesto" with Kurdish leader Barzani in 1970 which stated the Kurdish population in Iraq would have an autonomous state by 1974. This move apparently appeased Kurdish dissidents within Iraq. The provisions of the agreement never came to fruition, however. In 1975, Hussein reached an agreement with the government of Iran regarding the Shatt-al-Arab Waterway. This agreement, more favorable to Iran, essentially eliminated the external threat from Iran while simultaneously eliminating Iran's support of the Kurds inside Iraq.

Hussein also eliminated threats he perceived from individuals within the government. He incriminated persons in "coup's" and held fake trials. In 1973, one such victim was Abdul
Khalig Samarra'i, the Minister of Interior. Samarra'i was "critical and outspoken" against Hussein and Bakr. He was sentenced to death, changed later to life. Ali Hasan Al-Majid, aka "Chemical Ali", stated as long as Samarra'i was alive, coups would continue. Consequently, Samarra'i was removed from prison and executed in 1979. Per AZIZ, Samarra'i was a "humble man" who had no aspirations of power. Hussein and Bakr saw him as an obstacle and a threat to "their wrongdoings." AZIZ stated the treatment of Samarra'i was "ethically and morally wrong" and "weakened the party." In AZIZ' opinion, democracy in Iraq was gone after 1979.

In 1979, Bakr stepped down due to health reasons and Hussein assumed the Presidency. Various factors contributed to Hussein's rise to power. He had served as Vice Chairman of the RCC since 1969. He also served as the Deputy Secretary General of the Ba'ath. Aflaq did not support Hussein at first, but eventually did. Hussein had the reputation of being a strong Ba'ath loyalist. This was due to his participation in the coup attempt against President Qassem in 1963 and his active role in reformating the party after 1963. AZIZ stated Hussein's true power developed after 1968.

AZIZ stated the RCC was the supreme body in Iraq prior to the new regime under Hussein. The RCC made laws and was considered higher than the cabinet. Upon assuming the Presidency, Hussein moved immediately over the next two years, to consolidate power into his hands from the RCC.

Hussein convened a Cabinet meeting in July, 1979, shortly after assuming the Presidency. During the videotaped meeting, details were relayed of a "plot" uncovered three to four days before involving a conspiracy with Syrian officials to overthrow the Iraqi government. Former President Bakr's Chief of Staff, Muhie Abd Al-Hussein Mashhadi, was brought before the group and announced his complicity in the plot. Other "conspirators" were named and taken away from the meeting. AZIZ did not believe the "plot" was true. At the time, AZIZ felt that if one voiced opposition to the proceedings, he would be arrested. Thus, AZIZ remained silent or may have clapped when others clapped so as to not appear to oppose Hussein. The videotape of this meeting was sent to various Middle Eastern leaders including the Syrian President. AZIZ stated Hussein opposed the "almost eighty percent complete" plans for an Iraq-Syria unification, similar to the United Arab Republic which previously temporarily united Egypt and Syria. Shortly thereafter, Hussein created a "fake" court to try the individuals involved in the "conspiracy." He appointed Na'im
Haddad, a Shiite and Ba'ath member, to serve as the presiding judge. AZIZ believed this was an attempt by Hussein to add credibility to the proceedings. AZIZ did not attend the trial and described the entire event as a "crime against the people and the Ba'ath Party."

Other less dramatic steps occurred pursuant to a consolidation of power into Hussein's hands. Until 1979, the RCC held regular meetings with minutes recording the details. After Hussein became President, the meetings were less frequent and no minutes were recorded. Hussein told the RCC there would be times when he would not be able to consult with them. Thus, according to Hussein, the RCC had to give him power to make decisions alone.
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Interview noted OK:
Tadj Aziz (B2-25)

""
Notes of WSA

SSA George L. Piro

Aug Rep

13/04

ISRAELI

Tariq Azeiz (Issa) - grandfath. BL #75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS CONFIDENTIAL

DATE 05-11-2009 BY 50394 UC BAK/5AB/LSO

Examined by

- Born in 1936, Mosul, Iraq - moved to Baghdad, children 6-7 years old when father died
- Educated mother raised
- Studied English, three high school, kept up his area
- Journalist, writer
- 1988-graduated, worked as journalist 2 months
- Army one year and a half
- Editor of Baath party newspaper
- Released to Syria - 1994; Camp in 1983
- Stayed until 1989
- Jailed in Syria 1989-87, released, went to Iraq
- Taught English - 1987-88, Baghdad; edited Baath paper in 1988
- Joined Baath in late 1970s
- Grandson, son-in-law, vicinity, opposition
- Father - Michel Azeiz
- Concerned would be good for Iraq
Barzain

- military dictator presented Ba'ath
- came by Ba'ath in Feb. 1963; not active until Nov. 1963
- Per eliminated Ba'ath Party
- killed in helicopter/aircraft crash
- his brother became Inspecator

- Ba'ath came back in 1978 - President Baker
- had strong relationship w/ Baker because of Christianity
- Saddam liked Aziz + supported his membership in Ba'ath
- Mo I-3 hours
- 1979 - RCC created
- 1979 - Baker stopped when Saddam became president
- Saddam gradually became a dictator
- became editor again of Ba'ath party newspaper - 1984
- Saddam supported RCC created in 1968
- "White" Revolution - no bloodshed
- Saddam used Najeef (Dir of MI) into S. Iraq?
- Prime Minister of Oct. to make ambassadors
Baghdad - refused to join govt
Talabani - joined govt

All leaders of party became members of RCI
Saddam became Chairman of RCI
Vice Chairman of party
Michael ['-no'] did not support Saddam at first, eventually did

Saddam had reputation of being loyalist
participated in coup attempt on Bassam
reformed party after 1963 - very active

The "Black Palace" used in 1983
arrested, tortured, executed many communists
Saddam wasn't powerful at time but close to Ba'ath
became in the same time.

This power came after 1963
RCI

Supreme body in new regime - make law, higher than cabinet

until Saddam came to power in 1979
First 2 years consolidation of power - March 1969
Saddam attempted to recapture Barzani - March 1979 - joined
Communist joint guerrilla action in 1972
only North was ACC
Manifests sort kinds would be continuous by 1974
Barzani wants to mobilize - Saddam antigovt, did Russia it
Iran has backed Barzani
Saddam reached agreement with - Shafik Al-Arab waterway - 1975
Barzani revolt called up (Baghdad Pact)
Consolidate power in Iraq after that
The oil of Kirkuk, associated industry and many modernized
And part of Iraq (Baghdad, Baja, Mosul, Kirkuk - Telegraph
not owned by Arab as concession
Best next thing to do at the time
securty with Shukri Ramadan (and did the Iran)
Shah had an oil 1931 Shukri Agreement 1962
Iran gained strategic from Iraq in 70's (1975) -
later developed al dam gas port

J. Nathan - take - Director - 1973
arrived Min of Oil + Min of Home - copplot
Abdul Karim Saddam - Elena in cited
Party became weaker, Tikriti's strange
Chemical said as long as is clear, copy plots will continue
Abdul Karim had an aspiration of power - he was to succeed him and Saddam. Saddam saw him as an obstacle, though.

Their wrongdoings.

Samara - second capital of Iraq.

Elimination of him was ethically & morally wrong.

Weakens party, democracy weakened after Reagan.


17 used to have as many as 17 minutes.

After 1979, prominente.

Saddam said there are times when I want to consult so give me power to make decisions.

Meeting when Saddam came to power - July 1979 (Vice President).

Abdel Mohsen Addleman \(\Rightarrow\) compter or coach State.

It was known that Blair wanted to stop Iran

The secret before Saddam's - carded to conspiracy of Iran and Iraq.

He said he was healthy - called Saddam traitor.

1. Was Blair sick, did he behave? No.
2. Did they believe plot? No - almost entire cabinet at time.
3. Did Saddam want Syria or Iraq in 1979? No.

Became minister of Interior and arrested at meeting.

Frustration - opposition you'd be arrested & kept in jail. Others escape.
Also described this event as a crime against people

He created a "fake" court & App did not attend; hot headed.

Niamatullah

member of party

And
Date 1/30/04
01:30 AM

NAME: Abid dari Falah Alqasem

DOB: 1938 - Mosul

Father - Died when he was 7 yrs. old
1950's - While in 2 yr. day school joined Baath party
Journalist - then official of Iraq Govt
After graduation
Army 1/2

Interpreter with
1958 - Journalist for 2 mos
1963 - Editor of Party newspaper in Bagh
1964-67 went to Syria - broached by Govt
ble coup against gen T
met future intel in Bagh

1967 - Released
Become teacher

1968 - Baath Party came to power
became head of Party

In 1950's - I joined Baath Party ble 7 its ideology
Freedom
Socialism

I was attracted also by its leader Al

You Pd made first Coup against regime in 1967 but
failed @ 6 mos.
Among the greatest leaders - LDR / CHAD.

Name made 687 mistakes, w. one exqq the children Egypt & Arab

Hun't build in regime gradually

Other were corrupt

Unemployment in Israel (6 day war)

140 lost

 THEN he got sick & died

May Arab masses loved Mosse, nevertheless

1969 - At Bhk

At this time as prominent member - not a leadership role, but

Bhk was said to, but he didn't like it

Among Sudan had no problem

Eventually moved up to other position

1977 -

1979 - Bhk

En 78's gradually, SADAM became a dictator

Sadam became arrogant + isolated

In 1980's, SADAM picked wrong fights makes for

wrong job,

D became known as a "Terror

PTJ" journal of

At. Bhk was not all that interested in what

Sayed been stressed. I wasn't sure

but through asked by advice. Must had time

-2-

-2-
RCC created and after the corp on 12 July 68 — the corp being victors in battle.

be one of Prime Minister (Head of State) — Head Repub Govt

after 13 days

they were eliminated by 54000 men

Fate of the above two

came to town of Baker and joined his

and my the help of college.

but went to Spain

later 7 made to become men of RCC and grammar were elected up

Simon immediately clothed himself in the corp. He was Det. Sec Gen

the PT. There was @ 31

one year older then me.

I always thought Simon would be a good

But this didn’t happen, I became close to

Simon next to sign the Egypt the book in 1963 to 1970.
1963 - Family blow community & Belfast
Feb 1963 - communist puts streets against brit
By the 70's communist army excentred

Do the 9 mis - 7 ; both rule, the communist hold many corps

Casey's haj - plan used to torture people - exec the prisoners

Bliz 1963-68 - spmnn moved up fast -
He played a major role in - rebuild the party - became secretary general

RCC became a powerful body - after suppress powers after

After 1975, the RCC became a cover for SADF men who had all the power

The other who played a prominent role in the corp, I was removed
At that time, I was not a military person
At that time, their main job was to control the poor the people

The legation in Barcani
Communist went but not the RCC
Banyar revolt against Baathist - Dam used
Banyar t h to topple RCC

Kurdish Disse - Karkosk
Karkosk became modern city

1973 Abul Hade was openly anti arab
Abu Am 2nd un headed - Was Sham's henchman
Marjaq murder - 7 phy elimi
Sham - That became stranger

1973 Eliminating Abul Hade was from
Hade sentenced to death - committed to live

In 1979, he told Shawki that as long as
Hade is alive, there will be coup attempts.

It was very strange against the
"natural" others 7 Iraq

Kharas was trial was fake - Ab Bakr and Shawki
created a trial - Bkr & Shawki used opport
un to get rid of those they didn't like

My opinion is that Abdul Khaled was a very
honorable person, not a power monger.
Not be an critical outspoken against
Sammar
Abdel
Khaled

Note: speech
1/16
Bkr + Sarmah eliminated Abdel Khalid
but he was a threat to them unless doing
Sarmah + Bkr were done. What they wanted
in the money the party and they didn't
like Abdel Khalid - our politician.

Khalid's elimination was ethically,
morally wrong. And it changed to
part. Democracy started to

Prior to 1979 we had weekly meetings & attended,
read minutes, papers to sign.
After 1979 two minutes to REC meeting. Sarmah
said, "Well I'll let you make some decisions & you
don't have time to come meetings & the time k'll get a
Then he eliminated meetings
REC altogether.
He said, "REC has decided but he's
really not true."

Just before 17 July '79, I was asked to write
speech for Bkr who was speaking. At Moheer
meeting we opposed and told Sarmah & Just say Bkr +
Bkr and thought he looked thick. Najib called to a
meeting Sarmah opposed both, I was called & he told them to
assist him. Later, I was accussed by S, falsified
my organ & coup.

Then on 21 July a call from overseas
Video of Saddam

May both parties expect too.
We all kept our mouths shut. Many were not happy if strangers success after 13 years down, but they are still afraid of being accused so kept mouths shut.

He created the court, a fake court.

These were good people—shouldn't have been executed.

Maybe arrested.

Saddam put hurry in chry of court

That is Saddam considered elections.

Many more executed were my friends.

I was in a room with him in the office. He said, pointed me to draft an agreement between Iraq and Syria. I drafted it. The room was opened to the section.

As to my presence at the meeting (which was videotaped),

I cannot say what Saddam said but did not raise my hand.

Wants 100 credit cards.
Wants to burn so he can write a peace road.
To free a 1000.
I taken sleeping pills.
I fit talked.

Concern about his 1971-
ALI HASAN AL-MAJID AL-TIKRITI, aka "Chemical Ali" (Blacklist #5) date of birth July 1, 1941, place of birth Tikrit, Iraq was interviewed at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Also present at the interview was US Army Representative. US Army Representative. Also present at the interview was FBI Language Analyst, provided Arabic/English translation. After being advised that the interviewing Agents were members of the United States Government from Washington, DC, MAJID provided the following information:

MAJID is from the Abu Nasir tribe or clan located in and around Tikrit, Iraq. Fourteen different tribes/families lived in this area. MAJID's grandfather was the Governor of Tikrit. His father was a well-known, highly respected individual in Tikrit who had "no problems with anyone." There were no major problems between the families of the area. Issues were normally solved without approaching the government for a solution.

Tribal thoughts and customs pervade the entire social structure in Iraq including Baghdad. As an example, MAJID described how the tribe deals with an incident such as a car accident involving a fatality. After the accident, an agreement between the families of the involved parties normally takes place regarding the punishment of the person deemed at fault. This agreement is then presented to a court and sentencing occurs based on the recommendation from the two families.

MAJID's tribe has two primary rules, one which prohibits "fighting" within the tribe and the other which prohibits a man from "flirting" with a single woman. For violation of either rule, an offender would be killed.

The oldest male member of the tribe is generally the "sheikh" or leader and tends to be the one who is most respected and fair. Sometimes, however, the oldest male may not be able to fulfill this function due to mental or physical difficulties. MAJID became "sheikh" of his tribe after the death of the third person in line. Saddam Hussein, MAJID's cousin and former...
President of Iraq, later declared that he was "sheikh" of MAJID's tribe.

Concerning the Iraqi Ba'ath Party (Ba'ath), MAJID advised that from its inception the Party embraced a "democratic and humanitarian vision." MAJID still believes in these principles. The party does not believe in war, killing, mass killings, one person taking charge, oppression, or "bad behaviors." MAJID added Islam does not believe in violence or oppression.

The acts of some members of the Ba'ath, including Hussein, "brought shame to the Party." This included "bad behaviors" that were individual acts of Ba'ath members. MAJID agreed that there was a contradiction between the original tenets of the Ba'ath and the way it was practiced under Hussein's regime. This change occurred from the beginning and continued throughout Hussein's Presidency.

MAJID described a meeting which took place in July, 1979 shortly after Hussein assumed leadership of Iraq. Hussein invited all Ba'ath members to a meeting in Baghdad. MAJID was the Director of a "branch" of the Ba'ath at the time. At the meeting, Hussein provided details of a coup attempt in the Party. Over sixty members were identified and taken by security forces from the meeting hall. The investigation into this matter was headed by Barzan Ibrahim Hasan Al-Tikriti, Hussein's brother. MAJID does not know the details of the investigation and did not look at the files. Until the moment the "plot" was announced, MAJID had heard no information regarding this matter. It appeared that many people had been "marked," meaning they had been previously identified, rightly or wrongly, as being involved in a plot against Hussein. If some were wrongly accused, it was by Barzan and not Hussein. MAJID thought this "plot" might have been a continuation of one uncovered in previous years involving Abdul Khalig Al-Samarra'i and Nathim Ghezar. In 1979, MAJID said, "If Samarra'i lives, coups will continue." MAJID was in a "sad mood" at the time of this meeting. However, he felt all persons identified were guilty.

MAJID described his views regarding Hussein. During the period twenty years ago and more, MAJID considered Hussein to be the closest person to him. They grew apart from then until a period of time about ten years ago. At that time, MAJID came to a "crossroads" in life and was thinking about leaving the Ba'ath. Hussein convinced him to remain. Without Hussein's approval, MAJID's resignation would "shame" his tribe. Thus, MAJID continued.
in government service during the past ten years, though not as a volunteer.

MAJID stated that during this time he was appointed to three different Ministerial posts without first being asked or notified. He learned of these appointments from radio and television announcements. Concerning his most recent appointment as Minister of Interior, MAJID heard that Hussein was reluctant to ask MAJID to serve in this capacity for fear that MAJID would refuse and thereby embarrass Hussein.

Before the 2001 Ba'ath Conference, MAJID asked Hussein whether he would continue as a Party member. MAJID simply wanted out of the Ba'ath. Hussein denied this request. In more recent times, Hussein told MAJID that he could terminate his membership in the Party at the 2004 Conference. MAJID described the day he heard this news as "the happiest day of my life."

During the last seven to eight years, Hussein refused to accept advice or criticism from his closest advisors even if he was wrong. After Hussein Khamil, Hussein's son-in-law, fled Iraq to Jordan in 1995, Hussein did not trust anyone and appeared to change for the worse. He seemed particularly wary of individuals who were respected in the Party.

MAJID described his feelings and those of others regarding issues leading the latest war with the United States. MAJID wanted the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors to visit Iraq in 2003, as did the majority of the Ba'ath leadership. They felt the boycott would not be ended without certification of the termination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. Hussein, however, did not agree that the inspectors should be allowed to enter Iraq. Thus, MAJID and the other leaders had to support Hussein. If not, they would have been viewed as traitors and on the side of the United States.

During this period, Hussein, Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri, Taha Ramadan, Tariq Aziz, and MAJID held a discussion regarding WMD. The four men "pressed" Hussein to tell UNSCOM and the world that Iraq has no WMD. Hussein did not agree stating that Israel would strike Iraq if they felt Iraq had no WMD. At this meeting, MAJID asked Hussein, "Do we have WMD?" Hussein asked, "Don't you know?" MAJID stated "no" to which Hussein replied "no."
Prior to the 2003 war, MAJID attended a meeting of the Iraqi leadership, including Hussein, where MAJID stated that "Iraq will lose the war." However, Hussein was convinced that Iraq would win. MAJID considered this unbelievable as Iraq had undertaken no preparations or special precautions in anticipation of the war. Additionally, no plans were made for the post-war period, especially regarding the potential needs for adjustments or changes in the leadership of Iraq. As before, MAJID wanted to resign. He did not want to take responsibility for the actions of one individual, Hussein. MAJID added, "I'm fair. Saddam is not." Hussein was a "dictatorship of one man." Hussein is "cruel in dealing with everyone including relatives."

MAJID does not believe he has a chance to "clear his name" while imprisoned. He would like to see all the former Iraqi leaders, including those currently in jail, tell the truth and "criticize" Hussein. If MAJID were to do this by himself, he believes he would be viewed as a spy. MAJID stated it would be more appropriate for him to first solicit the opinions and support of other Iraqi leaders.

At this point, interviewers asked how one could get Hussein to take responsibility for his actions. MAJID replied that Hussein would take responsibility if "faced with the facts" such as the previously discussed issue regarding UNSCOM weapons inspectors. Interviewers later asked whether MAJID and other Iraqi leaders would be willing to compile a list of advice offered to Hussein on major issues which Hussein ignored or rejected. MAJID responded that he would first need to talk to these former Iraqi leaders. Later, however, MAJID stated that this could best be accomplished if he were released from custody and had the opportunity to form his own political party.

Interviewers asked whether MAJID considered Hussein "evil." MAJID replied "there are two faces of Saddam." One face revealed a man who freely shared his wealth with those in need. MAJID once saw Hussein crying while reading the Koran. The other face of Hussein was one of "evil." He was "so cruel you could not imagine."

Hussein had no friends, either inside or outside his family. Hussein did not even trust his own sons. His personality was not stable and he was "lonesome." When presented with a problem, Hussein often made quick decisions without all the facts. His worst decision was the most recent war with the United States,
the world's greatest superpower, coming after a lengthy and unsuccessful war with Iraq and thirteen years of an economic boycott.

MAJID acknowledged the "shame" Hussein had brought upon his tribe and the Iraqi people. MAJID appeared to agree that he had a responsibility to reclaim honor for his tribe as a result of Hussein's actions while serving as leader of Iraq.
ALI HASAN AL-MAJID AL-TIKRITI, aka "Chemical Ali" (Blacklist #5) date of birth July 1, 1941, place of birth Tikrit, Iraq was interviewed at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Also present at the interview was US Army Representative, FBI Language Analyst, provided Arabic/English translation. After being advised that the interviewing Agents were members of the United States Government from Washington, DC, MAJID provided the following information:


MAJID first provided background information leading to his appointment to duties in Kuwait. MAJID was summoned to an Iraqi leadership meeting on August 7, 1990. In attendance were Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leaders. Hussein told MAJID that he (MAJID) needed to go to Kuwait. MAJID told Hussein "the leadership is here," and there should be someone among them who is qualified for the job. He reminded Hussein that he had previously sent the Intelligence Director on such a mission and "me going will do no good." Hussein replied, "OK. We'll see." Upon conclusion of the meeting, Hussein announced to everyone that MAJID would be going to Kuwait. At the time of this announcement, MAJID remembers Hussein was placing his handgun on his person. MAJID responded, "By your order, I go." At the time, Sabawi Hasan Ibrahim, Hussein's brother, was already in Kuwait.

Hussein's declaration to the Iraqi leadership authorized MAJID and Sabawi the responsibility of "managing" Kuwait. Aziz Saleh Al-Noman was appointed Governor of Kuwait and "included" in the security plans.

The work in Kuwait was divided into two parts, with Sabawi serving as Director of Intelligence in charge of security of Kuwait and MAJID charged with the responsibility of maintaining "organization" among the various Ministries. Sabawi was in charge of the Security Committee of Kuwait with members from various government components including intelligence, special security, the...
police, the military, and the militia. MAJID stated both he and Sabawi had equal overall responsibility with respect to Kuwait.

In Kuwait, MAJID interacted with various ministers including the Minister of High Education, the Minister of Trade, the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Transportation, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Industry, and the Minister of Local Government.

Part of MAJID's duties and one which he was "happiest" to perform was the protection of the "belongings and finances" of the people of Kuwait. MAJID stated, "I was severe in performing my job" and "committed crimes." These "crimes" were actions directed at Iraqi military personnel who broke the law. MAJID described the details of three events or "crimes."

In one instance, a captain in the Iraqi forces told soldiers under his command to burglarize an electronics store in Kuwait. The soldiers complied, broke into the store, and took various electronic devices including televisions. When MAJID heard of this incident, he ordered the arrest of the captain. The matter was then referred to a committee for investigation. Upon conclusion, the captain was sentenced to death. Normally, the arrest of a military officer requires approval by Hussein or the Minister of Defense. In this instance, MAJID called one of Hussein's bodyguards for "approval" to carry out the sentence after the conclusion of the investigation and trial. Thereafter, Presidential Secretary Hamid Hamadi informed MAJID of the approval. The execution was carried out in Kuwait in front of a government building in the county of Al-Kathima.

In another incident, a woman in Kuwait, possibly Lebanese, was sexually assaulted by an Iraqi soldier. MAJID contacted the head of the military unit of the accused soldier and a committee was formed to investigate the attack. The soldier was found guilty and sentenced to death. With the permission of the woman, the soldier was executed at the same location the assault occurred.

The third incident involved three Iraqi military personnel who raped a Kuwaiti woman and stole items from her house. Again, an investigation took place and the three men were sentenced to death. With the permission of the woman, the men were executed in front of her house.
MAJID only attended executions of military personnel. He never attended executions of civilians.

MAJID denied personal knowledge of any atrocities committed in Kuwait by Iraqi military members or Iraqi citizens prior to or during the reported occurrences during the occupation of Kuwait. MAJID is aware of media reports regarding these events which came after the occupation. MAJID is not aware of the results of an international (and not Kuwaiti) investigation detailing the crimes committed. He has no knowledge of the findings of the investigation which details the atrocities including torture sites located at police stations or sports facilities, punishment including amputations of limbs, ears, noses, tongues, genitalia, and eyes, and torture via use of electric shock. Furthermore, MAJID is not aware of 500 Iraqis identified as war criminals and 1082 Kuwaiti civilian deaths, including 57 mentally handicapped individuals, which occurred as a direct result of Iraqi misconduct. MAJID denied knowledge of punishment, including execution, of individuals who failed to display pictures of Hussein, displayed pictures of the Kuwaiti royal family, or wrote anti-Iraqi graffiti. MAJID stated "If I had heard of these atrocities you detailed, I would have asked to be released from duty." He does not doubt they occurred but reiterated that he never heard such information, did not witness such events, and had no knowledge of these events at that time. If committed, these atrocities would have been carried out by the Iraqi Intelligence Service under the direction of Sabawi who reported directly to Hussein.

MAJID is aware of the destruction/sabotage of the Burgan and Al-Rumaila oil fields by the Iraqi military. This "operation" was not the responsibility or under control of MAJID but fell under the direction of the Iraqi military.

MAJID denied personal knowledge of any persecution, including executions and imprisonment, of Shia Muslims living in southern Iraq in 1991. He denied personal knowledge of the destruction of Shia villages during this or any other time.

MAJID denied personal knowledge of any persecution, including executions and imprisonment, of Kurdish individuals living in northern Iraq during the Anfal Campaign in the late 1980s. He denied personal knowledge of the destruction of Kurdish villages during this or any other time.
MAJID denied personal knowledge or responsibility regarding Iraqi use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, against the Kurds, or at any other time. He stated, "I never used or saw anything about chemicals."

MAJID avoided interfering with "things that had nothing to do" with him. He felt as if Hussein was "watching" him. At one point, Hussein took some property from MAJID.

When asked whether he feared Hussein in the past, MAJID replied, "Yes. I was afraid that if I disobeyed him, he would tell our tribe that I was a coward." When asked whether he feared Hussein now, MAJID replied, "No. If given a month to talk to our tribe, I would be able to convince them and Saddam would lose to me."

MAJID wishes Hussein was dead. MAJID wishes Hussein had "martyred or killed" himself instead of being captured. Hussein's sons (Qusay and Uday) died "honorably," even though Uday was a bad person. In contrast, Hussein's ending (capture) was "lousy," displayed his cowardice, and brought shame to the tribe. Martyrdom of Hussein would have brought honor to the tribe. After Hussein's capture, MAJID offered to kill him for the US military. MAJID believes history will be the judge of Iraq and Hussein as its ruler for the past twenty-four years.

MAJID does not consider himself a failure, except that he "stayed with Hussein." MAJID feels he had no choice but to carry out Hussein's orders.

Though Hussein is no longer head of their tribe, MAJID stated that he could not testify against him because it would "shame the tribe." If given the opportunity to first talk to the tribe, MAJID feels he could explain the situation. Then, he might be able to provide information in public regarding Hussein.
KHALID NAJIM ABDALLAH AL-SULTAN, aka KHALID ABDUL AL-MAJID AL-TIKRITI (Blacklist # 143), date of birth June 30, 1964, place of birth Tikrit, Iraq was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents were identified as members of the United States Government from Washington, DC. Also present at the interview was British representative from the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG), Baghdad. FBI Language Analyst, provided Arabic/English translation. Khalid provided the following information:

In 1982, when Khalid was 18 years old and attending high school, he obtained a job with Himaya, the security force responsible for the protection of Saddam Hussein. He was able to obtain this employment through the help of a distant cousin, Hussein Kamil, who worked with the Murafiqin, Saddam Hussein's closest bodyguards. As part of his employment, he attended a 45-day preliminary course which included physical fitness and weapons training. While Khalid worked with the Himaya, he continued attending high school and graduated in 1983. The following year, he began studying for his Baccalaurate degree which he subsequently received in 1996. Khalid continued to work with Himaya for the next twenty years, until 2002.

Khalid related that the Himaya never had advanced knowledge where Hussein was going. The Murafiqin would tell Himaya where to go, and they would follow behind. When they arrived at a location where Hussein would exit his vehicle, the Himaya would form a protective circle around him. Sometimes, Hussein's personal bodyguards and members of the Republican Guard would surround Hussein as well. Typically, the Himaya consisted of two 30-man teams, each working a 48-hour shift. The Murafiqin consisted of two teams of 1-3 members. On local protection details, the Himaya and Murafiqin would be joined by approximately 100-300 Republican Guards. On overnight journeys, approximately 1000 Republican Guards would be mobilized.

Khalid noted that in the 1980's, Hussein never bad-mouthed his security detail. After the 1990's, however, he "became

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like a beast, swore and bad-mouthed them." In fact, he kept a very close watch on the Himaya, and if he saw something he did not like, he would see to it that the offending party was punished. For example, Khalid recalled an incident in which Hussein's motorcade passed a truck which was parked on the opposite side of the road from the motorcade. Rather than stopping the motorcade to determine why the truck was there, Khalid and other members of the Himaya chose to ignore the truck in order for the motorcade to continue on its way. Believing that the motorcade should have stopped to investigate the presence of this truck, Hussein directed that Khalid and two of his colleagues be imprisoned for three weeks as punishment.

Khalid advised that during his tenure with the Himaya, he observed a distinct difference in Hussein's temperament as well as his pattern of communication and mobility. For example, prior to 1990, Hussein freely used telephones. However, after 1990 and the Gulf War, Hussein avoided using telephones, fearful that U.S. satellites would intercept his communications and be able to track his whereabouts. Hussein also worried that satellites would be able to locate his motorcade, either by reading the license plate number of his vehicle or by spotting a cluster of motorcade vehicles and guards standing outside locations where Hussein was visiting. Accordingly, Hussein directed that the license plates on his vehicle be changed every few days. He further directed that both motorcade vehicles and guards remain underneath covered areas as much as possible to avoid being spotted by satellites. Those violating this edict received "big punishment." In terms of mobility, after the Gulf War, Hussein seldom traveled away from Baghdad. This stood in stark contrast to his frequent trips to northern and southern Iraq prior to 1990. It was as though Hussein chose to live in a "cocoon."

As a result of Hussein's watchful eyes over the Himaya, his growing paranoia since the Gulf War and his proclivity to punish members of the Himaya over relatively minor transgressions, Khalid described his job as "hell." He and colleagues "hated" their jobs and quietly joked about Hussein's paranoia. However, he was careful when talking about his disdain of Hussein and his antipathy toward his job. For example, when expressing criticism about Hussein to his (Khalid's) wife, Khalid would cover his telephone or leave the room as a precaution in case his conversations were being monitored by Hussein's internal security apparatus.
Khalid recalled that Hussein was at his happiest when he was meeting with his girlfriends, and other women as well. Whenever Hussein wanted to see he would arrange for one of his protection detail to pick her up at her residence and then transport her to one of his palaces. Meeting however, was easier since she worked as an engineer and could arrange for her own transportation.

Regarding Hussein's family, Khalid related that since approximately 1988-89, Hussein visited with them only infrequently. For example, he saw his wife and other members of his family, including his family, including his son, Uday, about once or twice every few months. On these occasions, he would invite them either individually or collectively to join him for dinner at one of his palaces. These visits would last approximately 1-2 hours after which the family members would return home.

Not only did Hussein appear disinterested in his family, he also appeared not to trust them. In Khalid's opinion, Hussein trusted only his son, Qusay, and certainly not his son, Uday, whom he could not control and whom Hussein appeared to fear. In contrast, Uday did not seem to be afraid or intimidated by his father.

Khalid characterized Hussein as a selfish person. He thought it unlikely that Hussein would be trying to "groom" either of his sons as his successor since Hussein appeared to be enjoying his power too much. He said that if Hussein had his choice, he would remain in power for 2000 years.

After his two sons-in-law, Hussein and Saddam Kamil, fled to Jordan in 1995 with their wives, Hussein stopped trusting everyone except Qusay, whom he trusted completely, and his personal secretary, Abd Hamid Mahmoud Al-Khattab Al-Nasiri Al-Tikriti, whom he trusted "just under 100%.

Concerning Hussein's leadership, Khalid observed that Hussein liked to consider himself as one of the greatest leaders in the world on the scale of the ancient King of Babylon, Nebuchadnezzar, and Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser. However, Hussein demonstrated very poor leadership in his ill-fated decisions to go to war with Iran and to invade Kuwait despite advice and warnings from a world coalition. Khalid placed the responsibility of Iraq's fall squarely on the shoulders of Hussein and his close advisors who were, in his view either "liars or yes
men." According to Khalid, the people below Hussein and his advisors simply "had no voice."

Khalid was asked if during his twenty-year assignment to the Himaya if he ever witnessed behavior suggesting Hussein had a humanitarian side to his personality. Khalid recalled an incident in approximately 1983-84 when the Presidential motorcade came upon an auto accident on a road between Basra and Baghdad. Two vehicles had apparently collided. Hussein ordered the motorcade to stop, and he dispatched medical personnel from the motorcade to assist the victims. Hussein ordered his staff to send the victims to Europe for hospitalization and treatment if necessary. Additionally, he directed that each party be given a new vehicle to replace the ones damaged in the accident.

Anniversaries which were special to Hussein were the Western New Year and his birthday. For his birthday, Hussein would have a public celebration and then meet privately with one of his girlfriends. Khalid could not remember an occasion in which Hussein celebrated his birthday with his wife or children.

In terms of hobbies, Hussein enjoyed swimming, fishing and hunting. His idea of hunting was to shoot flocks of birds from a helicopter.

Khalid described Hussein's health as "good." He recalled that in the 1980's, Hussein stayed awake for long hours in his office or in the command post watching the news. In the 1990's, however, Hussein began retiring between 9-11pm and rising early in the morning.

At the conclusion of the interview, Khalid advised that prior to the 2003 war between the United States and Iraq, he fled to Syria. After the Americans began occupying Iraq, he decided to turn himself in even though he knew his name was not among the 55 Iraqis most wanted by U.S. forces. He added that part of his motivation was to be able to see his family again.
Abd Hamid Mahmoud Al-Khattab Al-Nasiri Al-Tikriti, date of birth 07/01/1956, (Black List #4), was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. The interviewing Agents were identified as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. Department of Defense representative was also present during the entire interview. FBI Language Analyst, provided Arabic/English translation. Al-Tikriti provided the following information:

Al-Tikriti completed his Master's thesis on the Israeli military and its influence in Israeli politics. Al-Tikriti's findings were that the Israeli military controlled the Israeli government and dictated the government's policies. In other countries, the political components of government make decisions which are then carried out by its military. However, in Israel, the military dictates the political decisions and then carries them out. Al-Tikriti based his findings on the research and texts which he read, as well as his professor who convinced him to pursue this thesis. Al-Tikriti was impressed with the Israeli military reserve capability. The Israeli military is not a large army, but because of its efficient and well trained reserve force, its capabilities are dramatically increased. Additionally, The Israeli army is very good at taking offensive actions against its enemies on its enemies' soil, protecting its own soil.

Al-Tikriti described his duties as the Presidential Secretary as overseeing the other governmental secretaries, controlling the mail flow to the President, except mail from the Presidential Diwan. In addition, Al-Tikriti served as the focal point for the President's appointments, cables from foreign ministers, the media, and Presidential appointments of ambassadors and governmental directors. Al-Tikriti did not have oversight on matters within the control of Qusay Saddam Hussein, or the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), especially if it involved Presidential taskings. Additionally, Al-Tikriti would not open confidential letters from senior government figures such as Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri or Ali Hassan Al-Majid. Al-Tikriti assumed this post in

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by George L. Pirca

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1991. Prior to that, the duties were executed by the National Security Council (NSC) Secretary.

Al-Tikriti also took over the secretarial responsibility for the NSC in 1991 from Hamid Hamadi (phonetic), who held the position from 1983 to 1991. The NSC was comprised of the President, the Vice President, the Presidential Secretary, the Minister of Interior, the Director of the IIS (Mukhabarat), the Director of the Special Security Organization (SSO) (Al Amn Al-Khas), the Directorate of General Security (DGS) (Al Amn Al-'am), and the Director of the Military Intelligence (Istakhbarat). The Minister of Defense would attend only if a military matter was to be discussed. After Al-Tikriti assumed the post of Secretary of the NSC, the President did not attend a single NSC meeting. Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri usually presided over NSC meetings. The budget of three of the four services is approved by the NSC, while the SSO budget is approved by the Presidential Diwan. The NSC's discussions usually dealt with general internal security issues, such as border check points. The IIS and the SSO were not permitted to disclose or discuss their operations, even during meetings of the NSC. DGS was allowed to discuss issues only after approval by the President. In Al-Tikriti's opinion, the NSC did not serve a true purpose and did not have any true power.

Al-Tikriti was a member of the Himaya (Protective Unit for Hussein) in 1979. He was present during an infamous July meeting in which Hussein announced the discovery within his ranks of a coup attempt involving Iraqi governmental officials, backed by the Syrian government. At the time of this announcement, Al-Tikriti was assigned to guard duties on the second floor balcony overlooking the crowd. Hussein was on the stage with Muhie Abd Al-Hussein Mashhadi, the Secretary General of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). Hussein directed Mashhadi to detail the plans of the coup, which he did. Mashhadi described the coup attempt and identified several alleged co-conspirators among the crowd who were then ordered to stand. Hussein ordered these individuals to leave and had members of the Himaya escort them to waiting IIS officers who had vehicles ready to take them away. Al-Tikriti identified Barzan Ibrahim Hasan Al-Tikriti as the Director and Sa'dun Shakir as the Deputy Director of the IIS at that time and advised they were responsible for the investigation of the coup attempt.

Al-Tikriti is not aware of any atrocities, torture or mass executions, having taken place in Iraq. He became aware of
the mass graves in southern Iraq from media broadcasts, and he was shocked. Al-Tikriti felt those actions were criminal and that those responsible should be punished.

Al-Tikriti previously thought of Saddam Hussein as a fair man based on how he treated others. However, approximately a year and half ago, an incident made him change his mind. There was a dispute between nephews of Hussein and nephews of Al-Tikriti. Hussein sided with his own nephews when Al-Tikriti felt he should not have. After that incident, Al-Tikriti sensed that Hussein began to distrust him and began isolating him, an early indicator that Hussein might eventually remove him from his assignment. Further indication of Al-Tikriti's isolation and potential elimination from his position occurred when Hussein named Jamal Mustafa Abdullah, Hussein's son-in-law, as Deputy Presidential Secretary. Normally, Al-Tikriti would speak out when he did not agree with Hussein or would point out differing viewpoints from the ministers. After the "nephew" incident, Hussein told him to not get involved in these issues. Al-Tikriti discussed this with Qusay Saddam Hussein, as the two were friends. Al-Tikriti did not/does not feel he was the fourth most important man in Iraq by "rank" and ranked himself below the ministers and other key figures in the government. The "nephew" incident, among other things, led Al-Tikriti to want to leave his post but he claimed he could not just resign. Al-Tikriti's two sons were attending medical schools and he had hopes of building a hospital and having his sons operate it.

According to Al-Tikriti, the most important thing to Hussein was protecting Baghdad, as it was directly linked to Hussein's own protection. By protecting Baghdad, Hussein was, in effect, protecting his position as President of Iraq. Al-Tikriti described Hussein as egotistic and gave Kuwait and the 2003 war with the United States as examples. Al-Tikriti was opposed to the war with Kuwait, as an Arab country should not attack another Arab country with arms. During all of Al-Tikriti's time with Hussein as his bodyguard and then as his Secretary, he never heard Hussein blame himself for any mistakes that occurred. Hussein claimed that he was not afraid of prison and that he could handle it, as Hussein had been previously imprisoned. Although Hussein appeared to be mentally sharp, his personality was such that he often appeared to be unbalanced, contributing to his poor decision making.

Al-Tikriti never saw Hussein kill anyone. Al-Tikriti is aware that Hussein ordered/approved the executions of a number of Iraqi military personnel, possibly five or six, in 1991 after the
war. Al-Tikriti has never seen a film showing Hussein kill someone.
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TARIQ AZIZ (Blacklist #25), date of birth April 1, 1936, place of birth Mosul, Iraq, was interviewed at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Also present at the interview was US Army Representative. After being advised that the interviewing Agents were members of the United States Government from Washington, DC, AZIZ provided the following information in English:

AZIZ detailed various events precipitating the Iran-Iraq War, fought from 1980-1988.

Beginning in 1975, relations between Iraq and Iran were "normalized" with the signing of the "Algiers Agreement." This agreement, concerning the Shatt-al-Arab Waterway, essentially eliminated the external threat to Iraq from Iran and established "friendly" relations between the two countries.

By 1978-79, however, relations between the two countries changed for the worse. This deterioration was due to the presence of exiled Iranian cleric Ayatollah Khomeini in Najaf, Iraq and the dissension towards the Iranian government resulting from his preachings.

The Shah of Iran asked Saddam Hussein to "turn over" Khomeini to Iran. Hussein refused citing tradition and Arab cultural requirements towards "guests" such as Khomeini. Khomeini remained in Iraq but refused to cease his rhetoric calling for the overthrow of the Iranian government. In AZIZ' opinion, Khomeini was a "political refugee" and was not supposed to act in this manner.

At one point, Khomeini attempted to leave Iraq and enter Kuwait. He was refused entry and returned to Iraq for a short period. Eventually, "arrangements" were made by the Iraqi government and Khomeini departed Iraq to live in Paris, France. AZIZ felt Khomeini "held a grudge" against Iraq because of these events.
In 1979, Khomeini came to power in Iran upon the overthrow of the Shah. Khomeini attempted to proclaim himself as the "Imam" for the Shia sect of Islam. An "Imam" is supposed to be a direct descendent of Imam Hussein, which Khomeini was not. According to belief, the twelfth Imam, the last one, disappeared and Shias are awaiting his return. AZIZ described this belief as similar to the Christian belief regarding the return of Jesus Christ. Khomeini felt it was not logical to await the return of the "Imam," that it might take thousands of years. Thus, he proposed that he be proclaimed "Deputy of the Imam" and be allowed to conduct affairs as the "Imam" would until his return. He would fulfill this function first for the Shias, then for all Muslims.

For Shias, all of the important "sanctuaries" or religious sites are physically located in Iraq. Thus, in AZIZ' opinion, when Khomeini announced the concept of the "Deputy of the Imam," he was targeting Iraq. Khomeini viewed Hussein as a non-believer in Islam and therefore an illegitimate ruler.

An exchange of communications took place between the governments of Iran and Iraq in 1980, with no success in resolving tensions. Hussein later convened a meeting of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and told members that Iraq would have to go to war with Iran. AZIZ, RCC member since 1977, served as Deputy Prime Minister at the time. He did not "protest" the decision made by Hussein. Additionally, no one else in the RCC spoke out against the war and no formal vote was taken.

AZIZ repeated and added to previous interview information regarding the decision-making process prior to and under Hussein. According to the Iraqi Constitution, the RCC had the power to vote on issues, such as the Iran-Iraq War. Before Hussein's Presidency, RCC meetings were held regularly with minutes recorded for each meeting. After Hussein assumed Iraqi leadership in 1979, he changed this practice and held RCC meetings at irregular times of his choosing, terminated RCC voting, ceased recording of minutes of meetings, and made decisions on his own.

Just prior to the Iran-Iraq War, Hussein convened a meeting of the National Assembly. Hussein presented information regarding the situation vis-a-vis Iran, his perceived "annulment" of the 1975 treaty between Iraq and Iran, and his belief that Iraq had to go to war with Iran. A "vote" took place in support of the war with a simple clap of the hands of National Assembly members. No formal votes were recorded nor was a debate held regarding the
war. Ultimately, the final decision regarding fighting the war rested with Hussein.

Hussein sent AZIZ to Moscow just prior to the war to "remind" the Soviets of the "treaty of friendship" between Iraq and the Soviet Union. Soviet officials, including the Deputy Foreign Minister, suggested that Iraq should make peace with Iran. They stated that the Soviet Union could not/would not support Iraq in the war. In AZIZ' opinion, the Soviets thought they could ally with Iran. The Soviets were incorrect, however, as Iran viewed the Soviet Union as the "Second Great Satan" after the United States which was considered the "First Great Satan." Further complicating any Soviet-Iranian alliance was the fact that Khomenei had imprisoned and/or executed communists in Iran. While in Moscow, AZIZ received an official cable from Iraq announcing the war had begun. AZIZ then returned to Baghdad.

Clashes between the two countries began with Iran first entering Iraqi territory in September, 1980. Initially, Iraq lost control of several cities and other territory, especially in the southern portion of the country. These areas were quickly regained, however. Generally, Iraq "was winning" the war, taking some Iranian territory, through 1982. Those early successes, however, changed for the worse as a result of the actions of Hussein.

Hussein "micro-managed" military operations, acting "more like a military officer than a President." To a lesser extent, Adnan Khairallah, Hussein's cousin and Minister of Defense, also managed military operations. Although Military Chief of Staff Nazar Khazraji was a very qualified military officer, Hussein made all the decisions. Hussein traveled to the front lines "hundreds of times" pretending to be a military expert/tactician. In AZIZ' opinion, Hussein "interfered" with military operations and concerned himself with details beyond the scope of his duties and abilities. As an example, AZIZ stated Hussein would sometimes provide direction to the military regarding the preparation of trenches on the battlefield. As a consequence of Hussein's "interference" and incompetence, the Iraqi military suffered huge losses including approximately 10,000 soldiers killed in single battle at Khorramshahr.

In 1982, AZIZ participated in another meeting with Soviet officials to discuss bilateral relations and support for the war. Thereafter, the Soviets acquiesced and began providing military
weapons to Iraq. From that point forward, AZIZ considered relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union as "improved."

Despite these Soviet arms shipments to Iraq, Iran appeared to have the "upper hand" in the war after 1982. This included taking back some territory and cities. At this time, it was generally thought that Iraq had lost/would lose the war. As a result, there was significant talk in the Middle Eastern press outside of Iraq regarding replacing Hussein with one of various individuals named as possible successors. However, no internal discussion took place within the government in Iraq regarding a change of leadership.

Iraqi leaders felt that Iran received support from Israel around this time. This assumption was based on the shooting down of an Argentinian aircraft in Iraq that carried a cargo of Israeli weapons.

In 1985, Hussein and AZIZ visited Soviet leader Gorbachev and other Soviet officials in Moscow. AZIZ served as Foreign Minister at this time. From this point through the end of the war in 1988, relations were "good" with the Soviet Union. They continued to provide arms to Iraq. During the earlier years of the war, the Soviets had "closed their eyes" to arms shipments to Iraq from Eastern bloc countries including Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary.

During the war in 1984-85, Iran attacked civilian areas including the city of Baghdad with recently acquired SCUD missiles. Though possibly targeting military facilities, the missiles' poor guidance system caused them to fall on civilian locations. Iraq also targeted Iranian cities, including Dasht-e Kavir, with missiles. In 1986, Iraq acquired SCUD missiles which were capable of reaching the Iranian capital city of Tehran.

Although strong, the Iranian Air Force had a limited range and generally attacked cities close to the border occupied by Iraqi forces including Abadan, Basra, and Amarah. One focus of these attacks was Iraqi oil production facilities. The Iraqi Air Force, on the other hand, had even greater difficulty reaching into Iran.

AZIZ commented on Iraq and Iran's use of chemical weapons during the war. Around 1984, French President Francois Mitterand sent a letter to AZIZ saying it was not appropriate for Iraq to use
chemical weapons. Evidently, the French had learned that Iraq was considering the use of such weapons. According to AZIZ, it was common knowledge in the media that Hussein might decide to use chemical weapons.

Hussein did not convene a meeting of the RCC, National Assembly, or any other Iraqi or Ba'ath Party government entity to discuss recommendations regarding the use of or approval for the use of chemical weapons prior to their deployment. Hussein gave no official written or verbal notification of the use of the weapons after deployment. AZIZ stated the RCC was "informed" and "it was mentioned." He added it was "common knowledge" through the media that chemical weapons had been used. No RCC member protested their use because of fear of reprisals from Hussein and fear that Iraq would lose the war without such a drastic step. At the time, the situation was viewed as dire and "life or death." AZIZ agreed that Iraq, and Iran, violated provisions of Geneva Conventions of 1917 and 1948, signed by both countries, prohibiting the use of chemical weapons.

While AZIZ agreed that it is an undisputed fact that Iraq used chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, he added that according to the Iraqi military, Iran also used chemical weapons at the onset of hostilities. AZIZ reiterated the decision for Iraq to use these weapons was made by Hussein and, at times, Khairallah in consultation with Khazraji.

The war ended in 1988. Many in the Iraqi government considered the war a victory for the country as they were not defeated by Iran, a country three times the size of Iraq with a better trained and equipped military. Many felt that Iraq "forced" Iran to agree to a cease fire. AZIZ pointed out that Iraq accepted the original United Nations cease fire in September, 1980 at the start of the war, while Iran did not. He also added that Iraq agreed in 1987 to UN Resolution 598 calling for a cease fire, while Iran did not. AZIZ feels Iran ultimately agreed to cease hostilities in 1988 due to Iraqi successes at that time in the war including the recapture of the Al-Faw Peninsula.

AZIZ stated the Iran-Iraq War was "the most foolish decision of the two countries." For Iraq, the loss in human lives as well as economic damage was catastrophic. The budget surpluses prior to the war changed to overwhelming debt after the conflict. AZIZ reiterated, despite all this, Iraqis felt victorious. AZIZ believes if Iraq had devoted as much human and financial effort
elsewhere to internal development instead of war, Iraq could have been very prosperous, on the level of other countries such as the United Arab Emirates or Switzerland.

AZIZ provided comments regarding the Kurdish situation in Iraq. He described the situation with the Kurds in 1987-88 as "another serious problem." The two most infamous events regarding the Kurds were the use of chemical weapons at Halabja and the Anfal Campaign (Anfal).

AZIZ agreed that the first confirmed use of chemical weapons in the world against a civilian population occurred at Halabja, Iraq in March, 1988. Although he agreed with speculation that the weapons may have been deployed to deter Iranian forces from occupying Halabja, he acknowledged that, in fact, the city was occupied by Kurds and not Iranians. AZIZ indicated that he learned more about the attack after watching a film on Halabja produced by the media which showed "a few corpses" of men, women, and children dead as a result of the attack. AZIZ claimed that he does not know how many people were killed during the attack.

After the attack, Hussein admitted chemical weapons had been used at Halabja. The authority to use them rested in the hands of Hussein alone at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War. Khairallah and Khazraj were asked for and were given this power by Hussein during the war. In early 1988, Hussein withdrew this authority from them. Khairallah, however, told Hussein this would "weaken" the military's ability and his power to act decisively and quickly. Thereafter, Hussein returned the authority to use chemical weapons to Khairallah and Khazraj, and the two of them used these weapons at Halabja. According to AZIZ, Hussein did not specifically order the chemical weapons attack on Halabja but was notified afterwards. Hussein told AZIZ, "Halabja was not my decision. It was in the hands of Khairallah and Khazraj." At one point afterwards, Hussein said the chemical weapons attack was not necessary. Hussein was "bothered" by the attack because of the international ramifications and "outrage" from the world community. AZIZ noted that Hussein did not punish, reprimand, or remove either Khairallah or Khazraj from their positions. Normally, this would have been his response when someone's actions reflected negatively on him. AZIZ is unsure whether the lack of punitive action on Hussein's part implied his post-event approval.

AZIZ stated there is a 1989 Institute of Defense, Pentagon report which indicates Iran used chemical weapons first at
Halabja and Iraq used them second. According to AZIZ, this report was published in a "limited manner."

In 1988 after the Iran-Iraq War cease fire in August, Hussein appointed Ali Hasan Al-Majid Al-Tikriti as head of the "north" including Mosul. Majid had served as Minister of Local Affairs prior to this position. This new appointment gave him "exceptional" powers and placed him in charge of Anfal, aimed at "neutralizing" the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq. The decision to appoint Majid to this position was made by Hussein without discussion with the RCC, Council of Ministers, or any other Iraqi government or Ba'ath Party entity. This appointment was viewed as "strange" as other government members already held responsibilities associated with this region. Further compounding the oddness of the decision was the fact that Majid was not even an RCC member. In AZIZ' opinion, this made the appointment unconstitutional. A document informing the RCC of this decision was provided to all members. It was written on behalf of the RCC, without consultation, and signed by Hussein. It announced that Majid was in charge of the northern part of Iraq and gave him the power of the RCC. Thus, Majid reported to Hussein and no one else, including the Military Chief of Staff or Minister of Defense.

The primary purpose of Anfal was to stop the Kurdish insurgency inside Iraq. Most of the Kurdish population lived in Iraq near the northern border with Iran. A decision was made to relocate the population, at least a significant portion, to settlements one hundred kilometers or more inside Iraq. This relocation was accomplished in a "harsh manner." Those who conducted the relocation, including Majid and the Governors of the region, were "idiots." In AZIZ' opinion, they probably felt they had to accomplish the task quickly in order to be viewed by Hussein as successful.

Neither AZIZ nor any other RCC member was informed or asked for an opinion prior to the start of Anfal. No RCC member protested the decision once the details became known, through the media. AZIZ stated, at the time, it seemed "justified for the security of the nation." In retrospect, Anfal was criminal in nature. AZIZ added he "would not have done this" and it was "not his way of doing things."

Through the media, AZIZ heard information about documentation of Anfal provided post Gulf War (1991) by Kurds from
Irbil. Media reports documented the mistreatment and abuse of the Kurds by the Iraqi government.

There are disputed accounts whether Majid authorized and whether the Iraqi military actually used chemical weapons during Anfal. Some reports indicated "flour" was dropped by aircraft, not chemical weapons, in order to psychologically affect the Kurds making them believe chemical weapons were used or might be used. In later years, an American team arrived and conducted an investigation but could find no evidence of the use of chemical weapons during Anfal.

AZIZ concluded by stating that Majid was "a violent person, and everyone knew it." At the detention facility where AZIZ and MAJID are currently housed, Majid told other prisoners that he (Majid) is "negotiating a settlement" with the Americans. AZIZ told the other prisoners "he is a liar." In AZIZ opinion, an agreement between Majid and the Americans will never occur because Majid has an international reputation for evil and is known throughout the world as, "Chemical Ali."

According to AZIZ, Hussein continued using telephones until August, 1990. This included regular use during the Iran-Iraq War and the Kurdish insurgency campaign previously discussed. Hussein stopped using telephones upon the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
On February 21, 2004, Sa'dun Shakir Mahmud Ahmad Al-Ubaidi, date of birth July 1, 1939, place of birth Baghdad, Iraq, was interviewed at the military detention facility, Baghdad International Airport, Iraq. Al-Ubaidi was advised the identity of the interviewing agents as representatives of the United States Government, and the interview was observed by DOD personnel. Al-Ubaidi provided the following information:

In 1957, Al-Ubaidi graduated from Mustansiriya University, in Baghdad, having majored in political law. After the 1968 Iraqi revolution, he was appointed to a leadership position in the Ba'ath Party (Party). Al-Ubaidi first met Saddam Hussein in 1966 while the two were imprisoned at the Al-Rashid camp, Prison #1. Hussein was a known and recognized member of the Party, primarily due to his involvement in the assassination attempt on Iraqi President Abdul Karim Qassem in 1959. The assassination attempt became widely known as some of those involved in the assassination attempt were captured and their trial was televised. Others, like Hussein, fled the country.

Al-Ubaidi drove the getaway car during Hussein's escape from prison in 1966. Al-Ubaidi's relationship with Hussein, including the prison escape, has been detailed in approximately three books based on information provided by Hussein. Additionally, Al-Ubaidi was interviewed once by an Iraqi newspaper regarding their relationship. In Al-Ubaidi's opinion, the books' depictions of the events were accurate. However, as Hussein became more prominent in the government, their contact became minimal due to Hussein's professional demands. The two would occasionally see each other at the Hunting Club, which was described as a social club, where Al-Ubaidi was the president. On a few occasions, Hussein also participated in hunting trips with Al-Ubaidi and others from the Hunting Club.

In 1972, Al-Ubaidi was named the Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS). At the time, the IIS was not very sophisticated and mostly focused on internal security and the protection of the government, especially from the Iranian threat. During Al-Ubaidi's reign as Director, the IIS was divided into
three sections, political, administrative, and technical. The IIS eventually evolved into a broader service, which included both internal and external intelligence functions. As the IIS Director, Al-Ubadli took his orders from both President Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr and Vice President Hussein. Reports prepared by the IIS were provided to both Bakr and Hussein.

When questioned about the alleged coup attempt by several Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) members in 1979, Al-Ubadli stated he was aware of the general facts of the coup attempt. However, the investigation was conducted by Barzan Ibrahim Al-Hasan, Hussein's half-brother who was the Deputy Director of the IIS at that time. Barzan Al-Hasan reported directly to Hussein and Al-Ubadli claimed he did not know how the plot was uncovered or what investigative techniques were used in the identify the conspirators. The plot was uncovered at the time Hussein became the President, as well as Barzan Al-Hasan became the IIS Director. Al-Ubadli did recall an RCC meeting in which Bakr's resignation and Hussein's selection as the new President were announced. During this meeting, Muhie Shamari, as he was known at the time, spoke out about Bakr's resignation and Hussein's selection as a conspiracy. Hussein responded to Muhie Shamari, stating he was aware of Muhie's own conspiracy and ordered him out of the room, where he was arrested by the Himaya (security detail). Mohammad Ayesh tried to defend Muhie, stating that he should not be treated in that fashion, and, Hussein also stated he was implicated in the conspiracy and ordered him out of the room. Al-Ubadli claimed the Himaya advised that shortly after Ayesh's detention, Ayesh swallowed a pill and died several hours later. This caused many to believe that he committed suicide.

Al-Ubadli attended the July 22, 1979 meeting in which the plot was described to the members of the Ba'ath Party, and the identities of the conspirators were revealed. Muhie Shamari spoke at the meeting, confessing his involvement in the plot. He was identified by the last name Mashhadi, indicating that his origins are from the city of Mashhad in Iran. Al-Ubadli claimed he was not involved in the investigation nor the prosecution of the suspects, but believed they were guilty as reported by others.

In 1979, Al-Ubadli was named the Minister of Interior. The Ministry originally oversaw the security of the country such as police services, internal defense and the Directorate of General Security, as well as the governing of local governments and counties. However, after Al-Ubadli took over the Ministry, the two
duties were split, with the security aspect being retained by the Ministry of Interior and the governing of the local governments being assigned to a new Ministry. However, Al-Ubaidi claimed his oversight of the country's security was administrative and not operational.

When asked on his stances as an RCC member regarding significant events in Iraq history, such as the Iraq and Iran War, he stated he supported the President and the RCC's decision regarding the war as Iran had attacked Iraq first. Regarding the naming of Ali Hasan Al-Majid as the Governor of Northern Iraq and being provided the authority and power of the RCC body during the Anfal Campaign, Al-Ubaidi stated that the decision was not voted on by the RCC and was made solely by Hussein. Regarding the use of chemical weapons against both Iran and civilian Kurds, Al-Ubaidi stated he was unaware of these events and the decisions made regarding use of chemical weapons. He only learned of the use of these weapons later from international news reporting. Al-Ubaidi stated that the use of the chemical weapons, especially against civilians, was inhumane. When asked if Al-Ubaidi spoke out against these acts carried out by the Iraqi government, he stated no, as they were never brought up for discussion.

Al-Ubaidi was removed from his post in 1990 when he spoke out against Hussein's position regarding Kuwait. The Iraqi government obtained a tape of a conversation between King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and an unknown second Arab leader, wherein King Fahd mocked the Iraqi leadership and government during its build up on the Kuwaiti border. Saddam Hussein played the tape to the RCC in an effort to convince them, and eventually the Iraqi people, of the conspiracy against Iraq. After hearing the tape, Al-Ubaidi felt that it was something they did not need to hear, and he made his sentiments known. He recalled that on the day they listened to this tape, King Hussein of Jordan arrived for a brief visit. The following day when other RCC members went to the airport to bid farewell to the King, Al-Ubaida was called and told not to come to the airport. He interpreted this as Saddam Hussein's disapproval of comments Al-Ubaida had made on the previous day. Nevertheless, Al-Ubaida claimed he drafted a long letter to Hussein reiterating his opinion regarding the tape matter and outlining his opposition to the proposed Kuwait invasion. In this letter, he offered alternatives to invading Kuwait and explained to Hussein that he had not voiced his opinion during the meeting so as not to embarrass him.
Several days later, Al-Ubaidi was summoned to the Presidential Palace by the President of the Diwan and was told that Hussein demanded his resignation. Thereafter, Al-Ubaidi submitted his resignation as instructed and was removed from the RCC.

Thereafter, Al-Ubaidi had minimal contact with Hussein. Several years later, Hussein visited Al-Ubaidi at the hospital as he was suffering from a heart condition. Hussein approved Al-Ubaidi's travel to Jordan on several occasions for heart surgery and follow-up visits. In addition, Hussein approved the travel of Al-Ubaidi's wife and Al-Ubaidi to France for both of their required medical treatments. All of these travel and medical expenses were paid by the Iraqi government, with the exception of his original heart surgery in Jordan, which was paid by King Hussein of Jordan.

Al-Ubaidi was named Presidential advisor in 1994 or 1995, a ceremonial position which provided him a salary without any true responsibility. Al-Ubaidi claimed this was done to provide retired members of the Party income, as there were no retirement benefits. Al-Ubaidi claimed he was never consulted regarding any significant political or governmental issues while serving as Presidential advisor.
On 02/05/2004, while walking through the Camp Cropper Military Detention Facility, at Baghdad International Airport, SSA George L. Piro was approached by Abd Hamid Mahmoud Al-Khattab Al-Nasiri Al-Tikriti (Black List #4). Al-Tikriti advised SSA Piro that he had completed a handwritten note on Saddam Hussein as requested by SSA Piro. Al-Tikriti advised that he had provided the note to his military handler, requesting he deliver it to SSA Piro.

Thereafter the Department of Defense provided the note to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The note has been added to the files of the FBI.

Investigation on 02/05/2004 at Baghdad, Iraq

File # 315E-HQ-1448534 -12 Date dictated 02/08/2004
by George L. Piro

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
SECRET

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Records Management

Attn: Record Mgmt. Center Unit A/UC

From: Counterterrorism
Iraq/Syria/Libya Unite Room 4383

Contact: SSA

Approved By:

Drafted By: sas

Case ID #: 315E-HQ-1448534-
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-1A-
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-1B-
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-302-
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-BC-
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-CE-
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-EL-
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-EL1-
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-EL1A-
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-EL1B-
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-LAB-
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-NC-

(U) Title: DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

(U) Synopsis: Opening of subfiles for captioned matter. AD authority to restrict subfile 302.

(U) Classified By: 11109, ITOS/CTD
Reason: 1.5(c)
Declassify On: X1

(U) Full Field Investigation Instituted: 05/04/2004 NONUSPER

(U) Administrative: Per all SAC, EC from CTD dated 12/25/2002, no case restrictions in ACS or

SECRET
may be made without the approval of the Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division.

Details: The captioned investigation was opened to capture intelligence and evidence as it relates to the national security investigation targeting Saddam Hussein. This EC establishes the subfile system for capturing information regarding Hussein. The following subfiles will be established:

1A - Will be a repository for all contemporaneous notes and items which will need to be retained that are not evidentiary in nature.

1B - will document FD-192 bulky records and will be a repository for evidentiary material.

302 - will be a repository for FD-302's, inserts and classified LHM's which document interviews conducted of captioned subject and additional High Value Detainees.

BC - will be a repository for background information on captioned subject and his closest associates.

CE - will be used maintain all records regarding expenditures of case funds in captioned matter.

ELA - will be used to maintain all documents regarding the administration of electronic surveillance in captioned matter.

EL1 - will document all original elsur logs developed or maintained in captioned matter.

LAB - will be a repository for all laboratory requests, reports and findings in captioned matter.

NC - will be a repository for all pertinent newspaper clippings deemed of significant value that they will add to the overall progression of the investigation.

This EC also documents the fact that due to the sensitive nature of the interviews of captioned subject, and the request of the Department of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General [noted in immediate EC from Counterterrorism to General Counsel, dated 02/06/2004] the 302 subfile will be
To: Records Management
From: Counterterrorism
Re: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/17/2004

restricted in the Automated Case Management System (ACS). Access will be granted to the following individuals:

- UC
- SSA George Piro
- IA
- RO
- ITOS II Deputy Section Chief
- ITOS II Section Chief
- D/AD Counterterrorism Division
- AD Counterterrorism Division
- EAD Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Division
- OSC Baghdad Operations Center
- D/OSC Baghdad Operations Center
LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

RECORDS MANAGEMENT

AT WASHINGTON, DC

RMD will ensure the aforementioned subfiles will be opened and that access to sub 302 will remain restricted to the above mentioned personnel.
Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 02/18/2004

To: All Field Offices

Attn: SACs
Iraqi Program Coordinators
FBIHQ, Manuals Desk

From: Counterterrorism
ISLU/ITOS II Room 4383

Contact: 

Approved By: 

Drafted By: sasjes

(U) Case ID #: 
315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending) 7/17
66F-HQ-C1384970 (Pending) 9
66F HQ C1384970

(U) Title: (x) DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

(U) Synopsis: (x) This EC requests all FBI Field Offices to contact logical sources for information relating to the potential prosecution of Saddam Hussein (HVD #1).

(U) (x) Classified By: 11109, ITOS II/CTD
Reason: 1.5(c)
Declassify On: X1

(U) Details: (x) In anticipation of the potential prosecution of Saddam Hussein for crimes against humanity and war crimes, all FBI Field Offices should canvass logical sources for information relating to crimes such as genocide, torture, inhumane treatment, destruction of property and unlawful confinement committed by Saddam Hussein and the former Hussein Regime.

(U) (x) Field Offices are directed to report to FBIHQ positive results. FBIHQ will make an attempt to insure sources are protected and information will be used primarily
To: All Field Offices  From: Counterterrorism
Re: 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/18/2004

for lead value. In instances where FBIHQ believes that source information would be instrumental to the successful prosecution of Hussein or members of the Hussein Regime, FBIHQ will coordinate with the respective field office.

(§) In addition to contacting sources, Field Offices should review interview results for similar information and forward positive results to FBIHQ.

(U) Responses should be directed to CTD/ITOS II/ISLU, Attention, SSA
To: All Field Offices  From: Counterterrorism
Re: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/18/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:  (Action)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

(U) (S) FBI Field Offices should canvass logical sources for any information regarding potential war crimes committed by the former Hussein Regime. Positive results should be forwarded to FBIHQ.

Set Lead 2:  (Action)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

(S) FBI Field Offices should for information pertaining to potential war crimes committed by the former Hussein Regime. Field Offices should notify FBIHQ of any pertinent information.

**
Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 02/06/2004

To: General Counsel
Counterterrorism Team

Attn: National Security Law Branch
Attn: Baghdad Operations Center
Fly Away/Rapid Deployment

From: Counterterrorism
Iraq/Syria/Libya Operations Unit
Room 4383
Contact: SSA

Approved By: [Signature]

Drafted By: [Signature]

Case ID #: 515E-HQ-1448534 (Pending)

Title: DESERT SPIDER IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: Department of Justice guidance regarding dissemination of HV-1 interview information.

Classified By: 11109, ITOS-II/CTD
Reason: 1.5

Declassify On: X1

Full Field Investigation Instituted: 01/01/2004

Details: For information of receiving offices, a meeting took place on Thursday, February 5, 2004 with FBI personnel and attorneys for the Deputy Attorney General. Attending the meeting were the Assistant Director, Counterterrorism, Section Chief, ITOS II, FBI Deputy General Counsel and the Director's Chief of Staff. The Deputy Attorney General's attorneys raised a concern regarding the dissemination of information from the interviews of High Value Detainee - 1 (HVD-1). The Office of the Deputy Attorney General does not want information disseminated until the Deputy Attorney General has an opportunity to review the matter.
To: General Counsel  From: Counterterrorism  
Re: (X) 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/06/2004  

(X) This EC advises that until further notice, all 
disseminations regarding FBI interviews of HVD-1 must receive 
FBIHQ approval. The approval authority will remain with the 
substantive unit (ISLOU), with Office of General Counsel 
consultation.

(X)
To: General Counsel  From: Counterterrorism
Re: (X) 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/06/2004

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT BAGHDAD OPERATIONS CENTER

(U) Baghdad Operations Center will ensure that all personnel with access to information regarding the interviews of HVD-1 will adhere to the aforementioned policy. Specifically, until further notice, all disseminations regarding FBI interviews of HVD-1 must receive FBIHQ approval. The approval authority will remain with the substantive unit (ISLOU), with Office of General Counsel consultation.

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Universal Case File Number: 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence: CTD, BAGHDAD OPS CENTER

Serial # of Originating Document: 

Date Received: DECEMBER 27, 2003

From: 

(Name of Contributor)

(Address of Contributor)

(City and State)

By: SA

To Be Returned

☐ Yes ☑ No

Receipt Given

☐ ☑ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

☐ Yes ☑ No

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☑ No

Title:

Reference: EC DATED 01/05/2004 BY [Blank]

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

HANDWRITTEN LETTER OF SADDAM HUSSEIN DATED DECEMBER 24, 2003
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
Universal Case File Number: 315E-HQ-1448534 - IA2

Field Office Acquiring Evidence: CTD, BAGHDAD OPS CENTER

Serial # of Originating Document: 

Date Received: DECEMBER 27, 2003

From: 

(Name of Contributor)

(Address of Contributor)

(City and State)

By:  

SA

To Be Returned:  □ Yes ☑ No

Receipt Given:  □ Yes ☑ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:  □ Yes ☑ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI):  □ Yes ☑ No

Title: 

Reference: EC DATED 01/05/2004 BY: 

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:  □ Original notes re interview of

HANDWRITTEN LETTER OF SADDAM HUSSEIN DATED DECEMBER 26, 2003


مساء الله الرحمن الرحيم

من صيدم خشی / ستر جمهوری بین الحلفاء، لما
وادي الدهر، مDataFrame في المكان الذي أدناه
هنا عن 15/12/83، حيث أطرت هذا
الأمر كما 2/12/83، وفي عام الأذى وجعله
الذي يحصل بعد أن نحن وناهي 12/8
وحينما حاليت لم نتغطي أي حرم من جهة من الروح
المقرض ولا زلنا أختار المقع منه "ما ها" عليكم.
كان ما أدرت أن أخبر الفحوص المعينة، لأن هو إن ملكة
 Memorandum 1 ما إن تقدم في هذه المكان صدوره وصخته نادرة
، وبكم اسم مكمل في سريركما على الوقت، وريق
نعرفه الجمعه مكانها ۸۲، فان الثمانية إيا "م الزاخر، ممّا
مجرع نوي في هنا قد لي سفر يارب وهم ناعام على
المكسوم، دون لزان المكان الذي أعناه، لأنه ثانية
ما أن الاعتقال عن ما يجري، تحول إلى مكان لعذبة
ال XCTest الموطن لير من بوعي عام، ومنا رأى أرضا في كثرة
الآهاب، بإرهاقة اليوت لحوارات البديعة المجزية لما
الخصبة هونيته، ولا أعتقد إن هذا للد
كم، والوقوف حضننا، ينطلق أن ينام، ويل صباع وعين
أمشهد بين، مزعات الأرواح أكسوس مزجات في
هنا كم همهم وأمنكم مأمون إنا نُصبر على أمركم

"""

عهدتنا

2003/12/26
Date: 01/05/2003

To: Director's Office

Attn: Director Robert S. Mueller III
      D/Director Bruce Gephardt
      EAD John S. Pistole
      A/AD Gary M. Bald
      DAD Thomas J. Harrington
      SC Frankie Battle
      SC M. Chris Brieses
      SSA

From: Counterterrorism
      Baghdad Operations Center
      Contact: SAC Edwin L. Worthington

Approved By: Worthington Edwin L

Drafted By: jag

Case ID #: (x) 315E-HQ-1448534-7 (Pending)

Title: (x) DESERT SPIDER
       IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: (x) To transmit original hand-written letters of Saddam Hussein.

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: XI

Enclosure(s): (x) Original letters, covered by 1A envelopes, the first undated, and the second dated December 26, 2003, hand-written by Saddam Hussein.

Details: (x) Special Agent______________________________ collected two original hand-written letters of Saddam Hussein (hereinafter "Hussein").

(x) The first letter was written by Hussein on December 24, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the "December 24th letter"). Hussein delivered it to his military headquarters on the 25th of December.
(S) SA has been in possession of the letter since that time.

(U) The December 24th letter was removed from the packaging and placed in a protective clear plastic sleeve. LS translated the text of the letter from Arabic to English. The text of that English translation follows:

"My belongings from the location I was found in and captured.

1) 750 Seven Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars in a package.

2) 240 Two Hundred and Forty Thousand Dollars in another package in the same iron safe.

3) Less than 30 Thirty Thousand Dollars between 500 Five Hundred and 2000 Two Thousand Dollars in a Samsonite case...

4) A number of simple necessities, the most important are notebooks with chapters from a story and other written papers.

(signature)"

(U) SA completed an FD-182 and Chain of Custody form on the December 24th letter, both of which and the original letter are enclosed and transmitted to FBI Headquarters under cover of this EC.

(U) The second letter was written by Hussein on December 26, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the "December 26th letter"). Hussein provided the letter to his military handlers on December 26, 2003. Hussein's military handlers delivered it to SA on December 27, 2003, without first placing it in any protective covering. SA has been in possession of it since that time.

(U) The December 26th letter was placed in a clear plastic sleeve. LS translated the text of the
letter from Arabic to English. The text of that English translation follows:

"Page 2-1

In the name of God the Compassionate and Most Merciful

From Saddam Hussein / The President of the Republic of Iraq to whom it may concern...I have been in this place since 12/13/2003, where I was captured until this day 12/26/2003, in addition to the harm and beatings that I have received following my capture on 12/13/2003, after which not a single part of my body was spared of the severe harm that was inflicted by the detention gang, and where some of the traces are still visible on my body until now, what I wanted to inform the concerned authorities now is that my opportunity to sleep in this place is limited and almost scarce, even though I am laying down on my bed the majority of the time, so in order in order for you to know the truth as it is, for example the last three days my total hours of sleep did not exceed four to five hours during all these days, because the place I am in, is similar in its condition to all detention places, it seems, that it was transformed into a place for torturing the detainees at night in general, and also during the day most of the time, in addition to the disturbing sound effects of those who are been interrogated or tortured, and I don't think that there is anyone with a sensitive and humanitarian heart, who can sleep amidst the screams of the torturers and the ones being tortured, and the many blows of the doors and the squeaking sounds of the chairs.

Page 2-2

Look into this matter and other matters if this is of interest to you, if not God will look and see from his heaven, and look upon anyone who stands in front of him in judgement...God is great...God is great.

Saddam Hussein

(Signature)
12/26/2003

(U) (A) SA completed an FD-182 and Chain of Custody form on the December 24th letter, both of which and the original letter are enclosed and transmitted to FBI Headquarters under cover of this EC.
To: Director's Office
From: Counterterrorism
Re: 315E-11448534, 01/05/2003

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Info)

DIRECTOR'S OFFICE
AT EADCTCL, DC
(U) (x) For information. Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM
AT FBI HEADQUARTERS
(U) (x) For information. Read and clear.

++

SECRET/OCR/NOFORN
Precedence: PRIORITY
Date: 01/15/2004

To: Records Management
Attn: 

From: CTD

MEU/ITOS II/4383
Contact:

Approved By: 

Drafted By: 

Case ID #: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending)

Title: (S) SADDAM HUSSEIN
       IT-IRAQ
       OO: FBIHQ

Synopsis: (X) This EC requests a title change to captioned matter.

(U) (S) Classified By: 11109, ITOS IT/CTD
       Reason: 1.5(c)
       Declassify On: X1

(U) Details: (S) Records Management is requested to change captured title to the code name DESERT SPIDER. New caption to read "DESERT SPIDER; IT-IRAQ; OO: FBIHQ."

(U) (X) CTD is requesting the assignment of a code name to this investigation in order to facilitate communications between all FBI Field Offices as well as components of the USIC. The investigation will involve extensive interviews and analysis of current and previously collected information.

(U) (X) A check of FBIHQ records on 1/15/2004, indicated that DESERT SPIDER is available for use as a code name.

SECRET
To: Records Management  From: CTD
Re: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534, 01/15/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:  (Action)

RECORDS MANAGEMENT
AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) (S) RMD is requested to assign the code name
"DESERT SPIDER" to previously captioned "SADDAM HUSSEIN; IT-
IRAQ; 00: FBIHQ," file number 315E-HQ-1448534.

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<td>2</td>
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</table>

INTERVIEW NOTES OR:

Abd Hamid Mahmoud
Al-Khawaja Al-Yasiri
Al-Tikriti
Universal Case File Number: 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence: HQ

Serial # of Originating Document: 

Date Received: 02/05/2004

From: ABID HAMID MAHMUD AL-TIKRITI

(Name of Contributor)

DETENTION FACILITY

(Address of Contributor)

BAGHDAD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, IRAQ

(City and State)

By: 

To Be Returned: ☐ Yes ☑ No

Receipt Given: ☐ Yes ☑ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: ☐ Yes ☑ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): ☐ Yes ☑ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER

IT- SABER

Reference: ____________________________

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

HANDWRITTEN NOTES BY

ABID HAMID MAHMUD AL-TIKRITI
SADDAM'S REACTION WHEN HE IS UPSET

Saddam Hussein said; it is better to be alone when I am mad, and no one to be close to me, so that I calm down. When he is upset we do not talk to him in any subject, we keep quiet until he talks to us, which means he prefer we do not say any subject waiting for him to initiate the conversation. When no one talk to him, I as the secretary keep my mouth close and if possible leave the room or the office that he is in, until he ask for me and sometimes he walks out and like to stay in outdoor get fresh air and take trips in the lakes. When he leaves I stay in the office as the secretary of the president do not accompany the president, only the protection and bodyguard accompany him. Exception for me to go with him is when he ask me to be with him in that trip. When he is upset, he react and deal with people very harshly, while he is normal when not upset.

2- When a triable dispute between my brother Dahman and sons of Sabawi and Wathban was brought to Saddam to be solved, he blamed my brother even though my brother is assigned with and official duty. At this time me, my cousins and uncles, we where upset and mad at this judgment, I decided at that time to gradually get out of the position and quit, so that I take care of my children. In fact Saddam Hussein appointed an assistant to the secretary, Lieutenant Colonel Jamal Mustapha Abdulla Al-Sultan his son in-law. I asked Uday and Qusay, why did he judge in favor of his brothers? Uday said, don't you know that he always take the side of his brothers, as they were present at that meeting. Therefore my feelings were that I should gradually withdraw and leave so that I will not have direct confrontation with him. And devote my time to my family and my tripe as my uncle was the sheikh of All Al-Nassiry tripe.

3- Personal habits:
He always crack his fingers, and put on the Arabic dress. His hobby is fishing, horse riding and smoking the Cuban cigars "Chohiba" and the predictable reactions, would be such as when he is mad he would shout, attack the one close to him and grab the moustache of that person.

The crimes that he committed during this period:
1- I have told you about this previously, the first person Saddam killed was in 1959, when he was shooting to scare a person named Sadoun Himod Al-Hasan who was a an active communist party member and a member of Saddam's tripe., the bullet was deflected from the ground and hit Al-Hasan and killed him.
2- The assassination attempt of president Abdul Kareem Qasim, in 1959.
3- The mass graves that were displayed on TV, I was surprised when seeing them. The responsibility of these graves happened in 1991, to be asked from the Column that restored the government control over the Southern Provinces when they fall down in Feb., 1991, those that Saddam gave them the authority of the president of the country, because there was no communication between the provinces. The president should be included in questioning about this as he is the head of the country and at the end it is his responsibility as the man at the top.
The leaders of the column were:
1-Ezat Ibrahim Khalel Al-Douri in charge of Misan. With him was Lt. General Nazar Al-Khzraji
2- Taha Yaseen Ramathan, in charge of Hilla and Najaf.
3- Mohammed Hamza Al-Zubaidi in charge of Nasiria (Deqar), with him were, Rokan Razouqi Abdul-Ghafour and Kamal Mustapha.
4- Hussen Kamil Hassan Al-Majeed and Sadoun Hammadi, in charge of Karbala and Najaf.
5- Saddam ordered the execution of an Iraqi Lt. Colonel in Kuwait because he burglarized as store, he was executed in front of people in Al-Kreen.
6- He (Saddam) sent 5 or 6 officers to military tribunal to be executed in 1991, this happened in 1991. Lt. General Saber Al-Douri know there names.
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
البرامج التي ارتقت هندسة المحمد:

(1) انطلاقاً من مبادئ أول مادة، فحكم قانونه بقانون 9
في عام 1909 ضرب 무حن عم دانيال كان مسيحي نظرًاً من منهجية شريعة
نظام متحفٍ شهير صمام قام بتكوينه ضربًاً طلقة
(product) لا في الألسن، وارتىّت الليّة وارداً فيها.

(2) محاولة إذن نائلي رفي اليد، قد عنيكم تاناً قريبًا شارع مع مجوأة
لنصرتها، أصبر في فيغ الفحم عمر الكرز ولم يغوض فيها وفكان في

(3) المفاوضات، التي تزوجت كل من المفاوضات المنسي
متجهة تطهير عندما أصرت على ان merger، هذه المفاوض
التي تبعت في عام 1910، ربما لعنها مهرٌ لارسال الدين
فاحوها إعادة إلى الملحة لما تفاقمت بين الحروب عند مضافٍ لها 66/666
1911 سرعان ما، فانزع صمام مسمى صليبة رئي شعبوية
انقطاعاً، أرسلنا بين الانتفاضات وجموع طبائر الجزيرة بحيث أنه
يا لعُمِّها أن تصرح في وفلاح الجربونة ها في البلاد وكأنها الركز،

(4) عزة إبراهيم طلأل الحريت، نايب شمساً خليفة الفريرة سوتو ولكل
حيًا، ووجه الفريرة الأول، نزار الرحمي، ركب كرامة جمال صفاء.
(ب) على ما رسمنا ناندي رستا، شوربة مسيحية مشتركة، كل أثر ما خف،
(ج) هم هم، النجمة، نفر نفر فوق قبرة المجهود، مُصوَّر ل
رجل النضالات (ز. ن. ناغال) ووجه رأسان، من فيدال الفقوش وراكاً لوطٍ.
(د) عُقَبنا، دخل صنعاء المجهود، ور، سعورون، شارع مجدول رجل
(ه) كلاً لبياض.

(5) صدع السماوات، وراما، الثورة الناز، في العُق،
(د) أصداً مسماع عن الكشفية، لبياضه.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Interview notes of Fadil Sulka, Muhammad Azzauki</td>
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Universal File Case Number: 815E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence: FABHS

Serial # of Originating Document: 

Date Received: 8/24/2004

From: FADI SUFAIT MOHAMMAD AZZAWI (Name of Contributor)

(Address of Contributor)

By: GEORGE [Redacted] (Name of Special Agent)

To Be Returned: Yes ☑ No ☐

Receipt Given: Yes ☑ No ☐

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Yes ☑ No ☐

Title: DESERT SPIDER

IT - IRAQ

Reference: (Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☑ Original notes re interview of

FADI SUFAIT MOHAMMAD AZZAWI
July 1, 1944

Big Family Al-Aza

Traveled to Greece under the name Sami. His mother & Sh's mother are sisters. Became knowing Sh since '50. But would only see him occasionally. Later became closer. Father's farm he worked for the British Petroleum Co. Spoke English with in turn taught a English.

4 Bros. 6 Sisters. Finished HS in Bag. in '58 College in '68 majoring in English and French. Also speaks Russian.

Went to Diplomatic Service. Did so well in school. In revoc scholarship for PhD but family didn't like Cambridge. Summer courses in Cambridge.

1974 Went to NY training @ Time Inc. Dr. Ismail Khattan was his trainer. Appointed to Cairo 75-78.

Washington 78-80 1st Secretary of Intercession. Going to Johns Hopkins Univ. Promoted to full ambassador.

Head of Intercession. 80-82 India Ambassador. 82-84 Moscow.
#I RECOMMENDED A TO POST OF HTS

CAPABILITIES & WAS SUMMONED BACK TO JOIN
FIS- DUE TO SIR'S SUSPICE OF BARZAI

D CLAIMED TO BE SIR'S ONLY BROTHER - HENESS &
OPEN TO SIR, D SAID IRAQ WAS OPEN TO
DEMOGRAPHY.

"CAME TO ISIS 1985" SENT TO UN W/ AZIZ
RE IRAQ & IRAQ. WROTE A LATE 1980
W/ SUGGESTIONS & OPINIONS.

1983 1st TIME RECEIVED SIR HIS BIRTHDAY D
CRITICIZED HIM FOR IT. I WROTE HIM A TIR
TELLING OTHER THINGS IS DONE BY MAQAR & ETC.
NO REACTION.

D'S BROTHERS, SISTER & HER SON WERE KILLED
SIR BELIEVED BY GOVT. SIR MAY HAVE FELT
ONME.

SIR WAS SACRED FROM BARZAI AS HE WAS YOUNG
BARZAI ran THE FIS & CONTROLLED MAKING HTS
POWERFUL AND THREAT. SIR WAS SUSPICIOUS.

SIR WANTED HIM TO BE DIR. BUT I SUGGESTED
TO BE DED. SO WE COULD LEARN THE DUT
IN WHICH UMAR D'S SEC.

FAULK 177321 M-4  DIR.
IBRAHIM AL-ANI M-4
4/4 Resp.

Arrested by SSO April 4. Instructed to be whipped 20 times a day. Held in small cell reserved for a 146+ risk cell because of 5 doors w/ 2 latches. Expected to be executed. Family wrote a niceSB 4647 NWR. Beside New Sun Hosp.

Prisons

For SSO

1. Dir. of Gen. Security: Inside their PO
2. For 358 - 52

Ct'd Prisoner: "Abu G., l Mosul, 1 Daha l Gaza."

If the imprisoned person has aavedi

in this then you are sent to another one so
it not to be treated better before colleagues.

12/12/84 - 1st Day @ It's wanted to see Prison
Small cells - sound prisoners held for mos of
years in our disposition. Given reason not
enough officers.

1 Prisoner - Iranian, 37 yrs old for staying for
Closing Border w/ out pass. Wife was famous
in West German Parliament. Need and spoke to press.
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS RE THIS GUY
HAS TOLD HIM NOT IN CUSTODY DO NOT
CANNOT TELL HIM THEY LIED & IF
HE IS RELEASED W/ DEMONSTRATE.

DESC.
NICE, BRAGGADOCIOUS ETC.
UNTIL 1988 SAW CHANGES, DOMINANCE
BECAME SHAKEN, POWER HUNGRY INCREASED
DUE TO WEAK LEADERSHIP
LEAD COUNTRY ALONE -
SH DREADED HIMSELF

4
FADIL SULFAI  
MUHAMMAD - AZZAU1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-11-2009 BY 60324 UC BAK/SAB/LSC

After College  
22/13 Diplomat Institute

Summer Course - COMBINE

Evaes in

1974 - Training at Nati Assembly UN
Dr. Khatami - QD diplomat

1975 NY Plaza
Wehrer Astana
Student Host

1975-78 - Cairo

1st Master degree

78-82 - Wash

1st Secretary

Astray

Abdul Hyder

Head 2 Division

Head 1 Division
80-82
Dublin
82-84
USSR
Dean of Arab Law
Abed Hamid Nahoul
I went to Tunesia.

Scram
W. Demme
M. Abougait
Dr. Hackett T. or T.

.. Security
17/01/71, Fwahia - MT
Phrahi Al-Thani - handshakes
3/03/70 with
MT
MT & collect
MT
Dear [Name],

63 became members of Bank P.T.

99 heard about 7 Bank

Deeply shocked

Spoke to me

I decided not to talk at this mtg

BEC I was so talkative much later President turned so

angry UMM!!! leniency

If you agree you must tell me

break your backbone

C. Ali didn’t talk so

in needy firm names

write it down

At next mtg

sat with [Name]

Ali Hassan

[Name]

behind

J.K. man A.P.D.A. wanted war

Ali agreed to stop

3
AI, A bit very close

I'm supposed to be

Opposed to losing patience

Spoke to one of my agents this morning

While the controls

Listen, I didn't start to hit

It be noted every day

I called for new leadership

A little bit on ground

I said leadership needs new blood

built here from work to work

Chemme Mind
Patient: near Al-Nur Hospital

Grand svc: Abu Khadab

ED pt

Gen: Scah

After six became unstable impact due to over movement
<table>
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Note: The page contains a table with item 7 marked for interview notes. The file number is 315E-545-14485534.
Universal File Case Number: 315 E-HQ-14 85-34-

Field Office Acquiring Evidence: FBI-BAAGHOAO

Serial # of Originating Document: 

Date Received: 2/23/04

From: FBI-BAGHDAD OPERATIONS CENTER, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

By: 

To Be Returned: ☐ Yes ☐ No

Receipt Given: ☐ Yes ☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: ☐ Yes ☐ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER

IT - IRAQ

Reference: 

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of BLACK LIST
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-08-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

Primes about the Law or Al Ghurab
The image contains handwriting and appears to be a page from a text or notes. The handwriting is not clearly legible due to the quality of the image. However, it seems to include names and possibly dates or numbers. It is difficult to extract coherent text from this image.
By further punishment or are美国人 getting into out 7 people?

"Both"

Run was taken in here in wooden shant
These people are clever people. They know they don't know it's me.

I know you know your job.

In private, some have suspicions about others. Dangers to him and his family.

I want you asking him, asking others. I want the divorce papers filed.
To: Who has control/authority in prison?

No one person, stemming from beginning

He was source of these rumors

[Handwritten note: "Write this"]

[Handwritten note: "b6 b7c b7d"]

[Handwritten note: "3/5 March (see next page)"]
A- Other individuals were outside here?

No one else truly

Few days ago when it occurred

Aided, window hanging; God is great

Closed window guards

Each new order was written

Refused to take a dive, left in front of door

Closed windows - guards were ready

Yet started out by not taking God

Yelling, "God is great"

How is said/report determined?

But cents outside but similar

Do hurricane storms make influences or homes where they go?
Days ago during interview we asked...

Others?
None

T: What about Saddam?
Critizing Saddam

T: Why?
Everybody thought this would be Saddam's
Saddam would praise Arab leaders
saying wouldn't be present worldwide
To you or the fact that Saddam surrendered?
- Do you think why did he give up
- I heard because to kill himself

To your local Saddam man after?
- Critic was Saddam

To do they think will face criminal charges?
- People think differently
- Some say will go to court, some will stay here
- My opinion
- Money will be taken to courts

Do think that is only form of the end
- From another Iran control?
- Rumor that all Iraqis are to be rid
- Not sure what came true
- While ago not now
- Some debates or party leaders, thought are your A and
- All will be bedside
Some distances not cooperating, but want to.

How can we get them to cooperate?

What category, party, level, etc.

7-AM categories?

Really I don't know.

Not sure how to do. Also is a liar.

To: Must have ideas? We can go on with other?

Heard say.

When leave interview, they ask about what happens?

Yes. He does. Asks everybody.

Any pressure here?

No. Everybody who can't, he tells to.

Ask it release.
T: Any concerns we threw back handed over to Iraqis?

- No, haven't heard lately
- Maybe months ago when a tents heard this
talk that $$$ would be given to Iraqis
not since then

X1: Are we going to be detained until it all would happen
X2: to southern far then part of Iraq
where don't think would it be

T: Some would be happy, some sad - it moved elsewhere

T: Sad? Who?

T: Any concerns for personal safety if relocated?
never talk about, don't expect

T: Do detainees here represent humanitarian there
by us as well as?
The opposite. Don't believe has advanced from that fact.
What is the treatment in your opinion?

Do you believe there are alternative treatments that could be considered?

Why is the condition occurring?

Could there be any environmental factors contributing to the condition?

What is the patient's current condition and how is it progressing?
First and foremost, I'm assuming the question is asking for a definition. Are you asking for the definition of the word "courage"? If so, courage can be defined as the ability to face danger, difficulties, or hardships without fear or hesitation. It is the quality that enables one to cope with even the hardest situations with confidence and determination. Courage is often associated with strength, resilience, and the willingness to stand up for one's beliefs, even in the face of adversity. It is a valuable trait that is admired in many cultures and is often celebrated in literature and history.
If of people stay with her, anywhere others tortured

Don’t know. If I knew, I would tell.

If I knew, I would tell. If she tells something, I will tell you through channels.

Is that military, IRS operations?

Don’t know. If I knew, I would tell.

Is she the one out of room?

Hurry. Isn’t that in wonder, but they are 15 times people first thought court or for rest area. General Saddam said this.

END OF NOTES
On February 23, 2004, a detainee, whose date of birth was (black listed) and whose place of birth was Iraq, was interviewed at a military detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents were identified as members of the United States Government from Washington, DC. Also present at the interview was a British representative from the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG), Baghdad. An FBI Language Analyst, provided Arabic/English translation. The detainee provided the following information:

He stated that the detainees currently held at the detention facility with him are "clever people." If investigators ask these other prisoners certain questions, these questions must be posed so that the detainees cannot determine that the origin of the information is acknowledged that he understands investigators know how to perform their duties. In the prison, some detainees have suspicions about other detainees. These suspicions, if confirmed through discovery of certain information, can be a danger to and his family. added, "I will never lie to you. There is no benefit."

Regarding who among the detainees has control or influence over the prison population, stated there is no one person in such a position. At some point in the past, detainee

Investigation on 02/23/2004 at Baghdad, Iraq

File # 315E-HO-1448534 Date dictated 02/23/2004

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stated that detainees become aware of news regarding events outside of the prison through several means. During permitted visits or telephone calls, detainee family members inform prisoners of the news. In addition, newly arrived prisoners provide detainees current information regarding events outside the facility. Finally, detainees who speak English converse with US military police who are assigned to guard them.

In opinion and through his observations, there are no other leaders within the detention facility. However, the facility is segregated and all the detainees, including do not have contact with all the other prisoners. They are separated into twenty-one cells per building, in blocks of seven prisoners. Several buildings exist and detainees are normally allowed outside of their cells for exercise in groups of seven corresponding to their block.

provided some details regarding the detainee "riot" or protest which occurred a few days ago. Reportedly, new
orders were issued to the US military guards requiring cell windows to be closed and the cessation of exercising. Thereafter, a detainee [supporter's name] (his nickname using the tribal name of the individual's mother) refused to accept food offered to him by the guards. [Supporter] then began banging on his cell door and yelling "God is great." Other detainees, in a show of solidarity and/or sympathy, joined in the protest mimicking actions.

stated rank and respect among the detainees is determined "not like the outside, but similar."

Regarding Saddam Hussein, [supporter] "criticizes" him. He has stated that Hussein [supporter's name] Hussein had previously praised the words of Yassir Arafat and often repeated Arafat's words saying he (Hussein) would not be taken prisoner, but would be martyred. After Hussein's capture, many prisoners questioned the reason he surrendered. They believe he should have at least used his gun to kill himself.
Regarding the possibility of facing criminal charges, stated that detainees have differences in opinion from one person to another. Some think that they will go to court, while others believe they will be released. Other detainees believe they will remain in the current facility. believes many will appear before a court.

Many months ago, a rumor circulated that some of the detainees would be transferred to another facility, possibly Abu Ghraib Prison in Baghdad. is unsure of the origin of this information, but such a rumor no longer exists. In addition, some detainees, particularly the Ba'th Party leaders, thought/think they would/will be released on the one year anniversary of the liberation of Baghdad by coalition forces.

stated he is unsure how to enlist the assistance of detainees who have not already been cooperating, regardless of their former level within the government. He stated, "A liar is a liar."

is unaware of any present prisoner concerns about being turned over to Iraqi custody. These concerns existed approximately nine months ago when detainees were being held in tents. At that time, there was "talk" that the high-value detainees would be given to the Iraqis. Since that time, however, there has been no discussion about this matter.
Regarding the possibility of transfer of detainees to another facility and prisoner reactions, stated, "Some would be happy. Some would be sad." One prisoner, stated

does not believe that news of a transfer to another facility would cause detainees to riot. pointed out that the possibility of a riot is diminished due to stated he is unaware of any detainee concerns for personal safety should relocation to another facility occur, including transfer to an Iraqi-controlled prison.

does not believe detainees interpret their humane treatment in the current facility as a sign of the weakness of the United States. On the contrary, detainees believe the United States is an advanced and educated country which would not torture people. One prisoner commented to

Despite this humane treatment by US forces in the present detention facility, offered no explanation for the reluctance of prisoners to cooperate with interviewers. offered that a non-cooperator is "a bad apple" and cannot be changed. In his opinion, the only way is cooperation.

Prisoners at the facility believe Hussein will "tell everything" and be taken to a tribunal. Such comments were made by and other detainees. believes that former senior Iraqi leadership members share responsibility along with Hussein for actions committed. Some of the leaders, and believe that Iraqi leaders before the Kuwaiti War share more blame than the "new leaders" after the war. does not believe that any of the leaders accept responsibility for their actions. He is uncertain of their reactions should Hussein blame these leaders for actions committed during his Presidency.

is not aware of the thought processes of other detainees, including leaders, after questioning by interviewers.
He has never heard any detainees talk about the details of an interview, including whether they admitted "talking around the subject."

understanding of the Geneva Convention is that there are two types of prisoners, prisoners of war (POWs) and civilian prisoners. POWs are released after the end of a war. Civilian prisoners have their cases reviewed every six months. Other detainees believe the same facts about the Geneva Convention, except the former leaders of the Ba'ath Party. These leaders believe they will have a "different ending" that looks "dark" and does not involve release from prison. Some, including has never been tortured, nor has he tortured another person or ordered the torture of another person during the previous Iraqi regime. He has never witnessed any torture.

stated his belief that torture is used as both a punishment and to obtain information. denied knowledge of any individual among the current detainees who has been tortured, tortured another person, or ordered the torture of another person. stated, "If I knew, I would tell." denied knowledge of role in the military and his involvement in executions.

stated there are rumors that Hussein is presently located at the same detention facility in the last row of buildings with the "wood construction." Detainees first thought this wood structure was being built as a type of courtroom for prisoners. Later, detainees assumed this was a new rest area for US workers. The latest rumor indicates that Hussein is housed in this area.
File Number: 315E-HQ-1448534
Field Office Acquiring Evidence: FBIHQ
Serial # of Originating Document: 
Date Received: 5/7
From: Tariq Aziz
(Address): Baghdad, Iraq
(City and State):
By: SA

- To Be Returned: ☐ Yes ☐ No
- Receipt Given: ☐ Yes ☐ No
- Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e)
- Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
  ☐ Yes ☐ No
- Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
  ☐ Yes ☐ No
Title: Desert Spider
ITL - Iraq
Reference: (Communication Enclosing Material)
Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of Tariq Aziz
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-08-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

Health

Date

No.

I am well since recovered

I was dizzy, fell down May June July 03

Writing Book?

Encouraged by Interrogators to do so

Difficult camp conditions: RAG LIGHT

'Memoire' Room small, shaky table, bad ground

Because of war, too busy, but now time

T.A. I know most of the people, 56 firm men

Members of leadership, officers

Little opportunity for discussions

Pol career:

1969 Townsman

1974 Minister of Info & Cult

77 CIAO RCC

79 Dep Prim Min

83 For minister

91 Dep Prim Min
Terror there done that.

Not everything

Isolated, no newspapers, only old magazines.

Rumors, national habits of prisoners
to believe all rumors.

18th will be 557 free.

Mr. Ramadan former V.P.

let former Baath party participate.

Latest rumor: Iossif not accepted

June 11 released 1/2 to new gov.

Counsel is not a real government, it is a counsel.

I want to live in Detroit.

Wife has relatives no people.

Iraqi community, large Caidan Christian community.

Nothing has materialized, still in prison.

Talk many U.S. officials: many prisoners.

Psychofacts (things) sadam & relatives' say know them.

I like barzain.

Director of intel. changes as an ambas.

Changes as a prisoner comm 0308.
Daan didn't like (my brother's children)
Daan left from the others
- 'BAA'NST, more liberal minds
- Tries to open up his brother's mind
- 's relatives of Shoan...
- Don't like brothers (Almost united)
- Though they have RHD

Frankly
All is criminal

- Daan was young man early 20's
  - When BAA'MIC came
- Then foreign min
- Then INTEL till 1983 (DISMANTLED)
- Amro GENEVA
  - Asked to take ODEH (now became open)
  - Spoke about his connections
  - Spoke about aid in Israel (counters)
  - DaaN had differences

Mattamy told me or inter OATHMAN
Sabra... Died or SECURITY
Saoud Rashid

ODEH couldn't live in a country of CSA
Odeh realized that attacked Barzan. Found it difficult to attack T.A.

Thuls: Murt S.H. Family

Some men, i.e. Interior Ministry. Not honest person, told Saddam he was a CIA, not clean, real thieves.

- Confiscated money, car.
- Multi-millionaires in Iraq + US currency.

H.K. -> CPL

Ali -> CPL became Maj Gen (Saddam gave him)

Relationship w/ Ali

Never lunch/dinner/recreation.

Ali was a member of sponsorship only relationship.

-Sabouhi Director of Intec

He never asked T.A. advice & knowledge.

Had relationship with Barzan.

Tried to choose friends when had choice.

My mentality differs from theirs.
No common ground

NEVER went in dinner or left

Ranjan and Vidya to Geneva J.A. went see
Times to Swiss for Red Cross meeting ok
Went to residence New wife
more of Sadans family (Swiss) seen

Ranjan had real education prices went up

4 wife died of cancer could person

1988 HACAISA
China into, T.A. outside May on trip
to U.N.
New April upon return
Shi said yes
Shi claimed chief of staff Kowal
Shi was decision should not be used
Unless C.O.S. says so
USSO in Iran, not good
A dan D.C.O. said this Dec
's weakening me

USSO in in to kill command
S.H. military matters, strategic matters, NOT

T.A. was in France
S.H. authority was S.H. for Chem
S.H. go to T.A. he was surprised
- maybe not necessary
- 2) Big repercussions

Conversations before attention to
bad repercussions

Difficult times you due to attack
Chem used, did not as many

German minister

In Iran, when cur, arrested girls, mutant, Khajoo
Executed, women, raped, then killed
Left go to heaven

CIA, 54 son, FRANCE, General, minister

Not justifiable that I want to occupy land
Not allow Iran to occupy land

Defensive
U.S. in Japan not threatened

T.A. was in Geneve

1. Don't all USSR
2. 'DAN' USSR ordinary power

As for. Min lot of publicity but no material cause any accusations

1984 Archives, Doo in US Institute Policing

That requires material. 'Inanimous' started US or China

To be fair to history, Iraqis did use
- I don't think it was highly populated
- When hostilities many people leave

Feel don't wait

I don't think Israelis were excruciating
Unjustified are murder + violence
- Just those few who remain
- Inanimous first of all most people

Also, only few remain is 20 corpses men + women not (by 00s)

Unexpected

Army to Army no civilians

Near MACUSA then seen
- No meeting at that time, our or country. No communication returned. Not matters to talk via telephone.

- T.A. was not aware of strategic & tactical matters nor part of M.I. 020.

M. of Defense
cash

- As a reason our own was set something about this or that, Iranian threat.

- Didn't protest against sale.

- Some officials would go more than extending.

Chem was bad, not moral & practical.

- Long range missiles affected war.

Chem used on the front, both sides.

Missiles hit cities after war.

Releasing prisoners 1990: 37,78,000 P.O.W.

Iran said one more P.O.W.

When Iranian guy said we took families they are prisoners. 35 4CV P.O.W.
Aug 1984

Ali Magi no income or date

AFLC AFTER AFLC

George

Sense of collective responsibility

Education

Early 80s S. M. more discuss

Pass on Rep are CAW

Chairman of R.C.

Car discuss for the R.C. (I was traveling)

Stipulation not defense

Discuss 160

Dont' have votes tradition or practice

After 1979 people could not protest againstsoft life or abortion

Ali was minister

Min of Home Aff.

NEVER in Ministry or many was that much power given to one person
R.C.C. was a body that vote

SERIES OPINION

DECISION was made everyone must comply

DON'T AFFECK principle group empower

women who is not ACC member unconstitutional

Annex as of 1987

was violation of convention

Directen against all Iraqi citizens

all meetings of ACC were taped

Kunoj forcefully removed to camp

N. N. no other

Hassan Ali

Cancer

Punish all good humans. T.A. had fairness

inMohamed AMIN had a big personal

compain. Nouri Housse no running water

Hassan Sa, o.k. too small

PRETEXT of EMERGENCY

Withdraw March 1989 by ACC DECREE
WAR w/ IRAQ connected to KURD

SITUATION IN NORTH

Date
No.

1979

was in prison

not involved was executed

RELEASED MILLIONS of dollars, THEY

ARE VILLAGERS HAVE MISSED

MARCH 4TH 1971

2 YEARS AFTER CEASEFIRE

ISS # 54 PCC SIGNED

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT GIVEN AUTHORITY OVER

MIL 1977 NAMIBIA

ALL MACIO

SAID TO DECIDE

THAT INT.

HUN BULGAR

ISS PCC

RECEIVED AGAINST DECISIONS

SIGN DECISION

— AFTER 1979 IT DISAPPEARED

ALL WERE SLOWED AND NOT IMPLEMENTED UNLESS ALL

SANG 1979 CHAKKUM only
ALL NOT CONSULTED

MIGHT HAVE HEARD OF IT Date: COMM

55-56 TO GIVE POWER TO THE GOVERNORS

FEEDBACK ONLY SAM

THAT TH

ASSISTANT

DUBAI I知 NO ALL/ S U M

T.A.

SABRIN HAMAOI

STILL FORMER MINISTER

MET SAMAR OCCUPED GB7 + G88 REPR.

MEMBER UN IF GI BABA AC QUDR MI

LEADERS WERE REPORTING BACK TO SAMAR

TH GOUINS-BELROSY

RAMAOI BABA AC GI

MET SAMAR DURING PERS.: PERS. FEW TIMES

CEASE FIRE. P.O.W. AS FOR NORMAL

MEETINGS IN BB (ALL MEM. outside.

BACHOCO
THURS

- AAD
- BA
- MREH RAAM LAR
- ROY G24 NOU

- 04'00 AM ABDULLA
- MILITARY INVASION

AHMED MUSLIN

NOT DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR

OFFS. IN A DIFFERENT SITUATION

CONFIDE, BRAVE ENOUGH TO SAY NO

ABID MANID MAHMOO

CHUCK WINTER THOM

HAPPY 2-12-5

PSYCHOM, INCORRUPT, PM, USA

TUNE OF TOWNS

1991 PLANT CONTROL MUSLIN KANAL

R.2.17.89 T.A. HAMOON

MOTHER ALAM MINO OK WOON

HAMOON WOON

T.A. VOTES WERE 75%.

DON'T DO

AS HE FELL S.M. DECIDE TO RESCUE HIM
I wrote this letter

Meeting on July 20, 1982

Hamid, Spokesman to be selected

Hamid Zarrini, SHIA

BECAME MEMBER OF NC as a SUNNI

TAHA YASIN RAMI

Yes or no? I should SUPPOSE

NACEEF, CURST HIMSELF, Ranis &

remani and reman

SALAH AZIZ, Puma

good guy, didn't like his job.

But not very capable, governo or

16/02/82. ASAL power was in

All Misa

not highly educated

Masoud Rajaee

connected to rafic or people

I was a technical coach MFC to France

Osama with him 716 19905 to Storm

invite to ASAL with Maza

Ask for assistance, Osama or with others

Yes there

Do or just watch and report

Recommend to help MEK to storm
On 05/06/2004 TARIQ AZIZ (Black List #25) was interviewed in Iraq by Federal Bureau of Investigation Supervisory Special Agents George L. Piro and Special Agent At the time of the interview, AZIZ was a detainee being held in a Coalition Forces detention camp. After remarking that he was in good health, AZIZ provided the following information:

AZIZ has been encouraged by some of his interrogators to write a book while he is in prison. The dim lighting, wobbly table, small room and conditions of camp life have dissuaded him from doing so. He would like to eventually write a memoir about his career that revolved around the self-described roles of journalist (1969), Minister of Information and Culture (1974), leader within the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) (1977), Deputy Prime Minister (1979), Foreign Minister (1983) and Deputy Prime Minister (1991). If given his option, AZIZ would choose to move to Detroit in the United States where there is a large Iraqi population including a Chaldean Christian community. His family has relatives in the Detroit area.

In the general isolated environment of prison, with no newspapers to read and only old magazines and rumors to consider, it is the natural habit of prisoners to believe all rumors. One of the rumors currently circulating claims that the prisoners will be released on the 18th of May. Another rumor contends that former Ba’ath Party members will be brought back to participate in the future Iraq government. Former Vice President TAHA YASIN RAMADA was promulgating this rumor by stating that some of the prisoners would be released and some would take their positions in the new government. AZIZ did not accept this idea. Firstly he wants to retire and has no interest in participating in future politics. Secondly, this rumor seemed completely unrealistic to him.

Investigation on 05/06/2004 at Iraq

File # 315E-HO-1448534  Date dictated  

by George L. Piro

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
Many of the prisoners in the camp are sycophants and thugs. The worst of this group are former President SADDAM HUSSEIN’s family members. They are almost illiterate, yet they are in possession of PhDs. They were not honest people. They were liars, not clean and real thieves. They confiscated money and land and were multimillionaires in both U.S. and Iraqi currency. They think like villagers. Because they have millions of dollars stashed away in foreign banks, they believe life will go on for them when they get out of prison.

AZIZ liked BARZAN ABD AL-GHAFUR SULYMAN MAJID. BARZAN was a young man in his early twenties when the Ba’ath Party came to power. He served as a Foreign Minister, then as the Director of the Mukhabarat (intelligence service). He was discharged of this job in 1983. During his tenure as the Iraqi Ambassador to Switzerland, he became a changed person for the positive. He became liberal-minded and had good ideas. He was different from the other leaders and became outspoken. He published articles about letting others participate in the political process. He tried to open his brother’s (SADDAM HUSSEIN) mind. SADDAM did not like this. BARZAN was asked to take SADDAM’s son UDAY SADDAM HUSSEIN with him to Geneva. UDAY was a thug and could not live in a country like Switzerland. People realized this. UDAY attacked the reputation of BARZAN. AZIZ’s assignment as the Minister of Foreign Affairs necessitated his travel to Switzerland on several occasions in order to attend Red Cross meetings and other diplomatic requirements. AZIZ would meet with BARZAN and BARZAN’s very nice wife who died of cancer. BARZAN had a real education. His children all spoke English and French. Because AZIZ had a different mentality than most of the leadership, he tried to choose his government friends when he could. He did have an amicable relationship with BARZAN.

ALI HASAN AL-MAJID, frankly speaking, was a criminal and a thug. He was a Corporal in the military who was given the unearned rank of Major General. AZIZ never had lunch, dinner or recreation with ALI. Their only relationship was their interactions as part of leadership affairs. ALI was a Minister of Home Affairs. Just as the Anfal campaign was beginning, ALI was invested with unprecedented power. Never before in the history of Iraq had that much power been given to one person. AZIZ did not agree in principle about empowering someone who was not an RCC member, it was unconstitutional.
SABAWI IBRAHIM HASAN AL-TIKRITI as the Director of the Intelligence Service. He would occasionally ask AZIZ about knowledge and advice. On one or two occasions they shared a drink, but never a lunch or dinner or other face to face meetings outside of work.

AHMED HUSSEIN was not directly responsible or involved in decision making. He was the Chief of Staff, but was in a difficult position. In short he was a coward, or not brave enough to say no.

ABID HAMID MAHMUD is a crook a thief and a thug.

MUHAMMAD HAMZA ZUBAYDI was a poor man and an incapable Prime Minister. He was actually the joke of the town. During the 1991 Party Congress ZUBAYDI had fallen in popularity amongst members and the predicted voting outcome was expected to show this. As he fell, SADDAM decided to bolster him. AZIZ was writing the draft of the expected voting results when he surprisingly found out that ZUBAYDI’s career was spared.

TAHA YASIN RAMADAN was not trusted by AZIZ. He was described as a ‘yes-man’ who eagerly supported all of SADDAM’s bad decisions. He was rude and narcissistic, spending the first thirty minutes of any meeting talking about himself.

AZIZ SALIH NUMAN was a good guy who did not have a bad reputation. He was not highly educated nor was he a very capable person. Although he served as the Iraqi Governor of Kuwait, the real power in that situation was invested in ALI HASAN AL-MAJID.

MASOUD RAJAVI, the founder of Mujadin el Kalq used to interact primarily with the Director of the Mukhabarat or the Minister of Defense. AZIZ was the first Iraqi official to meet with RAJAVI. They had met in Paris. AZIZ understood that RAJAVI would seek assistance in terms of support from the Iraqi government. The Director of the Mukhabarat would prepare reports for SADDAM recommending to help RAJAVI’s group, Mujadin el Kalq. AZIZ believed that this group wanted more and more and advised the Mukhabarat director that RAJAVI was asking for too much.

ABU ABBAS came to Iraq representing himself as the great leader of a large population of Palestinians. Iraq was helping all Palestinians. But AZIZ saw ABU ABBAS as the leader of the tiniest organization in Palestine. The bad shape of the Iraqi economy prevented the Iraqi government from being able to disburse large
sums of money to the Palestinian cause. ABU ABBAS was given a farm that he could run. The profits generated from the farm could support the cause. The farm evolved into a camp where ABU ABBAS would train fighters with AK-47s. The AK-47s were provided by the Iraqi government.

In 1987 AZIZ was traveling outside of Iraq, possibly in France, when the chemical attack on Halabja occurred. He asked SADDAM upon his return if the news were true. SADDAM said 'yes'. SADDAM blamed the military Chief of Staff NIZAR KHAZRAJZ, and the Minister of Defense during the Iran/Iraq war. SADDAM made a decision that chemical weapons should not be used unless the Chief of Staff says so. The Minister of Defense, ADNAN KHAIRALLAH, SADDAM’s cousin, said that this decision weakened him. SADDAM reversed his decision granting power to the Minister of Defense. He used it without the proper consent. SADDAM did not consult with AZIZ when it came to military and strategic matters. SADDAM said to AZIZ that he was surprised that they were used. Firstly the use of them was maybe not necessary, and secondly the big repercussions that would follow. AZIZ had previously brought to SADDAM’s attention the bad repercussions associated with the use of such weapons.

AZIZ readily acknowledged that Iraq used chemical munitions in its war against Iran. These were difficult times. Hundreds of thousands of Iranian troops were being held off from invading Iraq. AZIZ recalled confiding in the German and French Foreign Ministers at that time. He told them about Iranian fanatical fighters called the Mujadin al-Kalq, and the group’s capturing of girls. The girls were executed, but not before being inspected for their virginity. Those who were virgins would first be raped before being executed. According to Mujadin al-Kalq’s interpretation of the Quran, if a girl dies while still a virgin, she will go to heaven. AZIZ stated that he did not justify using the chemical weapons which was a violation of the Geneva Convention. But as an Iraqi patriot, he would not allow Iran to occupy Iraq. And if the defensive use of these munitions would prevent that from occurring, he would not protest it.

AZIZ said that to be fair to history, Iraq did use chemical weapons against Iraqi citizens. According to his belief, the Kurdish target wasn’t a highly populated area. Generally, when hostilities start, people leave. They flee rather than wait. AZIZ did not believe that the Iraqi military had fully circled the Kurdish village. Just those few villagers remained. Iran first
attacked, most people fled, only a few villagers remained. There were 15 or 20 corpses, from what he saw on the international television program, not hundreds of thousands. The chemical attacks against Iran was army verse army, no civilians, but Halabja there were civilian victims.

There were no meetings that took place during that time. AZIZ was out of the country and did not communicate with SADDAM while traveling. International phones were monitored and AZIZ was in the habit of meeting with SADDAM upon the return of his trip. AZIZ was not aware of the strategic and tactical matters and was not part of the military decision making. Despite his belief that some officers would use more than an extensive amount of force, AZIZ did not protest to SADDAM. AZIZ felt that the use of chemical weapons were unjustifiable not only for moral reasons but for practical reasons. They were not effective weapons. In the war with Iran, they were used only on the front, by both sides. The weapons that had the biggest affect on the war were the long range missiles. These were used against the cities.

In 1990, Iraq released thirty seven or thirty eight thousand Iranian prisoners of war(POW). The Iranian government had told the families of many of their war dead that the Iraqis had actually captured them and were holding them. When all of the Iranian POWs were returned, the Iranian government had a difficult time explaining the lessened numbers to their people. As a result, they withheld releasing all of their Iraqi POWs as a way of posturing in front of their people that more releases were being negotiated.

On 03/04/1991, two days after the Gulf War cease-fire, The RCC signed and released RCC Resolution #54 which gave Goverors control of military forces in their territories. All of the RCC members except AZIZ who remained in Baghdad, were in the south of Iraq or outside of Baghdad at this time. AZIZ was working on implementing United Nations Resolutions 687 and 688 which involved the repatriation of POWs. He met with SADDAM on occasion but spent most of his time with the Director of Military Intelligence, General SABAH AL-DURI. AZIZ believed that in actuality the RCC was not consulted on Resolution #54. They may have heard of it. It makes sense to give authority and power to the governors in the times of crisis. But there would have been no voting or feedback, only SADDAM’s order.
AZIZ acknowledged that in the sense of collective responsibility, he should be held answerable for what the government did in general terms. But the man who holds the full accountability is SADDAM. Originally, when AZIZ was in the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), members would receive a typed letter as to what the agenda items for each meeting would be. When decisions were agreed upon, they would be typed up and signed by each member. Each decision was signed and not implemented until all the RCC members signed it. In the early nineteen eighties, SADDAM directed that the Chairman of the RCC can decide matters on behalf of the entire RCC. Later he decided that anything decreed by the RCC would become the law. In addition to these legal measures which relegated the RCC to SADDAM's personal rubber stamp, there was the chilling affect of the July 1979 RCC meeting, where Ba'ath members were killed. This made the proposition of disagreeing with SADDAM a life or death matter.
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IT - IRAQ

Reference: (Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☑ Original notes re interview of

KAMAL MUSTAFA ABDALLAH SULTAN AL-TIKRITI

4/29/04 INTERVIEW
KAMAL MUSTAFA AL ABDOULLAH (Cousin of HVA^2)

- Commander SRE in RAMLAH (1965-67)
- Political Pioneer from 1973 in RAMLAH

- Assist to (DAWAH) (Under Kamman) - (The Commander)

RAMLAH NKtb = SPECIAL REPUBLICAN GUARD

- HVA #10 was moved in command of SRE

- SADAM HAMID
- HUSSEIN KAMMAN
- HVA #10 (2nd Lt)

- No intel services or civilian service only and served as a military man

For his career...

- 4 months as an intel service officer
- Ultm. Commander of SRE - HUSSEIN KAMMAN

- Structure of SRE: Varied Dual Perception

And crisis...

- Commander Resigned in 4 Areas or sections

- South, South, Central, Eastern, & Eodic, South
- Establishment for Communications under in cas

Communications was secretive
1991 - ARMY WAR COMMAND ORDER

TO COMMANDER, COMMAND, REPAINTED

AND REVIEW WITH AN OFFICER OF A SUPERVISORY

3/41 TO 15TH KHAZARAN COMMAND STAFF

TO JPL ORDERS A REMINDER TO

LEO TO KASAIAN TO WASTE IS NOT

HAZARAN ZERBAN TO RECONSIDER

AND ASSIGN THIS RESPONSIBILITY

- TO REMAIN EMPLOYED TO MISSION/JEST

COMMANDER OF INDIA

- Z AND S CAPITAL CARGOS WANT RECEIVED

MUHAMMAD, P.

TO ANSHER TO HAMERN ZIRAIYI

- MILITARY ORDERS WERE TO DENY TO

MARRIYA AND RAMSI ON BUREAU

- DIRECTOR COMMAND TO CHIEF AME

OF MARRIYA.

- ISSUED ORDER BY HIGH RANKING CIVILIANS

TO THE MINISTRY, MILITARY DESERT ED

AND DEPORT THE ORDER
- God only sees Him for a moment
- A man in (3) was
- Sounded on the "parish" in
  my home in Nazareth.
- TO S OR THING OR A SONG
- Hand on Maia. (Kes)

- After being used with Malak

- Happened on 2/18/19 - Hug10
- All theirs, all theirs was specialist
- Delivered at 5:11 AM in
  Kingston
- Like he had handled the situation
- My report above this rebellion
- Sounded huge for the boys involved.
  According to Mr.
- Who was present? Different
  
- Allegedly, says, says, says, says
  - Allegedly, says. (Kes)
  - Allegedly, says. (Kes)
The Regiment consists of:

- 4 Companies of Infantry
- 1 HQ Company
- 1 Support Company

HMS #10 was the Regiment Commander

Communications through radios to the

Spinal Commander

Met with Muhammad Hanand M-Buddy
at 4:30am and departed at 5am

First went to (Kabyle) near the

Makriza.

Accompanied by Itan Mann - Baghdad
by Sadam Hussein.

On 26/3/2003 interview of HMS #10

Never mentioned rebellion or
uprising, and only told of
Rebel's trouble on the road in
Syria. Rebels were never mentioned.

'Never try to clean with an shotgun'

Lives of Rebel/Rebel

There must be lesser Roberts'

From 1995 with myself live these problems
To Deano,

Once Regiment was boarded on 3/2/1991 following Zubairi's sinking.

From a party member and learned this might be an unusual happen in Kuwait.

- A missile was fired from the sea miles outside of Kuwait.
- SEP, long range and multiple fire - estimated force of the enemy, 20-70 people.
- Remaining expected as hit 1 hour later
- (Al-Hay City) (Both police and military forces were not aware of this.)
- The later learned after deplaning from the city as learned thus many were

Injuries from Iraqs:

- Blood handed to help hand to Deano has
- Calling for restara 1st of Al-Hay
- Regiment officers in our city
and only then released was our city
of our city that summary stopped.
Police,
\[-\text{mer} \quad \text{and both} \quad \text{armed forces were}
\]
released. Letters from my mother
\[-\text{my killed,}
\]
- Light a medium machine gun, mortars,
and RPG's were utilized on us,
advanced to the city of Al-Haj.
- Troops did not sustain injuries
- Very few among of any individuals
- Killed or injured
- Duty of security officers was to
"round-up" perpetrators and got them
- out of railroad.
- This round was not contact to
prisoners.
- PSYOP "parish" was fake to order
- maximum and six to barracks
- USA TO RESPONSIBLE THAT THE MAIN
RESponsibilities FOR THE SHUTDOWN OF THE
SYSTEM DURING THE 1991 EVENT
IN ATRACTIVE SHUTDOWN AND RESPONSIBILITY
FOR Gann ADESH

- HURT TO WY Brand BARGE IN A
DELUGE AND CAME UP JUST FOR TIDAL
ACCORDING TO MY UNDERSTANDING
= COMPANY COMMANDER SHOT A 161-LONG TO ALAMAR
AND MACHINEicorn
AD VISIT A\(204\) OR 161
ADVISOR TO KICKED ONE OF THE
EXECUTIVES, INDIVIDUALS THAT LIVED IN
A HOUSE WHERE THE SPECIAL DEATH KILLED
ONE CADE, EMMANUEL FROM, INDIVIDUAL WAS
ALLEGED TO RESIDE TO "ABIA" AND AFTER
BEING SHOTTED AND KILLED IT WAS
TAKE HOME.

ADAM
- Still to serve, member of Jadshin
command, has not worked with me in the
past, action in boot party from Jadshin
~ possible site.
- Ask a military man
- Guess all else - does not impress man

Weary one classed.

- After all this time
  The one thing that comes to
  Normalizes (as shown)

- 15 minutes regained

- house breadth rose in instrument room

- Instrument $\frac{1}{2}$
11:22 4/29

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-08-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sah/ks

10

Difficult for me to swear. Bad. I will swear on 1 o'clock all my answers will be truthful.

- Please we are searching for you. When I surface, I was confirmed this is what U.S. want do. Please no hurry search for truth, salute these efforts.

1941 ~ C'mon of SIECI d.c.

Statements in Baku.

Refine: protect pass sites that I 'AN x MOSUL

Mak Houk

Next in C.O.C. was Husseim Kamal in supervision A.R.C.

H.K. was

THE c'mon R.C. & S.I.C. ASSGA

H.K. was connected to S.I.

S.H.

H.K.

10
I was highly trained but truly Debien command was hit. And all Iraqis were this.

I never served in the military.

I was there for 4 months. Staff college - career path. Chief of S.R.G.

- Would have been stationed at an arm near Sh.
- Most likely assigned all its officers from Sh.
- Would have reports only to S.H. or chief of S.R.G.

Truth I was C.S. C.R.G.

Man who received orders was H.I.K.

Stating unless there was peace time & causes, since its final S.R.G. & R.C. always answered to the commander of Kuwait.


Defends with 3/4. Year 1 Command 4 area.

Mil. & Const of the added to command.

Command 83730 to maintain contact

Comm 83730 to Adjacent

+ (83730) + Adjacent Command

Although 71/64 Enemy Army maintains contact

91 not clear. This / Enemy was converted to

Gen Comm

941 March lent RC & S.R.C. Comm to French

Off RC & S.R.C.

1.16 Army orders

1:00 AM to P.S.C. HQ

To take P.S.C. or S.R.C. Answer to

P.S.C. no AMT 20540

G7 no Answer

17 17

A91 HAM vs AC 24520 14 10

Mul to 151725 A

- Deon Ages party & assault

Reconnaissance

Go to report. Employees act as
SOCET & ASSINS 0000

Another to remaining MIC units LF
- Caserta

- Deploy NASMIL will be in No.

- May be difficulties to get there.

- Hands will be there.

- Division Command will be SAC OIS Command.

- Affetto since 7/147 until now. The story.

- No. 2 in 106th 10th... show to.

- Military carried out orders as high levels of opinion.

- Come to Nazaara.

- A Sao Command to join the Army.

- At Nazaara.

- One more with him, Ronnie.

- Protect him all command.

- DEPOM, Ronnie protect the command.

- J.K. Group, one useless then after 2007.

- Main task, protect of command, check points.

- Plan & 2007. Point with heavy units.

- To recycle in 108.
Mohan Hanzo Al-Zamir

Main reason for the protection from when

I month ago

Not even Mr. & Mrs. Khan nor 3775-7 or
Sultan at that time knew security

Sultan was surprised (SHOCKED) by rebel
Is actually one person attacks him

- Took one regiment - list rifles
  - Hend M6
  - 303 lee u cont war - 00 9-000
  - Support company lersen
  - Minna Pl
  - HQ company
  - 00 00 00 00

Communicated by Rakes

Once the fleet 3-15 orders sail. Mr. Ali will
come here visit us. He come to
2:00 on July 11 at 5.00 am

- Khan also attended the meeting
  - Has "Army Town"
  - 3AM

- We will see at same meeting
  - till us all 2
NAZARE NAJASA

- Secure his release
- Clean southern cities of uprisings
- Cases were verbal
- Transfer prisoners basic to MI. in Sessions
- Maintain Al Durrani as ACC member who in charge of southern region

NEVER mention dates or NAR with @NYS
- Officers or real
- Secu nce
- Anying as NAR
- SSU NACE & PLUNGE PROJECT
- Turn over 70 sf cases
- Return to work

NEVER turn to clean up cities
may have Deputy Azerbaijani minister
The way

- 100 AM is minute earlier, 15 min. AHS time
- Follows can AHS
- As in Canada
- Only ACH met party member
- Sisi a S.A.S. anyone in as HAIL

- Had party member
Exchange of Fire began.  
- Gov. said: Mayor & Party Members KILLED  
- Mayor was missing (not no - meaningless)  
- Fire came from outside city.  
- 2, 300 men & forces were killed.  
- Regiment Gen. 10 & Oscar killed.  
- 14,000 died.  
- UN later REC entire city.  
- A. H. & Governor at 1:37 P.M. city center.  
- worst, while we were waiting here,  
- did so in our presence.  
- Some from our police, & Gov. were killed.  

Learned later, many insurgents from Iran  
- after dispatches.  

A. H. & others REC should operate  
- REC operated & advanced  
- almost nowhere until Mayor came out  
- S overtime men came out.  Hearing Part office  
- was killed  
- 2 companies operated on entire REC  

To RETALIATE  
- NO NEGOTIATION FOR REC  
- 60 in main ICU  
- Lt. Lt. & Mt. MG. & RFH were used  
- Forces received from 167-000 forces.
FIRE: DONT LAST COLD

ALL ATTACKS BY VISIR. ArmCINA ROCIUS

Two killed five returned fire seven officials came out

No leaves residing through doors windows

and ran

- in capturing present but local security

- only member security control have given information

- some capture some escaped, some killed

- Gov. of NAFINIA, killed running this Monday

- ake, one killed beside of the traffic

- in air craft

- most of Al-.... Staff officers were

- taken as killed in village, this was not

- may be in man;

- whenever once as this should be taken

- responsibility equal in duties in RSDVR/3/76

- now even issues the main show be held

- January
M.H. memory is not secure and well.

M.H. king may not say where he is. He is not well.

Make people do not gasoline never meet this.

Mrs. History is lemon, Burke and Agnes in 160 C. E.

If I ever happens any one in my way.

Viose went about this man.

Don’t wear this, he is available.

Group or his music first C.C. floor, she above 3.17.

Reeling or AID. Answer

(2) Plants as answer.

He play scene here at house. M. Home. Shop.

I kicked him up to take him to his house.

Fire came from direction off his house.

Mar in 1930 lives 18.
Rk Gamal Al-Sadun

NAZI command

I have not worked with you so far.

He's not as he has last seen.

He's gone since...

Active cornering of enemy. He is gone.

Near Souq Al-Shihiyukhi.

Now: Shiva

Not a military man.

Jasib Mustaf

Chief

Ann.in. Bul.-Hilm. Was on a Resolution.
Stated overview. And when so...

Missile from Retun Arrive from enemy Fire from Retum.

Thursday, 9 July 1986.

Following day... Ariz was in unit.

in Shahrar?

4th Corp. Supp. to 1st and 2nd. Stannin

It came until Ariz.
Besar incises

IV can suppose "We were with them"

We bury him for Aziz here

-WS+7 only mind to breake of nurses

-We are not to wash

Bey R.C. Husain Jibal at Jasum!

Passer by from our palace, was a common

Al-Shata'a

Bakar Bakr

-SP was caught in Shatrah

To say he crossed video taken, in Anina prison

- Iran has many in our there

- We never go music very well

- Many families in our money in removal from there

We received 700 to 1200

Iran army has menning on 11/14/11
ONE CAPTURE L.B.E. or Distinguished Service Crosses

Saw 17 Dressed

Saigonese Baggie Black Trousers Face Covers 'Skawac'
Det W. Kamal Mustafa Abduallah Sultani al Tikriti

Det W. Kamal Mustafa Sultani al Tikriti

Informed that Samir & Sr. leaders will be going to hearing by new govt

I'll be telling youth correct truth

When I surrendered, I knew myself who did enemy to find truth?

Looks scared, rigid, hands clasped together - stary.
1. As 25 of 526, regre misplaced
   Prof Dr. H. Saad in Bag
   in Bag, Mosul, Nakhal

2. Reparted: Hassan Kamel - NCO 1st Sup
   of RG 4 on day 7 Sep, RepH
   1st Gunn. Sectry

3. Hassan Kamal connected to ITOs.

   I Say, SH
   ↓
   Hassan Kamal
   ↓
   ME

4. I have served my county well since became a LA.
   I never served in intelligence svc.

5. That must have been Max, this...

   After Start we've had to size...
5)  Had to another official,

G.  

PC + 8 1/2 always right

Policy military in peace time

Policy military in crisis

Before war,

Communist in 4 areas

Military to Constantinople
assigned to the communes

Kemal I went to see the

Atatürk, told me to restore
A: I am in Washington, a near faculty place No. to reorganize & reappoint faculty positions that have become vacant.

What your military bases?

A: To go to Marjariya.

B: There is a RQ, tear in the NASIRIYA, but AM insisted to go

B: I must protect my soldiers

A: Why go to Marjariya?

Primary - Protect the command - Primary Object

Secondary -
A. My main duty was to protect Afgani No.
   until PC could take over the
   protection this is not called
   home.

1. Neither now nor ever will I lie.
   Really, out situation
   doesn’t think so.

Q. What equip did you take for mission?
   A. Lt. rifle, M2 machine gun
      M60's main platoon and
      defense platoons and aircraft

Q. How was regiment broken down.
   4 Regiment, 70
   4 Company (negroes)
   1 Support Company

Q. How did you communicate with them?
   Q. Where did you meet Afgani
   I came at 3 pm he departed at 5 pm
Q: We first went to Lt. Col. NASA Red 12.

Q: Were you accompanied by anyone else?

A: A marine accompanied me to Kharajla.

A: Then asked

My orders were:

- You have to go to Kharajla
- You may encounter problems on the way
- You are to provide protection for Col. Khayat
- Don't turn to RG

I was never told to clean up any Connor City.

But I was told there was a high road robbery. No one could have foreseen.

It was unusual to receive orders at 6 AM prior to March 1, 1991, we were flying for 42 days.
In Kur, we ran into force which told us that major city was missing.

I estimated the force to be 20-30 strong.

An hour later, the regiment was able to enter the city.

The governor joined the regiment in Kur.

In May,

An Armenian thought we should check out their regiment. They deployed to the city.

As we reached the city, we noticed:

The 1st two companies deployed used RBG and light weapons.

No prisoners captured.

It was my duty to send our troops in.
DID you receive any medals for your actions?

DID you write up anyone in your regiment for an award?

[Excuse]

[Dismissed]

Don't know exact numbers but 45 Hy.

You falsely accused me ofilly insights.

Most staff officer killed in outlying areas add to others.
4th corps came under fire.
" " deployed to Inzago, and we went with them.
$told the brothers how to bring ______ in.
The next day the incident of the cap took place -
we continued to Kasuwa.

Most Buganda Police led by JABOUTI & we later
made him Major 7 DKR 17

Captured 5 Iranians

5 of them wearing Enron uniforms

Black Baggy truss

& Cave
On 04/29/2004, KAMAL MUSTAFA ABDALLAH SULTAN AL-TIKRITI (Sultan), Black List #10, was interviewed by Supervisory Special Agent George Piro. Observing the interview were Supervisory Special Agents and Special Agent The interview was conducted in English and Arabic. Providing translations for the interview was Federal Bureau of Investigation Language Specialist Sultan provided the following information:

In 1991, Sultan was posted in Baghdad as the commander of the Special Republican Guard (SRG). This was a high rank, but the person who was truly in charge of all of the Republican Guard (RG) was Hussein Kamel and all Iraqis knew this. In his position as commander of the SRG, Sultan answered directly to Hussein Kamel. Hussein Kamel answered directly to President Saddam Hussein. Hussein Kamel was the "Supervisor" of the RG, which meant he was in charge of the RG, the SRG and the al-Amn al-Khass (Special security office). The RG units were responsible for protecting the presidential sites in Tharthar, Mosul, Makhoul and other locations.

Sultan served only four months as an officer in the Military Intelligence Unit. This administrative assignment, like other similar corps-level duties, was part of a normal career path that all officers had to follow.

Sultan was confronted with the statement of a Government of Iraq official who asserted that the commander of the SRG would have been stationed in Baghdad close to President Saddam Hussein, most likely received all his orders from President Saddam Hussein and would have reported only to President Saddam Hussein. Sultan responded by affirming that he was the commander of the SRG but that Hussein Kamel was the man who received orders.

Although the command structure varied during peace or times of crisis, since its founding, the RG and SRG always answered to the commander of the guard. During peace time the Republican Guard Units fell under the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defense. About three or four years before the war, the command established four sectors. The military and consultants were assigned to command these sectors. The areas were 1) the South, 2)
the Central Euphrates, 3) the Euphrates and 4) the North. These commands were established to maintain contact in case communication was severed between units and President Saddam Hussein, or adjacent commands. Although they existed, the Army maintained control of the situation.

1991 was not like this. The Army was connected to the general command. Sultan stated that the RG and the SRG were connected to the Supervisor of the RG and SRG. On 03/01/2004, a day after the United States stopped its offensive military operations in Iraq, Sultan received a visitor at SRG Headquarters at approximately 1:00AM. Hussein Kamel came to give Sultan orders. Sultan's orders were to take a regiment of SRG troops and go to Nasiriyah with MUHAMMAD HAMZA AL-ZUBAYDI (Hamza) (to whom Sultan would be answerable). Upon arrival, they were to reorganize the party and reassign responsibilities. This would involve reappointing employees to include selecting and assigning a governor.

Sultan was asked to clarify the role that a military unit would have in these civil service-type affairs. Sultan explained that they were to go to Nasiriyah, for two days, to meet with Hamza. His orders explained that there might be difficulties en route. There would be a Divisional Command from Baghdad's Special Forces Unit in Nasiriyah to which Sultan's unit would turn over the situation. Sultan suggested to Hussein Kamel that since this other Baghdad unit was near Nasiriyah, they could perform the duties rather than deploying both units. Hussein Kamel reiterated that Sultan's unit was to stay only two days, turn over the situation to the Divisional Command from Baghdad's special forces, and return. It is the military's duty to carry out orders by high level civilian officials. Sultan understood his instructions were to travel to Nasiriyah, establish command to run the Army at Nasiriyah. Once he met up with Hamza, Sultan was to provide protection for his command, remain two days and turn the situation over to the special forces. His main task would be to protect the command by setting up check points, securing the route of travel and use local units to replace his troops and withdraw.

During this 03/01/1991 meeting, Sultan was not told about rebels, revolution or uprising. He was never told to 'clean up the cities'. Sultan believes that at the time, even Hussein Kamel and President Saddam Hussein probably did not know that events in the south had risen to the scale of an actual uprising. President Saddam Hussein was always told that all of the people loved him.
According to Sultan, when it was revealed to the former President Saddam Hussein that there was a rebellion under way, Saddam Hussein was shocked, as he was always told that his people admired him.

When asked if getting orders to deploy at 1:00AM was something that struck him as urgent or unusual, Sultan stated that it was not, they often conducted reaction drills that required such a short notice response. In regards to the threat or troubles along the route for which he was supposed to prepare himself, Sultan speculated that at that time it could have been highway robbers from Iran.

The regiment that Sultan assembled for deployment to Nasiriyah consisted of four companies of infantry troops, a support [weapongs] company and a headquarters company. These companies were made up of light rifles, medium machine guns, RPGs, rocket launchers, a mortar platoon, an air defense platoon and a 106 anti-tank gun element. These units had a system of radio communication. Hussein Kamel told Sultan that Hamza would come to the SRG Headquarters and that Sultan was to wait for him. Hamza arrived at 3:00am, and they departed Baghdad at 5:00am, southbound for Kut. The regiment traveled in a caravan, with the command element, including Hamza, in the rear of the formation. Traveling with the group was a bodyguard of President Saddam Hussein's. Sultan believed that this bodyguard may have been at the original meeting with Hussein Kamel and President Saddam Hussein.

In Kut, the group received word from a party member that there was a disturbance in Al-Hayy. The Governor briefed them that the Mayor was missing and that party members were killed. When the regiment arrived outside of Al-Hayy, they came under fire. They responded with RPG and light weapons fire. Hamza decided the regiment should deploy. The regiment broke up and deployed. Two companies deployed on line and prepared to retaliate. An hour later the regiment entered the city. There were no targets for the support weapons. All of the attacks were visual. The regiment used light and medium machine guns and RPGs. The advancing forces came under fire and returned fire. The firing didn't last long as there was no resistance. The enemy had apparently thrown down their weapons and ran. Hamza and the Governor of Kut put the city in order. This happened while the regiment was still there and in the presence of Sultan. Some party members, police and some of the Governor's men were still fighting. Some people were captured, but the SRG did not deal with debriefing or transporting them. This was a matter for the local security elements. Sultan stated that
neither he nor his military units tried to collect intelligence from the captured fighters. He received intelligence from party members, security services and other sources.

When read a surviving witness account about atrocities that RG troops perpetrated against a civilian Shi'a family in Southern Iraq in 1991, Sultan stated that he believed whoever ordered that event should be held responsible. Sultan stated whoever issued the order should be held responsible.

Sultan was read a statement which Hamza gave to investigators about Sultan's involvement in abuses of civilians. Sultan responded by saying he did not know why Hamza would say something like that. Perhaps Hamza's memory is not serving him well. Hamza is a kind and compassionate man. Sultan had heard from some of the investigators about Hamza making people drink gasoline. There is no way that Sultan could ever imagine Hamza ever being involved in anything like this.

Sultan was confronted with the account of him violently putting his boot on the chest of a man who was lying on the ground. Sultan did not deny that this took place. He said that the man is available. This incident took place in Ash Shatrah. After the resistance was put down in Al Hayy, the regiment stayed overnight and moved out the next day. They turned control of the area over to a military division from Baghdad. There was word of a threat in the nearby village of Hafajeh. The IV Corps was responding and Sultan's regiment went with them. Sultan spent the night at AZIZ AL-NU'MAN's. The brothers knew how to get Aziz al-Nu'man through his in-laws. A group of people fired weapons from this man's house. Killed was a Republican Guard company commander and a soldier. Another soldier who was wounded, later died. Their blood was on the ground. Sultan saw this and reacted with anger. This man was one of the five prisoners that were caught near Ash Shatrah. All five men were later released.

Sultan was asked if he knew BAKARI AL-SADUM of the National Command. Sultan stated that he had not worked with him in the past. BAKRAI AL-SADUM has possibly lost an eye or wears sunglasses to cover a bad eye. He is above average height and has active connections to the party. With the name of 'Sadum', he must be from Nasiriya, possibly Suq al-Shiyoukh. He is not a military man. Most likely he should be a Shia.
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Field Office Acquiring Evidence: FBI BAGHDAD
Serial # of Originating Document: 
Date Received: 5/6/04
From: FBI - BAGHDAD OPERATIONS CENTER
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Title: DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ
Reference: 
(Communication Enclosing Material)
Description: □ Original notes re interview of
AHMED HUSEIN KHUDAYIR
Dr. Ayad Alumaeo Hussein Khudadaiyar

Date: 05-08-2009

1975-78 - Heart Surgery in Jordan - Jordanian Dr.
          Good Recovery - lots of food - Dr. D's graduated from med school in Baghdad

Since 91, Iraq not well equipped for surgery

Grad from law school in Baghdad

Placed in college based on your grades - They gave you ten choices

Famous people grad from the law school

Had
got more rights before July 14 --- resolution, communist men took everything

executed leaders of old parties, especially religious leaders. From 1958-63, N'west

The Beasts executed a lot of communists.

After 63, still no screen about individual rights

Guns from being friend of British to being enemy of British was difficult to
effect all society

At first I think were very principled fair -

The Arab League would call on US judges

for advice.
Was there a particular low point?

In 1991, the body responsible for issuing laws:

(a) Revel Council — Headed by Hussein — was supposed to be a committee but turned into Hussein himself.

(b) The House of Parliament

In 1991, Hussein issued an amendment to the constitution giving the President the power to issue laws and amend laws — This never happened since Hammurabi's day.

Q: Why didn't anyone contradict Hussein that this was bad idea?

At the time, I was in Foreign Ministry. Hussein didn't respect any advice. He was very difficult to deal with. The closer you get to him, the more he distrusts you.

Thinks must people here speak freely.

Ali Hussein Moghrabi, Alaa al-Aswany
I told Ramadan he desired our country and we prepared him, Sir, to take his place.

After 61 - Hussein moved down just things which came to me want to Abd al-Mahmoud, good people after sent sort to work for the Internal Security do background checks. I was not authorized to fire anyone.
Attorney - attended University of Baghdad Law School. The system ranks people by their grades and gives them a chief of security, a prime minister.


The communist party and the Ba'ath party control the government and attempt to suppress opposition and liberation. The military period is censoring for individuals' human rights.

Discussion on draft independence system. The system works reasonable.

RCC and parliament were in charge of managing the police. RCC headed by Saddam Hussein.

In 1991, the Iraqi army amended the constitution. The question of the president to issue laws and among laws was raised. The law (Roman origin).
SMUGGLED NOT DESERT ANYTHING AGAINST
THAT IT WAS A JUST OFFICER PREFERENCE TO
DEAL WITH THE CLEAR INMATE CASE TO
THE WAVE CIRCLE, THAT I WAS HEARD
THEM.

USED AN OFFICER THAT WAS HE COULDN'T
HE不停的10501962801 AT AL COMM
THAT WITH THE COMMISSION, AND THAT I
AND THE COMMISSION, ALSO, SOME OF OUR
OTHER DECISION IS DETERMINED WITH ASSIST
THE HIGHER - SANDAN

IN HIS OPINION, IF SOMEONE IS NOT TITLING
THE MURDER, THEY MADE TO DEPORT THEMSELVES
DEFEND THEMSELVES OR PROTECT THEMSELVES

HAS HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CAMP TO
AID OR ASSIST OR TAKE CARE OF THEMSELF FOR
(HUMAN Ali HASAN HASSAN & RAMADAN) SELF-PRESERVATION

HAS HUMAN RIGHTS Ali HASAN HASSAN &
RAMADAN AND NOT AGAINST THE
AMERICAN. HE DOESN'T BELIEVE THEM.
- PERSONAL BUSINESS - ALL WORKING ARE REDACTED

- fisseh not last and the rest is redacted.

- Does not think this will explain the redaction.

- He takes himself is or the or

American and any information as to

whom were not concerned.

Where we stand ourselves, and why

we were interested in the American.

- The information is likely redacted

as the information has been lost.

- Conservation of the information

size and therefore.

- All or of the info. He has previously provided

is was true. Looking again there was

have been things in it 1972 or whatever, but seeing

like os kingship relationship which was and

intended is.

Promised info. Relation

- Closing line is Blowing E 5/25/92.

- Do not have a personal relationship now.

Barak Ibrahim Hadi Al-Tikriti
As Mr. President of our Defense, he did not have his position as Head of our National Security and Intelligence Service from 1991.

Samarmehr claimed that he is a traitor and got some of our country's secrets.

Claim he is an honest man, but he had 25 years of opportunity in the past to commit 25 acts.
- The Iraqi people are facing hardships.

- During Saddam's regime, there was a general climate of fear and terror. People lived in constant fear.

- Personal knowledge of public events was limited.

- Saddam's rule lasted until his removal.

- Over a year, under Saddam's leadership, a general state of fear prevailed.

- The Iraqi people lived in fear.

- Saddam's regime ended.

- Saddam is dead. He was

- It was said that Saddam is dead. It was

- Saddam's regime has come to an end.
Date 5/4/04

- Discussion in South Stadium in January 1979

-why can't we use our names, even when in the
President's person or in his own room?

- trying to organize SOUTH as informal
organization, to involve non-African leaders

- we can be described as having a

- how can SOUTH be demonstrated?

- Casamor and President help me to find

- or not involve others if others let

- become our new room or nucleus

- its person, a new room will

- be remembered as a "real place"

- SADAM used to be in the gift/sitting

- its tribal leaders are Africans, etc. on a

- masonic basis, new African leaders

- UN LEADER SECOND MONEY

- its using leadership capacity of MR. SADAM

- REMOVES US FROM THE REGIME SELF-THOUGHTS, AND

- was compartmented
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

On 05/04/2004, Ahmad Hussein Khudaiyir (Black List #76) was interviewed at Camp Cropper Detention Camp, Baghdad, Iraq where he was being detained by the U.S. Army following his surrender to authorities in approximately April 2003. Present during this interview were Special Agent (SA) Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) SSA George Piro and SSA Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Providing translation for this interview was a language specialist with the FBI. Also present during this interview was a military interviewer.

Khudaiyir advised he is currently 65 years old and in good health. In 1995 and 1998, he traveled with his brother to Jordan for heart surgery. He noted that his Jordanian physician graduated from medical school in Baghdad several years ago. At one time, Baghdad boasted the finest medical schools in the Arab world. Khudaiyir decided to have his heart surgery in Jordan because after 1991, Iraq was ill equipped to handle complex operations.

Khudaiyir has lived in Iraq for most of his life. Following completion of secondary school, he attended college in Iraq. At that time, placement in college was reserved for those who scored well on an examination which determined one's educational future. Those with good marks were allowed to choose their area of interest from among ten choices. Khudaiyir chose to study law and subsequently graduated from a prestigious law school in Baghdad. Law schools in Iraq had many distinguished alumni. In those days, the judicial system in Baghdad enjoyed an excellent reputation. Iraqi judges were considered very fair and principled, and the Arab League was known to call on them for advice.

Concerning life in Iraq, Khudaiyir recalled that prior to the Communist revolution on July 14, 1958, Iraqi citizens enjoyed more rights than they had in subsequent years. When the Communists took over Iraq, they executed the leaders of various parties, focusing particularly on religious leaders. Later, between 1958–63, the Ba'athists executed many Communists. However, after 1963, despite years of conflict, Iraq was no closer to understanding the concept of human rights. Part of this may have been due to the difficulties which the Iraqi people experienced while trying to
adjust from being friends with the British to becoming friends with the Soviets.

Khudaiyir identified the year 1991 as being a particular low point in Iraq. At that time, Khudaiyir was serving in the Foreign Ministry, and he recalled a particularly defining event. Prior to 1991, two bodies were responsible for issuing laws in Iraq: the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), headed by President Saddam Hussein, and the House-Parliament. The RCC was originally established to function as a committee. However, it gradually turned into a one-man operation with Saddam having total control. That same year, Saddam issued an amendment to the constitution giving the President in the Executive Branch (Saddam) the power to issue and amend laws. Such a wide grasp of power had not occurred since the ancient days of the Babylonian ruler, Hammurabi. When asked why RCC advisors did not confront Saddam and tell him that having control of both the Executive and Legislative functions was a poor idea, Khudaiyir responded that Saddam did not respect anyone's advice and that the closer anyone got to Saddam, the more he distrusted them. Saddam's control of matters extended to Khudaiyir's office in the Foreign Ministry. He recalled that after 1991, as Saddam focused on narrowing down the government, matters which would have normally been brought to Khudaiyir's attention, were instead sent to Abid Hamid Mahmoud Al-Khatib Al-Nisiri Al-Tikriti, Saddam's Presidential secretary.

Khudaiyir compared Iraq to "an airplane that was hijacked, and Saddam was the hijacker." Saddam created an environment of distrust and paranoia throughout the country. Prior to Saddam's regime, Iraq enjoyed favorable relations with other Arab countries. However, after Saddam came to power, Iraq's relations with other Arab countries deteriorated, and many wanted to see an end to his regime. According to Khudaiyir, several detainees currently housed in the detention camp occupied positions of leadership in Saddam's government, and, thus, were responsible for assisting Saddam in hijacking the country. Khudaiyir stated that if these detainees were not being completely truthful during interviews, it is because they are trying to protect themselves.

Concerning rumors circulating within the detention camp, Khudaiyir related that Ali Hassan Al-Majid and Taha Yasin Ramadan have instructed detainees to defend themselves during interviews. Both Al-Majid and Ramadan believe, and have been telling other detainees, that after June 30, 2004, all of them will be released and that many will be appointed to positions of power in the new
government. Khudairi has also heard rumors that Al-Majid and Ramadan have been negotiating with the Americans. However, he does not believe this. Instead, he thinks that Al-Majid and Ramadan may never be released.

Some of Saddam's relatives have told Khudairi that he is a traitor who sold-out his country. As to Saddam's relatives, Khudairi stated it was common knowledge that the ones occupying positions of power in Saddam's regime were "thieves" and corrupt.

According to Khudairi, the staff of the Presidential Diwan has comprised only of good individuals. All prospective employees had to undergo background checks by Internal Security. In his position at the Presidential Diwan, Khudairi was not authorized to fire anyone working under him. After 1991, the function of hiring and firing employees became the responsibility of the Special Security Organization.

Khudairi compared Saddam to Adolf Hitler. However, he claimed that if Hitler had been in Saddam's position, he would not have had problems with the U.S. He considered Hitler to be a smaller player than Saddam, explaining that Hitler was not known for being as ruthless a dictator. In Khudairi's opinion, the human side of Saddam is dead. As an example, he pointed out that Saddam ordered the executions of several people whom he had previously brought back to occupy positions of leadership in his government.

Khudairi was aware that Saddam's birthday was last week, but he believes that only crazy people would have celebrated it. At the conclusion of the interview, Khudairi acknowledged that Saddam may be regarded by history as a blood-thirsty loser.
FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

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Field Office Acquiring Evidence HQ

Serial # of Originating Document

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From ABID MAHMOOD
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(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

- ABID MAHMOOD

- Copy of photograph viewed by Mahmoody
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DATE 05-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BSW/sab/15
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<th>Name</th>
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<td>Aziz Salah Al-Numan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yahya Al Asmani</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
ABD HAMID MAHMUD AL-KHATTAR ADEKIRI AL-JIKRI

DOB: 07/01/1954

VIEWED A COLOR PHOTOGRAPH OF THE RCC MEMBERS
CIRCA 2001 - IDENTIFIED MEMBERS STANDING IN
THE BACK ROW LEFT TO RIGHT.

CLAIMED TWO OR THREE INDIVIDUALS TERMINAL IS
THE COLOR PHOTOGRAPH WERE REEDUMBURY COMMAND
COUNCIL MEMBERS.

COMMAND OF 1. MAI ABD

- ALI YASSIN MANSO
- YASIR RASHID
- HASSAN MR. DII

SELECTED IN JAAR

1. GENERATE COMMAND SECRETARY - ABDEL HASSAN RASHID
   ADMINISTRATION
2. PRESS SECRETARY - ABU ABDUL SALEH
3. CAUCUS SECRETARY - DR. KHADIDJAH MANOUI
4. DILAAS PRESIDENT - AHMED HASSAN
5. GENERATE SECRETARY OF THE BA'AAH - ABDEL NASER
   MANII
   ABU HAMID

6. NATIONAL COMMAND SECRETARY
   FOR THE BA'AAH FRONT - ABDUL BASIR MAHOMADI
   ANNAB

7. PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY - 3/23-24/91 BLEAVE
   PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY
   AFTER THE 9/11 SHAW SUP 1312
- View RCC Delegate and General Meeting

- AND LETTERS OF THE DECISION ON
- THE DRC PRESIDENT. THE DECREE WAS
- ISSUED DIRECT FROM DIVAN OFFICE - "Ismel
- Divan"

- THE DRC SEASON IS THE DIVAN'S PRESIDENT
- WITH RECORDS OF MINUTES FROM THE RCC
- MEETING. THE DECREE WAS TAKEN IN
- THE 7 MEETINGS OF THE RCC

- AND MEETS LEADER AMONG THE RCC MEMBERS.

- PROCEDURES OF ON RCC MEETING

- THE PRESIDENT ASKS FOR A
- SEATING AT RCC MEMBERS

- SENDS LETTERS TO PRESENCE MEMBERS TO RCC
- MEMBERS, DEPENDING ON THE ISSUES THAT ARE TO
- BE DISCUSS - DECISIONS THAT WERE ALLMEM'S
MEETINGS

- PRES. SENDS AN ASSISTANT TO DELIVER
  ISSUES AND DETERMINES IF THE ARE GOOD
  TO BE IN ATTENDANCE PER THE MEETING.
- THE DAILY PRESIDENT READS OUR ISSUES
  AT THE START OF THE MEETING. TODAY AS:

ISSUES THAT ARE DISCUSSED IN THIS ORDER:

1. R.T.
2. PILKINSON
3. A. 217
4. MAHOF
5. MASIQ
6. NORTH WISAN
7. N. 208479

- OTHER MCC MEMBER GIVES PREP WORKERS

END OF OUR ISSUES:

- SADDAK WOULD TAKE LAST MINUTE MCC
  MEMBER [LAKE ORAM ADAM]. SADDAK
  WOULD MICES SPEAK LAST, THE MCC MEMBERS
  WOULD HAVE A TENDER TO CHANG/DIFF.
  OPINION BASED ON SADDAK'S OPINION.

- DARWIN REJECTED MCC LEADER'S OPINION
  AS OF SEEM BUT WOULD "TWO-FACED"
DISCUSSIONS WHERE ROC CHALLENGED THE PRESIDENT

- 1997 CONSTITUTION BY-LAWS OF THE PRESIDENT
- DISCUSSIONS HELD IN 1999 AND WENT TO 1997
- SADAM CARRIED OUT A SHOCK WEAPON
- SADAM CHALLENGED THE PRESIDENT
- NOT REC IT IS TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE
- NOT ALL MEMBERS WERE ABLE TO ATTEND MEET.

- SADAM TOLD THE MEMBERS THAT HE HAD
- DISCUSSED WITH ROCS AND ROC - CONCLUSION
- FRENCH DEPARTMENT AGREED
- FRENCH OF OUR ARMS

- SADAM TOLD THE MEMBERS THAT HE ADDED A
- NEW AND ADDITIONAL POINT THAT CONSTITUTIONS
- HENCE HAD A TERM LIMIT OF 7 YEARS FOR
- PREVIOUS, ROC IRAS HAD BEEN PUBLISHED
- AND A NEW COUNCIL LEADER HAD BEEN FORMED

- OPENED FOR DISCUSSIONS:
  (a) 122,000 IR IRAS
  (b) AS REAL
  (c) THE PRESIDENT WAS LATER
  (d) PARAD A212 - WAS FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE
  (e) COUNCIL MEMBERS SIGNED WITH IT.
AUD was asked if the project had any reason to be a disappointment. A judge—driving one side and siding near our real members near side with our previous asked it for future expansions.

AUD always said our president was 50% as our real member.

FAIR AND WAS A DICTATORSHIP.

SAID SOME WOULD WANT ANY AND "STRENGTH"-outranked us for Council on this regional command.
Abd Hamid Mahmoud Al-Khattab Al-Nasiri Al-Tikriti, (Black List #4), date of birth July 1, 1956, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. Department of Defense representative was also present, and observed the entire interview. FBI Language Specialist, provided Arabic/English translation. Mahmoud provided the following information:

Mahmoud viewed a color photograph depicting members of the Iraqi Regional Command and Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), circa 2000/2001. Starting in the back row of the photograph, and proceeding from right to left, Mahmoud identified the following individuals: Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash, Aziz Salih Al Numan, Latif Sayyif Jasim, Mizban Khadir Hadi Nidyala, Mohammad Izam Al Sadun Al Basra, Ali Hasan Al Majid, Taha Yasin Ramadan, President Saddam Hussein, Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri, Tariq Aziz, Samir Aziz Al Najim, Abid Baki Al Sadun, Adil Abdul Al Duri, First and Last Name Unknown (FNU) (LNU); front row of photograph proceeding from right to left - Muhsim Al Khafiji, Yaha Aboudi, Qusay Saddam Hussein, (FNU) (LNU) and (FNU) (LNU). (All names are phonetically spelled.)

Seven of the individuals depicted in the photograph, Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri, Taha Yasin Ramadan Al Jizrawi, Tariq Aziz, Taha Muhyi Al Din Maruf, Ali Hasan Majid, Mizban Khadir Hadi, and Muhammad Hamza Zubaydi were RCC members. A copy of the photograph viewed by Mahmoud is enclosed in a FD-340/1(A) envelope and maintained with the interview notes.

On approximately March 23-24, 1991, Saddam Hussein appointed Mahmoud to the position of Presidential Secretary. Mahmoud started this position after the 1991 Shia uprising, and held this position of trust until the war. The previous Presidential Secretary was Hamad Hamadi. Mahmoud proceeded to identify the other Secretary positions within the Iraqi government: General Command/Military Affairs Secretary - Hussein Rashid; Press Secretary - Ali Abdul Saleh; Cabinet Affairs Secretary - Dr. Khalid Al Mamouri; Diwan President/RCC Secretary - Ahmed Hussein; General Secretary of the Ba'ath Party - Adnan Al Hadithi; and National

Investigation on 05/07/2004 at Baghdad, Iraq

File #315E-HQ-1448534

SSA George L. Pir...

Date dictated 05/08/2004

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Command Secretary for the Ba'ath Party - Abdul Fattah Muhammad Ammeen.

A letter addressed to President Hussein, from a Colonel of the Iraqi military, who was located in the Southern part of Iraq during the 1991 Shia uprising was discussed with Mahmoud. The self-serving letter described the Colonel's actions during the Shia uprising indicating that he deserved some type of commendation. Mahmoud was not familiar with this particular letter, and advised he did not see, nor was he privileged to all of the correspondence addressed to the President.

Concerning an RCC decree which bestowed military control to Governors during the time frame of the 1991 Shia uprising. Mahmoud initially learned of this decree through the Diwan President, who is also the RCC Secretary. Mahmoud believed the decree was issued through the legal department of the Presidential Diwans office and was ultimately voted on by the seven RCC members.

Mahmoud discussed the flow of communications through the Presidential Secretary office and the protocol that is followed during the RCC meetings. When President Hussein needed to convene a meeting of the RCC, he would ask Mahmoud to contact the RCC members and announce the date and time. Mahmoud would send notes, via an assistant, announcing the meeting to the seven RCC members. Occasionally, an agenda would be sent to the RCC members prior to the meeting regarding the various issues that were to be discussed. Once the RCC meeting was convened, either the Presidential Diwan or RCC member Tariq Aziz would read the topics/issues for the meeting. Subsequently, each individual RCC member would have a chance to voice their opinion. The order of discussion was always the same, Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri, Taha Yasin Ramadan Al Jizravi, Tariq Aziz, Taha Muhyi Al Din Maruf, Ali Hasan Majid, Mizarb Khadr Hadi, and Muhammad Hamza Zubaydi. Once all of the RCC members had a chance to voice their opinion on a particular topic/issue, President Hussein would then give his opinion.

According to Mahmoud, while President Hussein was giving his point of view on a particular topic, RCC members would study his facial expressions which would determine if they needed to speak out and change their opinion to match his. Mahmoud believes the RCC members would change their opinions because they were two faced, and not because they were in fear of President Hussein.
Mahmoud provided an example when the RCC did not side with President Hussein. In 1997, after seven years of discussion regarding the by-laws of the political parties and the press, President Hussein assembled a joint meeting between the RCC, Regional Command, and Sardoun Hamidi (phonetic)-Parliament President. The purpose of this joint meeting was to discuss and vote on the constitution, freedom of political parties, and freedom of the press. Specifically, President Hussein was in favor of establishing a seven-year term limit for the president, abolishing the RCC, and establishing a Shura council. The meeting was open for discussion, at which time RCC member Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri spoke out against the passage of the law. Other council members, with the exception of Tariq Aziz, sided with Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri. Tariq Aziz was in favor of the passage of the new laws. According to Mahmoud, the laws were never passed.

Regarding the situation that Iraq is currently facing, Mahmoud would place fifty percent of the blame on President Hussein and fifty percent of the blame on the RCC. Mahmoud advised that President Hussein would not allow for strong or outspoken individuals on the RCC or regional councils.

Mahmoud concluded by saying he believed the Saddam Hussein regime was a dictatorship.
FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HD-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FHD

Serial # of Originating Document

Date Received 5/3/07

From A212 SALIH NUMAN AL HAFASI

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

BAQOUD, IRAQ

(City and State)

By

To Be Returned

Receipt Given ☑ No

Grand Jury Material – Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ☑ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI) ☑ No

Title: OPRANAN DESERT SOF, IRAQ

Reference: SALIH 3D2 TM1 NARA 5/3/07

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☑ Original notes re interview of

A212 SALIH NUMAN AL HAFASI
AZIZ SALLAH AL-NUMAN

- DOB: 7/1/1941
- BO: 8/10/1945
- SURF: 20TH/2ND/2ND/2ND

AZIZ SALLAH AL-NUMAN

CAREER IN IRAQI ARMY

- Served in 1965, became a division member
  in 1970
- 1975 commander of Karbala
- Division member transferred to Baghdad
- 1987-1990, became a division member
  in 1990
- 1992-1993, became a commander member
  in charge of Misan and Wasit provinces
  1992-2002
- 1992-2002, became a commander of Wasit province
- 1992-2002, responsible for Wasit province
- April 2002, moved to Baghdad
  in charge of Karbah 3 district in Baghdad
- VIETMINH SECONDARY CIRCLE 2nd Date PHTCC No. 1
- INCLUDED THAT WAS ORIGINAL FEED
- RECENT COMMAND - IDENTIFIED HIMSELF
- STANDING OR AT RENEU - HUA ANH KHANG

- SAIU TO AM PARTY BECAUSE OF REVOLUTION
- IN 1970 AND 1971 IN VIETNAM, ARMS REBELLION
- AT ALMOST THE COMMUNIST PARTY
- SHARED THE IDEAS - APPROXIMATELY 1,500 MILITARY
- MEMBERS
- IDENTIFIED
- DIED IN COMINGS 1979 MURDER, WHERE
- REVOLUTION A NIK BACHU SONG, IS AWAY
- OF THE WORK IN VIETNAM AND TO THE
- UNITED STATES

- SAIGON DEFENSE DEPARTMENT BECAUSE OF
- THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT

- STILL CLAIMS IT'S SUPREMACY OF OUR
- US, SAYS DAMAGING US BATTLE
- AT NIK AIRPORT

- BELIEVES IT IS DENOUNCED BECAUSE IT
- WAS A MEMBER OF THE REBELLION COMMAND
- WITH ARMS ITSELF AND LONG-TERM BOOKS
- A MONTH AT NIK AIRPORT
DON'T JIVE HIMSELF AT A COURT
JUSTICE OR A CONVICTION

LEON BAKS RESIGNED FROM KUWAIT IN 1990 - HAMID ALABD AL-KHAN
OF THE ORG. OF JESUS OF NAZARETH
A 3-MEMBER DELEGATION ACCOMPANYING
PROTEST AND DEMANDS WITH CHURCH
CLERGY LEADERS AND CLAIMING THE U.S. MIGHT
ALONG THE DIVIDE

AMILKAN IN NAZARETH AFTER FEAST KIWIAT

THE MIGHT INTEGRITY

ACKNOWLEDGES THE "MIRACLE" IN NAZARETH
IN 1991, THE UPRISE OF PROLIFERATION
NAZARETH AMONST MUSLIM OPPRESSORS
CONCLUSION RESULT FROM THE REVOLUTION NAZARETH
- CLAIMED U.S. GOVERNMENT CURY TO
NAZARETH, ARRESTS OF MILITARY ARMED
THAT GRANTED

AZI HASAN WASIN A sAliAM FOR HIS
OPINIONS. ABDU AN-NAB IS KNOWN AS
OHMARA A1 AS BEING A MEMBER OF
OK PAF, AND OK REGIONAL COMMAND.
Aziz Salih Numan Al Hafaji, (Black List #8), date of birth July 1, 1941, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAF), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. Department of Defense representative was also present, and observed the entire interview. FBI Language Specialist, provided Arabic/English translation. Salih provided the following information:

Salih began the interview by chronologically detailing his career within the Ba'ath Party and Iraqi government. He joined the Ba'ath Party in 1968, and became a division member in 1970, at Nasariyah. In 1975, he assumed the Governor's job in Karbala. During this time frame, his status as a division member was transferred from Nasariyah to Baghdad. In 1987, Salih became the Minister of Agriculture, and subsequently retired from the Ministry in 1988. In 1988, he became a member of the Ba'ath Party in Baghdad, and then became the Governor of the occupied Kuwait Province in 1990. In 1992, Salih was elected to become a command member. From 1992 through 2002, he was in charge of the Misan and Wajit Provinces. In August 2002, Salih moved to Baghdad and was in charge of the Karkh District of Baghdad.

In 1968, he joined the Ba'ath Party because he believed in God, Arab unity, and the struggle against the Communist Party. Salih claims he is the Sheik of his tribe, the Al Hafaji tribe, which consists of approximately 1.1 million people.

Concerning the infamous 1979 meeting which Saddam Hussein convened shortly after assuming the presidency of Iraq, which unveiled an alleged conspiracy against the president. Salih did not attend this meeting and could not provide details. Salih allegedly became aware of this meeting through watching it on television.

Salih believes that Iraq was destroyed through the wars the country has fought, and personally blames Saddam Hussein for the current situation. Salih does not view himself as a subject or a witness, and believes he is being detained merely because he was a member of the regional command. Soon after his capture by U.S.
forces, Salih was allegedly told that he was going to be released within a month. Salih was captured by coalition forces on May 21, 2003. Salih maintains that he surrendered to occupying forces which is contrary to official reports.

Concerning the time frame of 1990-1991. Salih was the Governor of the Kuwait Province in 1990, and had to flee to the city of Nasariyah because U.S. forces were closing in. Subsequently, Hamid Muhammad Hamza Zubaydi asked him to be the Governor of Nasariyah. Salih accepted the position which was supposed to last for a three month term. Salih acknowledged there were disturbances in the outlying cities/towns of Nasariyah, and the disturbance was progressing toward the main city. Salih claims there were U.S. forces across the river from Nasariyah during the time frame of the 1991 Shia uprising. Salih did not elaborate or provide any further information regarding the events that occurred in and around Nasariyah in 1991.

Interviewers specifically asked Salih his personal opinion regarding Ali Hasan Majid. Salih responded by saying Ali Hasan Majid was known as Chemical Ali, and was a member of the RCC and regional command. Salih did not provide his personal opinion regarding Hasan.
File Number: 315E-HD-1449534
Field Office Acquiring Evidence: FR1148
Serial # of Originating Document:
Date Received: 05/27/04
From: AZIZ SALIH NISWAN AL HAFASJI
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
(Address)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ
(City and State)

By

To Be Returned: ☑ Yes ☐ No
Receipt Given: ☐ Yes ☑ No
Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:
☐ Yes ☑ No
Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI):
☐ Yes ☑ No

Title: OPERATIONAL DEBRIEF

IT - IRAQ

Reference: SALIH, JCI, TCI, 05272004
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☑ Original notes re interview of
AZIZ SALIH NISWAN AL HAFASJI
President assigned him to be the Governor of Kuwait, receiving orders from Saddam.

The Arab countries were not pleased with Saddam for occupying Kuwait.

US forces have real hope if the rescue to accept the role at Command of Kuwait.

Belief is that Assilमा is one command because he has removed in the order of Kuwait.

Is it happening with the new Kuwaiti Prime Minister of 1991?

Orders came through Saddam. Did not specify what the orders were.
- WAS IRAN AMERICAN SDFNDS DECE  
  IN JASRIYAH IN 1991.

- THE INTIFADA WAS QUASI-
  RESPONSE AND WAS IRANIAN.

- WRITTEN ORDERS WERE COME FROM
  THE MINISTER OF MINISTERS.

- DID ABDU RESPONSIBLE 1/1/187
  KEEP PEACE AND RESPONSIBLE
  KEEP 1993 AT SERIOUS
  COST.

- VISION VORD OF 1991 SHIA HARIAN.سؤ巴士
  PEOPLE THAT WERE RESPONSIBLE SHOAIB
  BUT ACCOUNTABLE.

- MAYSAYS HE BECAME THE GOV. OF
  JASRIYAH AFTER THE VIOLENCE.

- NEVER WITNESSED ANY PUNISHMENTS IN
  JASARIYA.
Aziz Salih Numan Al Hafaji, (Black List #8), date of
birth July 1, 1941, was interviewed at a detention facility located
at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAF), Baghdad, Iraq.
Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the
United States Government from Washington, DC. Department of
Defense representative was also present, and observed
the entire interview. FBI Language Specialist, provided Arabic/English translation. Salih provided the following information:

Salih is the leader of the Al Hafaji tribe in Iraq which
consists of over one million people. He acknowledged that in March
1991, he was appointed by Saddam Hussein to be the Governor of
Kuwait. Salih acknowledged that he would have been hung if he
refused to accept the Governors job in Kuwait. This was a civilian
position, and he reported to Saddams half brother, Sabawi, and to
Ali Hassan Majid. He claimed that his responsibilities were
extremely limited but they included acting as liaison with the
people of Kuwait. He believes he was appointed as the Governor of
Kuwait because he had relatives that lived in that area. Salih
acknowledged there were human rights violations committed by Iraqis
in Kuwait, and maintains he had nothing to do with their poor
treatment. Interviewing agents asked Salih to specify information
about what he had heard regarding the treatment of the Kuwaiti
people, and contradicted himself by stating he did not have
information. He reiterated that his position as Governor in Kuwait
was merely a title, and he did not have any authority.

Salih acknowledged having held several other positions of
leadership within the Ba'ath Party and Iraqi Government over his
career, but he minimized his role in all of these positions. Salih
advised he has never killed anyone, ordered executions or
punishment, nor had he ever witnessed such activities during his
lengthy career of service for the Ba'ath Party and the Government
of Iraq. Salih viewed a copy of a Public Broadcasting System (PBS)
documentary depicting atrocities committed by the Republican Guard
and others regarding the Kurds in Northern Iraq, and the 1991
Intifada in Southern Iraq. While Salih was viewing the
documentary, he was squirming in his seat, tapping his toes on the
floor, and would occasionally raise his voice. After viewing the
documentary, Salih adamantly denied participating in any of these

Investigation on 05/27/2004 at Baghdad, Iraq

File # 315E-HQ-1448534  Date dictated 05/31/2004
by SSA  

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atrocities or having any knowledge about them. He acted as though he had never heard of such abuses and atrocities. He did acknowledge, however, that more than one person was probably involved in committing these atrocities, and he stated that those responsible should be held accountable and killed.

Salih insisted he would have received written orders regarding the situation in Nasiriyah from the Minister of Interior. Salih's responsibilities in Nasiriyah were to keep the peace, and to keep the services running throughout the city. He advised the Shia's were burning buildings within the city of Nasiriyah during the 1991 Intifada. Salih also insisted that he became the Governor of Nasiriyah after the violent activities took place.

Salih claims he does not know why he was arrested by Coalition forces, and believes that Allah will set him free.

Throughout the interview, Salih was pleasant but would not directly answer the interviewing agents questions. He only acknowledged the various positions he has held within the Ba'ath Party and government throughout his career.
Original notes re interview of
KAMAL MUSTAPHA ABDULLAH
AL-SUQIANI AL NAZARI
Kamal Mustapha Abdullah Al-Sa'di

Al - Nasri

Born 15/4/1955 in Tikrit

Served approx 30 yrs in IRAQ Govt.
Last 4 yrs secretary general of RG
77 - Military Acad. Graduate
77 - 10/80 - Co of Battalion Repairs, Anti Aircraft Battery

17 July Armored Div.

Trainee of Armor Div.

184 - Staff Officer College

Graduated 6/85

1st Brigade of RG

Left in 85 - 10th Brig Armored RC

06/87 Basra of RG

89 - SRG

93 - Co RC Brig

94 - Co of Corp of RG

98 moved to another Brig.

02/02 Advisor to Northern District of Kirkuk

He was called by I to Baghdad 10 days after the war started to take over the RG but I refused because the Hill leaders did not agree. I believe the war was solution and did not want to shed additional blood.
A WANTED A PEACEFUL SOLUTION
THAT DESIRABLE.
A YEAR AGO HE EXPRESSED HIS FEELINGS TO
QUSAY FOR POLITICAL SOLUTION. HE SAID THIS
IS NOT A DEC. FOR THE MILITARY BUT A
POLITICAL DEC. FOR THE LEADERS.
DURING MILITARY CONFERENCES WHERE TREATED
PERSONS WERE PRESENT OR DISCUSSIONS OF
HOPES FOR PEACE TOOK PLACE.
FRIENDS LT GEN RAID MARATHD

MOST OF THE MILITARY DISCUSSED IT IN
PRIVATE BECAUSE THEY WERE AFRAID TO
DISCUSS IT OPEN AS IT WOULD LEAD TO
QUSAY WHO WOULD TAKE THIS AS A REJECT
OR DISTORT BY THEM.

WE THOUGHT MILITARY COULD
BE WOULD NOT EXPRESS THEIR OPINION
AS HE WOULD NOT LISTEN AND THEY
WERE AFRAID.

NO CONTACT UNTIL SATURDAY. CONTACT W/ @ W95
OR DID NOT CARE & SADLY B WANTED
THE MILITARY (QUSAY'S FEELING) AS BUT WE
WANTED PEACE BASED ON CONTACT W/ Q
WHO SAID POLITICAL DECISIONS ARE PESSES OF
CIVILIAN NOT MILITARY.
He was patient in negotiations and calm. His reaction when a refusal was made was not as severe as expected due to the war. Common reaction was dismay. The worse was when he refused to shake hands with RG.

Common reaction would have been present at the meeting. SG in the meeting, RG airport, must of defense. Sultan Hashim, Sayid Al-Rawi. Chairman of RG Principles. 4:00 PM, Al-Sattar, Chief of Staff Military. SG came at 9:00 PM. ABID. Welcomed each person individually. Asked questions and did not stay long. Getting updates on the US forces were moving. Al-Sattar took charge of the Army & RG in Baghdad as he was familiar of area.

Al-Sattar DIED before the war. He suggested to the leadership for a peaceful solution. But, it was refused. Suggestions were made during meetings of Military Leadership and Joint Cabinet of staff.
Did I 10 ignore military advice going into 1st Gulf War. Did not know, but
later felt bad. As a young officer, I wanted to go to war.

Everything could have been solved easily if only UN SCOM inspectors were given
the opportunity to do their jobs. Barzan wrote an article criticizing OCS
occupying Kuwait which was not accepted warmly by Q. Criticizing Barzan for writing it,
Q was young. I attempted show myself
as a person to be recognized. In 1991-1992

Q & his brother talked before the
war. I told him to tell Father-in-law
this war will not be an easy war
like the previous one. When he saw his
bro in custody, told him that he told me
what I asked. I ignored him.

Jamal's opinion of inside wanted peace but
the pressure from opinion neighboring countries
that forced me to show his strength or not
be seen as weak.
D's opinion he who creates war will be remembered by what peace in history where once with sick's peace will have a different place in history.

Eventually all the people will realize it will be better for them. The idea of is Palestine.

Hussein Kamal – Did see a change in leadership after the defeat of 1973 and thought they never really took advice, but what they thought was right.

Q was going to be next president & was in Iraq. Not was next all of Iraq.

HK was very trusted by #1

Salim Omar Ali – Emb. @ UN Wafd Mission ended called back & he did not return in mid 80s. Old Mub of Party, Liberal Section. S he not coming back would effect the party.

 HK told O he was going to the US to convince Ali to come back based on HK discussion that Ali was in danger.
(7) IS IN CHARGE OF RC, COMES TO
BOST DAILY OR AT LEAST EVERY COUPLE
DAYS.

HAS BEEN IMPROVED S, INITIALLY STATED
HE HAS NEVER BEEN TO A PRISON BUT
SAID HE VISITED PRISONS IN MILITARY
CAMPS TO SEE THE CONSTRUCTION & OF
THE SET UP.

DID NOT EVEN VISIT HIS COUNTRY KILLED WHERE
LAST IMPROVEMENT WAS DUE TO A DISPUTE
W/ NDA. CAUGHT ABU F.

BE HIS CURRENT POSITION. THIS MORNING
HE THOUGHT THAT THE PLACE WAS WERE
SOMETHING FEE & HAD POLICE BUT
NOW THEY ARE ALL IMPROVED DUE TO NOT
HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE PLACE
WAS BUT BELIEVED THAT WAS MAROLA
NICOLAEK & ON SITTING & D.

DEFINITION OF CONCENTRATION CAMPS AS
QUESTIONS WE DISCUSS IN OUR DICTATION.

NOT CONCASSED ABOUT BEING IDENTIFIED AS
KNOWS THE US IS COUNTRY OF ICHAN &
PRECURSOR
NO TORTURE
II MURDER
II IMPRISON
II EXECUTION
His biggest fault was entrusting the military as he knew Saddam would keep the country in the US's destiny.

WMD

He did not know if the inspectors did not agree, Saddam would have ordered it.
He heard from Mr. A. and Mr. B. about a plot against Mr. C. Mr. D. and Mr. E. agreed to inform Mr. F. about the situation.

Mr. G. is good. (The number) 5 to 6.

Mrs. H. who works for Mr. A.
In 1977, grad from Millikin College.

1977-2006 - Chief of Staff, 17th Armor Div.

The transition to the command division became automatic in the armor division.

Following the Secretary of Army, since 2006, served in office.

All information contained herein is unclassified.
1988 - moved to 1st Infantry
1189 - moved to Special Troops Guard
1993 - CA 1st Repsb. Guard
1994 -
1996 - moved from one corps to another
1997 - moved to 1st past
1998 (Feb) appointed as adjutant

They were putting someone in his place.

In 1989 after war I was called by NATO to come to Bruxelles to take over the Republican Guard but I refused.

As a military leader, we didn't think that fighting was the solution.

DIDN'T WANT MORE BLOOD TO BE

A fear of overwhelming US forces in Europe to war.

B - we wanted a peaceful solution...
Was anyone goed listening?

I told Desay I hoped we could find a political solution to this. We (trusted friends) believed in a peaceful solution. It gathered in trusted friends about this. We were afraid Samuel Desay would find out, the world suspect a plot, etc.

I try to say that Desay did not do so, because we wouldn't listen and that he would not do anything anything to support us.

After we commit to save himself

A more contact with Desay

This was around 1895. He got into fitting the war (but not did not) and neglected advice from military leaders.

And this is nothing concerning you. This is for politicians.

Samuel did not want to negotiate and was stubborn.
A year ago, we met someone and approached Storan.

After this, Storan didn't call me again. Storan's reaction was one of dismay, but Storan's reaction was not as severe as his underlying mood disorder.

But Uday wouldn't shake his hand when I saw him.

They normally would have put him in jail.

Q - why did you do that?

Sat @ 9 April

1. Ousey
2. Zita Asher - Mr. Dega
3. Saneen - Co Rep. 1st
4. Saff Richmond - AC CoS
5. Storan came at 1:00 but unannounced. Came @ 9:00 pm

People giving status to Storan.

I didn't discuss directly with others, but

I don't think they wanted more.
Ibrahim told me they had suggested to the leadership that war was not a good idea. But leaders not listening.

1. Saddam
2. Sajee Rashid
3. Foreign Affairs
4. Air Force
5. May
6.

Not sure if meetings were regular or not.

Re: 1st Gulf War

don't know — was young after the feeling of not because, All Waj was that we didn't want to go to war.

Always with friends we discussed our interest in being friends of USA. We knew us supporting Iran helped keep Iranian out.
Q: See difference in SAV & leadership in 1990's after 1st Gulf War?

A: A lot could have been solved early. A stale to our deployed early. If full access had been granted early to UN Inspection, we could have avoided all this.

An Article by Barnard was critical to our decision. He criticized his uncle for writing an article. Omorey criticized it.


My brother was arrested.

I said tell your father in law this war will continue until everything is gone. This time when I saw my brother.
(Brother name: Jamal) As before, Jamal ignored him.

Jamal said he had feeling that Saddam wanted peace but the pressure he had from the opposition pressured him to decide on combat.

In his opinion, all the problems were created by Hussein.

The stubborn peoplekaghd in (Khawanit Saddam) and millions of people died.

My opinion is the one who creates war will not be viewed positively in history.

Most people even if they agree in peace, read to what is happening at the moment.
Eventually all the people will realize it will be better for all of them. I'm sure we want peace and prosperity, but the sensitive point is Palestine.

Those who advocate violence are doing it for show. Others are saying, let's help Palestinians by not getting Russia, and build hospitals.

Rez's Hussein Kamr

They never took advice from anyone.

Sheik Obey

Q. Did Oday become the in Iraq? All Iraqis know this and said Oday would be next president.
A: Hussein Kamar previously was a position I trust. Yes?

I agree.

Q: Became aware that was mid-sold
Sali Ali Marzuki - Iraqi human vel (MY) was endangered.

He ended up not returning to Iraq

had a unique position thereby

Q: what was his unique position in this?

Rec. - Booth PTV

It was time for him to come home.

Hussein Kamil told me he was going to US to try to convince Morali to come back home.
Q: In 1940's why did Hitler put up obstacles to UN?
A: Asking for trouble
Spoke at Desert Base hearing Read of Republican

I forced myself to go to Desert, even though I felt
some reluctance to do, in order to make my point

Agreed to put that one who is not ready to fight discarded
the military will make him that way.

My question: I didn't take notes during
my own question.

We heavily split to kill Chelabi
@ 5 to 10 mos before the war. Our friend
works for Chelabi,
Kamal Mustapha Abdallah Al-Sultan Al-Nasri, born 04/04/1955 in Al-Tikrit, Iraq, was interviewed at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Department of Defense representative was present during the entire interview. After being advised the identity of the interviewing agents as United States government representatives, he provided the following:

Al-Nasri served in the Iraqi military for approximately 30 years. He graduated from the Military Academy in 1977 and served as the commanding officer of a anti-aircraft battery repair battalion until 1980. He was then transferred to the 17 Armored Division, where he changed his military specialty to trainer for the armored divisions. In 1984, Al-Nasri attended the Staff Officer College, graduating in June, 1985. Al-Nasri was transferred to the 1st Brigade of the Republican Guard (RG). Sometime later that year he was again transferred to the 10th Armored Brigade of the RG. In 1989, Al-Nasri joined the Special Republican Guard (SRG). In 1993, Al-Nasri became a commander of a RG brigade. In 1999, Al-Nasri assumed the Secretary General position of the RG. Additionally, in February, 2002, Al-Nasri became the presidential advisor to the Northern District of Kirkuk.

Al-Nasri claimed that ten days after the war with coalition forces began in 2003, he was summoned to Baghdad by Saddam Hussein and directed to assume command of the RG. However, Al-Nasri refused to comply with this directive. The military leaders did not believe that war was the best solution, and Al-Nasri personally did not want to shed additional blood. Al-Nasri and some of his close and trusted colleagues wanted a peaceful solution sought through political means. Approximately a year ago, Al-Nasri had approached Qusay Saddam Hussein, expressing his desire for a peaceful political solution. Qusay Hussein advised him that such matters did not pertain to him or the military but were at the discretion of the leadership. Many in the military shared Al-Nasri's sentiment but could not express it out of fear that it may reach Saddam Hussein or his son Qusay. Such opinions would most likely be interpreted as a revolt and would cause distrust by

Investigation on 02/11/2004 at Baghdad, Iraq

File # 315E-HQ-1448534

Date dictated 02/11/2004

by

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
Saddam or Qusay. Secondly, most felt that Saddam or Qusay would ignore or dismiss anyone's position which did not agree with them, as their position opinions were always deemed to be correct.

Al-Nasri denied having had frequent contact with Saddam, but acknowledged having almost daily contact with Qusay who oversaw the RG. Based on Al-Nasri's contact primarily with Qusay and to a lesser extent Saddam, he felt that since 1995, both Saddam and Qusay favored going to war. This conclusion was further supported by political decisions the two made. However, Uday Saddam Hussein wanted peace. None of this surprised Al-Nasri who described Saddam as stubborn, especially during negotiations.

Al-Nasri described Saddam's reaction to his refusal to assume command of the RG as less severe than he expected, and he attributed this to the immediate focus on the war effort. Saddam's reaction was one of dismay. The worst reaction was exhibited by Uday, who later refused to shake Al-Nasri's hand. Under other conditions, Al-Nasri's refusal of Saddam's order would have prompted Saddam to imprison him.

The meeting, which took place at the RG base, was initially attended by Qusay, the Minister of Defense, Sultan Hashim, the commander of the RG, Sayif Al-Rawi, the Chief of Staff of the military, Ibrahim Abd Al-Sattar, and heads of the various military branches. Later that evening at approximately 9:00 pm, Saddam arrived with Abid Hamid Mahmud Al-Tikriti, Presidential Secretary. Al-Nasri was unaware that Saddam was coming to the base. Hussein talked to the military leaders present, receiving updates on the advancements of the United States forces. Al-Sattar took charge of the army and RG in the Baghdad area, as he was intimately familiar with the area. Saddam did not stay at the base very long.

According to Al-Nasri, Al-Sattar confided in him before the start of the war, that Al-Sattar had suggested to the Iraqi leadership that they should endeavor to seek a peaceful solution. Al-Sattar stated he made these suggestions during meetings of the various military chief of staff, but the Iraqi leadership refused. As he was a relatively young officer at the time, Al-Nasri is unsure whether the Iraqi leadership's practice of ignoring its military's advice played a role in the first Gulf War. With respect to the most recent war, Al-Nasri believed things could have been peacefully resolved if the United Nations Inspectors had been allowed to perform their inspections. Barzan Ibrahim Hasan Al-
Tikriti, Saddam's half-brother wrote an article critical of Saddam's decisions. In response, Qusay was very critical of Barzan Al-Tikriti, whom Al-Nasri suspected was attempting to demonstrate his position of power despite his young age.

Recently while in custody, Al-Nasri saw his brother, Jamal Mustapha Sultan, who is also in United States custody. Jamal Sultan is the son-in-law of Saddam. Prior to the war, Al-Nasri had told Jamal Sultan to talk to his father-in-law and informed him that this war will not be an easy war and the results will be different from 1991. Jamal Sultan told Al-Nasri when the two saw each other in custody that he did speak to Saddam but he ignored Jamal Sultan. Al-Nasri felt Saddam did not have a choice, because he would have been seen as weak by neighboring countries or opposition groups.

Al-Nasri did see a change in the Iraqi leadership after the defection of Hussein Kamel, who was very trusted by Saddam. Al-Nasri had no doubt that Qusay was destined to be the next Iraqi President, and this was common knowledge throughout the country.

On one occasion, Hussein Kamel discussed with Al-Nasri concerns about Salah Omar Ali, the Iraqi Ambassador to the United Nations's, and Ali's allegiance to Iraq. Ali had not returned after completion of his assignment at the United Nations in the mid 1980s. Based on Kamel's statements, Al-Nasri believed Ali was in danger and alerted a friend of Ali to warn him. Al-Nasri also heard of a plot targeting Ahmad Chalabi by the Iraqi Mouhabarat approximately five to six months prior to start of the war. Al-Nasri claimed he and his brother warned a friend in Chalabi's camp, LNU, of this alleged plot.

Al-Nasri denied that he had ever visited a prison or been incarcerated in a prison in Iraq. He then stated that he visited some prisons in military camps to inspect their construction or set up. He claimed he did not even visit who was imprisoned several times with the most recent being in Abu Ghuraib prison due to a dispute with Uday. Al-Nasri claimed he has never tortured anyone or ordered the torturing of anyone; he has never murdered nor ordered the murder of anyone; he has never imprisoned nor ordered the imprisonment of anyone; and he has never executed nor ordered the execution of anyone. He was aware of only one case of torture, and this involved a cousin of his wife who had problems with his relatives which resulted in his burning and execution. In
this case, Al-Nasri believed that the punishment was excessive for the crime.

Al-Nasri blames his current predicament on the decisions and actions of Saddam. He recognizes that he and fellow detainees are currently being held in a facility which he believes may have been used as housing for either Saddam or Qusay's Himaya (protective detail).

Al-Nasri has never been concerned about his safety while in United States custody, as he is aware that the United States is a country of laws and freedom. He currently considers the most important thing for him is that the United States trust him. This, he claimed, was more important than his own health. Al-Nasri considers his biggest mistake in life was entering the military, for he recognized many years ago that Saddam was going to take Iraq to an unknown destiny. Al-Nasri claimed to have no information about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Nevertheless, he believes that had it not been for the United Nations inspectors, Saddam would have obtained such weapons.
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<th>Item</th>
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All information contained herein is unclassified.
File Number: 315E-HQ-1449534
Field Office Acquiring Evidence: FBI HQ
Serial # of Originating Document: 
Date Received: 5/11/04
From: ABDUL GHAN, ABDUHAFIZ FLAYAH AL-MINAW
(Name of Contributor/interviewee)
(Address)
RABIAH, IRAQ
(City and State)

By: 

To Be Returned: ☐ Yes
Receipt Given: ☐ Yes ☐ No
Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: ☐ Yes ☒ No
Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): ☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: OPERATION DESERT SNAKE II - IRAQ

Reference: ABDUHAFIZ 302-TM1 DATE 5/13/01
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

ABDUL GHANI ABDUHAFIZ FLAYAH AL-MINAW
Religious man from rel. family - must be honest as religion is important.

Uday was a major problem for D

When Saddam was in power no one could stand in front of Uday or Ali - but D tried. D was not loyal - as 1st argument with Uday removed from minister of

Author of 12 books in culture and info in his position because of his qualifications not loyalty

Believe was sent to Basra because it was a cultural center.

Abdul Ghati - Abd Al Ghatour Flayan
Al-Midigal
Born in Baghdad - family of Hana, Ambar
DoB - 7/1/1944 believe he was born in 1943

D was told he would be detained for no longer than 3 days but has been in custody 360 -
12 MEN TOLD 18TH, PM WAS DETAILED FOR QUESTIONING & SHOULD NOT TAKE MORE THAN 3 DAYS. SAME MAN CONVINCED HIM TO SURRENDER.

CORRESPONDENCE W/FAMILY LIMITED TO FAMILY NEWS AND EVENTS.

CAMP ISOLATED COMPLETELY -

SINCE 01 DID NOT HAVE INCOME, SMALL POSITION W/MINISTRY OF INFO FOR $20.00

#9 - WITNESS LEFT IN OR KEPT SALARY, CAR PROTECTION. 1 YR NO INCOME 2 SECOND YR EARNED $50 A MO.

DEMOGRAPHIC -

1 - CLOSED TODAY'S NEWS PAPER - BECAUSE RACIST, SPREAD HATE BETWEEN SOONI -)

CHRISTIAN. HAD AUTHORITY IN MUSEUM AND INFO.
His decision even threw him. He knew there would be serious repercussions. So he sent a notice. Uday answered him very angrily. All Hasan al-Majid. He was older and senior to #5, but #5 was placed over him in the South (Baghdad). During a 2001 MTC, Ali spoke out against him, and replied forcefully to #5 in front of #1 & #6. In 2001, he was a MBR of Regional Command.

To be removed from Party, a MBR was to be confronted @ a big MTC. Saddam met #6 & asked him to resign, but he refused. I was voted out at what ever #1 wanted happened.

When #6 closed the newspaper, he expected #5 to respond with force. As that was Uday's nature, but limited to #6.

Now we can find opposition to Saddam, but he was one of the few who did. Most were very frightened to do so.
1991 BASRA -
PREV. SMRT DECEASED GUIDO #5 POWER OVER SOUTHERN REGION.

A 1TR FROM #1 W/J ORGANIZATIONAL CHART LISTING QT AS IN CHARGE OF ALL THE ENTITIES. OCCURRED 30th June to 4th July.

DID NOT QUESTION #1 AS #1 WAS ITS RELATIVE. #1 ONLY TRUSTED HIS FAMILY. BEFORE THE UPRISING, 2 DAYS BEFORE THE END OF THE WAR.

DURING UPRISING - IRANIAN INTEL OFFICERS TOOK PART IN THE PROTESTS SUPPORTED BY IRAQI SHIAS (BOTH IRAQI/IRANIAN) ROSE UP W/ WPNS KILLING BATTAIN PARTY OFFICIALS AROUND 50 PERSONS. SOME # OF SHIA

#5 FORMED A UNIT FROM THE IRAQI MILITARY TO QUELL THE UPRISING.

#5 HAD NO AUTHORITY OVER THE MILITARY & SECURITY SERVICE.

I FEEL SADDAM DID NOT TRUST HIM. PERSONALLY EFFECTED BY SADDAM'S DISTrust. BELIEVES THIS DIStrust LED TO THE APPOINTMENT OF #5 OVER HIM.
DID NOT INTERROGATE ANYONE & WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE.

CSOR OF BAHR ABABACT TACAB
SAHAWI

MILITARY OFFICERS DO NOT TAKE ORDERS FROM OUR BRAH MOSI OICIALES EXCEPT #5.

PEDAKINS WERE UNDER UDAM & HAD VENISON COMPENSATION. VERY POWERFUL.
WANTED FOR THE MONEY & PRIVILEGES.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/14/2004

Abdul Ghani Abdul Ghafour Flayah Al-Midlag, (Black List #65), date of birth July 1, 1944, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. Department of Defense (DOD) representative was also present, and observed the entire interview. DOD translator provided Arabic/English translation. Ghafour provided the following information:

Ghafour started by saying he is a religious man, and honesty is an important characteristic of being a religious person.

Correspondence with his family has been limited since his detention approximately one year ago, and he is not aware of current news or events within Iraq.

Ghafour has authored approximately twelve books regarding cultural issues in Iraq. He was the former Minister of Culture & Information (1996-1997) and believes he was chosen for this position because of his qualifications, and not because of his loyalty to the regime or Saddam Hussein. He was forced to resign from the Ministry of Culture & Information because he utilized his authority and closed down the offices of Babil, a newspaper formerly owned and operated by Uday Hussein. Ghafour advised it was his decision to close the newspaper because he felt the newspaper was racist and had a tendency to spread hatred amongst the Sunni, Shia, Muslims, and Christians of Iraq. Ghafour knew there would be serious repercussions for closing down the newspaper, and fully expected to lose his Ministry position. In addition, Ghafour expected Uday to retaliate by verbally chastising him, or possibly physically assaulting him. Ghafour was not worried about his family's safety because of his significant position within the government.

Regarding the 1991 Shia Uprising (Intifada) in the area of Basrah. Ghafour believes he was sent to Basrah because it was one of the cultural centers of Iraq. During this time period,
Ghafoor was the southern region Ba'ath Party Secretary and had responsibilities over the civilian Ba'ath Party. Ghafoor acknowledged a decree from President Hussein which provided Ali Hasan Majid the authority over civilian and military Ba'ath Party members in the southern region to include Basrah. This authority was granted to Ali Hasan just prior to the first Gulf War. Ghafoor did not question President Hussein regarding this decision, even though Ghafoor's current position within the Ba'ath Party was senior to Ali Hasan's position.

Ghafoor initially described and blamed the 1991 Shia Uprising on Iranian Intelligence Officers who were instigating the protests and violence against the Ba'ath Party officials. He then admitted there were both Iranian and Iraqi Shia's who armed themselves and killed approximately fifty Ba'ath Party officials in Basrah. Once Ali Hasan arrived in Basrah, he formed a unit from the Iraqi military to quell the uprising. Ghafoor did not have responsibility or authority over the military and security service, and took orders directly from Ali Hasan. Ghafoor knew that Hussein did not trust him since he was not related to him, and believes that was the primary reason he appointed Ali Hasan the Commander of the southern region. During the 1991 Shia Uprising in Basrah, Ghafoor denied interrogating prisoners and did not take responsibility for any of the alleged atrocities or executions that took place. He maintained that he was responsible for the civilian Ba'ath Party and took orders from Ali Hasan.

Events surrounding Ghafoor's removal from the Regional Command Council in 2001. During the course of a Regional Command Council Meeting in 2001, Ghafoor spoke out and challenged Ali Hasan Majid within the presence of President Hussein. Subsequently, Hussein sent Ali Hasan to ask for his resignation. Ghafoor refused to resign, and advised that in order to be removed from the regional command, a member must be confronted during a council meeting and voted out. Ultimately, the council voted Ghafoor off the Regional Command Council. Ghafoor advised he was the only outspoken person on the council that would challenge other council members to include Hussein. Ghafoor believes that most of the council members were frightened to speak against and oppose Hussein.
File Number: 315E-HQ-1448534
Field Office Acquiring Evidence: FSS HQ
Serial # of Originating Document:
Date Received: 05/14/2004
From: Jamal Mustafa Arqallat Sultan Al-Tikrit
(Name of Contributor/interviewee)
(Address)
Baghdad, Iraq
(City and State)
By:

To Be Returned: [ ] Yes [ ] No
Receipt Given: [ ] Yes [ ] No
Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: [ ] Yes [ ] No
Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): [ ] Yes [ ] No
Title: Operation Desert Spider
[ ] IRAQ
Reference: __________________________ (Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: [ ] Original notes re interview of
Jamal Mustafa Arqallat Sultan Al-Tikrit
__________________________
BL#22 - SAMM MUSTAFA ABDULLAH SULTAN AL-TIKRIM

- RUMORS THROUGH THE CAMP
  THAT RAMADAN AND MANA
  WERE RESISTING WITH THE U.S. GOV'T.
  - GREAT RESPECT FOR SAMMAM AND
    HIS BROTHER AHMAD. BECAUSE THEY
    ARE LEDEREN AND LIKE
    EXCELENTIA.

- SAMMAM: HAD CONCERN AS RAMADAN
  TO WITHDRAW. WE CAN CONCLUDE
  THE PEOPLE REPEATEDLY AS ASKED." "
  REPEATED TO SAMMAM AS HIS EXCELLENCY,
  AND TO ABDUHAMN ABDALLA
  - ABDU HAS MET ALQUI AND INSTRUCTIONS.
  - PRESIDENT IS THE LEADER OF THE
    MINISTERS (Prime Minister)

RESPECTED AS AND THE ABDUHAMN.

ABDU - CHARACTER → WORKMATIC, HARD WORKING
  - EDUCATED FROM A PhD.
  - COMPARES PEOPLE IN HIS OWN
  SUPER ABUSIVE MAN.
  - NOT VERY WELL RESPECTED OF.
  - MOTIVATED TO DO HIS WORK, WANTED

TO SPOTLIGHT, ASSUME HIS ROLE BY FORCE
  AND NOT BY RESPECT.
CONSIDERED ABID TO BE SYMPATHETIC

Our view is that the former minister
should attend the meeting and present
their case for the removal of the former
commander.

ABID LARGELY ATTEND ANC MEETINGS

Re: ANC Command Meetings but missed
most of the meetings if there was a
security issue.

Does not feel his position is untenable

but should not remain because he
should not command unlike the
previous years when there was a
security concern. Any security issue

they expect.

They expect him to resign

while in 1993 there was

He will do whatever the law to allow
sacrifice of our lives. I am
and necessary, etc., to let him out.

WIFE OF SYLVIA HERSEN

in 1994.
- After war the last part of the day

- Who all attended S. S. and others

- Speech by Mr. Abdul Hameed, Prime Minister of the

- Topic of the meeting was the

- Meeting was well attended.

- Council of Ministers met on the 2nd of May

- Welcomed the Prime Minister's

- Meeting of the Council of Ministers on 2nd May

- Council of Ministers met to discuss the

- Prime Minister's

- Meeting was attended by

- Bureaucracy was made aware of the

- No one mentioned the

- Council of Ministers met on the 2nd of May.
- Belief in the singularity and the divine
  
- Dimension of 100,000,000 - dead African
  
- Plane and marine decisions for the country

- Again, warning to the world
  
- 12th of December the event was
  
- Again the invasion of Kuwait

- 1947-1992 and the complete - remain
  
- Sign of change and slavery
  
- Sign of failure and responsibility
  
- 26 January

- Here at a council meeting everyone military chiefs and saints are present

- Irregular
Jamal Mustafa Abdallah Sultan Al-Tikriti, (Black List #22), date of birth January 10, 1964, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. Department of Defense (DOD) representative was also present, and observed the entire interview. DOD translator provided Arabic/English translation. Mustafa provided the following information:

Throughout his detention period Mustafa has heard other detainees talking about Taha Yasin Ramadan and Ali Hasan Majid allegedly negotiating a deal with the United States Government. Mustafa has discounted these rumors since the aforementioned detainees are still in the custody of the Coalition, and doesn't believe the U.S. would enter into negotiations with these two individuals.

Mustafa has been married to Hala Saddam Hussein, daughter of Saddam Hussein, since 1994. Mustafa worked for Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Government since approximately 1983. He started out as a Himaya (protection for the President), and was promoted to various positions within the regime over the past twenty years. His most recent positions within the regime were Deputy Chief of Tribal Affairs, and Aid to the Presidential Secretary. He was expected to replace the most recent Presidential Secretary, Abid Hamid Mahmoud, had it not been for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

President Saddam Hussein, who Mustafa kept referring to as his excellency and Kamal Mustafa Abdallah (Black List #10), Mustafa's brother, are two people Mustafa has great respect for and admires the most. He respects Hussein because he is well educated, has a high capacity of knowledge, and has the ability to influence and convince people. He respects his brother, Kamal, because he is well educated and described him as having great encyclopedic knowledge.

He described Abid Hamid Mahmoud as an educated man with an advanced degree who was hardworking to the point of becoming a workaholic. Mahmoud was not very well thought of because he...
attempted to control people by being strong and abrasive and not by earning their respect. Mahmoud was more influential than a Minister and wanted to be recognized by others within the regime. One of Mahmoud's responsibilities as Presidential Secretary was to attend the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and the Regional Command (RC) meetings. According to Mustafa, Mahmoud would be asked to dismiss himself from those council meetings if there were particularly sensitive issues that needed to be discussed amongst the council members.

Mustafa's role as the Aid to the Presidential Secretary was to attend the Council of Ministers meetings. He did not attend the RCC or the RC. The Ministers meetings would be held approximately once or twice a week and would normally follow a set protocol. An agenda would normally be sent to each of the Ministers prior to the meeting. During the meetings, each of the Ministers would discuss relevant issues, and President Hussein would interject his opinions throughout the discussion. At the end of the discussion period, the Ministers would vote on the particular issues. Ultimately, the Prime Minister/President Hussein would make the final decision.

Mustafa never viewed the infamous video regarding the July 1979 meeting with the Ba'ath Party and other Iraqi Government officials. Interviewers explained to Mustafa the meeting was convened by President Hussein for the purposes of uncovering an alleged plot between Syria and certain Ba'ath Party and government officials to overthrow the current regime. Interviewers continued to explain that dozens of Ba'ath Party members and government officials were implicated in this alleged plot to overthrow the government and were either given lengthy prison sentences or executed. Mustafa acknowledged he has heard about this meeting/gathering but maintains he has never viewed the video. Mustafa would like to view this video the next time he meets with interviewers.

Mustafa believed that Iraq had a democratic style of government throughout Hussein's presidency, and also believed that the citizens of Iraq had a voice. Mustafa was challenged and asked for his definition of a dictatorship. He responded by saying a dictatorship was one person ruling and making decisions for the country. It was then pointed out to Mustafa that President Hussein was just reelected in 2002 for an additional seven year term, and during this past election, Hussein did not have opposition, and allegedly received one-hundred percent of the vote. Mustafa did
not have an answer regarding how it was possible to have one individual receive one-hundred percent of the vote. Interviewers told Mustafa about the current democratic style of government and the new constitution for Iraq. Mustafa commented that he believed it was going to be very difficult establishing that form of government in Iraq.

Interviewers engaged Mustafa in a discussion regarding the 1987-1988 Anfal Campaign against the Kurds of Northern Iraq. Mustafa believes the individuals that were responsible for using the chemical weapons against the Kurds should be held accountable. Mustafa learned at a Council of Ministers meeting that the Military Chief of Staff during that time period, Nizar Khazraji, was the individual responsible for ordering the use of chemical weapons without the president's knowledge.

Mustafa doesn't believe he should be detained, and stated he should be rewarded for his service to the Government of Iraq and its citizens. Examples of his service to the government and the people include his work with citizens public affairs, athletic programs, instructing at the University, and working with the tribes.

Mustafa admits there were mistakes made by Hussein during his reign. These mistakes include the invasion of Kuwait and the failure of the Iraqi Government to establish better relations with the United States. Mustafa advised he never had the opportunity to meet with Hussein privately and never provided Hussein with advice regarding any type of decisions. Mustafa would do anything, in the legal sense, to assist his father-in-law, Saddam Hussein, for his defense, to include hiring legal council.
Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ITOS II
SC M. Chris Briese
ASC
UC

From: Counterterrorism
Baghdad Operations Center

Contact: SSA

Approved By: Piro George

Drafted By: tmi

Case ID #: (U) 315E-HQ-1448534 - (Pending)

Title: DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: 

(U) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Details: 

SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN
To: Counterterrorism  From: Counterterrorism
Re: (U) 315E-HQ-1448534, 05/20/2004

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON DC

(U) For information.

**
FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SSA) GEORGE L. PIRO TO LONDON, ENGLAND VIA AMMAN, JORDAN.

INTEND TO TRAVEL TO LONDON, ENGLAND VIA AMMAN, JORDAN ON MAY 27, 2004 AND RETURN TO BAGHDAD, IRAQ ON MAY 31, 2004.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS TRAVEL IS FOR SSA PIRO TO CONDUCT AN INTERVIEW.

TRAVEL TO LONDON, ENGLAND VIA AMMAN, JORDAN FOR THE PURPOSE DESCRIBED ABOVE.

IF NECESSARY, IDENTIFYING INFORMATION WILL BE FORWARDED UPON REQUEST.

SA PIRO'S BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION IS AS FOLLOWS:

NAME: GEORGE L. PIRO
DOB: 
POB: BEIRUT, LEBANON
SSN: 
PPN: 
PPE: 12/13/2005

POINT OF CONTACT FOR THIS MATTER IS SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT OR INTELLIGENCE ANALYST IRAQ/SYRIA/LIBYA UNIT, ITOS II, COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION.
PAGE 2 OF 3 SECRET

DERIVED FROM: G-3 DECLASSIFY ON: X-1

BT
/////
ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE/TICKLER COUNT:

NOTE FOR SSA GEORGE PIRO FROM BAGHDAD TO LONDON.

REFERENCE: 315E-HQ-1448534

DRAFTED BY: JFV:JFV RM#: 4383 EXT:
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 05/20/2004
To: Counterterrorism Attn: ISLU/ITOS II Seattle

From: Seattle
Squad 3
Contact: SA

Approved By:
Drafted By: 

[ ] Case ID #: [ ] (S) 715E-HQ-1448534 (Pending)

[ ] Title: [ ] DESERT SPIDER;
IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: (S)

[ ] Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: XI

Details: (S)

(S)
To: Counterterrorism  From: Seattle
Re: 315E-HQ-1448534, 05/20/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

(U) Read and clear. For additional information concerning the identity of this individual, contact SA

140k1r01.ec

**
Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 06/07/2004

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ITOS II
SC M. Chris Briese
UC
ORS
SC Frankie Battle
UC

From: Baghdad Operations Center
Desert Spider Team

Contact: George L. Piro,

Approved By: Piro George

Drafted By: Piro George L:

(U) Case ID #: (X) 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending)

(U) Title: (X) DESERT SPIDER;
IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: (x/OC.NF) To report results of debriefing

(U) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Details: (S/OC.NF)
LEAD (U):

Set Lead 1:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ITOS II

(U) Information provided for review.

★★
Sultan Hashem Ahmed Muhammed Hamid Al Jabburi Al Tai, (Black List #27), date of birth July 1, 1945, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. FBI Language Specialist provided Arabic/English translation. Hashem provided the following information:

From approximately January 1987 to July 1987, Hashem was the Commander of the VI Corps of the Iraqi Army, located in Amarah, which is in the Southern Region of Iraq. In approximately July 1987, Hashem became the Commander of the I Corps for a forty-five day period, then returned back to command the VI Corps. On February 19, 1988, Hashem was appointed to command the First Anfal Campaign. This was a temporary command position, as he still had the duties of commanding the VI Corps. The temporary headquarters for the First Anfal Campaign were located in Sulaminiyah, located in the Northern Region of Iraq. Hashem advised during the First Anfal Campaign, Jalal Talabani's group, known as the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), fled to Iran. Hashem was then appointed as the Commander of the I Corps on April 1, 1988.

Hashem was selected to become the Commander of the First Anfal Campaign by President Saddam Hussein, the Minister of Defense, and the Army Chief of Staff. The Army Chief of Staff, Nazar Khazraji (phonetic), met with Hashem and informed him the plans were already prepared for the First Anfal Campaign, and he was officially designated the temporary Commander. Khazraji provided Hashem with ten officers, maps which delineated his geographic areas of responsibility, and advised him to start preparing. The Iraqi Military Intelligence (Istikhbarat), prepared intelligence reports regarding the PUK and their relationship with the Iranian forces, and disseminated these reports to the military for purposes of strategic planning. Sabir Abd Al Aziz Husayn Al Duri (Black List #205) was the Director of the Istikhbarat during this time frame. A decision was previously made that they would concentrate their efforts during the First Anfal Campaign from East of Sulaminiyah to the Iranian border.
During the First Anfal Campaign, Hashem was in charge of the IV Division, the 33rd Division, and approximately one-hundred National Defense Command Battalions (Jahsh), and reported directly to Khazraji. The V Corps of the Iraqi Army assisted with the Anfal Campaign, and was led by Lt. General Na'ama Faris Al-Mahyawi (phonetic). According to Hashem, the I Corps Commander, General Kamel Sachet (phonetic), developed the plan for the First Anfal Campaign. Interviewers reminded Hashem that in his previous interview on May 28, 2004, he was proud of the fact that he was the one who developed the military plan for the First Anfal Campaign. Hashem maintained it was General Sachet's plan, even though he was the one selected to command the First Anfal.

The mission for the Anfal Campaign was to remove the Kurdish population from the Northern Region of Iraq, and force them across the border to Iran. There was pressure on the Iraqi military to quickly clear the Northern Region during the First Anfal Campaign because they believed there was information to suggest the Kurdish resistance had devised a plan to encircle and take over the city of Sulaminiyah. Hashem wanted to proceed with the military plan slowly and cautiously because of the extreme winter weather conditions, and advised if they had hurried the plan, they might have been defeated.

During the Anfal Campaign, Hashem advised he was never ordered to use, nor did he order the use of chemical weapons (CW). Hypothetically speaking, Hashem stated he would have deployed CW if he was directly ordered; otherwise, if he would have refused a direct order, he would have been executed.

Hashem viewed a copy of a document in Arabic that was dated April 6, 1987. The subject of this document was "Using the Special Ammunition." Hashem claimed he had never seen this document, but did acknowledge that special ammunition was a word utilized to mean CW. Hashem initially denied the use of CW during Anfal, but then recanted, and acknowledged CW were utilized, but were not deployed by military units under his command. (A copy of the document viewed by Hashem, along with the English translation will be maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope).

Ali Hasan Majid was in charge of the Northern Command Bureau, however, according to Hashem, the military would only follow the orders given by the Army Chief of Staff. Hashem advised the Army Chief of Staff would normally accompany Majid. The orders
were delivered in written form and telephonically. Hashem did not meet Majid until after the First Anfal Campaign was over.

Hashem viewed copies of two documents in Arabic dated May 9, 1987, and May 20, 1987. The subject line in both of these documents read "Sites of Iranian Agents." Hashem advised he had never seen these documents, and believes his predecessor would have read them. (A copy of the documents viewed by Hashem along with the English translations, marked Document #7, will be maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope).

Hashem viewed a copy of a document in Arabic dated April 26, 1988, regarding the use of the "special ammunition" against targets that deserved punishment. Hashem acknowledged this document and advised it dealt with the Kurds. Hashem maintains that the Iraqi Army did not have, nor did it deploy CW. He believes there was another unit with CW, because it took specialized training to utilize these types of weapons, and the Army didn't go through this type of training. Hashem could not provide the name of this unit or who they may have reported to. (A copy of the document viewed by Hashem, along with the English translation, marked Document #14 will be maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope).

Hashem viewed a copy of a document in Arabic dated June 23, 1987, regarding "Dealing With the Villages That Are Prohibited For Security Reasons." Hashem advised he is familiar with this document, in particular paragraph number five of this document which describes captured individuals being interrogated, and those between the ages of fifteen and seventy must be executed after any useful information had been obtained from them. (A copy of the document viewed by Hashem, along with the English translation, marked Document #15, will be maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope).

Hashem advised the I Corps of the Iraqi Army were involved with the other Anfal Campaigns, and personnel involved with those Anfal Campaigns would file reports that were reviewed by him. During the First Anfal Campaign, when the Iraqi Air Force were needed, Hashem would request the Air Force assets through the Army Chief of Staff, or the Deputy in Charge of Operations. In the request, Hashem would provide the Air Force with targeting information. The Air Force would then review the requests/orders from the Minister of Defense, and would then carry out the orders.
Hashem viewed three copies of documents in Arabic dated March 22, 1988, April 1, 1988 and May 1, 1988 respectively. The three documents again describe the use of "special ammunition" and "special strikes" that occurred in the Northern Region of Iraq during the Anfal Campaign. After reviewing these documents, Hashem only responded by saying Iyad Khalid Zaki (phonetic) was the Commander in charge of the Second Anfal Campaign and subsequently became the IV Corps Division Commander. (A copy of the documents viewed by Hashem, along with the English translation, marked Document #12 will be maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope).

Hashem viewed two additional copies of documents in Arabic, both dated May 22, 1988. Both documents were in reference to the Anfal Campaign and the use of "special ammunition" and "special strikes." Hashem could not specifically comment on either document, however, he concluded after viewing all of the documents that another group or specialized unit must have deployed the CW. (A copy of the documents viewed by Hashem, along with the English translation, marked Document #16 will be maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope).

Hashem believes President Hussein, the Minister of Defense, and Army Chief of Staff should be held responsible and brought to justice for the chemical weapons attacks that occurred during the Anfal Campaign.

Hashem viewed video footage of the Anfal Campaign that was videotaped by a Kurdish film crew. The video contained footage of the aftermath of the chemical attack of Halabja. The video contained images of numerous victims of this attack. Hashem was visibly disturbed by the images; however, after viewing the video, he advised if he had been ordered to carry out a CW attack he would have followed the orders and done so.

Hashem advised the orders to utilize CW would have been communicated from President Hussein, to the Minister of Defense, to the Army Chief of Staff, and then conveyed to the special unit charged with deploying the CW. Again, Hashem advised the special unit may have been attached to the Army or possibly the Air Force, but could not provide any further details regarding this special unit.
File Number: 315E-HQ-148534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence: Baghdad

Serial # of Originating Document: 06/10/04

From: SULTAN HASHEM AHMED MUHAMMAD HAMIA
       AL SARRQI AL TAI

(Address)

City and State: Baghdad, Iraq

By: 

To Be Returned: No

Receipt Given: No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): No

Title: OPERATION DESERT SPIDER
       IRAQ

Reference: HASHEM.302. TMI. 06/10/004

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of
              SULTAN HASHEM AHMED MUHAMMAD HAMIA AL SARRQI
Date 6/16/84

Sultan Hashem Ahmed Muhammad Hamid
Al Sarrrai Al Taai

Bl#27 - DOB: July 1, 1945

1987 - Commander of V Corps is SEM
    Southern Region of Iraq (IS ANMA).

Feb 19, 1998 - Asked to command an Army I
    East of Kuwait, IRAQ/Iranian Rival

SULAMNITA - Temp Hq Command of Army

In addition to has responsibilities

To Commanding Corps VII.

Sala Tarabusi - Forces from Iraq

April 1998 - Removed Commander of

1st I Corps.

July 98 - Commander of I Corps

For 45 days Wassal West Area

ID RE 05A Commander of V Corps

Went Feb 19, 1998

Commander I Corps until Oct 1989

Moved to Balkhhu and BMN

DPA Chief of Staff of NDS Army.

Responsible 1917 until 1996

Nawab Talib Ali - 1903 NDS Army Chief of Staff
HE WAS APPROVED BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE,
PRIME MINISTER, CHIEF OF STAFF TO LEAD
THE FAMILY.

MAKING OUT MANY CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH
DIFFERENT HOURS AND TIMES, SOME OF THEM
QUICKLY, AND THE END OF THE EMPLOYMENT
COMMISSIONS. IT IS ABUSIVE USE, AGREED TO THEM.

PROVIDE MARS AND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY AND
ORDER IT TO YOUR AREA.

THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE POLICIES AND AREA.
RELATIONS WITH TAZMINI'S GROUP AND OTHER
RELATIONS WITH PERSIAN IRANIANS.

THE DECISIONS OF TAZMINI'S LAND LAGGED
APPROX. 20 DAYS.

ChIEF OF COMMAND FOR ARMY F.

HE ANSWERS TO NAZM  HAJJARASI - CHIEF OF
STAFF.

ORDERS TO HAVE ALARM ON THE
AREA THEY WOULD GIVE TO COORDINATE
East of Samandizan is NOT IRANIANS
BADAL.

THE ISRAEL/USA FOR PURPOSE OF COORDINATE
AND SPECIFIC AREAS CAN BE FROM
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ISRAEL.
THE I CORPS ASSUMES US IN ARM.
- COMMANDER OF I CORPS US
  LT. COL. SHA'AMA SARI IS MUKHTAR

- SQUAD W/ 13 COMMAND OF 1/3 DIVISION
  - IV DIVISION - INFANTRY DIV.
  - 33 DIVISION - INFANTRY DIV.
  - NAVAL DEFENSE COMMAND NAVY - NAVY
  12 BATTALION (SAHARA)

SIXTH
- THE ASSISTANT W/ US TO REVIEW THE
  GRASS AND PLACE THEM IN THE ORDER
  OF PLAN.
- MILITARY INTELLIGENCE KEEP ISSUING THE
  ORDER ON OUR PRIORITY LIST
  (AS #/S, REQUIRES)

- I CORPS COMMANDER, SARI
  SAHAB ZAKAYEH DEVELOP

  PLAN FOR ARM. DID NOT MODIFY THE
  PLAN EVEN THOUGH IT WAS IN CONJECTIONS
  OF OUR SPECIAL OPS, KNOWN AS AREA:

  MARINES PLAN AND CLICKED TE IT WILL SHOW

- SAHAB ZUBAIR, DIR. OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE,
  MAKES SOME PLANS PREPARE THE
  REPORT OF AREA (VIA MAP) PROVIDE TO
  THE MILITIA OF STRATEGIC PLANNING
  PURPOSES,
These were in a basket to clean up the area because there was a lot of stuff in our kitchen and they were in a plan to an circle and take out cleaning.

- We have analyzed the mission to take at school that day or some because of the horses' reasons compared tomassage water. It's obvious if not today, they might have lost.

(If he was ordered to utilize chlorine, weapons and other after use they dispose of are used have been examined,)

- Dust control at never was absolute. No use chemical were not all anymore. Any one of use chemical impossible.

- Denies use of chemical weapons.
- Viewed document - can in Arabic.

Rape (1) Sperm Ammunition

Claims he had not seen the letter.

Acknowledged this sperm ammunition was a code for chemical weapons.

Acknowledged chemical weapons used was run by his command.
- Ali Hasan Mashal
  Ot. Head of the Operations
  Command Division. Dpl Oy
  Military Warrant.

  Orders given by the Chief of Staff.
  (Hereinafter and written orders).

- Most of the time when Mashal was
  abroad, he was accompanied by Dar
  Chief of Staff.

- Neelam was Ali Hasan Mashal's
  Assistant.

- Volumes # 39 - This order did not
  issue to him. Claims that
  was the first time that he
  seen my document. The orders
  clear and the relevant dates were
  have been followed by the following:

- Volumes # 42 - Acknowledged letter written in
  Division. Was written in a dramatic fashion
  for the second by Ali Hasan Mashal.

- Claims Army Defeat didn't have chemical weapons.
ARMY JUDGE JURISDICTION / DEPARTMENT

Date: No.

HE DOESN'T KNOW WHAT THE UNIT WAS OR
WAS NOT REPORTED TO

VIEWED 12/15 - 

- AE - EO BASKET 4/5
- AE - EO BASKET 5
- AE - EO BASKET 7
- AE - EO BASKET 9
- AE - EO BASKET 12

- PROHIBITED

- INTERACT CHILDREN AND NON-COMMUNICATING
- WRESTLING, HANDHELD, AND TAKEN FROM

THE 1 CORPS WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THAT
OTHER ARMY CAMPAIGNS, REPORTS WERE
TAKEN BY THE PERSON AND TO REVIEWED BY
SULTAN HASSEN
He under requests, pursuant to Chief of Staff and/or Director in Charge of Operations to Request Assistance from the Air Force, Air Force

To whom Request Comes from the Min of Defense, in the Request, he states

Mission Problems Incorrectly.

Viewed Dec #12 by Mr. Kim. Mr. Naka is Chief of 2nd Apr. Mr. Kim is II Corps Commander after Mr. Kim.
Viewed Doc #16 by others here utilizing Source.

The conclusion that another person must have written changes in War Room.

Chair of Staff, President, Minister of Defense, Senator, Mr. Man.
Representative in United States Congress, and Opponent in Senate

Viewed video of Arafat, filmed by

Yusuf Nana, if occasion can not see Arafat

Chair or Senate, Mr. Saddam.

Minister of Defense to the Chief of Staff

To the Desert Line Unit.
File Number: B156-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence: HQ

Serial # of Originating Document: 

Date Received: 06/11/2004

From: SABIR ABD AL AZIZ AL DIN, (Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address) 

(Baghdad, IRAQ) (City and State)

By: 

To Be Returned: ☑ No
Receipt Given: ☑ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e) Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: ☑ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): ☑ No

Title: OPERATION DESERT SODER

IT- IRAQ

Reference: SABIR, 302, TUR, 06/11/2004

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

SABIR ABD AL AZIZ AL DIN.
SABIN AND AL-ARIZI HUSAIN AL-DURI

Date
No. 411/64

1967 - DIRECTOR OF PREPARATION:

- COMMUNICATION
- CABLES AND TELEGRAME FROM ALL SITES AVAILABLE
- DJIES, Etc., SABIN'S EQUIPMENT, ARRANGEMENT
- AIRBASE RECON.

- 5 BRANCHES 10 CARS
  1) COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE EXCEPT IRAQ
  2) GENERAL SECURITY
  3) 3RD BRANCH
  4) 4TH BRANCH
  5) 5TH BRANCH

- AFRICA CAMPAIGN:
  THE SECOND WAS SPECIFIC TO
  THE KURDISH AND MAVE FROM
  THE 1ST BRANCH TO THE SECOND

- PERSON IN CHARGE OF SEASON III
  GEORGE ZAID KHALIL, IN
  CHARGE OF M.S. SEASON DURING

- MISSION OR ASK FOR HUMAN BRANCH IN
  BAGHDAD WITH LEAD AND TASKS: IRAQ
  MILITARY
  NO. 04/63
  11/63
Date: No. 2

- The Iranian continues to demand
  - More UN inspections
  - Guaranteed access to military sites
  - Immediate guarantee of non-proliferation
  - Immediate guarantees to drop all UN weapons

- The US has made clear their lack of
  - Negotiations in good faith.

- The US has warned Iran, "We will respond.
  - Consequences are severe.
  - All options are open.

- Iran has issued a list of
  - Demands which are
  - Designed to
  - "Neutralize" the US

- Saddam, Minister of Defense,
  - Chief of Staff, Oji, Ahmad Mas'ud

- His response was to launch raids, and
  - More attacks on, to the Israeli
  - "Neutralize" the US

- Chairman - Planning of unit
  - Movement of troops
  - Intelligence

- Chairman - Iran's next move
  - Intelligence and came up with a
    - Plan and solution. Briefed by
  - Recommendation of the committee
USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS SECTIONS

Chief of Communications to CUS

CUS to Department of Defense

CUS to Army

CUS to Corps Command

CUS to Division

Spec Ops

DRESS A DIAGRAM
Case I - Kasab, Zameer Ahmed

CSC Advisor mentioned it.

- Al Baker Rashed Habib

Rased was not shown any documents

He was shown, what?

- Habib Raza Sharakat, Sundaas Al Al Baka

Rased: Air Force Squadron Commander

Hamper's orders from Habib Shara' bin M. Alain

Air Force Commander.

1. Commander for not showing me the Baker Frady

Hamper through some documents at 9 am

If used, the planes not deployed due to heavy cloud as in Khulna

- Lebanon for planes were from me

Baker Rashed was deployed not due to

Cloud as it.

- Usama Nada for us in Iran and comrade

Samaam, I am interested in the

Deploying as in Sanaa as were from

TO Samaa in day 11 of April. This

Lahore has been gassed.

Bilal is not from Lahore and

Not Officer.
AS SOON AS IT HITS THE NEWS
OF OUR CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE IF WE ARE NOT
TO MAKE A KINDEES - A KINDLE OF
SOMETHING LIKE Aki, NIREM DURIAN OUR
AS A HINDU - WE ARE COMING
DEMONSTRATORS FROM SMURR LOST OUR\ AS WE
HERE IS WHERE WE ARE UNDOING OUR LIVES,
AND WE ARE OF WII, OUR LIVES COME TO
AS SOON AS MONGS SENT OUR NAME
AS IMMEDIATELY TELEPHONED OUR CONGRESS
OF OUR OWN HOME OR LIVING
OUR CONCRT

SOMETHING BROUGHT OFF - A MEETING
WITH SADHU AND OTHERS IN THE HOME
FROM HERE SADHU SAYS LET US "I'
BE KNOWN THAT AND JAMA KHAIZIN
LAUNCHED A CALL TO VOTE ELECTIONS AMONG
THE WAITING.

CLAIMS OUR DECISION TO OUR HOUSEMATE AND
OUR CALL WAS NOT APPROVED WITH
NO CONSENTED.
His underscoring of **O.N.C.** - Ten Pounds
ANNOUNCED MG... or RELAX

**O.N.C.** stands for Official National Criminal
and its purpose is to thwart crime.

Also, **P.M.** is mentioned as "CLAIM"

DA's office of appeals and court

TRANSLATION:

CLAIM MY MONEY NOW

THE KILLS MUST END. DO NOT WANT

THE KILLS OR CONFIRMS ANY

THE JUDGES. THEY DECIDE

VICTIM VS. DEFENDANT. PLAINTIFF

REVENUE REQUESTED.

("STORM KILLED PENDENCY SO THAT

ONLY EASY. WE WILL DO ANYTHING

to stay in power.

INCarceration for STORM - DOES NOT WANT

HIM FURTHER DEATH, BUT WANTS HIM

TO SURVIVE. EVEN STORM DESIRES

RAY COUNTY.

...
File Number: 315E-HQ-144533

Field Office Acquiring Evidence: FBI HQ

Serial # of Originating Document: 

Date Received: 05/27/04

From: MUHAMMAD HAMZA AL ZUBAYDI

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(=Address)

(RAYMOND, IRAQ

(City and State)

By: 

To Be Returned: □ Yes □ No

Receipt Given: □ Yes □ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (c)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:

☐ Yes ☐ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI):

☐ Yes ☐ No

Title: OPERATIONS DESERT SCAMER

(KT - IRAQ)

Reference: Hamza 3422 trn 05/27/004

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☑ Original notes re interview of

MUHAMMAD HAMZA AL ZUBAYDI on 05/27/04
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREBIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-11-2000 BY 59324 WC: DESC/SS

MUHAMMAD HAMZA AL ZAHAURI - BLF
Date 5/27/04 No.
DOB: S12/22/1936
PER MAHANIY IN APRIL 1982

REMEMBER
- 1952 OUT OF ONE MILLION MEMBERS OF
  BA'IYAH, INCLUDING Michael alphabet,
- SAVED ONE BA'IYAH FOR THE IRAQI UNIT.
- PRINCIPLES - FREEDOM AND EQUALITY
- DOESN'T POINT OUT BA'IYAH NORTH
- IS RELATIVELY ONE OF ITS LEADERS
  IT SOUNDS FOR.
- SEIZED IN 1941 LATE, RANG
- TO REACH OUT PRINCIPLES IN ONE BA'IYAH
- leaves
- 1962/1963 MET SOMEONE OF A
  BA'IYAH PARTY CASE.
- Adjoin Relationship

Saddam TOUCHED A Profession:

- Acknowledged he was a friend
- High level cas of official
- Would have never admitted his
- High level problems if not wanted
- A Ba'ath Party member
- Former prime minister
- Made a very big sin as a president
- Could have made the army of
- Iraq - Egypt. Admittedly large
- About Iraqi source and Iraq laws
- - Describe Saddam Hussein - standoff
- - Part of Ba'ath party
- - Think Saddam can win
- STANCE

- Big part of Iraqi's dream was
- Iraqis first
- Doesn't sound very 13 in current
- Because he was retired in 2 years
- Last prison 4 yrs 2000
BILLING PRACTICE AS IRAN BECOMES TIGHT.

- IRAN TO DECREASE OIL
  PRODUCTION FOR YEAR

- IRAQI OIL WAS THE #1 ENEMY TO
  OPEC MEMBERS AND EXCELLENT PROFIT.

- 1991 - OPEC BAN ON OIL TO THE
  TRANSITION WITHDRAWAL.

- HEARD OF RAID ON KUWAIT WITH
  WATER AND DRAMATIC IN WORST.

- MICHIGAN SAW DAILY DAWN MINISTRY.

- 1991 - IRAQ WAS UNDER ARMADA
  AND ISRAELI AIR RAID.

- REMEMBER THE CONSEQUENCES OF
  WATER ON WOMEN, AMERICAN
  LADIES, OR ANY OTHER GENDER.

- IRAQI LEADERS WERE REPORTED
  TO SHOOT UP.

- LADIES AND THE CAUSE OF PRAYER

- RABBIAH ASKED HOW TO GO TO NAJIRIYAH.

- TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM IN A PEACEFUL
  WAY, SHE WAS A SHIA.

- REPUBLICAN GUARDS AT SARAH GUARDS NORTHERN
  REGION. THERE IS NAIMIYAH.
- HE AND THE MUSLIMS ARE IN TROUBLE AND SUFFERING.

- HIS CONVERSATIONS AT DRESDEN IN NORTHERN IRELAND

- IRAN IS NOT STARTING A NEW DREAD

- FOR OUR LOSS, LOSING, PRESERVE,

- VIOLENT ACTIONS THAT RA'IOTH MUST

- AND OUR IRAQI LOSS

- KNOWS THE 240,000 LOSS. OUR

- WEAK AND COUNTRY.

- MAINTAINED THAT IRAQ WOULD BE THE ACCOUNT

- IRAN AND WILL BECOME OUR VICTIM

- EVERYTHING HE IS SURE OF CAN BE

- TRANSFERRED RA'IOTH AND I NADIR.

- COMMANDER OF REPUBLICAN GUARDS IS

- HASHEMI - KAZMI MUSTAFA

- COMMANDER OF RA'IOTH PERSIAN

- MEMIA

- TAJZ SADIQ M. JILANI - RAIOTH PERSIAN

- LAIB, ASSISTANT TD

- REGULAR ARMY - COMMANDER BY KAZMI MUSTAFA

- WEAPONS - AUTOMATIC RIFLES, LIGHT WEAPONS,

- NO TANKS, NO HAAKAMAT

- NEVER WITNESSED BE HOME PRAYED ONCE, KILLED

- BY HAAKAMAT.
The edit experience was unusually
in a successful manner.
Muhammad Hamza Al Zubaydi, (Black List #9), date of birth July 28, 1938, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. Department of Defense (DOD) representatives (LNU) were also present, and observed the entire interview. FBI Language Specialist provided Arabic/English translation. Hamza provided the following information:

Hamza was born in Mahawil, Babil, Iraq.

Hamza was personally acquainted with Michael Aflaq, the originating founder of the Ba'ath Party in Syria; and in 1956 helped form and organize the Ba'ath Party in Iraq. Hamza decided to help form the Ba'ath Party in Iraq because he believed in the principles of the Party which were freedom, equality, and Arab unity. He served in the Iraqi government because he wanted to assist in achieving the goals of the Ba'ath Party. Hamza believes the Ba'ath Party fell short of achieving all of its goals, but did not specifically elaborate which goals it failed to achieve.

Hamza acknowledged he was a high level government official, and advised he would not have risen to this level if he wasn't a Ba'ath Party member. As the former Prime Minister of Iraq, Hamza worked closely with President Saddam Hussein, and was responsible for administering social justice and labor laws. Hamza believed the goal of the Iraqi government was equality for its people.

Around 1962 or 1963, Hamza first met and became acquainted with Saddam Hussein at a Ba'ath Party conference. He strictly had a professional relationship with Hussein over the years and rarely socialized with him. He described Hussein as a strong man, who was a leader of the Ba'ath Party. He believes that Hussein's goal for Iraq was social justice for the people. Hamza believes that the Iran-Iraq war, which lasted from 1980 to 1988, was one of the main problems that led to the demise of the Iraqi
government and the country. Hamza believes that Iran was Iraq's number one enemy because he believed Iran wanted to occupy Iraq. Hamza believes that Iraq, in the past, had an excellent relationship with the United States.

Hamza retired from his government position in approximately 2000, and doesn't know why he was arrested and detained by Coalition forces.

In 1991, Hamza believes he was either the Minister of Transportation, or possibly the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq. He learned of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait while he was traveling in Morocco. Hamza allegedly did not have prior knowledge of Iraq invading Kuwait.

After the United States liberated Kuwait in 1991, Hamza was telephonically contacted by President Hussein, and was directed to travel and take charge of the southern city of Nasiriyah. Hamza believes he was chosen to be in charge of Nasiriyah and resolve the 1991 Shia Intifada (Uprising) in a peaceful manner because he was a Shia. Even though he is a Shia, Hamza first considers himself to be a Ba'athist and Iraqi. He believes that Shia's from Iran were the cause of the 1991 Intifada, and had learned that they were revolting against the government. According to Hamza, there was widespread looting and violence occurring against Iraqi government officials and Ba'ath Party members in Nasiriyah. Hamza maintained that the 1991 uprising was started by Iran because they wanted to invade and occupy Iraq. By the time Hamza arrived in Nasiriyah, the Republican Guard and Special Forces were already there to quell the uprising. Hamza remembers conducting meetings with the various tribal leaders, community leaders, and elders in Nasiriyah to help resolve the situation and quell the uprising in a peaceful manner.

During the 1991 uprising, the Commander of the Republican Guard Forces and Regular Army in Nasiriyah was Kamal Mustafa. The Ba'ath Party leader, and Hamza's assistant was Aziz Salih Al Numan. Hamza advised the Republican Guard Forces and Regular Army were equipped with light weapons, and did not have access to, or utilize armored tanks or helicopters.

Hamza maintains that he never participated, witnessed, or directed any tortures, executions, violent acts, or other atrocities during the 1991 uprising in Nasiriyah. Hamza advised the 1991 uprising was handled entirely in a peaceful manner.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-11-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/28

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)
File Number 315E-HQ-1448554
Field Office Acquiring Evidence FR1 HQ

Serial # of Originating Document
Date Received 05/28/2004
From SULTAN HASEEM AHMED MUHAMMAD
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee) ALSARJAN ALTAI
(Address)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

By

To Be Returned
Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☐ No
Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
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☐ Yes ☐ No
Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
☐ Yes ☐ No

Title: OPERATION DESERT SARGA
IST - IRAQ

Reference: HASEEM, J02, GM1, 05/28/2004
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

SULTAN HASEEM AHMED MUHAMMAD
AL SARJAN AL TAI
SULTAN HASEIN AHMED MUHAMMED HAMID

Date: 7/14/84

- Doesn't believe he did assisting, spared, and stealing BF in current.
- Never took advantage of was pregnant.

- Discharged Criminal Act since 1979

1981-1983 served as September, win

The King's Crown they used repeated

(remainder of title illegible)

in Jamnagar. (Municipal, Forensic, Police)

- Brave Commander of 1st Corp

As of April 1, 1984.

- Commander of Ahmed from March 1, 1981-20/6/1983

Was also the 6th Corp Commander.

- Was a special tax he was assigned

- Responsibilities in charge of 3 Divisions, 70,000

- No desertion, reasons of race, human.
WHEN 14TH BATTALION 3RD ANFAN COMMANDER
AND 1ST CORPS COMMANDER 14F
WOUNDED A VIBRANT ARMY CAME FROM
SAGA, A MINORITY OF SHI'ITE AND ARMY CLAN
OF SOUTH JU'UAN.

VIBRANT ARMY FROM МУЗАИК KHALIFAS.

AFGHAN MISSION PLANNING
AND GADAFU.

ALGERIAN TOOK 15 HM AND CAME
to BE IN CHARGE OF SAGA. (8 FEB 1982)

THE MAN TO BECOME COMMISSION
WITH THE PRECEDING NOON AND RESPONSIBILITY
MISSES OF ANFAN TO KICK OUT MY
MY LONGS 00 TO THE RURAL AREAS

WAS TO RETURN MARCH 1, 1983.

TEAM OF 10 OFFICERS WENT ARABIAN
TO DO THE PLANNING OF ANFAN.

MISSION
- KICK FROM KABUL AND DEPORT DROH
- SD FROM KABUL TO DO THE PARADES

TO KABUL CHAKAH

IT'S IDEA CAME TO

CARRY OUT THE MISSION.

EXPECTATION TO ACQUIRE KM

AND 3RD ARMED DIVISION AND ALL OF THE ORGANIC
WEAPONS THAT WE WERE TAKING.
- AIM TO REPAIR AIR BASES.
- 9 DIFFERENT MADS OF ATTACK
- DEFEND TO KILL OR KIDNAP ON SITE FORCE OR IRANI
- SMALL NUMBER OF CARAVAN/TS
- AS OF 1341 AMAY
- VISIT KSAR MAGZTRAN, MADAY, MAHJA, ALFALAL.
- ILAM VOLUNTEER KIDNAP ONN ON RETURN ARMY OR KIIT.
- ILK PRISONERS CAPTURED.
- ILIBB EN THE KIDNAP TAKEN AT iterating WITH AMNHAD
AND CAPTIVITIES.
- BEGINNING OF MARCH 1945
- OIL SHIP WOMAN AND CHILDREN
- IN KSAR TALAL/ULULAS
- SHABAB WAS ON IN CHARGE OF THE 1ST ARMY COMMAND, ONE OF THE 8 TOTAL CAMPAIGNS.
- AIKH ASSAD WAS IN CHARGE OF THE 8TH AREA.
- KHASAR SPAAN/SHABAL ON KIDNAP FROM HADJO RAIN.
- AIM FOR LIONS BE TAKEN BY THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.
STUDIES: 2M KILLED OR
DEAD/MASSACRE OR KUROS
- SOCIAL STRESS NOT MISSILE KUROS
- EITHER KILLED, FIELD
- AND PLACE HIS HAND ON IT MEANS
OF KUROS WERE MISSING AND
THEY RECALLED RAMIS
- THOSE SO KUROS, NOT GUN SHOT
- WHAT HAPPENED TO THEM?
- IS THERE RECENT RECORD RECORDED
CASUARIES AND PROOF TAKEN
- BUT EVE THE KURDS WERE EXECUTED
THE NUMBER
Began mil service 40 years ago.

- Accepted to mil school 1963
- Graduated Jan 1 1964
- Served all this time since then in army
- Was M. of D.
- From platoon cmdr to chief of staff + M. of D.
- Injured 4 times, 3 in Iran + Kuwait

- Saddam was respected because he was Comm in Chief
- Because I respect myself, everyone respects me

- Army sector mates: "Atman, Asaad", former minister
- Saad Tomo, "Tom", former M.O.D.
- General SNV
- Hasan Malin (bro. to Chem Ali)
- Someone else related to Chem Ali
- Palestinian
- KHall
- OA, Assam, bank general
Discuss future with other detainees No.
- Jail atmosphere problems, mistakes.


Confident he didn't do anything wrong.
Wrong: steal, beat up others, take advantage.

Minister misuse signature to position.

Two sons are trailer drivers in Canada.
Getting good salary, no need for him to be
curious or never took advantage of his
position.

Nobody knows what is happening as future
didn't even ask during family visit as
guards were present. Some rumors say
people may get out
who might never be set free.

Hypothetically, Saddam
Hussein would admit all wrong doing.

Saddam should take blame.

This is a good country, we have many
resources that could allow all to live comfortably.
I wore uniform to every war for Iraq. Why first
U.S. (strong w/ resource) we were weak w/resouces, this mistake.
War after war after war.
SA'ID WADHOONNG:

Academic for POW exchange was part of Gen. Swann meeting re surrender negotiation including my presence or POW list. I was deputy chief of staff.

Sadi Toma was M.O.D.

Did someone act on their own? Never. Anyone w/ P.O.W. wouldn't know the names who showed as held accountable can't answer question. "I didn't see it" "Every day heard about it with Kuwaiti News broadcast.

No one talked to me about it.

Iraqi Gov put out info saying this isn't true.

Whatever did this should go to jail.

Heard about KURDS getting killed.

Heard police arrested husband & kids & put them in jail; people connected to Saddam.


Very small exposed in 1944.
KURDS CARRYING GUNS AGAINST IRAQI GOV., SECURITY FORCES PUT THEM IN JAIL. THIS WAS GOING ON ALL THE TIME.

M.G. CUMMINGS

During war if no follow orders... then have war or no war.

NEVER got an order to round up people or arrest people.

NEVER refused or regret NOT REFUSING an order or give one NO NO NO ETC.

EVEN MILITARY ORDERS YOU WERE INVOLVED IN, YOU AGREED WITH THEM.

WAR IN 87 ARM'T & RIFLE TO KURDS.

GROUP TARIKI KURD GROUPE WANTING TO FIGHT IRAQI ARMY.

SO MANY OF THESE SKIRMISHES REGISTER TO IRAQI IRIS, IRAQI (TWO DAYS, FEW DAYS, WEEKS).

A GROUP OF 20 KURDS SEE SOFT TARGET IN IRAQI ARMY AND ATTACK IT.

CAVES, SWIM TEAM, IRAQI ARMY.
KURDS

SOMETIMES FIGHTING IN IRANIAN AREA

ANFAH: S. WAS THE LEADER

QURAN TO A. OF IRAN

S. WAS 1 CORPS COMMANDER

ANFAH WAS 'SPECIAL TASK' (1 TEAM)

S. WAS CORPS COMMAND MINISTRY HEADED BY

SAOQAN (OVERALL) M.O.D. + CHIEF OF M.I.

GENERAL LEADERSHIP:

SAOQAN PUT S. IN CHARGE. S. GOT THIS THROUGH

C.O.S. SAOQAN M.O.D. C.O.S. S.

3/20 -> END 88 WRITTEN + VERBAL
BEGIN 1st AUGUST OF MAR 88

- KAMEL SAJIT WAS IN CHARGE 1 CURAS,

S. TOOK OVER FOR HIM APRIL 1ST

- WAS A GOOD OFFICER, HANGED BECAUSE SPEAKING
WILL SÃOQAN'S AFFAIR IN OFFICE, "AGAINST SÃOQAN
+ AGAINST SÁARTH"

C.O.S. 1983 RETIRED BEFORE THAT WAS IN JAIL

+ CAME BACK TO ARMY, SERVE AS SAL

COMDA 9/8 4TH DIVISION SÁAMMAY

AFTER GOT CURSO AS DIV. COMDA. SÁAMMAY
AFTER R.G. DIV COMMAND
KAME STCLT

AFTER GI WAS ADVISE. INDATE PRES. M.TAF 0422
AFTER 10/17

ANFAL OVER MARCH 77

I CORPS

WHILE ANFAL C.O. VI CORPS COMMANDEE BECAME 'SPECIAL TARY' C.O. AFTER 10 DAYS part
ANFAL TOOK OVER I CORPS
20/21 MAR/ANFAL ENDED

ANFAL C.O. DUTIES: 5 DIVISIONS & 100. BATTALION
30,000 TROOPS ZERO OBSERVATION
OR DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS
1) AFRAID OF PUNISHMENT
2) TROOPS HAD BEEF W/ OTHER TROOPS
Verset orders

Culled from VII Corps 2nd Central Command.

Nizam at Hizary, in Nizam Force S.

Was given Verset orders (written order account)

15th April 1944, Verset Operation.

We have everything planned and set up

for the I Corps. Since I Corps was

away elsewhere, it must be a mission

[Voyage], Nizam said you

will be in charge. These are your troops

Look at maps & area - we will visit in few

This was mid-Feb. Mission: Kill our all ICORAS to

The Burusa, pass to OP, (not to march

Where?) we will face space in order to

Adapt to every weather.

Assume team of 10 planning officials for staff

Miss Kill them out during till

they feel the Burusa.

→ Stegot written orders situation.

Mission: S. Devises plan about execution.

S. considered harsh conditions into planning.

S. thought he had huge army and ICORAS

Weren’t small (Easy to overwhelm)

A pronged thrust was planned.

Aviation support was on request.

Basic crew to Iran destined so Retreat to

Iran Army.
SMALL CASUALTIES / FROM / WEAPONS / WAR CASUALTIES

INFANTRY

HELICOPTER: NO FACE TO FACE OR DOOR ARTILLERY: NO DOOR FIGHTING; CAVES
ARMOR: IN AREA; BEFORE USING
OUR ARMY WILL COP WITH
10,000 I.N.A.; ARMY IN TASK;
VOLUNTEERS

BEGIN IN MARCH - MARCH 26/21
ABOUT 5 P.M. BEFORE

ARMY WITHDRAW 607 AND OR AMMO 50
IN AREA - CONTINUE VIGIL THEM.

AFTER FIGHTERS CERF THE AREA I WALK VISIT: 20 AREAS WERE OPENED, Didn't SEE
EVERY ONE STRAGER STAY BEHIND

ALL MARIO WAS OVERALL COMMANDER

SPECIAL TASK TUNE TUNA

SPECIAL TASK

SPECIAL TASK

SPECIAL TASK
AFTER: HEARD STORIES OF DISAPPEARANCE. WHERE DID THEY GO, WHAT HAPPENED TO THEM?

THE RESPONSIBLE MEN WHOLE AREA IS UNDER ALL MAJOR ARMAMENTS. ARE THEY DEAD, IN JAIL?

HEARD THESE THINGS.

WHAT ARE THE PEOPLE jji, hospitaR, missing. ESCAPES. KILLED THOUSANDS. KURDS, NEWS IN JAIL.

ONLY NEWS OF ISSUE OF Missing. KURDS.

WAS FROM RADIO.

THE DIVISION WHO MET 100 CI|U|L, WRIT|E UP A REPORT.

IRAQI ARMY WRITE UP VIA ASPIRINT.

NOT ALWAYS ACCURATE. HEAD OF CORPS.

RADIO: EXAGGERATED NUMBERS 0-5.

ANCAR | REPORTS WERE ACCURATE.

RADIO WAS INACCURATE.
Now war is over with Kuras before the info was inaccurate. Now it is being reconsidered.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/01/2004

Sultan Hashem Ahmed Muhammed Hamid Al Jabburi Al Tai, (Black List #27), date of birth July 1, 1945, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAF), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. FBI Language Specialist provided Arabic/English translation. Hashem provided the following information:

Hashem surrendered to Coalition forces in September 2003, and believes he should not be detained because he hasn't done anything that would justify his incarceration. He tried to justify this statement by saying he was respected as a career military man and never took advantage of his position. He has had the opportunity to have one family visit which occurred on January 15, 2004. He does not know what the future holds for him, and is unaware of current events regarding Iraq. He has heard rumors throughout the detention facility that some of the detainees may be released.

He respected Saddam Hussein because he was the Commander in Chief and President of Iraq. However, he did not agree with all of the wars that Iraq has fought throughout the years, especially the war with the U.S. and Coalition forces. He believes Iraq is a good country, and thinks that Hussein should take responsibility for his actions. He believes that Hussein's poor decisions ultimately led to the demise of the Iraqi government.

Hashem discussed his forty year career within the Iraqi military. He was accepted into the Iraqi Military School in 1963 and successfully graduated from it on January 1, 1964. After graduating from military school, Hashem worked his way through the military ranks and held various positions from being a Platoon Commander, a Lt. General, Chief of Staff, to ultimately becoming the Minister of Defense. During the course of his military career, Hashem sustained battlefield injuries on four occasions, during the Iran-Iraq war, and conflict with the Kurds in Northern Iraq.

Hashem discussed what he described as a skirmish with the Kurds in the Northern part of Iraq between 1987 and 1988 known as
the Anfal Campaign. During the First Anfal Campaign Hashem was a Lt. General, and commanded the VI Corps of the Iraqi Army which was based in the Sulamaniyah area of Iraq. Hashem was officially selected to become the Commander of the First Anfal Campaign on March 1, 1988. There were both written and verbal orders received from Baghdad which descended through the chain of command from Saddam Hussein to the Minister of Defense to the Chief of Staff to Hashem regarding his appointment. In approximately February of 1988, Nazar Khazraji (phonetic) met with Hashem and told him that he was chosen to be the Commander of the special task known as the First Anfal Campaign. Khazraji provided Hashem with ten officers and directed him to start planning and becoming familiar with his areas of responsibility in the Northern part of Iraq. Hashem advised the mission of the Anfal Campaign was to remove the Kurdish population from the Northern area of Iraq, and either destroy them, or make them flee to Iran. Hashem commanded three (3) Army Divisions and one hundred (100) Battalions which consisted of approximately eighty thousand soldiers for the First Anfal Campaign. With the number of military personnel under his leadership, and the weaponry at his disposal, Hashem expected to overpower and defeat the Kurdish resistance.

Hashem utilized artillery, armor, infantry, and helicopters during the First Anfal which took place from March 1, 1988 until approximately March 20-21, 1988. Hashem did not have direct operational control over other air assets (Air Force), but was able to request those resources when needed. There were nine different avenues of attack utilized in the First Anfal which were designed to allow for the Kurds to flee across the border to Iran. According to Hashem, the army engaged the Kurdish resistance fighters predominantly in caves, and there was little fighting within the cities/villages. There were few casualties suffered in battle by the Iraqi Army during the First Anfal, and there were just as many casualties suffered from exposure to the cold weather conditions. He never received an order to round up people or arrest them. Hashem maintained that no prisoners were captured by the army forces he was commanding during the First Anfal, and that he never personally witnessed any women or children casualties. He advised that when the Kurdish fighters would flee a specific area, they would take their casualties and ammunition with them. Hashem stated that any prisoners taken would have been taken by the Iraqi Intelligence Services. Hashem wanted to emphasize that he was only in charge of the First Anfal Campaign, and that Ali Hasan Majid was the overall Commander, and was in charge of the entire Northern region of Iraq. He advised there were a total of eight Anfal
Campaigns directed against the Kurds. Subsequent to the First Anfal Campaign, Hashem became the Commander of the I Corps of the Iraqi Army on April 1, 1988.

After the Anfal Campaign was concluded, Hashem first learned of missing Kurds through Kurdish radio broadcasts. He had heard stories and rumors that there were thousands of Kurds that had seemingly disappeared. Interviewers challenged Hashem and told him that it was inconceivable and implausible that he first learned of the thousands of missing Kurds through Kurdish radio. Hashem further stated that he never discussed the issue of the missing Kurds with any of his friends, relatives, superiors, subordinates, or peers. Hashem believes the thousands of missing Kurds were either killed, jailed in Iraq, or fled to Iran. Interviewers pointed out to Hashem that earlier in the interview he advised that his troops did not capture prisoners, and thus how could he make a statement to suggest that a portion of the missing Kurds were in jail. Hashem clarified by saying that none of the troops that he commanded took prisoners, however, other troops or forces had taken prisoners during the course of the Anfal Campaign. He came to know this from reading battlefield situation reports. Hashem believed the Kurds were exaggerating the figures of the missing.

Regarding the first Gulf War in 1991, and the surrender and subsequent return of Kuwaiti POW's. Hashem was the Deputy Chief of Staff for the Iraqi Military during this time frame, and answered to the Minister of Defense, Sadi Toma (phonetic). Hashem was selected to meet with General Norman Schwartzkopf to negotiate Iraq's surrender, and turn over the list of Kuwaiti POW's. Hashem never witnessed atrocities or executions that occurred regarding the Kuwaiti POW's. Hashem learned of the missing POW's through Kuwaiti news broadcasts, but maintained that he never spoke to anybody about this particular issue. Anyone with the Republican Guard would not know the Kuawiti POW issue. He was then asked who should be held accountable for these missing POW's, Hashem responded by saying he could not answer that question. He did not hear about it, nor did anyone talk to him about this issue. He reiterated that he heard about this issue through daily Kuwaiti news broadcasts. The Iraqi government allegedly refuted this by broadcasting their own version of the events via the radio and television. Hashem doesn't believe anyone acted on their own regarding the situation of the Kuwaiti POW's, but stated that whoever was responsible for this should be held accountable.
Hashem was a career military man, and advised that he never refused a direct order, nor has he regretted giving a direct order. Hashem advised that if anybody refused to follow an order they would have been hung.
File Number: 315F-SC-1448534
Field Office Acquiring Evidence: FBIMD
Serial # of Originating Document:
Date Received: 6/3/04
From: SABIR ARD AL-AZIZ HUSAYN AL DUBAI
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
(Address)
RAGHDAN, IRAQ
(City and State)
By
To Be Returned
Receipt Given: Yes No
Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Yes No
Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): Yes No
Title:
OPERATION DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ
Reference: ABD.202.EMI.06082004
(Communication Enclosing Material)
Description: Original notes re interview of
- NOTE - SABIR ARD AL-AZIZ HUSAYN AL DUBAI
RECEIPT FOR REPAIR OF MUSTASHAQ

TO REPAIR "MUSTASHAQ" OF ZABLE
CAREFUL DURING (GUARD)

COURT WAS A RAQI "MUSTASHAQ" FOR MAM

MAIM KUHARR JAIL RELAUED TO COURT

ARMY 1st CORP WAS IN KIRKUK

2nd CORP WAS IN MOSUL

5th CORPS WAS IN DAIYL

THE CORPS CONSISTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

THE COURT WAS CONCERNED WITH THE CORPS WITH IRAQ

AND THE JUDGE DEEMED THE CORPS RESPONSIBLE

FOR DEFENDING THEIR TERRITORY.

IN KIRKUK: MARIO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE

BAHR AMAR AND MAS EXPRESS ORSA. THIS

WAS DUTY AS ONE PERSON IS CHARGE OF THE

SUNRISE COMPANY,

ROLE OF ISRAELI DID NOT FALL UNDER

MASIO'S COMMISSION,

MASIO HAD THE AUTHORITY OF THE PCC AND

PERIOD TO Act AS HIS OWN,

MASIO DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY OF

MEST W/M THE HEADS OF THE INTEL SERVICES,

HENCE THE JUDGE EVIDE THE AUTHORITY OVER THEM.

EACH CORPS WAS OFFICER IN CHARGE OF

GUARD INSTEAD
THE INSURGENCY IN EAST OF THE
CORPS REPORTED TO HIM.

ALL OF THE SECURITY FORCES
ANSWERED TO THE SECURITY COMMITTEE,
WHICH ANSWERED TO THE SECRETARY OF
THE PRESIDENT.

COORDINATED AN IDEA REGARDING OPERATION
SPREADING AMONG THE GURMAMAR TO ALL
-PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARIAT
-MINISTER OF DEFENSE
-MILITARY COMMITTEE.

HE DID NOT REPORT TO HIS MASTERS.
CHIEF OF MI REPORTS TO UNIIQ AND IN
VIRIAL STATE COAST IN MOST REPORT TO
HIM.

GENERAL SAMSAM - IN COMMAND OF THE
NORTHERN REBEL MILITARY DISTRIBUTES OF MILITARY
IN THE NORTH.
ANSWERED TO THE NORTHERN REBEL SITTING IN
BALDAN WHO NEEDS REPORT TO DEPUTY
WAFAR AL SAMSAM.
SECOND OF CATEGORIES
NORTHERN REBELS.
IKRAM'S ROLE IN ANFAZ
-
Role was to connect ISRC from within the Corps.

- Military was responsible for fighting on the front lines and clearing the area of resistance.
- Knowledge of the terrain was vital for defining the area of responsibility and the other areas.
- The responsibility of the military.
- Military was responsible for "cleaning up" the area in the north of the Kurds.
- The role of relocating the displaced Kurds was up to the Governor's ability.

Reviewed Documents:

- Described all Kurds as not present in the area. The Governor was not able to issue orders as civilians and police.

Views Raised:
- Letter from Massoud to Dariyam, Dariyam, Massoud.
  Executions of people, relatives 15-20
- Hand Written to Dr. John Ambrose and son
  
  what an hourly wage was in England of it.

- Viewed a letter and verified its
  signature as not Bravo of the
  documents.

- Page 4 Document - Authorization for Signature

  USE OF "SPECIAL WEAPONS" AS RETALIATION
  TO IN ORDER TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

  (STARTED TO SWEAT PROFUSELY) I wipe vision
  (LIP GUMM, EYED PEELED)
  INSTANT RESPONS. Collect info for
  TARGET INFO & PROVIDE TO MILITARY
  IDENTIFICATION

- DECISIONS MADE BY SADDAM HUSSEIN
 Specimen led to the deaths
  of the people in the Tiso Village
  on April 15, 1987. Chile - My home country

- During this time frame has passed to
  direct one
  destruction of the Hussein's lab in TD
  Dazed Iran.
- The important safeguarding of

succeeded the idea of utilizing

lithium weapon was to be seen

against the Iranians and not against

use by us civilians. Primary use was

to target the Iranians.

- The plan to use chl was altered

transferred in 1981 when Iran was

legally and war against Iran. While

PLA-proof against this policy.

- REMARK CASSIE OF HAZARDA

Sabir Abd Al Aziz Husayn Al Duri, (Black List #205), date of birth May 19, 1949, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. Department of Defense (DOD) representatives were also present, and observed the first thirty minutes of the interview. FBI Language Specialist provided Arabic/English translation. Sabir provided the following information:

Sabir was the former Director of the Istikhbarat (Directorate of Military Intelligence) and former Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Services (IIS) (Mukhabarat). In 1987, during the Iraq-Iran war, the primary role of the Istikhbarat in the Northern region of Iraq was to gather intelligence on Iranian forces. The secondary role of the Istikhbarat was to gather intelligence on the activities of the Kurds and determine their relationship with the Iranians. During this time frame, Sabir was a member of the Northern Affairs Committee and advised the Chairman of the committee, was Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri (Black List #6), Deputy Secretary General of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). Other Directors of the Iraqi security services were members of the Northern Affairs Committee.

The Iraqi government utilized tribal Sheikhs to recruit Kurdish fighters (Jahsh) in the war against Iran, and during the Anfal Campaign. The tribal Sheikhs would get paid by the Government of Iraq (GOI) by the number of Kurdish fighters they recruited. The Sheikhs who recruited the Kurdish fighters on behalf of the Iraqi government were known as Mustashars.

Sabir believes the planning stages for the Anfal Campaign occurred between approximately 1985 and 1987. Three Corps' of the Iraqi Army were positioned in the Northern Region of Iraq at this time. The I Corps was located in Kirkuk, the II Corps was located in Diyala, and the V Corps was located in Mosul. The Corps of the Iraqi Army concentrated on the war with Iran, while the Jahsh Battalions were responsible for defending the Kurdish territory. Each Corps had an Istikhbarat officer assigned to it who was responsible for gathering intelligence. The Istikhbarat officer...
reported directly to Sabir. Sabir formed two units of the Istikhbarat in the Northern region, the first unit was located in Kirkuk, and the second unit was located in Mosul. Both units reported to Sabir. General Farhan Jaaburi (phonetic) was in charge of the Northern Region Military Directorate of Intelligence and reported to the Northern Region Section located in Baghdad. The Northern Region Section in Baghdad would report to Deputy Wafiq Al Samaarai (phonetic), who was in charge of Section/Department III, which had responsibility over the Northern region of Iraq. The Iraqi Intelligence and Security Services reported to the Security Committee, who in turn, would report to the Presidential Secretary. Copies of the operational intelligence and information reports would get disseminated to the Presidential Secretary, Minister of Defense, Chief of Staff, and Military Committee.

During this time frame, Ali Hasan Majid (Blacklist #5) was stationed in Kirkuk and was responsible for the Ba'ath Party and the Northern Region. Sabir was unsure of the exact dates, but believes it was approximately 1987 that Ali Hasan Majid was given the authority by the RCC to become the Commander of the Northern Region of Iraq. Sabir initially advised the control of the Istikhbarat did not fall under Majid's authority, and later advised that Majid had complete authority over the military and the Ba'ath Party. According to Sabir, Majid did not have the authority to meet with the Directors of the Intelligence Services, however, Majid would exert his power over them.

Interviewers refreshed Sabir's memory and told him that Majid was given the authority as Commander of the entire Northern region of Iraq as referenced in RCC decree #160 dated March 29, 1987. Sabir viewed a copy of this decree, which formally appointed command of the Northern Region of Iraq, to include the autonomous region of Kurdistan, to Ali Hasan Majid. RCC decree #160 gave Majid authority over the Foreign Intelligence Apparatus, the Internal Security Force, the Military Intelligence, the Popular Army, and the Military. (A copy of RCC decree #160 which Sabir viewed in Arabic along with the accompanying English translation will be maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope and marked as Document #'s 1 & 2).

During the Anfal Campaign, the military was responsible for fighting on the front lines and clearing the areas of resistance. The Istikhbarat was responsible for gathering intelligence from within each of the Corps. Sabir did not have knowledge of Majid's specific defined areas of responsibility, and
advised areas outside of Majid's responsibilities would have been given to the military. The military was also responsible for removing the Kurdish population in the Northern Region, and the Governors in each of those areas were responsible for relocating the displaced Kurds. Each Governor was responsible for reporting directly to Majid.

Sabir viewed twenty-five pages of documents in Arabic which centered around the time frame of 1987 involving pre-Anfal and Anfal Campaign activities. The copies of documents describe correspondence between different entities within the Iraqi Government involving the use of "Special Ammunition" in the Northern Region of Iraq. Sabir acknowledged that Special Ammunition was a term used by the Iraqi government to represent Chemical Weapons (CW).

Sabir doesn't remember each and every document, however, did verify his signature on the bottom of several of the documents, and thus concluded they were authentic. (A copy of the twenty-five pages of documents viewed by Sabir, and the accompanying English translation will be maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope and marked as Document #'s 3 & 4).

While viewing the copies of documents, and upon verifying his signature, interviewing agents observed the following physical changes in Sabir. Sabir started to profusely perspire, his facial characteristics dramatically changed, and his lower lip began to uncontrollably quiver. Additionally, after explaining the April 16, 1987 chemical weapons attack on the villages of Balisan and Sheikh Wasan, Sabir's eyes began to tear. Sabir stated that decisions made by President Saddam Hussein to utilize CW directly led to the deaths of the men, women, and children in those villages.

The original plan to use CW was formulated in 1986 when it was perceived that Iraq was losing the war, which was due in part to the loss of the Faw Peninsula to Iranian forces. Sabir believes the general consensus was that the Iraqi forces needed a small victory to boost their confidence and continue fighting the war with Iran. The idea to utilize CW against Iran during the war was originally brought up by his subordinates within the Istikhbarat. The Istikhbarat's primary mission was to defeat and expel the Iranian forces, and not utilize the CW against innocent civilian populations which included women and children. Sabir advised the Istikhbarat was responsible for collecting information
for target identification and providing that information to the Iraqi military in 1987.

Sabir viewed another document which was dated June 23, 1987, drafted by Ali Hasan Majid of the Northern Bureau Command, to the Commander's of the I, II, and V Corps. This memo set policy on dealing with the Kurds by turning the prohibited areas in the Northern Region of Iraq into free fire zones, and ordered the arrest, interrogation and summary execution of all those aged 15-70 who were found in the prohibited areas. In addition, it gave permission to the pro-government Kurdish militias (Jahsh), to keep everything they might seize in those prohibited areas, not only light weapons but also personal belongings. Sabir acknowledged this memo and reiterated that Majid had the authority to act on his own, and had the support of President Saddam Hussein and the RCC. (A copy of the document viewed by Sabir in Arabic, and the accompanying English translation will be maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope and marked as Document #'s 5 & 6).
File Number: 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence: FBI HQ (Baghdad)

Serial # of Originating Document:

Date Received: 5/27/04

From: SA

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By

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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: ☐ Yes ☑ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): ☐ Yes ☑ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER

IT - IRAQ

Reference: (Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

On 05/27/04 [redacted] was interviewed at a detention facility in Baghdad, Iraq. After identifying themselves and the purpose of the interview, the investigators were provided with the following information:

Investigation on 05/27/2004 at Baghdad, Iraq

File # 315E-HQ-1448534-1
by SSA George L. Pitt

Date dictated ____________________________

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File Number: 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence: FY11 HQ

Serial # of Originating Document: ____________________________

Date Received: 6/5/04

From: MUHAMMAD HANZA AL-ZUBAYDI
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(Baghdad, IRAQ
(City and State)

By: ____________________________

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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☑ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☑ No

Title: OPERATION DESERT STORM

IT IRAQ

Reference: HANZA, 302, Tm1, 04052001

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☑ Original notes re interview of

- MUHAMMAD HANZA AL-ZUBAYDI

__________________________________________

__________________________________________

__________________________________________
- Discuss Time Frame of 1947.
- Was in Charge of the National Bureau of Haiti in 1947.

- RAND - Personal Opinion.
- Did not provide - Stated it was a decision by one President.

BARZANI: I Ruled, Denial, Massacre
TALABANI: Szalamisya, his life, Ramadan

Of Iran

Reza was against this Arab Government
BARZANI was not Razed Adversary.

TALABANI wanted to be part of Iran
So that they became independent from Iraq.

His role was mainly an administrative role.
And the overall responsibility of
civilian care of the revenues was
under the Army.

Prior to April 1987 what were his
installations from Saddam in remains with
the President? - Under his protection?

He claims there were no problems.
- ADDED THAT WE WERE UNDER, BUST DUB REW

- FOLLOWED IN OUT INCREDIBLE WAY

- WHEN HE WAS FIRST SENT TO LEND THE PATIA

- REPS, COMMUNICATE WITH USA... ALL THAT

- MIDDLE EAST REPELLING US WITH MUSLA

- MUSLA WHO CAME A BANDIT OF SANAM

- AND WAS GIVEN UNPRECEDEDent AUTHORITY

- CLAIMS HIS DEATH WAS DUT OF A

- POLITICAL AND DID NOT HAVE ANY MUSLA

- RESPONSIBILITY.

- IBRAHIM AL-DI... ORGANISATION CERTAIN

- FROM 1965-1967. IF IT IS SOMEONE THAT

- WAS IMPORTANT - SANAM WAS A LEADER HER

- WRITERS OR TELEPHONE OR WAS OBLIGED

- BUT PRES. SECRETARY, WERE

- ORDERS FROM 1931-1947. HIS ORDERS WERE

- TO QUIT THE VIOLENCE. HIS ROLE WAS

- TO EXPRESS THE CURRENT TENSIONS AND RELIEVES

- THE PROBLEM.

- DOESN'T KNOW THAT RABAN WOULD NOT USE

- CHEMICALS USED HEMP. HADNO AFFAIR AT THE biç

- BUT RABAN.
HE TRIED TO RESOLVE THE MANY PROBLEMS AND FALLS AND NA\N
US THE USE OF REAL IZE 17 ALI HASAN MAS\I0

THE PROBLEMS IN THE NATION WERE CAUSED
BY REVENUE AND TAXATION WE RE U\N\N
LIKE THE IRANIANS AND DETERMINING THE
IRANI GOVERN

AFTER HE RETURNED TO Riyadh, Saddam
OSLIRED HIM TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR AND
ADMINISTRATION. Saddam did not allow
TO HIM ABOUT HIS PERFORMANCE IN THE
SAUDI AND SAD TO BE FOR THE FIRST
TO REPLACE HIM WITH ALI HASAN MAS\I0

RECEIVED A CALL FROM MR. PRESIDENT.
SECRETARY AND WRITING ORDERS TO BE REPLACED.
DID NOT QUOTE THE ORDERS AND HAD AL\I0
FOLLOWING ORDERS, IF NOT DIA NT EX\A
THE ORDERS BE PAGED OR AMIRAT

DI NOT KNOW MR. HUZAN MAS\I0'S ORDERS
1991

Mamutu A. was a minister of Home Affairs.

Reason he was chosen was because he was one of the ministers and was familiar to the majority. As president he was a Syria.

- Mamutu A. was known as a peaceful man.

- President Sadao was responsible for all violence.

- Claim he was slapped and individuals with his wife in Nasiriyah.

- Never killed anyone, was always existing, never witnessed executions.

- Deemed nickname as "Shia Mad".

- Believed Saddam should be fought to death, but wrong/counter comment was the way he should be fought to death.
Muhammad Hamza Al Zubaydi, (Black List #9), date of birth July 28, 1938, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. FBI Language Specialist[________] provided Arabic/English translation. Hamza provided the following information:

In 1987, Hamza was in charge of the Northern Bureau of the Ba'ath Party, and claims that his role was that of a politician. He did not have control or responsibility over the Iraqi military. From approximately 1985 to 1987, Hamza received his orders from Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri, however, if there were orders that were of significant importance, President Saddam Hussein would provide them to Hamza through the Presidential Secretary. Hamza would receive his orders telephonically or in writing through the Presidential Secretary's office.

Hamza initially denied there were problems in the Northern Region of Iraq during his tenure, however, later stated there were two Kurdish factions headed by Barzani and Talabani, that were resisting against the government. Barzani's group was located in the Irbil, Dohak and Mosul areas; and Talabani's group was in the area of Sulymaniyah to the Iranian border. Talabani's goal was to separate the Kurds from Iraq so they would gain their independence. Of the two groups, Barzani's was the more worthy adversary according to Hamza. Both Kurdish groups were working with the Iranians and threatening the sovereignty of the Iraqi Government. Hamza then admitted there was unrest in the Northern Region of Iraq but continued to deny there was a war, or fighting against the Kurds.

Conditions in the North began to deteriorate with Talabani's group, and Hamza remembers between approximately 1986 and 1987, his orders were to quell the violence, and bring the parties together to resolve the situation. Hamza's attempts to resolve the situation with the Kurds failed, and he was subsequently replaced as the Northern Bureau Commander. By Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) decree #160, dated March 29, 1987, Ali Hasan Majid became the Commander of the Northern Bureau and was given, according to Hamza, unprecedented authority over the
Iraqi military and Ba'ath Party. Hamza stated that Majid was a relative of President Saddam Hussein, and that was the primary reason he was given so much authority. Hamza found out he was being replaced through a telephone call and via written orders from the Presidential Secretary. He did not question the orders he received from Baghdad, and advised he would have been put to death if he hadn't followed the orders.

Hamza returned to Baghdad and was placed in an administrative position within the government. President Hussein did not speak with Hamza about his performance as the Commander in the Northern Region, however, did state that it was for the best that he was replaced by Ali Hasan Majid.

Hamza acknowledged the fact that chemical weapons (CW) were utilized in the Northern Region of Iraq during this time frame, however, doesn't know what the governments reason was to utilize them. He allegedly learned of the use of the CW through radio broadcasts.

Regarding the 1991 Shia Uprising (Intifada) in the Southern Region of Iraq. Hamza remembered that he was the Minister of Transportation during this time frame and believes he was sent to Nasiriyah because he was a Shia, and was familiar with the area. Hamza continued to maintain that the 1991 Intifada was resolved in a peaceful manner. Interviewers challenged Hamza and reminded him that he previously admitted to the fact that there were violent acts committed against the Shia population. Hamza admitted to slapping an individual in the back of the head and advised that was the extent of his physical abuse.

He vehemently denies ever killing anybody, ordering executions, or witnessing any executions or atrocities during the 1991 Intifada in Nasiriyah. Hamza responded by saying that President Saddam Hussein should be held responsible for the violence that occurred during the 1991 Intifada.

Hamza concluded by saying Saddam Hussein should be brought to justice, but failed to elaborate or articulate why he should be brought to justice.
Session Number: 25  
SSA George L. Piro

(U) While engaging SSA George L. Piro in casual conversation in his detention cell, SADDAM HUSSEIN provided the following information:

(U) SSA Piro discussed with HUSSEIN Iraq’s relationship with Al-Qaeda. HUSSEIN provided a brief historical account of conflicts between religion, specifically Islam, and historical rulers. HUSSEIN stated that he was a believer in God but was not a zealot. HUSSEIN believed that religion and government should not mix. Additionally, the Ba’ath Party ideology was not religiously based, as its founder was a Christian. However, HUSSEIN was clear that he opposed anyone who collaborated with the West against his country.

(U) HUSSEIN stated USAMA BIN LADEN’s ideology was no different than the many zealots that came before him. The two did not have the same belief or vision. HUSSEIN claimed he had never personally seen or met Bin Laden. SSA Piro advised HUSSEIN there is clear evidence the Iraqi Government had previously met with BIN LADEN. SSA Piro specifically cited FAROUQ HIJAZI’s (BL #104), former IIS M-4 Director, meeting with BIN LADEN in Sudan in 1994, ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI’s two visits to Baghdad, and his request for financial assistance of ten million dollars. HUSSEIN replied “yes”. HUSSEIN stated the Iraqi government did not cooperate with BIN LADEN. SSA Piro asked HUSSEIN “why not” since Iraq and BIN LADEN had the same enemies, United States and Saudi Arabia. SSA Piro then cited him the quote “my enemy’s enemy is my brother”. HUSSEIN replied that the United States was not Iraq’s enemy, but that HUSSEIN opposed its politics. If he wanted to cooperate with the enemies of the United States, HUSSEIN would have with North Korea, which he claimed to have a relationship with, or China.

(U) HUSSEIN stated that the United States used the 9/11 attack as a justification to attack Iraq. The United States had lost sight of the cause of 9/11. SSA Piro advised HUSSEIN that due to Iraq’s contradiction between its
Baghdad Operations Center

statements and actions, many believe Iraq miscalculated the
effects of the 9/11 attack on the American people and its
leaders. Iraq denied having any connection with BIN LA DEN or
Al-Qaeda, but evidence showed continued contact between the
two. HUSSEIN denied miscalculating the effects of the attack,
but he did not have any options in front of him. The only
choice he was given was to leave Iraq which he claimed was not
an option.

(U) SSA Piro asked HUSSEIN why was Iraq the only
country to applaud the 9/11 attack, which HUSSEIN immediately
denied. SSA Piro advised HUSSEIN that the Iraqi newspapers
were reported to have applauded the attack. HUSSEIN stated
that he wrote editorials against the attack, but also spoke of
the cause which led men to commit these acts. The cause was
never reviewed which could create such hatred to kill innocent
people. After the attack, TARIQ AZIZ wrote personal letters
denouncing the attack to two individuals, one possibly Ramsey
Clarke, which AZIZ personally knew. These letters served as
informal means of communications for Iraq to denounce the
attack. HUSSEIN stated he could not make any formal
announcement as Iraq considered itself at war with the United
States. HUSSEIN was asked if that was why the request of the
Iraqi Ambassador to the United Nations, MUHAMMAD AL-DURI, to
attend the 9/11 memorial was denied by the Council of Four.
It took the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ personal request to
HUSSEIN to obtain permission for the ambassador to attend the
memorial. HUSSEIN stated he could not recall what transpired,
but specifically remembered the ambassador attending the
memorial. Again, HUSSEIN stated that the ambassador attended
the memorial as a representative of the United Nations, and
would not have attended as a formal representative of Iraq.
File Number: 315E-HQ-1448534-A31

Field Office Acquiring Evidence: FBI HQ

Serial # of Originating Document:

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From

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By GEORGE L. PIRO

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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: ☑ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): ☑ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER

IT-IRAQ

Reference: (Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☑ Original notes re interview of SADDAM HUSSEIN


Discussed new Pres. took foundation of new Govt. Good Bel A said it appeared a lot of thought went into the selection and it was good how it does well.

Specificly, he writes today: "From the heart. Did not enjoy turning fences like an exam."

6/2000

2 meanings: 1. Deals with the region
   As to make sure not seen as weak in the region, being threatened by others.

Operational: 2. Compliance w/ UN
   Destruction of WMD.

Reps. Iran & Israel, but more so Iran as it bordered Iraq. Israel was a threat to all Arabs, but Iran secure to Iraq, the other neighbors couldn't defend or stand against them. Iran wanted Saddam Iraq for themselves.
2.52 Ambient

MINUTES:

Meeting Time at 8:00 A.M.

Agenda 1: Implementation of the new software.

Agenda 2: Notification to the teams.

Agenda 3: Discussion of the new system.

All three agendas will be discussed completely.

North/South: 12/20/86

In light of the decision, the following issues will be addressed:

1. Date: 12/19/86

2. Subject: Review of the program.
His Future - God's Hopes

Is Baby Your Life End -
Do You Want It To Have Meaning?

Yes

War of Cities

IRAPH Used Missiles Range 250-270 Km
Iran Obtained Missiles From Libya &
Struck Baghdad - He Asked Iraq
Not To Take It There - Iran Stuck
Plan - His Scientists Told Him They
Could Extend Their Missiles To Tehran
& He Told Them To Do It. They
Struck Iran & They Were Up In
Air. As Tehran Is More
Susceptible To Missile Strikes Than Baghdad.

IRAP Tech / Scientist Far Exceed
Other Countries & Will Take Steps
To Protect Ourselves After Ourselves

1 - Relationship WI/US

2 - Otherwise Have Problems, Will Do
What Warrant Is Necessary With Assis. If Would
" Re-constitute Its WPS Capabilities
DID NOT USE TELEPHONE SERVICE

March 1990 EXCESS OF ON 2 OCCASIONS. RECEIVED V.C. TREAT OBLIGATIONS.

WILL NOT STRAY @ HOUSE ALL MORE THAN 68 OR 80 AS THEY WISDOM/WANTS TO BE KNOWN.
File Number 315E-HQ-1448534-1432

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBI/HQ

Serial # of Originating Document

Date Received 06/28/2004

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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

□ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

□ Yes ☒ No

Title Desert Spider IT-Iraq

Reference

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description ☒ Original notes re interview of Saddam Hussein
STATE IS A BELIEVER IN GOD BUT NOT A FUNDAMENTALIST (ZEALOUS)

DOES NOT BELIEVE GOVT & RELIGION SHOULD MIX

PROVIDED A BRIEF HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF ISLAM/RELIGION & RULE OR GOVT.

BAATHISTS BELIEFS WERE NOT BASED ON RELIGION. THE FOUNDER WAS A CHRISTIAN.

UBI'S BELIEFS ARE THE SAME AS ALL OF THE OTHER ZEAL THAT CAME BEFORE HIM.

HAS NEVER SEEN UBI.

WITNESS INFORMED ABOUT FIDEL'S INTL W/ UBI AUTHORIZED BY HIM.

REQ. FOR $10 M/L VISIT IN 2000

HE RESPONDED "YES", DID NOT WORK TOGETHER W/ UBI

WHEN ASKED "MY ENEMY'S ENEMY IS MY BROTHER" HE SAID AMERICA

US / SAUDI
Was not his enemy, the American politics. If he wanted to work w)
America's enemies, he could have 2/1 N. Korea nuk'd
They had a relationship with OR China.
SAID US used 9/11
dr justification to invade
Iraq & lost sight of the
cause of 9/11. Contradictions words, actions, IRAQ miscommunicated
US' determination & effect of
He said NO. They
had no options in front of
them. They recognized
US' determination but were
not given any choice except
leave IRAQ which was not
a choice.
Does not like those who work/cooperate
w/ the West against their country.
Iraq was the only country to applaud the 9/11 attacks in its newspapers. He denied it, saying he wrote against the attack, but spoke of the cause, which could lead men to commit such acts. These causes should have been examined. Then Alzidi wrote to personal ites to 2 Americans opposing the attacks. These were informal means of communications as Iraq was at war with us. I could not speak formally. Brought up in ambassador's participation in memorial of the Council of 9/11 initial refusal to allow him to attend. It took the MFA to ask him & he allowed it. Would not comment this except that emb. did
ATTEND AS PART OF THE UN

WOULD NOT HAVE ATTENDED AS

A FORMAL REP. OF IRAQ.
DG 31 ORIGINAL NOTES RE INTERVIEW OF SADDAM HUSSEIN BY GEORGE PIRO
Session Number: 23
SSA George L. Piro

(U) While engaging SSA George L. Piro in casual conversation, Saddam Hussein providing the following information regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD):

(U) Saddam Hussein read SSA George Piro a poem he recently wrote. SSA Piro used this opportunity as a segue to discuss Hussein’s speeches. SSA Piro advised Hussein that after hearing several poems from him, SSA Piro is now able to recognize Hussein’s writing style, which was prevalent in a speech SSA Piro recently read. It was clear to SSA Piro that Hussein wrote his own speeches, which he confirmed further, stating all his writings came from the heart. Hussein claimed he did not enjoy reading his speeches, preferring instead to have his speeches read by others, such as news broadcasters. Hussein described the feeling of writing his speeches and giving them was the same as taking an exam.

(U) SSA Piro then asked Hussein if he wrote his own speeches and they come from the heart, then what was the meaning of his June 2000 speech. Hussein replied this speech was meant to serve a regional and an operational purpose. Regionally, the speech was meant to respond to Iraq’s regional threat. Hussein believed that Iraq could not appear weak to its enemies, especially Iran. Iraq was being threatened by others in the region and must appear able to defend itself. Operationally, Hussein was demonstrating Iraq's compliance with the United Nations (UN) in its destruction of its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

(U) Hussein stated Iran was Iraq’s major threat due to their common border and believed Iran intended to annex Southern Iraq into Iran. The possibility of Iran trying to annex a portion of Southern Iraq was viewed by Hussein and Iraq as the most significant threat facing Iraq. Hussein viewed the other countries in the Middle East as weak and could not defend themselves or Iraq from a attack from Iran. Hussein stated he believed Israel was a threat to the entire Arab world, not specifically Iraq.

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Hussein continued the dialogue on the issues relating to the significant threat to Iraq from Iran. Even though Hussein claimed Iraq did not have WMD, the threat from Iran was the major factor as to why he did not allow the return of the UN inspectors. Hussein stated he was more concerned about Iraq discovering Iraq's weaknesses and vulnerabilities than the repercussions of the United States for his refusal to allow UN inspectors back into Iraq. In his opinion, the UN inspectors would have directly identified to the Iranians where to inflict maximum damage to Iraq. Hussein demonstrated this by pointing at his arm and stated striking someone on the forearm would not have the same effect as striking someone at the elbow or wrist, which would significantly disable the ability to use the arm. Hussein indicated he was angered when the United States struck Iraq in 1998. Hussein stated Iraq could have absorbed another United States strike for he viewed this as less of a threat than exposing themselves to Iran.

Hussein further stated that Iran's weapons capabilities have increased dramatically, while Iraq's have been eliminated by the UN sanctions. The effects of this will be seen and felt in the future, as Iran's weapons capabilities will be a greater threat to Iraq and the region in the future. Hussein stated Iraq's weapons capabilities were a factor in the outcome of the Iraq-Iran War. Initially during the war, Iraq had missiles with a limited range of approximately 270 Kilometers (km), while Iran had no viable missile capability. The Iranians obtained long-range missiles from Libya which could strike deep into Iraq. The Iranians were the first to use the missiles, and struck Baghdad. Hussein claimed he warned the Iranians through a speech he gave, to cease these attacks. But the Iranians again attacked Baghdad. Iraq's scientists came to him and advised him that they could increase the range of Iraq's missiles to also reach deep into Iran. Hussein directed them to do so. Iraq responded to Iran's attacks by striking Iran's capital, Tehran, with its own missiles. Hussein stated the Iranians were up in arms to Iraq's strikes. Hussein stated that Tehran was more vulnerable to missile strikes due to its geographical design. Baghdad, on the other hand, was geographically spread out and broken up into districts making Iran's missile strikes less effective. Hussein identified this as the "war of the cities" and Iraqi actions were in response to Iran's. At that time,
Hussein recognized that Iran was at a disadvantage, as Iraq had the technology to design and develop its missiles, while Iran was forced to obtain its missiles from Libya. Iraq was limited only by its own production while Iran was limited by the quantity it could obtain.

Hussein recognized that Iran continued to develop its weapons capabilities, to include its WMD, while Iraq had lost its weapons capabilities due to the UN inspections and sanctions. Hussein was asked how Iraq would have dealt with the threat from Iran once the UN sanctions were lifted. Hussein replied Iraq would have been extremely vulnerable to an attack from Iran, and would have sought a security agreement with the United States to protect it from threats in the region. Hussein felt such an agreement would not only have benefitted Iraq, but its neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia. SSA Piro agreed that such an agreement would have assisted Iraq immensely. SSA Piro noted due to the history between the two countries, it would have taken some time before the United States would have entered into such an agreement with Iraq.

Further, SSA Piro advised Hussein that paragraph 14 of UN Resolution 687 states that the disarming of Iraq was part of a total disarmament of the entire region, however, that portion of the resolution was not enforceable. The threat from Iran would have loomed over Iraq, especially as Iran had continued to advance its weapons capabilities. SSA Piro commented that under those circumstances, it would appear that Iraq would have needed to reconstitute its own weapons program in response. Hussein replied that Iraq would have done what was necessary and agreed that Iraq's technical and scientific abilities exceeded others in the region.

Hussein commented he allowed the UN inspectors back into Iraq to counter allegations by the British Government. Hussein stated this was a very difficult decision to make, but the British Government had prepared a report containing inaccurate intelligence. It was this inaccurate intelligence on which the United States was making their decisions. However, Hussein admitted that when it was clear that a war with the United States was imminent, he allowed the
Baghdad Operations Center

Inspectors back into Iraq in hopes of averting war. Yet, it became clear to him four months before the war that the war was inevitable.

(U) Hussein reiterated he had wanted to have a relationship with the United States but was not given the chance, as the United States was not listening to anything Iraq had to say. Further, he was concerned about the United States's advanced technological capabilities and resources.

(U) On another matter, Hussein stated he only recalls using the telephone on two occasions since March 1990. Additionally, Hussein did not stay at the same location for more than a day, as he was very aware of the United States's significant technological capabilities. Hussein communicated primarily through the use of couriers to communicate or would personally meet with government officials to discuss pertinent issues. Hussein stated that a technologically under-developed country, such as Iraq, was vulnerable to the United States.

(U) The discussion then turned to the new interim President of Iraq, Sheikh Ghazi Al-Yawar. Hussein stated Al-Yawar came from a good family and would be favored by the other countries in the region, especially Saudi Arabia. Hussein stated it appeared the United States had put a lot of thought into Al-Yawar's appointment, as Al-Yawar was a good selection. SSA Piro told Hussein the selection of Al-Yawar was not solely made by the United States, but was a joint effort by the United States and UN. The selection of the new Iraqi Government was based on the needs voiced by the Iraqi people. The new Iraqi Government has a strong foundation on which to build on as it progresses in its work to serve the Iraqi people. SSA Piro then asked Hussein how he personally felt about their discussion of a new President and Government in Iraq. Hussein began to respond in reference to Al-Yawar, but SSA Piro stopped him and asked how he personally felt. SSA Piro reminded Hussein that he had previously made it clear to SSA Piro that he still considered himself the President of Iraq. However, it is clear now to everyone that he is no longer the President, as there is a new President who is representing the country and the people of Iraq. SSA Piro told Hussein he is no longer the President of Iraq; he was done. Hussein replied yes he knows, saying what could he do as it was God's choice. SSA Piro asked him if he had any thoughts about his future and Hussein stated...
that it was in God’s hands. SSA Piro pointed out to Hussein that God was very busy and that God had more important issues than he and SSA Piro. Hussein agreed, at which point, SSA Piro told Hussein that his life is nearing its end, and asked him if he wanted the remainder of his life to have meaning, to which he responded yes.

(U) SSA Piro informed Hussein that he had surrounded himself with weak individuals, who are now refusing to take any responsibility for the actions of the former government. The other High Value Detainees were putting the blame for all of Iraq’s mistakes on Hussein, to which Hussein replied by saying what could he do. Hussein recognizes that he may bear the responsibility or blame while others will attempt to distance themselves.
On 03/21/2004, Ali Hasan Al-Majid (Black List #5) was interviewed at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Al-Majid was advised the interviewing agents were representatives of the United States Government. The interview was monitored by a representative of the military Joint Interrogation Detainee Cell (JIDC). FBI Language Specialist (LS) provided Arabic/English translation. Al-Majid provided the following information:

During the years 1987 through 1989, Al-Majid served as Secretary General of the Ba’ath Party’s Northern Bureau Command with responsibility over northern Iraq including Kurdish territory. Iraq was divided into the Northern, Central, Euphrates, and Southern Sectors. Al-Majid replaced Mohammad Hamza Zubaydi (Black List #9), former Secretary General. Saddam Hussein appointed Al-Majid to this position during a meeting of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). At the meeting, Hussein informed Al-Majid of his new responsibilities while simultaneously appointing Zubaydi as Iraqi Minister of Transportation. Al-Majid’s appointment was made personally by Hussein, as he was clearly in charge, and no vote was taken by the RCC. Prior to this appointment, Al-Majid was the Deputy Commander of the Ba’ath Party’s Military Organization.

Al-Majid was shown and read a copy of a document written in Arabic, described as RCC decree number 160, dated March 29, 1987, signed by Saddam Hussein, which sets forth details regarding Al-Majid’s appointment as the representative of the Ba’ath Party for the northern region of Iraq, including the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan. Al-Majid acknowledged that this decree was issued and that it spelled out his authority over all civilian, military and security agencies in the region. He stated a decree is issued at the conclusion of an RCC meeting which details issues addressed by the RCC. Al-Majid denied, however, having authority over the military forces or security services in the region, as the security services are never subordinate to anyone in the government except Hussein. The security services, Fedayeen Saddam, and Saddam’s Cubs answered to Hussein only and took their instructions only from Hussein. Al-Majid received a copy of decree number 160 in writing at a later time. Immediately after issuance of the decree, he also
received additional instructions in writing from the Presidential Diwan which further defined his authority.

As specified to him in the additional instructions, Al-Majid only used the authorities in the decree for the "collectivization" of the villages in the northern region located within five kilometers (km) of provinces, and areas classified as cities, zones, or suburbs. This "collectivization" consisted of moving villagers from their homes to Iraqi government housing complexes. Per the additional instructions given to Al-Majid, areas outside of five km fell within the control of the military including cities near the border between Iraq and Iran. Al-Majid noted that the Anfal Campaign in Kurdish territory in 1988 was conducted by the military under the command of Sultan Hashim Ahmad Al-Tai (Black List #27). The instructions that followed decree number 160 set the aforementioned five km parameters and restricted Al-Majid's authority. Al-Majid acknowledged that he did delegate orders to the security services as it pertained to the areas under his span of control, but the services acted independently everywhere else to include their technical work.

Al-Majid claimed to have once excused himself from a meeting where a discussion was to take place regarding the collectivization of villages outside the five km boundary. In Al-Majid's opinion at that time, such actions would have required a large budget, engineers, planners and other professionals which he did not have at his disposal. Al-Majid concluded that such tasking should have been controlled by the Minister of Housing. The Ministry of Housing had the responsibility for the construction of housing complexes for the villagers affected by the collectivization. Al-Majid's role was to inform the governors of the various provinces of the completion of the complexes to initiate the transfer of the villagers.

Al-Majid claimed each province had a security committee composed of representatives from the various security services. These committees were not, however, under his control. If Al-Majid required assistance, he would seek it from the Army Chief of Staff. The military had two major bases, one in Suleimaniyeh and the other in Kirkuk, where the 1st Army Corps headquarters was located.

Al-Majid does not hate the Kurds as they are Iraqis and his people. Just as the Arabs, the Kurds have good and bad people. Al-Majid claimed to have personal relations with many Kurds. Al-Majid had a good relationship with Jalal Talabani and claimed
they had eaten at each other’s homes. Al-Majid disliked Talabani but did not hate him. He affectionately referred to him as the "sheikh of the saboteurs." Al-Majid stated "saboteurs" was the term the Iraqis used in official documents to describe Kurds who resisted Iraqi government rule. Al-Majid had only heard that the "saboteurs" had relationships with other governments such as Iran and Turkey, and eventually with the United States and other western countries. Iran entered into a relationship with the Kurds, whereby Iran not only benefited from the relationship but also destroyed the Kurds Iraqi reputation. In 1987, Iran declared that year would be the last one of the Iran-Iraq War and sent its agents into Kurdish territories inside Iraq. Iran attempted to establish its presence in certain areas such as Halabja and others. According to Al-Majid, these actions necessitated military action by Iraq. Al-Majid agreed that it was difficult for the Iraqi government to distinguish Kurds from Iranians or good individuals from bad ones.

Al-Majid’s powers in the northern region lasted approximately two years until April, 1989, but he does not recall whether an RCC decree was issued repealing his powers. Hassan Ali Al-Amiri replaced Al-Majid as the Secretary General of the Northern Bureau Command. In June, 1989, Al-Majid was appointed Minister of Local Government.

Al-Majid denied having any knowledge of executions of Kurds in Northern Iraq. Al-Majid stated his duties included the collectivization of villages within the specified five km boundary into government housing complexes. Those villages outside of the five km boundary fell under the control of Nazar Khazraji, Iraqi Army Chief of Staff. As part of the process, Al-Majid ordered Kurds within the Ba'ath Party to explain the need for collectivization to the effected Kurdish population. Additionally, Al-Majid declared that no one, not even one person, would be moved until the land was prepared and electricity was established. As part of their relocation, the affected Kurds were given 3,000 Iraqi Dinars (approximately $10,000) to build new homes within the authorized zones. Alternatively, the Kurds were allowed to choose new living quarters within the government housing complexes. Al-Majid also coordinated the travel of those living in distant villages to their new homes by communicating with the governors of the provinces. These tasks required considerable effort from all the government services.
After the deportation or collectivization process began, Al-Majid believed that the Kurds and Iranians felt threatened. The Iranian insurgents previously would have had to walk only approximately five km in mountainous terrain to bordering villages where refuge or assistance was provided. However, because of the deportation process, this distance was increased and it became more difficult for insurgents to cross mountainous terrain without safe havens.

Al-Majid agreed that most Kurds did not want to move or leave their homes. Those that did were seeking improvements such as electricity, refrigerators, and school teachers. If Kurds refused to be relocated, they were forced into vehicles and taken with their belongings to government housing complexes. Once the villagers were deported, the villages were leveled so as not to become safe havens for saboteurs. Al-Majid stated these were not his personal orders but those of the Iraqi government as it cost millions of dinars and required the efforts of all of the government’s ministries.

Interviewers played a portion of an audiotape of Al-Majid’s voice in Arabic. (This tape is described in a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report titled "Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds," dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes, as a recording of a Northern Bureau meeting to review the campaigns of 1987 and 1988. According to HRW, the tape is undated but is in a batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989.) In the tape, Al-Majid discusses the previous decision to collectivize and destroy villages. Al-Majid acknowledged that the tape contains his words and his voice. He acknowledged that he ordered the destruction of homes within the prohibited zones after the residents were removed. Al-Majid acknowledged that he held a separate meeting wherein he instructed those under his command that no house was to remain standing within the prohibited zones. Al-Majid also acknowledged that he informed his subordinates that he would tour the prohibited zones and if his orders were not carried out completely, he would hold the section commander responsible.

During a portion of the same tape, Al-Majid stated that he discussed with Nazar Khazraji, Iraqi Army Chief of Staff, the failure of Tali' Al-Duri, 5th Army Corps Commander, to carry out his orders. Al-Majid claimed that this portion of the tape demonstrates that he did not have authority over the military, as Al-Majid could only complain about military officers that failed to carry out their orders. Al-Majid claimed that if he did have
authority over the military, he would have removed Al-Duri. However, Al-Duri was allowed to finish his assignment and continued to other posts.

Al-Majid was shown and read a copy of a handwritten letter in Arabic, described as number 3324, dated May 14, 1987, from the Director of Security, Halabja Security Directorate to the Suleimaniyeh Security Directorate. The letter details an order by the Commander of the First Army Corps, as requested by Al-Majid, to execute wounded civilians, to use bulldozers to level neighborhoods, to impose a curfew, and to destroy with tanks and bulldozers any house which opens fire. Al-Majid denied knowledge of this order from the Iraqi military or any such request from him and suspects the document is a forgery. Al-Majid stated he would not have issued an order to a Corps Commander. In Al-Majid's opinion, the letter did not follow the normal chain of command. Al-Majid denied that civilians were executed after interrogations. He added that interrogations were the responsibility of the security services.

Al-Majid was shown and read a copy of a document written in Arabic, described as number 28/3650, dated June 3, 1987, signed by Al-Majid, marked "Top Secret and Personal" directed to various military, political and security commands. It orders, in part, that the armed forces kill any human being or animal present within the prohibited areas. Al-Majid admitted to issuing such an order and that it was sent to the referenced agencies including the military. Al-Majid acknowledged the authenticity of the copy of this document and confirmed the authenticity of his signature on the last page.

Al-Majid was shown and read a copy of a document written in Arabic, described as Directive 4008, dated June 20, 1987, signed by Al-Majid, addressed to various military commands. The subject of the directive is "Dealing With The Villages That Are Prohibited For Security Reasons." It lists certain actions to be effective as of June 22, 1987. Paragraph two states, "The presence of human beings and animals is completely prohibited in these areas, and these shall be regarded as operational zones in which the troops can open fire at will, without any restrictions, unless otherwise instructed by our headquarters." Paragraph four states, in part, "The Corps Commands shall carry out random special bombardments using artillery, helicopters and aircraft at all times of the day or night in order to kill the largest number of persons present in those prohibited areas." Paragraph five states, in part, "All
persons captured in those villages shall be detained because of their presence there, and they shall be interrogated by the security services and those between the ages of 15 and 70 are to be executed after any useful information has been obtained from them." Al-Majid admitted issuing the order in paragraph two. According to Al-Majid, everyone, whether civilian or military, knew that no one was allowed in those areas as it was a theater of operations. Anyone caught in those areas, including women and children, was to be killed. Al-Majid denied issuing the orders in paragraphs four and five. Al-Majid acknowledged the authenticity of the copy of this document and confirmed the authenticity of his signature on the last page.

Al-Majid was shown and read a copy of a document written in Arabic, dated November 22, 1988, from the Deputy Brigadier General of Security, Director of Security of Erbil Province to the Section Security Chiefs. This document reiterates paragraph five of Directive 4008, dated June 20, 1987, and states that this portion of the directive "is to be applied to anyone present in the prohibited areas." Al-Majid questioned the authenticity of this document stating that such an order (Directive 4008) was already in effect and did not need to be repeated.

Al-Majid stated that while he was authorized to issue orders to the military, he did not have the authority to take action against military members if they did not carry out his orders.

Copies of the documents referenced in this report are contained in the 1A section of the file.
Universal Case File Number 315E-HQ-1448534
Field Office Acquiring Evidence Baghdad Operation
Serial # of Originating Document 34
Date Received 3/20/04
From SSA
(Address of Contributor)
Baghdad Operation CTS (CIS)
(Railroad Yard)
By SSA

To Be Returned □ Yes □ No
Receipt Given □ Yes □ No
Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure □ Yes □ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER


Description: □ Original notes re interview of
Universal Case File Number: 315E-HQ-146835

Field Office Acquiring Evidence: FBI HQ

Serial # of Originating Document: 34

Date Received: 3/20/2001

From: George L. Pike

(Address of Contributor)

By: George L. Pike

(City and State)

(Name of Special Agent)

To Be Returned: No

Receipt Given: No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: No

Title: Desert Spider

IT - IRAQ

Reference: (Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of Ali Hasan Al-Majid
1987 - 1989 - HIS RESP. IN CHARGE NORTHERN COMMAND OF BAATH PARTY POLITICAL APPARATUS, SEC. GEN.
NO OTHER RESP. IRAQ DIVIDED INTO SECTOR NORTHERN, CENTRAL, EUPHRATES, SOUTHERN. I WAS REPLACED
MOHAMMAD ZUBAYDI, I WAS APPOINTED BY SADDAM DURING A MITG OF THE LEADERSHIP.

MBCS ARE ASSIGNED TO POSITIONS DURING MITG AND D. OF HIS ZUBAYDI APPOINTED AS MINIST. OF TRANS. A WAS
DEP. CHIEF OF MILITARY SRG.

I WAS IN CHARGE AND MADE APPT.

YES DECREES WERE MADE AT THE END OF MITG DOCUMENTING
THE MITG, NO VOTE FOR APPT.

I WAS IN CHARGE OF BAATH PARTY.
NO TO SECURITY
SH AUTHORIZED D TO REP
THE LEADER @ MILES
SECURITY SYS ARE NEVER
SUBORDINATE TO ANYONE IN GOVT.
EXCEPT TO SH
NONE OF LEADERS WERE IN
CHARGE OF SECURITY FEDAYEEN
OR SADDAM’S CUBS ONLY SS6.
WAS NOT IN CHARGE OF
MILITARY. WAS IN CHARGE
OF THE SECURITY TIER
STRAIGHT, THE PEOPLE’S ARMY
AND SUPERVISE THE GOVERNORS
REGARDING SECURITY 5 CONSIDERED

* SHOWN COPY OF RCC DECREE

WAS NOT IN CHARGE OF THE ENTITIES
AND DID NOT USE THE DECREE
EXCEPT FOR COLLECTIONS OF WIDOWS.
THIS GEN DECREES CAME TO HIM IN WRITING. DID NOT USE IT'S INSTRUCTIONS IN THE NORTH UNTIL HE LEFT.

EVEN THOUGH IT HAD THE AUTHORITY IT DID NOT REMAIN OR ACT AGAINST ANY MILITARY OR CIVILIAN PERSON.

NEVER GAVE ANY ORDER TO OR §RS TO DO SO. AN AUTHORITY RESTRICTED TO WITHIN CITY. THE MILITARY CONDUCTED INTEL - COLLECTION.

DURING MTE. WHEN THRS. VILLAGES WOULD BE TREATED IN A MANNER THAT WAS 5KM AWAY FROM CITIES. NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY STRESSES 5KM AWAY FROM CITIES. 1ST ANAK GABL QAMM.

2ND OF SARABOUT BARGAIN, 3RD 8 4TH INRIL AND DATUK. N nước PARTY OF OR6. ONLY ARMY ENGAGED IN THEM.
Dr AACM discussing collectivization.

Asked to be executed as it and budget did not part of budget as it would require engineers etc.

8 Should be handled by Ministry of Housing.

DWE 7 ministered took over to include construction, D's role was to inform Governor of completion of housing as to begin the transfer.

Each province would have a security committee encompassing all the EAs.

12 needed 4 would go to chief state for army/military. 2 officers, smaller unit in Kirkuk. 1st corp located @ both.

Sultan Heshim emir of Arbil campaign.
I was in charge of
province, suburb & some
zone areas but not
villages

Those areas were under military
control and cities were
border of Iraq/iran also
and not party's responsible.
I\'m afraid among others were
under military

Instructions that followed
the decree gave the 5km
rule and in some areas even
less. Those instructions came
written from diwan. Immediately
after decree issued.

The security service carried out
only the president's orders and
instructions. In the city, I
was able to delegate orders
only I in the City. Everything else the SDs were independent, such as technical work by the SDs.

The instructions that followed the decree are what he followed & restricted his role and duties.

Kuros— Iraqis, does not hate them, they are its people, they have good and bad as Arabs. has personal relations w many eaten at Jalal's house vice versa. does not like, but does not dislike him. "Sheik of sages" what he called him, referred to them official communications. heard the sages & relations w other countries but personally did not know.

A Committed: calls his enemies.
NAME BUT THAT HAPPENS DURING WAR OR CONFLICT. IRAN WENT INTO ITS RELATIONS W/ THOSE GAYS & BENEFITTED FROM DESTROYING USA'S GOLDS' IRAN REPLACEMENT. IRAN TRIED TO ESTABLISH RESIDENCE IN CERTAIN AREAS SUCH AS WASHINGTON, ETC. CALLED FOR MILITARY ACTION FROM IRAQ DURING THE WAR. WHEN IRAN DECLARES IT IS ITS LAST YEAR & DECIDES TO SEND ITS AGENTS INTO THOSE TERRITORIES THE MILITARY RESPONDS. IT IS DIFFICULT TO DIFFER BETWEEN TERRORIST KUROS & IRANIANS AS IT IS TODAY FOR THE US MIL.

POWERS CASTER FOR AMECO. 2 YRS RETURNED POSSIBLY 3 OR 4 IN THE 1980s. DOES NOT KNOW IF A DECREE WAS ISSUED REMOVING HIS WIFE. HE WAS TRANSFERRED AS FORTHOUGH THE DECREE WAS VOID.
06/1988 - Minst. of Coal Rule

O replaced him Hasan Al-Amini
Former ROC MBL.

Rev. denied any info/knowledge
of execution etc. of Kurds in
Northern Iraq.

As tasked, his job was to ensure
the collection of the villages
in zones (500,000) w/ 5 km into
complexes, those outside 5 km
will be reconstruct.

Cave orders re collectivization -
tasked Kurds w/ in party to
explain the deed.

Not in div. until the land is
prepared & electricity was brought.

Would give 3,000 Dinars or $10,000
to each home. The examine or
take the money & build there.
Transport distant villagers to visit the land. The Governor with oversight of the security issues. This required a lot of effort from all Govt. ps. When the situation below K poder political parties & Iran were threatened. For an Iranian to walk 5K to pass leaflets or carry out insurgency in mountains area. Those villagers provided assistance & they opposed the move.

Agreed most did not want to move and give up their homes etc. Those who wanted sought things like electricity, fridge, teachers etc. If they did not want to leave, force them to move by cars and put them in the complex. The villagers were leveled as not in secure safe hand.
For shrapnel, I ordered the destruction of villages after the moving of 100 people as not to be
sanctuary to persons who could attack the military.

Not personal orders, cost
millions of dollars & all of the ministries are carried it out.

MTG RE those refusing to move — told there under their
and that no house remain standing UIID TAKA inhabited zone. Would tour the area.

If so would hold that section clear. Responsible.

He played him audio.
Field Marshal al-Duri could not carry out his orders.

The Amdor was a discussion with Karzai.

If the execution decree of 160 al-Duri would have been retired, but he finishied his duties as corp. omal 8 went on to other posts.

Tate indicated that he was not in charge of MII. As he was forced to complete on the military officers who forced to complete his task.

Anfal was in the zone outside of his control.
Doc #2 Dir Helgeson to Dir

"Have not heard these words
suspect it is a forgery"

Would not issue an order to a
corp. order who would then
inform Governor and so on.

It is clear it does not
follow a chain of command.

Were 3 wounded civ.

Executed after interlocution.

No I did not hear those
words & did not an invest.

Body who could have looked
at these: interlocution
was the resp. of the
Sec. cvs.

Semearant Col. Friesen

[Signature]
IT IS DATED JUN 3/198 TS B.P.

SIGNED BY D

LET ISSUED THRU ORDER
LET WENT TO MIL
TO ENTER

LTR #3 (DIR 4008)

DID ISSUE ORDER RE PERSONS
ANIMALS IN KANGAROO AREA

DENIED SEC #4
II SEC #5

AGREEED HS SIGNATURE SEC #2 WAS HS.

FORBIDDEN ZONE - EVERYONE
KNOWS, OIV, MILIT. ETC NO ONE
CAN BE THERE AS IT WAS A
THEATRE OF OD. ANY PERSON
WOULD BE KILLED.

MAY ISSUE ORDER TO MIL. BUT

I DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO
THREE ACTION AGAINST ALL
THAT DID NOT CHECK OUT ORDERS.
per Red, well discuss period 1987-91

Q: I was in cry I wanted 
A: Replaced Mohammad Foad who became minister
Doook his post when he left.

Sanaa appointed me

It was during a meeting the party's leadership.

Q: Was a decree that put you in cry?
A: Yes

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-07-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/is

Q: That put me achy I bathed
A: Yes

Did it put you in cry? Secret
A: Yes, in the north

A: No, it was not a forgery
A: The secret services are never subordinates.

B: None of the leaders was in charge of the secret services. They were strictly subordinates of the police.

B: I was in charge of the secret services. I had to spend the governor in the area.

B: I have no idea of any secret services.

B: No, I didn't use any strategy.

B: Describe collaboration.

B: Decisive action at 100 A.M.
My Ath. Limited to intern. 7 the 25.

My collection was not undertaken. At the meeting
I was in charge.
It was disgraceful.

Every programme here is a secret committee.

Military Intelligence
I cannot read this handwriting.

I have not posted in

Some areas of policy
starting this April

The Austrian were invited to
attend the dinner and not to

That the city in 5 kilometers area

An intelligence or search
aspect, I did not know about

Modern secures the city

What are people about KURDS?

A MY have good & bad
Nice people
I do not hate KURDS
I don't Oudel Habtom. He may hate me.

I heard from those who

destroy bridges, roads etc.

They have heard that I

They have been told to talk to their people about

Q What calls his money

Darstaab
Did Action by Kurds + Iranian necessary? 

A: Definitely when Iran sends agents into our territory. 

A: Agree: It was difficult for distrustful & largely bad. 

A: There is no one who wants to injure his own people. 

A: The Kurdish individual is loyal. A Kurd is truthfully would be allowed in a place where women gather. 

Q: The sources who had from Peet's 1625. 

Informed in 1958.
In June 89 I was assigned as minister of local role

A. There is a decree Aps 85

d

Q. Who replaced you?
A. Hassan Ameniyeome

Q. In Jan 81, Feb 4, you told we you had no perspective or exact or important
to + no knowledge

But + no knowledge

But + no knowledge

Unfortunately I had to go, I expatriated directly

As I told by leadership I was to delegate the
not to gather
and collectness

Bing to another village

te + another
Something to do with Matters, etc.

Outside the 5 mile area was not my responsibility.

Please visit these areas.

Q Re: collecting
I gave orders
To task cards up
To go again
To explain the need

More evident
To take over his
We asked the Hospital
To send Santa suits
to more people

The annual tradition, I should have noticed this fail
For some time, this went on until...
0. What resistance due to fact people didn't want to move.
A. Yes, Age prevents dry not want leave.

0. If they didn't want to leave that's where we would force them to move put them on carts and force them to move.

Heavy Egypt would know so I can't be used by enemy under any conditions at all of something.

I didn't think the

I would move with

TF was a contract plan.
Q. What if people did not desert their villages?

Do you ever think people might not have reason to leave

Pretty important

2nd tape

This was a discussion with my

also 7 Stall

I would immediately rehire him

ended up going to another position.

Things must be leveled

so they don't become

I'm told this tape
The nurse doesn't discuss my role.

The nurse decorates.

Q: This decree says you are in charge. 
A: Who issued the decree specifically how I implemented.

Although in Sydney, they were outside my area of responsibility.

A: This was my order, I had to enforce for just deport.
A. Order pre Andal

Letter from
Doe to
Habiba
re: executive work

A. Don't not

Hard to see things
I forgot this
is a forgery

Why would I tell him

The Corps is point
something
The Sculpt

This is a forgery
A security director at Student A

A Why would I need a
order to copy

A Administrative
Login

A Were registered
properly created

A Delta was speedy
A Security

A Who was directing

A Don't know
Mr. AHMED is here

He is a "Milt. Intelligence Man"

Ahmed Rashman of Northern Committee

Q Refer to direct action

Top Secret

to

Discussion re: order to LN

Animals or people

inftilth drains
Universal Case File Number 315E-HQ-144953-I
Field Office Acquiring Evidence BAGHDAD OPERATIONS CENTER
Serial # of Originating Document 57
Date Received 3/27/04
From
(Name of Contributor)
BAGHDAD OPERATIONS CENTER
(Address of Contributor)
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
(City and State)

By
(Name of Special Agent)

To Be Returned  □ Yes  □ No
Receipt Given  □ Yes  □ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
□ Yes  □ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER

Reference:
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: □ Original notes re interview of

ALI HASAN AL-MAJID
I said to my guy

It shouldn't be in my govt.

Before he was Senator, said

I should leave the govt.

And that is my wish.

I am not deemed by major.

I am not contracepted and you are in control of this country.

In my discussion, he talked about

how we can rebuild Prague

the Americans

Thus, you understand the need to be cooperative.

A rest against such an approach.

I believe in my need to cooperate to rebuild a better D.C. and stop bloodshed.
Q: You asked to kill Logan.
   Is that correct?

A: Yes, this is correct.

B: I heard of it.

I had never had a chance

to

Samson for his own sake does
not care about

Therefore he would come to kill me

Of his own taking, I would shut
him
I had thought about resigning.

In 2007 I wish that I had left the leadership party minutes before the meeting. I asked him, "Am I going to be nominated — and do you mean, "yes." I could do nothing but keep quiet. If I had to object, would it be perceived as a disgrace to my own tribe."
He used to believe that
Army, Army believe Army
couldn't get into Baghdad

God the Almighty blinded him
He couldn't see

Did he not care about them?
Yes, people?

I did not know these facts until now
He does not believe in anything

Q
Q: So what allowed Shooman to take it to this point?

A: Don't confuse me with

I am nearest relative
When we would speak, I would urge him to invite my mother back.

Q: What did Shooman do to lieutenant he reach this point?

A: he didn't think Am- Amy would be able to get into Baghdad
A. Previously you said.

If chance to kill him of promising tribe,
I would say I'd knew you loved yourself better,
than that, you say were better than you.

I blame him now
when I was with the group.

He never listened to us
and this, the reason for the situation
now.

Used to speak against the war
and call for the return.

I used to beg him to allow the inspectors to return
and avoid the war.
R AHN WAS PAST WEEK

PAST WEEKS WERE BETTER AFTER PUNISH.

WISH THINGS TO BE BETTER

R EXPLAIN

TOLD TO BE MOVED ISOLATED AND NOT EXERCISE WITH OTHERS

R - MORE QUESTIONS AND PROCESS HAS CHANGED

A CONSIDER YOURSELF A LEADER

I AM A PRISONER. DON'T FEEL SENIOR

R - CONSIDER EQUAL AS THE OTHER SENIOR LEADERS

YES I WAS BATH BUT NOW PRISONER

UNTIL REGIME FEEL I LOST POSITION

R - OTHER PRISONERS SEE YOU LEADER

SAME AS OTHERS

R - TELL OTHERS ABOUT DEAL

NO I SAID TO MY CREW I PRESENTED RECOMMENDATIONS. I SHOULD NOT BE PART OF ... BEFORE WAR SADDAM SAID I SHOULD LEAVE LEADERSHIP.
R: COULD EXPLAIN TO TRIBE ABOUT SADDAM

STILL A WISH

R: STILL A DESIRE TO LEAD.

I AM NOT DECIDED BY MYSELF NOT CONFUSED

YOU IN CHARGE OF COUNTRY, IF NO PERMISSION

FROM YOU AN CONTRARY ALL DISCUSSIONS

HOW TO BETTER EXIST WITH US

R: YOU SHOULD BE COMPLETELY COOPERATIVE

I AM NOT AGAINST APPROACH. BELIEVE

MY NEED TO COOP. WITH US TO END THE

IRAQI BLOODSHED

R: ONE POINT YOU OFFER TO KILL SH

YETS CORRECT BECAUSE THAT POINT

TO RID OF TRIBE AND SPEAK AND THAT'S

WHY FORMING OF PARTY BE PERCEIVED

SH A THREAT. SH DOES NOT CARE ABOUT

CUSTOM TRAD. THEREFORE HE KILL ME OR

I KILL HIM. WITHOUT TALKING I SHOOT HIM

AND TRIBE WILL KILL ME. POSITION SENSITIVE

IF NOT ME THEN SONS.
R: Talk about SH
Is this what we want to hear?

No, I believe

R: Long before

Before us, no chance

I thought but would be loss

To me, family, and tribe. Thinking about resigning during party meeting 2009.

I would not have been nominated.

2001 did not want nomination.

Minutes before, I ask SH for answer.

But SH said said he nominated.

R: Verbal denial?

Object would have been disgraceful.

G: Wish SH be kill?

Yes.

G: If opportunity with tribe?

Yes.

G: If given talk to SH say?
Did not know he loved him self and sons better.

I blame him now. He never listen and I speak against war and want return of inspec. No war against equal beg for return of G, council of ministers.

No RCC

G - one of four minister to make council

No

G - no argue fact. So what forced war for sh destruction prisonment what in him?

No different of position this committee.

Please no mix of titles, reply to. I am one of the four import. People one of RCC and both national command, I am nearest relative. Sometimes agree with inspectors but sh never review.
it impossible for me to lead
against sh

G: what drove sh? what in him?
he did not think us enter baghdad
G: no person in universe that us not be able.
he used to believe us not
G: how?
god almighty blinded him did not realize force.

G: not care about people or iraq
not know facts, for sh does not care about boys family iraq or people
T: what is sh character?
I don't know but e-go
T: who in history compare?
no equal
T: explain

surprised thought courageous but surrender with pistol not courage
wish suicide. perplexed to describe
SONS DIED - WIFE & DAUGHTER WONDER
IF SHE KNEW TRUTH SHOULD HAVE SURRENDERED
AND SAVE IRAQ

T - WHAT DO OTHERS SAY (PRISONERS)
I USE TO HAVE CONTACT NO CHANCE TO
DISCUSS CANNOT MEET THOSE IN AGREEMENT

T - YOUR ONLY MISGIVINGS NOT COURAGEOUS?
DURING TIME AS PROGRESS SH STARTED
AS INDIVIDUAL NOT PARTY COMPLETELY AS
INDIVIDUAL

G - IF IRAQ CLAIM UNITED THINGS VOTED WITH
ALL IS WHAT CARRIED COUNTRY

NO NOT CASE
R WHAT WAS CASE

HYUSSIEH PREPARE RESOLUTION DEGREE DID ALL EVER
AGREE? YOU HAVE SECRETARY? HAS RCC
MEET MORE THAN 2/3 TIMES?

G - HOW DECISION MADE?
Resolution on order of SH. Please ask Chief of Diwan (asked meeting)
told JPC resolutions send copy
G. Example 1991 Iraq in VADA Kuwait
based RCL
I was not member. No RCL not meet on issue
G. All decision on SH
ask others senior
G. Closest relative
Yes but I did not know 1980-2003
1991-2003 RCL did not meet but twice
just to nominate 24 President
G. Some see as democratic. How would you describe
General concept. How on single individual
G. You nominate
Our mistake all gave auth. to make immediate decision
6 - YOU ARE TO BLAME AS GROUP FOR
YES WE HAVE TO ANSWER FOR SILENCE
AND PAYING FOR IT

6 - HOW DO YOU ANSWER AND SH?
OUR PRESENCE HERE IS PARTIAL. FUTURE WILL PAY EITHER COURT AS FOR ME IF GOD ALMIGHTY
IF RELEASED I WILL NOT ENTER AN IRAQI CITY
BUT ISOLATE. HOW DO I ANSWER PEOPLE. EVEN
FAMILY UNFIT TO CARE FOR. HAD IT NOT
BESIN WOULD HAVE SUICIDE
T - DESCRIBE SH AS FATHER?
FAILLURE FATHER / CLEANER EVERYTHING

T - DONT SAY TO MAKE ME FEEL GOOD

NO BELIEVE

T - ANY GOOD? SH
YES WHEN POOR / NEEDY INDIVIDUAL HE
WOULD GIVE / CRY

T - EXCEPT FOR ISOLATED, WORLD SAW POVERTY
WITH PALACES EXPLAIN
Pride / Personality

T - What good with Togo's suffering
Your ex. This is what I saw

T - Afraid of Sh

Yes, he can distort my history
Last 3-4 years I isolate afraid Sh
Think I want Pres. Why would you think I would want to lead

R - You told us this 2 months ago to lead the people
At time it is what is said but mentally I am tied up and no desire. I will no behave to lead.

R - Give up desire because no change
Desire lessen not completely

T - Fear Sh cause to do things not normally would have done

No

T - Actions your decisions
Yes
T- ANY INSTRUCTIONS FROM SH YOU DON'T FEEL GOOD ABOUT
I HAVE TO IMPLEMENT NO CHOICE.
T- SUGGESTS YOU HAD CONFLICT WITH ORDERS
YES EXAMPLE- 7 AUG 1990 CALLED MEETING CAR TAKE ME SH AND LEADERSHIP SH TURN TO ME AND SAID KUWAIT IS WORRY SOME SHOULDN'T YOU GO TO CIA TO CALM THINGS DOWN I POINTED TO MOBI AND OTHERS. HE KNOWS I HAVE NO DESIRE. WE LEAVE AT END AND SH PLACE'S CARTILAGE BELT AND PISTOL ON. I ON GUARD FOR KUWAIT. SO IN BEGINNING I NO DESIRE WHEN ORDER THEN I GO T- WHO RESPONSIBLE FOR MISERY/DEATHS FOR IRAQ US AND SH SH FIRST WE NOMINATE T- OTHER THAN NOMINATE WHAT WOULD PO DIFF. 10 YEARS BACK NO PEOPLE ON EARTH STAND LIVING, WAR CONDITION NOR PERSON CHOSE 10 YEARS OF EMBARRASS AND FIGHT GREATEST POwERS
T - EXPECT WHEN US LEAVES

2 weeks ago I told them we must have done something good with us not Iraq not have coup. Would have long been executed but I am alive - and hope to see family.

T - World views you as evil unless words are empty, if truly want to atone you should be willing to disclose to us beyond what we ask.

What Intelligence?

T - We can spend endless hours on who did what to whom, or you tell us in narrative. If you really believe about healing, I will no keep intel but for military WMD no info. It will not be mental pressure.

T - No mental pressure you mention earlier an opportunity to reverse for history
I wish to apologize.

T - We instrument of God's will

Yes, thank God with us not Iraqis.

Now as stabilize I will go to courts.

My presents respected not spit upon favor from God let us feel pain.

R - Capture or surrender

-cap

R - War wrong and happy with us

Yes

R - Wait or capture?

I wish surrender and ask where to

Surre. Those who don't are losers and bitter life. I have guarded human rights

I await God decision to court executed or release.

R - Why you commander with Anfal/Kuwait/Shia uprising?

I not leader of Anfal.

R - Full cooperative and no games no respond.

Reg 160 in charge of North and not
ONLY CITIES AND LATER ORDER 4008
TO MILITARY THAT IS PRE-ANFAL DECREES
STATEMENT IS YOU IN CHARGE. YOU SEEM IN
CHARGE OF ANFAL /KUWAIT/BASRH
IT WAS NOT MY CHOOSE TO KURDS AND
5 PROVINCES. YOU HAVE COMMANDERS
AND HE TELLS YOU I WAS IN CHARGE THEN
I AM CLEAR.
ONLY 8 DAYS IN MARCH
B. YOU UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM WE HAVE
WITH YOU TELLING US YOU NOT IN CHARGE.
SH WAS COMMANDER CHEIF IT WOULD BE
ILLOGICAL FOR ME THEREFORE DECREET I WAS
IN CHARGE OF CITIES.
G. OUR DISCUSSION AT END SOMETHING TO THINK
ABOUT. THINK ABOUT WHAT WE SAID AND
YOU SAID TO US. YOU WISH TO APOLOGIZE
FOR PAST ACTIONS YOU KNOW WHO WE ARE
YOU KNOW WHAT WE REPRESENT YOU THINK
ABOUT YOUR PLACE IN HISTORY. YOU DO CARE-
AND SHOULD. WAY YOU ARE SEEN
But your actions and what happens will be burden on sons and sons of sons. I am Waze, they are Iraq. And face what you have done. What is in your control is how you carry yourself from now on. In past not able to speak freely you can change now. Opportunity to show character. Can not blame us our invest continues us is unlike any other tech exceeds any other. We know more than you think. At least allow child. Allow them to live in country.

We don't need your info we have doc audio sat. You have chance to redeem yourself. Next time I give you chance.
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<td>As human have go relations with neighbor and family, use as guide.</td>
<td>G - payment to Iraq, time here part of it difference between us and Iraq control our treatment differ for prisoners under former regime.</td>
<td>You are advance country with human rights, you are better treatment, compare us/Iraq. Wrong.</td>
<td>G - I watch videos, the treatment of Iraq prisoners torture/maiming of Iraqis by fellow Iraqis, some in name of go. Correct.</td>
<td>G - your payment to Iraqi people and other have debt far exceeds what you can pay. Correct. If we not done wrong go not allow us to remove, we deserve to pay higher. Correct.</td>
<td>Future in God's hand and Iraq. Correct.</td>
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Precedence: PRIORITY

To: [Checkmark] Counterterrorism

Counterterrorism

From: Louisville JTF

Contact: IOS

Drafted By: [Signature]

Approved By: [Signature]

Case ID #: [U] 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending) -38
[ ] 66F-HQ-C1384970 (Pending) -4950
[ ] 221C-LS-C57849 (Pending) -47

Title: [S] DESERT SPIDER

IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: [Space for synopsis]

Reference: [U] 315E-HQ-1448534 Serial 9

Details: [U] Referenced communication advised of anticipated prosecution of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and other members of his government for war crimes and crimes against humanity. CTD requested all field offices canvass logical assets regarding crimes of genocide (murder), torture, inhumane treatment, destruction of property and unlawful confinement committed by members of the Hussein regime. CTD also requested a review of Iraqi interviews conducted during [Space for review details]

Operations. Following are results of these efforts by Louisville Division:

SECRET
To: Counterterrorism
From: Louisville
Re: 315E-448534, 03/25/2004

(S) On 03/08/2004, a source of known reliability whose reporting has been corroborated, was contacted and provided the following information:

(U) Review of Louisville refugee interview revealed the following information of interest in this matter:

(S) On 12/13/2002, [DOB] was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

advised that
To: Counterterrorism
From: Louisville
Re: 315E-1-148534, 03/25/2004

(S) On 03/20/2003, ___________ was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

During this interview, _________ (No further details were offered or solicited).

(S) On 03/20/2003, ___________ was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

advised ___________ (No further details were offered or solicited).

(S) On 03/20/2003, ___________ was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

advised ___________ (No further details were offered or solicited).

(S) On 03/20/2003, ___________ was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

advised that

(S) ___________ (No further details were offered or solicited).
To: Counterterrorism
From: Louisville
Re: (S) 315E-R-1448534, 03/25/2004

(S) On 03/20/2003, was interviewed at Louisville, KY. 

(S) On 03/20/2003, was interviewed at Lexington, KY.

(S) On 03/28/2003, was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

(S) On 03/24/2003, was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

(S) On 03/20/2003, was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

(S) On 03/20/2003, was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

(S) On 03/20/2003, was interviewed at Louisville, KY.
To: Counterterrorism
From: Louisville
Re: 315E-448534, 03/25/2004

(S) On 03/27/2003, ___________________________ DOB was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

stated that

(S) On 03/20/2003, ___________________________ DOB was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

advised

(S) On 03/21/2003, ___________________________ DOB was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

stated that

(S)
To: Counterterrorism From: Louisville

(U) Re: 315E-148534, 03/25/2004

(§) On 03/24/2003, DOB stated that was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

(§) On 03/28/2003, DOB stated that was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

(§) On 03/26/2003, DOB advised that was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

(§) On 04/01/2003, DOB advised that was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

(§) On 03/27/2003, DOB advised that was interviewed at Louisville, KY.
REQUEST (#1) OF CTD/TRRS

(U) Review of the following information indicates that the two persons identified in this interview were likely CTD/TRRS is requested to prepare an ILR in order to provide this information to U.S. Army Central Command (CENTCOM) for action.

CTD/TRRS should characterize Louisville Interviewee (Protect) as "A source of unknown reliability who is in a position to know". The information for passage to CENTCOM follows:

(S) On 03/20/2003, [DOB] was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

stated that

(S)
REQUEST (#2) OF CTD/TRRS

(S) On 03/25/2004, a source of known reliability whose reporting has been corroborated, was debriefed by Louisville. Review of this information reveals information of value regarding the Iraqi Nuclear and Chemical Weapons programs. CTD/TRRS is requested to prepare an IIR in order to provide this information to U.S. Army Central Command (CENTCOM) and the [spaces] identified in this section have information of value which they wish to provide to U.S. authorities. This information was previously provided to CTD/ITOS II/MEU but source advised that they have not been contacted by U.S. authorities. The debriefing is as follows:

(U) (S) Louisville source advised

(U) [spaces]

(U) (S) Source advised that

(U) (S)
(U) Louisville requests CTD/ITOS II and CTD/TRRS provide feedback to Louisville regarding the two IIR disseminations. CTD/TRRS is also requested to provide copies of these IIRs to Louisville. Louisville considers this lead (Serial 9) covered.
LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) TRRS is requested (#1) to prepare an IIR to CENTCOM regarding possible actionable intelligence regarding contained in instant communication.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(S) CENTCOM is requested (#2) to prepare an IIR to regarding possible actionable intelligence contained in instant communication.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) ITOS II/ISLU - For information and coordination with TRRS.

♦♦
SECRET NOFORN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATIONAL MESSAGE FORM

Classification per OGA letter dated 08/21/2009

TRANSMIT VIA:
[X] SAMNET
[ ] NEPTUNE
[ ] IIR SENT VIA ACS

Date: 01/14/2004
Page 1 of 3

FM DIRECTOR FBI

BT
SECRET NOFORN
CITE: (4510-1318) /

PASS: SSA

SUBJECT: REQUEST LODGING AND A VEHICLE FOR FBI PERSONNEL
ASSIGNED TO IRAQ IN CONNECTION TO THE DEBRIEFING OF HVD-1.

(U) THE FBI DEBRIEFING TEAM CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS:

TEAM LEADER - UNIT CHIEF
(GS-15 / SSN:)

INTERVIEWER - SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT GEORGE L PIRO
(GS-14 / SSN:)

INTERVIEWER - SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT
(GS-14 / SSN:)

BEHAVIORIST - SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT
(GS-14 / SSN:)

REPORTS OFFICER - REPORTS OFFICER
(GS-14 / SSN:)

ANALYST - INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
(GS-12 / SSN:)

LINGUIST -
(GS-13 / SSN:)

Approved by:

Case ID#/Serial: 315E-HO-1448534 140

Original Filename: LODGING.wpd

****** FOR SAMNET OPERATIONS USE ONLY ******

Time Received: 
SAMNET filename: JPV001S0_014

Time of Transmission: 0337Z JAN 14 2004

MRI/JUL/ISN: 5/15

DTG: P15 0002 JAN 04
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATIONAL MESSAGE FORM

PAGE 2 OF 3

(U) POINT OF CONTACT FOR THIS MATTER IS SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT GEORGE PIRO, OR SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT

DERIVED FROM: G-31 DECLASSIFY ON: X-1

BT

///

SECRET NOFORN
ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE/TICKLER COUNT:

NOTE: FOR IDENTITIES AND TIMING/ITINERARY FOR PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF AN FBI TEAM TO BAGHDAD TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEBRIEF ON HVD-1.

DRAFTED BY: JFV: JFV RM#: 4383 EXT: 

COPY DESIGNATIONS:

1 - 

SECRET NOFORN
Precedence: Deadline: 04/14/2004

Date: 03/31/2004

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ISLU/ITOS Room 4383

SSA

Dallas

Attn: All Supervisors

From: Dallas

North Texas Joint Terrorism Task Force (NTJTTF), IT-1

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

(U) Case ID #: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending)

(S) 66F-HQ-C1384970 (Pending)

(U) 66F-HQ-C1384970

(U) Title: DESERT SPIDER

IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: (S) This EC directs all Dallas Supervisors to ensure all logical sources are contacted for information relating to the potential prosecution of Saddam Hussein (HVD #1).

(U) Classify By: 11109, ITOS II/CTD

Reason: 1.5(c)

Declasify On: X1

(U) Reference: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534 Serial 9

(U) Details: (S) Referenced EC directs all Field Offices to canvass all logical sources for any information regarding potential war crimes committed by the former Hussein Regime.

(S) In anticipation of the potential prosecution of Saddam Hussein for crimes against humanity and war crimes, Dallas Supervisors are to ensure their personnel canvass logical sources for information relating to crimes such as genocide, torture, inhumane treatment, destruction of property and unlawful confinement committed by Saddam Hussein and the former Hussein Regime.

SECRET
To: All Field Offices  From: Counterterrorism
Re: 315E-HQ-1448534, 03/31/2004

Supervisors are directed to report negative and/or positive results via EC to SA Dallas Iraqi Program Coordinator, IT-1, no later than 04/14/2004.

FBIHQ/Dallas will make an attempt to ensure sources are protected and information will be used primarily for lead value. In instances where FBIHQ/Dallas believes that source information would be instrumental to the successful prosecution of Hussein or members of the Hussein Regime, FBIHQ/Dallas will coordinate with the respective field office/source handler.
To: All Field Offices  From: Counterterrorism
Re: 315E-HQ-1448534, 03/31/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

DALLAS

ALL RECEIVING SUPERVISORS

(U) Dallas Supervisors will ensure their personnel canvass logical sources for any information relating to crimes such as genocide, torture, inhumane treatment, destruction of property and unlawful confinement committed by Saddam Hussein and the former Hussein Regime. Positive and negative results are to be forwarded via EC to SA____________, Dallas Iraqi Program Coordinator, IT-1, no later than 04/14/2004.

♦♦
Precedence: PRIORITY Date: 03/30/2004

To: Counterterrorism Attn: ISLU/ITOS II Room 4383

From: Oklahoma City Squad 4 Contact: SA

Approved By: msp

Drafted By: msp

Case ID #: (S) (Pending)

(U) Title: (S) DESERT SPIDER IT - IRAQ

(U) Synopsis: (S) Provide FBI Headquarters with response regarding information which may be relevant to the potential prosecution of Saddam Hussein.

(U) Derived From: G-3

(U) Reference: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534 Serial 9

(U) Details: (S) The following information is being submitted to FBIHQ in response to leads set forth in the referenced communication. Oklahoma City requested all agents to contact logical sources regarding any potential war crimes or crimes against humanity. A review of Oklahoma City's control file established for the war against Iraq was also conducted. A summary of positive information follows.
To: Counterterrorism From: Oklahoma City
Re: 315E-HQ-1448534, 03/30/2004

(U) SOURCE
For information contact OC SA

SECRET
To: Counterterrorism From: Oklahoma City
Re: 315E-HQ-1448534, 03/30/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

(U) Read and clear.

**
Precedence: PRIORITY

To: Investigative Technology  Attn: UC TRU
Counterterrorism  Attn: SC M. Chris Briese, ITOS 2
Contact: George Piro,

From: Counterterrorism
Baghdad Operations Center

Approved By: ______________

Drafted By: tkf

Case ID #: S 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending)

Title: DESERT SPIDER

IT-IRAQ

Synopsis: (S/OR,NF)

(U) Derived From: Multiple Sources

Declassify On: X1

Enclosures: (S)

Details: (S/OR,NF)

(SECRET/CON/NOFORN)
LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

INVESTIGATIVE TECHNOLOGY

AT TRU

(S//OR.NF

(S//OR.NF

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ITOS 2

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ORS

(U) Read and clear.

+++

SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN

3
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 04/23/2004

To: Investigative Technology
Counterterrorism

Attn: UC TRU
SSA TRU
SC M. Chris Briese, ITOS 2
UC ITOS 2
SC Frankie Battle, ORS

From: Counterterrorism
Baghdad Operations Center
Contact: George Piro,

Approved By:

Drafted By: tkf

Case ID #: 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending)

Title: DESERT SPIDER
IT-IRAQ

Synopsis: (S//OR,NF) Request installation of secure FBI communications capability in support of the Desert Spider investigation at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), VVIP Terminal.

Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: X1

Details: (S//OR,NF) The FBI Desert Spider Team (DST) is currently interrogating Saddam Hussein as part of a joint FBI/OGA operation. The Desert Spider Team works and resides separate from the FBI's main Baghdad Operations Center (BOC). With the upcoming relocation of the FBI BOC from the BIAP to a new facility located in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) area, the ability to have secure communications capabilities will be lost to the DST. In order to be responsive to the reporting and accountability requirements of FBIHQ, it is imperative that a secure means of communication, to include FBINET, be available. Additionally, the DST conducts a large amount of research on the Internet on topics relating to this project attainable through
open source reporting. Therefore, Internet capability is also critical for the analytical support of the operation.

In furtherance of the joint DST, OGA has allocated a designated Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) located on the BIAP. This SCIF is in a controlled, secure area, which meets or exceeds FBI requirements for a storage container for materials up to the "SECRET" level. Once the secure communications equipment has been installed, the DST will comply with all security requirements for the receipt and storage of classified information.

TRU conducted the required survey for the installation of this secure equipment on 03/25/2004. As discussed with TRU personnel on 03/25/2004, it is requested that TRU install the appropriate communications equipment to provide secure communications to the DST, as soon as possible.

POCs for this matter are Supervisory Special Agent George Piro and/or Intelligence Analyst at telephone  

SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN
To: Investigative Technology  From: Counterterrorism
Re:  315E-HQ-1448534, 04/23/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:  (Action)

INVESTIGATIVE TECHNOLOGY

AT TRU

(U) (S//OR,NF) 1) TRU is requested to install secure communications equipment for use by the Desert Spider Team in the OGA allocated skiff located on the Baghdad International Airport.

(U) (S//OR,NF) 2) TRU is requested to advise POCs and the FBI Baghdad Operations Center of travel plans and any special requirements necessary to install the above described equipment.

Set Lead 2:  (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ITOS 2

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 3:  (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ORS

(U) Read and clear.

SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN
On April 4, 2004, Ali Hasan Al-Majid (Black List #5) was interviewed at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. The interview was monitored by a representative of the military Joint Interrogation Detainee Cell (JIDC). FBI Language Specialist (LS) provided Arabic/English translation. Al-Majid provided the following information:

Al-Majid was questioned regarding a letter issued by the Iraqi Ba'ath Party Northern Bureau Command, dated April 6, 1987, signed by him. Al-Majid was not shown a copy of the document as none was possessed by the interviewer. (This document is described as letter S Sh/18/2396 in the Human Rights Watch Report (HRW) report titled "Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds," dated July, 1993. It is referenced on page 13 and in footnote 41 of the Prelude to Anfal section of the report.) According to the HRW report and as read to Al-Majid by the interviewer, the letter states the following, "By the authority vested in us by the Revolutionary Command Council's decree number 160 of March 29, 1987, we have decided to authorize the chairmen of the security committees in the northern governorates to confiscate the real and personal property of the saboteurs, provided that their properties are liquidated within one month of the date of the issuance of the confiscation decree."

Al-Majid acknowledged giving such authority to the security committees, but does not remember the details. The confiscation discussed applied to money as well as real property. However, Al-Majid stated the authority for this order was not based on Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) decree number 160. It was based on a separate RCC decree which authorized the confiscation of funds and property of individuals who worked against the Iraqi government as saboteurs. (Al-Majid stated in a previous interview that saboteurs was a term used by the Iraqi government to describe Kurdish rebels.) This decree also authorized the confiscation of the funds and property of individuals in the Da'wa Party. These two categories of individuals were considered to be hostile or anti-Iraqi government political forces. Al-Majid does not remember the number or date of the other RCC decree.
Al-Majid's directive regarding the confiscation and liquidation of property and money was issued to the chairmen of the security committees of each province in Northern Iraq. The liquidation of property was accomplished through auctions. Al-Majid emphasized that money and property were taken only from saboteurs who had been proven to have participated in sabotage activities against the Iraqi government. Al-Majid noted that the confiscation was not limited solely to Kurds, but also applied to Yezidis and Arabs as well.

Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a document written in Arabic, described as letter number 1/2713 of the Northern Bureau Command, dated April 10, 1987, issued by Radhi Hassan Salman, Deputy Secretary General of the Northern Bureau Command. This letter was distributed to all the Directorates and the Security of Chamchamal via a cover letter signed by the Deputy Director of the Security Directorate of Suleimaniyah Governorate. The document states, in part, "His Excellency has ordered that [legal] cases of people from the villages prohibited for security reasons, or cases of the saboteurs, regardless of their nature, not be heard and to freeze the cases that have already been heard." (The copy of this document was obtained from the HRW report titled "Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in Its Own Words," dated February, 1994. It appears on pages 35-36 of the report.)

Al-Majid stated, "I do not remember this." He added that all Northern Bureau Command orders were issued by him and not by his deputy. Al-Majid acknowledged that Salman was the Deputy Secretary General of the Northern Bureau Command. He asserted that he would not have tasked Salman with issuing such an order and that Salman did not issue it in Al-Majid's absence. He stated that all [legal] cases are matters for courts of law and are not matters for the security committees. Al-Majid acknowledged that he did issue similar instructions to the courts in approximately June, 1987. He directed the courts not to hear cases and/or to postpone cases regarding individuals from the prohibited zones. In these zones, villages were cleared of people, their residences were demolished, and the residents were relocated to government housing complexes. Al-Majid reiterated that such an order would have been issued only by him and would have been logically directed to the courts and not to the security committees. He added that the security services were not in charge of the courts. When questioned about the authenticity of the document and whether he thought it was a forgery, Al-Majid stated, "I do not know. Maybe."
Al-Majid was questioned regarding an order issued by him to the Security Directorates of the Northern Bureau directing the execution of all "first-degree relatives of criminals." Al-Majid was not shown a copy of two documents referencing this order as neither was possessed by the interviewer. (The two documents are described as a handwritten note, dated November 20, 1989, from the Security Chief, Interrogating Officer, Amn Office in Suleimaniyeh to an Iraqi citizen and letter number 106309, dated May 1, 1987, from the Security Directorate of the Autonomous Region. These documents are referenced in the previously described HRW report dated July, 1993, Prelude to Anfal section, pages 13-14.) According to the HRW report and as noted to Al-Majid by the interviewer, the handwritten note provides a response to an Iraqi citizen's request for information regarding his missing parents and brother. The note states that the brother was executed July 12, 1987 as "a member of the group of Iranian saboteurs." The note further explains that the parents were executed May 19, 1987 "in compliance with the order from the Struggling Comrade Ali Hasan Al-Majid, member of the Regional Command [of the Ba'ath Party], that was relayed to us by letter number 106309 of the Security Directorate of the Autonomous Region, dated May 1, 1987, regarding the liquidation of first-degree relatives of criminals."

Al-Majid stated that he did not issue an order to execute the first-degree relatives of saboteurs. In July/August, 1987, he did, however, order the "deportation" of the first-degree relatives of saboteurs to the prohibited areas. Al-Majid issued this order to ensure the security of the cities. He was responsible for the security of the cities and areas within five kilometers of the cities. First-degree relatives included only the fathers of the saboteurs. It did not include the female relatives such as an individual's mother, sister, or daughter.

As previously described, prohibited areas were those regions where the Iraqi government had already removed the citizens and relocated them to government housing complexes. The order regarding deportation of first-degree relatives was intended to force fathers to control the actions of their sons. After the "gathering of people" into Iraqi government housing complexes, Al-Majid stated any acts of sabotage against the government would result in implementation of this order. Al-Majid wanted the sons who were saboteurs, and the consequences of their actions, to be a "pressuring factor" on the fathers. Al-Majid ordered first-degree relatives only to be deported to prohibited areas so that the security committees did not expand the order to include other
relatives. He acknowledged that other relatives including mothers, sisters, and daughters could have elected to join their relatives who had been ordered "deported" to the prohibited areas.

Al-Majid further acknowledged that Directive 4008 issued by him effective June 22, 1987 was still in effect at the time of his issuance of the order regarding first-degree relatives. As previously stated by Al-Majid and reiterated in this interview, anyone caught in the prohibited areas after June 22, 1987, including women and children, was to be killed. He added that Directive 4008 was modified in September, 1987 to allow farming in certain areas. When questioned whether the deportation of first-degree relatives to prohibited areas was tantamount to sentencing them to death because of Directive 4008, Al-Majid stated, "Why would we deport them to a prohibited area [so that they would be killed] when we could kill them?" When the interviewer suggested that perhaps this procedure was meant to minimize the "blood on the hands" of Al-Majid and others, Al-Majid offered no reply.

Al-Majid noted that saboteurs and first-degree relatives were given one month to decide whether they wanted to stay or leave. If they decided to remain in government housing complexes, they were required to pledge not to commit acts of sabotage against the Iraqi government.

Al-Majid denied chairing a meeting on or around September 6, 1987 of senior Ba'ath Party officials to discuss the national census of October 17, 1987. (This meeting and the national census are referenced in the previously described HRW report dated July, 1993, Prelude to Anfal section, pages 17-20.)

Al-Majid stated that he was not involved with the national census as this was a "scientific and technical matter" beyond the scope of his duties. He did, however, facilitate the work of the census takers by means of seminars and meetings which explained the census process to residents of the northern region. In the north, a Kurdish individual named Dr. Samal Majid Faraj, Iraqi Minister of Planning, was in charge of the census. According to Al-Majid, a census takes place every ten years in Iraq.

Al-Majid denied that October 17, 1987 was viewed or treated by the Iraqi government as a "cutoff date" for the saboteurs in the north. He stated that neither a discussion took place at any meeting nor was a decision made to allow "subversives to repent" and "return to the fold" up to the day of the census.
Al-Majid denied that he ordered family members of "unrepentant saboteurs" living in government-controlled areas be forced to join their "saboteur kin" in the prohibited areas after the date of the census. As previously stated, he did issue an order to deport first-degree relatives of saboteurs prior to the census. However, Al-Majid stated there was no connection between that order and the national census. Al-Majid stated there were no parameters placed on the ages of the "saboteur kin" or on the ages of the males ordered deported, including the age ranges between 12 and 50, 17 and 50, or 15 and 70.

Al-Majid characterized northern Iraq as "backward." For the census process, many translators were needed. Most residents of northern Iraq received information about the census and understood the instructions. According to Al-Majid, census takers did not travel into prohibited areas, which were under control of the Iraqi Army, and conducted their work only in cities and villages. Individuals were required to make themselves available to census takers in order to be counted. If an individual failed to participate in the census, Al-Majid stated, "He would be the loser." Without being counted, such an individual would have no citizenship and would not be allowed to send his children to school. However, other services, such as electricity and food from the government, were unaffected.

Al-Majid stated that an individual could register for the census according to their ethnicity and religion, whether Arab, Kurd, Yezidi, Christian, Jew, etc. In northern Iraq, a person was not required to register only as an Arab or as a Kurd, and no other ethnicity.

According to Al-Majid, an individual was not deemed an army deserter simply because of failing to register for the census. He noted that most Kurds neglected their military service. According to an RCC decree dated 1984/85, a Kurdish individual was required to serve only three months versus the normal three years of military service. As a result, some individuals registered themselves as Kurds during the census. Al-Majid recalled that four or five families in Mosul, whom he described as Jarjaris and as Arabs, registered as Kurds. This "error" was caught, however, and the individuals were directed to register their true ethnicity.

Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a document written in Arabic, described as RCC decree number 10, dated January 3, 1988, signed by Saddam Hussein, which amended RCC
decree number 677, dated August 26, 1987. The document states, in part, "The Party organization shall carefully examine the situation of military deserters and draft dodgers who are captured. The death sentence shall be carried out by the Party organization, after that examination, on every deserter or draft dodger who is captured if the duration of his desertion or draft evasion exceeds one year or if he has committed the crime of desertion more than once. The provisions of this Decree shall apply to all persons who evaded military service prior to its date of promulgation and who do not follow up with their recruiting departments within 30 days from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette." (The copy of this document was obtained from the previously described HRW report dated February, 1994. It appears on pages 89-91 of the report.)

Al-Majid acknowledged that he had "heard about" this decree, but stated he does not remember actually seeing it or the details contained within it. He denied that there was a connection between RCC decree number 10 and the national census. Al-Majid further denied there was a connection between registering or failing to register for the census and military service. Al-Majid reiterated that an individual was not deemed a deserter or draft dodger simply because he failed to register for the census. He added that RCC decree number 10 and its order to execute deserters and draft dodgers did not come into effect because an individual failed to register for the census. Al-Majid reiterated that those who failed to participate in the census lost their citizenship documents.

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 9:55 to 16:06 of the tape. (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from the United Kingdom Liaison on Transitional Justice, Office of Human Rights & Transitional Justice, Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad, Iraq. Per FBI LS the copy of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the previously described HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a meeting Al-Majid held with members of the Northern Bureau and governors of the Autonomous Region of Iraqi Kurdistan on April 15, 1988. From context, however, it appears this recording took place in 1987.)
Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He added that he believes this meeting took place in April, 1987 rather than in 1988. Al-Majid stated that those present included the governors and Ba'ath Party secretary generals of each province of the Autonomous Region of Iraqi Kurdistan. These provinces included Irbil, Dohuk, Suleimaniyeh, Kirkuk, and Mosul.

Al-Majid stated that in the audiotape he is speaking about the "gathering of villages" in the northern Kurdish region of Iraq. In the audiotape, he explains the difficulty with moving safely between cities in the north and the numbers of "martyrs" suffered at the hands of saboteurs. Al-Majid is encouraging those present to "speed up the process" of gathering or collectivizing the villages in the north.

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 3:28 to 4:25 of the tape and states the following, "If you remember, when I was placed in charge of the Northern Bureau, I was also tasked with additional responsibilities [including] administration, the relevant Special Services, the Security and Intelligence ones, and the Army, and the civilian wing of the Party, and the military wing of the Party. These were my responsibilities, that's all. So, I was to work as I wished. Therefore, we started making our own decisions and in some instances, even in violation of the Leadership's instructions. But Comrades, this was three months ago." (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from ______) previously described. Per FBI LS____ the copy of this audiotape appears to be a portion of a meeting detailed in the previously described HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, a recording documents a Northern Bureau meeting to review the campaigns of 1987 and 1988. Also according to the report, the audiotape is undated but is in a batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989. Per LS____ the HRW translation of the audiotape of this meeting appears to begin at approximately 6:15. The recording referenced here appears to be from the same meeting and precedes the HRW translation.)

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He added that this audiotape recorded a meeting held by Al-Majid with Nazar Khazraji, Iraqi Army Chief of Staff, Kamil Sajid, the Army First Corps Commander, Sultan Hashem, the Commander of the Anfal Operation, Tali'a Al-Duri,
outgoing Army Fifth Corps Commander, Yunis Zareb, incoming Army Fifth Corps Commander, and the Secretary Generals of the Ba'ath Party Sections. Al-Majid believes this meeting took place in late 1988 or early 1989.

Al-Majid stated that despite the impressions which may be given to the listener of this audiotape regarding the official in charge of the meeting and the person in charge of the military, he was only responsible for the cities and "what was in between the cities." Specifically, Al-Majid stated he was in charge of the "security of the cities" and the "security committees of the cities" during the period he served as Secretary General of the Northern Bureau Command. He added that he "had nothing to do with Iranian intelligence." Al-Majid reiterated that he was only in charge of the cities and roads connecting cities in northern Iraq. The Iraqi military was in charge of all other territory within that portion of the country. Within cities, Al-Majid commanded military forces, intelligence services, security services, and all other government agencies. Al-Majid stated he was in charge of the cities of Suleimaniyeh, Bazyan, Chamchamal, Koysanjaq, Al-Rabie, Kirkuk, Alton Kopri, Erbil, Shaqlawa, Hareer, Zakho, and Khabat. He added that he was in charge of the provinces of Dokan, Mosul (except Agra), and Kirkuk (except Qader Karam).

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 8:25 to 9:28 of the tape. (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from previously described. Per FBI LS [redacted] the copy of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the HRW report July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a Northern Bureau meeting to review the campaigns of 1987 and 1988. Also according to the report, the audiotape is undated but is in a batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989. The recording referenced here appears to be from the same meeting discussed in the previous three paragraphs.)

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He added that this audiotape recorded the same meeting which was just previously discussed. Al-Majid stated that he met with Khazraji because "he had work" and "I had work." Al-Majid remembers complaining to Khazraji during this meeting about the delay of the military in leveling villages where residents had already been removed. According to Al-Majid,
the village buildings needed to be removed as they often served as sanctuaries for saboteurs. He added that after removal or "deportation" of villagers, the army had the responsibility to remove "what was left."

During this meeting as acknowledged by Al-Majid, he criticized Tali'a Al-Duri, Army Fifth Corps Commander, because of his failure to execute his duties regarding the destruction of villages in a timely fashion. This complaint by Al-Majid placed the responsibility for handling this matter upon Khazraj. Al-Majid stated this audiotape shows that he was not in charge of military forces in northern Iraq during this period. If he had been in charge, Al-Majid would have removed Al-Duri and not just complained to Khazraj.

Copies of the documents referenced in this report are contained in the 1A section of the file.
Universal Case File Number 305-F48-144853

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Reference: FD-302 of Mr. Hasan Al-Majd 4/14/04

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: □ Original notes re interview of
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☐ Yes ☐ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER

Reference: (Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of
Ali Hasan Ali Majid (Blacklist #5)
ITEM 3 - April 6, 1987, Northern Baja

I imagine, but remember details

remember confiscation of relative's money from project

circumvention by security committee

sent to security committee

not based on 160

RCC decree issued

authorizing confiscation of banks' deposits also

workers sollten + NRA Party

not a wrong thought

think's related, another RCC decree

all hostile political forces

of Arabs + Drawa Party

Don't know which decree referred

thorough instruction through

security committee in province

gathered & confiscated, liquidate prof + money
Only taken from salutations
premise have participation salutation
not being old, young, or middle
strictly followed and used in salutation

Item 4 Document
Read Again
All orders issued by me, not by deputy
I would not have signed
I don’t remember this
Jsued instructions similarly
all cases are matters of their first security cases
issue in order to show not being paid post time
regarding publish three individuals
various close to toward to complese
issued orders the sworn the lawyer and
said lands can be found unlawful sentence
in April 1991

We would not have given such another that what is issued to court post see
should have been issued with


Security services not in charge of courts

February 7, 1995

We haven't gathered volunteers yet.

Handwritten notes:

5 Item B, letter number 105.0379, May 199-

Watermelon note:

- Prohibition
- Jordan deportation, first degree to forbidden areas
- So that others could be secure
- Broadcast July/Sept 1985

You're in charge those in 5 km

Handover of security of (5) areas + 75 km zones

Prohibited areas?

All villages which we deported people from

Whoever commits a sabotage act in areas or complexes

Ad hoc gathering of people

Told them it was an incident

First phase

Father + son

Not mother, daughter, sister
Try to explain to Kurds

A

Item 10 Census

Remember straight talk or hot cuss takes

Kimball

some people like to be Arab or Kurd
My decision

Hands will be placed in care

Arabic words:

Your best interest in charge of census

Dr. Samad Majid Faraj

Minister of Planning

Every house contacted

Note: date October

Family members: prohibited areas

Itab with fourth census

Metal would be deducted at 1st degree

If don't report, date would be deportation

Instruction: Letters would be from sent not accountable

We have administrative 70

Census - nothing to do with this

Explain how to comply with Survey

Yes - No
F. General Rahm was balanced

Marked: all got word & understood

Census takers did not go to areas under enemy control

Prohibiting maps
Responsibility of army

N. Dresdorff

in age put a them

X. Letter daughter, she would be sent

Came to go forward

X. Only 20 years

in Moscow

Regular about Arab, 4/5 families changed here

Persuade this a verb

5. Only 20 years vs 3 years in military

Without others to do
√ Jews - Arab
√ If tells to participate in census
√ We need a clear
  statement: Yes, school for girls
  allowed
√ Absolutely allowed
√ Whatever - Arabic, Hebrew, Christian, Jew
√ Arab/No Arab
√ No, all were allowed

√ Caucasians
√ in cities and villages, most prohibited
√ According to federal register - no
√ Jews: not draft - must - military service
√ Census: wanting to do military service

RC disease ~ 1984/85

Handwritten notes: Jewish vs. Negroes

RC, December 1972 or copy
F.C. Dance 10 (Jan 3, 1998)

para. 2 + 3 + 18 new parts

Mary joy had data, 11/12, encodes details

Indicative to census

No - no connection between 10 + censes

Relating reports - see file

The census did not impact military service

Those who did participate - lost written documentation

- Aristophanes DA, Apr 15, 1989 - Item 1

9:35 - 16:26

Yes is my voice - Note: April

I have 1997, not 1999

Joining garrison of villages

Those persons and move between areas

Have

Encouraging those present to speaking prayers

Grant

Governors + Standing forces of Earth

Indiscreet, disingenuous, Kirkscavet
Andropog 13, Item 4
3-18-4.75

This is my voice.

MTG - maybe will bring back Estate - Clarke

Party Section Secretary

I was in charge of tickets and whatever between.

Secretary of State, Security questionnaire.

The remaining to do at the National Archive.

or touch Iraqi for them other committees.

Only call 4 tickets anyone.

Our session is 9:00 - 10:30 in the morning.

Habib, Salamang, the President.

all okay - not okay.

Owen for Rosa and{illegible}

Warkh - Qall Uzam

Abu

include, Sukkerta, Khan, private, Basir, Chad, Jordan.

of Arab, Iraqi - excitation, jilateral, private, Qall Uzam
Amritsar MB.
8:25-9:09

Some with og presence now.

Khan sahib, Khan sahib.

1st copy, Munis, 5th.

Talami - 5th. Copy, Munis, just to replace

to another. We both.

See General Party, August 4.

We met because of head work & Thakwar.

worse discussed.

I complained about hesitation. Not had enough work.

after we departed.

after departure, army responsibility.

On my suggestion for more doctors left.

Swasthik Command of the Camp had warned that doctors

were in hand of Khan sahib.

must leaving and charge of army

and departed as announced.

swasthik functions as sanchari for doctors.

Attending may take place with others.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/10/2004

On April 9, 2004, Ali Hasan Al-Majid (Black List #5) was interviewed at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. The interview was monitored by a representative of the military Joint Interrogation Detainee Cell (JIDC). FBI Language Specialist (LS) provided Arabic/English translation. Al-Majid provided the following information:

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 11:20 to 12:19 of the tape. (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from United Kingdom Liaison on Transitional Justice, Office of Human Rights & Transitional Justice, Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad, Iraq. Per FBI LS a translation of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the Human Rights Watch Report (HRW) report titled "Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds," dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a meeting Al-Majid held with members of the Northern Bureau and directors of the Ba'ath Party headquarters in the northern governates. Also according to the HRW report, the tape is dated May 26, 1988, but from context appears to be 1987.)

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He added that he believes this tape recorded a meeting which occurred some time during the first half of 1988. Attendees included officials of the Northern Bureau who were the Secretary Generals of the Sections of the northern provinces. They were sometimes called the Directors of the provinces. These individuals included Nazar Yunis of Mosul, Tariq Kafi of Dohuk, Soubhi Ali Al-Khalaf of Erbil, Khidhir Abdelaziz of Kirkuk, and Sayyed Aswad Ali of Suleimaniyah.

Al-Majid acknowledged that he is discussing the success of the deportation campaign in northern Iraq during this taped session. He stated that the "gathering" of the people in the north brought them physically closer to the Iraqi government authorities,

Investigation on 04/09/2004 at Baghdad, Iraq

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by 59

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separated the saboteurs from the Iranians, and ended sabotage operations.

The interviewer played a segment of the same audiotape from approximately 14:49 to 16:16.

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He added that this tape may have been recorded at the same meeting which was just previously discussed or from a meeting with Nazar Khazraj, Iraqi Army Chief of Staff, and Yunis Zareb, Fifth Corps Commander, among others, discussed during a previous interview.

During this meeting, Al-Majid is reviewing the positive results of the "gathering" of the villages. Al-Majid notes to the attendees that previous orders and decrees existed directing action against the saboteurs. However, there was "no enthusiasm regarding or execution of" these directives. In fact, some individuals, such as Army Commander Tali'a Al-Duri, did not "follow up on their work" and destroy buildings as had been directed.

Al-Majid stated that some villages had already been declared as prohibited before he was assigned as Secretary General of the Northern Bureau. These prohibited areas were specified on maps.

Regarding the statement "I know how rotten the Army is. I am its son, and its commander," Al-Majid stated that he was a civilian who was given military rank in 1991. He added that he was not the Army's "son." Al-Majid noted that he was a member of the military wing of the Party from 1968-91. Al-Majid further stated that when he said "I am its son, and its commander," he did not mean that he was, technically, a military commander. He was referring to the time during which served in the military wing of the Party.

In 1991, Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri, Muhammad Al-Zubaidi, Mizban Hadi, and Al-Majid were all given military ranks. At the time, Al-Majid was serving as Minister of Interior. Al-Duri was given the rank of General, Al-Zubaidi and Hadi were given the ranks of Major General, and Al-Majid was made a Lieutenant General. Al-Majid reiterated that he had served as a commander in the Party's military wing, not in the professional Iraqi Army.
The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 9:35 to 10:47 of the tape. (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from [redacted] previously described. Per FBI LS [redacted] a translation of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the previously described HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A; The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a meeting Al-Majid held with members of the Northern Bureau to review the campaigns of 1987 and 1988. Also, according to the HRW report, the tape is undated, but is in a batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989.)

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He added that this is probably the same meeting with Khazraji and Zareb, among others, discussed during a previous interview.

In the tape, Al-Majid stated that he is discussing "caring for the families of saboteurs" and is not discussing executing them. When questioned about his statement "I put his message to my head" and his seeming disregard of a message from Saddam Hussein to care for the saboteurs, Al-Majid asked, "I filed it in the back of my mind? I didn't listen to?" Al-Majid noted that if his intention had been to kill the people of the north, then why would he have "gathered" them and brought them closer to him. He stated that he would have sent the individuals to prohibited areas and the Army would have killed them. Al-Majid denied that a hypothetical act such as this is similar or identical to the actual order given by Al-Majid to "deport" the first-degree relatives of saboteurs to the prohibited zones, as discussed in a previous interview.

Al-Majid stated that he had no intention to kill the families of the saboteurs. He pointed out that there were three levels or stages of the process within the five kilometer zones around cities, the only areas for which he had responsibility. First, the gathering, then the declaration of forbidden zones, and finally, the establishment of a "certain level of trust between us and them." Al-Majid noted there was "not much trust." Neither the Army nor the administration was allowed to go into the prohibited areas. Once trust was established, however, the residents of the northern region were allowed to farm in the prohibited areas.
Al-Majid stated that the goal of the campaign in the north was not to kill families, rather it was to end sabotage. From the five kilometer zones around the cities (Al-Majid's responsibility), he noted that no one was deported back to the prohibited areas. Al-Majid added that no one was found in a prohibited area within the five kilometer zones.

Al-Majid stated that citizens of the north who desired to move to other provinces were allowed to do so. Those moving to a different province in the Kurdistan Autonomous Region were provided assistance in the form of funds from the government.

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 3:30 to 5:00 of the tape. (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from [previously described. Per FBI LS[a translation of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the previously described HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a meeting held by Al-Majid on April 15, 1989 to welcome Hassan Ali Al-Amiri as his successor as Secretary General of the Northern Bureau.)

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. This recording took place at a meeting in April, 1989 where Al-Majid is welcoming Hassan Al-Amiri as his successor. The attendees included officials of the Northern Bureau and possibly the governors of the northern provinces. Al-Majid is describing the situation at that time as "stable" and says that Al-Amiri is "the right person to take over." Al-Majid further states that it is not suitable for him (Al-Majid) to continue in this position. He does, however, offer to serve as an advisor if needed.

The interviewer played a segment of the same audiotape from approximately 6:56 to 7:35.

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. The interviewer asked Al-Majid about the statement, "It will no longer be allowed for a member of the leadership to have power over the Army." Al-Majid stated that the extraordinary situation had ended in the north and these powers were no longer necessary. Once the transition had occurred, Jalal Talabani broadcast that Al-Amiri would not have the
same powers as Al-Majid because he was not a relative of Saddam Hussein. In the tape, Al-Majid is not referring to his power over the Army in the entire northern region, but his power over the Army in the regions within five kilometers of the cities. As noted in a previous interview, Al-Majid stated that specific written instructions followed Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) decree number 160 delineating the responsibilities and territories of Al-Majid and the Army. These instructions were issued in writing from the office of the Presidential Diwan, signed by Ahmad Hussein on behalf of Saddam Hussein. Al-Majid received a copy of these instructions. Khazraj and Al-Majid met to determine how to best implement the orders. They discussed each others responsibilities, including Al-Majid's duties regarding areas within five kilometers of cities and the Army's responsibilities for all other territory in the northern region.

The interviewer played a segment of the same audiotape from approximately 8:00 to 10:10.

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. In this recording, Al-Majid is referring to his first meeting with the Army corps commanders, police, security services, and Party officials regarding the situation in northern Iraq. Al-Majid stated that while it is true he assembled all of these individuals for this meeting, "I was not in charge of the Anfal Operation." He stated that his responsibilities did not include the "gathering" of all the villages of the north. He reiterated his area of responsibility only included the cities and areas within five kilometers of the cities. Al-Majid opined that a "regular citizen" bearing witness to events during this time period might not have known the difference between the responsibilities of Khazraj and Al-Majid.

Regarding the statement in the tape asserting "directives which are still in force and will remain in force," Al-Majid stated that he is referring the early stages of the campaign in the north. He denied that this statement refers to Directive 4008 and added that this directive ended in September, 1987 when the Iraqi government granted permission for northern residents to farm. Al-Majid reiterated that all of his statements concern his area of responsibility at that time, cities and zones within five kilometers of the cities.

The interviewer played a segment of the same audiotape from approximately 12:00 to 13:30.
Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. Al-Majid stated that his comments about an Army commander refer to Tali'a Al-Duri, Fifth Corps Commander. According to Al-Majid, Al-Duri asked that the campaign in the north be postponed for one month. Al-Majid refused this request and described Al-Duri as "reluctant" despite having been provided everything needed by Al-Majid. Al-Majid added that he was in charge of all things owned by the provinces, including bulldozers and other equipment. Such items were provided to Al-Duri to complete his assignment, which included destruction of the villages that had been evacuated. Again, Al-Majid stated his comments refer only to areas within five kilometers of the cities.

The interviewer replayed a portion of an audiotape discussed previously during the interview. The segment replayed was from approximately 10:11 to 10:47 and included the statement, "No, I will bury them with bulldozers." (This recording is the one previously described as being in a batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989.)

Al-Majid denied that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He stated, "Those are not my words." Al-Majid added, "I would neither bury them nor kill them. They are Iraqis." He stated that he did not bury people or order people to be buried. Al-Majid added that he has never heard or seen others doing such things. He stated, "If I had done such a thing, I would tell you I was carrying out an order."

Al-Majid acknowledged previous statements made by him during interview on February 4, 2004 including "I never used or saw anything about chemicals." Al-Majid again denied personal knowledge or responsibility regarding the Iraqi government's use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, against the Kurds, or at any other time. He added, "I have never had any involvement with chemical weapons in my life."

Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a handwritten document in Arabic, described as letter number ShSh/4947, dated June 11, 1987, from the Security Directorate of Erbil Governate to the Security Directorate of Shaqliwa, issued by the Director of General Security of Erbil Governate. The document states, in part, "On 5/27/1987, our aircraft attacked the villages of Malakan, Talinan, Kandor, Bileh Aliya, and Bileh Sufa in Khalifan subsdistrict, which harbor some saboteurs...A number of saboteurs were killed and about (30) people lost their eyesight as
a result of the bombing, including the family of Kamal Haji Khidr Agha, the commander of the 12th [PUK] Division..." (The copy of this document was obtained from the HRW report titled "Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in Its Own Words," dated February, 1994. It appears on pages 62-63 of the report.)

Al-Majid denied knowledge of this document or the events described in it. He stated, "I have no idea about this." Al-Majid added that he does not think this document is genuine. He noted that security directors would not normally write about military matters such as those discussed in this document. Al-Majid further noted that Shaalgawa was subordinate to Erbil. In his opinion, it would have been more logical for a subordinate unit such as Shaalgawa to be communicating this information to a higher one such as Erbil. However, the opposite direction of communication is shown in this document. Al-Majid noted other discrepancies he perceived in this letter including the lack of use of state letterhead, the lack of a Top Secret classification on information this important, and the discussion of a matter in paragraph two which does not fall within the scope of the duties of the Director of General Security of Erbil. According to Al-Majid, this is a military intelligence matter. Finally, he stated that the author did not ask for any action. The last section, paragraph four, is blank and would normally include the action requested or any instructions. Al-Majid stated that he does not remember the name of the Director of General Security of Erbil.

The interviewer told Al-Majid that one of the common side effects of a chemical weapons attack is loss of vision. The interviewer further noted that the individual named as a victim in the document, Agha, was contacted by independent investigators. Agha confirmed that he and his family had been temporarily blinded in a chemical attack on May 27, 1987. Al-Majid stated, "I have not heard of this attack, only one in the city of Halabja."

Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a handwritten document in Arabic appearing on official letterhead, described as a letter, dated May 10, 1988, regarding the fourth Anfal operation from the Third Shoba (branch) to the Director of the Fifth Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence. The document makes recommendations for the use of "special ammunition" against the areas "Alsamaqloyat-Balisan and the villages existing in the separate border zone between Corps 24 and Corps 23." The document also notes that on May 9, 1988 "...a direction was issued to
Special Ammunition Committee to study the issue..." (The copy of this document was obtained from the US Army Criminal Investigative Division.)

Al-Majid denied knowledge of this document or the events described in it. He stated, in general, he did not know what took place between the Minister of Defense and military intelligence. According to Al-Majid, military intelligence reports directly to the President and only informs the Minister of Defense. He added that neither "special" nor regular ammunition was the responsibility of military intelligence. Al-Majid stated that the term "special" refers to chemical weapons. Any order to use chemical weapons would have come from Saddam Hussein or the Army Chief of Staff. Al-Majid believes such weapons would have been used only against Iran if, and only if, Iraq was in "a difficult situation." He stated that he does not believe it is the responsibility of military intelligence to search for saboteurs and direct strikes against them. By 1988, Al-Majid asserted that the saboteurs had "reached the end" and the use of chemical weapons was not necessary. Control of the villages in northern Iraq did not require chemical weapons and the Anfal Operation did not require chemical weapons. Al-Majid suspects that this document is a forgery, but can not say for certain.

Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a document in Arabic, described as cover letter number M5/Sh3/Q2/9879, dated May 18, 1988, and an attached report from the Director, General Directorate of Military Intelligence, to the Subdirector of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector. The cover letter states, in part, "Enclosed is our special report about the Northern Region for the month of April, 1988. Please be informed." On page four, paragraph c, the attached report states, "After the special strikes against the villages where the headquarters and bases of the agents were, their organization distributed a quantity of medical supplies against chemical strikes (injections and pills) among the inhabitants of those villages as well as neighboring villages." Paragraph (3) of the same page states, "The intensity of the artillery bombardments by our forces and the use of (the special ammunition) led to heavy losses among them." (The copy of this document was obtained from the previously described HRW report dated February, 1994. It appears on pages 57-61 of the report.)

Al-Majid denied knowledge of this document or the events described in it. As used in this report, he reiterated that the term "special" refers to chemical weapons. Al-Majid doubts the
authenticity of this document. He stated that if chemical weapons had been used in Iraq, particularly in the northern region during this time, "We would have heard. No such thing can be hidden."

Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a document in Arabic, described as cover letter number Q3/Qadissiyat Saddam/404, dated June 26, 1988, and an attached report from Captain Kifah Ali Hassan, Director of the Intelligence Center of Kalar to the Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector (Sh3). The cover letter states, in part, "Enclosed is the quarterly report about the saboteurs' movements within our sector during the first half of 1988. Please be informed." On page six, paragraph b, the attached report states, "During the month of March, 1988, our aircraft bombed the headquarters of the sabotage bands in the villages of Saywan (4596) and Balakajar (4294) in a chemical strike. This resulted in the death of 50 saboteurs and the wounding of 20 other saboteurs." (The copy of this document was obtained from the previously described HRW report dated February, 1994. It appears on pages 49-52 of the report. According to the HRW report, the numbers appearing in parenthesis in paragraph b are coordinates given to the villages by the military.)

Al-Majid denied knowledge of this document or the events described in it. He stated that this report should have been forwarded to the Northern Sector, Al-Majid's assigned location. Al-Majid doubts the authenticity of this document. He added, "I am certain chemical weapons were not used in the northern or southern sectors of Iraq, only in Halabja." According to Al-Majid, the Iraqi government's use of chemical weapons in Halabja was directed against Iranians. He emphasized, "If I used them, I would admit."

Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a document in Arabic, described as cover letter number Sh3/Q1/Qadissiyat Saddam/16093, dated December 13, 1988, and an attached report from the Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector, to the General Directorate of Military Intelligence (Sh3). The cover letter states, in part, "The following is the information that we received from source number 202 about the sabotage movements:" Page five, paragraph 10a, states, "After the expulsion of the saboteurs of the First Section of the Barzani band in the Badinan Sector by our forces during the Final Anfal operation, six British journalists arrived in the tri-border region of Iran, Iraq and Turkey to see the saboteurs who had come from the above sector via Turkish territory and interview them about the
chemical strike undertaken by our forces." (The copy of this document was obtained from the previously described HRW report dated February, 1994. It appears on pages 53-56 of the report.)

Al-Majid denied knowledge of this document or the events described in it. He noted that if this document is genuine, it proves that he was not in charge. Al-Majid was never informed of this matter. If he had been in charge, he would have been notified of this information. He added that he is unable judge the authenticity of this document. According to Al-Majid, the Iraqi government would not have had to use chemical weapons at that stage of the campaign in the north. The saboteurs were not stronger than the Iraqi military. Once the saboteurs were isolated from the cities, they "were weakened" due to lack of food, fuel, and other supplies. By this point in the operation, all the villages that could have provided assistance to the saboteurs had been removed. Thus, the Iraqi Army's advance into this area was not difficult so as to require the use of chemical weapons.

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 21:59 to 26:44 of the tape and includes the statements "That evening, I went to Suleimaniyeh and hit them with the special ammunition," "I will attack it with chemical weapons," and "I will kill them all with chemical weapons." (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from [previously described]. Per FBI LS [a translation of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a meeting Al-Majid held with members of the Northern Bureau and directors of the Ba'ath Party headquarters in the northern governates. Also according to the HRW report, the tape is dated May 26, 1988, but from context appears to be 1987.)

Al-Majid stated that this audiotape was "assembled" from tapes of two different meetings. One meeting, in the first half of 1988, was discussed at the onset of this interview, while the other took place in Mosul on March 30, 1991.

When the cities of Suleimaniyeh, Dohuk, Erbil, and Kirkuk fell out of Iraqi government control in 1991, Al-Majid was tasked with "liberating" Dohuk. He invited Abd Jawad Thannoon, Governor of Dohuk, Nasir Said, Fifth Corps Commander, and all state and Party officials to a "reception" at the Mosul Hotel in Mosul.
There, Al-Majid gave a speech declaring "Whoever has a friend in Dohuk, I will attack with chemical weapons tomorrow." Said attempted to interrupt Al-Majid because he did not want the timing of the operation to be revealed. Al-Majid directed him to communicate this information to Dohuk. He wanted "the illusion" of a chemical weapons attack to be imprinted in the minds of those controlling Dohuk. Al-Majid stated that the Iraqi government was weak in 1991. Thus, the chemical weapons "threat" was used as a "scare tactic" against the saboteurs in Dohuk.

Al-Majid directed the military to procure bags of flour or cement and attach them to helicopters. These aircraft were then used the following morning to spread the material over Dohuk and give the further "illusion" of a chemical weapons attack. Al-Majid used this "scare tactic" to reduce losses on "our side and their side." Al-Majid walked into Dohuk at 9:30 am the same morning. Some Iraqi military members would not enter the city, however, thinking that a chemical weapons attack had actually occurred.

Al-Majid stated, "This tape has been altered." He added that the story he related about Dohuk is the real reason he is known as "Chemical Ali" and not because of Halabja. According to Al-Majid, Khazraji once told Abbas Mahmoud or Rasool Mahmoud that Al-Majid ordered the chemical weapons attack on Halabja. This is not true, however.

A portion of this tape states, "Jalal Talabani asked me to open a special channel of communication with him. That evening, I went to Suleimaniyeh and hit them with the special ammunition. That was my answer." Al-Majid stated I inspected Suleimaniyeh and it was not hit. He added that he has never heard of such an attack, particularly with chemical weapons. He stated he did not order a chemical weapons attack on Talabani and his headquarters in the Jafati Valley near Suleimaniyeh. Al-Majid stated, "This tape is not correct." He claimed that he actually went to Suleimaniyeh to meet with Talabani and that the words "and hit them with the special ammunition" have been inserted into this tape. The remainder of the tape is a threat or scare tactic used by Al-Majid against the saboteurs in Dohuk.

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 1:54 to 4:17 of the tape and includes the statements "...we will surround them in a small pocket and attack them with chemical weapons. I will not attack them with chemicals
just one day, but I will continue to attack them with chemicals for fifteen days." (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from [redacted] previously described. Per FBI LS [redacted], a translation of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a meeting Al-Majid held with members of the Northern Bureau and directors of the Ba'ath Party headquarters in the northern governates. Also according to the HRW report, the tape is dated May 26, 1988, but from context appears to be 1987. The copy of this audiotape obtained from [redacted] though appearing to be from the same meeting, was provided to the FBI as a separate recording.)

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He stated that this is the same meeting with Ba'ath Party Section officials and Governors of the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan on April 15, 1987 discussed in a previous interview.

Al-Majid commented that these statements are attempts at "psychological warfare" against the enemy in the beginning of the campaign against the saboteurs in the northern region. His words were used as a scare tactic, similar to what was previously described in this interview and would later be used in Dohuk. In Al-Majid's opinion, the saboteurs would be "weakened by words." Logistically, they would later be weakened by their forced separation from the cities.

The interviewer questioned Al-Majid about the meaning of the sentences "I will not let the government get involved. I will say it is from here [the Northern Bureau]." Al-Majid stated he was simply projecting the power of the Northern Bureau and that he had not exceeded his authority.

The interviewer questioned Al-Majid about the statement "I told the expert comrades that I need guerrilla groups in Europe to kill whomever they see from them [the saboteurs]." Al-Majid admitted to making this statement but asserted that it was simply part of the "psychological operations" against the saboteurs. He added that he had neither knowledge of nor authority over Iraqi government operations or operatives in Europe. However, Al-Majid believed that such a statement would become known to Talabani and would possibly diminish the strength of the saboteurs.
Copies of the documents referenced in this report are contained in the 1A section of the file.
Universal Case File Number: 315F-HQ-1448534
Field Office Acquiring Evidence: Bangor, Maine
Serial # of Originating Document: 59
Date Received: 11/12/06
From: Bangor, Maine

By: (Name of Special Agent)

To Be Returned: ☐ Yes ☐ No
Receipt Given: ☐ Yes ☐ No
Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: ☐ Yes ☐ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER

Reference: FP-3120

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of
Universal Case File Number: 315E-479 - 1448574
Field Office Acquiring Evidence: Baghdad, Iraq
Serial # of Originating Document: 59
Date Received: 4/19/04
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Receipt Given: □ Yes □ No
Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: □ Yes □ No
Title: DESERT SPIDER
Reference: (Communication Enclosing Material)
Description: □ Original notes re interview of Ali Hasan Al-Majid

FBI/DOJ
2A (11:20 - 12:19)

My voice. In 1988, 1st half.

Present officials of Northern Bureau who were

Sec Genrals of sectored Northern provinces

or referred by Director of provinces

Names:

- Muzul - Nazar Ali Yunis
- Dauda - Tariq Kafi
- Jalil - Sadiq Ali Al-Ishala
- Rikal - Firdaus Al-Mudhaffer
- Salemann - Capped Ayahd Ali

Talking about success of deportation campaign

- Prevented casualties / martyrs
- Gathering and shearing / authorities
- Sabotage cut-off from Iraqians
- Sabotage roads

Notes of SSI

voted by SIC Rep

Ali Hasan Al-Majid

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 05-07-2009 BY 60324 UC baw/sab/ks
April 88

2b (14:49-16:16)

And set, possibly same night ...

review post accords of gathering of village

Ahmed Muhammad — Khan Ahmad no then

Dep. Sec. General of North Aseem

Rahul Khosha Salma

Orders — which are being followed

many order/desires before — no enthusiasm or

execution of them however

didn't follow up on their work

Villages had already been destroyed prohibited

already spread on maps — protect towns

when Table at Dhar

I know Madhu with the Army.

I am its son and its commander.

I am a civilian given military rank.

I am not its son.


Stay as member of civil wing of party 1968-1991

When I say I am son, I am leader not moral or party.
Never touch anime except when Ross

- Tajjali
- Mohammad Reza
- Nazanin
- Mohammad Reza (given unit rank)
- Not of those who gave rank majored
- Developing
- Milad
- Ehab

In view a commander in Party mil wing, not in presiding capacity.

TB (9:35-10:45)
- My voice. Probably samaritans.
- About caring for families of skeletons (not go after them)
- Message from JF to take care of
- Saturn a promise to take care of
- Same place to go to other province
- Will get certain amounts of money, house
- In province of Anbar, Ramadi

Eltalib also; because
- Didn't knowland villages
- Will use to store weapons, ammunition
- What is back of minds? What should I listen to?
- Citations was to tell why would assemble for bringing this item
I would have sent police there and Army would be placed similar to a regular domestic police. Do not bring our attention to Srebrenica.

3 phases of Bosnia:
1. Gathering
2. Declaration of blockade
3. Certain level of trust, published streamlines, not much trust

Neither army nor administration allowed to go into areas once trust established, allowed to pass.

JNA declared as regular army.

No one was deported back. A person who came back, was not deported again.

IB (3:30-5:00)

Meeting in April 1999, Mr. Varole.

Situation stable. American right present in Srebrenica.

Im not sure if I continue.

Wanted to be honest above all. Offered to continue, option 2, option 100.
Speaking to officials of northern province.
Possibly governor of province.

(6:30-9:35)

"I will not only be allowed to be a member of the Council to have power over the army."

Situation bad overall.

Not because of - not capable - Al-Majid.

Once more - issues.

Talking about Al-Majid.

Instructions written.

Office of Presidential Power.

Not signed by SA.

Signed by [Signature].

On 4 March 1965.

Abd al-Hadi bin [Name here].

I received a copy.
Chitral visit to determine how to implement
it to him it was clear
(Sept. 1987)
Foolom Majid & 7th Para group
discussed each's responsibility
-Wali Khel plan
Army everywhere else (9:00-10:00)

Reflected plan in April 1988 with...

Each provincial security, etc.

Party army political service

I assembled all of these officers
I was not in charge of total operation
I was able to assemble all of northern villages
his responsibility

Regular defeat - might not have difference

Between Wali Khel & 7th Para/7th Para duties
still involved

Not in charge until 1989
Talking about three with 7th Para

Where did 7th Para? Sep 1987
Spent by instruction

Issued to entire area then region

Saving only within 5 km

All my statements are about area within 5 km

1200-1330

Talking and asking what to do?

What part did he say? Yes, well, well, well

Talking, killing

Violent, deporting people provided it

Does this change if what promised and

buildings equip that etc.

I probably don’t understand

We could find some necessary

Only area within 5 km

Bulldozer

Buried in bulldozer

[Handwritten note]

Not anymore,

I would not bring them or kill them

They are trying

I don’t agree this is what it says

[Handwritten note]
If I had done such a thing, I would tell you I was carrying out an order.

We should discuss this more.

Reiterates same PD 3026 January 2002

There were no-land (army-land with Army Land

Document 12, Jan 17, 1989

No idea about this

Security director would not write about military matters

Do not know... maybe a State or letterhead

Author did not ask for action

para 4 Blake should have had instructions
Director of General Security Task - doesn't remember name
can't read either > Gerheim
Talk about a high-level interview

A general believed what takes place within NSC and CIA
Military reports to President

CIA Document

In general, don't know what takes place within NSC and CIA
Military reports to President

CIA Document

Spoke to regular areas and their responsibility

it will be a special order from S.H. or Army and State

use special commission only against Iran

address situation

don't think it is military but wants to start for situation

direct activity

In NSC meeting with leaders and
Special secret necessary<br>

May not have requested special basis

Report doesn't require

Director of Intelligence & Director of National Security

Here are large collection
Cast say if true document - C JD
should be sent to deputy for address director's writing when in some branch
suggest not correct possibly a wrong

Document 3

Eastern Sector Digala to Daba
Junior in Northern Sector
strange to report to Eastern Sector
conference Northern Region
for review of claim
read para c. 
para (3) to A. Majid
no information, handed

special - can use
authoritative - doubt?
if can used in Iraq, would have heard
no such thing can be done

Document 4

Read para b.
should have given in Northern Sector
within one sector according to letter
Nature of authenticity

I have certain authority
I am certain she was not a part of the desertion
Iraqi captured in Stalag "a"

Don't know how involved I was involved

I think we would tell

Iraqi used against Americans

Document 10

Read 10.c.

I have heard others

If genuine prove I was not in charge
not informing him of this matter

We would have been in charge

Authority cannot judge

I would not have needed to use air at that stage
Subs were not a surprise than Iraqi military

Once total surrender,

They were weakened

Lack of food, fuel, etc.

All villages that assisted were awarded for their assistance

Assist
It was assembled from different sources.

It was assembled when talking about it in London, reception in Moscow.

Mar 30, 1941

[Signatures]

Weighting government's House of all State Party Leaders
Governor of Jordan - Abd al-Fattah al-Hussein
Commander 5th Corps - Major General Saeed
Padre giving a lecture to all of us wherever has been in Jordan, in Mafraq, and in Amman.
Nasser said - attempted to manipulate by spreading because didn't want to lose support in Assad.
Told him to get out to be thrown in Assad.
Moral Motiv

Next day plan to report city of Jordan by our soldiers
accepted Major in their ranks.

In 1961, we were asked
used with a cut to knees to keep them in order
commander visited to year.

Hilliard of the GPO of Jordan
asked him to prepare bags of their precom
we will announce my again in order
wanted adroast to inspect our days
used to serve

Forschini on the side of our side
Well-intrix toArmy with Smith and Leavens
Some military�loud hotel.

Sold by helicopter dropped in.

Majid entered city.

Logist. to enter when CAS was.

This tape has been altered.

Reason why known as Chem-Tel.

Mubashir Mangal vs. Badar Mangal.

Wounded, told him #5 attacked Halata.

Majid Barjami, Naha, Tashkent.

Made about 15 special amn. attacks.

Inspected Humvee & it was not hit.

No heard of attacks.

Abut other attacks.

Tape is incorrect.

So & I went to Suranamyn for attack.

They inserted C.H.C. Special Forces.

Tape tape is the best.

We had 20 tons of U.S. Shells.

against
April 15, 1987

"Not going to involve "Here's where we're going"
Projecting power of U.S. doesn't exceed with
It's all the emptiness..."

I said, "My authorities? Just pondering no one
I'd have to get involved with..."

As regards in Europe?

No knowledge that no authority

Psychos only

X5 and may show designs or future
File Number: SISE- H4- 1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence: ________________________________

Serial # of Originating Document: ________________________________

Date Received: 05/13/2004

From: ________________________________ (Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By: ________________________________ b6 b7C

To Be Returned: □ Yes □ No

Receipt Given: □ Yes □ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

□ Yes □ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

□ Yes □ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER IT IS IRAQ

Reference: ________________________________ (Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: □ Original notes re interview of

IBRAHIM AHMAD ASO

AC SATTAR MUHAMMAD AL-TIKRITI

BLH 13
Saddam 'Adas Allah

- Car
- Chow (3 kilos)

87 CO, II Corps, HQ - 13 Annarra

AC M19 DAD14441 = HQ

Armed REduce after
Ceramic 5 21 January
20 April 91

Commander of RG - 1 division reserve
in Baghdad
All 7 divisions of
HQ in Baghdad special from RASHAD camp

Transfer

Reserve from 12 to 7 div RG
in 1976 assigned 6 div

# 86 EY97 FALMAH

How many SHIA
Killing? Muslim
SHI, BPF, ARFL
COMPLAINT AC No.
IN CHARGE

HQ

MOVED TO KANDIYA
AFTER UPRISING WAS
HANDED

N/A AFTER ACTION REPORT
SHIPS DID NOT FOLLOW THRU
ORDERS
ALL MOVES COMPLETED → (6) 20.7.91

- C.O.S. LEAVE OF ALL THE CONVS. → BATTLE
- HUSKY BASILIO #187 4.5.91
- ALL TROOPS PULL OUT ON 16.9.91
- CIVIL LAW IN PLACE
- 1 March 1991 VERSACE SHIRT, BILL'S (202)

(5) TROOPS WERE IN SELF DEFENSE
ATTACK GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS

NASSIR M. M.
WADAD
HILAL

(5)
ABOUT 30 PAIRS IN CHINESE BASMATI (LEFT ON BACKS) 21.7.91 (M.L.)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

On 05/13/2004 IBRAHIM AHMAD ABD AL-SATTAR MUHAMMAD AL-TIKRITI (BL# 13), former Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Armed Forces, was interviewed at a detention facility in Baghdad, Iraq. The interview was conducted by Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent [REDACTED] and Defense Intelligence Agency representative [REDACTED] The interview was done in English and Arabic with translations performed by ABD AL-SATTAR MUHAMMAD provided the following information:

In 1989, ABD AL-SATTAR MUHAMMAD was the commander of the Iraqi Army II Corps, serving as a Major General. The Army II Corps that he commanded served in the Iraqi Southern Region along the Iraqi border from the summer of 1988 through the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. During the withdrawal of Iraqi forces, ABD AL-SATTAR MUHAMMAD deployed to Basra with his forces.

When the Iranians began their infiltration and military operations in Basra region on 03/01/2003 ABD AL-SATTAR MUHAMMAD was in the city of Basra. ALI HASSAN AL-MAJID was designated by former president SADDAM HUSSEIN to be in charge of all political and military operations in the entire Southern Region of Iraq during this time. ABD AL-SATTAR MUHAMMAD did not relinquish the command of his Corps to AL-MAJID directly. But AL-MAJID was ultimately in charge of all government affairs in the Southern Region. On 03/02/2004, AL-MAJID met with ABD AL-SATTAR MUHAMMAD in Basra and demanded to know why the insurgents had not yet been put down. The source was leading military operations to suppress the insurgents, but it was not being accomplished in the conduct and effectiveness that AL-MAJID demanded.

The command and control of this operation was originally being conducted in a part of the city near the Ba’ath Party offices. Because of the instability of the situation, the command group retrograded from this area to a military installation outside of the city.

ABD AL-SATTAR MUHAMMAD was aware that former president HUSSEIN had issued an order authorizing all Ba’ath members to exercise whatever powers necessary to suppress the uprising. Many people died during the fighting. ABD AL-SATTAR MUHAMMAD could not account for what he did not see. He, physically, was not

Investigation on 05/13/2004 at Baghdad, Iraq

File # 315E-HQ-1448534-91 Date dictated

by [REDACTED] This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
Continuation of FD-302 of  IBRAHIM AHMAD ABD AL-TIKRITI  , On 05/13/2004 , Page 2

collocated with his troops and could not see or control what they were doing.

On 03/07/2004 AL-MAJID left Southern Region for Baghdad. At this time, ABD AL-SATTAR MUHAMMAD also departed the Southern Region and received his new assignment as a commander with the Republican Guard.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ITOS II
SC M. Chris Briese
UC
ORS
SC Frankie Battle
UC

From: Baghdad Operations Center
Desert Spider Team
Contact: George L. Piro,

Approved By: Piro George  

Drafted By: Piro George L:g

Case ID #: (x) 315-E-HQ-1448534 (Pending)

Title: (x) DESERT SPIDER;
IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: (x/OC,NF) To document Desert Spider's attempt to provide SSA George Piro a gift.

(U) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Details: (x/OC,NF) Since the commencement of the ICRC visits, Desert Spider has received two care packages from his family. These packages have contained various items of clothing, such as pajamas, underwear and t-shirts, sandals, and personal hygiene items.

(U) (x/OC,NF) On 06/13/2004, during casual conversation between SSA Piro and Desert Spider, SSA Piro informed Desert Spider that their time together was nearing its conclusion. On 06/14/2004, Desert Spider gathered some of the items contained within both of his care packages, which he described more fitting for a young man than someone of his age, and attempted to present them to SSA Piro as a gift. SSA Piro declined Desert Spider's gift offer, advising him that SSA Piro could not accept such gift, as well as it would be a shame for SSA Piro to take items that Desert Spider's family had gone through the effort to
purchase and send him for his use during captivity. Desert Spider became very agitated and advised SSA Piro that his conduct was insulting. Desert Spider reminded SSA Piro of the Arab culture, which SSA Piro should be very familiar with, that it was extremely offensive to Arabs for someone to refuse a gift once it has been presented. Under those circumstances, SSA Piro had no choice but to accept Desert Spider's gift and thanked him.

The gift consisted of two sets of new pajamas, two sandals, and undergarments. SSA Piro took the items and immediately returned them into Desert Spider's personal property inventory maintained by the military at the detention facility.

The items will be kept separate from Desert Spider's other personal property, which he has access through the military guards to exchange worn clothing or obtain new personal hygiene items. This is being done so that Desert Spider does not realize that SSA Piro in fact did not accept his gift which may severely effect the relationship between the two. The military will maintain the aforementioned articles and will dispose of them appropriately.
To: Counterterrorism  From: Baghdad Operations Center
(U) Re: (X) 315E-HQ-1448534, 06/16/2004

LEAD (U):

Set Lead 1:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ITOS II

(U) Information provided for review.
Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ITOS II
SC M. Chris Briese
ASC
UC

From: Counterterrorism
Baghdad Operations Center
Contact: SSA

Approved By: Piro George

Drafted By: tmi

Case ID #: (U) 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending)

Title: DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: (S)

(U) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN

DATE: 06/22/2004

SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN
LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON DC

(U) For information, read and clear.

++
On 06/12/2004, AHMED HUSSEIN KHUDAIYER (Black List #76) was interviewed at Camp Cropper Detention Camp, Baghdad, Iraq where he was being detained by the U.S. Army following his surrender to authorities in approximately April 2003. The interview was conducted by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Supervisory Special Agent George L. Piro. Special Agent [redacted] and Language Specialist [redacted]. After being explained the purpose of the interview, KHUDAIYER provided the following information:

One of the roles of the Presidential Diwan was to serve as the Secretary for the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). As the Secretary of the RCC, the Diwan had the responsibility of formally promulgating any decisions that were finalized by the RCC. KHUDAIYER pointed out that most people who read the RCC results assume that they were the results of consultation and discussion. This was simply not true. SADDAM, the Head of State, who served as the Head of the RCC, assigned all decisions as a function of his own determination. No such meeting, per se, or consultations took place. If any meetings took place, it would have been limited only to SADDAM's closest two or three people. Generally, these outcomes reached KHUDAIYER through the telephone or the Presidential Secretary Abid Hamid Mahmud al-Tikriti.

When KHUDAIYER was given instructions, he would forward them to his legal section who would prepare a document. KHUDAIYER would then review the document and inspect it for typographical errors, formatting or any needed editing.

KHUDAIYER was shown a photocopy of Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) Decree Number 160, dated 03/29/1987 [this copy is in the attached 1A enveloped]. KHUDAIYER recognized it as the copy of an authentic RCC document in format and substance. RCC Decree Number 160 cited as references, two Constitutional provisions and a 03/29/1987 joint RCC and Ba'ath Party Regional Command meeting. RCC Decree Number 160 formally appointed command of the Northern Region of Iraq, (to include the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan), to ALI HASAN AL MAJID AL-TIKRITI. It outlined the full authority of ALI HASAN AL MAJID's command, to include control of the Foreign Intelligence Apparatus, the Internal Security Force,
the Military Intelligence, the Popular Army and the Military Commands.

KHUDAIYER did not remember attending any meeting when this information originally developed. He recalled receiving the information contained in this decree via handwritten instructions, as usual. He vaguely recollected making a correction on the original draft prepared by his legal section. KHUDAIYER was not overly surprised to see a decree like this. At that time, there were numerous Iraqi government organizations operating in the North of Iraq. Between the RCC, the army, and the Ministries all going back and forth through Baghdad, organizationally it was difficult to conduct administration and communication. By hiring an ultimate overseer of these efforts, affairs could be run much smoother.

Asked if Muhammad Hamza al-Zubaydi already served in that capacity, KHUDAIYER explained that al-Zubaydi received his position based on his Ba'ath party status, not a Decree issued through the Presidential Diwan's office. Furthermore, al-Zubaydi did not enjoy the trust from SADDAM that ALI HASAN AL-MAJID AL-TIKRITI did. When asked to define what he meant by trust, KHUDAIYER explained that everyone knew AL-MAJID 1) would never do anything against SADDAM, and 2) possessed the ruthlessness needed to quell the violence.

KHUDAIYER was asked if he ever promulgated a follow-on RCC Decree to RCC 160 which limited AL-MAJID's power to a five kilometer radius around the major cities of Northern Iraq. KHUDAIYER never published such a Decree. KHUDAIYER asked if it was possible that these five kilometer limitation instructions could have been verbal. He said that such an order, to contradict a Decree would be very big and written. The original Decree was sent to the Ministry of Interior, to governates and a variety of receivers. The Chief of Staff, the military intelligence, the party and the security services were aligned under the details of RCC 160. Even if the original Decree were to be modified, written coordination would be the only way to notify all of these groups who were responsible for adhering to the details of the original RCC Decree 160. To modify a Decree would require the same legal authority. Doing it verbally would not be lawfully feasible. If such an event occurred it would be, legally speaking, unprecedented.

KHUDAIYER was asked what he thought if AL-MAJID was claiming that the five kilometer limitation was given to him verbally. KHUDAIYER said that this instruction would only be in a
written format. If Al-Majid said it was passed verbally, he would be lying.

While serving as the commander of Northern Iraq, if AL-MAJID needed to contact the President, he would go through the Presidential Secretary's Office. From 1987 through 1989, KHUDAİER did not ever recall receiving requests from AL-MAJID through the Presidential Diwan's Office.

KHUDAİER was a shown a photocopy of Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) Decree Number 10, dated 03/01/1988 [this copy is in the attached 1A enveloped]. KHUDAİER recognized it as the copy of an authentic RCC document in format and substance. KHUDAİER has never heard of a political party having the authority to punish people who serve in the military. Decree number 10 stated that those who did not serve, would be killed. The reason for this being promulgated in a Decree and Diwan's signature was because SADDAH did not trust the military. There were many deserters.

KHUDAİER was asked about the atrocious conditions where the Kurds had been housed after their forced relocation in 1987 through 1989. This was not an oversight by the Baghdad government, but rather it was done by design. The intention was to prevent any Iranian-induced cohesion by displacing the Kurds out of their own area. He heard lots of people within the government talking about what was being done and he thought it was illegal and crazy. But it was to be expected as they had the craziest person in the regime, AL-MAJID, picked as the one to head a problem with this magnitude. AL-MAJID was a Corporal who served in Kirkuk. He rose all the way to Minister of Defense under SADDAH's patronage.

KHUDAİER remembered the chemical attack incident in Halabja. Iranian elements had conquered and occupied the town and this was a huge shock to the Iraqi regime. Many thought that this might represent the beginning of a more expanded invasion. He did not know at the time that chemicals were used. One day in 1988 KHUDAİER was bringing mail to the Presidential Secretary's office. SADDAH, who was on the phone at the time, saw KHUDAİER. KHUDAİER did not want to be impolite or eavesdrop, but SADDAH motioned him into the President's Office and summoned him to sit down. KHUDAİER heard SADDAH saying into the phone 'Why did you do that? We cleared the area and kicked out the Iranians. There was no need to use this.' SADDAH seemed angry and uneasy during this call. When he hung up the phone he asked KHUDAİER if he knew who he
(SADDAM) was just speaking to. KHUDAIYER sensed that SADDAM was in that emotional state where one wishes to talk with somebody. SADDAM explained that he was just on the phone with Minister of Defense Adnan Khairallah. SADDAM asked KHUDAIYER if he knew what has happened? SADDAM explained that 'it appears that the military has used chemicals in HALABJA'. SADDAM asserted that this will look bad on us with the world community. SADDAM seemed surprised.

KHUDAIYER was asked to explain why SADDAM would be surprised, given the series of correspondences that SADDAM had previously sent coordinating their usage. As President, SADDAM knew that gassing people would cause a world image problem. SADDAM could accept the use of chemical weapons in an environment where he could manage the information of their usage and contain the fallout. But given that foreigners were in Halbaja, this was going to be an incident which he would not be able to manage the information. Since the Iranians had control of the area, they could manage the story. If the Iraqi forces had military control over Halbaja, then they could have prevented the foreigners from capturing the story and informing the world.
File Number: SISE - HQ - 1448534
Field Office Acquiring Evidence: FA1HQ
Serial # of Originating Document:  
Date Received: 6/12/04
From: Ahmad Hussein, 1CH0вл
(Address:  
City and State:  
By:  
To Be Returned: ☐ Yes  ☐ No
Receipt Given: ☐ Yes  ☐ No
Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e):  
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: ☐ Yes  ☐ No
Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): ☐ Yes  ☐ No
Title: DESEAT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ
Reference:  
(Communication Enclosing Material:  
Description: ☑ Original notes re interview of Ahmad Hussein, 1CH0вл  

 OWN SEALS ACC AS SECRETARY

6/12

DISCREE IS THE LULU

HASSAN AL-MALIKI + N. TERRITORY

EVERYONE WHO ASKS FOR ASSESS AFS

ABSENT

INSTRUCTIONS: ACC / 1:30 PM

AT 8:00 PM

SUCH MEETING + CONFERENC

IF SUCH MEETING TUESDAY PLACE ONLY 2 ON 3

COLORED PHOTO A SPOON OUTCOMES THOUGH LATER

FIVE INSTRUCTION

LEGAL COLUMN: PROFESSIONAL远离

ALWAYS REPORT AND GET INSPECTED FORM

HOURS ALLOY TO ACC MEETING AT

SOME MEETING WHERE WHICH HE TOOK

A SPOON, AN IMPORTANT MAS SOME ITEMS

AUTHENTIC

NO S1. OF INSTRUCTORS: LIMIT

THERE 70

5 KILOMETERS OF MAJOR CITY: IDENTITY

AUNT

HANDWRITTEN RECEIVED MANUALLY /}

AS -195
What level of decision?

Any of the others are in my M.C. and my recollection was that ultimate decision to cause M.C. ceases when the gay back off of H.B.

Mr. H. is Zem.

HMS not the same as ACL.MAG.

As 1986 was 6 months to cerral end of 7.

That extend another 6 months?"

— M.P. Z. wanted to have programs for R.G.C.

or M.G. RAM, R. A. not Division.

— As per division 65, 63, 67.

A 1967 well that is shown.

Any we know he is business in order to quash the rumors.

If all wants to call possum, over there.

SECRETARY.

Next column that would not be verbatim. (Cit)

must be written or written.

Any order to commit is known as very all. An written. 7 will go against common. — Mr. of interest to emails desiring.

NOTIFY.

No orders.

If all still exists then Cit.
AUTHORIZED DOCS

PANY / MICO / INTELLIGENCE

Cable to happen 3:00 PM 162 SFO / 442 C.S.

12th Ave. 7:10 M.I.C / 12:30 Security Secs

So amplitude others will require same format

Spread is can / in / May / 10 required same

Leaves A.T. will require locally not feasible Z0

Security 12th case will be any

PREP SEPARATE

ACL DISC. ID

NEVER KNOW All M.A. HAS AGENCY TO

PUBLIC PERSON WHO SEEN THE ABC

DISC. AND THUS YOU MUST WILD BE IN

PERSON FOR DISC. & BE REAP SEPARATE

DISC. 7:00 AM 7:54 AM
S.S.A. I was specifically

M.O.D. Ann Kavanagh

S.A.D. emotion was to rule it

H.I.P. A change in N.A.A.

This will N.E.E.T. Dear on us.

V.A.C. communicate

Again when I was told over M.G.B.R. any

are the begin or more exquisite

Mission expanded

Toward, so did conversation, why you
don’t need to do that? I was busy man
be quiet, you’re come in sit a chair

Do you know who I was talking to?

K.A.N. M.A.

- I.f appears that many are so close

- Significant unconnected but field by us

I.A.N.

As a result, Mr. Lewis Erskine

Mark off to India in order
In order to use chemical weapons, you must have the proper permission, following regulations.

Passport

My address: [Address]

Review: [Date]

Due to wartime uses of chemical warfare, examples of cases exist in many countries. The main

issue remains very in certain cases. The only

answer is the other...

If anyone needs assistance, they had contact, I would never ask...

[Signature]

Dear one, you’ve seen this? Yes, see case files, case.

See ends on white, with black lines. The blank

signature behind where the things paper paper

would sign papers / [Signature]
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/14/2004

On 06/12/2004, AHMED HUSSEIN KHADAIYIR (Black List #76) was interviewed at Camp Cropper Detention Camp, Baghdad, Iraq where he was being detained by the U.S. Army following his surrender to authorities in approximately April 2003. Present during this interview were Supervisory Special Agent George L. Piro, Special Agent [redacted] and Language Specialist [redacted]. After being explained the purpose of the interview, KHADAIYIR provided the following information:

Khudaiyir believed that SADDAH did not truly trust anyone. The closest thing that came to trust was the relationship he had with his children and some relatives such as Ali Hassan Al-Majid and Abid Hamid Mahmud al-Tikriti. Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri projected himself as a spiritual person. It was not this religious facet of his personality that appealed to SADDAH, but rather his obedience and loyalty. Al-Duri followed instructions and looked at every job SADDAH gave him as an opportunity to perform.

SADDAH was always emotional during meetings with Ministers. He was quick to take action without thinking. His impatience and inability to wait for anything caused him to make premature decisions. It was similar to a child who acted without thinking and planning ahead for himself.

SADDAH would cry during speeches, but these were more like stage tears. Some said that he was like his mother in this manner.

When SADDAH demonstrated kindness, it was rarely for the sake of the act itself. Usually it was not genuine, it was to showoff. In 1996 there was an Iraqi man who SADDAH had known for a very long time. They may have been associates from SADDAH's Cairo days. He pleaded for assistance from SADDAH because he had nothing these days, and was absolutely destitute. SADDAH ordered an arrangement for this man to be provided with a house a car and a salary. Over the past few years, SADDAH would meet with the needy and beggars, especially during Ramadan. He would also arrange stipends for widows.

SADDAH would become most angry when Ministers would talk back to him. He considered Ministers as having lower rank and

Investigation on 06/12/2004 at Baghdad, Iraq

File # 315E-HO-1448534 Date dictated 06/14/2004

by SSA George L. Piro

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having no business arguing with him. As a result, they would never respond, even if they knew SADDAM was doing or saying something that was wrong or inaccurate.

SADDAM did not like hearing about Ministers punishing subordinates for no reason. Alternatively, he did not like it when Ministers did not take action to discipline subordinates who needed it.

When discussing fairness and justice, SADDAM used to cite Koranic hadiths which involved al-Ansar (the Prophet Muhammad's companions) and the Muhajir (those faithful who immigrated for religious reasons). In 1995 or 1996 SADDAM commissioned Ministry of Justice officials Munthar al-Shawri and Shabib al Maliki to research and produce a report. The report was to show those occasions and examples that SADDAM had demonstrated fairness. It was more of a public relations effort than a self inspection exercise.

It seemed to KHUDAIYER that since 1991, SADDAM has been very concerned about how he will be remembered. He was always working on his legacy by doing wasteful things like building palaces. This served as a source of embarrassment for KHUDAIYER when he met other members of the foreign diplomatic community. So many of these building materials were imported through Jordan. The Jordanian Prime Minister, seeing all of this, once asked KHUDAIYER how his government could import all of these extravagances, such as colored glass for windows, when so many Iraqi people did not even have bread, sugar or other staples.

KHUDAIYER hoped that SADDAM, in his detention, would say to the Iraqi people that 'I lost and I failed you, I hurt my people'. But realistically, he is too full of himself. He admires himself so much, he is conscientious of the jowls in his neck revealing his age. He is so fond of telling stories about himself as a fighter and a struggler.

The only way KHUDAIYER could see SADDAM saying something conciliatory is if he were to have some role in the future government. He is too tied to his chair when it comes to power. He never acknowledges mistakes. Once when he was making an address to an Arab conference after 1991. People were expecting him to say something contrite about his invasion of Kuwait. Instead, SADDAM used this platform to encourage the people of Kuwait to overthrow their government.
File Number: 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence: FBI HQ

Serial # of Originating Document:

Date Received: 6/12/04

From: Ahmad Hussein Khuainier

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By:

To Be Returned: No

Receipt Given: No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): No

Title: DESERT SPIDER

IT IRAQ

Reference: (Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of

Ahmad Hussein Khuainier
Army 1975 - 1976

IT WAS A HARD TIME. I HAD TO STUDY. I WAS AT HOME ALONE. I HAD TO STUDY. I WAS AT HOME ALONE.

IF NOT, I'D BE HOME ALONE. I HAD TO STUDY. I WAS AT HOME ALONE.
An AIRNESS Analysis-90CS

- AIKQA to evaluate society to human beings
  - How AI can affect human society
  - Understanding AI in today's world
  - Ethical considerations in AI development
File Number: 315E-HQ-1448534
Field Office Acquiring Evidence: HQ
Serial # of Originating Document:
Date Received: 06/27/2004
From:
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
(Address)
(City and State)
By: George C. Piro
To Be Returned: No
Receipt Given: No
Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:
No
Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI):
Yes
Title: Desert Spider
IT - IRAQ
Reference:
(Communication Enclosing Material)
Description: Yes
Original notes re interview of Taha Yassin Ramadan
BL #20  06/27  0939 HRS  No.

1. Does not see a dr. called family books ago (1st Time)

(has not done anything wrong/ bad)

I love my country/ people/ etc.

2. Up Robin inc of rel. wy/ Arab countries, due to sh did not leave country was forced to travel even though there were 2 others, he was selected over them.

3. 1994 - Had meeting w/ Ibrahim Sanusi Sudan - No relationship nor like his party, which conflicts w/ his beliefs. Sanusi is w/ Turabi

4. Have heard Sanusi sent to Iraq to mediate between the 3 factions poi in Sudan. Sanusi wanted to see sh but he did not want to, & ordered sh to leave. He would be bad for him not to see anyone. I met Sanusi in his Iraq. Talked about Iraq etc. Spoke about conflict w/ Basils. Party wanted iraq to mediate between 2 parties. I told him they have one party, he knows each other's party. Iraq does not know anything about their internal conflict.

5. Came then assistance of it is as their guest asked for his visit to be non-official
ONLY TIME TO SEE SANUSI, RECOGNISE THIS NO. RIDE OFFICE, CLOTHING ETC. IS CLAIMING HIS MOTHER IS PERFECT.

HE IS NOT AN HONEST MAN, VERBAL ANY INFO FROM IMMEDIATELY.

OUR INFO THEY HAD RELATIONS W/ BIN LADEN WHILE HE WAS IN SUDAN. PUBLIC INFO

SHIh ASSIGNED IT TO DO BECAUSE HE WAS LEADER IN THE PARTY & PURPOSE OF SANUSI'S VISIT WAS PARTY RELATED NOT POLITICALLY WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO FOREIGN MINISTER.

FOR THE DIFFICULT TASKS WERE GIVEN TO HIM.

SANUSI TRAVELEd BY HIMSELF - BROUGHT BY AN UNK. JES OFFICER. MTL NO LONGER THAN 1 HR.

NO DISCUSSIONS RE UBI - S SUDAN KNOWS IRAQ'S VIEWS - IRAQ'S LEADERSHIP OPPOSED UBI & ITS VIEWS. BAAJAD PARTY IS NOT A RELIGIOUS PARTY.
IN 1996 UBI WAS NOTHING NOT A POLITICAL ISSUE UBI BELONGS WAHABIS WITH OFFICER

IRAQ VIEWED UBI AS ENEMY BUT NOT A DIRECT ENEMY OR THREAT. BUT BECAUSE CONCERNED ABOUT WASHABIS COMING INTO IRAQ

IN 1999 THEY DESTROYED WASHABIS, FINANCED BY SAUDIS. STAYED IN JAIL UNTIL THE AMNESTY. THEY KILLED PEOPLE IN MOSQUE IN 1999 THE BELIEFS FOR FORCE

HAD NOTHING TO DO W/ SAUDI & DID NOT ASK FOR HIJAZI TO BE A CONFLICT.

ONLY MET IT REMEMBERED I'M NOT SURE IF HE MET IN SUDAN & HAS TRAVELED FOREIGNLY TO SUDAN SEVERAL TIMES.

- 1992
- MET VISITED PRES. & TURABI WAS SICK
- 8 VISITED HIM SAUDI MAY HAVE BEEN THERE. OFFICIAL VISIT GOVT TO GOVT.

- DOES NOT BELIEVE SAUDI ASKED FOR OTHER MATTERS OR OTHER TASKING.

- DOES NOT KNOW AYMAN & NEVER MET HIM. THAT IS A US LEGATION.
KNOWS: A LOT OF EGYPTIANS FLEE TO IRAQ
BUT DOES NOT KNOW ANYONE NOT IN
CITIES OF BASHING AND OF EGYPTIAN
IN IRAQ TO WORK.

HE READ AMERICAN PRESS REPORTS ABOUT
THIS IS COMPLETELY FALSE.

HAD NO CONTACTS WITH UDI AT ALL!

I REMEMBER TALIBAN EMBASSY IN
IRAQ ASKED IRAQ TO RE-OPEN THE AFGHAN
EMBASSY

HE BROUGHT THE 4 MINS. TO DISCUSS
THE ISSUE. DECIDED NOT TO.

NOT SATISFIED WITH TALIBAN GOVT
ADvised THE MINIS. TO ADVISE TALIBAN
COULD NOT STAFF IT AT THIS TIME.
2. Religious Popular Party

- Arab Popular Support - After War

Conf.: Would attend, not in U.S., states in 1982 - run by

1. Attendees: Arab vip's, publishers, lawyers, etc.

2. Islamic: (Requested SH to attend) Attendees would ask for audience w/ press. A lot of people met w/ him (press) would need some info on TV IE inc w/ a delegation.

No discussions about Arab Afghans family coming to Iraq.

Wahabis began to appear in Fallujah, Abu G., Bashir and Mosul. Iraqis converted to Wahabis & rece financial support from Saudi. Ramped up & imprisoned at Saddam's orders.

NBRR met w/ Zawairi.

Ms. an employee in IES. Came once a CSH and asked about Jordanian or Arab descendant. Ms. talked about that guy, an old Bahraini woman dismissed.
WANTED TO DISCUSS HOW TO ESTABLISH A BANANA PARTY IN JORDAN

SEEMED LITTLE EXPERIENCE/CAP. — ASKED WHY TALKING TO HIM. MS SAID WANTED TO ESTABLISH PARTY BUT MAKING IT CLEAR NO A THREAT POSITION TO IRAQ.

KIND TO JORDAN GOT AUTHORITY FOR PERS.

STARTED TO SEND INFO. REFRES OF INFO. DIRECTED THESE TO IES.

MS NEVER LEFT IRAQ UNTIL WAR.

50's SHORT DARK SKIN COLOR
MID BUILT 5'-10'

MS MET W/ A TWICE ONLY 4 OT TO BRIEF HIM 2ND BROUGHT JORDANIAN

DOESN'T KNOW BUT DOESN'T THINK SO - BECAUSE AS WOULD SEE ANY AROUND BAGHDAD < MOS. BEFORE OIF
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TAHA YASIN RAMADAN AL-JIZRAWI, Black List #20, was interviewed at a detention facility at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq on 6/27/2004. Interviewing agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, D.C. Department of Defense contract linguist provided Arabic/English translation. RAMADAN has been the Vice President of Iraq since 1991, Ba'ath Party Revolutionary Command Council member since 1969, and former First Deputy Prime Minister from 1979-1991. The main purpose of this interview was to determine RAMADAN's knowledge regarding Iraq's links to USAMA BIN LADIN (UBL) and Al Qaeda. He provided the following information:

According to RAMADAN, part of the Vice President's role included developing relationships with other Arab countries because President SADDAM HUSSEIN did not like traveling outside of Iraq. RAMADAN was chosen to travel, even though there was another Vice President. RAMADAN was chosen due to his ability to handle difficult and sensitive issues.

In 1994, RAMADAN had a meeting with Dr. IBRAHIM SANUSI, Deputy Secretary General of the National Islamic Front (NIF) in Sudan. Neither RAMADAN nor the Iraqi leadership had a relationship with Sudan, nor did they like the NIF because their party line conflicted with beliefs of the Ba'ath Party. SANUSI was a senior aide to President TURABI.

SANUSI was allegedly sent to Iraq to request assistance in mediating between the political factions in Sudan. His visit was arranged with the assistance of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), who requested that his visit be unofficial. SANUSI wanted an audience with President HUSSEIN, but HUSSEIN did not want to meet with SANUSI. HUSSEIN directed RAMADAN to meet with him, since it would look bad if SANUSI did not meet with any representative from the Iraqi Government. In addition, RAMADAN was a leader in the Ba'ath Party and the purpose of SANUSI's visit was party related, not political. An official political visit would have been arranged through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and SANUSI would have met with the Foreign Minister. SANUSI spoke about...
conflict with the rival political party headed by BASHIR. RAMADAN advised SANUSI that Iraq did not know about the internal conflicts between the parties in Sudan, nor should they intervene.

The 1994 meeting between RAMADAN and SANUSI lasted only an hour, and according to RAMADAN was the only time the two met. SANUSI traveled by himself, but brought an unknown IIS officer with him to the meeting. RAMADAN recalled the building and office where the meeting was held, and described the clothing that SANUSI wore during the meeting. RAMADAN claimed his recollection of that day and the meeting was perfect. RAMADAN described SANUSI as not an honest man, and any information from him needed to be verified immediately.

Interviewing agents advised RAMADAN that it was public information that Iraq had relations with UBL while UBL was in Sudan. RAMADAN advised there were no discussions regarding UBL at the meeting with SANUSI. Sudan knew that Iraq's leadership opposed UBL and his views. RAMADAN commented that the Ba'ath Party is not a religious party. RAMADAN advised that in 1994, UBL was a nobody and Iraq did not view him as a political issue. UBL was a Wahabist and opposed the Saudi regime and Saudi Royal family. Although Iraq viewed UBL as an enemy, he was not a direct enemy or a threat to Iraq. There was concern about Wahabists coming into Iraq, when they began to appear in Fallujah, Abu Gharib, Baghdad, and Mosul in the late 1990s. They were known to instill their beliefs by force and were known to kill people in mosques. Iraqi's were converting to Wahabism and were receiving financial support from Saudi Arabia. In 1999, SADDAM ordered Wahabists be detained and they remained in custody until the amnesty in 2002.

RAMADAN had nothing to do with SANUSI and did not assign FARUQ HIJAZI (Black List #104) to be the intermediary. RAMADAN insisted this was the only meeting he remembered. Although RAMADAN had traveled to Sudan several times, he was unsure if he had ever met SANUSI in Sudan. RAMADAN recalled in 1992, President TURABI was sick, and RAMADAN traveled to Sudan on an official visit to meet him. RAMADAN is not positive, but advised that SANUSI may have been present during this visit. RAMADAN did not believe that SANUSI requested anything else from the IIS.

RAMADAN was questioned regarding press reports that he had met with UBL advisor AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI. RAMADAN advised he had read these press reports and said they were completely false and were fabricated by the United States. RAMADAN claimed he did not
know AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI and had never personally met him. RAMADAN
knows many Egyptians, but reiterated he did not know ZAWAHIRI.
RAMADAN was responsible for bringing millions of Egyptians to Iraq
to work. RAMADAN advised that he had no connections or relations
with UBL.

RAMADAN recalled that in approximately 2000, the Taliban
Ambassador in Iraq made a request to see if Iraq would reopen its
Embassy in Afghanistan. President HUSSEIN convened a meeting with
the Council of Four (RAMADAN, IZZAT IBRAHIM AL-DURI [BL#6], TARIQ
AZIZ [BL#25], and ALI HASAN AL-MAJID [BL#5]) to discuss this issue.
They decided not to reopen the Embassy because they were not
satisfied with the Taliban Government. President HUSSEIN
instructed the Ministers to advise the Taliban that they could not
staff the Embassy at that time.

RAMADAN advised he is familiar with the name MUHAMMAD AL
SALMANI and said that he was an employee of the IIS. AL SALMANI
came to RAMADAN once to set up a meeting between RAMADAN and an
Iraqi living in Jordan who was interested in establishing the
Ba'ath Party in Jordan. RAMADAN could not recall this individuals
name. In RAMADAN's view, the Iraqi who wanted to establish the
Ba'ath Party in Jordan had limited political capabilities and
little experience. RAMADAN met with the Iraqi, who assured him
that the Ba'ath Party he was interested in forming in Jordan would
not be a threat or present any opposition to Iraq. The Iraqi
returned to Jordan to seek authority to establish the party in
Jordan. The Iraqi then began sending RAMADAN information reports.
RAMADAN directed the reports to the IIS, and had no further contact
with the Iraqi.

Regarding AL SALMANI, RAMADAN believed that he never left
Iraq until the war. AL SALMANI met with RAMADAN twice; the first
time to brief him; the second to introduce the Iraqi to RAMADAN.
RAMADAN does not believe AL SALMANI was stationed in the United
States, as he would periodically see him in and around Baghdad.
When questioned further, RAMADAN stated he did not officially know
if AL SALMANI had been assigned to the United States, and the
periods between his sightings of AL SALMANI stretched sometimes
over several years. The last time RAMADAN saw AL SALMANI was
several months before Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). AL SALMANI is
described as in his 50's, dark complexion, medium build,
approximately 5'6" height.
FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E·HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence HQ

Serial # of Originating Document

Date Received 06/25/2004

From HASSAYO RASHIA AND MUHAMMAD AL DRAIN
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(Baghdad, IRAQ)
(City and State)

By

To Be Returned [ ] Yes [x] No

Receipt Given [ ] Yes [ ] No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure [x] Yes [ ] No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI) [ ] Yes [x] No

Title: OPERATION DEBATE 30/08

[ ] Yes [x] No

Reference: HUSBAD, JDB, TM1, 06 25 2004
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: [x] Original notes re interview of

HUSBAD RASHIA AND MUHAMMAD AL DRAIN
Husayn Rashid Al-Muhammad Al-Tikriti

Date: July 1, 1940

1. Director General
2. Planning

2. Military Movement
- Chief of Staff - Director of the Time Frame: Nazar Khazazi

- Claims it never issued orders during Anfal
- Was responsible for movement of troops
to the front.

= Name: Alia of the 1960s at CCI, by 1980
And name of the coast of Anfal
Husayn Rashid Al Muhammad Al Tikriti, (Black List #131), date of birth July 1, 1940, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. FBI Language Specialist b6 provided Arabic/English translation. Sabir b7c provided the following information:

In 1987, Husayn was the Deputy Chief of Operations. He was responsible for the Directorate of Planning and the Directorate of Military Movements. The Army Chief of Staff during that time frame was Nazar Khazraji (phonetic).

Interviewers told Husayn that they wanted to discuss the time frame of 1987-1988 during the Anfal Campaign. Husayn claims his only responsibilities were handling the movement of troops to the front lines, and never issued orders during Anfal. In addition, Husayn allegedly did not know about the use of chemical weapons (CW) by the Iraqi Military, nor was he aware of the use of CW at Halabja. Interviewers advised Husayn that they have reviewed many documents and conducted numerous interviews regarding the Anfal Campaign. Interviewers then questioned Husayn's credibility due to the fact he was in an important position with the Iraqi military during that time frame. Husayn became indignant at which time the interview was terminated.

Investigation on 06/25/2004 at Baghdad, Iraq

File # 315E-HQ-1448534 Date dictated 06/26/2004
SSA George L. Pirro
by SSA tmi

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
File Number: 315E-HQ-1448534
Field Office Acquiring Evidence: FBI Baghdad (FBI-IQ)
Serial # of Originating Document: 
Date Received: 6/18/04
From: 

(Address)

Baghdad, Iraq
(City and State)

By: SSA George J Piro

To Be Returned: No
Receipt Given: No
Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: No
Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): No
Title: Operation Desert Spider

Reference: 302 date 6/26/2004
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re-interview of
Handwritten notes:
On 6/18/2004, [redacted] was interviewed at a military detention facility in Baghdad, Iraq, by SSA [redacted] and provided the following information:

Investigation on 6/18/2004 at Baghdad, Iraq

File # 315E-HQ-1448534-10Z Date dictated 6/19/2004

by SSA George L. Pir Date dictated 6/19/2004

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/28/2004

TARIQ AZIZ, (Black List # 2), Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) with the former Iraqi regime, was interviewed on 06/27/2004 by Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] and Special Agent [redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at a detention facility in Baghdad, Iraq. After being explained the purpose of the interview, AZIZ provided the following information:

Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait provoked the Saudi government into aligning itself with the United States in order to provide security for the Kingdom. USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL) encouraged the Royal family to rely on him, not the Americans, for their defense. UBL was the guest of the Sudanese government headed by HASSAN AL-TURABI. AL-TURABI had persecuted the Ba'athists in earlier days. The Sudanese National Islamic Front Party was a government based on Islam. The Ba'ath Party strongly believed it inappropriate to link Islam with politics. This fundamental disagreement caused a long-standing rift between Iraq and Sudan.

AZIZ was asked if Iraq used Islamic militants as a proxy army the way the Mujahadin were used in Afghanistan against the Soviets and in the Kashmir Region against Indian forces. AZIZ claimed this was not President SADDAM HUSSEIN's style and that SADDAM did not trust the Islamists. He pointed out that in a publicly disseminated video tape, UBL had called SADDAM an 'infidel.' In the Arab/Muslim world, this insult was extremely harsh and unlikely to be forgotten by SADDAM. When it was pointed out the Iraqi government, had supported the Mujahadin el-Kalq (MEK) as means of keeping Iran at bay, AZIZ noted that this was a nationalist group, not an Islamic fundamentalist organization, and that they actually had an official representative assigned to an office in Baghdad.

Following the East Africa embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salam, SADDAM issued no official response. As a dedicated anti-American, he delighted in it. The United States had bombed his country and tried to kill him. It was, therefore, no surprise, that SADDAM was pleased. AZIZ was asked if SADDAM considered al-Qaeda a more attractive option after these attacks and the bombing of the USS Cole. SADDAM thought that UBL's al-Qaeda was an effective organization.
In AZIZ's presence, SADDAM had only expressed negative sentiments about UBL. When the Taliban was pretending to be a legitimate government in Afghanistan, Iraq deliberately avoided opening an Embassy in Kabul. During traditional times of the year on the Islamic calendar for sending greetings, such as Id al-Fitr, Taliban leader, Mullah OMAR sent congratulations to the heads of state of all the Islamic countries, including Iraq. SADDAM refused to publish the greetings from OMAR in the newspapers even though it was the custom.

UBL adopted and endorsed a Wahabist position on Islam. In the 1990s, members of the Iraqi government began seeing young men with beards and no mustaches wearing dish-dashes that did not reach all the way to their feet. This was clear evidence that Wahabists had come to Iraq. Just as Iraq had forbidden membership in Hizb'Dawa ten years earlier, they found it necessary to issue a decree aggressively outlawing Wahabism in Iraq and threatening offenders with execution.

These events led to AZIZ to conclude that SADDAM was not interested in forming a partnership with Islamists. SADDAM was not shy about expressing his opinion in front of others that he considered Wahabists to be opportunists and hypocrites. Furthermore, SADDAM had tried to rectify Iraq’s relationships with the Saudis. He had exchanged correspondence with Prince ABDALLAH. During an Arab summit in Qatar in either 2002 or 2003, IZZAT IBRAHIM AL-DURI and Prince ABDALLAH kissed and embraced on television.

AZIZ agreed that heads of state and ambassadors often say things publicly to play to their domestic audiences while exchanging different messages privately. However, he contended that if this dynamic had taken place between SADDAM and any Islamist group, including al-Qaeda, it was not being done in front of AZIZ or with his knowledge. He advised he was unaware of such matters ever being discussed in open diplomatic circles. However, this would not surprise him. AZIZ's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) deals with a country's relationships with other nation states. Since al-Qaeda was a non state actor with no credentialed representatives registered with the MFA, liaison with them could not take place through diplomatic institutions. Additionally, since AZIZ was a Christian, he would not be the person with whom the Iraqi government would select to interact with Islamists. With the exception of Palestine movements, where Christians and Muslims
live harmoniously, no Islamic group would accept a meeting with a Christian to negotiate aspects of their cause. The years between 1995 and 1996 represented the beginning of AZIZ's marginalization from a position of influence within the Regime. He lost SADDAM's special trust that so many of SADDAM's relatives enjoyed.

In discussing former regime members, AZIZ described FAROUK HIJAZI, (Black List number # 104) as a good guy. He had a prominent role and enjoyed a favorable reputation within the Muhabarat or Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS). AZIZ opined, cynically, that HIJAZI's appointed as Ambassador represented the system's way of 'kicking him up.' HIJAZI was a trusted Ba'athist, certainly deserving of an assignment to head the Muhabarat (IIS). By contrast, TAHIR HABOOSH was 'just a policeman' who lacked the capacity or sophistication to run an organization such as the Muhabarat (IIS). AZIZ was aware of the famous rumor that had been covered by the media which suggested that HIJAZI traveled to Afghanistan in order to meet with UBL. AZIZ once asked HIJAZI if this was true, but HIJAZI denied it.

Following the 09/11/2001 attack on the United States, SADDAM asked AZIZ to draft letters of condolence to Iraq's friends in the United States, including former U.S. Attorney, RAMSEY CLARK, and KATHY KELLY. U.S. President GEORGE BUSH was not mentioned.

AZIZ was unaware of any overtures to develop a mutual relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda. When informed that senior Al-Qaeda member ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI had visited Baghdad in 1998, AZIZ replied by saying 'really?'. He was told that the Al-Qaeda member met with IZZAT IBRAHIM AL-DURI. AZIZ said it seemed natural that the regime would send 'sheik', the 'hypocrite' AL-DURI. AZIZ was further advised that ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI had returned in 2003 to meet with the Regime. AZIZ stated that he was not aware of this. He had no recollection of being in any meeting with SADDAM or Presidential Secretary, ABID MAHMOUD (Black List # 4), in which ABU HAFS' presence in Iraq in 2003 was discussed.

AZIZ did not know of any instances where Iraqi Forces shot Iranian prisoners of war. He recalled there was a documented incident in which the Iranians shot and captured Iraqi troops. This incident was brought to the attention of the MFA by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

The principal Iraqi leaders in Kuwait during the 1990/1991 invasion were ALI HASSAN AL-MAJID (Black List # 5),
SABAWI AL-TIKRITI (SADDAM's half brother). AL-MAJID also killed many individuals in northern Iraq. Nobody would question this. The disposition of Kuwaiti prisoners who were taken to Iraq, however, remained a mystery. AZIZ claimed that AL-MAJID was responsible for the 'disappearance' of these Kuwaitis, but he provided no specific evidence to support this claim. He related that conventional wisdom is that the Kuwaitis were captured inside their own country Kuwait and imprisoned in Basara. When the U.S. troops began their 1991 invasion of Iraq, the Iraqis opened the prison doors and fled the area. AZIZ could not confirm the truth of this story. Nevertheless, he claimed that if the prisoners were killed, it would have been at AL-MAJID's command.

According to AZIZ, Iraq used chemical weapons against the Iranians during the Iran-Iraq war. At first, the Iraqi government publicly denied using them, but they later acknowledged it. According to UBL, however, the reported use of chemical weapons against the Kurds in Halabja was dubious. He contended that there was credible news reporting that showed that the Iranians were the ones who first used chemical weapons in that area.
File Number: 315 E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence:

Serial # of Originating Document:

Date Received: 06/23/2007

From: SAQIR ABD AL A212 HASAWA AL DHA1
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(BALAHAB, IRAQ)
(City and State)

By

To Be Returned: Yes [ ] No [ ]

Receipt Given: Yes [ ] No [ ]

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Yes [ ] No [ ]

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): Yes [ ] No [ ]

Title: OPERATION DESERT SPIDER

Reference: SAQIR, J68, T21, 06232007
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: [ ] Original notes re interview of

SAQIR ABD AL A212 HASAWA AL DHA1
SARID ARAD AL ARIJ HUSAYN AZ ZUAI

Date 6/23/67 No. 1

1967 - 1968 Time Frame

Najm Khairas - Army Chief of Staff
Muhammad AlMalak - Minister of Defense

BEGINNING OF 1967

Hussein Rashid - BLN #131

Commander of Republican Guard

in Southern Bamas - Deputy Chief of Staff

For Operation

- DUTIES AT - RESPONSIBLE TO

- EXCECUT ALL ARMY ORDERS

2. Directorate - Responsibility for:
   1. Planning - Staffing/Planning
   2. Execution of all Orders and

2. Planning - Execution of A 15000 Man

For the Execution of the Plan.

- STAFF

- L C E L K H A I R A S

- L C E L K H A I R A S

- L C E L K H A I R A S

- L C E L K H A I R A S

- L C E L K H A I R A S

- L C E L K H A I R A S

- L C E L K H A I R A S

- L C E L K H A I R A S
DIRECTOR OF MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
AYAD STAYA

AYAD QASIM BECAME THE COMMANDEER OF
DIO DEF. COUNCIL, LATER KUWAITI DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT CHIEF OF STAFF OF NAVY

NASER MOHAMMED OSMAN AL AYUMI PLACE
AS THE DIR. OF MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

MUHAMMAD ARASH KHAIR AS DIR. OF DEFENSE

MINISTER OF DEFENSE

FUSIS AL THARAB AS ISLAMIC RELATIONS MINISTERS

DIRECTOR OF PLANNING

DSZ #1 - SIGNATURES RECEIVED AT AMB.

DIRECTOR OF DSZ 1 - SAHIB KHANIA (AMB. OF DSZ)

DEPUTY OF DSZ #1 - WADIA SAMARAI (AMB. OF DSZ)

DIRECTOR OF DSZ #1 - SABAH SAMARAI

— PALESTINE — AMB. SAMARAI

RECOGNIZED AND SAMARAI

PALACE — RECOGNIZED MUHAMMAD KHAIR AS SIGNATURES

LEADER Rights

— LEADER OF KUWAITI GOVERNMENT —

— CHIEF DISSIDENT — MUHAMMAD KHAIR —
PAGE 4

- SALT FAYAR - OMI SECRETARY OF ADIRES
- Louis Lott
- Local Right - Signature
- Division CO - World Salvation
- Bexim of OMI

PAGE 5

73 Page Doc.

Page 89, 90, Letter from OMI

7th Branch Second Section

World as far as possible until now

OCP Second Section Division

STAFF COLONEL (Signature) (Lost?)

- Windows Louis - LDS's Column - World Salvation
- Indicate My Regards to Doc.
- Identified My own Signature as
- President of Doc.
PAGE #12 - BRIEFING IT WAS SO difficult KHALING
SUMMER - 1977 REPTION

PAGE #13 - COMMITTEE REGARD TO SPECIFIC AMMUNITION
REPRESENTATIVE FROM PENTAGON, MILITARY
AND MILITARY UNITS WERE
THE COMMITTEE REFERRED TO AN
DOCUMENT.
ALSO REPS FROM REAGAN
AND WERE SOME ADVISERS
THE AIR FORCE OR ANY OTHER SERVICE
MIGHT USE OF MILITARY

COMMITTEE
COMMUNITY PROVIDES RECOMMENDATIONS TO

TO ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, WILD
OBSERVERS PREPARE RECOMMENDATIONS
TO MINISTRY OF DEFENSE COMMITTEE
TO ARMED SERVICES WHICH SADDAM CHAIR

HOWEREVER IN THE CASE THE
PRESIDENT HAS ORDERED IMMEDIATE
USE OF CODE BASKET ON REACTIONS
FROM NO DUE

WHENEVER YOU PUT KHALING DOWN
WE NEED CHAIR THIS COMMITTEE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING ON DEFENSE

- MINISTER OF DEFENSE
- DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE
- COMMANDER OF NAVY
- COMMANDER OF ARMY (NON-AIR)
- ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF
- DIRECTOR OF PLANNING
- DIRECTOR OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
- MINISTER OF MILITARY AFFAIRS

MEETING-TWICE A WEEK DISCUSSIONS

SECRETARY OF THE COMMITTEE, AL-AIM DIN KATHIM AL-JABILI

ARM PREDICTIONS AND MILITARY OPERATIONS

WE ARE DISCUSSED IN THE COMMITTEE.

- MEETING RECOMMENDATIONS ARE DISCUSSED
- IN THE COMMITTEE RECOMMEND ALL
- (SECRETS) ARE COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY TO THE PRESIDENT, SADDAM HUSSEIN
- ISSUE THE ORDER TO EXECUTE
- THE PRESIDENT'S ORDER

RECOMMENDATION RECOMMENDATION:
- DISCERNment REPORTING

ODD TIMES MOD 2 RECOMMENDATION
Page 6 - DOC #1 - 1st DIRECTorate DIV.

Signature of DIRECTor - SUDAN ABDUL HAKIM

ABU GHAIL

- THE DIRECTorate had no

INAVIG BRIEFING, DEPARTMENTAL

EXTERNAL matters

RAZIA #15 - DOC #1 - DURUS RECOGNIZE SIGNATURE

RAZIA #1 - DOC #1 - Coordinates REPORT CLEARANCE - WAKA

SAMAD

RAZIA #17 - DOC #1 - DURUS RECOGNIZE SIGNATURE

RAZIA #25 - DOC #1 - DURUS RECOGNIZE SIGNATURE

1990 - 1994 - DIRECTOR OF MUSLIMARIS (IES)

TRANOMED FOR SAFARI.

HE RETURNED IN 1994.
DOC 7 -

PROGRESS STATUS MISSION - LISTENING

PASS ON P.O. 12401 8/28/69

HEAD OF THIS PROJECT - MINISTRY

TRANSMITTED 8/28/69. ATTENT: MURTAUGH

THIS PROJECT WILL COME OUT RESPONSABLY AT OK JS.

- ABSTRACT: HAD REE. COMMUNICATION
- AND Send IT ONCE TO PRESIDENT
- SECRETARY, AND Send IT IMMEDIATELY

THAT Dear TO CONFIRM THE INFO COME

In the interests
Case ID: 315E-HQ-14485

DG  33  ORIGINAL NOTES RE INTERVIEW OF IBRAHIM AL ANI #277
BY SA  RE 315E-HQ-1448534
IBRAHIM SAMIR AL ANI (BL #277), was interviewed at his place of residence, a military detention camp in Baghdad, Iraq by Supervisory Special Agent and Special Agent Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Providing translations during this interview was FBI Language Specialist. After being informed of the purpose of the interview, AL ANI provided the following information:

AL ANI was born in 1957 in Baghdad, Iraq.

While AL ANI was growing up, his family lived in Tigris, al-Ramadi and Baghdad.

AL ANI joined the Ba‘ath party when he was twelve years old. When AL ANI was 22 years old, he joined the Muhabarat, an organization also referred to as the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS). His initial training included six months of intelligence trade craft followed by one month of weapons training. After the completion of this training, AL ANI was assigned to the Syrian Branch (M4) of the IIS in Baghdad. He worked in this position from 1979 through 1981. At the time, M4 was directed by a former military commander named IMAD AL-DURI. AL ANI’s assignment was to collect information on Syria from individuals and documents.

Beginning in 1981, AL ANI served as a Labor Attache in the Iraqi Embassy in New Delhi, India for one year and two months. This position was administrative in nature. The Iraqi Ambassador was the chief of an eight-man ISS station there. AL ANI’s primary responsibility was to collect information on labor matters and feed the information back to his headquarters. To accomplish this, he reviewed open source materials and met with Indian citizens and Iraqis living in India. Among this latter group were approximately 3000 college students, many of whom were children of Ba‘ath Party officials. The relationship between the two countries was substantial. Prior to the Iran-Iraq war, there were approximately 150,000 Indian nationals working in Baghdad. Because the Indian
people were so open and talkative, AL ANI thought that his job was easy. At times, however, he felt that he was not really engaged in meaningful intelligence gathering even though overseas assignments were prestigious, had distinct financial benefits and enabled one to gain experiences which could be parlayed into future work opportunities.

AL ANI also characterized overseas postings as 'life-changing' experiences, not just professionally, but personally. While working in New Delhi, he fell in love with an Indian woman, but was prohibited from marrying her due to IIS regulations forbidding members from marrying foreign nationals. He claimed that when he explained this to the woman, she wrote a letter to former Iraqi President, SADDAM HUSSEIN. Apparently, this letter was not well received, and AL ANI was recalled from India and sent to a prison for government officials for one year and four months. The prison, located in Baghdad, was separate from the one housing common criminals. Harsh treatment and torture were generally not employed on detainees at this facility.

In 1985, after AL ANI was released from prison, the IIS assigned him to work in Karbala where he remained until 1989. His areas of operational responsibility included the nearby areas of Najaf, Hillah and Qadisiya. His supervisor was his primary responsibility was to work on counterterrorism and espionage matters. He managed a staff of thirty IIS officers. The IIS targeted primarily communists inside Iraq. AL ANI pointed out that since Iraqi citizens seldom worked, the labor pool was comprised mainly of expatriates from Europe, China and Romania. Since the vast majority of these individuals were interested only in working and not in committing espionage, AL ANI felt there were no real security issues, and as a consequence, he had limited opportunities to excel.

In 1989, AL ANI departed Karbala for a posting in M6, the Security Office in Baghdad. At the time, M6 was being run by his friend and mentor for whom he had worked in India. M6 was responsible for maintaining security over people, documents, information, physical things and buildings. AL ANI specialized in building security for the entire country of Iraq. AL ANI stated that while he worked for M6, he did not have any contact with the Security Service Organization (SSO) which was a completely different unit run by Qusay HUSSEIN, son of former Iraqi President SADDAM HUSSEIN. AL-ANI's manager while he served with M6 was
According to AL ANI, in approximately May 1990, SADDAM's half-brother SABAWI HUSSEIN, replaced AL-AZAWI as the Director of the IIS. Rumors began circulating that SABAWI was unhappy with AL ANI because he thought AL ANI had received his assignment to M6 only because of his relationship with AL-AZAWI. Around this time, an IIS officer named, [REDACTED] who was previously imprisoned by SABAWI, was released upon a Presidential Pardon that set free thousands of prisoners in preparation for the Gulf War. AL ANI did not think it was right that this veteran should have to wait out in the street, so AL ANI invited him into his own office for tea and hospitality. Eventually, he gave [REDACTED] a ride home. This angered SABAWI who had AL ANI imprisoned for a month. Upon his release, AL ANI was dispatched to Kuwait in December 1990 for an assignment with M-5. Considering the military build up of coalition forces, orders to Kuwait seemed tantamount to a death sentence.

AL ANI was initially sent to Kuwait City for about a month. From there he was transferred to the city of al-Jarah. Al-Jarah was described as an insignificant town, nearly half way between Basra and Kuwait City. Many stateless Iraqis resided there. AL ANI claimed that by the time AL ANI had arrived there, it was deserted. He headed up a small eight man ISS detachment, along with 10 soldiers. Two of the IIS officers there were known to him from previous assignments, [REDACTED] Once the bombing of their position started, AL ANI and the others set out to walk back to Basra, as all of their vehicles had been bombed. AL ANI and the others walked for three days back to Iraq. They arrived in Basra and commandeered a bus. With swollen feet and the effects of walking in the desert for three days, Al-Ani led 25 others on the bus drive back to Baghdad. AL ANI asserted that the Shi'a uprising started six hours after his departure from Basra. He noted that this fighting is often incorrectly referred to as an 'intifada.' Upon his arrival in Baghdad, he stayed in his house for 15 days recovering from his ordeal in the desert and receiving visitors. During this time there was no IIS work.

Between May 1992 - January 1993, AL ANI was assigned to M-5, Asia Section which covered the countries of Thailand, Malaysia, Japan, China, Taiwan and the Philippines. Following this, he returned to M6, Security Office, in Baghdad.
AL ANI was asked about how the IIS handled extremists in Iraq. He answered that Islamic fundamentalists, especially Wahabists, were not allowed in Iraq. According to AL ANI, they were beginning to impose themselves in mosques, talking about their ideology to poor people in need of social services. Some established a small clinic to service the poor people, and they eventually moved to the universities to preach their Wahabist ideology. These activities by the Wahabists caught the attention of the IIS and the Ba'ath Party who decided to stop this movement by arresting its adherents. Thereafter, Wahabists were gathered up and sent back to their homes and their families were informed of their activities. AL ANI stated that the IIS only dealt with Wahabists inside Iraq. He claimed that the IIS did not know much about Usama Bin Laden, and that he never really heard of Bin Laden until after the tragic events of 9/11. AL ANI advised that IIS's intelligence collection efforts against the Wahabists included monitoring Friday prayers and developing sources of information.

As an example, AL ANI explained that if the IIS were given twenty names of suspected extremists, they would check these names against those in their files and then collect personal information on them. From this list, they would choose three or four individuals and formulate a recruitment plan for each of them. Various recruitment techniques were employed, including offering inducements of sex or money, using the influence of the family, or punishment and prison. The IIS would also conduct surveillance on suspects of particular interest.

AL ANI stated he was selected for this assignment because he had a clean record, was not corrupt and because his superiors thought he was the right person for the job.

In mid-1995, AL ANI was reassigned to M6. Shortly thereafter, he was assigned to M50 for eight months. ESSAM KHUDAR AL-DULAMI was the M50 chief. AL-DULAMI had served in Kuwait with AL ANI. He was selected to be the head of M50 because he was intelligent and well read. This assignment involved targeting any activities against Iraq. The groups they focused on were purporting to be nationalistic, but in actuality they were really interested in pursuing self-serving agendas. An example was the National Alliance, an organization comprising several Ambassadors who wanted to preserve the many benefits they had enjoyed over the years.
In 1996 AL ANI was next assigned to the Public Relations section of M5. This was some of the best times he spent in the IIS. His job was to liaison with the owners of clubs and hotels. If the IIS needed special arrangements to accommodate an operation at such venues, AL ANI would use these contacts. He often received the benefits of getting to use the health clubs and pools at these hotels. He never got free meals as food was too expensive in those days. The draw back was that if he had to slap a manager, and SADDAM’s son UDAY was friends with the manager, this could cause big problems. AL ANI never saw UDAY. If AL ANI heard that UDAY was coming to a club, he would leave.

In 1997, an IIS boss told AL ANI that he had a good job for him. It was with the IIS M7 Directorate of Investigations and Inquiries. The two groups to be investigated were Arabs and foreigners. The foreigners were almost exclusively Iranian, and this represented the bulk of the work. Rarely would they investigate an occasional Jordanian, Syrian or Yemeni. If a subject was picked up, he had to be brought immediately to Baghdad for interrogation. They were not allowed to initiate an interrogation until the subject was brought to Baghdad. An M7 judge would listen to the facts and decide if there was enough evidence to hold someone or move forward with the investigation. Every fifteen days, a national list was compiled of all the subjects detained by the IIS.

In 1999, AL ANI received an assignment to the Iraqi Embassy in Prague, Czech Republic. Some members of the IIS seek a career track that will set them up to be sent outside of Iraq for international service. Since his tour in New Delhi, AL ANI never had another chance for service outside of Iraq. He had a big family and a small house. An influential IIS boss who favored him had died. He had no specialty that was needed overseas. Despite this, he was finally accepted for overseas duty. He received orders to Greece. In the end, he passed these orders onto a colleague who was more interested in this assignment, and instead accepted the assignment to Prague.

AL ANI spent time preparing for his assignment by reading files and reports for ten days. It was a one-man IIS office. The embassy had a Charge d'affaires (an actual diplomat) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a financial officer, an administrative officer and two IIS guards whose exclusive duty was security. The guards at all Iraqi embassies are employees of the IIS. The Charge's name was KHALIL IBRAHIM HUSSEIN. The guards slept in the
building and provided security for the Ambassador but did not conduct regular intelligence collection operations. The previous IIS chief in Prague, 

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a passport in the name of AHMED KHALIL SAMIR AL-ANI. The IIS had the capability of preparing false passports, but this was a genuine diplomatic passport made with a deliberate modification in AL ANI's name.

The Czech Republic was a small, poor and weak country. AL ANI expected his assignment to be easy. There were several categories of ethnic Iraqis (non-Ba'athists) living in the country. There were the communists who left Iraq for the former Czechoslovakia who were then in their seventies or older. There were Iraqi university students who were enrolled in school. There were others, who married Czechs, returned to Iraq, but then departed the country during the days of economic sanctions and the war. Some of these individuals opened up businesses exporting Czech crystal.

AL ANI described his operational mission as having three collection components and three tiers of targets. The collection priorities were political, economic and military intelligence. Tier one targets were Iranian, Syrian and Israeli nationals. Tier two targets were the Gulf Arab countries, the United States and United Kingdom nationals. Tier three targets were those involving nationals from Asian countries such as China, Taiwan, Philippines and Thailand. AL ANI considered the collection priorities to be easy. He could gather much of his information from newspapers and off the internet. Since IIS headquarters (HQ) was primarily concerned with information on targets from tier one countries, AL ANI chose to focus on these. He felt it important to comply with whatever HQ asked of him in order to prevent them from discontinuing his IIS position in Prague. AL ANI was concerned that if AL ANI did not produce adequate results, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs might fill his position with one of their own employees.

AL ANI liked living in the Czech Republic and enjoyed good relationships with members of the Egyptian and Syrian embassies. AL ANI considered himself to be very skillful in interacting with people, and he believes this enabled him to become successful in his job. Some of the individuals whom he met inside the embassy were ones who came to obtain passports or simply to
visit. Occasionally, he met university students. Using his cover as a Consular Officer, he met various individuals at diplomatic functions. Sometimes, he met Syrians who had taken up residence in Prague. Coffee shops and restaurants became excellent venues for obtaining information and developing potential sources. Czech nationals were great sources of useful information. About a quarter of the individuals with whom he interacted were opposed to the Iraqi regime, and about a quarter were supportive of it. He would pass along such information to M50.

AL ANI would receive specific tasking from IIS HQ. Sometimes this tasking would require him to check on travelers passing through immigration at the airport. The most unique tasking that AL ANI received occurred after he returned from a 15-day road trip with his family from Prague to Baghdad. Upon reporting to his office, AL ANI was admonished by his supervisor for not requesting permission to make such a trip. Several weeks later, in approximately October 2000, this supervisor informed AL ANI that the Director of the IIS wanted to speak with him. During the subsequent meeting, the IIS chief requested that AL ANI transport some things to embassies in Ankara, Bucharest and Prague. He learned that these ‘things’ were three RPG-7s (rocket propelled grenade launchers). He realized that in transporting these weapons through several countries there would be a substantial risk. Despite this, he agreed to transport the weapons. To ensure that AL ANI fully understood the risks, his superiors asked him what he would do if he was caught. AL ANI answered that he would blame himself and lead authorities to believe that he was an independent black-market arms trafficker. Special modifications were then made to AL ANI’s vehicle such as outfitting it with secret panel compartments in order to accommodate the weapons.

AL ANI was told that the reason these weapons were being delivered was to increase the weapon's inventory at the embassies. Iraqi embassies were already stocked with pistols. During the days of the Iran-Iraq war, gunfights between embassy staff and Iranians would sometimes break out. After 1987, Iraqi President, SADDAM HUSSEIN, ordered that weapons be sent by diplomatic pouch to the Iraqi embassies. AL ANI never saw any silencers at the embassies where he served or visited. As diplomats, Iraqi embassy staff members would sometimes obtain a local license to purchase weapons. When staff members completed their embassy assignments, they would often leave their weapons at the embassy.
AL ANI was asked if he recognized that a shoulder-fired grenade launcher has only offensive purposes. He understood this even as he received his tasking. However, the only explanation he was given was that they were to be brought to augment the weapon's inventory at the embassies. No further account or plan was given. Asked if he thought this mission was designed by an overambitious manager or someone higher, AL ANI answered that this must have come for someone very high in the government. He believed that the Director of the IIS did not have the latitude to make such decisions. If the IIS wanted to kill someone in Beirut, they could not just do it at a whim. There was a process for seeking authorization and control over these actions. AL ANI knew that SADDAM sometimes made impetuous decisions. He thought that whoever ordered the delivery of these weapons was unwise.

While returning to Prague by car, AL ANI drove fast and arrived in Ankara in November 2002 and stayed at a friend’s house. The IIS chief in Ankara did not know that AL ANI would be arriving or making a delivery to the embassy. During the four days that AL ANI remained in Ankara, he talked very little about the RPGs with the Ankara IIS chief. AL ANI claimed he was not interested in the weapons or how they were to be used. He presumed they would be used against specific targets, but he did not know who these targets may be. The Ankara IIS chief called AL ANI a 'donkey' for carrying the unneeded RPG-7s all the way from Baghdad to Ankara in his car. AL ANI did not telephone anyone during his brief stay in Ankara. From there, he traveled to Sofia, Bulgaria, arriving three days later. The IIS Chief in Sofia was learned what AL ANI had brought to Romania, he stayed away from the office for two days. Upon arrival in Prague, AL ANI unloaded the last RPG-7 and secured it in a safe in his office.

During his tour in Prague, AL ANI made more than fifty trips to the airport. On two of these occasions, he flew out himself. The first occasion was when he flew home on leave on flights through Amsterdam, Beirut and Amman. He received permission to fly home again in January 2001. His other visits to the airport were to 1) send off or receive the Iraqi Charge d'affaires or members of the Charge's family, 2) receive arriving diplomatic pouches and 3) collect official visitors. However, he could not recall any of the official visitor's names. When he made these trips to the airport, he would sign up for a security badge,
leaving his own ID card as collateral. He was never issued a permanent airport badge.

When he first arrived in Prague, AL ANI used his embassy stipend to purchase a vehicle. Ministry of Foreign Affairs regulations allowed for overseas officials to draw $4,000 toward the purchase of a vehicle. After a year, the vehicle could be turned in and resold. AL ANI used this vehicle to travel throughout the Czech Republic to the tourist area of Byrno. AL ANI also traveled extensively outside the Czech Republic, making more than fifty trips. Some of his travel included trips to Turkey and to Warsaw for two days (where he visited the embassy) and to Budapest for a holiday with two Iraqi male associates.

AL ANI discussed the problems he encountered as a result of his involvement in the Radio Free Europe (RFE) surveillance incident. A documentary, which aired on Al-Jazeera television network, contained footage of the entire RFE facility, including its interior and exterior. Some Iraqi dissidents worked at this station. If anyone in the Iraqi government or IIS had serious intentions about collecting targeting information at this facility, they would have found it difficult to locate or record more detailed footage than what Al-Jazeera broadcasted.

AL ANI had previously received a special tasking to take surveillance photos of this facility. At the time, he wondered why this was being requested. First, he doubted that anyone in Iraq understood how large this facility was. It was not a target which could be easily destroyed. He speculated that the initiative may have been the result of bureaucratic posturing. He explained that it was not uncommon in the IIS for managers to sound off with anti-U.S. or anti-Iran rhetoric in the presence of superiors in order to curry favor. Sometimes, these individuals would feel compelled to back up their rhetoric by assigning operational tasks. Whoever ordered the surveillance of the RFE may have done so simply to present an image that they were being operationally responsive regarding their defense of the Regime. In actuality, the mission had little utility.

Nevertheless, as a loyal member of the IIS, AL ANI delegated this assignment to one of the IIS guards. (He would later be reprimanded for this decision which was not authorized by IIS operational regulations.) Ultimately, this surveillance caused the Czech government to contact the Iraqi Charge d'Affairs and demand that Al-Ani depart the country in seventy-two hours. At the
time of this event, AL ANI's second wife was visiting with their children. Within a few days, they were all on a plane back to Baghdad.

AL ANI was asked if he ever had any operational relationship with Islamist elements. He recalled an occasion in 1999 when the Charge d'Affaires wanted AL ANI to travel to a location near Byrno in order to meet with the head of a group which was similar to an Islamic Al-Ittihad (Unity) or Th'whan (Brotherhood). The purpose was for general posterity. Unfortunately, the head of this group was elderly, and he did not have any meaningful influence or status over the group. In the end, the meeting never took place.

While serving in Prague, AL ANI was never recruited, nor was he ever approached by Islamists. He was aware that some Chechans lived in Prague, but he never met them. His dealings with Egyptians were limited to those whom he knew from diplomatic circles. In his position as the Counselor General for Iraq, he met many individuals through his embassy connections. Prague was populated by young Egyptians, some of whom were involved in drug trafficking. The only Egyptian with whom he was friendly was an individual who sold vehicles to embassy personnel. AL ANI did not know any Egyptian university students. He never tried to recruit Europeans. AL ANI advised that as of June 2000, he was still living in Prague. He denied ever meeting anyone in a bus station.

AL ANI was asked if he had ever met an Egyptian named MUHAMMAD ATTA. This was a subject which AL ANI had spent more than thirty minutes speaking about with his previous interviewers. The first he had ever heard of this subject was when a friend called him, having seen a news story. At that time, he was very surprised to hear that a 9/11 hijacker was associated with travel to Prague. When he heard that his own name was being linked with that tragic event, he knew there would be problems. As this story began to escalate, AL ANI made several unsuccessful attempts to persuade the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue a statement addressing the issue and correcting the inaccuracy, especially since it had brought him much unwanted attention. To this day, AL ANI is bothered by this matter. He denied ever meeting MUHAMMAD ATTA. He claimed he never saw or heard of ATTA until after his face was shown on the news.

AL ANI recalled that in October 2002, the IIS received a request from the Jordanian Intelligence Service (GID) to locate
five individuals suspected of being involved in the murder of an American diplomat in Amman, LAWRENCE FOLEY, and the attempted assassination of a GID officer, Colonel [redacted]. A written order was passed from IIS Headquarters to M-5 to locate these individuals. One of the five, [redacted], was thought to be living with his wife at the home of his sister-in-law in the Hathra (Green City) section of Baghdad. AL ANI knew that once [redacted] or others were captured, he and other M-7 officers would conduct the interrogations.

AL ANI, together with approximately twelve other M5 and M7 officials, participated in [redacted] arrest. When he was picked up, [redacted] did not have a passport and was in possession of a false identification card. He was believed to have entered Iraq through Syria. A search of his premises revealed a computer, CDS containing religious material and a Kalishnikov rifle. AL ANI was not aware if the IIS pulled any information off this computer. Before [redacted] was escorted away from the arrest site, he gave his wife $700 in cash. He was then transported to an M7 detention facility where he remained for approximately 10-12 days. During that time, AL ANI and others, including the Director of M7, HAITEM KHALIL AL-RAWI, interrogated [redacted] several times. Prior to conducting these interviews, however, AL ANI read through the information provided by Jordanian authorities which outlined the case against [redacted]. After reading it, he believed that [redacted] was probably guilty.

AL ANI described [redacted] as a tall, angry, impolite and strong-headed individual who was approximately twenty-five years old. Although [redacted] acknowledged that he was hiding from Jordanian authorities, he adamantly denied culpability in either the murder of LAWRENCE FOLEY or the attempted assassination of Colonel [redacted]. He stated that Jordanian authorities had arrested his father, and he claimed that they were now falsely accusing him of committing crimes. He believed that because his father was a well-known Salafist, the Jordanians were attempting to associate [redacted] with these crimes.

AL ANI discussed [redacted] religious beliefs and learned that [redacted] considered himself to be a Salafist Sunni, which is a fundamentalist offshoot of mainstream Islam. AL ANI, who has interviewed many religious extremists during his career, including Wahabists, initially thought [redacted] may be affiliated with Salafia Islamiya. However, after conducting several interviews of [redacted] AL ANI believed he had more of a political agenda than a genuine
religious commitment. Although [redacted] denied being affiliated with Al Qaeda or Al ZARQAWI, AL ANI was convinced that the evidence amassed by the Jordanians against [redacted] was compelling. For this reason, he was shocked when the Director of M5 ordered that [redacted] be released. He could not understand why this order was being issued, especially since he considered [redacted] to be a killer. AL ANI favored returning [redacted] to Jordan, if for no other reason than to convince critics of Iraq that the country did not support terrorists. The Director of M7, HAITHEM KHALIL AL RAWI, arranged for a meeting with the Director of the IIS, TAHIR HABBUSH, in order to discuss these concerns. During a subsequent meeting, HABBUSH informed HAITHEM and AL ANI that the President of Iraqi, SADDAM HUSSEIN, had ordered him (HABBUSH) to release [redacted]. Following this, AL ANI reluctantly released [redacted] to M5 officers. He claimed that this was his last involvement with [redacted].

AL ANI could not recall the names of the four associates of [redacted] being sought by the Jordanians. He related that M5 officers suspected they may be hiding in northern Iraq and may well have connections with AL ZARQAWI. However, the IIS were reluctant to pursue leads in a region where they had no operational control. When asked if he had any information to suggest that [redacted] release was the result of a pay off by AL ZARQAWI, AL ANI said this was preposterous. He thought it equally ludicrous that the IIS would have had any involvement with Al Qaeda or AL ZARQAWI.
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Field Office Acquiring Evidence

Serial # of Originating Document

Date Received

From: ISRAELIM AL AM
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
□ Yes □ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
□ Yes □ No

Title:

DE SER 7 500EX

17 - HQ

Reference: (Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: □ Original notes re interview of

IBRAM A(AN11

# 27)
Ibrahim Samir al-Hilali

Not relevant

*Joined ISIS at 22 yr old while in school*

- 6 mo training in ISIS matters
- 2 months training in military matters, i.e.: shot guns.

Eventually it Overseas posting to Damascus.

*Basically being overseas had several advantages:*
- Change your life
- Make more $
- Prestige
- Good experience for later work

While in Iraq, admin responsibilities - not engaged in mukhabarat activities, met people with Iraqis.

He would send out a plan to mukhabarat.

We collect info, analyze - If its imp.

We send it to President via Presid. Secretary

E.g: We want all info made public.

From T.A.B war
Execution near Royal Palace - helmeted guards

"Party Court"

Thinks only 40% of "conspirators" guilt - 60% innocent

Indira - worked in labor - sent into from Indians
While in India, fell in (one-w) Indian woman

She wanted to marry - he was not allowed - she wrote
letter to President - put me in jail - a much better jail at How Chowk - not torture

After 1 yr & 4 mos. it was revealed.

Then assigned to ISI - Indian Sector
Then M-5 to kabala - which included

Najaf
Halah - Balis

My boss

I handled counterespionage
European + Communist, Chinese +
Indians workers
Like Saudi, Iraq's didn't work —
I was no so successful
No real security issues — Most people
Came to work —
Any real work in Baghdad, Basra, etc.
Had stuff of 80 offices
1985 — Married Um
Family left in Baghdad — Hired as
Kadhala + liked it
1985 Left Kadhala
Anyari became head of Mukhabarat
Shut us job to me —
Security Office in Arq
M6 — Hussein Al Juma al Duri
→ People
→ Document
→ Information
→ Physical (Things)
→ Buildings
Expertised in Buildings
We had no contact with the Secret Svc (Geesam) 1989-90.

Major 79

Sabawi replaced

Rumors abounded that had fired me

Sabawi didn't like this, had me put in prison for a month and then sent to Kuwait.

Mshkhabat is you and you old bad sidey Sabawi. Sent to prison.

This guy came to turn in his gear and then I drove him home. For this I was punished.
I was sent to prison for one month. Then we went to Kuwait. -
Nov 90

Regain [work] for M-5 -
Sent to an isolated area - desert
Wadi Blu, Basra, K, Al Jara
Me and 7 others + 10 soldiers
Small police station

I was there in Kuwait at a month

13th month event in Dec 90
Stayed only 3 mos.

In Baghdad in Aug '90
March 1992  -  I joined m/s - Asia -

Thailand
Malaysia
Japan + China
Taiwan
Philippines

I stayed 9 mos. 1 m-5.

Jan 92/Returned to Secret Office (M6)

M6 - Jan 94 - to 1995

From 89 - to this day.
1993-95, I had same
Title + no promotion.

Actin re: extremist returned home.
Example of Wahhabist Activity

- Started impose themselves in mosques
- Started to talk about ideologies
- Social services targeted poor people - some established small clinics to serve the people. Don't they moved to the universities?

- Baath SY and Saddam
- Baath SY made a lot with had to stop this movement
  I arrested!

- Said what's to be sent back to home + told family told

- Said he only dealt with and Aza
of Fogis who are with us

- We didn't deal with those outside 
  the area. Only within the parameters.
- About the purpose, we didn't have
  a clear understanding.
- Until 9/11, I had heard about it.

Collection of Fogis

at many squares

Muharake

General Secrat

Military Leader
If an Iraqi joins a group, he will have to check at his family.

Yes, agree that Saady keeps an eye on these people.

1. We get 3 maps — we try to connect all the names we collect person into on them.

We then choose 3 or 4 or they or make a plan for each one.

We bring to office

sex — we then have 3 or 4 from the other group. We recruit them.
Mid 1995 my assignment in M-50

Dead to M-50 - for eight months
Targeting a plotter against Drg

Three groups were not nationalists but they were preaching for their own cause.

U : Naked Alliance

350 were Ambassadors from Baath Party. They wanted to retaliate the good deal they had

ISSAM (from Kuwait) was the head of this job. He was chosen because he was a very smart guy. He had read too much about it. He was well read. The best IQ Intel officer. This is the one they selected to run M-50.

Drt in the first line

IQ had some dirty groups
25 yrs ago, we were told to be a member of Baath Party.  I joined Baath party at 12 yrs old.

Q: Why your service last only 8 mos.

A: Feels he hasn't done thing wrong.

We were into people, we were people, Problem was they haven't done anything.

The above occurred in 1996?

IQ Dilem as enjoyed public relations.

I got to sample all the clubs in Baghdad.
If a person of interest comes to a hotel, my duties are coordinating of the hotel. The general mgmgt hotel gives us benefits like pool passes.

Stayed for five months.

If I dealt of mgmgt by skipping a manager, I would have major problems.

We had good contacts in hotel & food. This was helpful for work & for play.

I got fired for 3 reasons:

1. I am clean - no corruption
2. Changed the staff
3. He thinks I am good for this job.
2 Branches

Death of Arab people

1997

1999 to Czech Republic

Some Muhabbad sent outside Fry in another county

I never had the chance

I had big family

Mullah's big, now deceased

I had my small horse

I wanted to sell me out for 32
d
I had no specifically
Firstly off to Greece

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Always passport
Ahmed Khalifa Spyir M Ali

Q: Can you habit forge passports?
A: Yes
Q: Read Prague 7 Statement
   me - me
A: Before Mr. Jazar Khalib
   He went to Germany
   His family with him.

Q: Am I at time?
   Charged Attorney a diplomat
   K. Ibrahim Hassan
   S. worked at embassy
   2 guards  - security
   2 Chair Affairs

All guards in all embassies are Muslim
Q. Preparation before going to Czech
A. I read for @ 10 days before going

Q. Perceptions
A. A poor weak country, very small

So I think it will an easy job here.

A. No relationship w/Frgt + Czech

300 Ig people

some communists

@ 75 yrs.

and some students who

studied in Czech

who returned and opened

a business e: crystal

Q. What is your job?
A. My plan for

2. Levels of Whitehurst

1. Item: Syria - Israel

2. Arab Countries, USA, British Gulf

3. Not Important - Philippines Theland Czech Rwanda
All I have to cover are 3 points

- Political
- Economic
- Military

I can fill up stuff on Internet
My work there is not difficult.

For Tier one, my goal was

For Iran, Israel, Syria, I
must do what he asked me,

if there were the only one I
cared about. I received
recent order via mail away 2 MOS
via diplomatic channel.

I had friends in Czech
Republic. If we don't produce,
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
will take over our job.
I would meet w/ people
then write report

Levels of contact
1. People come to embassy + visit
2. Some people visit students
3. From Syria

For Czech people, not everyone in Baath party

Not all endeavors

I write to the free people

After second war + embargo, he returned to their cell.

I would meet away from office, cafe shop, restaurant
Q: What info could have cased Ghana?
R: C2 period. I didn't math.

      20-25 against regime

Q: Where was one then raising $?
Q: What kind of work did he have done?
   He wanted me
   check out people at immigration.
Q Were there other resp. beside, collected information?

At one time in 2000
my family came to visit me
I stayed 2 mos.
mother + 2 boys

I decided to return to DC
by car - good chance
for them to see country
had to go to basis of Mukhtarat
went to say hello to head
of Mukhtarat.
Trip took 15 days & he got bad
no permission
After 2-3 weeks, Gen. Maj.
October 2002

Gen mgr said boss of Mushkavat
wanted to talk to me

They told me, we would like to
see you some day as long as you are
coming by car.

Don't said they had an assignment
for me - I said I was ready.

I said I'm ready - The said go back to
me Turkey.

Romania,
Czech Repub.

They told me to take 3 RPG-7's.

I had to cross 11 borders
but I said yes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A.</th>
<th>B.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21/12</td>
<td>asked, if I am caught, what I will do? I said I would take blame myself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>I took all 3 for each Embassy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>In last few years, too much talking.</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Told me to take current photos of Israel, Saudi, Kuwait, Paris, U.S.</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interahand coupé history of accomplished</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>This was not an ordinary duty of mine.</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
22

With the RPG-7's? - Was this planned?

1) Sudden made impetuous decision

2)

The center comes down from Safi, based on planning or based on an impetuous decision.

Was it the branch of a career climber?

It is direct does not have the latitude to decide

if we want to kill someone in Beirut, we (IFF) are allowed to do it,

The Same
- RPG-7's hidden under seats
- Head of Muthada Stab in knees and bring them.

- I drove fast in - Armed Nov 2000
- When I picked RPG-7
  They told me they wanted to keep the embassy.
  Lets 7 pistols is all embassies.
  I couldn't take gun out of embassy.

Stayed in Ankara
Stayed w friends
Head of Muthada is.
Ankara did not let me I had RPG-7's.
He didn't know I was coming.
I stayed only 4 days in Ankara

After 1987 - orders by Pres. not to carry weapons by diplomatic mail.
but we didn't talk about it.
At the time, I was not interested
in the weapons or how they were
used.

His guest said it would be
used against a specific target.

"He said are you a donkey" to bring
these RPD's to Czech.
We don't need it.

Left Ankara for Bucharest.

Also was Ross in Bucharest. Expected you?

I didn't use telephone
at that time.

Ankara—Sofia (x 3 of 78)
Sofia—Bucharest (5 days)
Hungary—Slovakia
To Czech Republic
I don't come to the Embassy in two days.

Name of Chief in Justice

Name munked in Hungary

I wasn't one there

Where did you put reps?

I put in safe in my room in office at Prague

April 2007 I returned on airline to Baghdad
Stayed at tower hotel in Prague @ 3x

I made two trips to airport,

1st trip to airport

Killed Amsterdam - Lebanon - Jordan

2nd trip to airport, Jan 2001, to

I got permission to go guests, diplomatic courtes, and

Can't recall names now.

I didn't a security badge permanently

Issued to me. But must return badge

When work is completed.

Stayed 3rd night to the airport more

Than 50 hrs.
Q: Ever traveled outside Peru?
A: Yes

A: Went to Turkey
More than 30 countries

Czech Republic - 10th most beautiful in world

During 3 days, I bought a car bile
Embassy gives us $400 for a car to be turned in a one year.
Usually I go to Borm bile lots
to DQ people.
I went to Poland by car for 2 days.
I went to Embassy.
I went to Bivile on holiday of Two Eng'g guys

Radio Free Europe

After 1 year, wrote story about
offices there

Dragi: people working there

I knew a few people work there
I took some photos of the building.
I have video.

Who took the photos?
Two guards actually took the photos.
Guard hung around other individuals.

Abdel khalq al-Awadi
Any relations with Cred Intell
Syrian Puban
Egyptian Embassy
They enjoyed a good relationship.
We sometimes...
Weren't any discussions at cocktail parties.

1999 Czech: Blame United
The chargé d'affaires wanted me to go hear Borns.

Q: While in Prague, were you ever approached by anyone?

A: NO

Q: Did someone approach you and single-handed help?

A: Sometimes changing people come to be
Ever see any Afghans

Stayed in Germany

Came to Embassy
Bought Cars for Staff
As my Counsel, he came to visit me
Yes, there are a number of Egyptians there in Dubai. Drugs sometimes die by drugs
I only know those working in Dubai.

Never met any Egyptian students

Q: Ever try to recruit anyone from Europe?
A: No
Q: Mohammed ATTA
A: We spoke for 6 1/2 hours.
   (me + interviewers)

Someone called me and said, "I met my Mohammed ATTA in Prague.
I was surprised."
Q: In June 2000, what were you doing in Prague.

Q: To dyor travel during millennium.

Feb 2000
M 2000
A 2000
M 2000

June 2000) My family came to visit me

A

Q: Did not anyone at bus station
BREAK

72 Hours to LV PRAGUE
Czech's called Charlie 'O' Hara
and gave me 72 Hours to LV
PRAGUE

Sent a DTM to
THE MUKAID's boss saying NOT SOMETHING
NOT GOOD ABOUT ME.

Couldn't help me

B/c in jail - I was

Sent to training unit off
Airport Road - B16 Whitley Bldg -

Teaching my students

I was teaching security

said I can't go to a

new post

I stayed a year

Director appointed a group to
investigate it in M7 -

mismanaged
Guard was among this group. He had been in M7.

In his remedy, he said a problem began when I was in M7.

The Board said they should talk with me. I was at the Trancy Field. It was for old men.

Con this time, an order from bosses to release all prisoners. It was not good.

August 2003, I had to return to M6. I had not enough work in M7.

I wish for 3 mos. of work in M6.
no work involved

Personnel security - essentially we help make others who have problems lie too many women or other distractions that keep them from being able to work.

(March '03
Go to house in Baghdad)

at 1147 - 408 FAN

Part 1
Iraqis - 250
Other 75-90

Part 2
Arabs
JORDANIAN NAME

MJ (chase spy) chased after him (can't recall name) (but thinks he's quite famous)

This fellow is one of 5 individuals who came to HQ. MJ caught him, gave him to MI for investigation and interrogation. MI had a written order. They caught him in Green city in Baghdad.

Caught him in his sister's in-laws house

MI brought him to me - I saw the file - he two cases in Jordan

His father a teacher in the college

He stayed w/ MI @ 6 days

Not polite, angry guy - denied

Said he was a Saleh at Sunnia but

Jordani - Gorf put him in this case.
He acknowledged he was hiding from Jordanian govt.

I said we must send him back to Jordan.
I believed he was involved in the court + newspaper.
I wrote a report to

MATTIE HADDOSH

and to

to [initials], who agreed (my boss)

2 assisted me in the interrogations:

(1) [initials]
(2) [initials]

The next day, they turned back the paper to us, not back to us.
[Initials] said the boss of MUBH said to release this man.
[Initials] and I refused, especially me.
I said this was a killer — I said let's send him back to Jordan so people could say I did.
does something right.

My boss, Mr. Thomas, in M-7, called.

"Hush, hush," said he, "we want to talk to him."

I urged him to be sent to.

Hathor said he dismissed the President who ordered him

to release him.

Mr. guys took him.
Habbush said,

"I am sorry, I can't change the order. It was the President's order."

Hathem and I then released the man to two MPs who said they would take him to his house in The Green City in Baghdad.

Q: Did you have any conversation with the MPs?

A: No, after case, it's not allowed for us to ask Q.
Q: Tell us why you thought he was involved?

A: I read Jordanian report. They had a computer, religious pictures, Kalashnikov rifle, political than religious discourse. They traveled to Syria. It's possible he traveled from Jordan - Syria - Baghdad.

He's tall & 25 years old. He has a strong head, denied culpability. He's not arrested by Jordanians as well.

I'm sure he had some friends in DA.

Said he had no contact with AQ, but I don't believe him.

I asked him about Zaragwi.

The Jordanians sent over the names of:

- 4 or 5 other individuals supposedly

w/ Abu Yusif - AS5 said a couple knew more in northern DA & associated w/ Zaragwi.
When arrested, presented false ID card.

Paid cash to escape. Gave to his wife.

They were boy and wife.

Wife is Egyptian.

A: No concern. That IRA in Ireland.
A: Yes, we were afraid.
But there is no sort in the north.

I spoke to him about politics and religion. He is political, commonly.
Religion, he doesn't.

Don't think he is Seljuk. Is maybe a
I'm sure he was political not religious.
Q: Did it have a relationship with?

Q: Did it play a role in his release?

Q: Did you know or suspect that when you released him he would attack Coalition forces?

Q: Why didn't IA notify Jordan?
Q: Would Saddam Hussein go?  

A: Wants to support him  

Gulf 7: To support Islam & feed food businesses

Gulf 8: Not from AQ

Tells that Saddam fell, won't make Islamic people in Jordan angry by handing back to them.

Thinks Saddam didn't want Muslim thinking to support Muslims.
NAME: ISMAIL

DATE OF BIRTH: 1957

FATHER: OFFICER in POLICE, 40 years old

BAGHDAD, 1912 as RAMADAN, 6th class, 12th night

11 ISRIES, 1970 - AFGHAN

Follows for: Home simple

22 single, in service

RELATION: 79 / BARZAI was deputy

TRAINING
1) 

MONTH: 9, 10TH, 11TH

DEPARTMENT of SYRIA, no choice

My Syrian name (IMAO AT OMRAN)

5 years

TAKE INFORMATION FROM PEOPLE, DOCUMENTS
2) NEW DELHI, good man.

sta-

notably props -

well fed.

1 yr. 2 mth. / C.O.S.

Ambassador was sick during the stay.

By hotel in New Delhi two or three weeks.

8 after.

IRAQ / IRAN war 2 or 1.

Casual attacks 150,000 injured.

Staten Island New York.

Embassy An Islamic people.

India political milieu situation.

Iraq good people.

Work many I.R.A.K. Activities because activities.

Change to change your e. c.

Good money.

Family or office passage.

Good chance to do work till different.

You are:

Embassy reception; Embassy hotel, pool.

All Arab were our friends.
Causety Why you come to work, you didn't know if your gonna like.

10. Misses Spent all the time in the office. Do good work, he gave me a raise.

21. Spoke with someone to buy key. Can't, everyone is sleeping. No answer.

School, 1000 BAMA FIST THEY SASS

Man:
3/4 year run

1.2

1984

ACC ARAB + FUSIR / CONDA

1985

family

1989

M6

1990

Leaves

Mar 3 months borne

SARAAH HA

A7mg
LEFT DESSERT

CAN BOMBERS NACIES DATE FOR THESE DATES
BASRA END OF FEB 1991

WHAT THEY EVER W/ WE DO IT

12:00 PM MID DAY DEPART
BASRA AIR LVL WITH FROM BAQO
2 S BUS BACK TO IRAQ, KUWAIT

KUWAITI SENT TO BAGHDAD
SOME SOLDIERS ARE, MATH'S

15 1/2 AT OF MOVING OFFICE STAFF COLO CATCH
2ND BAGHDAD CENTRAL JAINS
KUWAITI PROVES IT RIGHT

BAGHDAD BAGHDAD BAGHDAD
300 400 ALL ARRIVED BACK TO KUWAIT
THROUGH RED CROSS

CAN COME DETAIN AND QUESTION
ASSA & EMERGENCY U.S. + FRANCE

NO SPECIAL AIRY -6-
STATE AT MUHASSAN. HQ FOR 15 DAYS, NO
work recovery for walk: Recovery at home
house visits, local situation not good, fun into recov

Mr. SABAWI SIR NASARA
March 1st USAD of 10 MAN BANCH + 5 Guns
Ground 17, 23 March 1, operation finished
8 months any

Mr. SABAWI LEFT NASSARA

1947 March ACCORD

M-S ASIA BANCH: PURPOSEFUL
NASA IN ARIA
Visit, all left AFRICA, DjAR ethina
TAIMIN PHILIP

9 minutes

1947/1953 M/6 BARDAG
Nº 1975 LEAVE Building Security
Date No. 57-8

Marquis, Dress, 1st, 2nd, 1st, Upper Stories
Small Clinic, University.

Ann

- General 55-114
  - NATH 1, May Decision
  - Approves: 5-10 in Time
  - Meetings from Time
  - Title to Camerass

1) Access to Marquis in Marquis
2) Marquis Passenger Service
3) M.1
4)
5)
ESTIMATING

Choose someone from the date group. Yes.
Get me from all the groups.
Zameer, sno, and another new name from security service.

Personal info.

Choose 3 or 4: makes a plan for every one.

20, 20 days, 35 mic

M. SO

AC SHIT

After with new groups final to see even from council.
NATURAL IRAQI CONGRESS

Later, after all of these groups

Rather than cases for their own interests
Rather than Iraq, not for natural cases.
chose him sec 20se docr other

Give me some and more

1996

ASSEMBLY PUBLIC RELATIONS M 5

Hones, Clubs

1997

Muhammad does I would like to
see you for a moment this

Muhammad Daseuren of Investigation
and Inquiry

Mab

Forever

[Handwritten notes and signatures]
Mothi Lemmas
Rape for Jovanas

Baghdad internus: CENTRE: PAIC
saman office:

Must Bank to BAGHDAD for INTERROGATION
can't help him call him Thursday 8th
BAGHDAD

Judge listens after Monday
by court permission to answer:
- FREE
- OTHER court for procedure =
- Brinks back to Asia

LEGAL OFFICE - MULAYRAM
10th Floor from To 1990
Specialist follow, build a case, make report.
make report be big, 'Terror', 'Menace', did I thing
we want to pick him up + Interview him.
M-7 Judge is present now. Q6-55 Email over
To the police with M-7 Judge's comments on
his given to M-7 Defense presents evidence to judge. Judge person picked up at bright.

Torn area

All minute details about 7 Jubes. Judge asked to put Officers, 7/5 quantity 2/1 compares an Opinion: 1) Fact
2) Concl

Loose Officers put results to Here or McIntire.

The whole code of these proceed is legal in any form 6/15 or 8/4.

Every 1/2 much make cut, Naturally case 15 days

Turpin

Vine-

Donnie

All later power impresses Dr. Turpin by 10.48 & 6/5/27. 75.

Efforts against success, don't too much contact with 11/15. He's nice

D. Find with Swann Gissing

-12-

5-700 men corner with 1147 people
MAHARAJA Cnrg. Executive 100 Bn
£15 0 MASTERS No.

LIAISON: NOT USABLE, DON'T GIVE FULL
INFORMATION; DIPLOMATIC SENSITIVITY TO INDIVIDUAL.

- RELAY BETTER SERVICE

Jyran: For but force but don't give

- COMSAANS

- ARIA

- HOTEL YUSUF

- ANDES HOTEL

- RIVASANS

CHARLES BRIDGE / KARLOV MOST
PRAGUE CASTLE / PRASOSST
OLD TOWN

OLD TOWN HALL, ASTROMETER CLOCKS
April 16 2001

2 TRIPS

S marts BAGAO
2000 / 1585
WE

[Handwritten text]

AL AMIRIYA AL ISMAILIA

[Handwritten text]

NEAR BYNDIO
M-71 problems / investigate

K030
26/11/95 N3j6

2002 Oct/2002 LS Dir M-6

M-7 Jul/1994 BAC0A0

RELEASE ALL PRISON

JAN 2003 M-7

Come back to MC from M/are

3 months TCC can start

JAN - MARCH
12 Oct

ARAB BAND PRCPRD
Yemen
Jord

FADIC A

caught in Jord, sent back 20

DASH 20

SAME CASE
Salafist say to take money from rich to build mosque: $700

M-S cooking for other. States 10/12 044

Polished more for religion

S/84
Came back from Jeddah. Name is
Nevesha. We've been friends since
brought to M-7. Didn't help M-5 much
improve for two weeks. Signposted 527 him

From Neve Farchah. Tack, Black Play
brought to M-7 to see the new Ministry of Justice.
M-5 bringing evading, 300.

Make fake documents. Prison jail
same reactions.

Mentally unstable 30+
77 - 85

Juan Muslim Brother leads

Office of Police Affairs, D.C.

was good relationship with sexually explicit
used to support arms control

Head also in Canada, now not powerful

T.V. Court

Muhammad was killed

M-14 Special ops / Small office

1) squad present, kidnapping
2) small group

friends 15 years

was officer in charge of construction security

1994 she was Canadian fordyce

came to Muhammad (Passport says, join Muhammad)

She can't be man
M-14

Note:
3 or 4 soldiers

General Faulk
M-14 present dead

Last 93

Muslim to go to mosk

1 year in Yemen, shok, very rough

3 days before end of war

Lawrence went to draw to bring R 6-7

Shabazz

P.O.W. Civic to Bagdad
No Gov offers

2 months, 200, civilian

M-S
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Classification per OGA letter dated 08/21/2009

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

To: London
   International Operations

   Security
   Counterterrorism

From: Counterterrorism
   FARDT Unit/CTORS/LX1/G1E700
   Contact: Piro George L.

Approved By: 

Drafted By: Piro George L: glp

Case ID #: 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending)

Title: (U) REQUEST FOR COUNTRY CLEARANCE
   GEORGE L. PIRO
   TRAVEL TO LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM
   08/28/2004 - 09/02/2004

Synopsis: (U) Request country clearance from and passage of
security clearances to United States Embassy, London, United
Kingdom.

(U)

Classified By: 11109, ITTS/CTD
Reason: 1.5(c)
Declassify On: X1

SECRET
(U) Legat London is requested to obtain country clearance for SSA Piro for official travel to London, United Kingdom, as follows:

Official Name: George L. Piro
D/POB: Lebanon
SSN:
Official Passport #: Expiration: 12/15/2005

For information,

At this time, SSA does not require any additional assistance from Legat London. Flight information, lodging and conference location will be expeditiously furnished to Legat London via email upon receipt by FBIHQ.

Security Division is requested to pass appropriate security clearances to US Embassy, London, United Kingdom.

(U) CTORS very much appreciates Legats assistance with this matter.
LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AT FBIHQ

(U) International Operations is requested to expedite country and security clearance passage for SSA Piro.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

LONDON

AT LONDON

(U) Legat London is requested to expedite the country clearance and security clearance passage for SSA Piro. Legat London is also requested to notify SSA Piro, or via email once this lead is covered.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

SECURITY

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) Personnel Security Unit is requested to certify to American Embassy London the security clearances possessed by SSA Piro.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON DC

(U) Read and clear.

++

SECRET
SECRET NOFORN

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATIONAL MESSAGE FORM

DATE: 05-13-2009
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAY/SAB/LSC
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-13-2034

TRANSMIT VIA: 
☐ SAMNET
☐ NEPTUNE
☐ IIR SENT VIA ACS

PRECEDENCE: 
☐ IMMEDIATE
☒ PRIORITY
☐ ROUTINE

CLASSIFICATION:
☐ TOP SECRET
☒ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLASS

Classification per OGA letter dated 08/21/2009

PM DIRECTOR FBI
TO: _____________________________

SECRET NOFORN

CITE: ///4510.1318///

PASS:

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR CONFIRMATION THAT THE GENEVA CONVENTION WILL BE ADHERED TO

(S/NF) THIS TELETYPE SERVES TO CONFIRM THAT THE FBI IS AWARE OF THE OBLIGATION TO ADHERE TO GENEVA CONVENTION PROVISIONS. THE FBI FULLY INTENDS TO OBLIGE BY THESE PROVISIONS TO THE DEGREE THE FBI IS AFFORDED PRIMARY LEAD IN THIS MATTER.

(S/NF) THE FBI WILL CONTINUE TO COORDINATE WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON THIS MATTER TO ENSURE PROPER HANDLING OF ALL INTERVIEWS AND SUBSEQUENT DOCUMENTATION.

(U) THE FBI POINTS OF CONTACT FOR THIS MATTER ARE SSA _________ AND SSA _________ STU III

DECLASSIFIED BY: 11109, ITOS II/CTD; REASON: 1.5(C); DECLASSIFY ON: X-1

BT

/////
ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE/TICKLER COUNT:

(This teleprinter should indicate the recipient's understanding that this message is in accordance with provisions as set forth by the Geneva Convention.

DRAFTED BY: ____________________  CU: CU  RM#: 4383  EXT: __________
ACTION MEMORANDUM

(S) This purpose of this memorandum is to request Deputy Attorney General authorization to disseminate the contents of interviews with Saddam Hussein to Major General Dayton of the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG). The FBI has been instructed that dissemination of information derived from the interviews of Hussein outside the Bureau required authorization from the Deputy Attorney General.

The memo contains a verbatim readout of a conversation between SSA George Piro and Saddam Hussein regarding Iraq's response to United Nations weapons inspections, culpability of individuals within Hussein's inner circle and Hussein's own assertions that Iraq did not possess Weapons of Mass Destruction.

 Classified by: G-3
 Reason: 1.5 (d)
 Declassify On: August 26, 2029
Memorandum from Mr. Gary M. Bald to Mr. James Comey
Re: Desert Spider, 08/26/2004

SECRET//August 26, 2029

(S) BAGHDAD OPERATIONS CENTER

May 13, 2004

SECRET//August 26, 2029

-2-
Memorandum from Mr. Gary M. Bald to Mr. James Comey
Re: Desert Spider, 08/26/2004

NOTE: Request DAG authorization to disseminate Desert Spider information to Major General Dayton of the Iraqi Survey Group.

1 - Mr. Bald
1 - Mr. Briese
1 - 
1 - Baghdad Ops
1 - 315B-HQ-1448534

APPROVED:

Director
Deputy Director

Adm Serv. 
CJIS 
Crim. Inv. 
Cntnterror
Finance 
Gen. Counsel 
Info. Res. 
Inspection 
Inv Serv. 
Laboratory 
National Sec. 
OEEOA 
OFCA 
OPR 
Training

8/26/04
4/24/04

SECRET///August 26, 2029

-4-
Precedence: PRIORITY
Date: 09/27/2004

To: Records Management
General Counsel

Attn: Document Classification Unit
Attn: National Security Law Unit

From: Counterterrorism
ITOSII/ISLJ/6W-208

Contact:

Approved By: [Signature]

Drafted By: jfv

Case ID #: 315E-HQ-1448534-" (Pending)

Title: DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: This communication requests Assistant Director authorization for, and the assistance of the Document Classification Unit, in the declassification of selected FBI interviews on Saddam Hussein, former president of Iraq.

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Enclosure(s): Twenty-Five Letterhead Memorandums containing interviews conducted on Saddam Hussein by the FBI.
Since the conclusion of the debriefings and the hand-over of legal custody of Saddam Hussein to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) has begun the prosecution of Saddam Hussein and other members of the former Iraqi Regime for their part in war crimes and other atrocities. These debriefings of Saddam conducted by the FBI have been requested by the IST and the U.S. Intelligence Community for their use in the prosecution. The FBI has assessed the information and concluded there is no longer a need to maintain classification on the interviews.

The International Terrorism Operations Section II (ITOSII) and Office of the General Counsel concur that the enclosed Letterhead Memorandums can be declassified with the exception of the following:

1) All names of U.S. Government personnel
2) Locations of the debriefings
3) Interview Dated May 01, 2004: Remove the following paragraph on the second page:
   Interviewers then started to question Hussein regarding the committee that was established in 2000 regarding the missing pilot. Hussein quickly responded by saying the "humanitarian side of this conversation has ended."
4) Interview Dated June 17, 2004: Remove all listings of Iraqi detainee's BLACK LIST numbers.
5) Interview Dated June 28, 2004: Remove the following sentences from the third paragraph on the first page:
   "SSA Piro advised HUSSEIN there is clear evidence the Iraqi Government had previously met with BIN LADEN. SSA PIRO specifically cited PAROUQ HIJAZI's (BL#104), former IIS M-4 Director, meeting with BIN LADEN in Sudan in 1994, ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANT's two visits to Baghdad, and his request for financial assistance of ten million dollars. HUSSEIN replied "yes".

ITOSII request the Classification Unit to remove the above listed information from the enclosed Letterhead Memorandums prior to declassification.

The International Terrorism Operations Section II has evaluated the interviews and has determined none of the declassification of the information, with the exceptions listed above, disclose any effect of the following: 1) No sensitive techniques will be disclosed. 2) No Asset or source identifying information will be disclosed. 3) No foreign government or other agency information will be disclosed without permission. 4) No
other case equities will be affected. 5) Will not harm the national security of the United States.

(U) The Iraq/Syria/Libya Operations Unit is readily available to assist in whatever manner required.
LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

RECORDS MANAGEMENT

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) - (x) Request that the Classification Unit review and declassify all selected FBI interviews on Saddam Hussein, former president of Iraq.

**
Classification per OGA letter dated 08/21/2009

Precedence: PRIORITY

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: SC M Chris Briese ITOS2
     SC Frankie Battle, CTORS
     UC ITOS2
     UC CTORS
     SAC Steve Tidwell
     ASAC Janice Fedarctyk

From: Counterterrorism

HVD #1 Team/Baghdad Operations Center

Contact: [Blank]

Approved By: [Blank]

Drafted By: [Blank]

Case ID #: 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending)

Title: DESERT SPIDER
       IT-IRAQ

Synopsis: To provide the Counterterrorism and CIRG Divisions with a progress report on Saddam Hussein by the (HVD #1) Team.

Classified By: 11109, ITOS1/CTD
Reason: 1.5(c)

Administrative: To date, the HVD #1 Team has conducted sixteen interviews of Saddam Hussein. All of these interviews have been uploaded into the "Desert Spider" case file.

Enclosure(s): One copy of FBI team "Interrogation Strategy - Saddam Hussein," dated 02/13/2004. (Note: This report was furnished previously via email to CTD and CIRG.)
An FBI interview team was subsequently assembled consisting of three Supervisory Special Agents (SSAs), George Piro, FBIHQ, Omaha Division and an Arabic translator of Iraqi descent; and two Intelligence Analysts.

To date, the FBI team has conducted sixteen interviews of Hussein and approximately a dozen interviews of former Ministers, Presidential Advisors, Directors of Security and military leaders who are also in U.S. military custody. These latter interviews have been instrumental in obtaining a better understanding of the inner workings of Hussein's regime and determining how decisions were made and who implemented them.

Although the primary purpose of interviewing Hussein is to obtain intelligence.

When the FBI team first began interviewing Hussein, they concentrated
To: Counterterrorism  From: Counterterrorism
(U) Re: 315E-HQ-1448534, 03/21/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For information and appropriate action.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

CIRG

AT QUANTICO, VIRGINIA

(U) For information and appropriate action.

♦ ♦
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Classification per OGA letter dated 08/21/2009

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

To: Director's Office

Attn: Director Robert S. Mueller III
      D/Director Bruce Gephardt
      EAD John S. Pistole
      A/AD Gary M. Bald
      DAD Thomas J. Harrington
      SC Frankie Battle
      ASC
      SC M. Chris Briesee
      SSA

From: Counterterrorism
      Baghdad Operations Center

Contact: SAC Edwin L. Worthington

Approved By: 

Drafted By: jag

(U) Case ID #: (X) 3156-HQ-1448534 (Pending)

(U) Title: (X) SADDAM HUSSEIN
           IT-IRAQ
           CO:HQ

(U) Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X1
To: Director's Office  From: Counterterrorism
Re: X 315-HQ-1448534, 01/06/2003

X

SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN

2
To: Director's Office  From: Counterterrorism  
(U) Re:  (X) 315-HQ-1448534, 01/06/2003

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Info)

DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

AT EADCTCI, DC

(U)  (X) For information. Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT FBI HEADQUARTERS

(U)  (X) For information. Read and clear.

++

SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN

3
Precedence: ROUTINE  Date: 11/23/2004

To: Counterterrorism  Attn: ITOS II, ISLU, SSA

From: Charlotte  
Squad 6  
Contact: SA

Approved By:  

Drafted By: Ske

Case ID #: 315E-HQ-1448534  (Pending) 19

Title: Desert Spider  
IT - Iraq

Synopsis: (U) Lead covered by the Charlotte Division.

Classified By: 11109, ITOS II/CTD
Reason: 1.5(c)
Declassify On: X1

Reference: 315E-HQ-1448534 Serial 9

Details: (X) The above referenced EC set leads for Field Offices to canvass sources for any information regarding potential war crimes committed by the former Hussein Regime. The following was developed by the Charlotte Division:

(X) On March 20, 2003, Charlotte interviewed an Iraqi male named

(X) On March 20, 2003, Charlotte interviewed an Iraqi male. Around 1980,
(U) Charlotte considers Leads 9.1 and 9.2 covered.
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ITOS II

(U) Read and clear.

++
Precedence: PRIORITY  Date: 02/14/2005

To: Counterterrorism  Attn: ISLU/ITOS II  Room 4383

From: Charlotte  SSA

Squad 6
Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: Gmy γ

Case ID #: (S) 315E-HO-1448534 126 216

Title: (S) DESERT SPIDER

Synopsis: (S) To provide requested information regarding alleged actions of the SADDAM HUSSEIN regime.

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Reference: (S) 315E-HO-1448534

Details: (S) As part of the initiative

SECRET
To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: S 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/14/2005

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Discretionary)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ISLU

(U) Information provided for any action deemed appropriate.

**
Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Counterterrorism

From: Atlanta
Squad IT-1 / JTTF

Contact: 

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: 

Title: DESERT SPIDER
IT-IRAQ

Synopsis: To report positive results of information relating to the prosecution of SADDAM HUSSEIN.

Reference: 315E-HQ-1448534 Serial 9

Enclosure(s): Enclosed for FBIHQ is one FD-302 with positive information.

Details: All Atlanta JTTF and FCI Agents were informed via email and squad meetings to contact sources and review all interviews of Iraqis, in order to find information relating to crimes such as genocide, torture, inhumane treatment, destruction of property and unlawful confinement committed by SADDAM HUSSEIN and the former HUSSEIN REGIME. Additionally, Agents were asked to canvass logical sources for this information.

There is one positive result to report to FBIHQ from the Atlanta division being reported as an enclosure.
To: Counterterrorism From: Atlanta
Re: 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/22/2005

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM
AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

(U) Read and clear.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/04/2005

was interviewed at his residence, ________ and SA ________ on January 26, 2005. 
was advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and purpose of the interview. ________ provided the following information:

considers himself an American. ________ expressed his gratitude to live in freedom and stated he would give his life for this country if called upon. ________ is willing to assist the FBI and would be willing to provide testimony of what he experienced in Iraq.

Investigation on 01/26/2005 at Atlanta, Georgia

File # 315E-AT-98424 Date dictated 02/04/2005

by SA ________
File Number: 315E - HQ - 1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

Serial # of Originating Document

Date Received

From

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

Address

(City and State)

By

To Be Returned □ Yes □ No

Receipt Given □ Yes □ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure □ Yes □ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI) □ Yes □ No

Title: DESS27 SEEDFA

Reference: (Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: □ Original notes re interview of

TA021Q A212
1990 KUWAIT INVASION
SACE. GOV. SUPPORTED U.S.

U.S. SAID HELD ON ME TO TALK

SUEAO / MK COUP / ISLAMIST

URANI PERSECUTED HAMBATI

RCP ISSUES FROM 1989

U.S. CAUSING ANGER

- IN T.S. PRESSURE SAADAM WAS NEGATIVE
- DO NOT NEGATIVE HAVE OR RES. IN ICA

- NAYF UNA
- GENERAL MESSAGES OF CONGRESS
- TO AMR CANDIDATE FOR NAZIAK, DID NOT

PUBLIC

RAMI LINKING ISLAM VS RELIGIOUS WAS

NOT COMPATABLE

URANI WAKASIM, NOT ACCUSED IN 1989

- DENIED BACK, NOT GUY
- AFTER WAR? NOT AMNESTY TURN TO ARM

- RAMI ACCESSISH SO-CALLED DISEASE 1980

EXCEPT 1980

MARDU SAME DISEASE AGAINST WAKASIM
SAARIT, Orthodox Christian, was born in 1949.

She mustache, beard, small nose.

Saddam keen to rectify Samb relationship.

Correspondence with Prince Abdul Karim was tense but not active during autumn.


Father, prince, helper in 1949, lawyer, 1949

Saddam did not kiss Hassan al-Badi, former Saddam prime minister, opponents.

If contact with Islamic groups, Saddam would not include Christian T. (except for Hamas, Palestine).

1975/1996, call, 7/1, announcements.

Saddam do not favor Israeli opportunities.

Hypocrisy, not my agenda.
- Bandar S, 17/4/77, 2/7/77

Special Trust

- Not upset discuss in diplomatic circles
  - Fareed Hizazi, good guy, minimum problem
    - Officials, appointed Amman.
    - ICIC up.

- Queen went to visit URC in AFGH.
  - M. Masood Frank, he said no.

- Abid Homai

- S. Africa, officially no response.
  - Made a trip in AM

- Who was target 80 M. J. al Kaili
- Office in Al Cali

- Not his style to.os. of Islam, now.
  - Nayiri

- EVO
LETTER OF CONFIDENCE TO

- ALL VICTIMS CAME TO ISRAEL AS REFUGEES

- REACH

- IZZAT ISRAHIM AS OUR

- EFFICIENT ORGANIZATION A/Q

SNIPPED, INTER SERVICE WITH ISLAMISTS

MBOO

INVESTIGATE AS DETAILED
Iraqi forces shooting down warplanes:
- 930 masses and crosses
- Continuing remain silent after our
  American forces shoot down

Ali Hassan Al Mustapha
D.A. of Mi'hamma
Aji Al Hikmi

Ali Hassan
Bi Myihali, "Dissappear"

Imprisioned in security muses
 to BAGDAD, 6200 six. And there
continue April 1st is 20-8. Because of

11-15, 16 killed. Ali Hassan

Mass Execution: Wadi, no army
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE
To: Records Management

Attn: Record Mgmt. Center Unit A/UC

From: Counterterrorism
Iraq/Syria/Libya Unit
Contact: SSA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: sasjr

Case ID #: 315E-HQ-1448534
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-1A
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-1B
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-302
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-BC
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-CE
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-ELA
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-EL1
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-EL1A
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-EL1B
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-LAB
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-NC

Title: DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: Opening of subfiles for captioned matter. AD authority to restrict subfile 302.

Classified By: 11109, ITOS/CTD
Reason - 1.5(C)
Declassify On: XI

(U) Full Field Investigation Instituted: 05/04/2004 NONUSPER

Administrative: Per SAC EC from CTD dated 12/25/2002, no case restrictions in ACS or may be made without the approval of the Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division.
Details: The captioned investigation was opened to capture intelligence and evidence as it relates to the national security investigation targeting Saddam Hussein. This EC establishes the subfile system for capturing information regarding Hussein. The following subfiles will be established:

1A - Will be a repository for all contemporaneous notes and items which will need to be retained that are not evidentiary in nature.

1B - will document FD-192 bulky records and will be a repository for evidentiary material.

302 - will be a repository for FD-302's, inserts and classified LHM's which document interviews conducted of captioned subject and additional High Value Detainees.

BC - will be a repository for background information on captioned subject and his closest associates.

CE - will be used maintain all records regarding expenditures of case funds in captioned matter.

ELA - will be used to maintain all documents regarding the administration of electronic surveillance in captioned matter.

EL1 - will document all original elsur logs developed or maintained in captioned matter.

LAB - will be a repository for all laboratory requests, reports and findings in captioned matter.

NC - will be a repository for all pertinent newspaper clippings deemed of significant value that they will add to the overall progression of the investigation.

This EC also documents the fact that due to the sensitive nature of the interviews of captioned subject, and the request of the Department of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General [noted in immediate EC from Counterterrorism to General Counsel, dated 02/06/2004] the 302 subfile will be restricted in the Automated Case Management System (ACS). Access will be granted to the following individuals:
SECRET

To: Records Management  From: Counterterrorism
Re: 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/17/2004

UC
UC
SSA George Piro
SSA
SSA
SSA
SSA
IA
IA
IA
IA
RO
ITOS II Deputy Section Chief
ITOS II Section Chief
D/AD Counterterrorism Division
AD Counterterrorism Division
EAD Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Division
OSC Baghdad Operations Center
D/OSC Baghdad Operations Center
To: Records Management  From: Counterterrorism
Re: 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/17/2004

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Action)

RECORDS MANAGEMENT

AT WASHINGTON, DC

☑ RMD will ensure the aforementioned subfiles will be opened and that access to sub 302 will remain restricted to the above mentioned personnel.

++

SECRET
Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed on February 7, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

Hussein stated he has served the Iraqi people for a very long time. He considers his greatest accomplishments to be the social programs for the citizens of Iraq and improvements in other sectors of the economy including enhancements to education, the health care system, industry, agriculture, and other areas that generally enhanced the way of life for Iraqis.

In 1968, Iraqi people "barely had anything." Food was scarce, both in rural villages as well as in cities. Farmland was neglected and agricultural methods were primitive. The Iraqi economy depended entirely on oil production, with most being exported from Iraq by foreign companies and not controlled by the government. As the country of Iraq manufactured very few products, most goods had to be imported. The health care system was "primitive" and the mortality rate was very high, particularly among the poor. The infant mortality rate was very high, estimated at 40-50 percent, with many deaths occurring during pregnancy or delivery. The literacy rate was around twenty-seven percent, with those classified as "literate" often not capable of true proficiency in either skill. Roads were almost non-existent in rural areas and "very bad" in the cities of Iraq. Limited educational opportunities existed at the university level, even in Baghdad. Many cities had no college whatsoever. Generally, only wealthy individuals could afford to send their children to a university.
Hussein improved all of the areas previously discussed. He considers this his greatest accomplishment and "service" to the Iraqi people.

In response to a question regarding Hussein's own mistakes, Hussein agreed that all humans make mistakes, and only God is free of error. He noted that the interviewer was "smart" and it appeared he had read reports from Hussein's previous interviews. Hussein stated, "Perhaps, a conversation between two such educated people will not be useful or successful." If one says he is perfect, he is saying he is like God. Hussein added that not all of his efforts were viewed as successful in some people's eyes. Hussein compared this evaluation of himself by others and the existence of differing viewpoints to his own views about the American system of government, of which he is "not convinced." He pointed out that approximately 30 million people live in poverty in America, but US residents do not consider this a "crime." Hussein stated he would never accept that for Iraq. When prompted by the interviewer a second time regarding Hussein's own mistakes, he asked, "Do you think I would tell my enemy if I made a mistake?" Hussein said that he would not identify mistakes he had made to an enemy, like America. He pointed out that he does not consider the interviewer an enemy, nor the American people, but the American system of government.

Hussein stated it is not only important what people say or think about him now but what they think in the future, 500 or 1000 years from now. The most important thing, however, is what God thinks. If God believes something, He will convince the people to believe. If God does not agree, it does not matter what the people think. Hussein added that a "traitor" provided information which led to his capture. As a "guest" at the location and as an Iraqi, he should not have been given up to US forces. The grandchildren of this "traitor" will hold him accountable and tell this to future generations.

In the future, Hussein believes he will be known for fairness and as having "faced oppression." Ultimately, what the Iraqis think will be up to them. Hussein stated Iraqis would not compare leaders of the pre-Islamic era to the Islamic era.

Hussein believes Iraqi citizens were able to exercise their rights to self-govern as guaranteed by the interim
Baghdad Operations Center

Constitution in 1990. This occurred because the people had a leader and a government to lead them.

Hussein believes Iraq "will not die." Iraq is a great nation now, as it has been at times throughout history. Nations generally "go to the top" only once. Iraq, however, has been there many times, before and after Islam. Iraq is the only nation like this in the history of the world. This "gift" was given to the Iraqi people by God. When Iraqi people fall, they rise again. Hussein believes the Iraqi people "will take matters into their own hands," rule themselves, and, with God, decide what is right. Hussein hopes that Iraq will advance in all areas, financial, religious, etc. He added that, as a humanitarian, he hoped the same for the American people.

Hussein was quoted a passage from the book "Zabibah and the King," commonly attributed as his writing, where the deputies shout, "Long live Zabibah. Long live the people. Long live the army." The deputies do not, however, shout "Long live the king." Hussein was asked whether the Iraqi people will forget or fail to shout for him, to which he replied no. He said, "It's in God's hands." Hussein emphasized the king is not the main subject of the book, rather the people. He stated God comes first, then the people. Hussein added Jesus Christ was considered "from the people" as Mary was of the people and Christ lived among the people. Being faithful is a cherished thing in life, being a traitor is the worst thing. Hussein stated, "God wanted to tell us don't be surprised when people are traitors to you." Hussein ended this portion of the discussion by saying "a prisoner can not do anything for the people." He said he still has to have faith in God and repeated "It's in God's hands."

Hussein stated the National Progressive Front, a political party, first existed as the National Front from 1970-1974. The National Front consisted of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Communist Party, and the Ba'ath Party. Political parties express differences in Iraq as occurs in other countries. Some groups, including the Kurds, did not believe in socialism along the same ideological lines as the Ba'ath. In 1991, the National Progressive Front never actually came into being because of failure to pass the Constitution which was due to the first Gulf War.
Hussein considered any individual who was faithful to Iraq, and to the people, to be a part of the Ba'ath. The Ba'ath takes responsibility for successes and mistakes. In 1989 and again in 2002, Hussein attempted, unsuccessfully, to convince his 'colleagues' of the need for multiple political parties in Iraq. In Hussein's opinion, one party was not good for Iraq. Hussein stated, "Life does not accept only one idea. It accepts only one God." Hussein continued saying that a political system similar to America's, with multiple parties, would cause "too much commotion" for the Iraqi people and they would have to be forced to accept it. Hussein said, "I wish there were parties other than the Ba'ath." Differences, from family through the people to the government, are good. Hussein ended this portion of the discussion by stating, "Currently, the only political parties existing in Iraq are the ones with the weapons."

Hussein was quoted another passage from "Zabibah and the King" which states, "I'm a great leader. You must obey me. Not only that, you must love me." He was then asked whether a leader can obtain greatness through his achievements for his people or demand greatness through fear. Hussein responded that fear will not make a ruler and will not make people love a ruler. Love comes through communication. The "author" of this book is comparing this King to past kings. He did not want to emphasize or advocate the idea of the monarchy to the people as the "author" does not approve of this form of government. Thus, the King died and Zabibah lived, as a symbol of the people.

Hussein believes people will love him more after he passes away than they do now. People are resisting the occupation of Iraq, now and before, under the "banners" of Hussein. Now, however, Hussein is not in power and is in prison.

Hussein stated people love someone for what they have done. During his Presidency and before, he accomplished much for Iraq. He concluded a peace agreement with Barzani (the Kurds) in the north in 1970. Hussein nationalized the Iraqi oil industry in 1972. He supported the 1973 war against Israel in Egypt and Syria. Iraq survived eight years of war with Iran from 1980-1988 and the first Gulf War shortly thereafter. Iraq lived through 13-14 years of a boycott. Hussein asked whether the boycott still existed, and was told no. Despite all the hardships and issues endured by Iraq, one hundred percent of the
Baghdad Operations Center

people voted for Hussein in the last elections. In Hussein's opinion, they still supported their leader.
Interview Session Number: 2
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Pirso
Arabic/English Translation:

Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed on February 8, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

Hussein stated the farm where he was captured in December, 2003 was the same location he stayed in 1959 after fleeing Baghdad upon participating in a failed assassination attempt on then Iraqi President Qassem.

Hussein was asked whether the decision to go to war against Iran in September, 1980 was based on threats from Iran or whether the war was a means of reclaiming Arab/Iraqi territory, specifically the Shatt-al-Arab Waterway. Hussein stated, "We consider the war as having started on September 4, not September 22, as the Iranians state." Hussein then provided an example of a farmer who is your neighbor next door. Hussein prefers to use farming/rural examples as they have special meaning to him. One day, the neighbor's son beats up your son. The next day, the neighbor's son bothers your cows. Subsequently, the neighbor's son damages your farmland by disturbing the irrigation system. If all these things have occurred, eventually, after enough incidents, you approach your neighbor, tell him each transgression by event and ask him to stop. Usually, a warning or approach to the neighbor is enough to stop this behavior. With Iran, however, this approach by Iraq did not work. Iran, in Hussein's opinion, was in violation of the 1975 "Algers Agreement" concerning the waterway. Furthermore, Iran was also deemed to have interfered in Iraqi politics, also a violation of the treaty. In Hussein's opinion, this left Iraq no choice but...
to fight. Thereafter, Iraq fought the war and sacrificed so that interference by Iran in Iraq would end.

Hussein provided some thoughts about the mindset of the Iranian leadership, specifically Ayatollah Khomeini, and the Iranian decision to fight the war. When Khomeini came to power in 1979, he had two things which "interfered" with his mind. One, he was a religious fanatic who thought all leaders were like the Shah of Iran, a person easily toppled. Khomeini thought since he removed the Shah so easily he could do the same elsewhere including Iraq. Second, Khomeini had a "complex" about leaving/being kicked out of Iraq previously in the late 1970s. Khomeini, exiled from Iran, had been a "guest" of Iraq who was "given shelter" in Najaf. While there, he began speaking out against the Shah and the Iranian government. Khomeini, in Hussein's opinion, was not respecting the written agreement (Algiers Agreement) between Iraq and Iran and was interfering in internal Iranian affairs. The Iraqi government informed Khomeini of their position. They also told him "you are our guest, no one can ask you to leave or for you to be handed over." The Shah had, in fact, tried to get Hussein to turn over Khomeini to Iran. In Arab culture, one can not "give up" a guest.

Khomeini refused to cease his activities against the Shah and the Iranian government. Khomeini stated that if his practices were against Iraqi policy, he would leave. Thereafter, he attempted to depart to Kuwait but was refused entry. Iraq allowed him to return for three or four days and complied with his request for assistance in traveling to another country. Khomeini then traveled to Paris, France.

Hussein stated he does not regret Iraq's treatment of Khomeini. When asked whether Khomeini ignored the gratitude of Iraq upon return from Kuwait, a step which could have resulted in Iraq's refusal to admit him and subsequent transfer to Iran, Hussein stated, "No. It would not have changed the situation. The people did not want the Shah." Khomeini became a symbol for the people of Iran after departing Iraq because of his age and because he had been "kicked out" of Iran. Hussein only stated "maybe" when questioned whether Ayatollah Sayyid Mohammad Sadr, a prominent Shia cleric executed in Iraq in 1980, may have been such a symbol. Hussein added he himself was a symbol as one could find pictures of Hussein inside houses and elsewhere in Iraq.
Khomeini believed the Shia population in southern Iraq would follow him, especially during the war with Iraq. But, according to Hussein, "They did not welcome him." In fact, the Shia remained loyal to Iraq and fought the Iranians.

Hussein acknowledged that the Iranian military in 1980 was weak and "lacked leadership" as most of the high-ranking officers had been removed upon change of the Iranian leadership from the Shah to Khomeini. This, however, did not impact on the decision to engage in war with Iran at that moment. Hussein stated, "If the Shah's army still existed, we would have defeated them in the first month." Under Khomeini, despite lacking leadership, the Iranian military, including the army and the Revolutionary Guard, "advanced in thousands" against Iraqi forces. The Iraqi army fought bravely, especially at the borders.

Hussein was asked whether assassination attempts against Iraqi government officials prior to the conflict, allegedly at the hands of Iranian-backed groups, including Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and Minister of Culture and Information Latif Nayyif Jasim, affected the decision to go to war with Iran. Hussein stated there were "540 assaults" on Iraq by Iran before the war. 249 of these "assaults" included air incursions or raids. Iraq presented this information to the United Nations. Iran blocked the Shatt-al-Arab Waterway and sank Iraqi and foreign ships. Before September 29, 1980, Iran bombed Iraqi oil refineries in Basra and other cities in southern Iraq. The assassination attempts against Aziz and Jasim, and others, were among the many incidents leading up to war with Iran.

When asked the objective of the war, Hussein replied, "Ask Iran. They began the war. I have explained all the reasons for the war before." Upon repeating the question, Hussein stated the objective was "to have Iran not interfere in our internal affairs." Hussein repeated some information previously provided including the fact that he believed Iran violated the treaty of 1975 (Algiers Agreement). Iran occupied the entire Shatt-al-Arab Waterway, while the agreement stated their right to only half. Iran did not respond to diplomatic communications regarding these facts.

Hussein stated Iraqi forces initially succeeded and occupied cities and territory in southern Iran just across the
Baghdad Operations Center

border including areas in and near Muhamra, Ahwaz, and Dosful. Iraqi forces did not push further into Iran because the immediate objective was to stop artillery attacks from Iran which emanated from areas near the border.

After approximately two years, Iraqi forces were pushed back and the war became defensive for Hussein's military. When questioned why the war became defensive for Iraq, Hussein stated that "one can not plan for the Iraqi army the same as for the American army." From a military viewpoint, plans are made according to capability. The military agrees that when supply routes are lengthened, problems arise. Hussein stated, "The soldier of today is not the same as the soldier of 100 years ago." They are part of a "universal group" hearing and seeing things on the television and radio. The soldier is "part of the world" and is "affected" by this. If ordered to counterattack, the "winning" soldier will push to the objective and beyond. Hussein agreed that the later Iraqi offensive stage of the war in 1986-87 saw many successes, including the capture of three-fourths of Iranian tanks and half of the artillery and armored personnel carriers.

Hussein discussed further the reasoning behind not advancing further into Iran. He repeated that Iraq had recovered enough territory, removing the threat of Iranian artillery, in the early years of the war. Hussein said, "If we went deep inside Iran, they would think we wanted something else." He added, "We did not face a regular army, which is easier to plan against." Hussein further stated that for many Iraqi soldiers, this was their first combat experience. Many were "pumped up" especially with the early successes into Iranian territory. Within a few days, however, many soldiers thought "Why am I here?" As confirmed to Hussein by the Iraqi military leaders, many soldiers preferred to defend the borders and remain in Iraq. Withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Iranian territory should have occurred before this change in mentality took place. Some military commanders wanted to remain, others wanted to withdraw. After two years of war, some Iraqi military leaders felt Iran had "learned its lesson" and recommended withdrawal. Hussein respected information from the military commanders and ordered withdrawal of Iraqi forces.

Hussein stated, normally, defensive operations are not "good from a tactical standpoint" nor are they good for the
soldiers' morale. Hussein said, "If a soldier does not see logic, he will not perform as well or be obedient. If he accepts the task at hand as logical, he will be obedient. A soldier must be convinced, otherwise discipline is a problem." Hussein commented about the present mental state of American soldiers in Iraq. He said, "If you asked the American soldier, who came to Iraq to find weapons of mass destruction, but none could be found, and who came to remove the leaders of the Hussein dictatorship, who are all in jail now, but are replaced with other dictators, whether he wanted to stay or go, he would say go."

When asked whether the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iran during the defensive period of the war occurred only through necessity, i.e., Iraq would have lost the war without such use, Hussein responded, "I do not have an answer for that. I am not going to answer." When asked whether he thought Iraq was going to lose the war with Iran, particularly after 1982 and during the 1984-86 time frame, Hussein responded, "No. Not for a second. I said this on television. I said this in five letters I sent to Iran." In the letters, Hussein outlined the strengths of the Iraqi military. Hussein stated some Iraqi commanders did not like the fact that this type of information was included in letters to Iran. Iranian leaders thought Hussein was lying, while Iraqis believed him. Returning to Iraqi chemical weapons use, Hussein stated, "I will not be cornered or caught on some technicality. It will not do you any good. The United States has paid dearly for its mistakes here in Iraq and throughout the world and will continue to pay for its mistakes all over the world."

Hussein stated Iran did not "get the message" after 1982 when Iraq pulled back to its borders. He stated, "If you do not break their heads, they will not understand."

Hussein stated Iraq "did not owe much money" after the war with Iran. Iraq had received aid from Arab countries, which Hussein believed to be aid and not loans. After the war, however, these countries "changed their minds" and demanded repayment. Some countries viewed Iraq as a military threat. Iran was not viewed as a military threat, as its forces were devastated by the war. Hussein laughed at this point.
Hussein stated Iraq agreed to a United Nations resolution on September 28, 1980 calling for a cessation of hostilities with Iran. Iran, however, did not agree to this resolution. Hussein added that Iraq also agreed to UN Resolution 598 in 1987 calling for an end to the war. Iran, again, did not agree to this resolution. Iraq, in fact, attempted numerous times throughout the war to engage Iran in discussion in order to stop the fighting. Hussein stated "we did this when we did not have to" for the good of the people and for humanity. Iran only accepted terms of a cease fire in 1988 "after they lost the war."

Regarding UN findings about Iraq's use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, Hussein stated, "History is written and will not change. No one can stop history from being written." Hussein pointed out that Iran used chemical weapons first, at Muhamra (which is Khoramshahar in Iran), in September/October, 1981. When asked whether Iraq had to use chemical weapons for defensive reasons, Hussein responded, "I am not going to answer, no matter how you put the question."

Hussein stated, "I will discuss everything unless it hurts my people, my friends, or the army." Hussein gave details of an incident in 1964 involving Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr, General Secretary of the Ba'th Party. Bakr and Hussein, who was chief of the military branch of the Ba'th at that time, were arrested for plotting a coup against then Iraqi President Aref. Hussein stated he admitted full responsibility for the plot and could not have provided information against anyone else.

Hussein stated, "It is not fair for someone in charge to blame others. If someone says Saddam told me to do it, that is not a problem for me and does not hurt me."
Interview Session Number: 3
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
Arabic/English Translation:

[S] Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed on February 10, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

Hussein provided his comments regarding the Palestinian situation. Any attempt to understand the roots of the problems surrounding the Palestinian issue should be made from the viewpoint of an Arab, and not just as a Palestinian. The problem is not only a Palestinian one but also an Arab one. In the 1960s, many revolutions occurred in Arab countries with the uprisings generally taking place as the result of the dissatisfaction of the people with the rulers of those times. Part of the reason leaders were removed was their failure to address the Palestinian issue adequately or ignoring it altogether. Any solution to the problem should be based on fairness and international law. International law, and its application, created the problem in 1948 upon formation of the separate Jewish state of Israel from lands previously claimed by the Palestinians. A solution, from foreigners and those "internal" to the issue, must be presented in that scope. Everyone has been looking for a solution. However, Hussein stated, "A solution that does not convince the majority of Palestinians will not be successful." The foundation of any such solution, and the final outcome, must be the establishment of a separate state of Palestine.

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When questioned about a speech he once gave regarding the 1968 revolution in Iraq, Hussein agreed that he commented in the speech "we did not revolt against a person, we revolted against the system of government." He further agreed that he stated the revolution was undertaken "to move Iraqi people, the country, the Arab world as a whole, and the Palestinians forward." Hussein added the Ba`ath Party was the only political party that demonstrated against the Iraqi government in 1967.

Regarding the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War in 1967, Hussein stated that Arabs had hoped that lands lost in 1948 would be won back. Hussein stated, "We were sad when that did not happen." Although expectations were low for success, the news was especially disheartening when details were provided about the rapid defeat of the Egyptian and Syrian military forces. People of the Arab world became "sad and depressed" and developed a feeling of revolution.

Even though the 1967 war was lost, Hussein still respected Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser after the war. In Hussein's opinion, Nasser "could represent the Arabs to the world" while others were "weak." At that time, Nasser was the only ruler with a close relationship to the "Arab masses." Despite losing the war, Nasser did not lose the respect of the people. The hopes of the people, however, were greater than the result Nasser could deliver. Losing the war showed the limits of the capabilities of Nasser and the Egyptian military forces. Hussein pointed out that the war also exposed internal issues in the Egyptian leadership. Abdul Hakim Ammer, head of the Egyptian military, would not permit Nasser's "interference" in military matters "even though Nasser was head of the country." When Nasser later resigned, millions of Egyptians protested for him to resume his duties as President. Hussein opined that it seemed "Nasser depended on international politics rather than preparation of his military and people" leading up to the war. When he died in 1970, citizens "cried for him."

Regarding the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Egyptian President Sadat, who served as Vice President under Nasser, "could not bring back the hopes of the Arabs." Sadat seemed not to have a specific cause or aim and was unable to do anything about 1948 and the "rape of Palestine." Because Sadat was not a "man of cause," Egyptian soldiers were not "motivated" by him.
Similarly, the people of Egypt were not motivated. In fact, during this time, Egyptians mocked their own soldiers making jokes about the military saying they did not fight in 1967. Sadat did, however, through his own personality, make the United States and Israel believe he could win a war with Israel.

When questioned about Sadat's ability to ultimately do more for his people than Nasser, particularly with respect to bringing peace and reclaiming territory, Hussein stated Nasser's effect was "nominal." Hussein added, "If you tell Iraqis Kuwait will be a part of Iraq, they will be happy." The Arab nation, from poor to wealthy individuals, is one nation with the same language, common borders, and the same aims. There is one Arab world, from the "simple person to the lawmakers and thinkers." The strength of any person in a "family" comes from cooperation with and love of each other in the "family." If a member of the "family" does not understand this, he will be "weak and fall." Sadat was not faithful to "family" matters. Prior to the 1967 war, the West Bank and Jerusalem were under control of Jordan while Gaza was under control of Egypt. Sadat's peace agreement with the Israelis failed to return the territories to the rightful owners, the Palestinians. Thus, Sadat was a "traitor to the cause." Israel only willingly returned the Sinai Peninsula as it was a "military burden" and was an easy "political move."

Sadat lost honor as a result of agreements made with Israel. Additionally, the Egyptian economy worsened significantly under his leadership. In contrast, Egypt's economy flourished under Nasser with its markets opened to all Arab countries.

Hussein stated, "Being at peace is not easy." Peace without a cause will create a change in balance. Regarding a comment made to a British journalist approximately two years ago, Hussein did not mean peace could be achieved by losing faith and prestige. On the contrary, any peace should be negotiated to a "favorable position of power."

Hussein stated Iraq fought in the 1973 war on two fronts, with its air forces contributing in Egypt and Syria and ground forces fighting in Syria. When asked whether Iraq could have done more, Hussein responded, "What more could we have done? We sent all of our military to fight under Egyptian and Syrian command." Prior to the war, Egypt had sent then Vice President...
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Mubarak to Iraq to request aircraft and pilots for use in attacking Israeli surface-to-air missiles sites. Iraq provided the aircraft though they were already fighting the Kurds in the north. The Syrians requested Iraq's assistance just after start of the war saying Israel would occupy Syria without Iraq's help.

Regardless the reported failure of the Syrian military to "openly welcome" Iraqi forces in 1973, Hussein stated, "No one is as generous as Iraqis." Hussein was further asked for his comments regarding the failure/refusal of the Syrian military to provide Iraqi forces with maps, communications equipment, and other assistance needed to fight the war together. Hussein replied, "A loser does not know where his head and feet are. It was a difficult situation, to come together like this." Hussein postulated, "Perhaps the Syrians did not have maps." Iraqi officers were accustomed to different treatment in their own military ranks.

Iraq has always accepted Palestinian refugees into the country, during Hussein's time and previously. These influxes of refugees include after 1948 upon formation of Israel, after September, 1970 (Black September in Jordan), and in 1991 after the first Gulf War. Hussein stated, "We welcomed them, gave them jobs, and gave them the right to own land and a house." The latter policy regarding homes was in contradiction with the doctrine of the Arab League which did not permit Palestinians to own residences. In Hussein's opinion, Arab League members assumed that Palestinians would not leave if they owned their own residences. Hussein did not agree with this policy for "humanitarian reasons." When presented by Hussein, the Iraqi leadership agreed with this position. For Palestinians in Iraq, "this helped life be normal."

Hussein acknowledged that Iraqi government built and/or rented homes for Palestinians from Iraqi landlords. Hussein stated, "We were concerned about everybody in Iraq. We would not have let them live on the streets. Things such as food, work, and a home are needed for the sake of pride." Hussein stated some people accused Iraq of trying to remove the Palestinians. Hussein added, on the contrary, we "could not kick a guest out."

Hussein does not remember whether the Iraqi government paid all or a portion of rent, for all or a certain
amount of time, for the Palestinian housing in Iraq. Hussein has no knowledge of home owners suing the government for unpaid rent, particularly in the early to mid-1990s, and losing such a case to the government. Hussein stated, "If we promised to pay, we would have done it. If the case was lost, the government must not have promised to pay." Hussein denied there was a law permitting the government to "rent" homes without actually paying rent to the landlord. He said, "That's not true. There was no such law. That's rape or jungle law." Hussein asked to see the law on paper.

Hussein provided comments about the 1974 Rabat Summit where it is reported that the Iraqi government gave up its belief in an "armed struggle" for Palestine and accepted a "phased strategy." Hussein stated this was the first conference he had ever attended. Usually, the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs attended on behalf of the government. At the summit, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) presented a general strategy asking Jordan for the West Bank as a homeland. Previously, the West Bank and Jerusalem were under control of Jordan and its ruler, King Hussein. Hussein stated, "We approved this after a speech by King Hussein." In Hussein's opinion, King Hussein did not object to the plan "but seem unconvinced." Also at this time, Iraq agreed that the PLO would be the only legal representative of Palestine.

Hussein acknowledged that Palestinian groups, including Al-Fatah, had offices in Baghdad. In 1978, however, Al-Fatah closed its offices and reportedly distributed leaflets. Hussein does not know the details of the message on the leaflets but heard it was negative towards the Iraqi government. The relationship between the Iraqi government and Al-Fatah "was not good." Regarding the objectives of other Palestinian organizations, which seemed to differ from those of the PLO and Iraq, Hussein stated friction between individuals or groups regarding the same matter often results in differing ideas being put forth. According to Hussein, the Palestinians needed "central control." The individuals comprising the leadership of the various Palestinian groups were "not on the same page." As for the Iraqis, the leadership met and decided not to interfere in the internal affairs of the PLO. Hussein stated it was decided that Iraq would "help as we can." The Palestinians were told, however, the limitations of the Iraqi government. Thereafter, direction regarding Iraqi assistance to Palestinians,
and limitations, was provided to all Iraqi government sectors. Hussein described relations with the PLO during the period 1978-2003 as "good."

Hussein stated representatives of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) and Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) were present in Iraq at times. Hussein stated, "We accepted them as guests." They were directed not to conduct activities against Iraq and to refrain from terrorism. PLF and ANO members were told not to interfere in the internal affairs of the PLO. At one point, the ANO was warned to cease terrorist activities.

Hussein acknowledged the presence of Mohammed Abbas, aka Abu Abbas, in Iraq at some point. Hussein did not admit to specifically assisting Abbas. He stated, "If we accepted someone as a guest, we must help them. A guest cannot, however, demand what he wants for breakfast, lunch, and dinner." Hussein reiterated that Iraq considered the PLO as the official political organization for Palestine and all other groups were secondary.

Hussein was told the details of a videotaped meeting which took place approximately two years ago between Abbas and Tahir Jalil Habbush, Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service. At the meeting, Abbas requested Iraqi assistance, including money, training, weapons, and transportation, to carry out missions to attack Israel. Hussein was told the videotape was seen by the interviewer. Hussein was questioned as to whether these actions planned against Israel constituted a legitimate defense of Palestine or terrorism, thereby exceeding the normal assistance provided to a guest. Hussein asked, "What did the Iraqi government do? If you have the recording, you know." Hussein stated that his position is one where attempts are made to regain all Arab lands, including those "raped and taken." He stated this is neither a secret nor is it something which brings shame. Hussein added, "If Habbush and Abbas met, that's something else. We call for a military struggle to regain Arab lands. The principles are the same as that which we have talked about before." Hussein continued, "If Abbas asked for these things, it does not mean we gave them to him. If Abbas carried out any attacks in Israel, that means we helped him. If he did not, we did not help him." When told Abbas carried out attacks in Israel, Hussein replied, "Those occurred before asking us for assistance. That was their choice." Hussein stated, "At
any time, we have the ability and the right to help in the struggle. I'm not talking about Abbas, I'm talking about organizations in Palestine. Outsiders are not serious." Hussein asked for the answer provided by Habbush to Abbas. The interviewer told Hussein money was provided to Abbas, but not as much as requested. Hussein stated, "This is intelligence work. We have been open about Palestine."

Hussein was questioned whether assistance to Abbas would help achieve the goals of Palestinians or whether it would work against such aims. Hussein stated since he was a "young struggler" in the Ba'ath Party, he believed any organization should fight from the inside, not the outside. Per Hussein, any attempts from the outside are just "talk" and "not serious." Hussein suggested further details regarding Abbas could be obtained from Habbush or from further review of the videotape of the meeting between the two.

Regarding whether the Director of the IIS would meet without the approval of the Iraqi leadership to discuss such a matter with Abbas, Hussein replied, "Does the American Director of Intelligence call President Bush every time before meeting someone?" Hussein agreed that the President, in both the United States and Iraq, sets policy for all branches of government. Hussein stated, although Abbas reportedly asked the Iraqi IIS Director for 1-2 million dollars according to the interviewer, he would not have given him even "$10,000." Hussein added, "Any Palestinian who wanted to train and to go fight for Palestine, I said train him. Money and weapons are different from training." Because of sanctions against Iraq, the government could not offer as much assistance as previously provided. Hussein stated, "If the IIS had the ability, it is not wrong as long as the struggle is on the inside."

Hussein was questioned whether Iraq's stated position of recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of Palestine conflicted with support provided to other groups and individuals including Abbas. Hussein responded, "I didn't say I helped Abbas. Don't put words in my mouth." Hussein added, "I think the questions should be in the context of a dialogue, not an interrogation." Hussein continued saying, "If the IIS helped Abbas, and he fought for Palestine, that is not wrong. If a person says he wants to struggle against Israel, and that person is not officially representing Palestinians, there is no conflict.
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with Iraqi policy." Hussein said any such person who stated he wanted to "negotiate" would not be supported by Iraq as that is the role of Arafat and the PLO.

At the end of interview, Hussein was asked about his movements when hostilities began in March, 2003. Hussein stated he remained in Baghdad until April 10 or 11, 2003, whereupon it appeared the city was about to fall. Prior to his departure from Baghdad, he held a final meeting with the senior Iraqi leadership and told them "we will struggle in secret." Thereafter, he departed Baghdad and began gradually "dispersing" his bodyguards, telling them they had completed their duty, so as not to draw attention.
Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed on February 13, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

The lead interviewer began the discussion by explaining that today's session would be a general dialogue regarding the United Nations (UN) and various resolutions concerning Iraq as passed by the UN.

Hussein said, "Let me ask a direct question. I want to ask where, from the beginning of this interview process until now, has the information been going? For our relationship to remain clear, I want to know." The interviewer told Hussein that he is a representative of the US Government, and that reports from these interviews are no doubt being reviewed by many US government officials. Although the interviewer denied any personal knowledge, these individuals may include the President of the United States. Hussein stated that he would have no reservations if others were "brought into" the process and that he "does not mind" if the information is published.

When questioned whether Hussein had ever used "doubles" or those resembling him as has been often discussed in books and other publications, he laughed and stated, "This is movie magic, not reality." Hussein added that it is very difficult for someone to impersonate another individual.

When questioned whether others in the Iraqi government, including his son Uday, had used "doubles" as has been described in a book by an Iraqi man, Hussein denied any information regarding these reports. He stated, "I think my sons would not do this." Hussein added they might have considered such a tactic during war, but not in peace. He never saw
"doubles" for either of his sons, during times of war or peace. Hussein asked rhetorically, "Do not think I am getting upset when you mention my sons. I still think about them and the fact that they were martyred. They will be examples to everyone throughout the world." Both of his sons fought in the war against Iran in the 1980s, before "arriving at the normal age." They, and one other individual, are the only ones known to Hussein as having fought while "underage."

During the Iran-Iraq War in the battle for the liberation of the Al-Faw Peninsula in 1987, Hussein and all of his immediate male relatives fought. This was an important and decisive battle, a fact which was communicated by Hussein to all Iraqis. Hussein stated, "When I believe in principles, I believe in them fully, not partially, not gradually, but completely." Hussein added that God creates us, and only he decides when he is going to take us. Hussein ended this portion of the interview saying, "If you decide to publish a book, be sure to write it in English as well as Arabic."

Upon revisiting the issue whether Hussein ever used "doubles," he replied, "No, of course not."

The interview then turned to a discussion of Hussein's view/opinions vis-a-vis the UN in the 1990s, beginning with UN Resolution 687. As relayed by the interviewer, UNR 687 called for Iraq to, among other things, declare the existence, if any, or to destroy, chemical and biological weapons, and agree to make no further attempts to manufacture or acquire such weapons. The resolution also called for Iraq to reaffirm its compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. UNR 687 also detailed steps which Iraq had to undertake in order to have UN sanctions against the country lifted. Specifically, the interviewer asked about Hussein's decisions and the rationale for these decisions with respect to UNR 687.

Hussein stated UNR 661, not UNR 687, is the first resolution in the 1990s concerning Iraq which would eventually contribute to tensions and lead to the most recent war with the United States. The interviewer confirmed his familiarity with this resolution, but stated UNR 687 would be the starting point for this discussion.
Hussein acknowledged Iraq accepted UNR 687. Hussein further acknowledged Iraq made a mistake by destroying some weapons without UN supervision. When questioned as to whether Iraq also made a mistake regarding failure to provide complete disclosure, initially and throughout the process, Hussein responded, "That’s a very good question." UNR 687 was not written according to the "UN way." It followed UNR 661, issued before the first Gulf War, and similar to UNR 661, was supported by the United States. Hussein stated, "The United States started the cause and others followed. 661 was agreed upon by all parties while 687 was not."

After the first Gulf War began, the US President eventually requested a meeting in the Gulf on a ship, similar to the meeting held at the end of World War II between the United States and Japan, in order to discuss a cease-fire agreement. Iraq refused such a meeting. Ultimately, Iraq met with leaders of other countries in a location "at the borders." Iraq agreed to a cease-fire and withdrew its armies. Thereafter, UNR 687 was passed. Hussein reiterated that UNR 687 was approved at the insistence of the United States. According to Hussein, "no such decision" existed before in the history of the UN.

When the first Gulf War began, Iraqi military forces were "away from the borders." There were those who wanted to "rape" Iraq in war, since they could not do that in peace.

The Iraqi government wrote letters to the UN affirming compliance with UNR 687. Iraq did not agree with the resolution but agreed to implement it so that "people would not get hurt."

In Hussein’s view, UN inspectors wanted all expenses, including their accommodations, travel, and other costs paid for by Iraq. Instead of waiting for the inspectors and bearing these expenses, Iraq commenced destruction of the weapons. Iraq did not hide these weapons. UN inspectors later requested documentation of the destruction of the weapons and visited various places taking samples for review. Hussein stated, "If it is presumed that we were mistaken in the percentage of weapons that we say we destroyed, then how many mistakes were made by the United States according to UNR 687." These "mistakes" include occupying Iraq, implementation of the "No Fly Zones" over northern and southern Iraq, and the bombing
of Iraq which took place from the first Gulf War to the most recent one. Hussein questioned why the UN implemented UNR 687 in such a harsh manner against Iraq, while other UN resolutions, including those against Israel, were not enforced. Hussein ended this portion of the discussion saying, "If we were to bring a professor from a college in the United States to Iraq, he would agree with my observations regarding UNR 687, with the exception of the issue of the sovereignty of another country (Kuwait)."

During a lengthy dialogue with the interviewer regarding UNR 687, Hussein made several statements. He acknowledged UNR 687 passed and Iraq agreed "to deal with it." Regarding destruction of weapons, Hussein stated, "We destroyed them. We told you, with documents. That's it." When questioned about Iraqi restrictions placed on locations visited by UN inspectors, Hussein replied, "What places?" The interviewer told Hussein numerous locations including the Ministry of Agriculture, to which Hussein replied, "By God, if I had such weapons, I would have used them in the fight against the United States." The interviewer pointed out that most accused persons who are innocent agree to a full and complete examination of the details of the accusation. Once cleared, the accused party would then provide evidence of any mistreatment during the investigation. Hussein stated, "This is not a question, it is a dialogue. Good."

Hussein opined that the United States used prohibited weapons in Vietnam. He asked whether America would accept Iraqis inspecting the White House for such weapons. Hussein stated any such search would likely find nothing. He added, "A country that accepts being violated will bring dishonor to its people." Negotiation is the normal method of resolution of any disagreement, particularly among nations. Negotiation is the "way of the UN."

When emphasized to Hussein that the international community agreed that Iraq had not complied with UNR 687, he responded that Iraq believed there was something wrong with "the international way." The United States convinced the world of its position regarding Iraq. Regarding further discussion, Hussein commented, "I must prepare an answer in my mind, so that it does not come in pieces. Let's leave the past where it is, not that we agree, but to maximize our time."
Hussein commented that in the most recent war with Iraq, the United States only ally was Britain. All other major countries, including France, China, Russia, and Germany, were against the war. The United States was "looking for a reason to do something." Now, the United States is here and did not find any weapons of mass destruction. Hussein pointed out to the interviewer that decisions were made by the Iraqi leadership and not just by Hussein. Iraqi leaders made decisions which gave the United States an "opening" and the reasons for the most recent war.

Hussein remarked that, at times, people told Jesus Christ, the Prophet Muhammad, Moses, David, and all other prophets to give up their beliefs, teachings, and principles to save their own lives. Hussein stated, "If a man gives up his principles, his life has no value. In the case of the prophets, they would have been ignoring the orders of God." Hussein added, "If Iraq had given up its principles, we would have been worthless." Hussein stated that he was elected by the people, and not "brought in by some other country or companies." Thus, he was required to comply with the principles of the people.

The interviewer stressed to Hussein that Iraq's actions led to the implementation of UN sanctions. The Iraqi leadership's actions, and in some cases failure to act, compelled the UN to continue the sanctions. Hussein responded, "This is your opinion. I answered." He continued saying that it is difficult to give up "your nationality, your country, and your traditions." Hussein pointed out that perhaps the interviewer and another American might think differently on the subject of Iraq.

Hussein said, "If I wanted to be a politician, I could. But, I do not like politicians or politics." When noted to Hussein that some people would state he played politics with the UN, Hussein stated, "We abided totally by all UN decisions." The United States should be blamed, not the UN. Hussein stated, "We are among the few remaining cavaliers."

Upon any examination of blame, the interviewer pointed out one must first look at the origins of the discord between Iraq and the world, the invasion of Kuwait. Hussein responded, "America had a plan with Kuwait to attack Iraq. We had a copy of the plan in our hands. If I had the (prohibited)
weapons, would I have let United States forces stay in Kuwait without attacking? I wish the United States did not have the intention to attack Iraq."

Regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which led to war with the United States, also precipitated the sanctions against Iraq, Hussein asked, "I ask you as an American, when did the United States stop shipments of grain to Iraq? In 1989. When did the United States contact European countries to boycott sales of technological equipment to Iraq? In 1989. The United States was planning to destroy Iraq, an intention pushed by Zionism and the effect of Zionism on elections in the United States." This US "plan" was also influenced by countries located near Iraq, particularly Israel, which viewed Iraq as a dangerous military threat upon conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War. Hussein stated, "I believe this very much."

Regarding Kuwait and the war, Hussein stated, "It is difficult to avoid someone who is armed and standing outside your house unless you come out and shoot." As Iraq is a small country, it was difficult to stop the United States no matter what steps were taken.

Leading up to the most recent war, the United States provided much "history" to the world regarding Iraq. Hussein stated, "It was difficult for me, or any honorable person, not to attempt to stop the United States from entering Iraq."

Regarding providing his personal observations versus his opinions as President of Iraq, Hussein stated, "There is nothing I consider personal. I cannot forget my capacity as President. This is what I know and am convinced of. Thus, it is difficult to answer from a personal viewpoint. I cannot forget my role and principles for one second, and forget what I was."

At the end of the interview, Hussein was again asked about his movements after the beginning of the war in March, 2003. Hussein stated he was not in the Dora neighborhood of Baghdad on March 19, 2003 when it was bombed by coalition forces. Hussein added that he was not in this neighborhood in the ten days before this attack or at any time throughout the
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war. Hussein believes that coalition forces targeted this location because they mistakenly believed he was present.

(3) Regarding his method of movement before the fall of Baghdad in April, 2003, Hussein stated that success in movement of persons or equipment during war time required knowledge of enemy capabilities as well as "our own capabilities." The persons closest to Hussein (Murafiqueen) would direct him to "move this way or that way." When asked whether Hussein normally traveled in a Black Mercedes before the war, he stated, "Perhaps. We had all colors of Mercedes." Regarding whether he normally traveled in a long motorcade, Hussein stated, "I'll leave this for history."
Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed on February 15, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

Prior to any questions being asked, Hussein stated that he wanted to ask a question. He then asked what kind of changes have taken place in the world, i.e., with China and Russia, and in international politics. The interviewer related that there has not been a lot of significant changes, that efforts are underway to rebuild Iraq and this includes support from Russia and China, and that things are moving forward rapidly.

Hussein then explained that since he has been in prison for one or two months, he does not have a picture of what is happening. He indicated that he had intended to ask the interviewer this question two days earlier. Hussein discussed a movie he saw, based on a book, A Tale of Two Cities, which he had read long ago, in which a British man imprisoned in a French jail is likewise out of touch with what is happening in the outside world. According to Hussein, the author of this book was critical of French authorities for this treatment. Hussein noted that nothing had changed since that time. The interviewer responded that "Over time, some things have changed; others have not."

The interviewer informed Hussein that today's session would be a dialogue about the 1968 takeover by the Ba'ath Party, in particular trying to distinguish fact from legend. Hussein responded by stating in effect that in 1968, Iraq was living in a primitive way and could only advance itself seriously by understanding two concepts. The first was to recognize that the country had historical precedence for change as demonstrated
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in previous ages. The second concept involved the recognition that Iraq could learn by examining the way the rest of the world operated. Accordingly, Hussein and others traveled to other Arab countries. In comparing themselves with other locales, they discovered that Cairo and Damascus were far more advanced than Baghdad. Hussein had many friends who traveled to Damascus who believed that Iraq could reach the level of development in Damascus, but they could not imagine reaching the level of development of Cairo.

Iraq's manufacturing ability at the time was limited to making blankets and to operating a canning factory in Karbala which needed to import its materials. Aside from these, there were only a few other simple attempts at manufacturing in other fields. However, Iraq was motivated and had the energy to advance itself. Early efforts resulted in mistakes, but these were corrected. As they progressed, they continued to send people to countries around them in order to gain experience. Among the countries which Hussein and others visited were the Soviet Union, France, Spain, Iran, Turkey and all the Arab countries. In all of these, Hussein believed that the Soviet Union was the closest match to Iraq in terms of the social life of its people. However, this did not mean that Hussein took sides between the East and the West. Hussein stated that while looking at the ways in which others live, we "don't forget we are Arabs and Iraqis and that Iraqis have their own way of co-existing and relating with other Arabs." Hussein added, "Looking at our aims to develop, we tried going for development in all aspects including, political, economic, technological and industrial."

Concerning the Ba'ath Party takeover, Hussein acknowledged that they had help from the military who were members of the party. He also acknowledged that Colonel Ibrahim Abd Al-Rahman Da'ud and Colonel Abd Al-Razzag Nayif, non-Ba'ath members of the military, helped with the takeover. He added that the two had not played an important role in allowing the takeover to be undertaken without resistance or bloodshed.

Hussein stated that the decision not to have bloodshed was done at his request, that it was his belief that "we had to forget the past and not have more bloodshed." He claimed that this matter was discussed at a meeting at the home of the Minister of Health, Dr. Mustafa. A few members disagreed
with Hussein, especially party members who had been tortured by the previous regime and wanted revenge. A dialogue ensued and Hussein said that he, too, had been tortured. Eventually, an agreement was made that there would be no bloodshed. As evidence that this decision was honored, Hussein pointed out that the Ba'athists did not harm President Abdul Rahman Aref, but just expelled him. Additionally, he advised that his party made a decision to release prisoners from all parties including nationalists and communists. Concerning Colonel Da'ud and Colonel Nayif, Hussein related that they chose not to harm them either, but simply to expel them.

When asked about Colonel Da'ud's role in the military, Hussein stated that it was Abu Haitham (Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakr) who had a stronger voice than Da'ud, who had no real voice.

Hussein advised the Presidential protection, the Republican Guard, consisted of three divisions: Armored, Infantry and Special Forces. Colonel Da'ud's responsibility was not to clash or fight with the Armored Division. This was his only role. Hussein said, "We controlled the Armored Division; I commanded a tank and fired on the Presidential Palace." He said, "Practically, we could have done without both Da'ud and Nayif."

Hussein stated, "We got news in the afternoon before the attack that Nayif was offering to join the revolution. Apparently, Da'ud had told him about our plans even though we had told Da'ud to keep our plans a secret. As a result, several members wanted to postpone our plans. At the first stage of the revolution, we discovered that Nayif and Da'ud had been planning among themselves and that they had been contacting other officers outside our line of communication. So, we took removed them on 31 July. It was me who led the operation."

According to Hussein, Da'ud was sent to Jordan on a military assignment. Hussein added, "We could have taken him anytime. I went to Nayif with a gun; I didn't have an automatic weapon. With one gun, I took all the weapons from Nayif and his staff." Since Da'ud was serving with a military corp in Jordan, Hussein sent Ba'ath members to arrest him and bring him back to Baghdad. "However, he said that Da'ud and Nayif "were like a knife in our back."
Contrary to popular accounts of Nayif's arrest, Hussein advised that Nayif was not invited to lunch at President Al-Bakr's house. The arrest actually took place at the Presidential Palace. According to Hussein, "We had lunch at the Presidential Palace everyday during the thirteen days after the revolution because decisions had to be made. We were always in the Palace as was President Al-Bakr. Others attended when meals were served. When Nayif arrived, I pulled a gun on him. He carried a gun too. It was like a movie. I put Barzan Ibrahim Hasan, my half brother, in the room to guard Nayif. When I arrested Nayif, he said, 'I have four children,' so I told him that his children would be taken care of. I told him to sit there and then I asked him where he wanted to go for an assignment as an ambassador." At first, Nayif said he wanted to go to Lebanon. Because Hussein considered Lebanon to be a place where conspiracies are made, he told Nayif to choose another location. Nayif then asked to go to Algeria, but Hussein denied this request because Algeria was having their own revolution. Then, Nayif asked to go to Morocco, and Hussein agreed. Hussein took Nayif to the airport in a car and sat beside him. Other Ba'ath members were in the car as well. Hussein told Nayif, "When I promise something, I do it. We promised that nothing would happen to President Aref and nothing happened. Friends know I keep my word." Hussein told Nayif that "he would be in a safe place, that no one would hurt him, but that he would have to obey."

Hussein laughed as he recalled the story about Nayif and wanted to relate to the interviewer additional details. He remembered telling Nayif, "When the guards salute, you salute back. If you try to think about doing something, remember I am next to you." He told Nayif, "When you go as an ambassador, act like one. We'll notice if you are planning something or not." Hussein recalled that at the time of Nayif's departure, they (the new Ba'ath Party) failed to ask Moroccan officials for permission before dispatching Nayif as ambassador. At the time, Hussein and others were young student revolutionaries and did not know about such things.

As Nayif boarded the plane for Morocco at the Rasheed Camp (military airport), Hussein returned Nayif's gun to him. Hussein described the scene as being, "just like a movie."
Hussein was asked why, if Nayif represented a potential threat to the Ba'ath Party, he was appointed as ambassador. Hussein repeated that they did not want bloodshed anymore. He stated that during the 1959 coup, Ba'ath Party members were tied to cars and dragged through the streets until death. Virgins were hanged on electric poles. There was killing in the streets. When the Ba'ath Party came to power in 1963, people were executed out of revenge. Hussein reiterated that it was his opinion at the time that they needed to forget about the past and prohibit revenge. Hussein stated, "As part of this thinking, we started our arrests of Da'ud and Nayif and went on. Da'ud wanted to be the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, so we sent him there."

In the early 1960s, there was a lot of violence against Ba'athists by the communists. Hussein maintained that when the Ba'athists subsequently took control, however, they did not do to the communists or others what the communists had done to them, at least not to the same extent. He advised that they took the communists to court and acknowledged that some (approximately five or six) were executed. He advised that they released communists, Nasserites, Kurds and members of the Muslim Brotherhood who had been previously imprisoned.

Hussein acknowledged that Nayif was killed on his doorstep in London and that following this, thirteen Iraqi diplomats were expelled from the country. When Hussein was told that some people believe that Nayif was executed by members of the Iraqi Security Service, Hussein answered, "God killed Nayif. Nayif started acting in a way against the country. He gave his word that he wouldn't act against his country. He went to Iran, then met Barzani in Northern Iraq, and according to information, he met with Moshe Dayan (Israeli Defense Minister). These were all considered bad acts. As to who killed him, that's something else. Only God knows." When Hussein was asked if he knew who killed Nayif, Hussein answered, "I told you, God knows." Pressed further, Hussein said, "I told you in a very clear way." As to Da'ud's fate, Hussein stated, "maybe he's still alive, but he wasn't treasonous. There was nothing recorded against him." When asked what the Iraqi government's action was regarding Nayif, Hussein stated, "I am not sure, but I think we warned him. I cannot remember." Hussein was then asked if Nayif could have been arrested, imprisoned and punished, instead of executed, and that some people believe that an order was given to execute him.
Hussein replied, "What people think is something else, but I gave you my answer."

Hussein acknowledged that after the revolution other key figures such as Salih Mahdi Ammash and Hardan Al-Tikriti were removed. Asked if they were removed because they were viewed by the Ba'ath Party as a threat, Hussein answered that compared with coups elsewhere in the world, fewer officials were removed from the government. Hussein stated, although positions may change, relationships do not. As an example, Ammash's daughter became a member of the leadership. His half brother, Barzan, was a revolutionary who rode in the same tank as Hussein which fired on the main gate of the Presidential Palace on the 17th of July. He took many positions but never moved up again. Hussein pointed out that other revolutionaries "ran out of gas," and fewer were able to serve for a long time.

Hussein was asked about Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri and Tariq Aziz. Hussein described Aziz as being an old-time comrade, very respected in the party, but he was not one of the revolutionaries. Hussein said, "I am talking about seventy persons who went into the Presidential palaces." Hussein identified Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri and Taha Yasin Ramadan as having been in the revolution from the beginning until now. He said they had struggled, but that they continue in leadership to this day.

Hussein brought up the subject of Sa'dun Shakir who he claimed to be his lifelong friend. Shakir helped Saddam escape from prison. He stated, "Shakir was waiting for me in the car when we fled, actually, we didn't flee; we had an agreement with the guards". Hussein stated, "Shakir was the driver. He's very dear to me". He added, "When he had nothing more to give, we kept our friendship and love and then we went on from there. It happens. The right people are picked at the right time."

Asked about his comment that some revolutionaries run out of gas and that few are able to serve the revolution for an extended period of time, Hussein replied that there were only about six or seven such individuals. When pointed out that some may consider that he, Hussein, may have "run out of gas," Hussein laughed and said, "I don't get upset at questions that go for the truth. First, I wasn't in the government from the beginning. If you were talking about me as President, then no one was saying I
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had run out of gas. I only started in 1979. Before that, there was someone above me. The two individuals within the leadership that could have told Hussein he no longer benefited the Party were Hardan Al-Tikriti and Salih Ammash.

Considering the time since Hussein was in the tank that fired on the palace through his assumption of leadership in the RCC and his presidency, Hussein was asked, "Your service has been one of the longest; Is it coincidence?" Hussein replied, "They could have said that. This subject is more deep than the details that you give. A leader is not made in a factory in Europe. Leadership is developed gradually. This was done underground." Hussein's opinion at the time was that Al-Bakr should be the President. Hussein stated that he was elected as Deputy Chairman of the Party before the revolution. Hussein said, "I don't like the government, but I like to be in the Party. Notice my speeches, I never say the government; I always say the Party."

Hussein advised that he considers himself to be a revolutionary, not a politician. In both 1968 and 1974, he asked the Party to allow him to be excused from his official position. However, the Party refused his request.

Hussein was asked about Hardan Al-Tikriti being killed in Kuwait and was told that people blamed the Iraqi Security Service. Hussein said that Hardan had not been sent to Kuwait, that he thought Hardan had been appointed as an ambassador somewhere else, perhaps Spain. In any event, Hussein denied knowing the reason why Hardan was killed nor did he acknowledge that the Security Service killed him.

Hussein was asked about Iraqi leaders being killed in different parts of the world. The interviewer asked whether these leaders posed a threat, was it merely a coincidence, was it purposeful, or did he find it strange? Hussein replied by saying, "The question should be asked of the Kuwaitis."
Interview Session Number: 6
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
Arabic/English Translation: SSA

Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed on February 16, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

At the beginning of the interview, Hussein was informed that today's dialogue would be a continuation of yesterday's discussion regarding the years following the 1968 revolution and about prominent members of the Ba'ath Party.

The interviewer mentioned to Hussein that he understood that the attempted coup in 1973 was undertaken by a protege of Hussein, Nadhim Kazzar, Director of the Ba'ath Party's Security Service and a Shi'a from the city of Al-Amarah. Hussein related that at the time, the Party did not know which members were Sunni or Shi'a Muslims or Christians. As an example, he pointed out that it was not until later that he learned that one of the Party's leaders, Tarig Aziz, was a Christian. The Party was successful because it related to the people, and, thus, no distinction was made on members based on their religion or ethnicity.

Hussein related that among the Party's leadership between 1958-63, very few members were Sunni. The Secretary General was Shi'a from the city of Al-Nasiriyah. Hussein claimed that when he attempted to assassinate President Qassem in 1959, he knew nothing about the Sunnis and Shi'as. In 1963, with the exception of two or three Party members, almost all members of the Ba'ath Party were Shi'as. After the revolution, people began inquiring which members were Sunni and which were Shi'a. At the time, it was difficult to know because they were all mixed together. However, by 1968, nearly all Party members were Sunnis. Because the Party had previously operated secretly, few knew or cared about one's religion. However, after the
revolution, people in the government began talking more frequently about this issue. Many were concerned that promotions and demotions were being decided on the basis on one's sect or religious affiliation. Hussein stated, "You would be surprised to know that the Secretary General of the Party in 1964 was Kurdish."

Hussein was asked about a perception that Nadhim Kazzar was Hussein's "right-hand man" and that at one time, he was considered a threat to take over President Bakr's regime. Hussein refuted this characterization by saying that he was not his right hand man in the government and that each person has their own duties and responsibilities. He said that although Kazzar was neither a revolutionary nor among the seventy individuals who took over the Presidential Palace, he was a good Party member and a tough individual while he was in prison.

Kazzar was not convinced that the military would be good for the Ba'ath Party. He was influenced by the thoughts of Party members who split and believed in a communist socialist philosophy. Kazzar considered the military members of the Party to be old-fashioned and a burden. Despite his perspective, however, Kazzar decided to remain with the Party. Hussein had no information whether Kazzar had met with officials in Iran. He related that when Kazzar's coup failed, Kazzar fled to Iran but was arrested before he arrived at the border. Hussein said he did not want to talk "bad" about Kazzar. He said that when Kazzar "arrested" the Minister of Defense Hammad Shihab and Minister of Interior Sa'dun Ghaydan, it was done easily and did not require a big plan.

While discussing Kazzar, Hussein digressed and characterized this period as being the best time for Iraq because "we nationalized oil, settled oil disputes with the oil companies and invested money in Thuraya City," which was later renamed Saddam City.

According to Hussein, the psychology of the Ba'ath Party was to recruit young individuals at the beginning of their schooling such as when they were in elementary and secondary school. The Party seldom recruited members from colleges. Their philosophy was that they wanted a person they could mold to "grow" into the Party. In the 1950's and 1960's, the Party accepted primarily young people and only a few older individuals.
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Some Party members such as Kazzar questioned the allegiance of newer officers to the Ba'ath Party.

(3) The interviewer mentioned to Hussein that many people believed Kazzar's plan to kill Bakr went awry after Kazzar learned that President Bakr's plane had been delayed and then incorrectly assumed that his plot had been exposed. The interviewer continued stating that Kazzar then kidnapped Ministers Shihab and Ghaydan as hostages and fled to the border of Iran where he was captured by Hussein. Hussein responded by saying, "Your information is not specific. According to my information, President Bakr's plane was not delayed, and his guards were awaiting his arrival." Hussein waited at the airport for Bakr and after Bakr arrived, he accompanied him to the Presidential Palace where the two drank tea together. Hussein later excused himself so that Bakr could visit with his family. Hussein was then driven by his staff through Baghdad. As they were driving, they heard an announcement on the police radio that a coup had been attempted by Ministers Shihab and Ghaydan. Because of the importance of this matter, Hussein pushed his driver to the side and proceeded to drive the car himself to his residence which was located near the President's residence. Near the gate of his residence, Hussein used a telephone to call Bakr, who asked where Hussein was located because he had something very important to relate. Hussein answered that he was nearby, and that he had heard the news. Hussein met with Bakr at his residence. Bakr told Hussein that Ministers Shihab and Ghaydan had attempted a coup, saying that he had tried calling Minister Shihab, but received no answer. Hussein advised Bakr that he had an "intuition" about Kazzar and believed it was Kazzar who had attempted the coup, not the two Ministers. Hussein subsequently asked Bakr to call the Military Division and prepare to go after Kazzar and "to hit him before he crossed the border into Iran."

(8) Near the borders of Iran were tribes where Hussein and Sa'dun Shakir used to go hunting. After the revolution, Hussein had given these tribes many rifles. An announcement was put out on the radio to arrest Kazzar and inform the nearest Ba'ath Party unit. Members of a tribe who became aware of this through the radio, saw Kazzar's caravan, surrounded it and detained him. Special Operations helicopters were then dispatched to pick up Kazzar and return him to Baghdad.
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(5) After Bakr obtained a clear picture of what had occurred, he started crying, picked up his belongings and went from his palace to his residence. According to Hussein, Bakr said that he did not want to be President. Bakr told Hussein he wanted Hussein to remain in the government so he could "slip out." Hussein claimed to have made a similar statement to Bakr about also wanting to leave the government.

(6) Following this, Hussein told people not to bother Bakr and to let him stay at home. Hussein then began arresting the alleged conspirators of this coup. He called Bakr to inform him that some of the conspirators were members of the Ba'ath Party leadership. Hussein then began organizing a meeting between himself, Bakr and leaders of the Ba'ath Party Central and National Committees.

(7) Hussein was asked how he knew that Kazzar would be fleeing to Iran. He answered that when the announcement went out on the radio to look for Kazzar, people started calling in sightings of him. Gradually, it was those periodic sightings that led him to believe that Kazzar was heading towards Iran.

(8) Hussein was asked if Kazzar called President Bakr, and he said, "No." Hussein said that apparently Kazzar's vehicle had become stuck in the mud. When he solicited the assistance of local farmers, they called for help. It was around this time that Kazzar shot Ministers Shihab and Gaydan. Shihab survived by pretending that he was dead.

(9) Hussein was questioned whether Kazzar had called President Bakr to negotiate the release of the hostages, and at the same time selected Abd Al-Khaliq Al-Samarrai's residence as a place to meet. Hussein denied this, stating that there was no announcement on the emergency radio band that a coup had been attempted and that all party members should meet at Abd Al-Khaliq Al-Samarrai's residence. Hussein did not know why this house was chosen as the meeting location, but suspected that the Party members were being called to one location to be arrested. When asked whether Samarra'i was implicated in the coup simply because of the meeting, Hussein answered that a "committee" took care of this. Hussein does not remember who headed the "committee," including whether it was Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri. Hussein stated, "I do not want to make a mistake on the details regarding something which I am not one hundred percent sure." Hussein
acknowledged that Samarra'i had been a Ba'ath member since 1968. When asked if Samarra'i spoke out on issues, Hussein said, "The Ba'ath Party talked freely. This is only a media interpretation that people could not talk." Hussein stated that there are members of the Party still available, and he suggested that the interviewers talk to them. Hussein was asked if he was surprised by the allegations against Samarra'i. He responded, "When we give someone in the Party something to do, we trust them. These and other things happen in a revolution."

Hussein then stated, "Whether I am the first person or the second person, all the questions come back to me. I am not afraid of taking responsibility in front of the law or the people. You have to put blame not just on the leadership, but also on the people who conspired such as Samarra'i." Hussein added, "I want you to understand clearly about the situation. Yesterday, we talked about the fact that Nayif and Hardan were killed overseas. Ibrahim Daud was not killed. If the Iraqi government is being accused of all this, why did they not kill Daud?"

Hussein stated, "As I recall, Bakr ruled until 1979 but was not called a dictator, but after I ruled, they called me a dictator." Hussein then asked, "After 1979, who was killed or assassinated inside or outside of Iraq? Who was executed from the Ministries or out of the leadership after 1979?"

Following these questions, the interviewer said that these are unanswered questions which needed to be clarified for the sake of history. Hussein said, "It’s not enough to ask me. You should ask other leaders. I advise you to talk to others." Hussein said he was not worried about answering questions.

The interviewer told Hussein that he (Hussein) was answering the questions for the same reasons they were being asked, for the sake of history. Hussein replied, "Sometimes, you see me upset because some things are dark. During this period, we had good and bad times. We laughed and joked. Samarra'i served, and we made jokes with him. He made mistakes. We moved on. I hope you will be just in what history you (the interviewers) write."
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The interviewer told Hussein, "Fortunately or unfortunately, I will have a major impact on your history." Hussein agreed and replied, "Nobody can say I have no bias. People think what they want. Everyone has his own opinions. People are not a computer. We all have flesh and blood."
Interview Session Number: 7
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
Arabic/English Translation:

(✓) Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed on February 18, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

(✓) Prior to the start of interview, Hussein was informed that this session would be a continuation of the two previous discussions. Topics to be covered would include a discussion of Sa'dun Shakir, among others.

(✓) Hussein acknowledged that Shakir was an example of someone in the Ba'ath Party (the Party) who had "served out his abilities." Nevertheless, Shakir was someone with whom Hussein maintained contact after his departure from service to the Party.

(✓) Hussein first met Shakir in the Taji Prison near Baghdad. Both Hussein and Shakir had been sentenced to prison upon change of the Iraqi government in late 1963 when a coup led by Abd Al-Salem Aref overthrew the Ba'ath government. During 1965 or 1966, Hussein and Shakir were transferred to Prison # 1 also near Baghdad. At some point, Shakir was released but continued visiting Hussein in prison. During this time, their friendship continued and developed more. Eventually, Hussein and Abd Al-Karim Al-Shaykhli escaped from prison with the assistance of Shakir, who served as their driver during the escape.

(✓) After escaping from prison, Shakir was still a member of the Party and served in that capacity. During this period, Hussein continued friendly relations with him. He described Shakir as a very trusted person whom Hussein considered as a friend to him and to his children. Shakir was one of the original seventy "revolutionaries" of 1968.

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When questioned regarding positions held in the Party by Shakir, Hussein commented that, like any other leader, Shakir would accept any assignment. Hussein does not remember any of these assignments and stated this was not important. He was a friend and that is what is important. Hussein suggested that the interviewer should ask Shakir in order to confirm this information.

Regarding whether Shakir was Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), Hussein replied it is well-known that he was the IIS Director. The interviewer opined that it is generally accepted that someone in charge of an organization such as an intelligence service should have certain qualifications and abilities prior to appointment to such a position. Hussein replied, "We were all young revolutionaries." As such, they did not have the necessary experience and learned "on the job." Hussein added that regarding management matters, they learned from the Party. Hussein stated leading people is the most difficult thing in life. Whoever can lead people in the Party, and the masses, will be effective in their jobs. Hussein continued saying Party members "gave it a try" with some succeeding and some failing. Party members continued in their positions until the responsibilities of their work overcame their individual abilities. At this point, they were replaced. Regarding Party members with a military background, Hussein noted this military experience was limited and did not necessarily translate into something useful for governmental affairs.

Hussein acknowledged Shakir served as IIS Director at an important time of the revolution. He noted, however, that the entire history of a revolution is important. Perhaps, Shakir did not serve at the most critical time. Hussein added, "Difficulties become larger when the job becomes larger."

The interview then turned to a discussion of Shaykhli. Hussein acknowledged Shaykhli was a fellow revolutionary and a friend. Hussein and Shaykhli participated in the assassination attempt against Iraqi President Qassem in 1959. Each escaped Iraq and fled to Damascus, Syria. There, Hussein and Shaykhli's friendship and brotherhood continued and grew stronger. After Syria, their friendship continued upon moving to Cairo together.
After the first Ba'ath revolution of 1963, Hussein and Shaykhli returned to Iraq together. Upon return, Hussein worked with farmers and Shaykhli worked investigations at the Qasr Al-Nihayya (The Palace of the End). Later, Shaykhli was appointed military attache to Lebanon.


Hussein commented that Shaykhli had a very good mind but did not concentrate and focus on the job at hand. According to Hussein, Shaykhli liked to "live and entertain himself." Hussein told Shaykhli how the Party perceived him. Later, the majority of Party leadership voted to remove Shaykhli from his position. He was later murdered in Baghdad in 1980.

The interviewer pointed out that Hussein had omitted some details of his relationship with Shaykhli including the fact that the two of them had served in prison at the same time after the 1963 overthrow of the Ba'ath government, becoming friends. As is commonly understood, the interviewer also noted Shaykhli once saved Hussein's life. Hussein responded, "In what sense?" The interviewer then relayed the details of an incident during the "underground" years of the Ba'ath between 1963 and 1968. According to the story, Hussein was at Shaykhli's apartment late one night. Hussein decided to leave the apartment and spend the night at a location where weapons for the Party were stored. However, Shaykhli convinced Hussein to remain at his place. Later, the same night, the weapons storage location was raided by the police. Some believe Hussein might have been killed, or at a minimum, arrested if he had been at the location.

Hussein acknowledged this story is true and that he was with Shaykhli at this time. However, he stated the police could not have captured or killed him. With Shaykhli driving, Hussein went to the weapons location the next morning. Upon arrival, a policeman at the location put the barrel of his machine gun in Hussein's side as he rang the bell of the house. Simultaneously, Shaykhli sped away from the location in the car.
Hussein explained that although Shaykhli was a brave man, people react differently in different situations.

At that time, Hussein was not widely known and was someone who would not have been recognized. As such, the policeman did not recognize him. Hussein pretended not to know anything and asked whether this was "Mohammed's" residence. Hussein was not concerned about being shot or killed as the police in Iraq do not kill someone easily, unless their life is seriously threatened. Additionally, people in Iraq generally "know each other" and there are many tribal influences. Even if the law permits such conduct, tribes will seek revenge. Hussein continued his story saying he surprised the policeman by pushing his machine gun aside and pulling a pistol which he (Hussein) had concealed under his shirt. Hussein ordered the policeman to place his hands on Hussein's car, which had been previously left at the location and was likely the reason the house was discovered. Hussein did not want to kill the officer, but decided to fire a round in the air over the policeman's head. The gun malfunctioned, however, and Hussein "reloaded." He told the policeman he would fire one round over his head, and if he moved, a second round into his body. He then fired a round over the policeman's head and the officer "became like a dog." A standoff then occurred as some of Hussein's "comrades" had been arrested by the police inside the house. These "comrades" heard all the activity outside and told the police their comrade Saddam had arrived with a big group and would kill the policemen. Simultaneously, one of the men in the car with Shaykhli returned to the house with a machine gun. The police then acquiesced to the "comrades" in the house asking them for their help and to be saved from Hussein and his men. Thereafter, the standoff ended without bloodshed. Hussein ended this portion of the discussion saying there are many stories from the "underground" period, all of them like "scenes in the movies."

Hussein was told that Shaykhli was described, similar to Hussein, as a prominent and popular Party member at that time. Hussein responded there is no need and it is not important to compare one person to another. Each person is different, one is not better than the other.

Hussein acknowledged Shaykhli served as Foreign Minister until 1971, whereupon he was removed from this position by the leadership. Hussein stated that removal of any individual...
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from a position requires a decision by the leadership. Not all may agree on the removal, but a majority was required. In Hussein's opinion, Shaykhli could have continued his service to the Party and the government. At that time, Hussein believed Shaykhli could have been "criticized" and given the chance to correct his behavior. Shaykhli would never have been elected as a Party member without the support of Hussein. Because of Shaykhli's lack of concentration on his work and failure to accept criticism, the Party leadership was "not convinced" of him and decided on his removal.

Regarding whether Shaykhli was viewed as a potential successor to President Bakr, Hussein did not agree and said this statement was too strong. Hussein commented that it appeared as if the interviewer was implying that he removed those from leadership viewed as a threat to Hussein's position of leadership. From the underground days, Hussein was already in charge. While in prison, the Ba'ath leadership sent a letter notifying Hussein of their recommendation that he become a member of the Ba'ath Party Central Committee. Hussein answered the letter, "What good am I in prison?" He asked the Party to find someone else, however, they did not listen to his opinion. Thereafter, Bakr and Hussein served as two members of the Central Committee, a body above the Regional Committee and all other Party components. Bakr served as Secretary General and Hussein served as Deputy Secretary General while "underground."

Hussein commented that it is embarrassing to talk about one's own positions. His status in the Party was known, even before the revolution. All those appointed to Party positions, dead or alive today, deserved these appointments. Basically, it came down to who was elected. Hussein stated, "It is difficult to talk about myself." Within the Party, members do not like to talk about themselves. Hussein had recommended that members not talk about themselves.

The interviewer pointed out that it is commonly believed, both inside and outside Iraq, that Hussein's potential rivals in the Party were eliminated during the period between the 1968 revolution and Hussein's ascendancy to the Presidency in 1979. Hussein denied that those on the inside of Iraq would say or believe such information. He agreed that this information could have come from outside Iraq. According to Hussein, this
conclusion is the opinion of these people and not necessarily a fact.

Regardless of the information, Hussein stated any examination of this idea needs to be conducted logically. Hussein stated there are many examples in history throughout the world of similar ascensions to power after a revolution. In Egypt, Nasser and Sadat were the only individuals who "stayed" with the revolution, with Nasser eventually becoming leader of the country. In France, a single soldier, Napoleon, became the leader of the country after the French Revolution when others gave up. American history is also full of examples of this phenomenon. In Hussein's opinion, these are the "revolutionary ways."

According to Hussein, previous uprisings, such as the French Revolution, were tragedies when compared to the times in which we now live. Revolutions are a new step in government, not a "liberal way" where someone is chosen and groomed to be a leader. Revolutions come from the people.

The 1968 revolution in Iraq included seventy "revolutionaries." Very few of them continued in government and/or Party service after the revolution. Some were appointed to positions and performed well, some did not. All of them did not have the ability to lead and be professional. Some continued in service while others dropped out over time. Hussein stated they all were servants of the people.

When questioned whether he believed Nasser became a dictator, Hussein replied that he did not agree. Upon responding to a request from the interviewer to define dictatorship, Hussein stated this is a form of government where one person rules alone, without a parliament, council, or committee. Hussein did not agree with the characterization that Nasser's government fit this definition. Hussein stated Nasser had a parliament. However, a parliament is not possible at the beginning of a revolution. Normally, a revolutionary council is first established and is later followed by a parliament or people's committee. Hussein does not like comparing Iraq and its 1968 revolution to Nasser and Egypt. Nasser was a military person who did not have a political party. In Iraq, the Ba'ath had a Party ranging from the cells in villages all the way to the leadership as well as a
When asked whether Hussein and Shaykhli remained friends after Shaykhli's departure from Party service, Hussein stated his friends were among those with whom he met regularly in the leadership. He did not have any friends outside of the Party and the leadership. A true friendship has "obligations." Hussein considered Shakir as the person closest to him after the 1968 revolution. Whenever Hussein needed to discuss something, he would send for Shakir and they would have lunch together and talk. After Shakir left government service, Hussein does not remember how many times they met. Hussein stated Shaykhli "kept up good relations" with his sons Qusay and Uday. Regarding Shaykhli and the period of time after his departure from government service, Hussein's feelings of friendship remained the same, but the two did not spend the same amount of time together. Due to the demands of work, Hussein did not have time to associate with those outside of work, the Party, or the leadership.

When questioned whether he had special feelings about Shaykhli, who was shot and killed in Baghdad in 1980, Hussein stated, "Yes." Regarding whether Shaykhli's killer(s) were captured, Hussein responded, "I don't think so." An investigation took place, but the crime was not solved. Hussein stated that not all crimes committed are ultimately solved. He added that other crimes, including those committed against his cousins and those involving the deaths of various Iraqi dignitaries and ministers, remain unsolved. Hussein noted that not all crimes are solved elsewhere in the world, such as in America, France, or Italy. When questioned whether it was unusual for a crime involving the murder of a former government minister, a former revolutionary, and a former friend of the President of Iraq to go unsolved, Hussein retorted, "What do you want to say? Why are you going around the subject?" There are others who were close to Hussein in the leadership who were targets of assassination attempts, including Tariq Aziz, Uday Hussein, and others. These crimes remain unsolved as well. It happens in Iraq, just as it happens elsewhere in the world.

Hussein ended the session acknowledging the possibility that some people may say Shaykhli was killed by the Iraqi government. He added that some people might say anything.
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Logically, those who would say this are probably the same people who said Shaykhli could have become President.
Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed on February 20, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

Prior to the start of interview, Hussein was informed this session would be a continuation of the three previous discussions, focusing on Hussein's ascendency to the Presidency.

Beginning in 1973, Iraqi President Bakr began having health problems including issues with his heart. Despite these problems, Bakr performed his duties as best as he could. Periodically, Bakr told Hussein that he should retire and that he could no longer fulfill his duties as President. Hussein is unaware whether Bakr made such comments to others within the Ba'ath Party (Party) leadership. Hussein stated Bakr felt "close to Hussein."

Around this time, Hussein seriously considered leaving the government but remaining in the Party. His main reason for wanting to leave government was linked to the overthrow of the Ba'ath government in 1963. Hussein believed this overthrow occurred because the Party leadership concentrated on the government and forgot about the Party. Hussein did not like the "power" and his position in the government. When he joined the revolution of 1966, his intention was not to stay in government. Hussein had planned to stay involved only within the cells of the Party at the lower levels. At that time, he believed it would be a "shame" to serve in the government. Until this day, Hussein still does not like government. He likes the people and the Party, but believes it is difficult for the government to judge fairly. Hussein observed individuals he
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described as "kind and gentle" before serving in the government who subsequently became the opposite after their appointments to government positions.

After the 1968 revolution, a governing Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was formed. However, the announcement of the RCC was not made until one year later in 1969. The members of the RCC, with the exception of the military members, were not and "did not want to be known." For this reason, the announcement of the RCC was delayed. Hussein was "forced" to take a leadership position in the RCC. Party members asked Hussein whether he wanted the revolution to fail, implying it would without his participation, and that it was his responsibility to be a Party leader.

Hussein wanted Bakr to remain as President for as long as possible, describing him as a "nice person." In 1979, however, Bakr contacted Hussein and asked him to meet in Bakr's office in the Presidential Palace. At this meeting, Bakr told Hussein he no longer wanted nor felt able to serve as President. Bakr implored Hussein to assume his duties, telling Hussein if he did not accept the "normal method" of appointment as President, he would use the radio to make an announcement that Hussein was now President. Hussein told Bakr that this means of announcing a successor would not be good for the country, the people, or the Party. Outsiders, or foreigners, especially would have thought something was wrong within Iraq. Thereafter, Tariq Aziz was asked to prepare an announcement regarding the change of leadership. A meeting of the RCC was convened in July, 1979. Hussein is unsure whether he or Bakr called the meeting.

At the meeting, Bakr explained to the RCC members that he had wanted to step down since 1973. He further explained to the members that Hussein was ready to assume the Presidency. Hussein described the meeting as being "like a family gathering." There were many emotions present including sadness. The transfer of the Presidency to Hussein was conducted according to the Constitution. Hussein stated a vote was taken, but he does not remember whether it was by secret ballot or by raising hands. He was designated Secretary General of the Party and President of Iraq.
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When asked whether Hussein observed any changes in himself upon assuming the Presidency, he responded, "No." He stated he became "stronger and closer to the people."

When asked what Hussein believed would have happened to himself if he had been allowed to leave government, Hussein replied that he would have been a regular person, possibly a farmer. He would, however, have continued as a Party member and continued attending meetings of the Party.

The interviewer noted his own personal opinion that it would be difficult to imagine Hussein as a farmer. Hussein stated he was afraid to become a public figure. He stated that his situation changed as did his obligations, becoming almost personal. Hussein observed that while he served as President, thousands of people viewed themselves as being close to him. Until 1995, people did not elect him, rather Hussein stated, "The revolution brought me." After 1995 and 2002, the people did, in fact, vote for and elect Hussein. After the elections, his relationship with the people became stronger, and Hussein now felt an obligation to those who had voted for him. Hussein was not only obligated to the people by law, but also to the people "in front of God."

Hussein was questioned whether, at the meeting where Bakr announced his resignation, the entire RCC supported his becoming President. Hussein responded there was nothing or no one against him to become the leader. Morally and out of respect for Bakr, some members asked Bakr to stay. Bakr, however, did not allow their wishes to influence his final decision. Hussein viewed Bakr's decision as final because he, himself, could not convince Bakr to remain as President.

The interviewer noted reports which stated there was at least one outspoken person at the meeting who questioned Bakr's retirement and stated that Hussein's selection should be unanimous, Muhie Abd Al-Hussein Mashhadi. Hussein stated this information is not correct. There was discussion about Bakr's resignation but no talk about the process for selecting Hussein. Others offered to assume some of Bakr's duties so that he might be able to remain as President. He did not accept these offers, however. At that time, Hussein was Deputy Secretary General of the Party and Vice President of Iraq. As such, he was next in line to become President, a fact which could not have been
questioned. Additionally, the Constitution specifically stated any selection of the President had to be made by a majority, not unanimous, vote. Some members talked about the possibility of postponing Bakr's resignation. Hussein stated there are former RCC members still alive who can be questioned regarding this matter. The interviewer stated several former RCC members generally agree on the details provided by Hussein about this event. However, some former RCC members also provided information indicating Mashhadi voiced his opposition to Bakr's resignation and Hussein's selection as President at the referenced RCC meeting. Hussein replied that he had told the interviewer all the details known to him.

The interviewer stated a plot against Hussein was discovered shortly after Hussein assumed the Presidency. An infamous meeting took place on July 22, 1979 whereupon the details of the plot were revealed to senior members of the Party. The interviewer added that the meeting was recorded on videotape, viewed by the interviewer. Hussein stated this matter was not a secret and the video was given to all Party members. Hussein does not remember whether the meeting was opened with comments by Taha Yasin Ramadan. He acknowledged that Mashhadi was brought before the assembly, admitted his participation in a plot against Hussein involving the Syrian government, and named some of the others who participated in the plot. Hussein's reaction and feelings were the same as anyone who had been betrayed by friends in the Party and the government, sadness and a feeling of being "back-stabbed." This was especially true because the plot involved Arabs outside the government and country. Hussein described these actions as treason and the participants as traitors.

Regarding when Hussein became aware of the plot, he responded, "At that time." The interviewer pointed out that Mashhadi was arrested a few days before the meeting, approximately July 15, after Hussein became President. Hussein stated he became President July 17. The interviewer responded that July 17 was the official date, although Hussein had actually assumed the Presidency almost one week prior.

The interviewer questioned Hussein as to how the plot was discovered. Hussein asked, "Did you hear the video?" He added that the information on the video should be enough. The interviewer noted the video did not provide details about how the
plot was discovered. Hussein responded, "These are secrets of the country." He emphasized that he still considered these details secret despite the fact that the event occurred almost 25 years ago.

The interviewer then steered the discussion to the video which was not a state secret. The interviewer noted the video depicted several present and future members of the senior leadership. Among those shown were Tariq Aziz and Ali Hasan Al-Majid, who was seen standing and shouting. The video names approximately sixty-six individuals as participants in the plot, including Adnan Hussein, Deputy Prime Minister, and Ghanim Abd Al-Jalil, Director of the Office of the President. Hussein stated Adnan was the Minister of Planning and Secretary of the Committee for Oil and Agreements. Hussein acknowledged that Adnan may have already been appointed as Deputy Prime Minister after Hussein assumed the Presidency and before this meeting. Hussein acknowledged that a total of five RCC members, and none of the original seventy revolutionaries, were implicated in the plot. Hussein denied that any of the conspirators, including Adnan and Ghanim, were his friends. People who worked in the government were not his friends. Hussein stated Adnan and Ghanim were "not close to me." Like others, they were appointed to government positions. Some "made it" while some did not. When pointed out to Hussein that the interviewer saw Hussein crying in the video when Ghanim’s name was announced, Hussein responded that, as a human being, he still had feelings. As the head of his office, Hussein saw Ghanim every day delivering various papers. All of the members of the plot were in the leadership. Hussein remarked that treason makes you feel "sorrowful." When noted by the interviewer that one might say Hussein had been betrayed by his closest colleagues, Hussein responded the most important thing is that they were in the government and were with Hussein in the Party.

Hussein acknowledged that over sixty people were implicated, although not all were convicted. Hussein further acknowledged that the names of the "conspirators" were announced by Mashhadi or read by Hussein from a list at the meeting. As the names were announced, the person named was asked to stand up, and, one by one, was escorted from the hall by the Himaya.

Thereafter, a tribunal was held to adjudicate the matter and to decide punishment. Hussein stated he does not
remember the exact number or identities of persons who were found guilty and were executed or imprisoned, or who escaped, or who were found innocent and were released. He acknowledged that the entire matter, including executions, was concluded within approximately sixteen days, or by August 8, 1979. Hussein believes the amount of time used during the process was "more than enough" for an unbiased and impartial trial. Although he believes this was enough time to be fair, Hussein acknowledged there might not have been adequate time to "go deep into things." When asked to clarify this statement, Hussein responded there may have been other conspirators who were not identified. Hussein does not know whether there were other participants, but he reiterated that the information available and the time utilized for the investigation were enough to convict those who were identified. He commented that the law says it is better for one guilty person to go free than for many innocent people to go to jail without being guilty.

(8) Hussein stated he does not know the specific results of the investigation. This matter was decided by a court and the sentences were carried out thereafter. When questioned about Abd Al-Khaliq Al-Samarrai's involvement and how it was possible for someone already in prison to be a part of such a plot, Hussein responded, "Ask those who did the investigation." When asked to provide the names of the investigators, Hussein stated he does not remember. The interviewer noted that Barzan Al-Tikriti, having just been named Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), headed the investigation. Hussein replied that there must have been a committee, but he denied knowledge of the composition of any such committee. He further denied knowing anyone who might know the composition of this committee.

(8) Regarding the involvement of the RCC in this investigation, Hussein first denied knowledge of any details. He observed that if the matter was decided by tribunal, there must have been an official committee. The interviewer reminded Hussein of a speech he gave on August 8, 1979, wherein he stated that the RCC, formerly numbering twenty-one, now included sixteen members due to the implication of five RCC members in the plot. Hussein continued in the speech saying, of the sixteen RCC members, three conducted the investigation and seven formed the tribunal which heard the facts and decided the punishment. In the speech, Hussein added that this was the first time in the
history of revolutionary movements and human struggle that over half of the supreme leadership of a nation took part in such a matter. Hussein responded to the interviewer, "Good, very good." According to the Constitution, members of the RCC must be tried by other RCC members, not by a tribunal outside of the RCC. When questioned regarding the fairness or neutrality of the RCC conducting a trial of its own members, Hussein replied that fairness existed within the individuals of the RCC. The plot was not against them, it was against Hussein. Additionally, the Constitution, which dictated procedure, existed well before the plot.

When questioned regarding previous statements he made saying the plot was against the Party, Hussein replied, "I did not say that. I said it was against Saddam." The conspirators plotted with another country (Syria) to prevent Hussein from coming to power. While it is true Hussein was head of the Party, the plot was against him individually. Hussein believes there were individuals who did not want him in power because he would not be "easy to control." With another person as President, who had conspired with the five members of the RCC and the other country, others would have been able to control Iraq. Hussein acknowledged that a tentative agreement regarding unification of Syria and Iraq was being worked on at the time, specifically through Tariq Aziz. However, the plot ended that discussion/agreement as "anything based on plotting has no value." When questioned what the other country hoped to gain, Hussein responded, "Ask them. We did not ask them."

Hussein denied knowledge of any reward being paid to the individual(s) who discovered the plot. When questioned as to the reason for videotaping the meeting on July 22, Hussein stated the video was made in order to inform the Party of what had occurred. He confirmed that, as seen in the video, there were many emotions present, including sadness. The interviewer pointed out that fear appeared to be the most noticeable emotion, first from audience members, and then from those who were named and shouted their innocence upon being ordered to stand. Hussein acknowledged that he, himself, ordered at least one of the named individuals to leave the hall.

The interviewer noted three things in the video which seemed to stand out, including Hussein smoking a cigar, the expression on Tariq Aziz' face, and Ali Hasan Al-Majid shouting
about Al-Samarra'i and his belief that conspiracies would continue as long as Al-Samarra'i was alive. Hussein responded that he knows the meaning behind each example provided by the interviewer. He stated that he rarely smokes unless the "times are difficult." Hussein questioned the expression of Aziz, whether it was a happy or sad one. The interviewer responded that Aziz appeared scared. Hussein stated this "reading" by the interviewer was not correct, "we were all scared." Regarding Ali Hasan, Hussein asked the interviewer whether he was implying Al-Samarra'i was executed simply because of the words of Ali Hasan.

Hussein stated copies of the video of the July 22, 1979 meeting were sent to Iraqi ambassadors in other countries. The videos were to be used by embassy officials to present information to Iraqis living outside of the country concerning events occurring within Iraq. Hussein denied knowledge of whether the video was shown to leaders of other countries. Hussein remarked, if it was shown to such persons, that would have been "a good thing, not a bad thing." Perhaps the video would have been shown to other leaders because another Arab country was involved in the plot. Regarding whether the video was made and distributed to demonstrate that Hussein was in charge of Iraq, Hussein responded that the interviewer had seen the video and "this is your opinion, you have the right."

The interviewer provided comments reportedly made by Hussein around the time of the plot wherein he said, "With our Party methods, there is no chance for any one who disagrees with us to jump on a couple of tanks and overthrow us." Hussein stated he does not remember making such a comment, but believed he could explain as these words were a part of his thinking. This message was directed at not only the other country with whom the conspirators were plotting but also to all Party members.

Hussein was questioned about the sincerity of his reported previous statements to Bakr in the 1960s and 1970s wherein he expressed a desire to leave the government. Hussein responded by saying that after 1974, he believed he had a moral obligation to the Iraqi people. After many discussions with President Bakr, Hussein acknowledged it was "his fate." From this time forward, he decided he would accept such an appointment and planned for the Presidency.
Interview Session Number: 9
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro

Arabic/English Translation: [Blank]

Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed on February 24, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

Hussein stated that after the war with Iran from 1980-88, Iraq was trying to rebuild. Hussein likened the situation with Kuwait as similar to when two individuals fight, the fight ends, and the two parties go their separate ways. Thereafter, one of the previous disputing parties is bothered by someone else who also wants to fight. Then, there is no choice but to fight again.

According to Hussein, Khomeini and Iran would have occupied all of the Arab world if it had not been for Iraq. As such, Iraq expected the Arab world to support them during and after the war. However, Iraq saw the opposite regarding support, especially from Kuwait. At the end of the war as Iraq began the rebuilding process, the price of oil was approximately $7 per barrel. In Hussein's opinion, Iraq could not possibly rebuild its infrastructure and economy with oil prices at this level. Kuwait was especially at fault regarding these low oil prices.

In an effort to solve the situation and stimulate economic recovery, Iraq sent Dr. Hammadi, Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Kuwait. Hammadi, and the Iraqi leadership's conclusion after the meeting was that the oil price situation was not just the responsibility/work of the Kuwaitis. Iraq believed
some other entity, some larger power was behind this "conspiracy."

Iraq also sent government officials to Saudi Arabia to convince the Saudis to pressure Kuwait. In addition, the Saudi Minister of Oil came to Iraq and held talks about oil prices, the Iraqi economy, and the actions of Kuwait. Hussein claimed that a Kuwaiti official said, "We'll make the economy in Iraq so bad, one would be able to sleep with an Iraqi woman for ten dinars." Hussein told the Saudis that if Kuwait did not stop interfering in Iraqi affairs, he would make the Kuwaiti dinar worth ten fils.

Hussein stated that when Kuwait was faced with the facts regarding "stealing" Iraqi oil using the practice of slant drilling, they admitted to having taken "only two and a half billion barrels." They stated this fact as if it was not significant.

Regarding the problems with Kuwait, Iraq sent delegates to other Gulf countries which Hussein does not remember. These delegates explained the Kuwaiti situation and the Iraqi situation. The other countries promised to correct oil prices at the next meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

At the next OPEC meeting, a decision was made to fix the oil price at $16-17 per barrel, as remembered by Hussein. Kuwait concurred with this decision. Thereafter, the Kuwaiti Minister of Oil or Minister of Foreign Affairs stated Kuwait would not abide by the OPEC decision.

Regarding loan debts owed to Gulf countries as a result of support received during the Iran-Iraq War, Hussein stated these were not loans and were supposed to be free aid from these countries. The countries had originally used the word "loan" as a formality only to disguise the purpose of the funds from Iran. When Iraq was informed the money was actually from loans, Iraq held discussions with these countries, including Kuwait, in order to resolve these debts. Because the money had been "registered as loans" to Iraq, Iraq could not secure loans from other countries in order to rebuild.

Hussein stated that twice he discussed a change in oil prices to $25 per barrel. Once, when the price per barrel
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reached $50, Hussein dictated a letter to Tariq Aziz, which was sent to the Thoura Newspaper. In the letter, he told the oil-producing countries that they should not take advantage of the industrialized nations. Hussein asked them to reduce the price per barrel to $25. He commented that this was strange at the time as Iraq had oil and could use the money. When the price dropped to $7 per barrel in 1989-90, Hussein called for an increase to $24-25 per barrel. In Hussein's opinion, this price would not burden the consumer or hurt the producer.

Regarding the kind of message Kuwait's action or lack of action sent to Iraq, Hussein stated "this confirmed our information" that there was an "conspiracy" against Iraq, the Iraqi leadership, and Iraq's economy. In Hussein's opinion, the visit of US General Schwarzkopf to Kuwait also provided further confirmation. His visit included "sand planning" or wartime preparations for the invasion of Iraq confirming what Hussein and the leadership already believed. Previous to this event, Kuwait's relationship with the United States and Great Britain was well known. When noted to Hussein that the US military visits many countries throughout the world conducting exercises which are not indicators of a "conspiracy", Hussein asked, "In what other country did Schwarzkopf do 'sand planning' like Kuwait?" Hussein further questioned which other countries Schwarzkopf conducted negotiations with in order to enter for defensive purposes. Hussein acknowledged that he understands the existence and nature of exercises conducted by the United States in Egypt and Jordan. However, when exercises or planning cast Iraq as the enemy and include ways to defend Kuwait or attack Iraq, this is a different situation than the other exercises.

Hussein discussed the perception in the West regarding Iraq in the months leading up to the war in Kuwait. After Iraq's defeat of Iran, the media discussed Iraq as a military threat to the region. Iraq, however, was not "within Soviet circles" and was attempting to rebuild its economy. Iraq was also starting to build its relations with United States.

Soon, the United States made Iraq its enemy through three means or for three reasons. First, the "Zionist" power and influence in the United States dictates foreign policy. Any country viewed as a threat to Israel, such as Iraq, becomes a target of the "conspiracy." Hussein offered proof of this position stating Israel issued an official statement saying that
any peace agreement with Arab countries must include Iraq. Hussein claims Israel is not hoping for peace, only that other countries abide by their wishes. Israel used its influence over the West against Nasser in Egypt similar to its position vis-a-vis Iraq. This "Zionist" influence extends throughout the United States to include elections. Secondly, there were formerly two superpowers in the world, the United States and the Soviet Union. According to Hussein, the world's existence then was "better than now" as it was easier for two powers to agree rather than attempt to get many to agree. Each of the two superpowers attempted to get other countries to side with them, forging a balance of power in the world. With the collapse of this balance, however, the United States was left alone as the sole superpower. The United States is now viewed as attempting to dictate its will to the rest of the world including Iraq. When countries do not agree with United States, such as Iraq, they become enemies. The third reason the United States made Iraq its enemy is for economic purposes. Certain entities within the United States, including weapons manufacturers and elements in the military, favor war due to the financial profit which can be reaped. This is true for companies selling everything from carpets to tanks in support of a war. Hussein added that America discovered the war in Afghanistan was not enough to sustain the profit making of the military-industrial complex of America. Thus, the war began with Iraq. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, all of these internal and external reasons combined to compel the United States to make Iraq its enemy.

Prior to the invasion of Kuwait, Hussein stated there was a meeting of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) in which a discussion of the matter took place. The Iraqi leadership of the RCC had hoped the Saudis would "interfere" and have a solution. The Deputy Chairman of the RCC had traveled to Saudi Arabia to solicit their assistance but returned without success. Thereafter, the matter could only be discussed and decided upon in favor of military action. Hussein acknowledged the possibility that one or more RCC members opposed or voted against the invasion, but he does not specifically remember any such opposition. He does not remember if a majority or all of the RCC members agreed on military action. Hussein stated, "I was against attacking if a solution could be found." The last attempt at reaching a solution occurred during the previously referenced visit to Saudi Arabia in which the Deputy Chairman of the RCC met with the brother of Kuwaiti leader Sheikh Sabah.
The final decision to invade Kuwait was made in order to "defend by attacking." Hussein further justified the invasion based upon historical facts. He stated history dictates that Kuwait is a part of Iraq.

Hussein stated the objective of the invasion was "the one announced." That is, Kuwaitis were to rule themselves and would decide what kind of relations they would have with Iraq. As for the Kuwaiti leaders, Hussein stated they were "conspirators" against Iraq, Kuwait, and all Arab countries. These leaders kept conspiring even after they left Kuwait upon invasion by Iraq. They were controlled by the United States.

Because of the country's "conspiracy" with the United States, Kuwait did not expect the "blow to them." Hussein stated Kuwait deserved "ten blows." Kuwait was not as strong militarily as Iran. Kuwait's lack of defensive positions is not indicative of the absence of plans with the United States. The plans discussed during the previously referenced "sand planning" may have been offensive in nature, not defensive. The reasons for Iraq's invasion existed, with or without the presence of American forces. As they did in the most recent war, the United States "created" the reasons to fight Iraq in Kuwait in 1991. Hussein denied creating this "conspiracy" as a justification for the invasion of Kuwait. He claimed documents discovered by Iraq in Kuwait prove the existence of the Kuwaiti "conspiracy" with the United States.

Hussein remarked, "We can discuss this for days."

The United States and twenty-eight other countries took seven months to mobilize forces for the war in 1991. This mobilization occurred because of the power of Iraq and perceived military threat it posed. This threat motivated US politicians to support action against Iraq. In addition, the financial interests of companies that could profit from a war also motivated support for action against Iraq. The preemptive strike by Iraq into Kuwait was conducted so that defensive lines could not be completed. Hussein reiterated the lack of American forces in Kuwait does not mean there was not a "conspiracy."

Hussein restated that the goal of the invasion of Kuwait was to allow Kuwaitis the right to "decide the way they wanted to deal with Iraq." Hussein denied that the declaration of Kuwait as the 19th Province of Iraq contradicts his previous
statement. According to Hussein, a Kuwaiti government was established after the invasion and included a prime minister and various other ministers. Hussein denied that Iraqi RCC member Ali Hasan Al-Majid was appointed Governor of Kuwait. He added that the Kuwaiti cabinet decided to "join the Iraqis." When questioned whether the Kuwaitis were given a choice, Hussein asked whether Iraqis were given the choice to voice their opinion regarding the recent war against Iraq. He continued that Iraq's acts with respect to Kuwait were more logical than the United States position on Iraq in the most recent war. Hussein stated the designation of Kuwait as the 19th Province was "deserved and logical." In 1961 or 1962, then Iraqi President Qassem wanted to make Kuwait a district of Iraq.

Hussein emphasized that he has already explained why no other actions were taken to avoid the invasion as well as the reasons Kuwait was designated the 19th Province. The political solutions for this matter were completely removed when America attacked. Hussein claimed Iraq "would have gone the other way" if the United States had not attacked. With political solutions exhausted, two options remained. Iraq could have withdrawn from Kuwait, with attacks against their forces not likely to stop during the withdrawal. Iraq would have been the "laughing stock" of the world. Iraqi forces would have been especially reluctant to fight if Kuwait had not been declared as the 19th Province. The other solution, and the appropriate one, was not to withdraw and to declare Kuwait as the 19th Province so that Iraqi forces would fight with greater vigor.
Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed February 27, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

Prior to the start of interview, Hussein was informed this session would be a continuation of the previous discussion regarding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In particular, today's conversation would begin with a discussion of United Nations Resolution (UNR) 662 which did not recognize Iraq's annexation of Kuwait.

Regarding the Iraqi government's reaction to UNR 662, Hussein stated, "Nothing happened." According to Hussein, when the United States decided to attack Iraq, this action made the annexation of Kuwait the only solution. At that point, there was no political solution. Hussein reiterated comments from a previous interview wherein he stated Iraqi soldiers would not have fought appropriately or "have taken care of Kuwait" were it not annexed and made part of Iraq. He again emphasized that the actions of the United States "forced our hand."

When noted to Hussein that UNR 662 was issued in August, 1990, long before any US or coalition forces military action, Hussein stated that military forces opposing Iraq were already in Saudi Arabia at that time. This, coupled with various decisions and announcements made by the United States, indicated a prelude to a US attack against Iraq.

Hussein noted that the UN seemed only to "watch" the Iran-Iraq War for eight years, without concern. Only near the end of the conflict, when Iraq had overcome Iranian forces, did the UN propose and Iran accept a cease fire agreement. In
Hussein's opinion, the UN "was not honorable" during the Iran-Iraq War. During the war between the two countries, some of the major countries wanted to see "the power drained" from Iran and Iraq. He added that the UN "interferes with everybody." Hussein believes that Iraq's membership in the UN should have precluded its invasion in 1991 and its present occupation.

Hussein questioned whether legitimate efforts were made by the UN or individual countries to prevent the conflict with Kuwait or to set the terms of withdrawal after invasion. He denied there was any "initiative" from other countries. Hussein stated the Soviet Union proposed one plan for withdrawal which Iraq accepted. However, the UN did not accept this proposal. Egypt, in Hussein's opinion, "did nothing."

The initiative concerning any plan for withdrawal from Kuwait came from Iraq. On August 12, 1990, Iraq proposed a solution for "everybody in the area." This plan included enforcement of previous UN decisions regarding lands occupied by Israel. Hussein questioned why the UN did not attack Israel for failing to observe resolutions. Hussein stated that the "mistakes" of Israel are not considered by the UN. Regarding Iraqi mistakes, however, the UN is always concerned.

During Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, Hussein denied knowledge of the commission of atrocities by the Iraqi military. These atrocities include the punishment, including executions, of Kuwaiti individuals who prayed on their roofs, who failed to hang pictures of Hussein, who displayed pictures of the previous Kuwaiti royal family, or who wrote anti-Iraqi graffiti. Hussein stated, "This is the first time I have ever heard this." He added, of the mentioned punishable offenses, he particularly does not believe two of them were designated as crimes. First, the Iraqi government did not force Iraqis to display pictures of Hussein, therefore, the government would not have forced Kuwaitis to do this. In Iraq, citizens voluntarily chose to display Hussein's picture in their homes. Second, neither Iraqis, nor Kuwaitis are prohibited from praying anywhere, including their roofs. According to Hussein, the other reportedly punishable offenses are on the "conscience of whoever said this" and that person is "a liar."

Hussein acknowledged two, possibly three, incidents where Iraqi soldiers were executed in Kuwait. In one incident,
an Iraqi soldier was executed for committing burglary during the occupation of Kuwait. In another incident, an Iraqi Lieutenant Colonel was executed, and his body hung on public display for 48 hours, for assaulting a female in Kuwait. This individual's body was left in public for all Iraqi officers and soldiers to see in order to emphasize the rules. A third incident resulting in an execution may have occurred, but Hussein does not remember the details.

\[O\] Hussein denied knowledge of the number of Kuwaitis killed, military or civilian, during combat operations or during the alleged atrocities previously mentioned. Hussein stated, "It was war time." He added that Iraq is a Third World country which signed the Geneva Convention. The United States is an advanced country which supposedly would not make the same mistakes as a Third World country. Hussein questioned the statistics regarding the numbers of Iraqi civilians killed, abuses committed against Iraqis, or Iraqi prisoners tortured by United States forces.

\[O\] Regarding the igniting of oil wells in Kuwait by withdrawing Iraqi forces and the subsequent environmental disaster deemed one of the worst in history, Hussein asked, "More than Chernobyl?" He requested to know the number of people who died in Kuwait because of the smoke created by the fires. Hussein denied that Iraqi forces ignited the oil wells. He acknowledged that Iraqi forces burned "oil in trenches" as they were retreating. The resulting smoke blocked target acquisition by coalition aircraft and prevented additional troops from attacking. Hussein acknowledged that he was told that "a few" oil wells were ignited. He stated that even if he were shown pictures or videos of these events, he would not believe Iraqi forces committed them. He maintained that these forms of media are easy to manipulate and fabricate. Hussein stated his belief that it would not be a crime for the Iraqi military to burn oil in order to prevent planes from attacking them. If such an event took place, this would have been an act of a desperate person who had no weapons remaining with which to defend himself. When questioned if he was offered proof to show that the 150 oil well fires in Kuwait were an act of sabotage by the Iraqi military and not an act of defense, Hussein stated he would provide a response at that time.

\[O\] Regarding the previously discussed execution of Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait, Hussein stated that the information
about these matters may have been provided to him verbally or in writing. In all likelihood, a trial occurred prior to the executions. Hussein opined that without this severe and immediate action, more crimes, possibly hundreds, might have occurred in Kuwait.

Hussein stated that Ali Hasan Al-Majid was a member of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) during the occupation of Kuwait. Al-Majid’s role during the occupation was to "arrange and organize everything" in Kuwait. The decision granting Al-Majid this authority was made at an official meeting of the RCC. Al-Majid was the senior Iraqi official in Kuwait.

Regarding other Iraqi officials assigned duties in Kuwait, Hussein stated there were many of them ranging from traffic policemen to high government officials. Hussein stated he has no additional information regarding others with responsibilities in Kuwait and provided no additional names of such Iraqi officials. Hussein added that the Iraqi government attempted to provide all services, particularly the critical ones, such as electricity, to Kuwaiti citizens.

When questioned regarding the ongoing Kuwaiti resistance during the Iraqi occupation and efforts by the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) to stop it, Hussein stated, "I do not have an answer with these details." When again asked, Hussein replied that he had given his answer and "I am not a person who gives away his friends."

Hussein was asked, as the ex-President of Iraq, about Iraqi policy regarding treatment of POWs. Hussein replied, "I am not the ex-President of Iraq. I am still the President of Iraq." He added that he still respects the will of the people (their support of him as President). He continued saying that Iraq respects the Geneva Convention and that they had asked other countries to do the same. Hussein commented that in his speeches, he asked each soldier to respect the Geneva Convention and to remember and abide by the soldier's "religious principles."

Hussein denied giving orders to mistreat, abuse, or torture US POWs. According to Hussein, such a proclamation would have affected his reputation in front of the people and was, therefore, unacceptable. Others may state that Hussein issued
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such orders so that they might absolve themselves of responsibility. If these individuals say such things, Hussein will accept responsibility as commander and admit these accusations as long as such an admission will not dishonor him. He reiterated he would not have given such orders because of what religion teaches. Hussein provided a saying, "There is a well of water in Paradise. If one feeds an orphan or a prisoner, he will drink from the well." Hussein stated the proof of his beliefs is in his speeches. He made this assertion despite previously stating actions, not words, are what matters. Hussein remarked that his speeches as President are important.

(X) Regarding the credible information that Iraq removed the Kuwaiti leadership from their country, reportedly with the agreement of the Kuwaiti citizens, only to have the Kuwaiti people welcome them back, Hussein opined that leaders (Kuwaitis) who accept foreign occupation (the United States) of their own country can be forcibly expelled. According to Hussein, the Kuwaiti leaders were not "from the people." On the contrary, they were originally brought in by the British. Hussein stated that he knew how the citizens of Kuwait felt before the invasion and after occupation by Iraqi forces. If Kuwaiti citizens accepted the former leadership after Iraqi occupation, Hussein stated that he respected their decision.

(X) Hussein reiterated a belief provided in a previous interview that whoever "conspires against a brother" must be kicked out (Kuwait, in this case). Regarding the tradition or understanding that Arab nations should not take up arms against one another, Hussein stated that he concurred with this belief and that he affirmed so publicly in a speech long before the invasion of Kuwait. Other Arab nations, however, including Kuwait, refused to abide by this principle. Saudi Arabia confiscated land from Yemen. Syria continues to occupy territory in Lebanon. Egypt has confiscated land from Sudan and has acted aggressively towards Libya.

(X) Returning to the subject of American POWs, Hussein again denied knowledge of torture or abuse as documented through medical examinations upon their repatriation. Hussein questioned whether such findings were made by Americans or by an independent investigative body. Hussein restated that any bad treatment is not acceptable whether against an Iraqi citizen or against the citizen of another country. He denied that information regarding
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abuse and torture of US POWs was presented to the Iraqi leadership.

In the context of the discussion regarding allegations of mistreatment of US POWs by Iraq, the interviewer stated, "Both the US Government, the UN, and the Red Cross had made these allegations known to the Iraqi Government. These probably would not go to the attention of the President, but they were not addressed by anyone within the Iraqi leadership."

Hussein replied, "What I was made aware of was that there was an American prisoner, not a prisoner, excuse me, but an American person. I think an officer. It was said his plane was hit above the western desert and he parachuted and the Americans were looking for him. They showed me the paperwork and I told them to facilitate the mission and to tell them they are welcome. Let them keep the information so they will not say that we reviewed it. Let them keep the information with them. As for the people that are searching, let them come here and tell us where is that pilot, I mean they do the searching."

Hussein does not remember the pilot's name, including whether it was Speicher. He told Iraqi officials to allow the Americans to search for this individual. Hussein stated Iraqi officials "helped" in the search for information regarding the missing pilot's whereabouts.
Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed March 3, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

Prior to the start of interview, Hussein was informed this session would be a continuation of the previous discussions regarding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

Hussein stated that he devised the plan for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Because the geography of Kuwait is essentially open land, neither specific tactical planning nor special assets was needed to effect the operation. Any person with basic military knowledge could have put together an effective invasion plan.

The invasion of Kuwait was accomplished within two and a half hours, equivalent to that previously estimated. Hussein stated it should have taken no more than one hour. He believes it should have occurred more quickly than originally estimated due to support for the invasion from the Kuwaiti people. Hussein reiterated a previous statement to the interviewers that Iraq was asked by the Kuwaiti people to invade their country in order to remove the Kuwaiti leadership. When asked to clarify how the Kuwaiti citizens communicated their desires to the Iraqi government prior to the invasion, Hussein stated some, not all, Kuwaitis felt this way. He added, "We felt they were asking."

Regarding the assault on the coastal city of Khafji and who designed this attack, Hussein stated, "Me." He added that he would not shift the blame to his friends. Hussein stated that military planning was easy after eight years of war with Iran from 1980 to 1988. Any military operation requires
knowledge of the geography of the area and knowledge of the weapons and the capabilities of the enemy as well as one's own capabilities. Other important factors include the training, logistical support, and morale of the troops. With such knowledge, the military operation against Khafji was simple to plan. The land was open, similar to southern Iraq, and provided no "complications." The only concern was enemy air power capability.

When questioned whether the purpose of the assault on Khafji was to force the coalition forces into a ground war, Hussein replied that military experts knew that any ground attack against the Iraqi Army was a difficult task. He opined that two million troops would have been needed to fight the Iraqi ground forces. Aircraft, however, could be used to strike Iraqi forces and thereafter return to base. The preliminary information available to Iraq indicated that coalition ground forces were in the vicinity of Khafji. For this reason, Iraqi forces decided to attack the location and to "force a fight." Hussein stated that it seemed that coalition forces withdrew upon attack by Iraqi forces. Thereafter, Iraqi ground forces remained in the area. As time passed, Iraq lost soldiers, ammunition, and equipment. Many Iraqi soldiers died as the result of repeated coalition air assaults without ever seeing the enemy approaching over land.

Hussein denied that Iraqi forces were defeated at Khafji, forcing them to withdraw. Hussein stated Iraq did not intend to occupy the city. Iraqi ground forces went to the location to fight with coalition ground forces. Upon encountering little to no ground resistance, Iraqi forces withdrew on the second day, of their own choosing. Hussein noted that it seemed coalition forces were not aware of the Iraqi withdrawal for a few days. Hussein acknowledged that coalition forces had air supremacy.

Regarding whether one of the Iraqi objectives of the assault on Khafji was to capture American prisoners of war (POWs), Hussein stated one of the principles of war is to kill or capture the enemy. After fourteen days of coalition bombardment of Iraqi forces, Iraq wanted to force casualties upon coalition forces. However, Iraq preferred to capture coalition personnel. In Hussein's opinion, this would have had a "lot of effect" on the enemy. Hussein acknowledged that the assault on Khafji may not have been effective and may have shown coalition forces
Iraq's strengths. This may have led to prolonged coalition air strikes and a delay in the ground war.

Hussein believes Iraqi forces should have conducted their ground assault even earlier. The operation was delayed an additional week, creating an opportunity for the coalition to conduct additional air strikes which weakened the Iraqi ground forces. Hussein denied that there was a plan to capture American POWs as a method of trying to prevent continued coalition air attacks.

Hussein stated that he, and no one else in the Iraqi government or leadership, gave the orders to fire SCUD missiles at Israel. He stated, "Everything that happened to us was because of Israel." Hussein added that all the "bad things" for Arabs came as the result of Israeli actions. He opined that Israel "pushes" US politicians and "fills them with hatred." Israeli first attacked Iraq in 1981 destroying the country's only nuclear reactor. As far as Iraq was concerned, the war with Israel was "still on." During the conflict in 1991, Hussein reasoned that the United States would stop the war if Israel was "hurt." He also wanted to punish the country that he considered as the source of all the problems. Hussein denied that one of his reasons for striking Israel with SCUD missiles was to cause Israeli retaliation, a collapse of the coalition, and withdrawal of Arab support for the coalition. According to Hussein, the Arab countries which supported the coalition had been "shamed." Thus, any withdrawal of their support against Iraq was inconsequential.

Hussein stated there were two reasons for the war in 1991, oil and Israel. He added that Kuwait would not have considered doing anything against Iraq unless "pushed" by another country (the United States). When the interviewer pointed out to Hussein that historians believe Iraq acted first, Hussein replied that this was the result (of Kuwait's actions) and not the reason (for the war).

Hussein denied that Iraqi forces withdrew from Kuwait following their defeat. He insisted Iraqi forces withdrew as the result of an official proclamation. This cease fire, including the Iraqi withdrawal, was negotiated by the Russians and accepted by Iraq. Coalition air attacks against Iraqi ground forces occurred while troops were retreating under official
orders from the Iraqi leadership. Hussein denied that Iraqi forces would have been eliminated if they had not withdrawn.

Hussein stated an Iraqi plan of withdrawal existed as early as August 12, 1990. However, Iraq found no government in the international community nor in the Arab world which would agree to negotiate the terms of this plan. The President of France expressed support for the plan, but subsequently withdrew this support after receiving pressure from the United States. Thereafter, Iraqi accepted the previously discussed Russian initiative. Hussein denied that the plan was accepted because of huge Iraqi military losses.

The interview then turned to a discussion of a letter dated February 19, 1991 from Hussein Kamil, in the name of Iraqi President Hussein, to Ali Hasan Al-Majid. The letter stated, in part, that the Iraqi military should remove any and all property from Kuwait which will aid in the rebuilding of Iraq. Hussein stated the normal method of conveying directions from the President would be via letters from the Presidential Diwan. Kamil was not a secretary, but was simply one of the Iraqi Ministers. Kamil was "known for his way of doing things." Upon being read the letter by the translator, Hussein asked whether the document referred to items used by the Iraqi military in Kuwait or to things from Kuwait itself. He added that he never instructed the Iraqi military to remove items, either their own equipment or Kuwaiti items. Hussein opined that the letter may refer to equipment in Kuwait that was utilized by the various Iraqi Ministers for critical services such as electricity, water, transportation, and telephone service. He stated the letter was dated nine days before the cease fire. Hussein denied that the letter referred to Kuwaiti property. He stated it was simply a letter from one minister subordinate to another minister, asking for the return of materials taken to Kuwait by Iraqi forces. Hussein stated that he did not issue the letter. He asked what items or materials were taken from Kuwait after this letter was published.

When questioned whether members of the Iraqi leadership were allowed to issue letters in the name of the President without his knowledge, Hussein stated, "There are bad elements everywhere. He (Hussein Kamil) is dead now." Hussein denied knowledge of whether other members of the Iraqi leadership acted on authority of the President without actually having power
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delegated to them by Hussein. Hussein acknowledged that the referenced letter was not conveyed in an official manner. He reiterated that the official method of issuance of such a letter, upon orders from Hussein, would have been to send a communication from the Presidential Diwan to Ali Hasan Al-Majid, in this case. This letter would have specifically enumerated the powers to be delegated to a particular individual, in this case, Hussein Kamil.
Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed March 5, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

Prior to the start of interview, Hussein was informed this session would be a continuation of the previous discussions regarding Kuwait.

Hussein acknowledged that Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz met with US Secretary of State James Baker in Geneva, Switzerland in January, 1991. From the perspective of the Iraqi leadership, the goal of this meeting was to exploit any chance for peace regarding the situation with Kuwait. When the opportunity was made available to discuss this matter with an American representative, Iraq decided to pursue this avenue. The Iraqi leadership believed that any results from this meeting would "carry weight" in the international community.

According to Hussein, Baker provided no solutions for the Kuwaiti situation. Instead, Baker dictated to Aziz certain steps that the United States wanted Iraq to accomplish first. Baker added, "Otherwise, we'll take you back to the pre-industrial age." Aziz told Baker that the accomplishment of these steps would not be possible.

Hussein stated that the Kuwaiti issue needed to have been placed inside the framework of international law. This matter should not have been reduced to one in which the strong side (United States) dictated to the weak side (Iraq) the terms of the agreement. Iraq sought a format which did not portray it as defeated, but rather one showing respect for the Iraqi military and its people.
Hussein stated, "We had a desire for peace." In a document dated August 12, 1990, Iraq expressed this desire through its first proposal. As stated in a previous interview, this proposal was not accepted by any member of the international community. Iraq wanted a guarantee of no further aggression directed against them and an end to the embargo against Iraq.

Without existing in the framework of international law, Hussein reiterated that Iraq would have appeared as defeated with respect to the Iraq-Kuwait issue. Hussein considered the referenced Iraqi proposal for a peaceful solution regarding Kuwait as legitimate. As with any proposal, not all parts will be accepted. The Iraqi solution was never discussed, however. Hussein questioned whether the issue regarding Kuwait was more important than the Palestinian issue. He opined that Kuwait was deemed more important by the United States and the international community because Iraq was the opposing entity and because of the existence of oil in Kuwait. As stated in a previous interview, Hussein implied that Kuwait had "been taken" from Iraq. He added that the world did not "assemble and stop" when Yemen was reunited after many years of separation.

Continuing the discussion of the Iraqi proposal of August 12, 1990, Hussein questioned why it was considered unusual for Iraq to have asked that United Nations (UN) resolutions be enforced with respect to lands previously seized by Israel and Syria. If these resolutions had been enforced, Iraqis would have believed that international law was being applied fairly to Iraq in 1991. Hussein stated that no one notified Iraq that certain paragraphs or sections of the Iraqi proposal needed to be changed or deleted. He stated that Iraq had seriously explored several avenues to achieve peace.

Asked whether Iraqi leaders were surprised at the number of Iraqi prisoners of war (POWs), estimated at 86,743, captured by coalition forces during the 1991 war, Hussein replied, "No. This is war." According to Hussein, the Iraqi POWs were not captured in the classic sense. There were many factors leading to their capture including their loss of communications and transportation, a lack of food and a sense of disorientation. Because of these factors, many Iraqi soldiers traveled to Saudi Arabia for safe haven where they were picked up by coalition forces. In contrast, Hussein stated that the effect
of the attacks against Iraq in 2003 was much greater than that in 1991. Despite this, fewer Iraqi POWs were captured in 2003 and he attributed this to different factors which existed in 1991.

Hussein denied that the Iraqi leadership was disappointed with the large number of Iraqi POWs in 1991. Hussein stated, "Nothing would shake our determination." He advised that war has fortunes and misfortunes and that this is God's will. Hussein denied that the large number of Iraqis captured by coalition forces influenced Iraq's ability to continue fighting. He claimed that the number of POWs indicates neither the stage nor the outcome of a war. He stated that Iraq had won the war against Iran despite Iran's capture of more POWs. In Hussein's opinion, the capture of POWs in any amount does not necessarily affect one's will to fight, nor does it necessarily force certain military decisions. Hussein acknowledged that Iraqi POWs were released by coalition forces in 1991 and allowed to return home after the cease fire agreement was signed.

Hussein was questioned about the 45 coalition POWs and the purpose of the apparent compulsory appearance of two British pilot POWs on Iraqi television. The interviewer noted that the pilots appeared to have been physically abused and that the featuring of them on television was a violation of the Geneva Convention. Hussein stated that the POWs, especially the pilots, would likely have provided different details about their capture. Some would say they were captured by farmers or villagers while others would say by a "group of people." These Iraqis might have celebrated the capture of the coalition combatants by hitting and pushing them around. The Iraqi military was not always in control or aware of circumstances regarding captured individuals because communications between military units had been knocked out by coalition forces.

Regarding coalition POWs captured in 1991, Hussein denied knowledge of any abuse of them by those serving in the Iraqi military or the Iraqi government. However, he clarified this statement by saying that he did not deny that others may have "behaved in a bad manner" and that he was speaking only about his personal knowledge of the matter. Hussein added that he would provide such information if he were aware of it. He stated that he subscribes to a document much older than the Geneva Convention, the Koran. The Koran and Arab tradition believe that it is "noble" to treat a prisoner well. Hussein
Believes that the principles enunciated in the Geneva Convention should be respected by the entire world regardless of one's circumstances or nationality.

(S) Regarding reports that all coalition POWs were tortured while in Iraqi custody, Hussein neither confirmed nor denied these reports. Instead, he stated this information is "on the conscience" of those who reported it and those who conducted the investigation. Hussein explained that leaders command by "communication instruments." Lower level commanders lead by "vision or voice." Without proper communication instruments, each entity behaves according to "how it sees things." Hussein reiterated that Iraqi communications systems were inoperative during the 1991 war. Accordingly, he speculated that some reported acts of physical abuse, such as the burning of a POW's hair, might have been the acts of a "simpleton." When it was pointed out that the abuse of coalition forces could reasonably lead one to believe this was a widespread practice conducted by the entire Iraqi military, Hussein replied, "I answered."

(S) Hussein maintained that he does not question the accounts of abuse of coalition POWs and that he has no personal information to either confirm or deny these allegations. However, from a practical perspective, he does not doubt that the Iraqi people, after being attacked by coalition pilots, might have abused pilots especially if they had participated in their capture.
Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed March 11, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

Prior to the start of interview, Hussein was informed this session would be a continuation of the previous discussions regarding Kuwait.

Regarding information from the Kuwaiti government indicating that the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait caused $180 billion in damages to the country, Hussein asked for the source of this information. When told the source was Kuwait, Hussein asked which neutral and legal entity questioned Kuwait regarding the basis of their conclusion. He opined that "no one" asked Kuwait for the details of their investigation of this matter. Hussein again questioned the existence of evidence supporting these Kuwaiti assertions.

Hussein reiterated information provided in a previous interview stating, "Kuwait is Iraqi." According to Hussein, Kuwait was "stolen" from Iraq by a British resolution. He added that if Kuwait had not been a country with oil, it would not have been "stolen." Hussein stated that the arrogance of the Kuwaiti rulers made them "stupid" and ignited the war. He further stated that he understands that the United States, located across the Atlantic Ocean, would want Iraq to be poor. However, he cannot understand how Kuwait would want to exist next to a "hungry country."

Hussein emphasized that he is not saying that Kuwait did not have the right to make these statements. He again questioned the identity of the neutral entity which examined this matter and whether it was discussed with Iraq. Hussein suggested
that something similar to a court should have been formed to hear the details from both sides and to decide this matter. However, this did not happen.

[Hussein stated that just prior to the latest war, American officials said all Iraqi debts would be forgiven including monies owed to Kuwait. In Hussein’s opinion, this proved any amount reportedly owed to Kuwait was not a legal debt and was a “political” matter. He added that this policy was driven by the United States and not the United Nations (UN), Kuwait, or any other entity.]

[Hussein stated that Kuwait asked for compensation for the damages suffered during the Iraqi invasion and occupation. Kuwait did, however, ask for the return of 605 prisoners of war (POWs). To date, these POWs have not been returned. Hussein stated these Kuwaitis were not “captives” and are missing as characterized by a UN resolution. He stated that many “stories and novels have been woven” around this issue, similar to the matter of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Kuwaiti POW accusations have been proven to be false, however, similar to the WMD rumors. Hussein stated that individuals often become “missing” during a war. He provided as examples the one coalition individual still missing from the first Gulf War and the thousands of Iraqis and Iranians missing from the war between the two countries. As for the 605 Kuwaitis, Hussein stated that Kuwait knows their fate. Hussein denied knowledge that 605 Kuwaitis were captured in circumstances other than combat after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

[Hussein acknowledged that Aziz Saleh Al-Numan was Governor of Kuwait during the Iraqi occupation. As such, he reported directly to the Iraqi Minister of Interior, a position held by Ali Hasan Al-Majid at that time. Al-Numan’s duties as Governor were set forth in Iraqi provincial laws. Hussein does not remember whether Al-Numan was appointed by him or by decree of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). In Iraq, the Constitution sets forth the authority of the RCC and the President who is also the Chairman of the RCC. Some governmental appointments such as those given to high-ranking officers in the military, judges, and general directors are based on a “republican” directive. Hussein explained that the Iraqi system does not prevent the President from submitting a name for consideration of appointment and requesting subsequent feedback]
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from the RCC. Decisions in Iraq are signed by the President. It is his prerogative to consult or not to consult anyone. Hussein stated "his style" was to always consult with others when the time came to make a decision. Governors were assigned based on a "republican" or Presidential directive. Hussein does not remember if he discussed the appointment of Al-Numan with the RCC.

(8) When questioned regarding Iraq's usage of Kuwaitis, Japanese, and westerners as human shields during the first Gulf War including the positioning of them at key sites such as communications centers and military positions, Hussein denied that such individuals were taken to Iraqi military positions. He added that the Iraqi government did not, however, prevent individuals from volunteering as human shields to protect facilities such as communications centers. When questioned whether such volunteers existed in 1991, Hussein replied, "I do not remember."

(8) The translator read to Hussein an Iraqi government communication from Qusay Hussein concerning the usage of Kuwaiti prisoners as human shields. Hussein stated that he has no information about this letter. When noted to Hussein that the document was recovered by American forces from an Iraqi government building and is deemed legitimate, Hussein stated, "I answered." He asked whether the captives discussed in this communication were ever questioned about being held in Iraqi captivity or being used as human shields. Hussein stated that Iraq released all the Kuwaiti captives. Upon being told the document was dated March 14, 2003, Hussein stated, "It is a forgery. It is impossible." He suggested that the communication should be examined closely to determine authenticity and that he had thought it was dated 1991. Hussein stated that if the date of the document is 2003, it is a forgery. He added that Iraq did not have captives at that time. Hussein stated that Qusay was not the type of person to "make up things." He reiterated that experts in the United States and in Iraq should scrutinize this document for authenticity.

(5) Regarding chemical weapons and why Iraq did not use them in the first Gulf War, Hussein replied that he had been asked this question previously and had answered. When noted to him that the interviewer had not previously asked this question, Hussein replied that he believed it was strange that the
interviewer or anyone else would ask this question, not just at this point but at any time. He stated that it is not Iraqi policy to use chemical weapons against coalition forces. Hussein commented that this was a discussion of history, not unrealistic hypotheticals. He asked how Iraq would have been described if it had used chemical weapons. Hussein replied to his own question, "We would have been called stupid." According to Hussein, chemical weapons, and their use, were never discussed by Iraqi officials before or during the 1991 war.

As stated during a previous interview, Hussein acknowledged a meeting in January, 1991 just before the war between US Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. Hussein remembers a statement by Baker to "take Iraq back to the pre-industrial age." He stated that Iraq would not be intimidated by threats, however, especially when coming from someone in "a strong position." Hussein denied knowledge that part of this discussion concerned the position of the United States regarding Iraq's possible use of chemical weapons should hostilities occur. According to Hussein, "We decided the right thing to do." He stated that the use of chemical weapons did not "cross our mind."

Hussein stated that Sultan Hashem, Iraqi Minister of Defense, and Saleh, Second Corps Commander, represented Iraq at the cease fire talks during the first Gulf War. Their positions and viewpoints were the same as those of the Iraqi leadership, to secure a cease fire and to start the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq. Hussein stated Iraq had no goal of continuing the war and desired a cease fire.

When questioned about other items discussed by Iraq at the 1991 cease fire talks, Hussein stated that he does not remember any additional Iraqi requests other than the withdrawal of foreign forces from their territory. In Hussein's opinion, the fighting would have continued without this withdrawal. Hussein denied knowledge that Iraq asked for, and received, permission to continue flying helicopters. He further denied knowledge of the purpose of such an Iraqi request.
Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed March 13, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

After the cease fire of 1991, Hussein stated the goal of the Iraqi leadership was the rebuilding of the infrastructure of Iraq destroyed during the war. This included reconstituting agricultural and economic programs. Hussein stated that Iraq rebuilt "almost everything" and started new programs in the areas of agriculture, education, and health. However, Iraq's efforts were hampered by the embargo, particularly affecting the health and education sectors.

When noted to Hussein that several changes were made in the Iraqi government around this time including the appointment of individuals to new positions, Hussein stated, "This is natural." In his opinion, such changes are a "regular" occurrence not only in Iraq but also in countries such as the United States. One such appointee, Abid Hamid Mahmoud, became Hussein's personal secretary at this time replacing the previous secretary who had been appointed as Iraqi Minister of Education. Hussein referred to Mahmoud as a "senior companion of mine" who had served as a member of the President's protective detail in the Himaya and Murafiqueen. Another individual, Tariq Aziz, was named as Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister. Hussein described Aziz as one of the early Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) members. In Hussein's opinion, Aziz "did not gain anything" with this appointment. Hussein stated that he told the Iraqi leadership if he (Hussein) was to also have the title as Iraqi prime minister, he would need assistance from others. Thus, Aziz and Taha Yasin Ramadan were named as deputy prime ministers.
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(H) Hussein explained that the duties of a personal secretary include arranging the schedule of the person for whom the person is working. A secretary must be precise in executing his duties. Hussein selected Mahmoud as his personal secretary because he was "suitable for the position." He added that this was his own choice and not a matter of historical significance. Hussein reiterated that Mahmoud had served in the Himaya and Murafiqueen, and that both organizations were composed of Hussein's relatives. At the beginning of the Revolution, only one of his relatives served in an Iraqi government political position. At that time, Hussein's relatives had limited education and primarily served in the Iraqi army and other military services.

(H) Hussein pointed out that members of his protective detail did not necessarily dictate the details of his movements. He claimed that at times, he taught them ways to improve their performance and be more successful. He recalled joking with them that he could perform their job better. He felt it was very important that detail members not to be "rough" when Hussein "mingled" with the people. In his opinion, the detail would have failed in its mission if it "isolated" him from the masses. It was also important that the detail be able to alter their duties and behavior to accommodate Hussein's nature. As further evidence of his teaching abilities, Hussein stated that if requested, he could provide advice regarding the writer's interviewing duties. When asked to expound on this statement, Hussein stated, "A doctor does not chase people asking them what is wrong. They come to him."

(H) Hussein stated the most important thing is to look at one's position, whether executing or planning, to determine how to perform duties. A person executing orders must be precise and quick. One who supervises must allow those under him to exercise initiative. The "margin for initiative" differs between civilian and military situations. Hussein stated, "The eyes in the field are different than those at headquarters." Often, the "field eyes" are more accurate in understanding a particular situation than headquarters components.

(H) Regarding character traits he seeks in subordinates, Hussein stated, "A human being in not like merchandise." One may think an individual is suitable for a position only to later discover that he does not possess the
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desirable traits. According to Hussein, a particular situation may require the selection of a particular individual even though, under other circumstances, this individual may not be considered the best choice. This is particularly true in the context of selecting the right person for military operations.

Hussein explained that the selection or dismissal of individuals for particular military or governmental positions often involves consideration of the perception of one's family or tribe. Another factor to consider is the strength of the Iraqi psyche and sense of "individuality." Although a particular situation may necessitate the removal of an Iraqi from his position, a leader must consider how this individual's removal may be perceived. For example, relatives of an individual removed from office may question the individual's character. Some will ask "again and again" why the individual was dismissed. Others may ask, "Was he a coward?" These questions may even be asked when an individual decides to retire under normal circumstances. The families of such individuals may feel "tainted." Under some circumstances, such actions may cause families to hate the government. Hussein explained that in having to consider these feelings and attitudes, military and governmental leaders were often limited in making personnel changes, even if they were deemed necessary.

When asked about the commonly reported uprisings which occurred in southern Iraq after the war in 1991, Hussein claimed that he had not heard of such uprisings. When it was pointed out that many interviews and reports had documented the uprisings, Hussein asked, "Have we not discussed this matter?" He stated, however, that within a day of the cease fire of 1991, "some elements" had initiated sabotage operations in the southern Iraq cities of Basra, Nasiriyah, and Amarah. Later, this activity spread to the northern cities of Suleimaniyyah, Erbil, and Kirkuk. Hussein stated that the groups conducting these operations were "pushed by Iran," and that Iraq captured 68 Iranian intelligence officers who were later exchanged for Iraqi prisoners.

At the time of the uprisings, most bridges in Iraq had already been destroyed. Electricity did not exist. Water service was sporadic, and food supplies were minimal. In the aftermath of the war, these factors contributed to general unrest in the country. Hussein stated the "elements" participating in
the uprisings were a mixture of thieves, rebels, and "those from Iran." The latter group included individuals from Iranian government services, Iraqis of Iranian origin, and Iraqis who had "escaped" to Iran. Their nationalities were difficult to determine with any degree of certainty because many had intentionally destroyed their citizenship documents.

Hussein stated that after deciding to reassert government control of the country, the Iraqi leadership considered the southern area of Iraq to be a high priority. It was in this area where Iraqi forces encountered and fought primarily Iranians. After order was restored in southern Iraq, government forces focused on the northern region where Iraqi forces met little or no resistance. The fighting in northern and southern Iraq lasted approximately two months. Hussein stated, "God made us victorious." Thereafter, according to Hussein, Iran continued to insert groups of ten to fifteen people into Iraq to conduct operations against the government. However, these individuals were, for the most part, thwarted by members of the local population. Ultimately, following an agreement between Iran and Iraq, these hostile operations ceased.

Hussein characterized the uprisings in 1991 as insurgent activity conducted by "outlaws and thieves." He did not consider the insurgents to be revolutionaries. When asked what factors allowed these disturbances, Hussein answered that it was support from Iran, weakness of the Iraqi government after the war, and possibly assistance from coalition forces. He noted that all government institutions including the police and the military had been weakened as a result of the war. Gradually, however, the Iraqi military grew in strength, and they were eventually able to overcome these rebels. According to Hussein, the Iraqi military's "blade got longer and longer." He acknowledged, however, that the weakened state of the Iraqi military had been the main factor which provided the opportunity for this lawlessness in the first place.

Hussein believed the goal of the insurgent activity was to control Iraq. In his opinion, this tactic was utilized in 1991 after Iran had been unable to accomplish this goal through its previous war with Iraq. Iran had wanted to control all or at least a part of Iraq, particularly the southern portion. It was Hussein’s belief that Iran also wanted to extend its power to eastern Saudi Arabia and into the entire Gulf region.
The RCC gave the Iraqi provincial governors control of the military during the uprisings in order to protect the people and the state and to re-establish security and a "normal life." The people and the nation were threatened by widespread killings, theft, arson, and general destruction, all of which had to be brought under control. Hussein denied knowledge of the methods used by the governors and the military to reassert control. Hussein stated, "They were given the authority, and they carried it out." At the time, he did not ask for details of the operation, but he did request and receive status reports regarding the progress of operations.

Regarding limitations placed on the Iraqi military by the leadership during this time period, Hussein asked, "What do you mean by limits?" Hussein denied that the Geneva Convention applied to this situation, claiming it only applied to wars. Hussein claimed that with respect to internal conflict, the Geneva Convention applied only to situations when an occupying power is another country. He claimed that the Geneva Convention was applicable to attempted coups or internal unrest involving crimes such as burning and looting.

The interviewer pointed out to Hussein that international law does not permit the targeting of civilians even when the location of a military objective is populated by civilians and that certain laws of humanity always apply. When asked again what restrictions were placed on the Iraqi military during the 1991 uprisings, Hussein replied that an Iraqi, whether civilian or military, knows what is acceptable as humane behavior, and there is no need for someone to have to tell them how to behave.

Hussein stated, "I am responsible for what I decide." He added that he is not responsible for how an Iraqi acts. Hussein claimed that if an Iraqi wanted to use him (Hussein) as the justification for his actions, he would accept that assertion so long as it does not harm Hussein's reputation. In Hussein's opinion, a leader is responsible for the actions of a subordinate if he becomes aware of that subordinate's transgressions and confronts him about the wrongfulness of his actions. He stated that each individual is judged based on his own law and constitution.
Interview Session Number: 15
Interview Conducted by: SSA SSA LS

Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed March 16, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

Prior to the start of the interview, Hussein was advised that today's discussion would be a continuation of the previous conversation regarding the disturbances or uprisings in southern Iraq in 1991 after the Gulf War.

Hussein stated that he was made aware of the details regarding the situation in southern Iraq in the same fashion as any leader of a country. Whenever faced with a situation, the Iraqi leadership assembled and consulted "quickly" about the best manner in which to confront an issue.

Hussein stated that, initially, those who carried out acts during the uprisings in southern Iraq were among "those who had crossed the border from Iran." Others from Iraq committed similar acts, while some were not involved at all in the incidents. According to Hussein, if the Iraqi government response to these actions had been slow and weak, some individuals might have shown sympathy and assisted the participants in the uprisings. Without such a response, they might have acted out of fear thinking that those who caused the disturbances would ultimately rise to power in the Iraqi government. In addition, other individuals Hussein described as "greedy thieves and robbers" might have participated in the uprisings.

Hussein asserted that it was the duty of the Iraqi government to confront the individuals participating in the uprisings. Hussein stated that although the "arms of the authorities had been severed" by the 1991 war, the Iraqi
government "picked them up and struck the enemy." He added that those who would not be deterred by words would be deterred by weapons. The Iraqi leadership ordered the army to assemble as many forces as possible in order to confront "treachery" and the disturbances. Hussein acknowledged that incidents of looting by certain individuals "got mixed in" with the actions of those participating in the uprisings.

Regarding the decision to place certain individuals in charge of areas in southern Iraq during this time period and their assigned roles, Hussein replied, "I said our decision was to confront and defeat the enemy." The participants in the uprisings were to be "put in their place," if not by word, then by weapon. Hussein stated that a lengthy discussion of this matter was not required. The individuals who had crossed the border from Iran were members of the Dawa Party. They were assisted by additional Iranian forces. Together, these individuals killed, burned, looted, and committed other crimes. According to Hussein, one does not need to ask what actions should be taken when faced with such a situation. Procedure, however, dictated that the Iraqi leadership meet to discuss the matter. All members of the leadership held the same opinion regarding the Iraqi government response required to the deal with the situation.

When asked how information was communicated to him regarding events occurring in southern Iraq and regarding subsequent responses by Iraqi government forces, Hussein asked, "With Iraq being so small, is it possible we wouldn't know what was going on?" He added that the entire population of southern Iraq began migrating to Baghdad during this time period. Information from one of the Iraqi commanders in the south, Ali Hasan Al-Majid, was "cut off" and was not reaching the Iraqi leadership. Soon after, it became clear to the leadership that Al-Majid was "resisting" in Basra.

When asked whether reports were true that Al-Majid was actually trapped in Basra at this time, Hussein responded, "In the past, Iraqis did not respect law and authority." When called to military service, Iraqis generally failed to respond. When called for "questioning," Iraqis also generally failed to respond. According to Hussein, national rule was a relatively new concept during this time period. Even though most Iraqis were Arab, they were not accustomed to being ruled by an Arab,
King Faisal at that time. He was "installed" into power by the British. The disregard for law was particularly prevalent in rural areas at that time.

Hussein then provided details of a story about an individual named Madhi Ubaid and his son who was wanted by the government. As the result of a police operation, Ubaid was captured and interrogated regarding the whereabouts of his son. Ubaid responded, "I have no son." The police asked, "Are you Madhi?" Ubaid replied, "No, I'm Fadhi." The police slapped him and told Ubaid "You are Madhi." Thereafter, Ubaid stated, "If the government says I'm Madhi, I'm Madhi." Hussein ended the discussion of Al-Majid's situation in Basra stating, "You heard what you heard. I heard what I heard."

Hussein stated that the threat to the Iraqi government in 1991 existed in both northern and southern Iraq. An uprising was even attempted in Baghdad. Hussein opined that those "sitting on the fence" joined in the uprisings upon seeing police stations and government offices attacked with no resistance by the authorities. As the Iraqi government reasserted control, the "enemy" went to a new area or reinforced in an old one. According to Hussein, the Iraqi military strength grew over time and "the circle started tightening around the enemy."

Hussein noted that the previous period of lawlessness he discussed, during Madhi's time, was in the 1920s. He added that the attitude of the Iraqis changed completely during the last 35 years under the Ba'ath Party. In Hussein's opinion, with a political party present throughout Iraq, the Iraqi people believed in the government agenda, had faith in their leadership, and were more disciplined than ever before. This led to an improvement in the situation in Iraq, particularly in the economy. According to Hussein, no "poor person" existed in Iraq in the 1980s. Widows, orphans, and the elderly were "taken care of and secure." Commercial products were relatively inexpensive. This Iraqi lifestyle diminished, however, around the midpoint of the Iran-Iraq War and later after the 1991 Gulf War. Hussein stated, "An embargo is an embargo." After the downturn in the economy, employees, and Iraqi citizens in general, were less disciplined. However, their allegiance did not change.
Hussein acknowledged that Iraq was on its way to becoming economically strong in the early 1980s. He added that all the positive things in Iraq had been created by the leadership. Hussein further acknowledged that the economic situation deteriorated dramatically in the 1980s. Hussein agreed that the decline in the Iraqi economy at that time and the subsequent 1991 Gulf War which led to embargos and United Nations (UN) inspections lessened the economic strength of the country. He acknowledged that this decline was felt by the Iraqi people, especially among those in rural areas and among lower income individuals such as those living in southern Iraq. Hussein added that the central and northern areas of Iraq were also affected.

Hussein acknowledged that, as a general rule, the pressures of poverty can greatly strain a society possibly leading to revolution. However, he provided several examples of situations involving revolutions in Iraq and other countries in the Arab world which did not stem from economic conditions. Hussein stated that acts of insurgency without a political goal, such as those which occurred in 1991, are not revolutions.

The interviewer noted to Hussein that various neutral non-governmental and humanitarian organizations conducted investigations of the actions of the Iraqi military during the uprisings of 1991. One such investigation conducted by Human Rights Watch (HRW), a neutral non-profit organization not associated with any government, provided details about Iraqi military actions. The interviewer read Hussein a summary of an HRW interview of a resident of Basra who witnessed one such event in 1991. According to the witness, he saw a column of Iraqi tanks approaching Basra. The lead tank had three children tied to its front being forced to act as human shields. When questioned regarding his knowledge of such actions of the Iraqi military in 1991, Hussein replied that even though he believes this information does not deserve a reply, he would answer for the benefit of the interviewer. Hussein stated, "It's a lie." He added that, in Iraq, each child has a father, a mother, and family. Iraq "does not have orphans walking the streets." Regarding these three children, Hussein asked, "Who were their parents?" He questioned why the interviewer would accept that a tank commander would act so irresponsibly. Hussein further asked why the tactic of using children as human shields would have been considered effective against those who were already killing, looting, and burning. He added that a story about using children
in this manner may have been fabricated by westerners. Hussein reiterated that the story did not deserve an answer from him and "the lie is clear."
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March 19, 2004

Interview Session Number: 16
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
Arabic/English Translation: LS

Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed March 19, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

Prior to the start of the interview, Hussein was advised that today's discussion would include the viewing of a documentary regarding the situation in southern Iraq in 1991 in the aftermath of the first Gulf War.

Hussein provided comments before viewing the documentary. He stated that each person presents information from a certain background, based upon his beliefs and life experiences. Despite having his own opinion, a person is affected by the thoughts of others. Any person presenting information on Iraq or any other country speaks from three viewpoints. The first is a "divine scale" according to his own beliefs. The second is a scale based upon his life experiences in his own country. The third and final viewpoint is based upon what is known by the person regarding information from the United Nations (UN) and international law. Hussein then asked the interviewer, "What is your scale as you show the film?" Hussein offered that this information would enable him to comment and answer questions in the best manner.

The interviewer told Hussein that one must listen to all the facts and find the truth. Hussein asked, "How will you know the truth?" He added that the interviewer would be using western media, possibly biased, to determine the truth. Hussein stated, "Your army occupies my country. You are free. I am a prisoner." He added that one who searches for the truth must directly contact the people who were involved in the matter of concern. In the instance of southern Iraq in 1991 after the war, Hussein stated one would have to speak to "those who were
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violated, such as women," by those who were sent by Iran. Those same individuals sent by Iran committed other acts in southern Iraq including looting, burning, and killing. Hussein stated that one should contact others who share his (Hussein's) opinion.

Hussein opined that a documentary such as this, prepared in the west and first broadcast in America, is not a neutral film produced by neutral individuals. He added that the film is likely based upon the teachings of Christ, the laws of the United States, international law, and life in the United States. Hussein emphasized that he did not want to put the interviewer in a difficult position. He added that the interviewer must "learn the truth as it is" not as Hussein tells it, nor as the film producers tell it.

The interviewer then started the approximate one hour documentary. Hussein stated that the scene showing Shias in southern Iraq "could be seen anywhere, even now." He stated that the Shias shown in Karbala in the mosque were not confined and surrounded, as depicted. In reference to the reporter's words regarding scenes showing Iraqi tanks approaching the mosque, Hussein asked, "Where are the tanks?" He added that a statement in the documentary indicating that President Bush "encouraged" the Shias to rise up against the Iraqi government is "a confession of the crime."

Hussein asked various questions including the date of the documentary, the name of the commentator, and the name of the non-governmental organization for whom the reporter worked.

Regarding the scene showing Shias who had fled southern Iraq and traveled to Kurdish territory in northern Iraq, Hussein stated these individuals "do not appear to be scared, they appear to be happy." He added that these individuals looked Kurdish, not Shia.

After viewing approximately 23 minutes of the documentary, Hussein stated that his exercise time and prayer time had arrived. When the interviewer noted to Hussein that his exercise period could be postponed until later in the day, he replied, "I think it is enough so far." Hussein added that the documentary could be viewed another day and asked, "Why rush?"
Hussein then provided several comments without further prompting or questioning. He noted that the documentary states the Shia rose up against the Iraqi government with the encouragement of President Bush. Hussein stated that the "traitors rose up at the order of a foreign country" and declared war on their own country.

Hussein stated that the interview of Shia Ayatollah Khoei demonstrates a contradiction in the truth. According to the commentator, Khoei believes in the peaceful aspect of his religion. Hussein stated Khoei's reply to commentator questioning indicates he does not agree with the mixing of politics and terror/violence. According to Hussein, this is in direct contradiction to the actions of the Shia.

Regarding the film's depiction of Shia conduct, Hussein reiterated "we can see this anywhere." Hussein stated that if an insurgent does not surrender his weapon, he will be confronted with force. He added that the Shia used the Imam Hussein shrine in Karbala as a headquarters for their resistance. Hussein stated that the blood shown on the inside walls of the shrine was from Iraqi "comrades" executed in the building and not from Shias killed during an Iraqi government assault.

Hussein stated that the individual shown in the film whose tongue was reportedly cut out may have simply been a mute. The documentary provided no information about why or who cut his tongue, other than Iraqi military intelligence.

Hussein opined that the Kurdish individuals shown walking and departing their villages may have been "migrating." He added that they may have been moving to avoid a combat zone.

Hussein asked whether the commentator questioned the Shias regarding the things they lost when the "criminals came and occupied their city." He stated that he felt sorry for someone who watches this documentary and does not know the truth. Hussein asked rhetorically, "How would someone know the Shia would act this way about something that happened 1300 years ago?"

Hussein agreed to continue viewing the documentary and to provide his comments at a later date.
Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed March 23, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

Prior to the start of the interview, Hussein was advised that today's discussion would be a continuation of the previous meeting. He was informed this discussion would include the viewing of the remaining portion of a documentary regarding the situation in southern Iraq in 1991 in the aftermath of the first Gulf War. Made in 1993, the film is titled "Saddam Hussein's Latest War" and is narrated by British commentator Michael Wood. The interviewer began today's viewing of the documentary approximately twenty-two minutes and thirty seconds into the program.

Hussein questioned the source of the figure 300,000 provided by a speaker in the documentary as the estimated number of Shias killed in southern Iraq by the Iraqi government. The interviewer noted that this figure had been discussed during the portion of the documentary viewed in the previous session and its source was the Iraqi government. According to the film, the Iraqi government informed the Kurds that this number of Shias had been killed. The interviewer added that this message from the Iraqi government is believed to have been intended as a warning to the Kurds not to defy the government.

The film depicted scenes of Iraqi government actions against the Marsh Arabs in southern Iraq including the poisoning of water resulting in the killing of fish, the destruction of villages, and the draining of the marshes. Hussein commented that some of the scenes shown did not appear to have been filmed at the site of the marshes. As the documentary continued, one scene showed a Marsh Arab female commenting on the
treatment of her people by the Iraqi government. She stated that they had nothing left and had to leave their homes with only a few possessions. Hussein laughed and asked, "What did she have before? Reeds?"

The documentary then showed additional scenes and provided commentary about the Iraqi government's treatment of the Shias in southern Iraq, the Kurds in northern Iraq, and the Marsh Arabs. The film discussed the possibility of placing Hussein on trial for these atrocities. Hussein stated, "Now that they have apprehended me, let them put me on trial."

The film then ended after a total of approximately fifty-five minutes and fifty seconds. Upon asking the interviewer, Hussein was informed this documentary was made in 1993.

Regarding the assignment of certain senior Iraqi leaders to positions in southern Iraq in 1991 who would bear the responsibility of dealing with the Shia uprising, Hussein stated, "We assigned responsibility to whoever was going to handle the situation." Hussein denied that he previously stated he did not want to know the details of how the uprising would be stopped and that he only wanted to know the results. Hussein asked, "Who says I did not want to know how?" Upon being informed by the interviewer that Hussein made this previous assertion, he stated that any person's main goal would have been to stop the disturbances and to end the "treason."

The interviewer noted that this documentary shows the cost, human and otherwise, of stopping the treason. Hussein stated that nothing was shown in this film. According to Hussein, it shows individuals who were apprehended by the Iraqi government and some government officials who "behaved in a wrong manner when they struck them." He acknowledged that the documentary shows scenes of other topics.

The conversation turned to a discussion about the definition of treason versus a revolution. The interviewer reminded Hussein that he had observed a portion of the film in the previous session claiming that President Bush encouraged the Shia to revolt against the Iraqi government in 1991. The interviewer further reminded him that Hussein previously stated that the Shia, after Bush's encouragement, turned against their
own country and that Hussein previously stated he considered the Shia to be traitors. The interviewer noted that some would describe the Ba'ath Party in the same fashion regarding various coup attempts and successful coups in 1959, 1963, and 1968. The interviewer further noted to Hussein that some describe a failed uprising as treason, while a successful one is viewed as a revolution. Hussein stated, "I do not have a comment." He added that it was "beneath him" to comment about this documentary. Hussein characterized the film as not being objective and opined that it was made as further justification for "what was being done against Iraq" including the partitioning of the country.

Hussein stated that an accused individual should be allowed to defend himself. He asked whether Iraq was afforded the opportunity to defend itself regarding the information in this film. Hussein questioned the appropriateness of interviewing the President of Iraq about such a "propaganda film." He added, "We should stop this program." Hussein asserted that he had answered all of the interviewer's questions. He affirmed that he would not comment on such propaganda films.

Hussein acknowledged that Muhammad Hamza Al-Zubaidi and Kamal Mustapha Abdallah were sent to Nasiriyya in 1991 to confront the Shia uprising in that area. Similarly, Hussein Kamal was sent to Karbala, Ali Hasan Al-Majid was sent to Basra, and Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri was sent to Al-Hilla.

Hussein described Al-Zubaidi as a "comrade in our party" who had reached the leadership position of Prime Minister. Hussein stated that he considers every Iraqi to be a good person until that person demonstrates otherwise to him. He characterized Al-Zubaidi as "good." Hussein acknowledged that Al-Zubaidi was one of the few Shia in the Iraqi senior leadership. When asked whether Al-Zubaidi was respected by his colleagues, Hussein stated, "That is another thing, something different." Hussein refused to explain this comment any further. He added, as previously stated, that he will only say good things about his comrades. Based upon Hussein's answer, the interviewer stated that one might presume that Al-Zubaidi was not in good standing with his colleagues. Hussein replied that the interviewer could presume as he wished, positively or negatively, about Al-Zubaidi. He added, "I gave my answer."
Hussein acknowledged that Abdallah was a distant cousin and member of the Ba'ath Party. He stated that Abdallah served as an officer in the Iraqi Army but was not "in the government." Abdallah assumed the same duties as any other military officer in the army. Hussein stated that he does not remember the location of Abdallah's assignments. When asked whether Abdallah held the position of Secretary General of the Republican Guard (RG) and Special Republican Guard (SRG), Hussein replied, "I thought the questions related to what happened in the South." The interviewer noted that Hussein's perspective on members of the Iraqi leadership is important. Hussein reiterated that he has faith and trust in anyone, whether in the party, the government, or the military, until that person "behaves badly." He added that if he does not describe someone as "bad" that means the person is good. Hussein further characterized a "bad" person as someone who behaves in a manner contrary to the trust existing between him and the person.

Hussein stated that during the war with Iran, the RG assumed duties on the front lines leaving Baghdad and the Presidential Palace unguarded. Thus, the SRG was formed, first of companies, then with regiments. At that time, many young officers served in the SRG including Abdallah. He would later become commander of the SRG. However, the commanders of the SRG and RG were not necessarily Hussein's relatives. Abdallah was one of the many individuals in the Iraqi leadership. Hussein stated that Abdallah performed his duties as would any other officer.

When questioned about the instructions given by the Iraqi leadership to Al-Zubaidi and Abdallah regarding the response necessary for the Shia uprising in southern Iraq, Hussein stated, "I explained during the last meeting." Hussein added that during the last session he also explained how information regarding the situation in southern Iraq in 1991 was communicated back to the Iraqi leadership. The interviewer noted to Hussein that Al-Zubaidi and Abdallah are in the custody of coalition forces. Hussein stated, "What do I want from them?" He asked rhetorically, "Do you think I would answer based upon who is in custody?" He added, "I am afraid of no one. I am only afraid of God." Hussein stated his answers are not based upon who is in custody but upon what he believes to be the truth. His answers are not dependent upon who is alive or dead. Hussein stated that he is not the type person who would blame someone
because that person is dead, such as blaming the late Hussein Kamil. He added, "I will only talk about myself." Hussein recommended that the interviewer talk directly to Al-Zubaidi and Abdallah as they "know themselves better."

Hussein reiterated a statement made during a previous interview saying "any person answering you who, if it lessened their burden, and it does not harm my reputation, I will accept."

The interviewer ended the questioning telling Hussein that he did not wish to further delay his (Hussein's) prayer and meal time. Hussein stated, "Any government, if it is to lessen its sins in the eyes of God, then it should do so." He added, "The sins of a government are not few." Hussein ended the session saying that it was good that the interviewer did not prevent him from praying, as this would be one less sin.
Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed March 28, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

Prior to the start of the interview, Hussein was advised that today's discussion would be a continuation of the previous meetings regarding the Shia uprisings in southern Iraq in 1991.

Hussein stated that it is natural for the leader of a political party, such as the Ba'ath, to attempt to know as many members of the party as possible. For Hussein, however, it was difficult to become acquainted with Ba'ath Party members outside of the senior leadership. Nevertheless, Hussein attempted to know as many members of the Party as possible, just as he tried to meet many individuals of the general population of Iraq.

The interviewer asked about the communication system between the various levels of the Party from the local to the national level and how much information the Iraqi senior leaders actually saw. Hussein stated that the Iraqi senior leaders received information regarding their Party much in the same manner as Democrats and Republicans in America. When a directive was issued by the leadership, instructions were sent to all Party members. When a Party member desired a certain action, a request was submitted through the appropriate channels to the Iraqi leadership. Hussein was questioned about his feelings regarding the importance of Party members informing him of the local situation. He stated, "There is a difference between desire and what is possible."

The interviewer stated that a number of documents describing the 1991 uprisings and Ba'ath Party activities during
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this period were recovered after the invasion of coalition forces in 2003. The translator read to Hussein portions of copies of two documents written in Arabic. One document, dated April 11, 1991, described as report number 7/1/383, signed by Hussein Hamza Abbas, Secretary General of the Saddam Section Command, was sent to the Secretary General of the Wasit Section Command. According to the document, Abbas wrote the letter to explain and clarify his conduct during the "disturbances" of March, 1991. The second document, dated April, 1991, bearing no report number, signed by Anwar Saeed Omar, Secretary General of the Wasit Section Command, was directed to an unstated, but presumably, higher command element. This document explains certain actions taken during "disturbances" in the cities of Basra and Wasit in March, 1991 including the arrest of approximately 700 military and civilian suspects in Basra. In the letter, Omar states that interrogation committees were formed and that he was put in charge of the Second Corps Committee. Omar writes that he personally executed two individuals on the same day he began interrogations. He further states that an additional forty-two individuals were executed after four more days of interrogation.

When questioned about the seeming contradiction in the actions described in these documents and Iraq's justice system, Hussein asked, "Where is the contradiction?" He added that committees were formed, questioning occurred, and judgement was passed. Hussein asked, "What was the alternative?"

The interviewer noted to Hussein that the documents appear to describe a situation where individuals were not investigated by a neutral entity. The necessity of a neutral investigative body was previously discussed by Hussein with respect to the situation in Kuwait and crimes reportedly committed by the Iraqi military during occupation of the country in 1991. The interviewer further noted that the individuals appeared not to have the chance to defend themselves, as also previously mentioned by Hussein as being important. Hussein stated, "I did not say anything about Kuwaitis." He commented that Kuwait and this issue are "two different things." These documents discuss acts of "treachery and sabotage." Hussein stated that it appears that the individuals did have a chance to defend themselves. The interviewer noted that it appears the two individuals mentioned were not given the opportunity to defend themselves and were executed on the spot. Hussein responded, "Possibly. Possibly not." He added that this is a report which,

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may not have included all the details. Hussein stated the author may have been simply bragging to show his loyalty and ability to accomplish a task. He questioned the validity of this report. If true, Hussein stated that when the time comes and America decides to place the individuals captured for these crimes on trial and Iraqis have resumed leadership of the country, Iraqis will investigate this matter.

Hussein questioned what right the interviewer had to ask about internal Iraqi events of 1991. He asked, "Is it because you are an employee of the American government?" The interviewer noted that he is attempting to separate fact from fiction and to record history as it occurred.

Hussein stated that it was difficult to comment on the referenced documents without the full details. He questioned the interviewer's assertion that the two individuals discussed in the one document were not allowed to defend themselves. Hussein further questioned whether the individuals were even executed.
Interview Session Number: 19
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
Arabic/English Translation: LS

Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed March 30, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

Prior to the start of the interview, Hussein was advised that today's session would be a continuation of the discussions regarding the Marsh Arabs of southern Iraq.

As stated in a previous interview, Hussein acknowledged that he had lived with the Marsh Arabs for a short period of time. When Hussein was in Egypt in the early 1960s, he hoped that it was "God's will" that he would return to Iraq. Upon returning, Hussein attempted to expand his own knowledge of Iraq through actual experience in areas of the country where he had never spent significant time including the mountains and the marshes. Hussein described life in the marshes of southern Iraq as "enchanted for any human being." The summers, however, were not pleasant due to the oppressive heat and humidity as well as the presence of insects.

Regarding the drainage of the marshes conducted by the Iraqi government, Hussein stated that one was faced with the choice of preserving nature at the expense of humans or sacrificing a bit of nature for the sake of humans. Hussein noted that the water in the inhabited parts of the marshes was not always clean due to human and animal pollution. The inhabitants of the marshes drank this water and bathed in it. As a result, illness was prevalent including widespread bilharziasis, an intestinal disease. Life expectancy was relatively low. Hussein stated the Iraqi government could not simply "sit back and watch this misery." He added that the government decided to "bring them inside life" or to modernize the Marsh Arabs way of life. Hussein reiterated the difficult
choice of the Iraqi government to preserve the simple, primitive life of the Marsh inhabitants or to bring them within the framework of modern life where a human is not "disgraced or insulted."

Hussein stated that all of Iraq is beautiful and again described the marshes as "enchanted." He added, "I slept there for days in 1981 and 1982." During that time period, Hussein stated he would travel to the front lines of the Iran-Iraq War in the morning, then return to the marshes in the evening upon completion of his duties. Hussein described this period as "the best of days." He claimed that he spent parts of each year from 1978-84 visiting the marshes.

Hussein described his visit in 1980 of a village called Baida located in the middle of the marshes. According to information, residents of Baida attacked a police station. Hussein stated this was not a matter to handle in a simple fashion. He traveled to Baida in a party of three boats, one carrying Hussein and others, one carrying his protective detail, and one carrying "news people." This event was filmed and shown on television. According to Hussein, the residents of Baida were "happy to see us." They slaughtered animals and prepared a meal thinking Hussein and his entourage would stay for dinner. However, the group only remained for a three hours then departed. Hussein never asked the residents of Baida whether they attacked a police station. At the time, Hussein was questioned by a member of his protective detail regarding the necessity for an investigation of the participation of the residents of Baida in the attack. In response, he stated, "Good people understood me. The evil ones also got the message." Hussein added that if a similar act had subsequently occurred, they would be "dealt with properly."

Hussein stated that the Iraqi government had good relations with the Marsh Arabs. However, upon entry of a foreigner into the situation, "it becomes bad." Hussein asserted that some of the Marsh Arabs were corrupted by Iran. In particular, the area of the Hweiza marshes became a smuggling route beginning during the time of the Shah of Iran. Hussein suggested that the family seen in the video previously shown by the interviewer was from Hweiza.
Hussein stated the Iraqi government chose to drain the marshes for the sake of the inhabitants and for strategic reasons for Iraq. He reiterated the Iraqi government wanted to modernize the way of life for the Marsh Arabs so that they would "not live like animals." Hussein believed it was unfit for an Iraqi to live in these conditions. The drainage of the marshes was also conducted for a strategic purpose. Only one road existed connecting Basra to Amarah to Baghdad. At points, this road was completely surrounded by the marshes. When the Iranians entered Iraq in 1984, their main goal was to cut off this road and to isolate Basra. Accordingly, the Iraqi government decided to drain the marshes and build a detour providing a secondary route.

The Iraqi government studied the idea of building homes in the marshes for the inhabitants. However, research showed that this project would be too expensive and complicated particularly in the areas of sewage and electricity. As a result, the idea was abandoned and the government decided to build housing complexes on dry land for the displaced Marsh Arabs. The residents were also offered monetary allowances to build their own homes. Hussein stated that the government provided water, electricity, health care services, and schools for the inhabitants. Previously, teachers and medical professionals would refuse to enter the marshes unless paid three to four times their normal salaries.

Hussein described the marshes as "nice to visit for two, three, or four days." In the summer, however, mosquitos would "eat you" and life was very harsh. Hussein acknowledged that humans have a need for primitive life, but only for a few days at a time. He added that the older man previously seen in the film commenting about the Marsh Arabs "came as a visitor, but did not live there" nor did his wife and children.

Hussein suggested that the interviewer talk to personnel of the Iraqi Ministry of Irrigation in order to understand how the drainage was implemented. He added that the task was accomplished within three to four months. Regarding the individual or individuals who designed and supervised the marsh drainage, Hussein stated the Iraqi government utilized the entities with the most expertise and the necessary equipment. The project included the involvement of the Ministry of Housing, the Ministry of Irrigation and possibly the City of Baghdad. The
entire nation" and many of its experts participated in the drainage of the marshes. When asked to Hussein that Muhammad Hamza Al-Zubaidi claimed to be the "architect" of the marsh drainage who first proposed such a plan to the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) in 1991, Hussein responded, "Maybe." Hussein stated, however, that he received the first plan and proposal from Hussein Kamal. He is unaware whether Kamal consulted with Al-Zubaidi regarding the project. Similarly, Hussein denied knowledge whether Al-Zubaidi discussed the marsh drainage with other Iraqi leaders. He added, "If he (Al-Zubaidi) said this, he is being truthful." The interviewer told Hussein that others had also claimed to be the originators of the idea of the drainage of the marshes. Hussein replied that it is understandable that any Iraqi might attempt to take credit for such an important task that improved the lives of the Marsh Arabs while simultaneously cutting off the path of a foe such as Iran.

(3) When questioned about reports of the presence of Iraqi army deserters and saboteurs in the marshes in 1991 and steps taken by the Iraqi government to deal with these individuals, Hussein acknowledged the existence of deserters. As typical for any protracted conflict, some individuals decide to abandon their duties. This has occurred in the past and continues to occur today during war. For a deserter, the Iraqi law is applied or the individual is pardoned by the appropriate authority. Hussein stated that the presence of deserters in the marshes of southern Iraq was not a contributing factor which led to the drainage.

(4) Hussein stated that saboteurs began using the marshes after 1991. The response of the Iraqi government was "the same as that of any government against those who violate the law." Hussein could provide no example of a government response to saboteur activity. He denied that a military plan existed for confronting saboteurs and deserters. He stated that deserters were typically pursued by the police, local citizens, and family members. In cases of mutiny such as that which existed in 1991, Hussein stated the army would intervene. Hussein acknowledged that there were probably times when the Iraqi military had to deal with saboteurs.

(5) When questioned whether the historical value of the marshes was considered prior to the drainage, Hussein asked
Baghdad Operations Center

whether similar consideration was given to the area where the High Dam was built in Egypt. He added that ruins located in the area of the dam were moved prior to construction. Hussein opined that some discussion most likely took place regarding issues concerning the movement of the stones versus saving the people from starvation. He stated that the matter of the drainage of the marshes "was studied" and "there is no historical value of the marshes."

(5) Regarding any consideration given by the Iraqi government to the environmental impact of the drainage of the marshes, Hussein replied that he could debate this matter with experts for "the next twenty days." He noted that Americans did not allow the Indians to live as they had existed prior to colonization. He asked what laws are in place which prohibit American and European companies from destroying the jungles of the Amazon, which he described as the "lungs of the earth." Hussein asked, "Do we preserve species of birds and other animals or do we worry about the existence of Iraqis?" He further asked whether the water of the marshes should have been wasted for the sake of preserving the marshes or used for agriculture. Hussein stated, "What we did was correct." He added, if not, Americans should reopen the water now. The interviewer noted that a recent news article reported local Iraqi citizens did, in fact, recently collect money, rented a bulldozer, and opened a part of the canal in order to allow water to flow back into the marshes.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 04/29/2004
To: Records Management
From: Counterterrorism
ITOS II/ISLU/4383
Contact: 

Approved By: Drafted By: ifv

Case ID #: 315E-HQ-1448534-302 (Pending)

Title: DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: To request that two individuals be given access to the restricted 302 sub-file under the DESERT SPIDER file, 315E-HQ-1448534.

Details: Records Management Division is requested to grant access to the following individuals for the restricted 302 sub-file under the DESERT SPIDER file, 315E-HQ-1448534.

The above-noted individuals will be working with the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) and will therefore require access to these files.
To: Records Management From: Counterterrorism
Re: 315E-HQ-1448534-302, 04/29/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

RECORDS MANAGEMENT
AT WASHINGTON, DC

Please grant access to the listed individuals for the restricted 302 sub-file under the DESERT SPIDER file, 315E-HQ-1448534.

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Interview Session Number: 20
Interview Conducted By: SSA George L. Piro
Arabic/English Translation:

Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed May 1, 2004, at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

Interviewers told Hussein they would like to bring closure to the family of the naval aviator, Michael Scott Speicher, whose plane was shot down in Iraq during the first Gulf War. Interviewers approached this discussion with Hussein from a humanitarian, and not a political point of view. Hussein responded by asking if this was the pilot that was downed in western Iraq? He proceeded by saying the interviewers were right to investigate this from a humanitarian point of view, and wished that this humanitarian effort would spread throughout the world.

Hussein viewed a photograph of Captain Speicher. Hussein responded to the photograph by saying that if he had a chance to assist the interviewers, or the family of the pilot, he would tell them.

Hussein first became aware of the missing pilot when the Americans asked for assistance, through official channels, in recovering the remains. Hussein responded to the Americans by telling them Iraq would assist in any way they could. Hussein stated that Iraq had the right to shoot down the plane, but no one has the right to hide the remains of the pilot. Hussein believes the official communication from the Americans was passed to him through Tariq Aziz, or possibly the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Hussein then provided his concurrence to Aziz or the Foreign Affairs Minister to lend assistance to the Americans in finding the remains.
In 1995, Hussein remembered directing his subordinates to assist the Americans and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in excavating the crash site. He doesn't remember the exact details, but believes he directed Tariq Aziz, through the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), in overseeing this request. Hussein stated he would have trusted his Minister to carry out the responsibilities regarding this request, and there would not have been a need to assign anyone else.

Interviewers then started to question Hussein regarding the committee that was established in 2000 regarding the missing pilot. Hussein quickly responded by saying the "humanitarian side of this conversation has ended."

Interviewers asked Hussein how he would go about finding the remains of the American pilot. Hussein responded by saying he would first determine the specific area where the plane was shot down. He would then approach the Bedouin Sheik of that particular area and tell him that you spoke with him, Saddam Hussein, and ask for their assistance in finding the remains. Hussein advised that the Americans must promise the Bedouin Sheik that they are concerned with only recovering the remains of the pilot, and are not there for any other reason. Hussein prided himself in having an excellent relationship with the Bedouin people.
While engaging SSA George L. Piro in casual conversation in his detention cell, Saddam Hussein provided the following information:

Hussein was advised of the accomplishments in Iraq, to include the signing of the new constitution, and the preparations for the turn over of sovereignty to the Iraqis. Hussein questioned the effectiveness of the Governing Council (GC), in his view the GC could agree among themselves to make decisions. Hussein was advised of the eventual elections in Iraq, in which the Iraqi people will have the opportunity to democratically elect a new leader. Hussein stated that the Iraqi people would not accept an elected leader during occupation and has experienced this in the past when King Faisal was brought to power under British power. SSA Piro described to Hussein the recent poll of Iraqis in which the Iraqi people want control over their government, but want United States forces to remain in Iraq.

While talking about the air conditioning in Hussein's cell, which was being repaired at that time, Hussein advised that he is used to living simply and personally does not like an extravagant lifestyle. Hussein was then questioned about the number of palaces and their extravagant nature. Hussein stated that the palaces belong to the nation and not to one person. Before 1968, the Iraqi homes were basically very primitive and made out of mud. As in western countries, historically architects developed their skill and designs by building castles. The palaces gave Iraqi architects the opportunity to develop their skills which could then be seen in the improvement of the design of the typical Iraqi home. Additionally, there was a threat from the United States and Israel, especially during the last ten years. For the government to function, the leadership had to meet and discuss issues prior to rendering decisions. If there were only two palaces or locations that the leadership could meet, it would have been very easy for the elimination of the Iraqi leadership. However, with twenty palaces, it was much more difficult to track or identify the location of the Iraqi leadership. Since these palaces belonged to the nation, Hussein did not live in them and
preferred to live in a simple home. Hussein would eat what was prepared for his protection detail and did not have a lot of demands. Hussein believed the United States had a misconception that he had an extravagant lifestyle, which lead to his ability to evade capture. Hussein believes his capture was solely caused by betrayal.

Hussein's work schedule was long, but he would set time aside for fictional reading, something he enjoyed very much. His days would include meetings with the other senior Ba'ath Party members. Hussein claimed he regularly met with the Iraqi people as he found them to be the best source of accurate information. Hussein would meet with citizens daily, or every other day. When asked, how could he be certain that the citizens were honest during their discussions, as most would have been afraid? Hussein replied that this could have been the case, but he had a extremely long relationship with the Iraqi people and the population knew he sought the truth. Hussein gave an example involving his half-brother, Watban Ibrahim Hasan Al-Majid, the Minister of Interior at the time. A citizen reported to Hussein that while stopped at a traffic light, Watban fired his pistol at the traffic light. Hussein contacted Watban to determine if this was true. Watban acknowledged it was. Hussein then told him to pack his things, allowing him to learn of his removal from Hussein instead of the state news radio. Hussein claimed that he held his family at a higher standard than others.

Hussein indicated he was interested in understanding the American culture, and did so by watching American movies. According to Hussein, he watched numerous American films, from these he developed his opinion of the American culture.
While engaging SSA George L. Piro in casual conversation, Saddam Hussein providing the following information regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD):

Hussein stated that the United Nations' (UN) Weapons Inspections had achieved its objectives of disposing Iraq of its WMD. Iraq does not have any WMD and has not for sometime. Hussein was advised that many were of the opinion that Iraq was reluctant to cooperate with the UN Weapons Inspections process. Hussein replied that Iraq had cooperated for seven years and granted access to the entire country to the weapons inspectors, to include the Presidential Palaces. Hussein was challenged on Iraq's cooperation, one example of which was the concealment of WMD components by Hussein Kamel. Hussein stated that Hussein Kamel's true character became known to everyone. Hussein admitted there were individuals in the Iraqi government who were initially reluctant to cooperate with the weapons inspectors. Those individuals were loyal hard working people dedicated to their work. It was difficult for them to be told one day to open all of their files and turn over all of their work and government secrets to outsiders. It took time and occurred in steps. However, by 1998 Iraq had complied with the UN resolutions; yet, Iraq was attacked at that time by the United States, without justification or the UN's authorization. Hussein further stated the Iraqis would not have stored WMD in the Presidential Palaces, as the government and the Iraqi leadership would have been at risk. WMD was and would have been stored in the desert, in remote locations. The palaces represented the sovereignty of Iraq, and it was very difficult for the Iraqis to turn over access to outsiders, but did so to demonstrate their cooperation.

Hussein claimed the strikes against Iraq by the United States in 1998 and in response to the alleged assassination attempt of former President George Bush were unprompted and unjustified. The United States did not obtain or receive UN concurrence for either attack. Even though, both attacks were the decisions of the United States, Hussein felt the UN had exceeded its authority and charter in regards to Iraq. Hussein was reminded that Iraq was a signatory body of the UN. Hussein attempted to use the Iraqi strike against the USS Stark
as an example to demonstrate Iraq's ability to openly admit to mistakes. Hussein claimed Iraq acknowledged the strike and its mistake. Hussein believed the UN resolutions and sanctions on Iraq were based upon the United States' position. Hussein was advised of Libya's cooperation with the UN, including their decision to dismantle their WMD; and because of this, Libya's international standing has improved and sanctions may soon be lifted. Hussein was further advised many would place the blame on Iraq for its problems as a result of its hard-line position with the UN. Hussein stated Iraq in the past had a good relationship with the United States and Iraq always wanted to maintain that relationship which would have benefitted both countries. Hussein cited that in the late fifties, the number of Iraqis trying to obtain visas for travel to the United States far surpassed the number at other embassies, including the Russian Embassy.

Hussein stated WMD was for the defense of Iraq's sovereignty. Iraq demonstrated this with the use of WMD during the Iraq and Iran War, as Iran had threatened the sovereignty of Iraq. Yet, Iraq did not use WMD during the 1991 Gulf War as its sovereignty was not threatened. Iraq's neighboring Arab countries were frightened of Ayatollah Khomeini and Iran. During a meeting involving several Arab countries, Saudi Arabian officials voiced their fears concerning Iran. The Saudis stated even though the United States was their ally, the United States was too far away while Iran was on their border. Hussein claimed during this meeting, he suggested that they reach out to Ayatollah Khomeini with a peace offer, and then if Iran rose up against them, Iraq would be the first to confront Iran's aggressiveness. The others were too fearful of Iran, and Iraq was the only one who stood up to them.

Hussein was reminded of a speech he gave in June, 2000, where he stated that he would not disarm until the region was disarmed; and his own words could be taken as an admission that Iraq possessed WMD. Hussein claimed his intention was for the region to be fully disarmed. Hussein was advised his speech did not project that message. He requested a copy of his speech and said he would then provide clarification. Hussein was informed the Coalition had gathered information indicating that Iraq was either maintaining or re-developing its WMD capability. Hussein denied this. He was then asked if others within his country would do this without his knowledge. Hussein said no,
and claimed on several occasions he held meetings with all of his ministers and asked them specifically if Iraq had WMD that he was unaware of. All of his ministers stated no, as they cited they knew Hussein’s position on WMD matters clearly. Hussein claimed his position was that Iraq did not have WMD.
To: Records Management
From: Counterterrorism
        ITOS II/ISLU/4383

Date: 06/14/2004

To request that two individuals be given access to the restricted 302 sub-file under the DESERT SPIDER file, 315E-HQ-1448534.

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To: Records Management  From: Counterterrorism  
Re: 315E-HQ-1448534-302, 04/29/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

RECORDS MANAGEMENT  
AT WASHINGTON, DC

Please grant access to the listed individuals for the restricted 302 sub-file under the DESERT SPIDER file, 315E-HQ-1448534.

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While engaging SSA George L. Piro in casual conversation, Saddam Hussein providing the following information regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD):

(8) Saddam Hussein read SSA George Piro a poem he recently wrote. SSA Piro used this opportunity as a segue to discuss Hussein's speeches. SSA Piro advised Hussein that after hearing several poems from him, SSA Piro is now able to recognize Hussein's writing style, which was prevalent in a speech SSA Piro recently read. It was clear to SSA Piro that Hussein wrote his own speeches, which he confirmed further, stating all his writings came from the heart. Hussein claimed he did not enjoy reading his speeches, preferring instead to have his speeches read by others, such as news broadcasters. Hussein described the feeling of writing his speeches and giving them was the same as taking an exam.

(8) SSA Piro then asked Hussein if he wrote his own speeches and they come from the heart, then what was the meaning of his June 2000 speech. Hussein replied this speech was meant to serve a regional and an operational purpose. Regionally, the speech was meant to respond to Iraq's regional threat. Hussein believed that Iraq could not appear weak to its enemies, especially Iran. Iraq was being threatened by others in the region and must appear able to defend itself. Operationally, Hussein was demonstrating Iraq's compliance with the United Nations (UN) in its destruction of its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

(8) Hussein stated Iran was Iraq's major threat due to their common border and believed Iran intended to annex Southern Iraq into Iran. The possibility of Iran trying to annex a portion of Southern Iraq was viewed by Hussein and Iraq as the most significant threat facing Iraq. Hussein viewed the other countries in the Middle East as weak and could not defend themselves or Iraq from a attack from Iran. Hussein stated he believed Israel was a threat to the entire Arab world, not specifically Iraq.

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Hussein continued the dialogue on the issues relating to the significant threat to Iraq from Iran. Even though Hussein claimed Iraq did not have WMD, the threat from Iran was the major factor as to why he did not allow the return of the UN inspectors. Hussein stated he was more concerned about Iran discovering Iraq's weaknesses and vulnerabilities than the repercussions of the United States for his refusal to allow UN inspectors back into Iraq. In his opinion, the UN inspectors would have directly identified to the Iranians where to inflict maximum damage to Iraq. Hussein demonstrated this by pointing at his arm and stated striking someone on the forearm would not have the same effect as striking someone at the elbow or wrist, which would significantly disable the ability to use the arm. Hussein indicated he was angered when the United States struck Iraq in 1998. Hussein stated Iraq could have absorbed another United States strike for he viewed this as less of a threat than exposing themselves to Iran.

Hussein further stated that Iran's weapons capabilities have increased dramatically, while Iraq's have been eliminated by the UN sanctions. The effects of this will be seen and felt in the future, as Iran's weapons capabilities will be a greater threat to Iraq and the region in the future. Hussein stated Iraq's weapons capabilities were a factor in the outcome of the Iraq-Iran War. Initially during the war, Iraq had missiles with a limited range of approximately 270 Kilometers (km), while Iran had no viable missile capability. The Iranians obtained long-range missiles from Libya which could strike deep into Iraq. The Iranians were the first to use the missiles, and struck Baghdad. Hussein claimed he warned the Iranians through a speech he gave, to cease these attacks. But the Iranians again attacked Baghdad. Iraq's scientists came to him and advised him that they could increase the range of Iraq's missiles to also reach deep into Iran. Hussein directed them to do so. Iraq responded to Iran's attacks by striking Iran's capital, Tehran, with its own missiles. Hussein stated the Iranians were up in arms to Iraq's strikes. Hussein stated that Tehran was more vulnerable to missile strikes due to its geographical design. Baghdad, on the other hand, was geographically spread out and broken up into districts making Iran's missile strikes less effective. Hussein identified this as the "war of the cities" and Iraqi actions were in response to Iran's. At that time, Hussein recognized that Iran was at a disadvantage, as Iraq had the technology to design and develop its missiles, while Iran was
Baghdad Operations Center

forced to obtain its missiles from Libya. Iraq was limited only by its own production while Iran was limited by the quantity it could obtain.

Hussein recognized that Iran continued to develop its weapons capabilities, to include its WMD, while Iraq had lost its weapons capabilities due to the UN inspections and sanctions. Hussein was asked how Iraq would have dealt with the threat from Iran once the UN sanctions were lifted. Hussein replied Iraq would have been extremely vulnerable to an attack from Iran, and would have sought a security agreement with the United States to protect it from threats in the region. Hussein felt such an agreement would not only have benefitted Iraq, but its neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia. SSA Piro agreed that such an agreement would have assisted Iraq immensely. SSA Piro noted due to the history between the two countries, it would have taken some time before the United States would have entered into such an agreement with Iraq.

Further, SSA Piro advised Hussein that paragraph 14 of UN Resolution 687 states that the disarming of Iraq was part of a total disarmament of the entire region, however, that portion of the resolution was not enforceable. The threat from Iran would have loomed over Iraq, especially as Iran had continued to advance its weapons capabilities. SSA Piro commented that under those circumstances, it would appear that Iraq would have needed to reconstitute its own weapons program in response. Hussein replied that Iraq would have done what was necessary and agreed that Iraq's technical and scientific abilities exceeded others in the region.

Hussein commented he allowed the UN inspectors back into Iraq to counter allegations by the British Government. Hussein stated this was a very difficult decision to make, but the British Government had prepared a report containing inaccurate intelligence. It was this inaccurate intelligence on which the United States was making their decisions. However, Hussein admitted that when it was clear that a war with the United States was imminent, he allowed the inspectors back into Iraq in hopes of averting war. Yet, it became clear to him four months before the war that the war was inevitable.

Hussein reiterated he had wanted to have a relationship with the United States but was not given the chance,
as the United States was not listening to anything Iraq had to say. Further, he was concerned about the United States' advanced technological capabilities and resources.

On another matter, Hussein stated he only recalls using the telephone on two occasions since March 1990. Additionally, Hussein did not stay at the same location for more than a day, as he was very aware of the United States' significant technological capabilities. Hussein communicated primarily through the use of couriers to communicate or would personally meet with government officials to discuss pertinent issues. Hussein stated that a technologically under-developed country, such as Iraq, was vulnerable to the United States.

The discussion then turned to the new interim President of Iraq, Sheikh Ghazi Al-Yawar. Hussein stated Al-Yawar came from a good family and would be favored by the other countries in the region, especially Saudi Arabia. Hussein stated it appeared the United States had put a lot of thought into Al-Yawar’s appointment, as Al-Yawar was a good selection. SSA Piro told Hussein the selection of Al-Yawar was not solely made by the United States, but was a joint effort by the United States and UN. The selection of the new Iraqi Government was based on the needs voiced by the Iraqi people. The new Iraqi Government has a strong foundation on which to build on as it progresses in its work to serve the Iraqi people. SSA Piro then asked Hussein how he personally felt about their discussion of a new President and Government in Iraq. Hussein began to respond in reference to Al-Yawar, but SSA Piro stopped him and asked how he personally felt. SSA Piro reminded Hussein that he had previously made it clear to SSA Piro that he still considered himself the President of Iraq. However, it is clear now to everyone that he is no longer the President, as there is a new President who is representing the country and the people of Iraq. SSA Piro told Hussein he is no longer the President of Iraq; he was done. Hussein replied yes he knows, saying what could he do as it was God’s choice. SSA Piro asked him if he had any thoughts about his future and Hussein stated that it was in God’s hands. SSA Piro pointed out to Hussein that God was very busy and that God had more important issues than he and SSA Piro. Hussein agreed, at which point, SSA Piro told Hussein that his life is nearing its end, and asked him if he wanted the remainder of his life to have meaning, to which he responded yes.
Baghdad Operations Center

(8) SSA Piro informed Hussein that he had surrounded himself with weak individuals, who are now refusing to take any responsibility for the actions of the former government. The other High Value Detainees were putting the blame for all of Iraq's mistakes on Hussein, to which Hussein replied by saying what could he do. Hussein recognizes that he may bear the responsibility or blame while others will attempt to distance themselves.
While engaging SSA George L. Piro in casual conversation in his detention cell, Saddam Hussein provided the following information:

Saddam Hussein stated on most days his work schedule consisted of meeting ordinary Iraqi citizens. Hussein preferred to meet them where they worked or lived instead of his office. Normally, Hussein tried to schedule time between 3:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. to interact with the Iraqi citizens. Hussein preferred to drive himself and would direct his protective detail to ride as passengers, which gave him the ability to stop whenever and wherever he wanted. Hussein took advantage of this time to address individual issues with citizens, which included discussions involving medical issues, personal grievances, etc.

Hussein enjoyed exchanging ideas with those around him for purposes of developing solutions. He encouraged those around him to discuss issues and exchange ideas amongst each other as well as with him. However, Hussein did not enjoy debating others, even though he considered himself an excellent debater, and superior to those around him. Whenever there were debates, Hussein stated he normally wouldn't take part, and would remain silent.

Hussein discussed individuals either related or close to him within the former Iraqi Government. Hussein stated Tariq Aziz (Black List #25) was very intelligent, and had the most knowledge regarding the West of all the Ba'ath Party officials. Aziz was an excellent speaker, as he was a former English teacher and former editor of the Ba'ath Party newspaper.

Hussein stated Ali Hasan Al-Majid (Black List #5) thought like an Arab. SSA Piro stated Al-Majid thought like a Bedouin, and Hussein stated that is what he meant to say. Al-Majid had limited experience outside of his tribe and his decisions were based on that limited experience. However, Al-Majid followed orders and carried out his duties as instructed.

Hussein described former Vice President, Taha Yasin Ramadan's (Black List #20) personality as open. Ramadan was the
type of individual who continually talked about himself, which Hussein allowed him to do.

Hussein then discussed his two half brothers, Barzan Ibrahim Hasan (Black List #38) and Watban Ibrahim Hasan (Black List #37). Hussein stated Barzan was very intelligent, but had a closed personality. SSA Piro told Hussein that Barzan was not very friendly, and would not be the type of person with whom SSA Piro could develop a friendship. Hussein laughed, and stated that SSA Piro knew Barzan's personality. Hussein then stated Watban was the opposite of Barzan, friendly but simple. According to Hussein, Watban could not carry out his Ministerial duties and was not capable of handling political positions or issues.

SSA Piro inquired about Abid Hamid Mahmoud (Black List #4), Hussein's Presidential Secretary. Hussein stated Abid was a good and loyal employee who carried out his duties and orders well. Hussein then asked SSA Piro his opinion of Abid. SSA Piro described to Hussein the meaning of a "used car salesman." Hussein again laughed and stated SSA Piro was correct in his description of Abid.
While engaging SSA George L. Piro in casual conversation in his detention cell, SADDAM HUSSEIN provided the following information:

S S S

SSA Piro discussed with HUSSEIN Iraq's relationship with Al-Qaeda. HUSSEIN provided a brief historical account of conflicts between religion, specifically Islam, and historical rulers. HUSSEIN stated that he was a believer in God but was not a zealot. HUSSEIN believed that religion and government should not mix. Additionally, the Ba'ath Party ideology was not religiously based, as its founder was a Christian. However, HUSSEIN was clear that he opposed anyone who collaborated with the West against his country.

HUSSEIN stated USAMA BIN LADEN's ideology was no different than the many zealots that came before him. The two did not have the same belief or vision. HUSSEIN claimed he had never personally seen or met Bin Laden. SSA Piro advised HUSSEIN there is clear evidence the Iraqi Government had previously met with BIN LADEN. SSA Piro specifically cited FAROUQ HIJAZI's (BL #104), former ISIS M-4 Director, meeting with BIN LADEN in Sudan in 1994, ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI's two visits to Baghdad, and his request for financial assistance of ten million dollars. HUSSEIN replied "yes". HUSSEIN stated the Iraqi government did not cooperate with BIN LADEN. SSA Piro asked HUSSEIN "why not" since Iraq and BIN LADEN had the same enemies, United States and Saudi Arabia. SSA Piro then cited him the quote "my enemy's enemy is my brother". HUSSEIN replied that the United States was not Iraq's enemy, but that HUSSEIN opposed its politics. If he wanted to cooperate with the enemies of the United States, HUSSEIN would have with North Korea, which he claimed to have a relationship with, or China.

HUSSEIN stated that the United States used the 9/11 attack as a justification to attack Iraq. The United States had lost sight of the cause of 9/11. SSA Piro advised HUSSEIN that due to Iraq's contradiction between its statements and actions, many believe Iraq miscalculated the effects of the 9/11 attack on the American people and its leaders. Iraq denied having any connection with BIN LADEN or Al-Qaeda, but evidence showed

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continued contact between the two. HUSSEIN denied miscalculating the effects of the attack, but he did not have any options in front of him. The only choice he was given was to leave Iraq which he claimed was not an option.

SSA Piro asked HUSSEIN why was Iraq the only country to applaud the 9/11 attack, which HUSSEIN immediately denied. SSA Piro advised HUSSEIN that the Iraqi newspapers were reported to have applauded the attack. HUSSEIN stated that he wrote editorials against the attack, but also spoke of the cause which led men to commit these acts. The cause was never reviewed which could create such hatred to kill innocent people. After the attack, TARIQ AZIZ wrote personal letters denouncing the attack to two individuals, one possibly Ramsey Clarke, which AZIZ personally knew. These letters served as informal means of communications for Iraq to denounce the attack. HUSSEIN stated he could not make any formal announcement as Iraq considered itself at war with the United States. HUSSEIN was asked if that was why the request of the Iraqi Ambassador to the United Nations, MUHAMMAD AL-DURI, to attend the 9/11 memorial was denied by the Council of Four. It took the Minister of Foreign Affairs' personal request to HUSSEIN to obtain permission for the ambassador to attend the memorial. HUSSEIN stated he could not recall what transpired, but specifically remembered the ambassador attending the memorial. Again, HUSSEIN stated that the ambassador attended the memorial as a representative of the United Nations, and would not have attended as a formal representative of Iraq.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/19/2006

To: Records Management

Attn: 

From: Counterterrorism

ITOSII/Iraq Unit/6S-200

Contact: SSA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: jfv

Case ID #: 315E-HQ-1448534-302 (Pending)

Title: DESERT SPIDER

IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: Provide AD Authority to remove the restriction from subfile 302.

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: XI

Reference: 315E-HQ-1448534-302 Serial 1

Administrative: Per all SAC, RC from CTD dated 12/25/2002, no case restrictions in ACS or may be made without the approval of the Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division.

Details: The captioned investigation was opened to capture intelligence and evidence as it relates to the national security investigation targeting Saddam Hussein.

As a result of the current international tribunal of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein and since the information is no longer considered sensitive in nature, the 302 subfile's restriction can be removed from ACS.
LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:  (Action)

RECORDS MANAGEMENT

AT WASHINGTON, DC

RMD will ensure the access to subfile 302 restriction be removed from ACS.
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Prosecutive Report of Investigation Concerning

SADDAM HUSSEIN

IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL

Article 11 - GENOCIDE
Article 12 - CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
Article 13 - WAR CRIMES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-11-2009 BY uc/baw 60324

Copy to: Regime Crimes Liaison Office
BACKGROUND

Introduction

From 1980 to 1988, Iraq was involved in a full-scale war with its neighbor, Iran. The Iraq-Iran war was fought on several fronts, including the Northern Region of Iraq which borders Iran. This region, sometimes called Kurdistan or the Autonomous Region, was home to the Kurds. Two major parties represented the Kurdish population: the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) headed by MAS'UD AL-BARZANI, the son of MULLAH MUSTAFA BARZANI (hereinafter MULLAH BARZANI), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) headed by JALAL TALABANI (hereinafter TALABANI). The Kurds had been seeking governmental autonomy for years.

On or about approximately February 12, 1987, the Iranian Armed
Forces (IAF) initiated a series of military offensives in Northern Iraq against the Iraqi government. On March 4, 1987, the IAF, with the assistance of Kurdish guerrilla fighters known as Peshmergas from both PUK and KDP, launched its most alarming offensive of the series. Code named Karbala 7, the IAF penetrated eight miles into Iraqi territory east of Rawanduz.

Indeed, SADDAM HUSSEIN and his officers in the Iraqi regime regularly referred to MULLAH BARZANI, his sons, and the KDP as the "offsprings of treason," and to TALABANI and the PUK as "Iranian agents."

During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), hundreds of Iraqi documents detailing HUSSEIN and his regime's offensive and retaliatory actions against the Kurds were recovered, and relevant documents are summarized in this report. This report also relies upon Iraqi documents Kurdish Rebel Parties had seized from various Iraqi government offices during the 1991 Uprising had given to the Human Rights Watch (HRW). HRW has published those documents in their reports, most notably in "Bureaucracy of Repression, the Iraq Government in its Own Words," February 1994.

The charging proposal detailed in this report also relies upon relevant statements and admissions made by various high-level Iraqi government officials, including SADDAM HUSSEIN. These statements were made to United States investigators while in United States custody in Iraq. All interviews were voluntary in compliance with Geneva Conventions.

Iraq’s Governmental Structure

According to the Iraqi Constitution in effect prior to HUSSEIN assuming the Presidency in 1979, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was the supreme law-making body in Iraq and was Iraq's highest authoritative body and was superior to the Cabinet. RCC decrees held the full force and effect of national law. Prior to OIF, the RCC was comprised of the following high level Ba’ath Party officials: SADDAM HUSSEIN, Chairman; IZZAT IBRAHIM AL-DURI (hereinafter AL-DURI), Vice-Chairman; TARIQ AZIZ (hereinafter AZIZ); TAHA YASIN RAMADAN (hereinafter RAMADAN); ALI HASAN AL-MAJID (hereinafter AL-MAJID); TAHA MUHYI AL-DIN MARUF (hereinafter MARUF); and MIZBAN KHADR HADI (hereinafter HADI).

Immediately upon his assumption of the Presidency, HUSSEIN successfully eliminated the RCC's power and consolidated
it into his own hands. AZIZ stated that between 1979 and 1981, HUSSEIN took other, less dramatic steps to consolidate governmental power into his own hands. For example, until 1979, the RCC held regular meetings and recorded the minutes of those meetings. However, after HUSSEIN became President, meetings were less frequent and were not formally recorded. HUSSEIN told the RCC there would be times when he would not be able to consult with them and therefore, the RCC had to give him power to make unilateral decisions, which it did. [TARIQ AZIZ January 30, 2004 interview].

HAMED YOUSEF AL-HUMMADI (hereinafter AL-HUMMADI), HUSSEIN's Presidential Secretary, stated that he was responsible for assembling and presenting all reports and letters to HUSSEIN, and for preparing and disseminating all reports, letters and orders drafted by HUSSEIN. AL-HUMMADI's role as Presidential Secretary was purely administrative and AL-HUMMADI held no authority whatsoever.

Similarly, the Presidential Diwan performed the same role for the RCC Secretary; that is, the Presidential Diwan facilitated correspondence to and from the RCC and was purely administrative in role and was without authority. [AL-HUMMADI interview June 2, 2004]

AHMED HUSSEIN KHUDAIYER (hereinafter KHUDAIYER), the Presidential Diwan, stated that as the Secretary of the RCC, the Diwan issued all finalized RCC decisions. KHUDAIYER stated that most Iraqis who read the RCC decisions assumed that they were promulgated after debate and consultation which simply was not true. The RCC rarely met as a governing body. Rather, HUSSEIN, the Head of State and therefore the Head of the RCC, assigned all decisions as a function of his own determination; that is, HUSSEIN made nearly all RCC decisions unilaterally without RCC input or debate. If meetings occurred at all, only HUSSEIN's closest two or three advisors would have been involved. KHUDAIYER generally learned of the RCC's "decisions" via a telephone from SADDAM HUSSEIN or from Presidential Secretary ABID HAMID MAHMUD AL-TIKRITI.

KHUDAIYER forwarded HUSSEIN/RCC's instructions to his legal section which prepared the ordered document. KHUDAIYER reviewed the document, inspecting it for typographical errors and formatting, and editing as needed. [KHUDAIYER interview, June 12, 2004]

In early 1987, MOHAMMAD HAMZA AL-ZUBAYDI (hereinafter
AL-ZUBAYDI) was the senior Ba’ath Party official in the Northern Region. AL-ZUBAYDI admitted during an interview that he failed to control the on-going Kurdish activity within his jurisdiction. In approximately March, 1987, HUSSEIN relieved AL-ZUBAYDI of his position in the Northern Region and ordered AL-ZUBAYDI back to Baghdad.

On March 29, 1987, HUSSEIN, through RCC Decree 160, appointed AL-MAJID as the RCC and the Ba’ath Party Regional Command representative who was empowered to implement their policies in the Northern Region which included the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan. This decree gave AL-MAJID control of the state’s civil, military, and security apparatuses in the Northern Region, including the Autonomous Region. AL-MAJID’s authority and special power far exceeded AL-ZUBAYDI’s. AZIZ, a longtime RCC member, stated that HUSSEIN unilaterally chose AL-MAJID and defined the scope of the authority RCC Decree 160 granted AL-MAJID. AZIZ stated that HUSSEIN successfully seized the RCC’s authority and decision-making ability from its members in the early 1980s. The RCC did not discuss or vote on the appointment of AL-MAJID. [AZIZ interview, February 2, 2004][RCC Decree 160 attached as document XX].

KHUDAIYER examined a photocopy of RCC Decree 160 and recognized it as the copy of an authentic RCC document in format and substance. KHUDAIYER did not remember attending any meeting at which the contents of RCC Decree 160 was discussed. Rather, he recalled receiving the information via handwritten instructions as usual. He vaguely recalled making a non-substantive correction on the original draft that his legal section had prepared.

KHUDAIYER stated the difference between AL-MAJID’s appointment and AL-ZUBAYDI’s was that AL-ZUBAYDI received his position based on his Ba’ath party status, not a Decree issued through the Presidential Diwan's office. Furthermore, AL-ZUBAYDI did not enjoy the trust from HUSSEIN that AL-MAJID did. When asked to define what he meant by trust, KHUDAIYER explained that everyone knew AL-MAJID would never do anything against SADDAM, and that he possessed the ruthlessness needed to quell the violence. [KHUDAIYER interview, June 12, 2004]

**PRE-ANFAL (1987)**

On March 10, 1987, the Iraqi Directorate of Military
Intelligence (DMI) submitted a Top Secret and Confidential intelligence report, M1/sh3/Q2/5809, to the Army Chief of Staff regarding Kurdish insurgent activity. The report identified the location of many of AL-BARZANI's bases, the cooperation and mutual assistance between AL-BARZANI's group and Iranian forces, and detailed acts of sabotage by AL-BARZANI's group. The report also noted that previous Iraqi aerial strikes had been ineffective because of the geography and size of the bases. [attached as document #XX]

The intelligence report was signed by Staff Major General SABIR ABD AL AZIZ HUSAYN AL-DURI (hereinafter SABIR), Director of the Istkhbarat or Iraqi DMI. Copies of the report were provided to the Presidential Secretary, the Secretary Bureau of the General Command of the Armed Forces, the RCC Committee of Northern Affairs, the RCC Deputy Bureau, the Office of the Ministry of Defense, and the Fifth Corps Headquarters.

On March 11, 1987, based on DMI Intelligence Report 5809, the Army Chief of Staff, through Staff Major General TAREQ HUSSEIN NAJIB (hereinafter NAJIB), the Senior Secretary, directed the Fifth Corps Headquarters through memo Number 2786 to take measures necessary to limit the activities of saboteurs by destroying their essential bases. Copies of this memo were provided to the RCC Committee of Northern Affairs, Office of Ministry of Defense, and the DMI. [attached as document #XX].

On March 12, 1987, HUSSEIN responded to DMI's Intelligence Report 5809. In a Presidential Memo to the DMI, Number 7/G2/3808/K, authored by Presidential Secretary AL-HUMMADI, HUSSEIN ordered the DMI and specialists to conduct a joint study for the use of "special ammunition" in a direct strike by the air force, army air assets, or artillery against the bases of Khomeini Guards and the First Branch of the AL-BARZANI Group. HUSSEIN's letter instructed the DMI "to do the necessary" and notify the President's office. [attached as document #XX]

SABIR stated that in 1987, the primary role of the DMI in the Northern Region of Iraq was to gather intelligence on Iranian forces. A secondary role was gathering intelligence on the Kurds and determining their relationship with the Iranians. SABIR believed the planning stages for the Anfal campaign occurred between 1985 and 1987. SABIR acknowledged that "special ammunition" was a term the President and other high level Iraqi Government Officials, including himself, used to represent chemical weapons (CW). [SABIR interview, June 4, 2004].
AL-HUMMADI examined a photocopy of HUSSEIN's memorandum responding to the DMI, recognized it as a copy of an authentic document in format and substance, and verified his signature on the document as the Presidential Secretary. Because Generals are not Ministers, they could not correspond directly with HUSSEIN but rather sent correspondence through the Presidential Secretary's Office. Hence, the DMI submitted the referenced March 10, 1987 correspondence to Presidential Secretary AL-HUMMADI. AL-HUMMADI, in turn, presented it to HUSSEIN.

HUSSEIN normally wrote his responses or directives on the margins or bottoms of the incoming correspondence. If the matter were urgent and time sensitive, AL-HUMMADI made a photocopy of the correspondence with HUSSEIN's original notes on it, filed the original, and sent the photocopy to the author of the correspondence. On more routine correspondence, AL-HUMMADI transcribed verbatim HUSSEIN's written remarks into a Presidential Secretary Office letter. Such was the case with this March 12, 1987, letter to the DMI. HUSSEIN read the DMI letter, accepted it and authorized the DMI's proposed use of "special ammunition." AL-HUMMADI then prepared HUSSEIN's March 12, 1987 official response memorandum and sent it to the DMI.

AL-HUMMADI stated that the phrase "special ammunition" meant chemical weapons, and that HUSSEIN's order that the DMI conduct a study of special ammunition usage, coupled with the order to, "Do the necessary, and notify us", indicated HUSSEIN knew of and authorized his military commanders' proposed use of chemical weapons. AL-HUMMADI reiterated his certainty that the document and his signature were authentic. [AL-HUMMADI interview, June 2, 2004]

The DMI Third Department, or Sh3, was responsible for handling the Kurdish insurgency. On March 13, 1987, the Director of the Sh3 responded to HUSSEIN's orders. The Director recommended the use of the air force to carry out the strikes because air strikes would be:

- more accurate and effective,
- achieves the surprise attack objectives, since using artillery would reveal our intentions,
- no doubt, some targets are beyond the artillery and helicopter ranges. [attached as document #XX]

In the same report, the Sh3 Director also enumerated "the conditions and requirements for directing the [Special] Aerial Assault to inflict the required damage and make it more
Provide the Air Force with detailed and accurate information about the targets.

It is necessary to brief the pilots about the targets descriptions and to make use of the aerial images.

Execute the strike at day break or a little later.

Dedicate the maximum effort (more than one airplane per target) and repeat air strikes with follow up airplanes, or make it a compound strike (The Special Ammunition, high explosive bombs, and surface to air missiles) using integrated or follow up bombing.

Strike all targets simultaneously with the most effective effort.

Use the artillery after a suitable time (a few days) to strike the targets within the range.

On March 13, 1987, Iraqi Cabinet Minister HASHIM HASSAN AL-'AQRAWI (hereinafter AL-'AQRAWI) stated during a media interview, "The Iranians are trying to use these people [the Kurds] to carry out dirty missions, and since they know the geography of the area and its ins and outs, the Iranians use them merely as guides for the Khomeini Guards and the Iranian forces."

On March 18, 1987, the DMI responded to the Presidential Office through Memo, Number M1/Sh3/Q2/6414. The subject of the memo is, "Use of Special Ammunition" and contains the following:

1. The following are the available capabilities to us for the use of the Special Ammunition directed at Khomeini Guard Bases and the bases of the saboteurs, AL-BARZANI Group - The First Branch.
2. The climate conditions do not permit the use of the (Sarin) agent at the present time because the target locations are covered with snow, which causes the agent to dissolve and transform into a non-poisonous substance. The same conditions apply to the (Tabun) agent.
3. We possess adequate (Mustard) agent. The
predicted effect will be a (miracle) in these conditions unless a large, concentrated dose is received, and that it evaporates slowly in snow covered areas.

4. We are capable of using the Air Force, tube launchers, and helicopters at night.

5. We suggest the following:
   a. The postponement of the strike against the Khomeini Guard Bases and the bases of the AL-BARZANI Group until next June. We prefer selected target locations outside the range of the Iraq-Turkey boundary line. We have selected targets that are located away from the probable effect of the forces along the Turkish border or Turkish villages.
   b. Start off with similar plans to execute limited operations toward the Iranian agents' bases.

6. Please review and inform us of the assignment... with respect, Walid

On March 19, 1987, in Presidential Memo Number 7/G2/877/K, HUSSEIN approved the DMI's suggestions. [attached as document #XX]

On March 25, 1987, the DMI concluded its study as directed by HUSSEIN and reported its finding in report Number S3/Q2/6885 titled, "Use of Special Ammunition" which SABIR signed. The report identified the locations of the Iranian agents' bases, and selected targets according to enemy size and their effect on the internal security in the Northern Region. The Report listed suitable and available capabilities of the "special ammunition" and the launching means. (attached as document #XX)

The report identified Iranian agents' bases in the region of Balisan Basin (Balisan villages, Tutemeh, Khatti, and Sheikh Wasan) located near the main road between Chuwa'r Qurna-Khalifan, and the region of Qaradagh Basin (Tekyah, Belkjar, and Siosenan) "as important to both Iranian agents and enemy personnel. Their size effected the internal security to the Northern Region and were far enough from Iraqi forces, making them more suitable than other targets, for 'special ammunition'."

Because limited amounts of "special ammunition" were available to the Iraqis at the time, SABIR described the following options:
Directing a strike to the selected targets during this period by using two thirds of what is available of the "special ammunition" (Sarin agent). In addition, one third of what is available of the "special ammunition" (Mustard agent), and keeping the rest for emergency situations in the operating sector.

Postpone strike until mid-April 1987, until there is enough "special ammunition" available, after improvements will be made in the production.

AL-HUMMADI examined a photocopy of the above correspondence sent from the DMI to the Presidential Secretary's Office. AL-HUMMADI recognized it as a copy of the authentic document in format and substance and would have given it to Huessin in the normal course of his duties.

On March 29, 1987, AL-HUMMADI authored the Presidential Office's response to SABIR's DMI correspondence which is numbered Presidential Memo 953/965/K. This memorandum relayed HUSSEIN's approval for the chemical weapons strike and emphasized that his approval was conditioned upon "exploiting the results of the strike as the purpose is not to simply hurt the sabatours." HUSSEIN directed SABIR and the DMI to coordinate with the intended Corps and inform the Presidential Office before initiating the strike. [attached as document #XX]

AL-HUMMADI examined a photocopy of HUSSEIN's March 29, 1987 memorandum. AL-HUMMADI stated that it was an accurate copy of the authentic document in format and substance, and verified his signature.

AL-HUMMADI explained that HUSSEIN himself did not correspond directly with his officers and advisors; rather, pursuant to normal communication protocol, the Presidential Secretary's Office issued all of HUSSEIN's communications and orders. Hence, AL-HUMMADI communicating HUSSEIN's orders to the intended recipients. Based upon his daily contact with HUSSEIN, it was clear to AL-HUMMADI that HUSSEIN was, in this series of communications, approving and authorizing SABIR and the DMI to begin chemical weapon strikes near Turkey.

On March 31, 1987, SABIR advised the Army Chief of Staff in Memorandum 7371 that HUSSEIN had ordered a study of the use of "special ammunition," and made the same suggestions he had made for HUSSEIN. SABIR, who signed the report, also detailed
the results of the DMI study and its recommendation of which
difficulties to strike, and advised that the DMI had Presidential
authority to proceed. [attached as document #XX]

On April 5, 1987, in response to DMI Memorandum 7371,
the Army Chief of Staff, Staff General SA’AD AL-DIN AZIZ MUSTAFA
(hereinafter MUSTAFA), drafted Memorandum 3656 titled "Using
Special Ammunition" which directed the First Corps and Special
Corps to conduct counter-operations against saboteurs, Iranian
agents, and Khomeini Guards by using "special ammunition" against
Iranian agents' bases in the region of Balisan Basin (Balisan
villages, Tutemeh, Khatti, and Sheikh Wasan), located near the
main road between Chuwa’r Qurna-Khalifan and in Qaradagh Basin
villages (Tekyah, Belkjar, and Siosenan). [attached as document
#XX]

The Army Chief of Staff MUSTAFA instructed the First
Corps to prepare a joint plan to complete the strikes against the
first group of targets and forward the plan to him by courier for
approval and coordination. MUSTAFA also ordered the preparation
of a plan regarding the second group of targets listed above, to
be presented during a visit to the First Corps Headquarters on
April 9, 1987.

This memo was also sent to the Presidential Office and
advised that the Army Chief of Staff MUSTAFA would inform the
Presidential Office of the plan in detail and would "exploit" the
results. Additionally, this memo was forwarded to the Operations
Department of the Ministry of Defense. The memo referenced a
previously-convened meeting on April 5, 1987, and asked that the
Special Ammunition Group be sent to the First Corps Headquarters
on April 7, 1987 to consult with the Corps and put in place an
executable plan.

SABIR reviewed, in Arabic, the above-described series
of memorandums between HUSSEIN and the various military entities
regarding the use of "special ammunition" in the Northern Region
of Iraq. SABIR admitted that "special ammunition" was a term
used by HUSSEIN and the Iraq Government to mean chemical weapons.
SABIR did not remember each and every document; however, he did
verify his signature on the bottom of several previously
identified documents, and thus concluded they were authentic.

While examining the copies and verifying his signature,
interviewing agents observed the following physical changes in
SABIR: he started to perspire profusely, his facial
characteristics dramatically changed, and his lower lip began to
uncontrollably quiver. Additionally, SABIR's eyes began to tear after he described the April 16, 1987, chemical weapons attack on the villages of Balisan and Sheikh Wasan. SABIR stated that HUSSEIN's decision to utilize chemical weapons directly caused the deaths of the men, women, and children in those villages.

The idea of using chemical weapons first arose in approximately 1986 after the loss of the Faw Peninsula to Iranian forces which lead the Iraqi government worry that Iraq was losing the war with Iran. SABIR believed the general consensus was that Iraqi forces needed a small victory to boost their confidence and commitment to the war with Iran. SABIR's subordinates within the DMI initially proposed the use of chemical weapons against Iran to provide such a moral and commitment boost. However, the DMI's primary mission was to defeat and expel Iranian forces and not to utilize chemical weapons against the innocent women and children in the civilian population. SABIR advised that in 1987, the DMI was responsible for collecting information for target identification and providing that information to the Iraqi military. [SABIR interview, June 3, 2004]

SABIR stated that during the Anfal Campaign, the DMI was responsible for gathering intelligence from within each of the Corps. The military was responsible for fighting on the front lines and clearing areas of resistance. The military was also responsible for removing Kurdish populations from the Northern Region, and the Governors in each of those areas were responsible for relocating the displaced Kurds. Each Governor was responsible for reporting directly to AL-MAJID. SABIR did not know the full extent of AL-MAJID's responsibility and advised that areas outside of AL-MAJID's responsibility would have been assigned to the military. [SABIR interview, June 3, 2004]

April 16, 1987 Chemical Attack on Balisan and Sheikh Wasan

During an interview with Le Monde in April 1987, PUK representative NAYWISHIRWAN MUSTAFA AMIN commented that one option under consideration by the PUK was the "severance of Iraq into a number of small states: Shia, Kurdish and Sunni."

In early April 1987, PUK Peshmergas launched an assault in the Jafari Valley, overrunning dozens of small Iraqi military posts and taking hundreds of prisoners. The Jafari Valley was home to the PUK's national headquarters. The Iraq Government responded on April 15, 1987 by launching chemical artillery
shells in the Jafati and Shahrbazar Valleys.

Balisan and Sheikh Wasan lay scarcely a mile and a half apart in a steep-sided valley south of the town of Rawanduz. The Balisan Valley was home to the PUK's Third Regional Command. Balisan was described as a sizeable village containing approximately 250 households, with an approximate population of 1,750 from the Khoshnaw Tribe. The village had four mosques, one primary school and one intermediate school. Sheikh Wasan was a smaller settlement of approximately 150 homes.

In July 1993, the Human Rights Watch (HRW), a non-governmental organization, published the report, "Genocide In Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds" which documented the Iraqi Government's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds during operations known as the "Anfal Campaign" in 1987 and 1988. HRW reported that its findings were based on interviews of survivors, examination of seized Iraqi documents, and examination of massacre sites.

According to HRW, the following is an account of the attack on Balisan and Sheikh Wasan:

During the evening hours of April 16, 1987, the villagers of Balisan and Sheikh Wasan heard the sound of approaching aircraft. Some villagers stayed in their homes, while others fled to air-raid shelters when a dozen aircraft came into sight, flying low over the villages. There were a number of muffled explosions. Witnesses and survivors, describing the effects of the attack to HRW stated, "It was all dark, covered with darkness, we could not see anything, and were not able to see each
other. It was like fog, and then everyone became blind." Some vomited. Faces turned black; people experienced painful swelling under the arms, and women under the breasts. Later, a yellow watery discharge oozed from the eyes and nose. Many of those who survived suffered severe vision disturbances, or total blindness, for up to a month. In Sheikh Wasan, survivors watched as a woman staggered blindly, clutching her dead child, and not realizing the baby was dead. Some villagers ran into the mountains and died there. Others, who had been close to the impact points of the bombs, died where they stood.

The following morning, ground troops and pro-regime Kurdish militia entered Balisan, looted the villagers' deserted homes and razed them to the ground. Sometime later, army engineers dynamited and bulldozed Sheikh Wasan. The surviving inhabitants had already fled during the night of the attack. Some made their way to the city of Suleimaniyah, and a few to Shaqlawa. But most headed southeast to the town of Raiya where there was a hospital. They were helped on their way by people from neighboring villages, including Barukawa, Kaniberd, and Tutma, which had also suffered from the effects of the wind-born gas. The people of Beiro sent tractor-drawn carts to Sheikh Wasan, and 10 of these vehicles, each carrying 50 or 60 people, left for Raniya. At the complex of Seruchawa, just outside the town, the tractors stopped to bury the bodies of 50 people who were already dead. The refugees who reached Raniya spent one night there. Local doctors washed their wounds and gave them eye-drops, but that did nothing to ease the effect of the gas on their vision.

The next morning, agents from Amn [Directorate of General Security, or DGS] and possibly from military intelligence arrived at the hospital. They ordered everyone out of bed and into a number of waiting vehicles,
consisting of 21 passenger vans, pickup trucks and cars. The villagers were told these vehicles would take them to the city Erbil for medical care. However, they were later warned their medical care was contingent on them reporting that their injuries were the result of an attack by Iranian airplanes.

At about 9:00 that morning, people in Kurdish dress began to stream into the emergency room of the Republic Hospital in Erbil. Approximately 200 unarmed civilian men, women and children arrived at the hospital. Four were dead on arrival. The survivors arriving from Ranya told doctors that they had been attacked with chemical weapons. Despite their burns, their blindness, and other, more superficial injuries, those who had survived the journey from the Balisan Valley were generally still able to work, although some were unconscious. Even with the assistance of doctors who rushed across from the nearby Maternity and Pediatric Hospital, the facilities were not sufficient to deal with a large-scale emergency. There were far from enough beds to deal with so many victims; many of the patients were laid on the floors, and the occupants of the vans were obliged to wait in the parking lot while the preliminary triage was done and the first treatment carried out. On examination, the doctors found that the victims' eyes were dried out and glued shut. Having some rudimentary notion of how to treat chemicals, the doctors applied eye drops, washed their burns and administered injections of atropine, a powerful antidote to nerve agents.

The doctors had been at work on their patients for about an hour when HASSAN NADURI, the head of the local branch office of Amn, arrived. When NADURI arrived on the morning of April 4, 1987, every doctor in the hospital was busy dealing with the emergency. NADURI was accompanied by two other Amn
officers, and, possibly IBRAHIM ZANGANA, the governor of Erbil, and a second local Ba'ath Party official, ABD-AL-MON'EM. The Amn officers questioned the hospital guards, demanding to know where the new patients were from and who the doctors were who were treating them. They then repeated these questions to the medical staff, and demanded to know what treatment was being given. As these questions were answered, NADURI telephoned the Amn office for instructions. After hanging up, he ordered that all treatment cease immediately. He told the doctors to remove the dressings from the patients' wounds. When the doctors asked why, NADURI stated that he had received orders from his superiors to transfer all the patients to the city's military hospital. At first, the hospital staff demurred, but the three Amn officers drew their pistols and ordered them to stop what they were doing at once. Otherwise, they would be taken to Amn headquarters themselves. After a second telephone call, this time ostensibly to the military hospital, a number of ambulances or trucks arrived and took the patients away, together with those who remained, for a full hour now, in the three parked vans.

Later that day, the doctors telephoned the military hospital to check on the condition of their patients. They had never arrived there. The doctors never saw any of the survivors of the Balisan Valley chemical attack again. They later heard that loaded military ambulances had been seen driving off in the direction of Makhmour, to the southwest of Erbil.

A handful of survivors told Middle East Watch that the Balisan Valley victims were taken to a former police station that was now an Amn detention center, a stark white cement building in the Arab quarter of the city, near the Baiz casino. There was a chaotic scene on arrival, as Amn officers attempted to sort out detainees by age and sex, and, in the confusion, several people managed to
escape. At least one woman fled leaving her children behind. Those who remained were thrown into locked cells, and guarded by uniformed agents; some dressed all in the green and others in blue. Here, they were held for several days without food, blankets or medical attention.

HAMOUD SA’ID AHMAD, an employee of the municipal morgue attached to Erbil’s Republic Hospital, was summoned on a number of occasions over the next few days to the Amn jail in the city’s Teirawa quarter and ordered to pick up bodies to be prepared for burial. Over a three day period, AHMAD counted 64 bodies. Arriving to collect them, AHMAD saw other prisoners wandering around the in the prison courtyard. Some had clear fluid oozing from their mouths; others had dark, burn-like marks on their bodies, especially the throat and hands. AHMAD saw men, women, and children in detention, including several nursing babies in their mother’s arms. The bodies, kept in a separate cell, bore the same marks. None showed any signs of gunshot wounds. Most of the dead appeared to be children and elderly people. An Amn official told AHMAD that “they are saboteurs, all saboteurs we attack with chemical weapons.” An ambulance driver told AHMAD that he recognized one of the dead as a Republic Hospital employee from Sheikh Wasan.

Family members waiting outside the jail for news said that the detainees were being held as hostages to compel their peshmerga relatives to surrender. On the last of his three visits, AHMAD saw two large buses pull up outside the prison, their windows sealed with cloth. Later that day, a female prisoner managed to whisper to him “do you know what the buses were doing here? They took all the men away, to the south, like the Barzannis.” The men were never seen alive again.
After the mass disappearance of the men, the surviving women and children were taken out during the night and driven off in the direction of Khalifan, three hours to the northeast of Erbil. At a place called Alana, they were dumped in an open plain on the banks of the river, and left to fend for themselves. They were reunited here with the Balisan Valley villagers who had fled to Suleimaniyeh.

At Alana, the mother who had escaped from the Amn jail in Erbil was reunited with her children. She recognized families from the villages of Kaniberd, Tutma, Sheikh Wasa, and Balisan, who told her that many children had died in place from hunger, thirst, and exposure.

On the basis of interviews with four survivors, and with a number of medical and morgue personnel in Erbil, HRW determined a rough estimate of the numbers who died as a result of exposure to chemical weapons.

There were 24 deaths in Balisan as a direct result of exposure to chemical weapons; these people were buried in a mass grave in the village.

There were 103 deaths in Sheikh Wasan, including approximately 50 buried in a mass grave in the government complex in Seruchawa. The dead included:
- 33 children under the age of four
- 28 children between the ages of 5-14
- 9 elderly people aged 60-85
- 8-9 dead at the hospital at Raniya
- 4 dead on arrival at the Erbil Emergency Hospital
- 64-142 deaths in the Amn jail in Erbil.

The deaths in the Amn jail were the result of untreated injuries sustained in the chemical bombing, aggravated by starvation and neglect. The victims included two
elderly women identified as SELMA MUSTAPA HAMID and ADILA SHINKO, and a nine-year old girl identified as HOWSAT ABDULLAH KHIDR.

The number of adult men and teenage boys taken by two busloads from the Amn jail and presumed to be executed later is estimated at 70 to 75. Twenty-two are believed to be from Balisan, 50 from Sheikh Wasan, and four from nearby villages. Among those that disappeared were MOHAMMAD IBRAHIM KHIDR, age 18, and MOHSEN IBRAHIM KHIDR, age 12, the two youngest sons of the Mullah of Balisan.

Allowing for some overlap, the Middle East Watch calculated that at least 225 and perhaps as many as 400 civilians from the Balisan Valley died as a result of the April 16, 1987 Iraqi Air Force’s chemical strike on their villages.

(hereinafter also witnessed the April 16, 1987, attack on Balisan. According to the Iraqi military attacked the villages of Sheikh Wasan and Balisan during the evening hours of April 16, 1987. The aerial attack was the first night attack conducted by the Iraqi military against the Kurds. believed the Iraqi military used chemical weapons against the villages at night because the highest concentration of villagers would be in their homes and the villages at night; the men who remained in the villages were the toughest in the valley; and it gave the Iraqi military the opportunity to attack the rear of the Peshmegas in Balisan and approximately 400 in Sheikh Wasan.

On April 16, 1987, who lived in Balisan, was in the village of Tutma, located within the Balisan Valley. saw Iraqi aircraft over the villages of Balisan and Sheikh Wasan. While over the villages, the aircraft conducted dive runs but did not hear any explosions. Approximately an hour later, heard the sound of helicopters, followed by dull explosions, and he saw large, high flames coming from the villages and knew that it had been a chemical attack. later learned through the PUK that the helicopters had taken off earlier from Kirkuk. The PUK has estimated that approximately 36 helicopters were involved in the attack.

immediately began walking to Balisan because his
brother, _______ was there. The journey took him approximately an hour. Upon arrival at the village, ______ saw villagers acting normally and going about their normal routine. ______ learned that his brother had fled the village because he had been injured in the attack. After some time, ______ began to see the effects of the attack on some of the villagers. The most common symptoms were pain to the eyes and loss of vision. People began to flee the village as word of the injuries spread throughout the village.

______ went to the PUK field hospital in the village of Khati to search for his brother. Because ______ face was so badly burned, ______ did not initially recognize his brother and found him only after his brother called out upon hearing ______ voice. ______ face was dark from the burn and appeared sunken, as if dehydrated. All the patients at the hospital were victims of that evening's chemical attack.

On April 17, 1987, at approximately 6:30 am, ______ heard the sound of artillery approaching the village of Khati. The Iraqi military had started a ground offensive in the Balisan Valley. The Iraqi military began clearing the valley one village at a time. The Iraqi military first fired artillery at the village, and then cleared it with tanks. When ______ heard the artillery fire approaching Khati, he knew that village would soon be the next target.

______ along with his brother and four other injured Kurds, fled the valley to hide in a cave in the mountain. ______ identified the others as two civilians from Balisan, a civilian from Sheikh Wasan, and a fighter from ______ hometown. When they arrived at the cave, ______ saw other victims from the chemical attack, captured Iraqi soldiers and civilians hiding. ______ estimated their number to be approximately 40. ______ interview, December 15, 2004).

On April 19, 1987, ______ led his brother and the remaining injured to the village of Sheikh Wasan. Although the Iraqi chemical attacks had concentrated on Sheikh Wasan and Balisan, the gasses had dissipated from a section of Sheikh Wasan because of the topography of the area. As a result, ______ and his group stayed the night of April 19 on that relatively safe side of the village.

The next morning, ______ and his small group traveled from Sheikh Wasan to Balisan. He gathered the food he had previously hidden on April 18, 1987. Although the food had been
contaminated with chemicals, the group was so hungry that they had no choice but to eat it. By nightfall, approximately 10 people had gathered around [ ]. Most of the homes in the village had been burned by the Iraqi troops, but they managed to find a house at the edge of the village to spend the night. [ ] noted that although approximately 2,000 people lived in Balisan, only 10 or 12 people had returned after the attack.

On April 21, 1987, [ ] intended to travel with his brother to Shaglawa to locate medical supplies. At approximately 9:00 am, [ ] was still in Balisan when two Iraqi Gazelle helicopters flew over the village. [ ] recognized them by sight and knew they carried 20mm machine guns. [ ] soon heard machine gun bursts as the helicopters traveled northwest from Balisan. He and another raced to the sound of the guns and found seven people, five males and two females, shot dead on the government road northwest of Balisan. One of the woman had been carrying an infant who had not been shot and was trying to breast feed from its dead mother.

[ ] estimated that the total populations of all of the villages in the Balisan Valley ranged from 400 to 2,000 (Balisan). Most were located within a mile or two of each other. Although the Iraqi military attacked and burned all 42 villages in the valley, the Iraqi government forces seemed to concentrate on the villages of Balisan, Sheikh Wasan, Tutemeh, Balanukawa, Kanibard, Berawa, and Khati which are all located within three miles of each other. The chemical attacks were most concentrated on Balisan and Sheikh Wasan, but other villages not directly attacked were indirectly affected by the gas as well. It appeared that Berawa, Khatti, and Kanibard were attacked by artillery or airplanes employing conventional weapons only.

[ ] interviewed, January 27, 2005].

The following declassified satellite imagery, illustrating Sheikh Wasan on May 27, 1987, depicts the impact
craters in and near the villages.

The FBI obtained several audiotapes, consolidated onto one CD, from Philip Trewhitt, United Kingdom Liaison on Transitional Justice, Office of Human Rights & Transitional Justice, Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad, Iraq. These tapes are referenced in the HRW report dated July, 1999, Appendix A, "The ALI HASAN AL-MAJID Tapes." These tapes contain recordings of Al Majid during Northern Command meetings held between approximately 1987 to 1989. Portions of the tapes were played for AL-MAJID.

We said that at that date we will start to implement the deportation campaign. And we did it everywhere, with the help of God. The same day they captured Qara Dagh in retaliation. JALAL TALABANI asked me to open
a special channel of communication with him. That evening I went to Suleimaniyeh and hit them with the special ammunition. That was my answer. 'I will attack it with chemical weapons.' and 'I will kill them all with chemical weapons!' Who is going to say anything? The international community? Fuck them! The international community and those who listen to them. [Tape 2A segment marked approximately 21:59 to 26:44]

AL-MAJID is presumably referring to the April, 1987 chemical attack on the PUK headquarters in the Jafati Valley. AL-MAJID also listened to the following portion of Tape 2B:

I will not attack them with chemicals just one day, but I will continue to attack them with chemical weapons for fifteen days. [Tape 2B]

We will surround them in a small pocket and attack them with chemical weapons. I will not attack them with chemicals just one day, but I will continue to attack them with chemicals for 15 days.

After listening to Tape A, AL-MAJID stated, "This tape has been altered" and that "this tape is not correct." He claimed the audiotape had been "assembled" from tapes of two different meetings; one meeting in the first half of 1988 and the other in Mosul on March 30, 1991.

AL-MAJID admitted that the audiotape A was a recording of his voice and his words at a meeting with Ba'ath Party Section officials and Governors of the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan on April 15, 1987. AL-MAJID stated that his statements were attempts at "psychological warfare" against the enemy in the beginning of the campaign against the saboteurs in the Northern Region. His words were meant as a scare tactic similar to what was later used in Dohuk. In AL-MAJID's opinion, the saboteurs would be "weakened by words." Logistically, they would later be weakened by their forced separation from the cities. [AL-MAJID interview, April 9, 2004]

AL-MAJID said he personally inspected Suleimaniyeh and it had not been hit. He added that he never heard of such an attack, particularly with chemical weapons. He stated he did not order a chemical weapons attack on TALABANI and his headquarters in the Jafati Valley near Suleimaniyeh. He claimed he actually went to Suleimaniyeh to meet with TALABANI, and that the words
"and hit them with the special ammunition" have been inserted into this tape. The remainder of the tape is a threat or scare tactic AL-MAJID used against the saboteurs in Dohuk.

According to AL-MAJID, when the Iraq Government lost control of the cities of Suleimaniyeh, Dohuk, Erbil, and Kirkuk in 1991, HUSSEIN tasked AL-MAJID with "liberating" Dohuk. He invited ABD JAWAD THANNOON, Governor of Dohuk, NASIR SAID (hereinafter SAID), Fifth Corps Commander, and all state and Party officials to a "reception" at the Mosul Hotel in Mosul. There, AL-MAJID gave a speech declaring, "Whoever has a friend in Dohuk, I will attack with chemical weapons tomorrow." SAID attempted to interrupt AL-MAJID because he did not want the timing of the operation to be revealed. AL-MAJID directed him to communicate this information to those in Dohuk. He wanted "the illusion" of a chemical weapons attack to be imprinted in the minds of those controlling Dohuk. AL-MAJID stated the Iraq Government was weak in 1991. Thus, he used the chemical weapons "threat" as a "scare tactic" to control the saboteurs in Dohuk.

AL-MAJID directed the military to procure bags of flour or cement and attach them to helicopters. The helicopters were then used the following morning to spread the material over Dohuk to further "illusion" of a chemical weapons attack. AL-MAJID used this "scare tactic" to reduce losses on "our side and their side." AL-MAJID walked into Dohuk at 9:30 a.m. the same morning. Some Iraqi military members would not enter the city however, thinking that it had been contaminated with chemical weapons.

According to AL-MAJID, NIZAR AL-KHAZRAJI (hereinafter AL-KHAZRAJI), Army Chief of Staff, once told ABBAS MAHMOUD (NFI) or RASOOL MAHMOUD (NFI) that AL-MAJID ordered the chemical weapon attack on Halabja which was not true. AL-MAJID is know as "Chemical Ali" because of the events at Dohuk and not at Halabja.

During his interview, TARIQ AZIZ confirmed that HUSSEIN's decision to deploy chemical weapons against the Kurds was a unilateral one; that is, HUSSEIN did not convene a meeting of the RCC, National Assembly, or any other Iraqi or Ba'ath Party government entity to discuss the use of chemical weapons in the April, 1987 attacks. Moreover, HUSSEIN gave no official written or verbal notification to these entities that he had authorized, or that chemical weapons had been used, in the attacks. AZIZ stated the RCC was "informed" and "it was mentioned." He added it was "common knowledge" through the media that chemical weapons had been used. No RCC member protested their use for fear of reprisals from HUSSEIN and fear that Iraq would lose the war.
without such a drastic step. At the time, the situation was viewed as dire and "life or death." AZIZ admitted that Iraq and Iran had each violated provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1917 and 1948, of which each was a signator, which prohibited the use of chemical weapons. [AZIZ interview, February 2, 2004].

May 25, 1987 Chemical Attack on the Malakan Valley

Pursuant to the authorization to use chemical weapons that HUSSEIN had given to the military in the series of previously identified letters, the Iraqi military attacked the Malakan Valley with chemical weapons on May 25, 1987. Specifically, based on an April 24, 1987 DMI report, Number 28357, the Secretary General for the Ministry of Defense, Staff General MAHMOOD SHOKER SHAHEEN, sent letter Number D/A/51/1/10374 to the Headquarters of the Army Chief of Staff. The letter, dated May 1, 1987, advised that the Deputy to the Minister of Defense had ordered:

All agents’ sites should be struck with aerial weapons, traditional and special, and all weapons within range. (Attached as document #XX)

This letter prompted the Senior Secretary of the Army Chief of Staff, Staff General TAREQ HUSSEIN MAJEED, to direct the DMI via letter Number RAG/1/15787, dated May 2, 1987, to:

Please take the necessary procedure and provide the Headquarters of the Air Force and Air Defense with the Agents’ sites in order to destroy them. (Attached as document #XX)

On May 3, 1987, the DMI informed the Headquarters of the Army Chief of Staff via report Number M1/Sh3/Q2/9819 that it had provided the locations of the Iranian Agents’ sites to the Headquarters of the Air Force and Air Defense. The DMI identified 17 villages by name and by what appears to have been grid coordinates. Additionally, the DMI suggested “ordering a study on the issue of striking the Iranian Agents’s sites with special ammunition by the authorized committee.” SABIR AL-DURI signed the report as the Director of the DMI. (Attached as document #XX)

On May 9, 1987, the Headquarters of the Air Force and Air Defense notified the Ministry of Defense via letter Number Sh1/QD/690 that based on SABIR’s report Number 9819, and Army
Chief of Staff letter Number 15787, "air strikes were launched with traditional ammunition by (20) aircrafts, and with special ammunition by (44) aircrafts against the Agents' sites mentioned in the DMI's report, except for Shadi A. Aclaya, due to its nearness to the troop line." The letter was signed by Lieutenant General HUMAID SHABAAN, Commander of the Air Force and Air Defense. (Attached as document #XX)

On May 12, 1987, the Headquarters of the Air Force and Air Defense identified for the DMI in letter Number SH/QS/707 the locations of sites struck by traditional ammunition and those struck by special ammunition. The ten sites struck by traditional ammunition on May 4 and May 8, 1987 and listed by name and grid coordinates were among the 17 sites the DMI had previously identified in report Number 9819. The sites struck by special ammunition on May 7, 1987 were identified only by grid coordinates. The letter was signed by Staff Pilot General HASSAN KHADER ALHAY KH SneHAMED, the Director of Air Movements. (Attached as document #XX).

On May 20, 1987, the DMI summarized the strikes directed at the Iranian Agents' sites as reported by the Air Force and Air Defense in report number M1/Sh3/02/11144 addressed to the Ministry of Defense. The report identified the ten sites struck with traditional ammunition and further reported:

2. As for the other targets, which were hit by air strikes (44) aircrafts using special ammunition (mentioned in the above Air Force and Air Defense letter), were groups of Iranian Agents existing North and East of Gowarta. (Attached as document #XX)

A handwritten memorandum, Number 4947 (attached as document #XX), dated June 11, 1987, from the Director of General Security of the Erbil Governate to the Security Directorate of Shaqlawa, provided information about attacks on "saboteurs" that resulted in their blindness. The document stated, in part:

On 5/27/87, our aircraft attacked the villages of Malakan, Talinan, Kandor, Bileh Aliya and Bileh Sulfa in the Khalifan subdistrict, which harbor some saboteurs. As a result of the bombing, lost his eyesight....A number of saboteurs were killed and about 30 people lost their eyesight as a result of the bombing,
including the family of KAMAL HAJI KHIDR AGHA, the commander of the 12th [PUK] division.

Temporary blindness is a common side-effect of a chemical attack. HRW interviewed KAMAL AGHA in March, 1993, who confirmed that he and his family had been temporarily blinded in a chemical attack on May 27, 1987.

On May 26, 1987, [ ] was part of a Peshmerga group that arrived in the Malakan Valley. In the late afternoon of May 26th, 1987, [ ] witnessed a MIG-25 flying slowly over the Malakan Valley. Approximately five or six miles long, the Malakan Valley was home to the villages of Malakan, Talinan, Bila-Zohri, and Bila-Zehri. [ ] believed the airplane was taking surveillance photographs for an upcoming attack. [ ] later learned from an Iraqi deserter that it was common for the Iraqi Air Force to send a MIG-25 to an area that it planned to attack. The MIG-25 would fly to the area of interest to take pictures of the villages and areas where people lived. The next day, the area would be attacked with chemical weapons.

As [ ] and his group prepared to depart Malakan shortly after 6 a.m. on May 27, 1987, Iraqi government forces attacked the top of the Malakan Valley with chemical weapons. A spring at the top of the valley which was the villages' water source channeled the heavy chemical gas through the valley and down towards the villages. Believing the attack was part of a larger operation that might include an attack on the Balisan Valley, HASSAN SHUSTANI, the PUK Third Malaband Commander, ordered his group of Peshmergas to leave immediately for Balisan. On the way out of Malakan which is on the north side of the valley, the group had to head down into the valley and through the gas. However, no one in GOZEH's group was severely effected by the chemical gases. The villagers in the area were left to deal with the chemical attack themselves.

[ ] believed this attack was in retaliation for an entire Jahsh regiment's (Kurdish pro-regime militia) recent defection and relocation to the Malakan Valley. According to [ ] , a total of fifteen died from the chemical attack, four of whom were members of the defected Jahsh regiment. [ ] interview, February 3, 2005].

June 6, 1987 Chemical Attack on the Zewa Valley

A handwritten note by the Director of Sh3 (DMI) dated
June 5, 1987, was attached to the DMI study, Number Sh3/Q2/6885, which was submitted to the Presidential Secretary for HUSSEIN's review and information. [Enclosure #8]. The note stated:

Regarding obtaining approval of the Presidency's Office on the said suggestion, and in paragraph A under item 2 of the attached letter which stipulates postponing the strike of Khomeini Guards in Barzani's First Division till June, therefore:

1. On June 4, a study was completed on directing a severe strike against these quarters and against Barzani's First Division quarters in (Zewa, Barzan, Katirash, and Lakirash), and this study was completed by participants from the General Staff, Planning Department, Army, Air Force, our Directorate, and the Chemical Division.

2. Support for the Strike on Zewa Village was obtained despite of its close proximity to the Turkish border, but striking the targets listed hereunder were not supported for the following reasons:
   a. Katirash - it's too close to the Turskish border.
   b. Lakirash - its close proximity to our army units in Jabal Kuwait.
   c. Barzan, where the Khomeini Guards are few and disbursed in the Barzan Basin, does not constitute a viable target.

In June, 1987, the (hereinafter) was living at an Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) compound in the Zewa Valley which is located in the top part of Kurdistan above Dohuk near Kani Masi. The compound housed the ICP leadership including HAMID MUSA, aka ABU MUSA, currently a member of the interim Iraqi Government, SLAYMAN YOUSEF, aka ABU AMIL, head of the military committee, TOMA TOMAS, aka ABU JAMEEL, head of the Bahdinan area, and ABU ADEL, political advisor for the Bahdinan area.

The Zewa Valley is surrounded by mountains and was home to approximately 1,000 Peshmergas from the various Kurdish parties. The ICP compound was located near two civilian villages. The valley was protected by doshkas, Russian anti-aircraft missiles.

On approximately June 5 or 6, 1987, between 6:00 or 7:00 p.m., 12 grey Iraqi MIG aircrafts attacked the valley while most residents were preparing for dinner. The aircraft came in very low at approximately 1,000 feet. The aircraft circled the
valley and conducted two bombing runs which lasted a total of approximately 10 minutes. There were approximately six to eight explosions. One bomb landed approximately 50 feet from everyone in the compound ran for the bomb shelters. According to this was the first time the Iraqis attacked with so many aircraft at such a low altitude and so close to homes and structures. described the explosions as a dull noise accompanied by heavy white smoke. Initially, there was no smell, but then noted a garlicky smell associated with the explosions.

Initially, did not notice any injuries except for (NFI), who sustained a leg injury as a result of the attack. No one in the compound initially realized that the attack had been a chemical attack. After approximately one hour, however, heard someone call for the doctor as symptoms of the chemical attack began to appear. friend, ABU RAZKAR, began vomiting, which alarmed her. He told her he believed he had inhaled sulfur.

Most people in the compound went to sleep at approximately 9:00 or 9:30 pm that evening. At that time, it was common for people to sleep on the roof of the homes. However, that night, decided to sleep inside. At approximately midnight or 12:30 am, was awoken and informed that the attack had been a chemical one. was instructed to go to the support detachment (isnad). When arrived, she saw hundreds of men, women and children from the compound and nearby villages standing around a large bonfire. Most were suffering from some effects of the chemical attacks and were in great deal of pain. stated that "no artist could paint, no writer could write, or no cinematographer could film the suffering." Many were complaining of a burning pain to the eyes and tearing. also began to experience a burning pain to her eyes. Everyone believed that fire would counter the effects of chemical attack, hence the large bonfire. Approximately 400 to 500 Peshmergas and civilians, to include approximately 50 children, were effected by this attack.

The Peshmerga leadership ordered everyone to evacuate the area and head to high ground. Peshmergas and civilians from the nearby effected villages began to make their way, on foot, to the top of the mountain through a small foot path, leaving everything behind. By this time, many of the victims were going blind and were unable to make their way up the path. Others complained of stomach pains. Many were unable to complete the journey. helped a blind man up the foot path, arriving
to a safe haven at approximately 3:00 am.

It was very cold at the top of the mountain and many suffered. They had no food, water or blankets. Those who reached the top were forced to eat berries from nearby trees. The victims went without food for three days until help finally arrived. Blisters began to appear on everyone's body which varied in size based upon the individual's proximity to the explosions. Those nearer to impact point blistered and suffered more. Three days after the attack, ABU EUAD died as a result of exposure to the chemical weapons. ABU EUAD (NFI) was very close to the point of impact of one of the bombs. On the fifth day, ABU RAZKAR (NFI) died as well.

As a result of the attack, the victims were forcibly removed from their homes and forced to live in the mountains for a month without shelter. Animals died. Trees in the surrounding area lost their leaves. It was not until September, 1987, that villagers were able to return to Zewa Valley. The valley had experienced heavy rain fall, which [deleted] believed helped clear the valley of the chemical residue. Some victims were blind for 40 days. To this day, [deleted] still suffers from her exposure. [deleted] hands still shake, and she has breathing difficulties.

[deleted] stated that at one point, all the Kurdish parties had joined efforts in resisting Iraqi forces and were referred to as the United Front. Prior to the attack, the Parties were planning a large scale offensive against the Iraqis in the area. The plan developed over a period of time at large planning meetings. On the day of the attack, a planning meeting had been scheduled to take place with representatives from all of the Kurdish parties at the Iraqi Communist Party compound. It was known that the Peshmerga had been infiltrated by Iraqi spies or double agents. [deleted] believed the attack was meant to thwart the Kurdish offensive.

DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY AND FORCIBLE DEPORTATION

AL-MAJID read a copy of RCC Decree 160, dated March 29, 1987, which was written in Arabic and signed by HUSSEIN. AL-MAJID acknowledged that this decree had been issued and that granted him authority over all civilian, military and security agencies in the Northern region. He explained that a Decree is issued at the conclusion of an RCC meeting and details issues addressed by the RCC during the meeting. AL-MAJID stated that he received a written copy of Decree #160 at a later time. Immediately after the RCC issued the Decree, he also received
additional written instructions from the Presidential Diwan which further defined his authority. The Presidential Diwan's instructions restricted AL-MAJID's authority to villages in the Northern Region located within five kilometers of provinces and areas classified as cities, zones, or suburbs.

AL-MAJID denied however, having authority over the military forces or security services in the region as the security services were never subordinate to anyone in the government except HUSSEIN. The Security Services, Fadayeen Saddam and Saddam's Cubs, answered only to HUSSEIN and took their instructions only from HUSSEIN. Pursuant to the additional instructions, AL-MAJID claimed he only used the powers granted to him by the Decree for the "collectivization" of the villages within the defined parameters in the Northern Region. This "collectivization" consisted of moving Kurdish villagers from their homes to Iraqi Government housing complexes. Per the additional instructions, areas beyond five kilometers fell within the control of the military, including cities near the border between Iraq and Iran.

AL-MAJID stated that the Anfal Campaign in Kurdish territory in 1988 was conducted by the military under the command of SULTAN HASHEM AHMAD AL-TAI (hereinafter HASHEM). AL-MAJID admitted delegating orders to the Security Services as it pertained to areas within his control, but the Services acted independently everywhere else, to include their technical work.

During his interview, Presidential Diwan KHUDAIYER was asked if he ever drafted a follow-up to RCC Decree 160 which limited AL-MAJID's authority to within five kilometers around major cities of Northern Iraq. KHUDAIYER stated that he never published such a Decree. KHUDAIYER was asked whether it was possible that the limiting instruction could have been given verbally. KHUDAIYER stated that such an order which contradicts a Decree would be very big and written. The original RCC Decree 160 was sent to the Ministry of Interior, to governates and to a variety of receivers. The Chief of Staff, the Military Intelligence, the Party and the Security Services were all aligned under the details of RCC Decree 160. Therefore, if the original Decree were to be modified, written coordination would be the only way to notify all of these groups who were required to abide by the details of the original RCC Decree 160. To modify a Decree would require the same legal authority. Doing it verbally would not be lawfully feasible. If such an event occurred it would be, legally speaking, unprecedented according to KHUDAIYER.
KHUDAIEYR was asked what he thought about AL-MAJID's claim that he received the five kilometer limitation verbally. KHUDAIEYR said that this instruction would only be in a written format. If AL-MAJID said it was passed verbally, he was lying.

AL-MAJID admitted that he supervised the implementation of the Iraqi Government's plan to control the activities of the *Peshmergas* whom the government labeled saboteurs. AL-MAJID explained that "saboteurs" was the term Iraqis used in official documents to describe Kurds who resisted Iraq Government rule, and that TALABANI was the "Sheikh of the Saboteurs." AL-MAJID stated that because Iran continuously attempted to establish its presence and take control of areas like Halabja, the Iraqi Government devised a plan which created security zones along the northern Iraq-Iran border. Mere presence in these areas was prohibited. The residents of Kurdish farming villages within the targeted areas were forcefully relocated from their homes to government complexes known as *mujamma'at* in a process that became known as "village collectivization." AL-MAJID stated that it was difficult for the Iraq Government to distinguish Kurds from Iranians or good individuals from bad ones.

AL-MAJID denied knowledge of any executions of Kurds in Northern Iraq. AL-MAJID stated his duties included collectivization of Kurdish villagers within the specified five kilometer boundary into government housing complexes. According to AL-MAJID, villages outside the five kilometer radius were controlled by KHAZRAJI.

AL-MAJID stated that most Kurds did not want to move from or leave their homes. Those who did were seeking improvements such as electricity, refrigerators, and school teachers. If Kurds refused to be relocated, they were forced into vehicles and taken, along with their belongings, to government housing complexes. Once the villagers were deported, the villages were leveled to avoid becoming safe havens for saboteurs. AL-MAJID stated that was merely following HUSSEIN'S orders and that he did not develop this plan himself because its implementation cost millions of dinars and required the efforts of all the government's ministries. [AL-MAJID interview, March 21, 2004].

AL-MAJID's statements are inconsistent with known facts provided by former Iraqi regime members and seized Iraqi memorandums. These memorandum, detailed below, document AL-MAJID's use of the broad authority delegated to him by Hussein to commit crimes against humanity and genocide against the Kurdish
AL-MAJID isolated the Kurdish population by issuing decrees and administrative orders depriving them of basic rights. AL-MAJID signed an Iraqi Ba'ath Party letter dated April 6, 1987, #S Sh/18/2396, which ordered the confiscation of the “saboteurs” property:

By the authority vested in us by the RCC decree #160 of March 29, 1987, we decided to authorize the chairman of the security committees in the northern governorates to confiscate the real and personal property of the saboteurs, provided that the their properties are liquidated within one month of the date of issuance of the confiscation decree.

(This document is described in the HRW report titled, "Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds," dated July, 1993, and referenced on page 13 and in footnote 41 of the Prelude to Anfal section of the report.)

AL-MAJID was questioned regarding this letter and admitted giving this authority to the security committees, but did not remember the details. He stated that the confiscation discussed applied to money as well as real property. AL-MAJID stated the authority for this order was not based on RCC decree #160, but on a separate RCC decree authorizing confiscation of funds and property of individuals who worked against the Iraq Government as saboteurs, and the confiscation of funds and property of individuals in the Da'wa Party. These two categories of individuals were considered to be hostile or anti-Iraq Government political forces. AL-MAJID does not remember the number or date of the RCC decree he referenced. [AL-MAJID interview, April 4, 2004].

On April 10, 1987, RADHI HASSAN SALMAN (hereinafter SALMAN), Deputy Secretary of the Northern Bureau Command, suspended the legal rights of residents in villages within the prohibited-security zone. In Northen Bureau letter Number 1/2713, SALMAN wrote:

His excellency has ordered that [legal] cases of people from the villages prohibited for security reasons or cases of the saboteurs,
regardless of their nature not be heard, and
to freeze the cases that have already been
heard. [attached as document #XX]

When questioned regarding this document, AL-MAJID
stated, "I do not remember this." He added that all Northern
Bureau Command orders were issued by him and not by his Deputy.
AL-MAJID acknowledged SALMAN was the Deputy Secretary General of
the Northern Bureau Command but asserted that he would not have
tasked SALMAN with issuing such an order and SALMAN did not issue
it in AL-MAJID's absence. He stated that all legal cases are
matters for courts of law and not for security committees. AL-
MAJID acknowledged, however, that he issued similar instructions
to the courts in approximately June, 1987 when he directed the
courts not to hear cases and/or to postpone cases involving
individuals from prohibited zones. Villages in these zones were
cleared of people, their residences demolished, and the residents
relocated to government housing complexes. AL-MAJID reiterated
that such an order would have been issued only by him and would
have been logically directed to the courts and not to the
security committees. He added security services were not in
charge of the courts. When questioned about the authenticity of
the document and whether he thought it was a forgery, AL-MAJID
stated, "I do not know. Maybe." [AL-MAJID interview, April 4,
2004].

The government's plan to eliminate the Kurds is further
corroborated in letter Number 28/573 to the Command of the Iraqi
Fifth Corps, dated April 13, 1987, classified "Top Secret and
Confidential," and written by the Special National Defense Forces
General Staff, a pro-regime Kurdish militia. This document is
referred to on page 4 and in footnote 14 of the HRW report dated
July, 1993, "Prelude to Anfal" section. The letter appeared to
be in response to a verbal order from the Fifth Corps Commander
and detailed the "final obligations in winding up {illegible}
procedures for the termination of sabotage in the Northern
Region, [and] the manner and the priorities of implementing the
evacuation and demolition of the security-prohibited villages." [attached as document #XX].

On May 14, 1987, AL-MAJID issued letter Number 106309
regarding the execution of first-degree relatives of "saboteurs." This document is referenced on pages 13-14 of the HRW report
dated July, 1993, "Prelude to Anfal" section. A handwritten note
dated November 20, 1989, from the Security Chief, Interrogating
Officer, Ann Office in Suleimaniyeh, refers to AL-MAJID's letter
Number 106309. The document is referenced on page 13 of the HRW
report dated July, 1993, "Prelude to Anfal" section. The note provides details about an Iraqi citizen who petitioned for information about his missing parents and brother. It states the brother was executed July 12, 1987, as "a member of the group of Iranian saboteurs." The note further explains that the parents were executed May 19, 1987:

in compliance with the order from the Struggling Comrade ALI HASAN AL-MAJID, member of the Regional Command that was relayed to us by letter number 106309 of the Security Directorate of the Autonomous Region, marked 'Secret and to be Opened Personally,' and dated May 1, 1987, regarding the liquidation of first-degree relatives of criminals. [attached as document #xx].

A hand-written communication, Number 3324, dated May 14, 1987, from the Security Director of the City of Halabja to Amn Sulaimaniyah regarding the execution of wounded civilians referenced cable Number 945 from the Command of the Fifth Army Corps and dated the previous day. Number 3324 stated, in pertinent part:

The Commander of the First Army Corps issued an order as requested by Comrade ALI HASAN AL-MAJID to execute the wounded civilians after the Party Organization, the Security and Police Departments and the Intelligence Center have confirmed their hostility toward the authorities; to use earth movers and bulldozers to raze the neighborhood of Kani Ashqan. [Attached as document #XX].

According to HRW/Middle East Watch (MSW) interview of a former resident, as documented in footnote 44, "Prelude to Anfal" section, this action and the reported destruction of some 1,500 homes was punishment for an anti-government demonstration.

AL-MAJID issued two significant and brutal directives that detailed the regime's intentions regarding the Kurds. AL-MAJID personally signed the first directive, Number 28/3650, dated 06/03/1987, was issued to the Commanders of the First, Second, and Fifth Army Corps, the Security Directorate of the Autonomous Region, the DMI, and the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS). The directive detailed the protocols for prohibited areas and included orders to kill all humans and animals. Paragraph
one states:

It is totally prohibited for any foodstuffs or persons or machinery to reach the villages that have been prohibited for security reasons that are included in the second stage of collecting the villages. Anyone who so desires is permitted to return to the national ranks. It is not allowed for relatives to contact them except with the knowledge of the security agencies. [attached as document #XX].

This directive was repeated word for word in communications between receiving entities and lower level units as, for example, in letter Number 4754, dated June 8, 1987, from Amn Erbil to all its departments and local offices. Letter Number 4754 is referenced on page 15 of the HRW report dated July, 1993, "Prelude to Anfal" section.

AL-MAJID examined a copy of the letter written in Arabic. AL-MAJID admitted such an order was issued and sent to the referenced agencies and the military. AL-MAJID acknowledged the authenticity of the copy of this document and confirmed the authenticity of his signature on the last page. [AL-MAJID interview, March 21, 2004].

The second and most significant directive AL-MAJID issued was SP/4008 on June 20, 1987. The directive was issued by the Northern Bureau Command, signed by AL-MAJID, and stamped with the seal of the RCC’s Northern Affairs Committee. The directive was conveyed to the First, Second, and Fifth Corps Command and provided procedures on how to deal with prohibited villages. The directive stated:

In view of the fact that the officially announced deadline for the amalgamation of these villages expires June 21, 1987, we have decided that the following action should taken with effect from June 22, 1987:

1. All the villages in which subversives, agents of Iran and similar traitors to Iraq are still to be found shall be regarded as out of bounds for security reasons;
2. They shall be regarded as operational zones that are strictly out of bounds to all persons and animals and in which the troops
can open fire at will, without any restrictions, unless otherwise instructed by our bureau;
3. Travel to and from these zones, as well as agricultural, animal husbandry, and industrial activities shall be prohibited and carefully monitored by all the competent agencies within their respective fields of jurisdiction;
4. The corps commanders shall carry out random bombardments using artillery, helicopters, and aircraft at all times of the day or night in order to kill the largest number of persons present in those prohibited zones, keeping us informed of the results;
5. All persons captured in those villages shall be detained and interrogated by the security services and those between the ages of 15 and 70 shall be executed after any useful information has been obtained from them, of which we should be duly notified;
6. Those who surrender to the governmental or Party authorities shall be interrogated by the competent agencies for maximum period of three days, which may be extended to ten days if necessary, provided that we are notified of such cases. If the interrogation requires a longer period of time, approval must be obtained from us by telephone or telegraph or through comrade TAHER AL-ANI;
7. Everything seized by the advisers and troops of the National Defense Battalions shall be retained by them, with the exception of heavy, mounted and medium weapons. They can keep the light weapons, notifying us only of the number of these weapons. The Corps commanders shall promptly bring this to the attention of all the advisors, company commanders and platoon leaders, and shall provide us with detailed information concerning their activities in the National Defense Battalions. [attached as document #XX].

AL-MAJID examined a copy of this document written in Arabic. AL-MAJID admitted issuing the order listed as item two. According to AL-MAJID, everyone, civilian and military, knew that
no one was allowed in those areas as it was a theater of operations. Anyone caught in those areas, including women and children, was to be killed. AL-MAJID denied issuing the orders listed as items four and five. AL-MAJID acknowledged the authenticity of the copy of this document and confirmed the authenticity of his signature on the last page. [AL-MAJID interview, March 21, 2004].

When questioned about his orders to execute first-degree relatives of saboteurs and wounded civilians, AL-MAJID stated he did not issue an order to execute first-degree relatives of saboteurs. He admitted, however, that in July/August 1987 he did order the "deportation" of first-degree relatives of saboteurs from prohibited areas. AL-MAJID issued this order to ensure the security of the cities. He was responsible for the security of the cities and areas within five kilometers of the cities. First-degree relatives included only the fathers of saboteurs. It did not include the female relatives such as an individual's mother, sister, or daughter.

AL-MAJID reiterated that prohibited areas were those regions from which the Iraq Government had removed the citizens and relocated them to government housing complexes. The order regarding deportation of first-degree relatives was intended to force fathers to control the actions of their sons. After the "gathering of people" into Iraq Government housing complexes, AL-MAJID stated that any acts of sabotage against the government would result in implementation of this order. AL-MAJID wanted the consequences of the actions of the sons who were saboteurs to be a "pressuring factor" on their fathers. AL-MAJID ordered only first-degree relatives be deported from prohibited areas so that the security committees did not expand the order to include other relatives. He acknowledged other relatives, including mothers, sisters, and daughters, could have elected to join relatives who had been ordered "deported" from prohibited areas.

AL-MAJID admitted that Directive 4008 which he issued effective June 22, 1987, was still in effect at the time of his issuance of the order regarding first-degree relatives. AL-MAJID reiterated that anyone caught in the prohibited areas after June 22, 1987, including women and children, was to be killed. Directive 4008 was modified in September, 1987 to allow farming in certain areas. When questioned whether deportation of first-degree relatives to prohibited areas was tantamount to sentencing them to death because of Directive 4008, AL-MAJID stated, "Why would we deport them to a prohibited area [so that they would be killed] when we could kill them?" When the interviewer suggested
that perhaps this procedure was meant to minimize the "blood on the hands" of AL-MAJID and others, AL-MAJID offered no reply.

AL-MAJID noted saboteurs and first-degree relatives were given one month to decide whether they wanted to stay or leave. If they decided to remain in government housing complexes, they were required to pledge not to commit acts of sabotage against the Iraq Government. [al-MAJID interview, April 4, 2004].

AMN repeatedly referred to this Directive 4008 throughout 1988. For example, a letter from Amn Suleimaniyeh, dated October 29, 1988, referenced the directive as the basis for "the execution of 19 accused, executed by this directorate because of their presence in the security-prohibited villages." This document is referenced on page 15 of the HRW report dated July, 1993, "Prelude to Anfal" section, and pages 1-2 of "The Camps" section.

The Iraq Government's plan is further corroborated by AL-MAJID's own words as he discussed the Iraq Government's campaigns in the Northern Region in 1987 and 1988. On April 15, 1988, AL-MAJID attended a meeting with members of the Northern Bureau and governors of the Autonomous Region of Iraqi Kurdistan during which he discussed Kurdish territory and prohibited areas. According to audiotapes of that meeting, AL-MAJID stated, in pertinent part:

I will prohibit large areas; I will prohibit any presence in them. ...Now you can't go from Kirkuk to Erbil any more without an armored vehicle. All of this basin, from Koysinjaq to here (Kirkuk) ...I'm going to evacuate it. I will evacuate it as far as Gweir and Mosul. No human beings except on the main roads. For five years, I won't allow any human existence there. ...If we don't act in this way, the saboteurs' activities will never end, not for a million years. ...In the summer, nothing will be left. [reference audiotape #xx].

On July 22, 1987, TAHER AL-ANI (hereinafter AL-ANI), Secretary of the Northern Affairs Committee, sent letter Number 5083 to the First Corps Headquarters, entitled, "Executing Criminals." The letter stated:
The struggler comrade ALI HASAN AL-MAJID, the head of the Northern Bureau, commented regarding your mentioned letter. We have no objection to the cutting of the heads of the traitors, but it would be better to send them to Amn for interrogation, as they may have useful information prior to their execution. [attached as document #XX]

On September 8, 1987, the DMI submitted a report Number M1/Sh3/Q2/19330 to the Northern Bureau Headquarters summarizing current Kurdish activity. The report stated:

1. At 1600 hours, on September 3, 1987, centralized artillery strikes (using special ammunition) had been launched against three sites of the Iranian Agents along the Dokan-Beera Macrcoon line, which included the site where the criminal JALAL TALABANI would be located. Their casualties were two killed and 12 injured from their leadership, in addition to a number of their saboteurs killed and wounded, and residents of the neighboring villages of the above mentioned sites.

4. Commentary: After the air strikes (with special ammunition) launched against the Iranian Agents’ sites in April 1987, the mentioned group’s headquarters received a number of chemical protective equipment from the Iranian regime, in addition to the issue of a special booklet by mentioned group. [attached as document #XX]

The report was signed by SABIR AL-DURI, Director of the DMI, and copies were forwarded to the Presidential Secretary for HUSSEIN, the headquarters of the Chief of Staff of the Army, the RCC Northern Affairs Committee, Armed Forces Headquarters, and the Ministry of Defense Diwan.

The April, 1987 air strikes referred to in the above-mentioned DMI report are very likely the April 15, 1987 strikes against the villages of Bergalu and Sargalou, and the April 16, 1987 strikes against Sheikh Wasan and Balisan.

A cable, reference number 4350, dated September 7, 1987, from the Northern Bureau to all regional security committees memorialized the details and instructions regarding the national census that were issued during a September 6, 1987 meeting of senior Ba'ath Party officials which AL-MAJID chaired. A second version of this document is letter Number 2/237, dated
September 19, 1987, from Shaqlawa District Security Committee to a number of local party and police agencies. These documents are referenced in footnote 51 of the HRW report dated July, 1993, "Prelude to Anfal" section. At the meeting, preparations for the national census were discussed. "Subversives who repent" were to be allowed to return to the fold right up to the day of the census. No returnees would be accepted after October 17, 1987, however, "even if they surrender their weapons." Furthermore, family members of "unrepentant saboteurs" could not remain in government-controlled areas and were to be physically removed and forced to join "saboteur kin" in prohibited areas. Upon completion of an AL-MAJID ordered inventory of cases, "the families in question should be expelled to the regions where their subversive relatives are, with the sole exception of males aged between 12 and 50 inclusive, who should be detained." One of the documents list the ages as 17 to 50.

According to pages 18-19 of the HRW report dated July, 1993, "Prelude to Anfal" Section, the Northern Bureau ordered mass seminars and meetings to discuss the importance of the census scheduled for October 17, 1987. Those who failed to participate in the census without a valid excuse would lose their Iraqi citizenship and would be regarded as army deserters, and as such, subject to RCC decree #677, dated August 26, 1987. Additionally, those not participating in the census were no longer eligible for government services and food rations as they would no longer be considered Iraqis. With respect to identifying ethnicity in the census, individuals could only choose one of two options, Arab or Kurd. Furthermore, people could only be counted if they made themselves available to the census takers. For anyone living in a prohibited area, this meant abandoning their home and registering and living as a resident of a government-controlled town or mujama'a.


HRW described the letter, issued the day after the census, as a stern memo to all security committees in Kurdistan, reminding them that aerial inspection would ensure that Directive 4008 of June 20, 1987, was being carried out "to the letter." Any committee that failed to comply would "bear full
responsibility before the Comrade Bureau Chief." AL-MAJID signed this letter.

On January 3, 1988, RCC Decree Number 10, signed by HUSSEIN, modified some aspects of RCC Decree 677 but retained the following paragraphs:

Paragraph one: The Party organizations shall carefully examine the situation of military deserters and draft dodgers who are captured. Paragraph two: The death sentence shall be carried out by the Party organization, after that examination, on every deserter or draft dodger who is captured if the duration of his desertion or draft evasion exceeds one year or if he had committed the crime of desertion more than once. [attached as document #XX].

On November 22, 1988, Directive 4008 was again reinforced, this time in report Number Sh.2/17983, by (name illegible), Deputy Brigadier-General of Security, Director of Security of Erbil Governate, and addressed to the Directors of Security Branches. The report reminded the Security Branches that Northern Bureau Directive SF/4008 was still in effect:

In accordance with the directives of senior authorities, it has been decided to apply Paragraph 5 of the message of Northern Bureau Command, reference 4008 of June 20, 1987, to anyone present in the prohibited 'no-man's land' areas (muharram) and the areas banned for security reasons (mahdour), without exception. Please be informed, take the necessary measures, and carry out. Let us know. [Attached as document #XX].

Muharram referred to the border zones cleared of all population in the late 1970s and denotes the empty land between two warring forces. Mahdour refers to the vast areas demarcated during the 1980s where all human presence was prohibited.

AL-MAJID, during a meeting with the Northern Bureau, summarized his actions in the Northern Region. The undated tape was is in a batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989. AL-MAJID stated, in part:

If you remember, when I was placed in charge
of the Northern Bureau, I was also tasked with additional responsibilities--administration, the relevant special services, the security and intelligence ones, the Army, and the civilian wing of the Party, and the military wing of the Party. These were my responsibilities, that's all. So, I was to work as I wished. Therefore, we started making our own decisions, and in some instances, even in violation of the Leadership's instructions. But Comrades, this was three months ago...
When we made the decision to destroy and collectivize the villages and draw a dividing line [i.e., the so-called "red line"] between us and the saboteurs, the first one to express his doubts to me and before the President was TAL'I'A AL-DURI. The first one who alarmed me was TAL'I'A AL-DURI. To this day, the impact of TAL'I'A is evident. He didn't destroy all the villages that I asked him to at that time. And this is the longest-standing member of the Ba'ath Party. What about the other people then? How were we to convince them to solve the Kurdish problem and slaughter the saboteurs?

So we started to show these senior commanders on TV that [the saboteurs] had surrendered. Am I supposed to keep them in good shape? What am I supposed to do with them, these [people]. Then a message reaches me from that great man, the father [SADDAM HUSSEIN], saying take good care of the families of the saboteurs and this and that. The general command brings it to me. I put his message to my head. But take good care of them? No, I will bury them with bulldozers....

Interviewers played AL-MAJID a portion of this audictape. AL-MAJID acknowledged that the tape contains his words and his voice. He admitted that he ordered the destruction of homes within the prohibited zones after the residents were removed. AL-MAJID admitted that he held a separate meeting and instructed those under his command that no house was to remain standing within the prohibited zones. AL-MAJID also admitted that he told his subordinates that he would tour the prohibited
zones and if his orders were not carried out completely, he would hold the section commander responsible. [AL-MAJID interview, March 21, 2004].

AL-MAJID also admitted that the second segment of the tape, from approximately 9:55 to 16:06, was his voice and his words. AL-MAJID stated he believed this meeting took place in April, 1987, rather than in 1988. AL-MAJID stated that those present included the Governors and Ba'ath Party Secretary Generals of each province of the Autonomous Region of Iraqi Kurdistan. These provinces included Erbil, Dohuk, Suleimaniyeh, Kirkuk, and Mosul.

AL-MAJID stated that in the audiotape he is speaking about the "gathering of villages" in the northern Kurdish region of Iraq. In the audiotape, he explains the difficulty with moving safely between cities in the north and the numbers of "martyrs" who suffered at the hands of saboteurs. AL-MAJID encouraged those present to "speed up the process" of gathering or collectivizing the villages in the north.

An audiotape segment from approximately 3:28 to 4:25 was played for AL-MAJID and contained the following:

If you remember, when I was placed in charge of the Northern Bureau, I was also tasked with additional responsibilities [including] administration, the relevant Special Services, the Security and Intelligence ones, and the Army, and the civilian wing of the Party, and the military wing of the Party. These were my responsibilities, that's all. So, I was to work as I wished. Therefore, we started making our own decisions and in some instances, even in violation of the Leadership's instructions. But Comrades, this was three months ago.

AL-MAJID acknowledged the recording was his voice and his words and identified the content as a meeting held by AL-MAJID with KHAZRAJI, KAMIL SAJID (hereinafter SAJID), the Army First Corps Commander, HASHEM, the Commander of the Anfal Operation, TAL'I'A AL-DURI, outgoing Army Fifth Corps Commander, YUNIS ZAREB, incoming Army Fifth Corps Commander, and the Secretary Generals of the Ba'ath Party Sections. AL-MAJID believes this meeting took place in late 1988 or early 1989.
AL-MAJID stated despite the impression given on the audiotape that he was the official in charge of the meeting and in charge of the military, he was only responsible for the cities and "what was in between the cities." Specifically, AL-MAJID stated he was in charge of the "security of the cities" and the "security committees of the cities" during the period he served as Secretary General of the Northern Bureau Command. He added that he "had nothing to do with Iranian intelligence." AL-MAJID reiterated he was only in charge of cities and roads connecting cities in Northern Iraq. The Iraqi military was in charge of all other territory within that portion of the country. Within cities, AL-MAJID commanded military forces, intelligence services, security services, and all other government agencies. AL-MAJID stated he was in charge of the cities of Suleimaniyeh, Bazyan, Chamchamal, Koysanjak, Al-Rabie, Kirkuk, Alton Kopri, Erbil, Shaqlawa, Hareer, Zakho, and Khabat. He added that he was in charge of the provinces of Dokan, Mosul (except Aqra), and Kirkuk (except Qader Karam).

AL-MAJID again acknowledged his voice and his words on a segment of the same audiotape beginning approximately at 8:25 and concluding approximately at 9:28. AL-MAJID confirmed the tape was recorded at the same meeting with KHAZRAJI. AL-MAJID explained he met with KHAZRAJI because "he had work" and "I had work." AL-MAJID remembers complaining to KHAZRAJI during this meeting about the delay by the military in leveling villages where residents had already been removed. According to AL-MAJID, the village buildings needed to be removed as they often served as sanctuaries for saboteurs. He added that after removal or "deportation" of villagers, the army was responsible for removing "what was left."

AL-MAJID acknowledged criticizing TAL'I'A AL-DURI, for failing to destroy the villages in a timely manner. AL-MAJID's complaint placed the responsibility for handling this matter upon KHAZRAJI. AL-MAJID stated this audiotape shows he was not in charge of military forces in Northern Iraq during this period. If he had been in charge, AL-MAJID would have removed AL-DURI and not just complained to KHAZRAJI. [AL-MAJID interview, April 4, 2004].

ANFAL CAMPAIGN (1988)

Anfal is the term used by the Iraq Government to describe its military campaign against the Kurds. Anfal, meaning "spoils," refer to the first battle in 624 A.D. between Muslims and non-Muslims. The Anfal campaign had eight stages of which
the first seven were directed at the PUK's territory and the last at KDP's territory.

The first Anfal targeted PUK strongholds Bergalou and Sergalou from February 23, 1988, to March 19, 1988. The second Anfal targeted the Qara Dagh region from March 22, 1988, to April 1, 1988. The third Anfal targeted the hilly plain known as Germain from April 7, 1988, to April 20, 1988. The fourth Anfal targeted the Valley of Lesser Zab River from May 3, 1988, to May 8, 1988. The fifth Anfal targeted the mountainous region Northeast of Erbil from May 15, 1988 until operations halted on June 7, 1988. Operations were re-initiated as the sixth and seventh Anfals in July and August 1988, respectively. On August 26, 1988, the PUK controlled area was declared clean of saboteurs. The final Anfal targeted the Badinan area and began on August 25, 1988. On September 6, 1988, the Iraq Government declared victory by declaring general amnesty for all Kurds.

**Anfal 1**

SULTAN HASHEM, who at the time was the 1st Corp Commander, advised the mission of the Anfal Campaign was to remove the Kurdish population from the Northern area of Iraq, and either destroy them or make them flee to Iran. HASHEM commanded three Army Divisions and 100 Battalions in the First Anfal Campaign which consisted of approximately 80,000 soldiers. With the number of military personnel under his leadership and weaponry at his disposal, HASHEM expected to overpower and defeat the Kurdish resistance.

HASHEM utilized artillery, armor, infantry, and helicopters during the First Anfal, which took place from March 1, 1988, until approximately March 20-21, 1988. HASHEM did not have direct operational control over other air assets (Air Force), but could request those resources when needed. There were nine different avenues of attack utilized in the First Anfal which were designed to allow for the Kurds to flee across the border to Iran. (HASHEM interview, June 1, 2004).

**Anfal 3**

(hereinafter age 12 at the time, resided in the village of Kulaio (Southern Germain) with his father, his mother, and his three younger sisters (eleven), (ten), and (nine). One morning in April, 1988, Iraqi Special Forces and Jahsh surrounded his village. The villagers were told they
were being taken to the city where they would then live. The villagers were loaded into carts pulled by the villagers' own tractors, and were driven away. When the caravan got to the city, they continued to drive through to a fort in Qoratu where they were detained for ten days with very little food and water. People died from starvation, and women were raped and killed. During their detention at Qoratu, observed Iraqi officials from military, Military Intelligence (Istikhbarat), and Directorate of General Security (Amn AL-'Am).

From Qoratu they were taken in large trucks with no windows to the Army Camp at Topzawa. At this point, the men were separated from the women and children and were housed in another building. could see the building where his father was kept, but never saw his father again. They stayed in the camp in Topzawa for approximately thirty days.

While at the camp in Topzawa, stated that the guards teased the children with food. The guards placed food at a distance and told the children that whomever ran the fastest and got to the food first could eat it. When the children ran to the food, the guards kicked it over and spill it.

One early morning, thirty large, windowless trucks arrived at the camp. and the others were herded onto the trucks and rode all day with no food and very little water. stated that three children on his truck between the ages of approximately six and seven died during the ride. Also on the truck was a woman who went into labor. She was foaming at the mouth from dehydration and was able to sneak her a small bit of water that was meant for him.

When the trucks stopped, everyone got out and was given some water. Their hands were then tied behind their backs and they were blindfolded. They were then forced back into the trucks. was able to get his hands untied and removed his blindfold once he was in the truck.

When the trucks stopped for what turned out to be the last time, the back doors were opened. saw pits which had been dug into the ground. The dirt that was removed to make the pits was piled behind each pit. Standing by each pit were two soldiers, each of whom wore camouflage uniforms and red berets and was armed with AK-47s. There were as many pits as there were trucks. and the others were forced out of their truck and fell into a pit where they laid, tired and starving. No one was screaming or fighting which led
to believe that the water they had previously been given had been drugged. Once they were all in the pits, the soldiers started shooting them. _______ looked around and that saw the woman who had gone into labor while on the truck riddled with bullets in her head and stomach. _______ stated that her brains were coming out of her head, and that her stomach was torn apart by the bullets and he could see the unborn baby.

_______ was shot in his left shoulder. At this point, he ran toward the soldier who shot him, grabbed him by the legs, and pleaded with him in Kurdish. _______ could tell by the look in the soldier's eyes that he did not want to be doing what he had been ordered to do. The other soldier became angry and yelled in Arabic. The angry soldier then threw _______ back into the pit and began shooting again hitting _______ in his lower back on his right side. At that point, _______ played dead.

The shooting finally stopped and the soldiers gathered together and talked in Arabic. _______ saw bulldozers beginning to cover up the holes. _______ was in the pit furthest from the bulldozers and decided to escape. _______ saw a young girl who had not been hit by a single bullet and he told her they needed to escape. She told _______ that she was scared of the soldiers and that she would not leave.

_______ crawled out of the pit and laid on the pile of dirt next to it. He made a space for himself so that his outline could not be seen by the Toyota Landcruisers that were patrolling the area with their headlights looking for survivors and shooting them. _______ moved from one dirt pile to the next until he eventually passed out. By the time he awoke, everyone had been buried. _______ walked for several hours and encountered a group of dogs which began barking. The dogs surrounded him and barked until their owner came outside. The man spoke Arabic and _______ was unable to understand him; however, the man took _______ in and gave him food and water. _______ stayed with this man for a night or two, but was then moved to town in order to get medical attention for his wounds. _______ was taken in by an Iraqi family and stayed with them for nearly two years before being reunited with an uncle.

_______ [Interview, March 8, 2005].

The following seized documents and statements detail some of the Iraqi Government's actions during the Anfal campaign. According to AZIZ and AL-DURI, only HUSSEIN could authorize the use of chemical weapons. As previously demonstrated, HUSSEIN
either personally authorized or delegated the power to authorize
the use of chemical weapons.

The April, 1988, monthly report for the Northern
Region, Number 9879, dated May 18, 1988, from Brigadier General
(signature illegible), Deputy Director, General DMI to the
Subdirector of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector,
referenced special strikes and "special ammunition." Paragraph c
of the report states,

After the special strikes against the
villages where the headquarters and bases of
the agents were, their organization
distributed a quantity of medical supplies
against chemical strikes (injections and
pills) among the inhabitants of those
villages as well as neighboring villages.
[attached as document #XX]

The report also provided a number of reasons for the
defeat of the agents and/or saboteurs by Iraqi forces including
"the intensity of the artillery bombardment by our forces and the
use of 'special ammunition' led to heavy losses among them."

On April 26, 1988, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) issued
letter Number D/A/51 to the Army Chief of Staff Headquarters
entitled, "Procedure." The letter, by Staff Navy General ABED
MOHAMMAD ABDULLAH (hereinafter ABDULLAH), the Secretary General
of the MoD, noted:

The Deputy to the General Commander Minister of
Defense has read the DMI letter, marked Secret, personal and
Immediate, #8368, dated April 23, 1988, and commented as
follows:

1. To create more of a psychological impact
than what has been established, no objection
regarding directing special ammunition
strikes if there is a target which deserves
punishment.
2. It is requested that operations be
renewed, and I believe it is being discussed
now with Comrade ALI HASAN, today April 26,
1988. [attached as document #XX]

On May 12, 1988, the DMI submitted report Number
M5/Sh3/Q2/9540 to the Army Chief of Staff Headquarters
summarizing the results of Anfal operations from February 26, 1988, to May 10, 1988. The report detailed casualties sustained by the sabotage groups, and identified the Iranian agent group, PUK, as sustaining the heaviest casualties because operations were focused in their territories. According to the report, an estimated 1,200 agents were killed or wounded. That estimate included casualties resulting from Special Strikes. The report also listed sites and bases of the sabotage groups, infiltration routes of the sabotage groups within their territories, and results of a meeting between representatives of the sabotage groups in which they agreed to integrate their offices. The report was signed by AL-DURI. [attached as document #XX].

On May 15, 1998, HUSSEIN responded to the DMI via Office of the President report #9540 which stated, "It is necessary to keep momentum and chasing them, and not allowing them to reorganize themselves." [attached as document #XX] The report was addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Army, and signed by Presidential Secretary AL-HUMMADI. Copies were forwarded to the MoD, the Northern Bureau Headquarters, and the DMI.

The DMI began to document measures the Peshmergas took to defend against chemical weapons strikes. These Iraqi reports not only confirm Iraqi's use of chemical weapons, but also document the measures the Iraqi military took to increase the effectiveness of its chemical weapons strikes.

On March 7, 1988, the DMI submitted letter #M5/Sh3/Q2/4797 to the Special Security Organization (SSO) which noted the instructions Iranian agents' leadership gave to "saboteurs" when exposed to chemical weapons. [attached as document #XX]

On April 28, 1988, the Presidential Secretary forwarded a memo from the Military Industrialization Institution (MII) to the DMI regarding the Peshmerga's activities, and requesting the DMI's opinion on the subject. The MII had obtained the following information on the net of the 21st Turkish Border Brigade:

2. The Iraqi military units will attack the site of the First Branch in the next two or three coming days with chemical weapons.
3. Peshmerga members are attempting to move closer to Iraqi military units in the zone, to protect themselves against chemical attacks. [attached as document #XX]
On April 30, 1988, the DMI submitted a response #M5/Sh3/Q2/8859 to the Presidential Secretary for presentation to HUSSEIN which stated:

1. After Anfal operations carried out by our troops to (traditionally) strike the sites and bases of the sabotage groups, and special injury the site and bases, the majority of the sabotage groups in the Northern zone became aware of these operations, and were expecting our troops to carry out similar operations.

2. The sites and bases of the first branch of the Descendants of Treason - BARZANI Group - who exist on the Iraqi border zone, are highly aware of being struck by our troops (including the Patriotic Defense Regiments) with special ammunition as in the Anfal operations. They have taken some procedures to deal with that, and they have evacuated part of the site and some of their bases near the Turkish territories. We are not sure yet if the saboteurs have moved closer to our units in the mentioned zone. [attached as document #XX]

Anfal 5

On May 22, 1988, the Secretary General for the MoD submitted letter #D/A/51/8 entitled, "Results of Anfal Operation" to Army Chief of Staff Headquarters. The letter contained comments of the Deputy to the Minister of Defense based on a letter from HUSSEIN:

1. After ending the operations in the Suran sector, operations should be carried on with momentum in the Bahdina sector.

2. It is useful to gather intelligence on the locations of the saboteurs there, and special strikes should precede our wide action. Please take the necessary procedures. [attached as document #XX]

On May 22, 1988, the Senior Secretary to the Army Chief of Staff, Staff General NABIL ABDULKADER HUSSEIN (hereinafter NABIL HUSSEIN), submitted memo #R A G/30/6545 to the MoD Diwan
entitled, "Anfal 5 Operation." The letter stated:

b. Strikes with special ammunition were launched on May 15, 1988, against sabotage groups in the Fifth Corps sector....
2. Operations of chasing and destroying sabotage groups are continuing in the First Corps and Fifth Corps sectors according to the plans prepared for this purpose (Operation Anfal), and Anfal 5 operation will be carried out in the Fifth Corps sector in the following phase. [attached as document #XX]

On June 2, 1988, the Northen office of the DMI submitted report #Sh3/Q3/1041 to the DMI (Sh3) entitled, "Fifth Anfal Operation." The report included the following:

2. The Iranian agents and other sabotage groups have made use of lessons learned from previous battles with our troops during operations in the First Corps’ sector (Anfal 1,2,3,4), and they had the time to enable them to take the following procedure:
e. Completing distribution of chemical protective masks, individual decontamination equipment, and training on the use of the equipment. [attached as document #XX]

On June 10, 1988, the DMI submitted report #M5/Sh3/Q2/11325 entitled, "Anfal Operation" to the Army Chief of Staff Headquarters. The report noted initiation of the fifth Anfal in which Iraq troops were to hit and destroy sabotage groups' sites and bases in the Fifth Corps’ sector. The report also included the following casualty summaries:

a. (58) killed, (72) injured from the saboteurs and their families as a result of special strikes.
b. (42) killed and a number of wounded as a result of our troops' activities. [attached as document #XX]

The report was signed by AL-DURI and copies were forwarded to the Presidential Secretary for HUSSEIN, the MoD Diwan, the Northen Bureau Headquarters, Secretary General of the Armed Forces Headquarters, Operations Department, and the Fifth
Corps Headquarters.

On June 11, 1988, HUSSEIN responded to the DMI report via letter #K/2305 from the Office of the President:

Under no circumstance, we must not permit the saboteurs to regain their morale, therefore striking them in sector 45 is imperative. Do the necessary. [attached as document #XX]

The letter was signed by Presidential Secretary, AL-HUMMADI, and copies were sent to the MoD Diwan and the DMI. As previously documented in this report, AL-HUMMADI prepared letters that contained HUSSEIN’s orders.

A cover letter and excerpt of a quarterly report dated June 27, 1988, from Captain KIFAH ALI HASSAN, Director of the Intelligence Center of Kalar, to the Subdirectorate of the DMI, Eastern Sector, gave details of a chemical attack against the Kurds. It stated, in part,

During the month of March 1988, our aircraft bombed the headquarters of the sabotage bands in the villages of Saywan and Balakajar in a chemical strike. This resulted in the death of 50 saboteurs and the wounding of 20 other saboteurs. [attached as document #XX]

HRW/MEW interviews indicate that the referenced attack occurred on March 22, 1988. Local inhabitants stated casualties ranging from 78 to 87 were almost all civilian. The rebel bases were located outside of the two villages mentioned in the report. Saywan is referred to as Sayw Senan by the Kurds.

On July 10, 1988, MoD sent letter D/A/51/1/14179, entitled, "Sabotage Groups in Balisan Basin and Alsamaqoleyyat area" to the Army Chief of Staff. The letter, based on DMI report #13081 dated July 7, 1988, stated:

1. It is necessary to exhaust them with aerial weapons and anti-personnel weapons prior to starting the mission.
2. Hold the area, prevent cooperation and supplies to and from the area.
3. Special ammunition might be needed if there is a collection of saboteurs. [attached as document #XX]
On July 12, 1988, Army Chief of Staff Headquarters forward the above-described instructions to the Fifth Corps Headquarters via letter RAG/22/804 and advised them to take the necessary procedure. [attached as document #XX]

Declassified satellite imagery from the Anfal period, listed as evidence in support of this Prosecutive Report, illustrate impact craters, the use of multiple rocket launchers and towed artillery, as well as the complete razing of Kurdish villages.

Final Anfal

Report #16093, dated December 13, 1988, from Branch 3, Section 1, Qadissiyat Saddam (operational name for the Iran-Iraq War) to the General DMI, Branch 3, provided Iraqi source information and made direct reference to chemical attacks conducted by Iraqi forces in Badinan during the Final Anfal from August 25, 1988, to September 6, 1988. The document stated, in pertinent part:

...six British journalists arrived in the triangular border region of Iran, Iraq and Turkey to see the saboteurs who had come from the above sector via Turkish territory and interview them about the chemical strike undertaken by our forces. [attached as document #XX]

Badinan, the traditional mountainous heartland of MULLAH BARZANI and his sons, is located in the Dohuk Governate along the Iraq-Turkey border. KDP Headquarters was located at Zewa Shkan, an abandoned village on the border. Brigadier General ZAREB commanded the Iraqi Fifth Corps which battled against the KDP in the Badinan region.

In 1985, the family of [hereinafter blank] was arrested by the Iraqi government and deported from Ba'shiga to a make-shift house in Maran (near Sosya), Kurdistan. All of his family's possessions were seized and sold, and his family was forced to leave with nothing more than the clothes on their backs.

A family was just one of several families deported and relocated by the Iraqi Government. The reasons for the deportations varied; members of their family may have been
military deserters or, as with family, they were related to members of the political opposition. Although the Iraqi Government's intention was to force those who opposed the regime (like family) to surrender, the relocations failed to produce the desired effect. Instead of succumbing to the pressure, family and others adapted to their surrounding and simply started over.

Other members of family were also relocated. Between 1985 and 1987, mother, his sister-in-law and her children, and finally his sister were all deported. sister was deported because she was accused of providing assistance to the Peshmerga by working as a seamstress.

On August 18, 1988, immediately after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi government began massing its forces in Badinan. In the following days, word spread from the surrounding villages that the Iraqi army was on the move.

On August 23, 1988, Iraqi forces attacked Avoke, a small village on the south side of Gara Mountain near Spindar, with chemical weapons. and his family were in Maraneh, about three or four kilometers east of Avoke. As Maraneh was situated at a higher elevation than Avoke, witnessed the Iraqi planes attack Avoke first-hand. He saw the bombs fall and the smoke rise from the explosions. Although initially black, the smoke dissipated into white and yellow tints as it rose.

heard from people who returned from Avoke shortly after the attacks that the Iraqi forces had used chemical weapons. Although most of the residents had fled to caves prior to the attack, the chemical gas killed two villagers and affected nearly everyone. Some had difficulty breathing and most had blisters on their faces, arms, and genital areas. The gas attack also killed some sheep and wild turkeys in the area. Even the landscape was affected. Everything appeared as if it had been burned. Although they did not show signs of an actual fire, the trees and leaves appeared dried up.

The gas attack spread over a large area. About thirty minutes after the attack started, the wind, which was blowing from the direction of Avoke, carried with it an unnatural, rotten smell. In addition, later in the day on August 24, noticed that the tops of the trees near Maraneh took on the same dried appearance as those in Avoke as a result of the drifting chemical gas. Some of the people with also began to experience difficulty breathing.
Once the attack on Avoke began, saw fixed-wing planes and helicopters continuously overflying the Avoke area. saw thousands of troops and tanks advancing from all directions. family, along with the others living in or near Maraneh, decided to head north to higher elevations and in the direction of Turkey. They left Maraneh on the night of August 24, 1988.

On August 25, 1988, Iraqi forces attacked villages throughout Badinan with artillery and aircraft, delivering both conventional and chemical weapons. As Iraqi forces quickly occupied most of the routes north, and several families traveling with him were forced to travel through Zebar in the direction of Kafia, east of Gara Mountain. The group occasionally came under fire from the Iraqi troops, but it seemed the Iraqis were targeting the general area as opposed to specific group.

By the time reached Kafia, the Iraqi forces was already preparing to surround the village. Hundreds of families from several neighboring villages had already fled to the area, and supplies were scarce. Some considered surrendering to the Iraqi forces, but both Kurdish collaborators and Iraqi officers advised against it. heard from the families of the Kurdish collaborators that one Iraqi officer said, "I may not kill you, but I don't know what Saddam will do."

Fearing capture, and his group retreated to the higher elevations of the Gara Mountain. They waited there for two days, but conditions were harsh and the group had no food or water. They decided to return to Maraneh and were almost there when they heard the amnesty announcement over the radio on September 6, 1988. Even as he announced the amnesty, however, SADDAM HUSSEIN showed no compassion. recalled HUSSEIN referring to them as "insects."

evaluated his situation: in addition to his children, he had to worry about his elderly mother, his pregnant wife who was in her third trimester, and a handicapped nephew. Not seeing any alternative, decided that his family stood the best chance of surviving if they surrendered. They were to rest in Maraneh for two days and then turn themselves over to the Iraqi forces. Concerned with the humiliation and poor treatment she would suffer at the hands of the Iraqi troops, wife begged him to shoot her. In the end, however, because she was his wife and because she was pregnant, he could not bring himself to do it.
On September 8, 1988, and two others, an Arab and an Assyrian who were also not going to surrender, hid themselves among the trees while the families walked in the direction of the Iraqi lines. watched as the Iraqi helicopters trained their guns on the surrendering villagers as the group walked toward them. A member of the surrendering party raised his white shirt to emphasize that they were, in fact, surrendering. feared the helicopters would shoot them right there; however they herded the villagers down the mountain in the direction of Kani Masi. never saw or heard from his mother (date of birth 1917); wife (1958); his sons, (1973), (1978); his daughters, (1987); his daughters, (1977), infant daughter, and his brother's wife, (1937), and sons (1969) (handicapped) (1968), and (1967).

After his family surrendered, the two others traveled north over the Gara Mountain. The group was forced to travel very slowly and cautiously due to the large number of Iraqi troops. Normally only a two hour journey, the trip took two days. Many times, they were within an arm's length of Iraqi soldiers, but they managed to avoid capture.

On September 12, 1988, reached the outskirts of Spindar (on the north side of Gara Mountain). The concentration of troops in the area forced the group to remain on the hills overlooking the village for approximately six days. They
survived by scavenging provisions and some medicines from homes on the outskirts of the abandoned village that had not yet been attacked. By the items left behind (a single baby sock, a half-filled tea cup, a single shoe), it appeared that the occupants had little warning before fleeing.

By the time reached Spindar on September 12, the village had already been burned. While living on the hills overlooking the village, and his group watched Iraqi bulldozers enter the area each day and topple structures. Each night they would retreat due to the threat of Peshmerga counterattacks. Sometimes the army would use explosives to destroy the buildings. The destruction, which took six days, was very slow and deliberate. In all, watched them destroy twenty to thirty buildings, and it appeared as if they were trying to erase any sign that the village existed.

and the others in his group eventually made their way to Turkey. never saw or heard from his family again. (interview, February 17, 2005).

In addition to providing pictures of his missing family members, provided a list of 193 names and in some cases, photographs, of Kurds who surrendered to the Iraqi forces and disappeared. All 193 Kurds, including family, are presumed dead. [Attached as Enclosure # XX]

HRW documented 13 primary sites of chemical attacks in Badinan from which the exact number of deaths is unknown. Page 4 of the HRW report, Final Anfal Section, states that 49 villages were "exposed" to chemical weapons, including those affected by wind-borne dispersal.

**Eyewitness Account of the Attack on the Village of Kane Balawi**

In approximately August 1988, was staying in an Assyrian village, Kane Balawi, in the Barwari Balla area north of Dohuk. She stated that villagers were warned by the pro-regime Kurdish militia, Jahsh, that the Iraqi military was approaching and they should leave the village. The villagers, including knew that when the Iraqi military arrived, their villages were going to be destroyed and everyone would either be arrested or killed, as had been the case throughout the Anfal campaign. Kurds were told that SADDAM HUSSEIN had said, "Let's finish with one, and we'll start the second group." The Kurds interpreted this statement to mean once
the war with Iran had ended, HUSSEIN would divert all of his
attention and military efforts toward the Kurds.

One evening, at approximately 10:00 pm, the people in
the village packed essential items and food on mules and left,
walking toward Turkey. More than a thousand men, women,
children, the elderly, and their animals, walked all night and
hid in the valleys during the day to avoid detection by Iraqi
aircraft. The journey took approximately two weeks. The
villagers ran out of food and were forced to purchase wheat from
Turkish smugglers operating in the mountains.

When the villagers finally arrived at the border, they
were stopped by the Turkish military and were refused entry into
Turkey. A sympathetic Turkish soldier told them to cross the
border at night. The villagers were forced to remain at the
border until nightfall, at which time they crossed into Turkey.
Once inside, they felt safe and slept for the first time in four
or five days. The villagers were out of food and went without
anything to eat for more than a day, while awaiting Turkish
smugglers. The next day, the villagers spent two days searching
for water. The villagers stayed in the valley for 10 days.

The conditions were very harsh. The villagers did not
have blankets, tents, beds, food, or clean water and suffered
from starvation. During this period, it was estimated that
hundreds of children and elderly people died as a result of
diarrhea. The deceased were buried in the valley. After 10
days, the Red Cross and Red Crescent arrived, set up tents, and
provided minimal medical care. When the Red Cross began to hand
out bread, people were so hungry, they swarmed them like animals.

The Turkish Government brought approximately 17 trucks
to relocate the villagers from the valley. They piled in the
back of the trucks and were crammed together like "sheep." The
trucks drove for 36 hours, passing several Kurdish villages along
the way. The villagers in the trucks begged for food from
Kurdish passers-by, who threw bread into the trucks to help them.

Finally, the trucks arrived at a refugee camp in
Slopia, Turkey, and the villagers were placed in tents. They
were placed approximately 15 to a tent. Everyone was forced to
share soup and bread and eat without utensils. It was estimated
that there were approximately 17,000 refugees at the camp.

Saw people who suffered from severe burns as a result of
a chemical weapons attack, while others had difficulty breathing.
Like others, all had fled their homes as a result of the Iraqi
military campaign. Soon after [ ] arrived, the burn victims were taken away by the Turkish government.

The refugees began to suffer from severe diarrhea. Hundreds died every day as a result of the sickness. A rumor circulated around the camp that the Iraqis had poisoned the food. According to [ ] the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) looked into the cause and determined that the bread given to the refugees had been poisoned. [ ] interview, January 21, 2005].

The Iraq Government appeared to become more secretive about its chemical weapons production after the end of the Iraq-Iran War. Letter #Sh 5/19299, dated December 17, 1988, from the Amn Director of the Governorate of Erbil to all branches, regarding the secrecy of documentation regarding chemical weapons notes:

Pursuant to the memorandum from the Honorable Office of the Presidency, number 4/4/11/44154 of December 4, 1988, a decision has been taken to give all letters (memoranda) which contain information about the production of chemical weapons the highest degree of secrecy. Take all necessary measures, keep this memorandum to yourself, and sign for its receipt.

This document is referenced in footnote 20 of the HRW Report dated July, 1993, "Final Anfal" section.

According to AZIZ, the primary purpose of Anfal was to stop the Kurdish insurgency inside Iraq. Most of the Kurdish population lived in Iraq near the northern border with Iran. A decision was made to relocate the population, at least a significant portion, to settlements 100 or more miles inside Iraq. This relocation was accomplished in a "harsh manner." Those who conducted the relocation, including AL-MAJID and the Governors of the region, were "idiots." In AZIZ's opinion, they probably felt they had to accomplish the task quickly in order to be viewed by HUSSEIN as successful.

Neither AZIZ nor any other RCC member was informed or asked for an opinion prior to the start of Anfal. No RCC member protested the decision once the details became known through the media. AZIZ stated that at the time, it seemed "justified for the security of the nation." In retrospect, AZIZ admitted that
the Anfal was criminal in nature. AZIZ added he "would not have
done this" and it was "not his way of doing things." [AZIZ
interview, February 2, 2004].

AZIZ acknowledged that, in the sense of collective
responsibility, he should be held answerable for what the
government did in general terms, but the man who holds the full
accountability is HUSSEIN. Originally, when AZIZ was in the RCC,
members received a typed letter with the agenda items for each
meeting. Once decisions were made, they were typed up and signed
by each member. The decisions were not implemented until all the
RCC members signed.

In the early 1980s, HUSSEIN decreed the
Chairman of the RCC
could decide matters
on behalf of the
entire RCC. Later, he
decided anything
decreed by the RCC
would become law. In
addition to these
legal measures which
essentially turned the
RCC into HUSSEIN'S
personal "rubber
stamp," there was the
chilling effect of the
July, 1979 meeting
where Ba'ath members
were killed. This
made the proposition of disagreeing with HUSSEIN a life or death
matter. [AZIZ interview, May 6, 2004].

SABIR provided a historical account of the events that
eventually led to the Anfal Campaign. The Iraq-Iran War was
ongoing, and the Iraqi military successfully concluded a four
month battle in Basrah. After the battle, the Iranian military
continued to shell Basrah, causing the Iraqi military to draw
forces from other battle fronts to defend the city. Iran
discovered an Iraqi troop shortage in the Northern Region of
Iraq, particularly in the area of Suleimaniyah. Iran took
advantage of the situation in the Northern Region and conspired
with Kurdish opposition groups led by BARZANI and TALABANI. The
momentum of the war shifted toward Iran, prompting Iraqi
Government officials to develop a new strategy. According to
SABIR, President HUSSEIN, AL-MAJID, ADNAN KHAIRALLAH (hereinafter KHAIRALLAH), and KHAZRAJI, developed the strategy for the Northern Region. SABIR stated that his role as Director of the DMI was to gather intelligence and disseminate that intelligence to high-level Iraq Government officials consisting of President HUSSEIN, the Minister of Defense, Army Chief of Staff, and the Presidential Secretary. The intelligence was studied by these officials and a recommendation for a plan of action was subsequently implemented.

The deployment of chemical weapons during the Anfal Campaign was at the sole direction of President HUSSEIN. The chain of communication to utilize chemical weapons during the Anfal Campaign flowed from President HUSSEIN to the Presidential Secretary and then to the Army Chief of Staff or Minister of Defense, depending on the delivery method of the chemical weapons. If the chemical weapons was to be deployed via the Air Force, orders would have been passed through the Minister of Defense. If the CW was to be deployed via artillery or other conventional means, orders would have been passed through the Army Chief of Staff to the Corps Commander. SABIR admitted that there was a special division within the Iraqi Army known as the Chemical Disbursement Division (CDD) which was responsible for manufacturing, housing, and distributing the chemical weapons. The Army Chief of Staff or the Deputy Chief of Staff was responsible for the CDD which was located at the Al Bakr Base. SABIR stated that a chemical weapons advisor was attached to the I Corps of the Iraqi Army during the Anfal Campaign.

SABIR understood that the Anfal Campaign had an announced purpose and a hidden purpose. The announced purpose was to relocate the Kurds from the Northern Region of Iraq, provide them adequate housing, and improve their quality of life. The hidden purpose of the Anfal Campaign was to relocate the Kurds toward the interior of Iraq, away from the border of Iran, and clear the Northern Region of the opposition groups that were led by BARZANI and TALABANI. There was concern the Kurds were going to conspire with these opposition groups and this was why Kurdish villages were razed. The Iraq Government believed destruction of the Kurdish villages would deter and prevent Kurds from returning to the area.

SABIR concluded the interview by stating HUSSEIN did not care about anybody and would have done anything to stay in power. In addition, SABIR that stated that HUSSEIN destroyed Iraq, and that he does not want HUSSEIN put to death, but wants him to suffer. [SABIR interview, June 11, 2004].
In welcoming HASSAN ALI AL-AMIRI (hereinafter AL-AMIRI) as his successor as Secretary General of the Northern Bureau on April 15, 1989, AL-MAJID discussed the reduction of powers associated with this position and the disposition of people in the prohibited areas:

It will no longer be allowed for a member of the leadership to have power over the army, because the exceptional situation is over. These powers are not being withdrawn from Comrade Hassan Ali because he is not up to the task, but because that stage is now finished.

From June 22 (1987), anyone who was arrested in those areas was to be killed immediately without any hesitation, according to the directives which are still in force.

RCC Decree #272, dated April 23, 1989, amended RCC Decree #160 and ended AL-MAJID'S extraordinary powers. This document is referenced on page 65 of the HRW report dated February, 1994.

**HALABJA**

TARIQ AZIZ admitted during an interview that the first confirmed use of chemical weapons against a civilian population, anywhere in the world, occurred at Halabja, Iraq, in March, 1988. Although he agreed with speculation that the weapons may have been deployed to deter Iranian forces from occupying Halabja, he acknowledged that in fact the city was occupied by Kurds and not Iranians. AZIZ stated that he learned more about the attack after watching a film on Halabja produced by the media which showed "a few corpses" of men, women, and children who died as a result of the attack. AZIZ claimed not to know how many people were killed during the attack.

After the attack, HUSSEIN admitted to AZIZ that chemical weapons had been used at Halabja. At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, only HUSSEIN held the authority to order the use of chemical weapons. KHAIRALLAH and KHAZRAJI asked for and received this power from HUSSEIN during the war. However, in early 1988, HUSSEIN withdrew this authority from them. KHAIRALLAH told HUSSEIN this would "weaken" the military's ability and his power to act decisively and quickly. Thereafter, HUSSEIN returned the authority to order the use of chemical
weapons to KHAIROLLAH and KHAZRAJI, and they used these weapons at Halabja. According to AZIZ, HUSSEIN did not specifically order the chemical weapons attack on Halabja, but was notified afterwards. HUSSEIN told AZIZ, "Halabja was not my decision. It was in the hands of KHAIROLLAH and KHAZRAJI." At one point afterwards, HUSSEIN said the chemical weapons attack was not necessary. HUSSEIN was "bothered" by the attack because of the international ramifications and "outcry" from the world community. AZIZ noted HUSSEIN did not punish, reprimand, or remove either KHAIROLLAH or KHAZRAJI from their positions. Normally, this would have been his response when someone's actions reflected negatively on him. AZIZ is unsure whether the lack of punitive action by HUSSEIN implied his post-event approval. [AZIZ interview, February 2, 2004].

According to SABIR, Halabja fell under Iranian control and the city of Suleimaniyeh was being threatened. SABIR and his Deputy, WAFIQ AL SAMARAI (phonetic), were traveling to the Suleimaniyeh area to check on their military positions when an intelligence officer advised them of the chemical weapons attack on Halabja. Once he learned of the attack, SABIR traveled to the city of Kirkuk and met with KHAZRAJI. During this meeting, KHAZRAJI told SABIR that KHAIROLLAH, who was in Kirkuk with KHAZRAJI, had just received orders from President HUSSEIN to launch a chemical weapons attack on Halabja. Once KHAIROLLAH received the orders, he telephoned the Commander of the Air Force, HAMEED SHA'ABIN AL-TIKRITI (hereinafter AL-TIKRITI), and ordered him to launch the chemical weapons attack on Halabja. SABIR advised that the Air Force planes that conducted the CW attack on Halabja were from the Al Bakr Base. SABIR learned from the other detainees that detainee HAMID RAJA SHALAH AL-TIKRITI was the Air Force Squadron Commander stationed at the Al Bakr Base who led the Air Force planes that conducted the CW attack on Halabja. [SABIR interview, June 11, 2004].

SABIR was under the impression Halabja was under Iranian control, and was not aware of a number of Iraqi citizens still residing within the city during the chemical weapons attack. SABIR claimed the decision to utilize chemical weapons on Halabja came quickly, and the DMI was not consulted.
The FBI obtained a copy of the video footage of the chemical attack on the village of Halabja. The footage, which appears to have been recorded by an Iranian film crew, depicted events leading up to the attack, and the aftermath of the attack.

1991 INVASION OF KUWAIT

Iraq and Kuwait are parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 1954 Hague Convention. Specifically, Iraq was a party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 which protect noncombatants, such as civilians living in occupied territory, and prisoners of war.
HUMMADI stated the fiasco of invading Kuwait was a decision completed in 30 minutes. During an RCC meeting, HUSSEIN recited an old farmer's proverb that claimed it is better to cut our necks than to cut our sustenance. HUSSEIN listed the reasons for invading Kuwait and then canvassed the committee members. He asked AL-DURI what he thought and AL-DURI sarcastically protested that Kuwait was a country. HUSSEIN asked AZIZ, who was wise enough to convey a subtle, indirect warning without openly opposing HUSSEIN's judgment. AZIZ explained if an invasion were conducted, predictable consequences would follow. At this point, AZIZ took 10 minutes to lay out the sure-to-follow adversarial responses of the Arab League, the United Nations (UN), the United States, and the rest of the Western world. But, AZIZ knew that if he did not approve HUSSEIN's plan, he would be thrown out. When AL-MAJID was asked his opinion, he shouted, 'Crush them!' [HUMMADI interview, May 27, 2004].

While in United States' custody, HUSSEIN stated that after the 1980-88 war with Iran, Iraq was trying to rebuild. HUSSEIN likened the situation with Kuwait as similar to two individuals fighting. The fight ends and the two parties go their separate ways. Thereafter, one of the previous disputing parties is bothered by someone else who also wants to fight. Then, there is no choice but to fight again.

According to HUSSEIN, Khomeini and Iran would have occupied the entire Arab world if it had not been for Iraq. As such, Iraq expected the Arab world to support them during and after the war. However, Iraq saw the opposite regarding support, especially from Kuwait. At the end of the war, as Iraq began the rebuilding process, the price of oil was approximately $7 per barrel. In HUSSEIN's opinion, Iraq could not possibly rebuild its infrastructure and economy with oil prices at this level, and he believed that Kuwait was especially to blame for these low oil prices.

In an effort to solve the situation and stimulate economic recovery, Iraq sent DR. HAMMADI, Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Kuwait. HAMMADI's conclusion, and that of the Iraqi leadership after the meeting, was that the oil price situation was not just the responsibility/work of the Kuwaitis. Iraq believed some other entity, some larger power, was behind this "conspiracy."

Iraq also sent government officials to Saudi Arabia to convince the Saudis to pressure Kuwait. There, the Deputy Chairman of the RCC met with the brother of Kuwaiti leader Prince
Sabah. In addition, the Saudi Minister of Oil came to Iraq and held talks about oil prices, the Iraqi economy, and the actions of Kuwait. HUSSEIN claimed that a Kuwaiti official said, "We'll make the economy in Iraq so bad, an Iraqi woman will sleep with you for 10 dinars." HUSSEIN told the Saudis that if Kuwait did not stop interfering in Iraqi affairs, he would make the Kuwaiti dinar worth 10 fils.

HUSSEIN stated when Kuwait was faced with facts regarding "stealing" Iraqi oil by slant drilling, they admitted to having taken "only two and a half billion barrels." They stated this fact "as if it were nothing."

Regarding problems with Kuwait, Iraq sent delegates to other Gulf countries, the names of which HUSSEIN does not remember. These delegates explained the Kuwaiti and Iraqi situation. The other countries promised to correct oil prices at the next Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) meeting.

At that meeting, HUSSEIN recalled a decision was made to fix oil prices at $16-17 per barrel. Kuwait concurred with this decision. Thereafter, the Kuwaiti Minister of Oil or Minister of Foreign Affairs stated Kuwait would not abide by the OPEC decision.

Regarding loan debts owed to Gulf countries as a result of support received during the Iran-Iraq War, HUSSEIN stated these were not loans and were supposed to be free aid from these countries. The countries originally used the word "loan" as a formality to disguise the purpose of the funds. When Iraq was informed the money were actually loans, Iraq held discussions with these countries, including Kuwait, to resolve these debts. Because the money had been "registered as loans" to Iraq, Iraq could not secure loans from other countries in order to rebuild.

HUSSEIN stated he twice discussed a change in oil prices to $25 per barrel. Once, when the price per barrel reached $50, HUSSEIN wrote a letter, dictated to AZIZ, which was sent to the Thoura newspaper. In the letter, he told the oil-producing countries they should not take advantage of industrialized nations. HUSSEIN asked them to reduce the price per barrel to $25. He commented this was strange at that time as Iraq had oil and could use the money. When the price dropped to $7 per barrel in 1989-90, HUSSEIN called for an increase to $24-25 per barrel. In HUSSEIN's opinion, this price would not burden the consumer or hurt the producer.
HUSSEIN stated there was a meeting of the RCC prior to the invasion of Kuwait where the matter was discussed. The RCC leadership had hoped the Saudis would "interfere" and have a solution. The Deputy Chairman of the RCC traveled to Saudi Arabia, but returned unsuccessful. Thereafter, the matter could only be discussed and decided upon in favor of military action. HUSSEIN acknowledged the possibility that one or more RCC members opposed or voted against invasion, but does not specifically remember any such opposition. He does not remember if a majority or all the RCC members agreed on military action. HUSSEIN stated, "I was against attacking if a solution could be found.

The final decision to invade Kuwait was made in order to "defend by attacking." HUSSEIN further justified the invasion based upon historical facts, stating that history dictates that Kuwait is a part of Iraq.

HUSSEIN stated the objective of invasion was "the one announced." That is, Kuwaitis were to rule themselves and would decide what kind of relations they would have with Iraq. As for the Kuwaiti leaders, HUSSEIN stated they were "conspirators" against Iraq, Kuwait, and all Arab countries. These leaders continued to conspire even after leaving Kuwait upon the Iraqi invasion. They were controlled by the United States.

HUSSEIN remarked, "We can discuss this for days." The United States and 28 other countries took seven months to mobilize forces for war in 1991. This mobilization occurred because of the perceived military threat posed by Iraq's power. This threat motivated US politicians to support action against Iraq. In addition, the ability of companies to earn financial profit from war also motivated support for action against Iraq. The preemptive strike by Iraq into Kuwait was conducted so that defensive lines could not be completed. HUSSEIN reiterated the lack of American forces in Kuwait does not mean there was not a "conspiracy."

HUSSEIN repeated the goal of invading Kuwait was to allow Kuwaitis the right to "decide the way they wanted to deal with Iraq." HUSSEIN denied the declaration of Kuwait as the 19th Province of Iraq contradicts his previous statement. According to HUSSEIN, a Kuwaiti government was established after invasion, which included a Prime Minister and various other ministers. HUSSEIN denied Iraqi RCC member, AL-MAJID, was appointed Governor of Kuwait. He added the Kuwaiti cabinet decided to "join the Iraqis." When questioned whether they were given a choice, HUSSEIN replied, "Did Iraqis agree to join the United States in
the recent war against Iraq?" He continued that Iraq's acts with respect to Kuwait were more logical than the United States' position on Iraq in the most recent war. HUSSEIN stated the designation of Kuwait as the 19th Province was "deserved and logical." In 1961 or 1962, Kuwait was a Province of Iraq under President Qassem.

When noted to HUSSEIN that Kuwaiti citizens voted 100 percent after withdrawal of Iraqi forces not to become a part of Iraq, he questioned whether this was the "respected opinion of world." HUSSEIN further asked, "What is the opinion of the Iraqi people now?" The forces of other countries have remained in Iraq longer than Iraq occupied Kuwait. These countries have no right to this as they are not Arab. HUSSEIN finished this portion of discussion saying "we will not come to a conclusion" and "days are needed to discuss" this matter.

On November 19, 1992, The Department of the Army, Judge Advocate General (JAG) published an unclassified report detailing Iraqi war crimes during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The report was based on investigations conducted by the 199th (JAG), St. Petersburg, Florida, and the 208th JAG, Washington, D.C. [The report is attached as document #XX]

According to the report, the 199th JAG collected evidence of Iraqi war crimes committed against citizens and residents of Kuwait. Evidence included written and videotaped accounts of victims who were raped and tortured, photographs of murdered Kuwaitis, and videotapes of burial sites and torture implements.

Documents collected authorized the "re-education" of Kuwaitis and the deportation of Kuwaiti citizens to Iraq. Summary executions were authorized for Kuwaiti civilians found praying on their roofs, and other Iraqi mandated offenses, such as failing to display pictures of HUSSEIN, refusing to serve Iraqi soldiers in stores and markets, possessing pictures of members of the Kuwaiti royal family, and writing "anti-Iraqi" graffiti.

The 199th JAG confirmed through its investigation of Kuwaiti medical records, that for the period of Iraqi occupation of Kuwait from August 2, 1990, to March 3, 1991, a total of 1,082 Kuwaiti deaths could be directly attributed to Iraqi criminal conduct. The deaths included 120 babies left to die after being removed from incubators taken to Iraq and 57 mentally ill individuals killed simply because of their handicap.
HUSSEIN was questioned regarding his decision directing the withdrawal of Iraqi forces to ignite Kuwaiti oil wells. HUSSEIN denied Iraqi forces ignited oil wells. He admitted that Iraqi forces burned "oil in trenches" as they retreated. The resulting smoke blocked target acquisition by coalition aircraft and prevented additional Iraqi troops from dying. HUSSEIN admitted that he was told "a few" oil wells had been ignited. He stated that even if he were shown pictures or videos of these events, he would not believe Iraqi forces committed them because these forms of media are easy to manipulate and fabricate. HUSSEIN believes that it would not be a crime for the Iraqi military to burn oil in order to prevent planes from attacking them. If such an event took place, this would have been an act of a desperate person who had no weapons remaining with which to defend himself. When questioned as to how he would respond if he was offered proof that the 150 oil well fires in Kuwait were an act of sabotage by the Iraqi military and not an act of defense, HUSSEIN stated he would provide a response at that time.

When questioned regarding ongoing Kuwaiti resistance during the Iraqi occupation and efforts by the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) to stop it, HUSSEIN stated, "I do not have an answer with these details." When again asked, HUSSEIN replied he had given his answer and, "I am not a person who gives away his friends."

HUSSEIN was questioned regarding a letter dated February 19, 1991, from HUSSEIN KAMIL (henceforth KAMIL) in the name of Iraqi President HUSSEIN to AL-MAJID. The letter stated, in part, that the Iraqi military should remove any and all property from Kuwait which will aid in the rebuilding of Iraq. HUSSEIN stated the normal method of conveying directions from the President was via letters from the Presidential Diwan. KAMIL was not a secretary but one of the Iraqi Ministers. KAMIL was "known for his way of doing things." HUSSEIN was read the letter by the translator and asked whether the letter referred to items used by the Iraqi military in Kuwait or to things from Kuwait itself. HUSSEIN stated that he never instructed the Iraqi military to remove items, either their own equipment or Kuwaiti items. HUSSEIN opined that the letter may refer to equipment in Kuwait utilized by the various Iraqi Ministers for critical services such as electricity, water, transportation, and telephone service. He stated the letter was dated nine days before the cease fire. HUSSEIN denied the letter referred to Kuwaiti property. He stated it was simply a letter from one minister subordinate to another minister, asking for return of materials taken to Kuwait by Iraqi forces. HUSSEIN stated he did not issue
the letter. He asked what items or materials were taken from Kuwait after this letter was published.

When questioned whether members of the Iraqi leadership were allowed to issue letters in the name of the President without his knowledge, HUSSEIN stated, "There are bad elements everywhere. He (KAMIL) is dead now." HUSSEIN denied knowledge of other members of the Iraqi leadership who might have acted on authority of the President without actually having power delegated to them by HUSSEIN. HUSSEIN acknowledged the referenced letter was not conveyed in an official manner. He reiterated the official method of issuance of such a letter, upon orders from HUSSEIN, would have been to send a communication from the Presidential Diwan to, in this case, AL-MAJID. This letter would have specifically enumerated the powers being delegated to the recipient, in this case, KAMIL. [HUSSEIN interview, March 3, 2004].

HUSSEIN was questioned about the 45 coalition POWs and the purpose of the apparent compulsory appearance of two British pilot POWs on Iraqi television. The interviewer noted the pilots appeared to have been physically abused and that featuring them on television violated the Geneva Convention. HUSSEIN stated the POWs, especially the pilots, would likely have provided different details about their capture. Some would say they were captured by farmers or villagers while others would say by a "group of people." These Iraqis might have celebrated the capture of the coalition combatants by hitting and pushing them around. The Iraqi military was not always in control or aware of circumstances regarding captured individuals because communications between military units had been knocked out by coalition forces.

Regarding coalition POWs captured in 1991, HUSSEIN claimed not to know that the POWs had been abused by anyone in the Iraqi military or the Iraq Government. But admitted that others may have "behaved in a bad manner" and that he was speaking only about his personal knowledge of the matter. HUSSEIN added he would provide such information if he were aware of it. He stated he subscribes to the Koran, a document much older than the Geneva Convention. The Koran and Arab tradition teach that it is "noble" to treat a prisoner well. HUSSEIN believed the principles enunciated in the Geneva Convention should be respected by the entire world regardless of one's circumstances or nationality.

HUSSEIN neither confirmed nor denied that all coalition
POWs were tortured while in Iraqi custody but stated that this information is "on the conscience" of those who reported it and those who conducted the investigation. HUSSEIN explained that leaders command by "communication instruments." Lower level commanders lead by "vision or voice." Without proper communication instruments, each entity behaves according to "how it sees things." HUSSEIN reiterated that Iraqi communications systems were inoperative during the 1991 war. Accordingly, he speculated that some reported acts of physical abuse, such as the burning of a POW's hair, might have been acts of a "simpleton." Regarding whether the abuse of coalition forces could reasonably lead one to believe that it was a widespread practice conducted by the entire Iraqi military, HUSSEIN replied, "I answered."

HUSSEIN maintained that he did not question the accounts of abuse of coalition POWs and that he had no personal information to either confirm or deny these allegations. However, from a practical perspective, he did not doubt the Iraqi people, after being attacked by coalition pilots, might have abused the pilots, especially if they had participated in their capture. [HUSSEIN interview, March 5, 2004].

HUSSEIN was informed the Kuwaiti Government claimed the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait caused $180 billion in damages to the country. HUSSEIN asked for the source of this information. When told the source was Kuwait, HUSSEIN asked which neutral and legal entity questioned Kuwait regarding the basis of their conclusion, and opined that "no one" asked Kuwait for details of their investigation of this matter. HUSSEIN again questioned whether evidence supported these Kuwaiti assertions.

HUSSEIN reiterated that "Kuwait is Iraqi" but was "stolen" from Iraq by a British resolution. He added that if Kuwait had not been a country with oil, it would not have been "stolen." HUSSEIN stated that the arrogance of the Kuwaiti rulers made them "stupid" and ignited the war. He stated his belief that the United States, located across the Atlantic Ocean, wanted Iraq to be poor. However, he could not understand how Kuwait would want to exist next to a "hungry country."

HUSSEIN emphasized he was not saying Kuwait did not have the right to make these statements; rather, he was questioning the identity of the neutral entity which examined this matter and whether it was discussed with Iraq. HUSSEIN suggested something similar to a court should have been formed to hear the details from both sides and to decide this matter. However, this did not happen.
The interviewer told HUSSEIN Kuwait never asked for compensation for the damages suffered during the Iraqi invasion and occupation. Kuwait did, however, ask for the return of 605 POWs who have not, to date, been returned. HUSSEIN stated these Kuwaitis were not "captives" and are missing as characterized by a UN resolution. He stated that many "stories and novels have been woven" around this issue, similar to the matter of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) but that the Kuwaiti POW accusations have been proven false, similar to the WMD rumors. HUSSEIN stated that individuals often become "missing" during a war and provided, as an example, the one coalition individual still missing from the first Gulf War and the thousands of Iraqis and Iranians missing from the Iran-Iraq War. As for the 605 Kuwaitis, HUSSEIN stated that Kuwait knows their fate. HUSSEIN denied knowing that 605 Kuwaitis were captured in circumstances other than combat after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

HUSSEIN acknowledged AZIZ SALEH AL-NUMAN was Governor of Kuwait during the Iraqi occupation and reported directly to AL-MAJID, the Iraqi Minister of Interior at that time. Iraqi provincial laws enumerated AL-NUMAN's duties as Governor. HUSSEIN does not remember whether he appointed AL-NUMAN or whether the RCC appointed him by decree.

In Iraq, the Constitution enumerated the RCC's and the President's, who is also the Chairman of the RCC, authority. Some governmental appointments like those given to high-ranking officers in the military, to judges, and to general directors, were based on a "republican" directive. HUSSEIN explained that the Iraqi system did not prevent the President from submitting a name for appointment consideration and requesting subsequent feedback from the RCC. Decisions in Iraq were signed by the President, and it was his prerogative whether to consult with anyone. HUSSEIN stated "his style" was to always consult with others when the time came to make a decision. Governors were assigned based on a "republican" or Presidential directive. HUSSEIN did not remember if he discussed the appointment of AL-NUMAN with the RCC.

HUSSEIN was questioned regarding Iraq's use of Kuwaitis, Japanese, and westerners as human shields during the first Gulf War, positioning them at key sites like communications centers and military positions. HUSSEIN denied that such individuals were taken to Iraqi military positions but added that the Iraq Government did not prevent individuals from volunteering as human shields to protect facilities such as communications centers. HUSSEIN claimed that he did not remember whether such
volunteers existed in 1991. The translator read HUSSEIN an Iraq
Government communication from QUSAY HUSSEIN concerning the usage
of Kuwaiti prisoners as human shields. HUSSEIN stated that he
had no information about this letter, and answered only, "I
answered" when informed that American forces had recovered the
document from an Iraq Government building. HUSSEIN asked whether
the captives discussed in this communication were ever questioned
about being held in Iraqi captivity or being used as human
shields. HUSSEIN stated that Iraq released all the Kuwaiti
captives. When informed that the document was dated March 14,
2003, HUSSEIN stated, "It is a forgery. It is impossible." He
suggested the communication be examined closely to determine
authenticity, and added that he thought it was dated 1991.
HUSSEIN stated if the document is truly dated 2003, it is a
forgery, and added that Iraq did not have captives in 2003.
HUSSEIN stated QUSAY HUSSEIN was not the type of person to "make
up things." He reiterated that experts in the United States and
in Iraq should scrutinize this document for authenticity.
[HUSSEIN interview, March 11, 2004, interview].

HUSSEIN stated that HASHEM, and SALEH, Second Corps
Commander, represented Iraq at the cease fire talks during the
first Gulf War. Their positions and viewpoints were the same as
those of the Iraqi leadership: to secure a cease fire and to
start the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq. HUSSEIN stated
Iraq had no goal of continuing the war and desired a cease fire.

When questioned about other items discussed by Iraq at
the 1991 cease fire talks, HUSSEIN stated he did not remember any
additional Iraqi requests other than the withdrawal of foreign
forces from their territory. In HUSSEIN's opinion, the fighting
would have continued without this withdrawal. HUSSEIN denied
knowing that Iraq asked for and received permission to continue
flying helicopters. He further denied knowing the purpose of
such an Iraqi request.

AL-MAJID claimed he was summoned to an Iraqi leadership
meeting on August 7, 1990 with HUSSEIN and other Iraqi leaders.
At the conclusion of the meeting, HUSSEIN announced to everyone
that AL-MAJID would go to Kuwait. At the time, SABAWI HASAN
IBRAHIM AL-TIKRITI (hereinafter SABAWI), HUSSEIN's brother, was
already in Kuwait. HUSSEIN's declaration to the Iraqi leadership
authorized AL-MAJID and SABAWI to "manage" Kuwait. AL-NUMAN was
appointed Governor of Kuwait and was "included" in the security
plans.

The work in Kuwait was divided into two parts; SABAWI
served as Director of Intelligence in charge of security of Kuwait and AL-MAJID was responsible for maintaining "organization" among the various Ministries. SABAWI was in charge of the Security Committee of Kuwait which included members from various government components including intelligence, special security, the police, the military, and the militia. AL-MAJID stated that he and SABAWI had equal overall responsibility over Kuwait.

AL-MAJID knew of the destruction/sabotage of the Burgan and Al-Rumaila oil fields by the Iraqi military. AL-MAJID claimed that this "operation" was neither his responsibility nor under his control, but rather fell under the direction of the Iraqi military. [AL-MAJID interview, February 4, 2004].

THE 1991 UPRISING

On March 1, 1991, one day after the Gulf War ceasefire, rebellion began in Basra. Within days, the rebellion extended to Karbala, Najaf, Hilla, Al-Nasiriyah, Al-Amrah, Samawah, Kut and Diwaniyya. At one point, all but two of Iraq’s provinces were in open revolt.

The RCC issued decree #64, dated March 9, 1991, which granted the following powers to Ba’ath Party officials [Enclosure #]:

1. To grant comrades, members of the Regional Command of the Socialist Arab Ba’ath Party, or members of the Revolutionary Command Council who directly supervise the forces and columns that face resistance from the groups of traitors and agents who are supported by Iran, the power of the President of the Republic to reward and punish.
2. To grant the Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council the powers of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council for the purposes mentioned in paragraph 1 of this decree.
3. To grant the Minister of Industry and Military Industrialization the powers stated in paragraph 1 of this decree.
4. This decree shall be in force from the day it is issued until the end of the crisis.
5. The Ministers and pertinent authorities must implement this decree.
TARIQ AZIZ stated that on March 4, 1991, two days after the Gulf War cease-fire, the RCC signed and released RCC Resolution #64 which gave governors control of military forces in their territories. All of the RCC members except AZIZ, who remained in Baghdad, were in the south of Iraq or outside of Baghdad at this time. AZIZ was working on implementing UN Resolutions 687 and 688 which involved the repatriation of POWs. He met with HUSSEIN on occasion, but spent most of his time with the Director of Military Intelligence, General SABIR AL-DURI. AZIZ believed that in actuality, the RCC was not consulted on Resolution #64 although they may have heard of it. AZIZ believed that it made sense to give authority and power to the governors in a time of crisis, but there would have been no voting or feedback, only HUSSEIN's order. [AZIZ interview, May 6, 2004].

AL-ZUBAYDI stated after the United States liberated Kuwait in 1991, HUSSEIN telephoned him and directed him to travel and take charge of the southern city of Nasiriayah. AL-ZUBAYDI believed HUSSEIN chose him to resolve the 1991 Shia Intifada (Uprising) in a peaceful manner because he was a Shia. Even though he is a Shia, AL-ZUBAYDI considered himself a Ba'athist and an Iraqi first. He believed that Shia's from Iran caused the 1991 Intifada, and learned that they were revolting against the government. According to AL-ZUBAYDI, there was widespread looting and violence aimed at Iraqi government officials and Ba'ath Party members in Nasiriayah. AL-ZUBAYDI maintained that Iran started the 1991 uprising because they wanted to invade and occupy Iraq. The Republican Guard and Special Forces were already in Nasiriayah trying to quell the uprising when AL-ZUBAYDI arrived. AL-ZUBAYDI remembered conducting meetings with various tribal leaders, community leaders, and elders in Nasiriayah in an attempt to resolve the situation in a peaceful manner.

KAMAL MUSTAFA ABDALLAH SULTAN AL-TIKRITI (hereinafter KAMAL MUSTAFA) was the Commander of the Republican Guard Forces and Regular Army in Nasiriayah during the 1991 uprising. The Ba'ath Party leader, AL-ZUBAYDI's assistant, was AZIZ SALIH AL-NUMAN. AL-ZUBAYDI stated that the Republican Guard Forces and Regular Army were equipped with light weapons and did not have access to or use armored tanks or helicopters. [AL-ZUBAYDI interview, May 27, 2004].

AL-ZUBAYDI adamantly denied ever killing anyone, ordering executions, or witnessing any executions or atrocities during the 1991 Intifada in Nasiriayah. AL-ZUBAYDI stated that President Saddam Hussein should be held responsible for the violence that occurred during the 1991 Intifada. [AL-ZUBAYDI
AL-ZUBAYDI’s statements are inconsistent with media video footage showing the Iraqi forces use of helicopters and tanks to regain control in Southern Iraq. Additionally, there is video footage of AL-ZUBAYDI physically assaulting a detainee which contradicts his statement that he resolved the uprising in a peaceful manner.

On March 1, 2004, a day after the United States ended its offensive military operations in Iraq, KAMAL MUSTAFA received orders from HUSSEIN KAMEL to take a regiment of Special Republican Guard (SRG) troops to Nasiriyah with AL-ZUBAYDI, reorganize the party and reassign responsibilities. This involved reappointing employees and selecting and assigning a new Governor. KAMAL MUSTAFA understood his instructions were to travel to Nasiriyah and establish command to run the Army at Nasiriyah. Once he met up with AL-ZUBAYDI, KAMAL MUSTAFA was to provide protection for AL-ZUBAYDI’s command, remain two days and turn the situation over to the special forces. His main task was to protect the command by setting up check points and securing the route of travel. Once secure, he was to use local units to replace his troops and withdraw. KAMAL MUSTAFA was not told about rebels, revolution or uprising. He was never told to “clean up the cities.”

The regiment that KAMAL MUSTAFA assembled to deploy to Nasiriyah consisted of four companies of infantry troops, a support company and a headquarters company. These companies were made armed with light rifles, medium machine guns, RPGs, rocket launchers, and were accompanied by a mortar platoon, an air defense platoon and a 106 anti-tank gun element. Each company had a radio communication system. AL-ZUBAYDI arrived at the SRG Headquarters at 3:00 a.m., and the entire regiment departed Baghdad at 5:00a.m., southbound for Kut. The regiment traveled in a caravan. AL-ZUBAYDI and the command element traveled in the rear of the formation. One of HUSSEIN’s bodyguards traveled with the group.

In Kut, the group learned from a party member that there was a disturbance in Al-Hayy. The Governor informed them that the Mayor was missing and that party members had been killed. The regiment came under fire as they arrived outside of Al-Hayy. They responded with RPG and light weapons fire. AL-ZUBAYDI decided the regiment should deploy. The regiment broke up and deployed, with two companies deployed on line and prepared to retaliate. An hour later, the regiment entered the city.
There were no targets for the support weapons, rather, the regiment used light and medium machine guns and RPGs. All of the attacks were visual. The advancing forces came under fire and returned fire, although it did not last long as there was no resistance. The enemy had apparently thrown down their weapons and retreated. AL-ZUBAYDI and the Governor of Kut put the city in order. This happened while KAMAL MUSTAFA and the regiment were still there. Some party members, police and some of the Governor's men were still fighting. Some people were captured, but the SRC did not debrief or transport them. [KAMAL MUSTAFA interview, April 29, 2004].

AL-MAJID denied personal knowledge of any persecution, including executions and imprisonment, of Shia Muslims living in southern Iraq in 1991, and denied personal knowledge of the destruction of Shia villages during this or any other time. [February 4, 2004 interview]. However, on January 2, 2004, AL-MAJID stated that he and other military commanders had received orders from HUSSEIN to execute any Iraqi civilians who were uprising against the Iraqi regime. On March 2, 1991, AL-MAJID arrived in Basra where approximately 200 Iraqi civilians were being detained by the 51st Division under the command of SAIF ALDIN AL-RAWI. Of the 200 civilians detained, 36 were being held at Saad Circle, in Basra, for committing crimes against the Iraqi Government. Of the 36, all but two had admitted to the crimes. However, the two were implicated by the other 34. AL-MAJID executed the two by shooting them with a rifle to make an example out of them. AL-MAJID claimed he released the other 34. [Attached as Enclosure #]

Regarding the 1991 Uprising, HUSSEIN stated that within a day of the cease fire of 1991, "some elements" had initiated sabotage operations in the southern Iraq cities of Basrah, Nasiriyah, and Amarah. Later, this activity spread to the northern cities of Suleimaniyyah, Erbil, and Kirkuk. HUSSEIN stated the groups conducting these operations were "pushed by Iran," and Iraq captured 68 Iranian intelligence officers who were later exchanged for Iraqi prisoners.

At the time of the uprisings, most bridges in Iraq had already been destroyed, electricity was unavailable, water service was sporadic, and food supplies were minimal. In the aftermath of the war, these factors contributed to general unrest in the country. HUSSEIN stated that "elements" participating in the uprisings were a mixture of thieves, rebels and "those from Iran," whom HUSSEIN described as individuals from Iranian government services, Iraqis of Iranian origin, and Iraqis who had
"escaped" to Iran. Their nationalities were difficult to determine with any degree of certainty because many had intentionally destroyed their citizenship documents.

HUSSEIN stated that in reasserting government control of the country, Iraqi leadership considered the southern area of Iraq a high priority as Iraqi forces primarily encountered and fought Iranians in this area. After order was restored in Southern Iraq, government forces focused on the Northern Region where Iraqi forces met little or no resistance. The fighting in Northern and Southern Iraq lasted approximately two months. HUSSEIN stated, "God made us victorious." Thereafter, according to HUSSEIN, Iran continued to insert groups of 10 to 15 people into Iraq to conduct operations against the government. However, these individuals were, for the most part, thwarted by members of the local population. Ultimately, following an agreement between Iran and Iraq, these hostile operations ceased.

HUSSEIN characterized the uprisings in 1991 as insurgent activity conducted by "outlaws and thieves." He did not consider the insurgents to be revolutionaries. When asked what factors allowed these disturbances, HUSSEIN answered that it was support from Iran, weakness of the Iraq Government after the war, and possibly assistance from coalition forces. He noted that the war had weakened all government institutions, including the police and the military. Gradually, however, the Iraqi military grew in strength and eventually overcame these rebels. According to HUSSEIN, the Iraqi military's "blade got longer and longer." He acknowledged, however, that the Iraqi military's weakened state created the opportunity for this "lawlessness" in the first place.

HUSSEIN believed the goal of the insurgent activity was to gain control of Iraq. In his opinion, Iran supported insurgent activity in 1991 after Iran failed to gain control of Iraq through the previous war with Iraq. Iran wanted to control all, or at least a part, of Iraq, and particularly the southern portion. HUSSEIN believed Iran also wanted to extend its power to eastern Saudi Arabia and the entire Gulf region.

The RCC gave the Iraqi Provincial Governors control of the military during the Uprisings to protect the people and the state and to re-establish security and a "normal life." The people and the nation were threatened by widespread killings, theft, arson, and general destruction, all of which had to be brought under control. HUSSEIN denied knowing the specific methods that the Governors and the military used to reassert
control. HUSSEIN stated, "They were given the authority, and they carried it out." HUSSEIN claimed that he did not ask for details of the operation but did request and receive status reports regarding the progress of operations.

HUSSEIN denied that the Geneva Convention applied to this situation, claiming it only applied to wars; that is, only to situations when a foreign country is an occupying power. He claimed the Geneva Convention was applicable to attempted coups or internal unrest involving crimes like burning and looting. When asked again what restrictions were placed on the Iraqi military during the 1991 Uprisings, HUSSEIN replied that an Iraqi, whether civilian or military, knew what was acceptable as humane behavior and that there is no need for someone to have to tell them how to behave.

HUSSEIN stated, "I am responsible for what I decide" and added that he was not responsible for how an Iraqi acts. HUSSEIN claimed that if an Iraqi wanted to use him as the justification for his actions, he would accept that assertion so long as it did not harm his (HUSSEIN'S) reputation. In HUSSEIN's opinion, a leader is responsible for a subordinate's actions if the leader learns of the subordinate's transgressions and confronts the subordinate with the wrongfulness of those actions. He stated that each individual is judged based on his own law and constitution. [HUSSEIN interview, March 13, 2004].

HUSSEIN stated that he learned about the Southern Iraq situation the same way as any leader of a country. Whenever faced with a situation, the Iraqi leadership assembled and consulted "quickly" about the best way to confront an issue.

HUSSEIN stated that initially, those involved in the uprisings in Southern Iraq were among "those who had crossed the border from Iran." Others in Iraq committed similar acts, while some were not involved at all in the incidents. According to HUSSEIN, if the Iraqi Government's reaction had been slow and weak, some might have shown sympathy and assisted the Uprising participants out of fear that those who caused the disturbances would ultimately take over power in Iraq. HUSSEIN speculated that some participated because they were simply "greedy thieves and robbers."

HUSSEIN asserted it was the duty of the Iraq Government to confront individuals participating in the Uprisings. HUSSEIN stated that the "arms of the authorities had been severed" but the Iraq Government "picked them up and struck the enemy." He
stated that those who would not be deterred by words would be
deterred by weapons. Therefore, the Iraqi leadership ordered the
army to assemble as many forces as possible to confront
"treachery" and the disturbances. HUSSEIN acknowledged that
incidents of looting by certain individuals "got mixed in" with
the actions of those participating in the uprisings.

Regarding the decisions regarding whom to place in
charge of areas in Southern Iraq during that time and what
authority and powers to delegate, HUSSEIN replied, "I said our
decision was to confront and defeat the enemy." The participants
in the Uprisings were to be "put in their place," if not by word,
then by weapon. HUSSEIN stated that a lengthy discussion of this
matter was not required. The individuals who had crossed the
border from Iran were members of the Dawa Party who were assisted
by additional Iranian forces. Together, these individuals
killed, burned, looted, and committed other crimes. According to
HUSSEIN, when faced with this situation, one does not need to ask
one's self what action to take. Procedure, however, dictated
that the Iraqi leadership meet to discuss the matter. All
members agreed regarding the necessary Iraq Government response
to the situation.

HUSSEIN stated the threat to the Iraq Government in
1991 existed in both Northern and Southern Iraq. An uprising was
even attempted in Baghdad. HUSSEIN stated that those "sitting on
the fence" joined the uprisings after witnessing police stations
or government offices attacked and seeing no response by the
authorities. As the Iraq Government reasserted control, the
"enemy" went to a new area or reinforced in an old one.
According to HUSSEIN, the Iraqi military strength grew over time
and "the circle started tightening around the enemy." [HUSSEIN
interview, March 16, 2004].

Regarding the senior Iraqi leaders assigned in 1991 to
Southern Iraq to deal with the Shia uprising, HUSSEIN stated, "We
assigned responsibility to whoever was going to handle the
situation." AL-ZUBAIDI and KAMAL MUSTAPHA ABDALLAH were sent to
Nasiriyah, KAMIL was sent to Karbala, AL-MAJID was sent to
Basrah, and AL-DURI was sent to Al-Hillah to confront the Shia
uprisings in those areas. During this interview, HUSSEIN denied
that he had previously stated that in 1991, he was only
interested in results and did not want to know the details of how
his commanders would stop the Uprising. HUSSEIN asked, "Who says
I did not want to know how?" When informed by the interviewer
that HUSSEIN himself had previously made this statement, he
stated that any person's main goal would have been to stop the
disturbances and to end the "treason." [HUSSEIN interview, March 23, 2004].

1991 Chemical Weapons Use

In the early morning of March 7, 1991, an unidentified Iraqi Government Official requested authority to use "liquids" against rebels in and around An Najaf. Regime forces intended to use the "liquid" to defeat dug in forces as part of a larger assault.

KAMIL, then Director of MIC, ordered senior officials in the CW program to ready CW for use against the revolt. His initial instruction was to use VX. When informed that no VX was available, he ordered mustard be used instead. However, mustard was ruled out because of its detectable persistence and Sarin selected.

On or about March 7, 1991, R-400 aerial bombs stored at the Tamuz Airbase were readied for use. Al Muthanna State Establishment (MSE) technicians mixed the two components of the Iraqi "binary" nerve agent system inside the R-400s. Explosive burster charges were loaded into the bombs and the weapons assembled near the runway. Helicopters from nearby bases flew to Tamuz where they were armed with Sarin-laden R-400s and other conventional ordnance. As of March 1991, about a dozen MI-8 helicopters were staged at Tamuz Airbase.

The helicopters were used to fly dozens of sorties against Shia rebels in Karbala and the surrounding areas. A senior participant from the CW program estimates that 10 to 20 R-400s were dropped. Other reporting suggests as many as 32 R-400s may have been dropped. According to an Iraqi helicopter pilot, MI-8 helicopters were also used during the Iran-Iraq war to drop chemical munitions.

Following the initial helicopter sorties over Karbala, the Senior Chemical Weapons Program Officer overseeing the operation received an angry call from KAMIL's office. The caller said the attacks had been unsuccessful and that further measures were required. The R-400s, which are designed for high-speed delivery from higher altitude, likely did not activate properly when dropped from a slow-moving helicopter.

As an alternative to the R-400s, the MSE filled large aerial bombs with CS (tear gas). Over the next two weeks,
helicopters departed Tamuz Air Base loaded with CS-filled bombs. One participant estimated that more than 200 CS-filled aerial bombs were dropped on rebel targets in and around Karbala and Najaf.

Trailers loaded with mustard-filled aerial bombs were also transported to the Tamuz Air Base. A participant in the operation stated that mustard gas was not used on the rebels because of the likelihood of discovery by the Coalition. According to the source, the mustard-filled bombs were never unloaded and were not used.

Refugees and Iraqi military deserters’ reports of the 1991 attacks include descriptions of a range of CW and improvised poisons that were used in the areas around Karbala, Najaf, Nasiriyah, and Basrah.

AL-MAHAWIL MASS GRAVE SITE

According to the HRW Report of May 2003, Vol. 15, No. 5, while many of those buried in the Al-Mahawil mass graves remain unidentified, remains that have been identified by relatives establish that the bodies are those of Iraqis arrested during the 1991 uprisings and killed while in Iraq Government custody. HRW interviewed many of the relatives of those identified in the mass grave, making the crucial link between their disappearance in 1991 and the discovery of their remains in the Al-Mahawil mass graves.

KAMIL MUHAMMAD DAWUD (hereinafter DAWUD), a Baghdad lawyer, age 74 (all ages are given as of the time of their disappearance), and his son KHALID, a 29 year-old university student, drove from Baghdad to Al-Hillah around March 9 or 10, 1991, searching for DAWUD’S older son, then a soldier in the Iraqi army. While the older brother soon returned home, KAMIL and KHALID disappeared. Their family found KAMIL’S half-looted car near the Al-Mahawil Army Base sometime later, but received no information regarding their fate. On May 17, 2003, their family identified their bodies at the large Al-Mahawil mass grave site based on the presence of DAWUD’S watch and Khalid’s identification document. DAWUD was blindfolded and both men had their hands bound. [HRW interview with RASHID KAMIL MUHAMMAD, Baghdad, May 18, 2003]

/Joseph (hereinafter /age 42, was at the Al-Mahawil grave site looking for five relatives who were
missing from a rural village in the Al-Madhatiyya district located approximately 20 kilometers southwest of Al-Hillah. According to [blurred text] three of his brothers were arrested on March 23, 1991, when local Ba’ath officials demanded that all local villagers attend a meeting at the local Ba’ath party headquarters and arrested approximately fifteen people. His brothers, SUBHAN, age 54, [blurred text] age 44, and [blurred text] age 36, all farmers, were arrested and never seen again. [blurred text] himself was briefly arrested with the other three but was released just as they were taken to Al-Mahawil military base because he was a soldier on active military duty who had not abandoned his post during the war. [blurred text] identified the remains of his brother, SUBHAN, among the bodies recovered from the Al-Mahawil mass grave based upon the identity documents he found on the remains. Two other relatives of [blurred text] were also arrested around the same time. The 21 year-old son of his brother [blurred text] and age 22, were soldiers returning to duty. A person who said he was an eyewitness to their arrest told [blurred text] that the two were arrested at a Ba’ath Party operated checkpoint on their way to their military division. [HRW interview with Mahawil, May 16, 2003.]

[blurred text] two cousins remain missing, but as they were arrested around the same time as relatives whose remains have been identified in the mass grave, the family believes they were likely executed and buried around the same time.

[blurred text] a 40 year-old teacher, described for HRW what happened when loyalist Iraqi forces entered his district in March, 1991: the military entered Al-Shamali [the northern part] on March 15 and the cleansing operation started in the villages. They destroyed many houses in the villages using bulldozers. They cut down the palm trees and the orchards. They chased and traced all the sons of my tribe. They arrested many people who were on the street, even people just passing through the area. They distributed checkpoints all over and controlled all the roads. [HRW interview with May 16, 2003]

Nine relatives of [blurred text] were arrested on the same day in March, 1991. His only brother, [blurred text] a 25 year-old army deserter, was arrested at his home by a group of Ba’ath party members, security officials, and police officers; his 31 year-old cousin, [blurred text] an army officer, was also arrested at his home; his father’s uncle, MUHAMMAD OBAID HUSSEIN, age 54, was arrested at his home along with his three sons, 23 year-old [blurred text] a soldier,
27 year-old ABBAS MUHAMMAD OBAID, an agricultural worker, and 29 year-old [ ] a soldier. [ ] age 67, another uncle of his father, was arrested as he came home from his shop; [ ] a 30 year-old teacher, and [ ] a farmer cousin whose age he did not know, were also arrested. At the Al-Mahawil mass grave, [ ] identified the remains of ABBAS MUHAMMAD OBAID and HADI OBAID HUSSEIN based on the identity documents found on their remains. He believed that his other relatives were also buried in the same mass grave because they all were arrested and "disappeared" on the same day.

[ ] a 46 year-old worker, and [ ] his son, a soldier, were arrested and "disappeared" on March 12, 1991, as they came home from his shop in Al-Hillah. A second son, [ ] 16 at the time of the arrest, told HRW that he was in the car with his father and brother when they were stopped at a checkpoint operated by the General Security (al-Amn al-"Amn): "the Amn had the names of my father and brother, and said they needed to investigate them." [ ] identified the remains of his father at the Al-Mahawil mass grave based on identity documents found on his remains and was still searching for his brother's remains at the time of the HRW interview. [HRW interview with [ ] May 14, 2003]

KHALID HASSAN KHUDAYYIR, age 13, and his 33 year-old cousin, FUAD ABD AL-HUSSEIN KADHIM, left their native village of Albu Alwan and walked toward the nearby city of Al-Hillah to purchase food on March 4, 1991. FUAD ABD AL-HUSSEIN KADHIM had been a soldier two years before the 1991 Uprising but had returned to civilian life. The two young men disappeared and for years the family had no information about their fate. Their bodies were found at the Al-Mahawil mass grave with their identity documents. [HRW interview with [ ] May 15, 2003]

Many more families still searching for their missing relatives told HRW similar stories of unresolved "disappearances." [ ] a 45 year-old woman, was typical. Her 14 year-old son, [ ] went missing on March 7, 1991, after she had asked him to go fetch some water from the river in Al-Hillah's Bab Al-Hussein neighborhood. When she asked the soldiers stationed on a nearby bridge about him, they threatened to shoot her and ordered her to leave. She never heard again of her son and failed to locate his remains after looking through hundreds of bags containing human remains at the

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Al-Mahawil mass grave site. [HRW interview with Mahawil, May 14, 2003]

HRW was given a list that, according to local officials, contained more than 1,200 names of identified victims from the two Al-Mahawil mass graves. However, the list appears limited in its usefulness and reliability: the actual numbering of the victims was sloppy; the numbering jumps suddenly from victim 830 to victim 931; many victims take up more than one number; and some victims are listed multiple times. A closer examination of the list suggests that relatives have claimed slightly less than 1,000 of the victims from the mass grave. These identifications were made in a variety of ways and some are of dubious reliability. While some relatives were fortunate to find remains containing identity papers, in other cases family members guessed as to identity based on much more circumstantial criteria such as items of clothing, medications, and cigarettes found with the corpses.

It is similarly difficult to estimate the total number of unidentified persons exhumed from the two Al-Mahawil mass graves as no records appear to have been kept. Local officials gave widely varying figures, but a HRW count of the unidentified bodies just before their reburial concluded that approximately 1,200 bodies remained at the large Al-Mahawil mass grave and just over 100 bodies remained at the Al-Mahawil brick factory mass grave. It appears, moreover, that some of the bodies from the brick factory mass grave were moved to the large Al-Mahawil mass grave site. Taken together, it appears that no more than approximately 2,300 bodies were recovered from the two Al-Mahawil mass graves.

Although the list of claimed victims provided by local authorities is of limited reliability in terms of the total number of victims, it does provide some crucial information about the likely identity and residence of the victims. The vast majority of the victims appear to have been young men from the general area around Al-Hillah, indicating that the mass grave was a result of a localized campaign of arrests and executions in the Al-Hillah area. The relatively small number of victims from Karbala, Ad-Diwaniyah, An-Najaf, and Baghdad in the mass grave appear to have been traveling through the Al-Hillah area at the time of their detention and therefore, were probably not arrested elsewhere and transferred to the area. Among the victims are more than a dozen Egyptian nationals who were working and living in the Al-Hillah area.

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According to local officials in Al-Hillah, several persons who were taken to the Al-Mahawil mass grave sites survived the executions at the Al-Mahawil brick factory mass grave site. HRW located one such survivor and his remarkable story provides important information about the manner in which the mass execution campaign was conducted in Al-Mahawil.

(Hereinafter [insert number] was only 12 years old at the time of the 1991 mass arrest campaign. On March 16, 1991, his 28 year-old mother, KHULUD ‘ABUD NAJI, took [insert number] and two other 13 year old relatives, his uncle, MUHANAD ‘ABUD NAJI, and his cousin, MUHAMMAD YASSIN MUHAMMAD, from their home in the Al-Sa’di neighborhood to their grandfather’s house in the Sha’awi neighborhood. On their way, a soldier stopped the group, asked them where they were going, and accused them of being looters. [insert number] mother explained that they were just going to their grandfather’s house, but the soldier arrested all of them and took them to a nearby school building. According to [insert number] “they put us in a school in a classroom. By the evening, the classroom was filled with people because they kept arresting people.” As evening fell, the people detained in the classroom were taken to the Al-Mahawil military base where:

they blindfolded us and bound our hands, and then they put us in landcruisers with shaded windows and a bus. We were about 25 to 30 people [detained]... They took us to the Al-Mahawil military base. Some of us were taken to another area [of the Al-Mahawil base]. They put me, my mother, my cousin, and my uncle in a tiny room. In the night of the same day, they brought a 14 year-old girl and a 30 year-old woman to the same room.

The family spent the night in the tiny room without food. The next morning they were questioned by high-ranking officers, including a lieutenant-colonel, who noted their names, the neighborhood they came from, and similar details. Following the perfunctory questioning, they were taken to a large hall at the Al-Mahawil military base where they were again joined by other detainees:

They took us to a big hall [and] started bringing in people now and then. We stayed there for two days. There were so many people.... They were children, women, and
men. We were sitting in [family] groups, me with my relatives and the others with their relatives. No one dared to speak to the other groups.

Toward the end of the second day, the evening of March 18, 1991, the detainees in the big hall were taken outside and lined up in the yard of the compound. "They brought some blankets which they ripped and they tied our hands and blindfolded us with those," [HRW interview with May 16, 2003] recalled. "They covered our eyes and put us inside some TATA buses looted from Kuwait. We were between 45 and 50 people on each bus. It was very crowded, there were two people on each chair." [HRW interview with who could see a bit through the blanket covering his eyes, recounted the route taken by the bus:

There was an asphalt road from the door of the military camp. Then we turned off into a remote, dusty dirt road, an agricultural road. We turned off the main road, and I didn't know where we were going. I was sitting on the bus at the chair near the window. There was an abandoned canal, I was sitting on that side of the bus....I couldn't see clearly, but there was a building—later, when I looked [after the executions], it was a brick factory.

Almost as soon as the buses stopped, the executions began. People were pulled off the buses, thrown in a pre-dug pit, machine-gunned, and then buried with a bulldozer. AL-HUSSEINI told HRW how he survived:

When they started taking us off the bus, some of us began reciting the shahada [Muslim declaration of faith]. My mother told me, "Repeat the shahada, because we are about to die." I heard the shouting of the children. We grabbed each other's hands, me, my mother, my cousin, and my uncle. They pulled us, we were all together. They threw us into the dug-out grave. When I fell down, there were
so many bodies underneath me. I lay down on top of them. They started to shoot on us. There were two [groups of] men. One was taking the people off the bus, and others were shooting at people in the hole. One of them pulled at my clothes and said, “That one isn’t dead, shoot him.” They shot again, but still I was not shot. So they gave an order to the bulldozer driver to bury the grave. I was at the edge of the grave. When the shovel came, I spontaneously tried to crawl out. It was sundown now. I crawled to the edge of the grave, and got to a place where the bamboo was on my face and I was able to breathe through it. I heard the man who was standing on the hill instruct the shovel driver to bury us more—he had seen that I was not yet buried—but the driver left the place and didn’t do it.

After he heard the noises of the vehicles fade away, crawled out of the mass grave, leaving his dead relatives behind. He made his way to the main Al-Hillah-Baghdad road, and met four sympathetic Shi‘a Iraqi soldiers who helped him return home.

Witnesses to the Al-Mahawil Arrests and Detentions

There are many others in the Al-Hillah area who witnessed the mass detentions and executions. Their testimonies provide further evidence of the mass detentions at Al-Mahawil military base and the subsequent executions of thousands. ISKANDAR JAWAD WITWIT, the newly-appointed Mayor, was a high-ranking Air Force officer based at Al-Mahawil at the time. He said that the Iraqi government crushed the uprising in Al-Hillah by March 11, 1991, and immediately began a massive arrest campaign throughout the area:

They arrested everyone they saw [and took them to Al-Mahawil military base]. If they found men, women, or children, they took them. People were brought from Al-Hillah, An-Najaf, and Karbala for execution. The executions happened every day; they killed thousands of people. [HRW interview with ISKANDAR JAWAD WITWIT, Hillah, May 17, 2003]
who was himself arrested on March 16, 1991, on suspicion of supporting the uprising, explained part of the massive Al-Mahawil military base had been taken over by individuals and organizations directly involved in the arrests and the killings. These people included high-ranking Ba'ath party members, General Security, Special Security (al-Amn al-Khas), the intelligence services (mukhabarat), and leading members of the pro-government Albu Alwan tribe, including its head shaikh, MUHAMMAD JAWAD ONAIFIS, who is in U.S. custody on suspicion of involvement in the Al-Mahawil executions.

Another eyewitness, himself a soldier at the time of the mass executions, provided detailed information to HRW about the involvement of Special Republican Guard troops in the detentions and executions. He drove from An-Najaf to Babel on March 8, 1991, together with his cousin KARIM 'ABD AL-SADIQ HITBAN, age 35 and also a soldier. The two men had just completed a three-day leave and were returning to their military base when they were stopped outside Al-Hillah by Special Republican Guard troops, whom they identified by the red triangular badges on their uniforms. The Special Republican Guards, he said, detained everyone who came to their checkpoint, loading more than 100 persons into their trucks, and took them to the Al-Mahawil military base:

They took us directly to prison. The prison was in the territory of Al-Mahawil military training camp near Babel [Babylon], 30 kilometers from the place where we were detained. There were many people in the track, like one hundred or 150, both servicemen and civilians. They blindfolded us
and tied our hands behind our backs. In the prison they took away the blindfolds and untied our hands.

The conditions in the Al-Mahawil detention camp were very abusive:

We were all herded to a hall where we could hardly stand. We were not allowed to use the toilet and we used a corner of the hall for our necessities. It was very dirty, stuffy, and smelly there. From time to time three or four Special Republican Guards came in to the hall and began beating us with their rifles, sticks, or iron bars. They picked out people in groups of three or four, blindfolded them, tied up their hands again and took away from the hall. These people would never return. They also took away my cousin.

________ was fortunate. His former military commander whom he had served under in Mosul, MAJOR HUSSEIN ABDALLAH, was one of the Special Republican Guard officers at the Al-Mahawil military base. MAJOR HUSSEIN ABDALLAH recognized his former soldier and released him to return to his military unit. According to _______ MAJOR HUSSEIN ABDALLAH was one of three members of an “execution committee” that decided who would die and who would live:

I know about the execution committee from the Special Republican Guards themselves. When I went out of the hall I saw a group of them at the door of the next building. They told me the execution committee behind that door decided who will be executed. The door was open and I saw a big room, a table and the members of the execution committee sitting at the table. [HRW interview with _______ Mahawil, May 16, 2003]

Witnesses to the Executions

The executions carried out near the Al-Mahawil military base, at the site where the large mass grave was discovered in an open field in May, 2003, were also witnessed by local farmers in the area. The farmers were threatened with death, and remained silent about the killings until the fall of the government of
HUSSEIN, a farmer who lives close to the mass grave site, described a month of almost daily executions that he witnessed from his home:

They started to bring groups of innocent people to this graveyard and began executing them here. Every day, those criminals started executing people at 9:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. They brought people here in buses—each group was between 120 and 150 people. They would bring three groups of this size each day. Before they brought these people, they would bring a bulldozer to dig holes. Military members surrounded the area so no one would come near the place. When they brought the people, they pushed them into the holes with their hands tied and their eyes covered. When they pushed them into the holes, they would start shooting massively. Afterwards, they would bring the bulldozers to bury the people. Then the criminals would prepare for the second and third groups [of victims]. This operation lasted from March 7 until April 6, 1991. [HRW interview with

May 16, 2003]

His brother had also had witnessed the executions:

They used to bring people from Al-Mahawil military base to this site. Their hands and
eyes were bound. They would bring them here in Kuwaiti buses that carried about 45 passengers and a Toyota Coaster bus that carried about 21 passengers....They brought a full army division and surrounded the area. Most [non-military at the site] were Ba'ath party members, the others were from pro-government tribes. The military were in uniform, the Ba'ath and the tribal people were in civilian clothes with red kaffiyas....I heard the sound of the shooting and heard the executed people shout. I would hear this several times each day. They used a bulldozer shovel to bury the graves—after they finished their work, they took it with them....would go to the roof and watch the executions—when they shot them and buried them in the holes. They used to take them from the cars and push them inside the holes. Their hands were tied and their eyes covered, sometimes two people were bound together. They put them inside the holes. They used to hit them, they had no mercy. The victims were unable to do anything—they would just start to shoot at them. After they were killed, they buried them using the bulldozer shovels. Every day, they used to dig three holes. Those were the holes they would use for that day. [HRW interview with [May 16, 2003]

Shortly after the executions at Al-Mahawil, the authorities appropriated the land of local farmers on which the mass grave was located and gave it to [a member of the pro-government Albu Alwan tribe—according to many witnesses, members of the Albu Alwan tribe were directly involved in the arrest and execution campaign.

The farmers who had witnessed the killings were regularly harassed, threatened, and arrested by Iraqi officials who accused them of trying to leak information about the mass grave to the international community. On June 6, 1993, Iraqi officials arrested the entire farming community in the area, and took them to the police station in Iskandriyya city. There, accused the farmers of digging up the mass graves and photographing the sites and smuggling the information to foreign journalists, but the men were ultimately released.
On April 5, 1991, the RCC announced "the complete crushing of acts of sedition, sabotage, and rioting in all towns of Iraq."

Additionally on April 5, 1991, the United Nations issued resolution 688, which:

Gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish-populated areas, which led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions which threatens international peace and security in the region,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering involved...

condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish-populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region.... [Attached as Enclosure #]
Iraqis Still Defying Arms Ban, Departing U.N. Official Says.

By BARBARA CROSSETTE

UNITED NATIONS, June 24--Six years after the Security Council imposed its extraordinarily intrusive inspections on Iraq, that country's scientists are still under orders to keep the nation ready to make lethal chemical weapons at short notice, even if existing stockpiles are destroyed, according to a United Nations official.

"We have documentary evidence about orders from the leadership to preserve a strategic capability," said Rolf Ekeus, the Swedish arms control expert who has directed the disarming of Iraq since 1991. "That means to keep the production equipment ready to produce at any given moment."

The commission headed by Mr. Ekeus feels that it is closing in on Iraq's missile programs, and the International Atomic Energy Agency is optimistic that it has shut down potentially "dangerous" nuclear projects.

But United Nations inspectors are focusing special concern on the less visible but very perilous chemical and biological weapons and the delivery systems Baghdad may be planning for them.

Denied-access to the West, Iraq has turned to Eastern Europe and Asia in search of prohibited equipment, said Mr. Ekeus in an interview a week before he steps down at the end of the month to become Sweden's ambassador to the United States.

In six years, Mr. Ekeus said, the Iraqis have consistently refused to cooperate in good faith, apparently believing that they could fool inspectors who would then go away. His comments echoed reports by past inspectors and his inspectors have often made about Iraq in those years, and frustration that nothing has seemed to change.

"They come up with a new explanation..."

Continued on page A3
Iraq Still Defies Arms Ban, Official Says

Continued from Page A1

The concern about shadowy biological and chemical projects intensified the urgency of stopping Iraq of the chemical and biological weapons programs, said Mr. Ekeus, who will be succeeded as executive chairman of the United Nations Special Commission by Richard Butler, an Australian arms control expert who is now that nation's representative at the United Nations.

Mr. Ekeus said he was aware that with his departure the Iraqis might be tempted to change the rules in their relations with the inspections team, or that they would try to test the will of a new team. "It is important," he said, "that the Security Council, and the world at large, keep pressure on Baghdad. A number of Middle Eastern countries have begun to urge a relaxation in sanctions..."

The special commission, armed with the most advanced equipment, has the authority to inspect Iraqi sites, destroy weapons and confiscate documents. By Security Council order, Iraq must comply with President Saddam Hussein's April 27 orders of June 27, and the inspections imposed on his Government after its 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

The commission has a total staff of about 150, most of them based in Iraq or moving regularly in and out of the country, to conduct inspections. The commission also has a team of monitoring devices to detect secret chemical production, and some 130 tamper-resistant surveillance cameras that provide live pictures of the plant. There are also cameras to monitor the Baghdad center by microwave radio links under international control. The commission also has the use of an American U-2 spy plane and satellite imaging, helicopters with high-powered cameras, and ground penetrating radars.

On Saturday, the Security Council threatened to tighten the sanctions in the fall if Iraq blocked or delayed inspections, as it has begun to do again in recent weeks. Among other measures, Iraqi officials could be denied visas to travel abroad.

"They blocked us at three locations," Mr. Ekeus said, describing his recent attempts to enter politically sensitive sites. The quality of the inspection was "very, very low," he said. "They delayed us once seven hours, once five. When the high officials arrived, he waited until the site commander cleaned out the place and investigated," he continued. "We have to go to odd times. Sometimes on night inspections, sometimes on Fridays, a holiday. We have to account for all such equipment we can find, and we tag them and follow them..."

Among the chemical agents in Iraq's arsenal are mustard gas and an exceptionally deadly nerve gas known as VX, which Iraqi forces denied they had, then admitted they had experimented with in 1989.

"Of course we have found documents and had investigated, so they couldn't deny it," Mr. Ekeus said. "Then we managed to detect a huge amount of imports of certain chemicals, so-called precursors, which could be used, possibly for anything but VX production."

"Why did you import these?" we asked. "Where are they now? They said, "We destroyed them secretly..."

"Then comes this matter of secret destruction, which is large-scale," Mr. Ekeus said. "Where did the secret destruction take place? Who decided? Who gave the order? Who carried out the order?"

Mr. Ekeus said his team interviewed people all the way down the line until they found someone who had carried out the destruction of material that Iraq denied having. But was it all destroyed? Mr. Ekeus said that lingering questions about chemical weapons stocks remain.

Iraq, pressed in the 1980s, in attacks meant to suppress rebellious Kurds, that it was selling to use chemical weapons. It had supplied some of its stores during the Persian Gulf war, but was apparently dissuaded from unleashing them, at least on a clearly detectable scale, by warnings of catastrophic retaliation.

After the war, Mr. Ekeus's international team of scientists and weapons experts destroyed stocks of these agents and passed on the information to the United States, where question about possible links between chemical agents and the illness known as gulf war syndrome..."
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: [Redacted]

From: [Redacted]

SO-11

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Approved By: [Redacted]

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UPLOADED

WITH/TEXT [Redacted]

WITH/OUT TEXT [Redacted]

BY [Redacted]

DATE 9/30/99
The Associated Press

BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) - Iraq's deputy prime minister led foreign reporters on a tour of Saddam Hussein's presidential palaces Friday, showing off lawns as big as several soccer fields and ornate sitting rooms that he declared U.N. inspectors will never see.

In New York, U.S. diplomats asked the U.N. Security Council to condemn Iraq's continuing refusal to open all sites to inspection for illegal weapons.

Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz toured about a dozen palaces with reporters, insisting Iraq is hiding nothing.

Arms monitors have demanded access to the presidential compounds to determine whether Iraq has met U.N. orders to destroy its weapons of mass destruction - a condition required to end sanctions imposed after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, setting off the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

"They shall never be allowed in," Aziz told the reporters. "Their inspection injures the dignity and sovereignty of the nation."

Iraq wanted reporters to see the palaces "where a lot of mystery has been fabricated," Aziz said, "so that you can see yourselves that these are normal presidential sites."

Reporters saw five palaces in the presidential complex on the western bank of the Tigris River in Baghdad, which is off-limits to civilians.

One building featured a huge domed hall tiled with Italian marble. Another had bronze statues of soldiers and paintings of Saddam leading his army into victory.

There were two palaces under construction in the sprawling compound, which was large enough that journalists had to take buses from one site to the next.

Staring down from the tops of the palaces were four huge bronze busts of Saddam.

Reporters also toured the presidential complex outside Baghdad, where huge man-made lakes were filled with wild ducks and birds. One palace there featured a wall filled by a huge Italian marble mosaic of a falcon.

Aziz said the main palace in Baghdad, which was built in the 1950s, was bombed during the Gulf War. A mural shows Saddam helping the builders during its reconstruction.

Some of the palaces were vacant of furniture and staff. A few sentries stood guard at their entrances.

Saddam's personal secretary, Lt. Gen. Abid Hamoud, greeted journalists at one site and restated Iraq's opposition to opening that palace.

The inspectors "will never be allowed to enter these places even if all are bombed and turned into ruins," Hamoud said.

Aziz was asked why he was opening these premises to journalists but not to the inspectors.

"You are guests. You are not inspectors," he replied. "Guests are allowed, inspectors are not allowed. Very simple."

Aziz took journalists to one multi-story building, which he said was the building where Iraq turned away an inspection team led by an American, Scott Ritter, three months ago - sparking a showdown with the United Nations.

"This is the notorious building which Mr. Ritter wanted to inspect in his last leg of inspections in September. And our refusal for that led to a fury at the Security Council," he said.

The U.N. inspectors, meanwhile, visited four sites Friday, the official Iraqi News Agency reported. Ritter's team inspected two military areas, including an air force base.

AP-NY-12-19-97 1710EST
The Associated Press

BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) - A U.N. arms inspector singled out for criticism by Iraq shrugged off the government's attacks as an effort to divert attention from its refusal to provide access to all suspected weapons sites.

"Instead of addressing this issue, it appears the Iraqi authorities have chosen to vilify an individual inspector," Scott Ritter, of the United States, told The Associated Press on Saturday. "Such vilification in no way moves the process forward."

In the past few days, Baghdad repeatedly has lashed out at Ritter.

Deputy Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz told reporters Friday that Ritter was "a troublemaker."

Iraqi newspapers condemned him for carrying out a surprise inspection Thursday of a tourist resort where President Saddam Hussein is known to stay.

Iraqi officials also accused him of being an agent of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

"It is absolutely untrue ... I have never been employed or affiliated with the CIA," Ritter told the AP. "I find it disturbing and even insulting that Iraqi authorities with whom I have worked in the past six years would undertake such tactics."

Ritter, a U.N. weapons inspector for six years, currently leads a team of 18 inspectors in Iraq.

The U.N. Security Council has warned Baghdad it will not lift the sweeping trade sanctions imposed after its 1990 invasion of Kuwait until Iraq proves it has eliminated its weapons of mass destruction.

Iraq says it has nothing left to hide. It maintains that there are no more banned weapons or documents in its possession.

But Ritter said the Iraqi authorities had adopted a sophisticated "concealment mechanism" that allows them to keep a step ahead of the inspectors and foil their surprise visits.

He declined to elaborate, but said part of this mechanism was the denial of access to presidential sites.

Baghdad has ruled 60 sites, including about 40 presidential palaces, off-limits to the U.N. inspectors on grounds of national sovereignty.

In one high-profile incident, Ritter, 36, was turned away in September, when he tried to enter the presidential compound on the west bank of the Tigris River in Baghdad.

Iraqi authorities said the site was out of bounds and his attempt was provocative.

"We do not focus on a site as being presidential or otherwise labeled," Ritter said. "If Iraq has declared a given site presidential, this is their prerogative. But it in no way gives them the right to deny access to that site."

Ritter said he had spent the past 18 months keeping tabs on the means by which Iraq "systematically conceals its proscribed material and activities."

"This is an extremely difficult task which requires perseverance over an extended period of time," he said.

Since he first started work in Iraq in December 1991, Ritter has taken part in more than 30 inspection missions, 12 of them as chief inspector.

In 1995, Ritter's team discovered the missile guidance and control equipment that Iraq had bought through Palestinian business agent Wiam Qababich.

AP-NY-12-20-97 2113EST
BAHGDAD, Dec 22 (Reuters) - An Iraqi newspaper on Monday urged the government to expel U.N. arms inspectors again and suspend cooperation with them if the United States launched a military attack on Iraq.

"Iraq should respond to any further U.S. aggression on its people by expelling all politically motivated personnel within UNSCOM (U.N. Special Commission) and refrain from cooperating with this commission," the daily English-language Baghdad Observer said in a commentary.

The United States on Sunday stepped up its campaign to put diplomatic pressure on Iraq to allow U.N. inspectors access to suspected weapons sites.

U.S. Defence Secretary William Cohen said on the CBS television programme "Face the Nation": "We hope to pursue this in diplomatic channels and see if we can't exhaust all reasonable opportunities to do that."

But neither Cohen nor U.S. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, speaking on ABC's "This Week" television programme, ruled out military options to force Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to comply.

The United States has assembled a strong military force in the Gulf region.

Iraq briefly expelled American members of the U.N. inspection teams in November, sparking a standoff with the United Nations and the United States.

UNSCOM chairman Richard Butler then withdrew almost all arms inspectors from Baghdad and Washington sent military forces to the Gulf.

Iraq let the inspectors including Americans back in after winning pledges from mediator Russia to push for an end to U.N. sanctions imposed on Baghdad after it invaded Kuwait in 1990. But it has declared that so-called "presidential sites" are off-limits to UNSCOM.

"Butler is trying to serve U.S. interests by creating a crisis between Iraq and the United Nations that could be used by the Clinton administration as a pretext to launch aggression on Iraq," the paper said.

The government newspaper al-Jumhouriya accused UNSCOM of recruiting officers from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

"The commission is depending mainly on officers from the American intelligence," it said.

The paper also said the commission was relying on hostile intelligence services for information concerning Iraq's weapons programmes and called for setting a neutral committee to check the data.

The ruling Baath party newspaper al-Thawra said that even if Iraq allowed U.N. inspectors into the disputed sites, Washington would find an excuse to create another crisis.

"No one should think that if Iraq accepts the inspection of presidential sites, America would agree to implement paragraph 22 (of the U.N. resolution 687)," the paper said.

The paragraph would allow Iraq free oil exports if UNSCOM certified that Baghdad was clear of weapons of mass destruction.

The paper repeated a statement issued by Iraqi leaders on Saturday saying that Iraq would not remain idle in the face of the "American game" aiming at prolonging sanctions.

05:38 12-22-97
SADDAK'S BEST FRIENDS
How the C.I.A. made it a lot easier for the Iraqi leader to rearm.

BY SEYMOUR M. HERSHEY

Last December, after Saddam Hussein threatened to end seven years of United Nations arms-control inspections, President Clinton ordered American attacks on Iraq. Once again, the world watched, on television, as missiles fell on carefully picked targets. The purpose of the attacks, Clinton said, was to "degrade" Iraq's capacity for waging war, and he added, "I gave the order because I believe we cannot allow Saddam Hussein to dismantle UNSCOM and resume the production of weapons of mass destruction with impunity." The President was mistaken.

When the C.I.A. trampled the U.N.'s turf, Saddam survived, arms control didn't.

Saddam responded to the bombing—and the bungled assassination attempt—by formally outing UNSCOM and turning a policy of dealing with the head. The C.I.A. was the real target. That, too, was a misstatement, for two of the targets were sites where Saddam was known to entertain mistresses, and they were specifically struck in the hope of assassinating him.

Ritter, the Deputy Secretary of State—"but Primakov is just not a good guy."
pret its intelligence findings since 1991, had a different agenda. Its goal, authorized by President Clinton, was to work with Iraqi dissidents, in Saddam’s Special Security Organization and elsewhere, to overthrow the regime, by any means possible. In the C.I.A.'s view, Ritter's intelligence unit was always in the way—and, in any case, could not be trusted, with sensitive information; the C.I.A. felt that any important intelligence it might supply to UNSCOM would inevitably find its way back to the Iraqi regime. There were killer fights about getting involved with the U.N.,” one former C.I.A. official told me. “We don’t get involved with international organizations.”

In March of 1998, a high-tech team from the National Security Agency, which is responsible for American communications intelligence, flew to Bahrain to review the telephone intercepts. One official recalled that when the intercepts had been decrypted and translated, the Americans told themselves, “Here’s the best intelligence that we’ve ever had!” The official went on, “Saddam is suddenly exposed for the first time. He’s the Godfather! He gets drunk, starts raving like a madman, and his secretary will get on and say he’s lost his mind—ordering murders. We never had him on this level before.” Like Mafia leaders, Saddam rarely, if ever, uses the telephone himself, but relies on aides to relay his commands. The overheard “secretary” was Presidential Secretary Abid Hamid Mahmoud, Saddam’s closest aide, who was much feared by Iraqis. At the same time, the official said, senior N.S.A. managers were “panicked,” because the information from the telephone intercepts was “controlled by the United Nations.”

The Americans felt that Ritter’s intelligence was too important to be left to arms controllers. For the first time, with the aid of intercepts, Saddam’s hour-to-hour whereabouts could conceivably be tracked—and even anticipated. Within a few months, the Clinton Administration persuaded Richard Butler, an Australian who in the summer of 1997 had been appointed the executive chairman of UNSCOM, to tell Ritter and his men in Baghdad that they would have to get out of the signals-intelligence business: Washington, and not UNSCOM, would now decide whom and what to listen to. (Butler disputes this account.)

Thus, in April of 1998, operational control of the Saddam intercepts shifted to one of America’s least publicized intelligence units, the Special Collection Services. The S.C.S., which is jointly operated by the C.I.A. and the N.S.A., is responsible, among other things, deploying highly trained teams of electronics specialists in sensitive areas around the world to monitor diplomatic and other kinds of communications. Its operations are often run from secure sites inside American embassies.

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The UNSCOM team in Baghdad felt betrayed, and believed that it would now be vulnerable to capture and prosecution by Iraq on espionage charges. The team’s equipment was still intercepting crucial telephone calls, but the United States was controlling the “take.” Ritter, desperate to keep the operation under U.N. control, asked the Israelis to process the telephone intercepts. (Israeli intelligence had been the first group to tell UNSCOM about the importance of Saddam’s Special Security Organization.) The Israelis refused (under pressure from Washington), and the UNSCOM operation was shut down until July, when the Americans unilaterally installed their own collection devices in the UNSCOM offices in Baghdad.

Ritter was reluctant to discuss the specifics of the UNSCOM intelligence program, but in a series of interviews recently he stressed that there was an enormous difference between accumulating information on behalf of the United Nations and accumulating it on behalf of the United States. “Stuff was being collected—by the Americans—without our knowledge and without Butler’s knowledge,” Ritter said. “That’s espionage. My team was worried. I told Butler about it—the American operation—and we said we have to shut it down.

I didn’t happen.

Once the American technicians were in control, they focused on Saddam—and not on his missiles and warheads. They eventually found a pattern in Saddam’s movements, as tracked by intercepts, which they believed might lead to a successful attempt to eliminate him. Saddam regularly saw his mistresses in two sites—one a retreat at Auja, near his ancestral home, Tikrit, and the other at his daughter’s villa in Babil, in suburban Baghdad. When the American forces attacked Iraq in December, cruise missiles destroyed both targets.

Saddam, of course, survived. One senior Clinton Administration intelligence official acknowledged the failure, but he added, “In our business, you never have one-hundred-per-cent assurance. Let’s assume you know he’s there. You’ve got a time delay. How do you know a guy doesn’t finish the business with his mistress and go on his way, or to the bathroom. It may be a double—someone posing as Saddam—or he may have changed locations. There’s so much potential for a slip between cup and lip.”

A Republican who served as a high level in the Reagan and Bush Administrations told me that he had learned before the December raid that the Administration had “a fix” on Saddam’s whereabouts. Administration officials, he said, “were touting” the fact that they had good intelligence. “People treat Saddam as an idiot,” he said, referring to Clinton and his senior aides. He added that the failure of the bombing was evidence that Saddam had been aware of the penetration of his telephones. In his opinion, the man said, “He was doubling or tripling on the commas”—intelligence jargon meaning that Saddam was deliberately generating misleading or incorrect statements.

Other high-level intelligence officials I spoke with had reservations about the Administration’s eagerness to eliminate Saddam in the absence of any long-term strategic plan for dealing with the region.

“Tm not against nailing the guy,” one fully informed military officer said to me, “but then what do you do?” Assassination, he added, “is not a policy. It’s a tool of policy.” (Officially, of course, “assassination,” which is barred by Executive Order, was “not the purpose of the raids.”) A former intelligence official who still consults at a high level in the Clinton Administration told me, “Eventually, they’ll succeed. And then what do we get?”

The result of the American hijacking of the U.N.’s intelligence activities was that Saddam survived but UNSCOM did not. “The American government walked on its dick—and with golf shoes,” a disgruntled U.N. official told me. “They just goofed us.”

In retrospect, given the inherent conflict between the C.I.A. and UNSCOM, the remarkable fact is that UNSCOM lasted as long as it did. In early 1991, during the Gulf War, the member...
states of the United Nations had helped the United States roll back the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The spirit of post-Cold War cooperation promised a miracle: UNSCOM, operating on behalf of the U.N. Security Council, would utilize the secret intelligence agencies of its member states, Communist and non-Communist alike, to investigate the Iraqi arsenal. Dozens of nations joined Washington in providing intelligence support and their most sophisticated intelligence officers to the early UNSCOM inspections.

The first executive chairman of UNSCOM, Rolf Ekeus, of Sweden, was a diplomat and arms-control expert with an amiable personality that masked a determination to run UNSCOM as an independent U.N. operation, and not as an adjunct of American foreign policy. Ekeus did turn to an American, however, for help in setting up an intelligence unit. He chose Scott Ritter, who had served as an intelligence officer in the Gulf War. In the security-conscious world of intelligence, Ritter arrived at the U.N. with high-risk baggage: earlier, while serving in a top-secret Pentagon arms-control job in the Soviet Union, he had been suspected of being romantically involved with a Georgian national. (He subsequently married the woman.) With this shaky security file, he was nobody's choice in Washington for the UNSCOM job, and some CIA officials chose to be skeptical of his bona fides.

Initially, the agency insisted that Ritter be excluded from its own intelligence briefings to UNSCOM, although Nikita Smidovich, a former Russian diplomat and arms-control expert, who was also assigned to UNSCOM's intelligence unit, was allowed to attend them. An internal CIA review by a senior intelligence official named Samuel Hoskinson, however, quickly concluded that Ritter was not a security risk, and the agency dropped its restriction. "I never thought Ritter was going to give anything away," Hoskinson told me. "Anyway, we're not stupid. We don't share everything with the U.N."

The proposed sharing of intelligence had some American proponents. It was the first time we ever turned over [intelligence] assets to a group like the United Nations," recalled David C. Underwood, a retired Air Force colonel who in 1991 was assigned to serve as a State Department liaison to UNSCOM. "I'm a twenty-six-year veteran—a Cold War warrior," he told me. "We had the greatest scientists and the great intelligence analysts of forty countries working together, with all hands on top of the table." He then described a dramatic early meeting of UNSCOM at which a Russian military expert briefed his counterparts from the Defense Department on how the Iraqis had camouflaged their fleet of mobile Scud missile launchers, with Russian help, before the Gulf War. (Only a few of the Scuds were destroyed by Allied bombing during the war.) "I had a colonel from Russian intelligence and one from the C.I.A. at the same table," Underwood said.

Not everyone in Washington shared Underwood's enthusiasm. "Some people in our government could not stand it," he explained, referring to the senior officials of the C.I.A.'s Directorate of Operations. "You have to understand the culture. People in the C.I.A. are a mixture of professionals and careerists overlaid with a Cold War mentality. The impulse is to spy." In the months before Iraq's August, 1990, invasion of Kuwait, however, Saddam had been relentless in driving potential American spies out of his government and military. "His counterintelligence blew them away," I was told by a former C.I.A. operations officer. "All the significant assets we had in Iraq died in 1989. The agency had zipped." The operators in the C.I.A. inevitably saw UNSCOM—if such an agency had to be tolerated—as a vehicle for collecting intelligence on Iraq. The U.N. inspectors were on the ground in Iraq, where the C.I.A. could not be.

The struggle between UNSCOM and Washington intensified in September of 1991, when a U.N. inspection team was detained by Iraqi forces in a Baghdad parking lot for four days, after its leaders refused to return newly discovered documents dealing with efforts by Iraq to obtain nuclear weapons. To Ekeus's surprise, some details of the parking-lot standoff were made public by the Bush Administration—an American member of the UNSCOM delegation had been "signalling privately" to the United States via a secure satellite-telephone link. Ekeus upbraided the American for his back-channel reporting to Washington, and soon received an angry telephone call from Richard Clarke, the director of the State Department's office of political-military affairs. "He said they—the American inspectors—should report to him and not to the United Nations," Ekeus recalled, adding dryly, "We had a nasty conversation. Ekeus held his ground, and refused to authorize any independent reporting from his inspection teams to Washington. "The Americans were irritated at us, because they could not control the flow of information," he said.

Before leaving office, President Bush politically embarrassed by Saddam's defiance after the Gulf War, secretly authorized the C.I.A. to begin plotting a coup. When Clinton succeeded Bush, he and his national-security adviser, Anthony Lake, renewed that authorization. But the new President and his aides wanted to keep Iraq off the front page. Ekeus recalled, "Lake used to say to me, 'Don't give us sweaty palms'—that is, don't create any crises. Dealing with Iraq became a secondary issue for the Washington bureaucracy, and the day-to-day management was left to junior officers in the Pentagon and the State Department—and, of course, to the C.I.A. Lake and one of his senior aides on the National Security Council, George Tenet (who was named C.I.A. director in 1996), became fervent supporters of a quick fix—the elimination of Saddam Hussein by a bloody coup d'état. At various times, they suggested that it was to be triggered by the Iraqi exile movement or from within Saddam's immediate circle of advisers. The failure of the White House to understand the severe limitations of the C.I.A.'s Directorate of Operations—only a few officers in the Near East Division spoke Arabic, for example—would mar Iraqi policy and create enormous difficulties for UNSCOM.

One agency officer in particular, a recent Defcon with eventually took over Iraq operations as head of the Near East Division, opposed UNSCOM's independence. Renowned inside the agency as a territorial and single-minded manager, Richter had grown up in the Directorate of Operations, and had served two decades abroad, much of it in the Middle East. Before he was recalled to Washington to run the Near East Division, he had been chief of station in Amman, Jordan, which was the overseas center for the C.I.A.'s coup plotting inside Iraq. Just before his promotion, Richter had been
deeply involved in the machinations of a group of high-level Iraqi defectors who he and his superiors thought provided the best hope of eliminating Saddam.

Richter was a controversial, and intimidating, manager—brilliant, but, as even his defenders acknowledged, with considerable faults. "Steven really knows his business," one colleague told me. "He's probably one of the savviest operational guys. But he's still dealing with a deck from the Cold War era. It's the D.O. mentality—very turfish." Another colleague said that Richter's insistence on making all decisions himself had been extremely destructive to the Near East Division. "He's in control, and you don't question him," the intelligence officer told me. "He's driven off the talented core of Arabists." A former White House official similarly depicted Richter as consistently letting "his ego get in on the way on the job," and explained, "He takes any person with independence and says, 'Get out of here.' Everybody who has any clue—it's 'Out of here.'" The result, the former official added, was that Richter ended up surrounded by "tail-wagging idiots" and found himself constantly being outmaneuvered by Saddam.

The Near East Division was internally polarized as the result of an earlier Richter assignment, as the director of a secret operations center in Germany in the late nineteen-eighties. The center's mission had been to collect intelligence from Iranians who were spying, at great personal risk, inside Iran. The operation was primitive. From Iran, the agents mailed their intelligence reports to a seemingly innocent private home or a mailbox in Germany—known in the trade as an "accommodation address"—to which the C.I.A. had access. "There were only two accommodation addresses" for Iran inside Germany; one of Richter's former associates told me. "It was assumed that Iranian counterintelligence was locked onto them and saw them." Richter discounted the warnings of colleagues and ordered the agents to double their reporting. (At the time, as everyone involved understood, a basic measure of a station chief's success was sheer volume of intelligence reports.)

Remarkably, as a subsequent internal C.I.A. counter-intelligence investigation showed, letters sent to Richter's agents in Iran were often addressed in the same hand and mailed in batches that included the return accommodation addresses. The Iranians quickly became suspicious and blew the network apart. More than thirty Iranian informants were seized and put to death. Many of Richter's associates remain convinced that the requirement for more message-traffic was their undoing. One associate told me, "Everybody in the organization who has a memory of this knows that Richter was guilty of the worst sin a senior operations officer could be accused of—being sloppy."

In early 1994, Rolf Ekeus was privately approached by an Israeli intelligence official, and he agreed to open discussions with Israel on the sharing of UNSCOM information. The first meeting, in New York, provided an electric moment. The Israelis had turned over a stack of intelligence reports, and the UNSCOM staff began rapidly flipping through the pages. At first, the documents seemed humdrum—"mostly an account of Iraqi stockpiles," Scott Ritter recalled. But one paragraph revealed the existence of the Iraqi weapons-concealment operation and the elite units in Saddam's Special Security Organization that were assigned to it.

Ritter now saw an opportunity, and envisaged a joint Israeli-Iranian United Nations signals-intelligence (SIGINT) operation aimed at Saddam's Special Security Organization. This prospect triggered acute anxiety at the C.I.A. What's more, Ritter and his colleagues wanted Washington's permission to share U-2 reconnaissance photographs of Iraq with the Israelis, whose photo interpreters were highly regarded. That was a hard sell, and it took more than six months. Ekeus himself had to intervene with John M. Deutch, who became C.I.A. director in May of 1995. Ekeus had enormous leverage in the dispute, for the U-2 flights were under the direct control of UNSCOM and could not be challenged by Saddam. If Washington rejected Ekeus's request and insisted that the U-2 film not be shared with Israel, all parties understood that Ekeus would simply stop the U-2 flights. Ekeus got his way, but only after a bitter struggle.

The Directorate of Operations resisted the move. "I can't tell you how much the D.O. sandbagged UNSCOM on the U-2 dispute," one former C.I.A. official told me. "They used to spin Deutch up—that is, raise constant..."
A New York Times article from April 9, 1999, discusses the U.S. government's actions in Iraq in the lead-up to the Gulf War. The article mentions the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its role in providing intelligence to U.S. forces in Iraq. The article also references the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi army's actions during the conflict. The article includes several paragraphs of text, but due to the image quality, only a portion of the text is legible. The article discusses the CIA's role in providing intelligence to U.S. forces and the impact of that intelligence on the outcome of the conflict. The article also mentions the role of the United Nations and its efforts to halt the conflict. The article concludes with a note about the impact of the conflict on the region and the world.
UNSCOM inspectors. Once the frequency was found—by itself an extremely difficult task—the signal could be recorded and sent off to N.S.A. headquarters, in Fort Meade, Maryland, for decryption and translation. Signals intelligence, if processed quickly and accurately, could help to unravel the Iraqi patterns of concealment and deception, and so make it possible to find the missiles and warheads that the UNSCOM inspectors sensed were being hidden. Eventually, after a few months of collection, Ritter recalled, UNSCOM was presented with the "take" from the intercepts, but much of it consisted of partial transcripts and summaries of Iraqi conversations "in the clear"—that is, unscrambled. There was little evidence of the encrypted conversations.

"It was crap," Ritter said. Washington was keeping the good stuff to itself.

UNSCOM's response to the lack of cooperation, Ritter said, was to say, in essence, "Screw the Americans," and to hand over its reels of tapes for processing to the Israelis and to British intelligence, with whom Ritter had established a working relationship. He went on, "I told the Brits, 'You have to understand that the Israelis are players and would share the take.' The Brits said it was up to Rolfin'." Ekeus gave his approval, Ritter said, but UNSCOM's SIGINT operation—not yet able to decipher encrypted telephone talk—merely "pissed along" until the breakthrough in the spring of 1998. The intelligence being collected, of high quality or not, was doing little to help UNSCOM keep Saddam from amassing a nuclear arsenal.

Ekeus initially refused to discuss details of electronic intelligence with me and warned me that Ritter often "fantasizes" about past events. But when I repeated Ritter's account to him he acknowledged that "much of what Ritter says is true. We had the technology to get Saddam, and we did all the work. We asked the Americans to process it, and they gave us very little—chicken feed. The United States was not prepared to go out on a limb for us."

Sometimes in 1996, the C.I.A.'s Near East Division, with approval from a high-level authority, had begun a separate, illicit SIGINT operation inside Iraq, sending in teams disguised as UNSCOM inspectors, to install listening devices aimed at Iraqi military movements. The highly secret operation, which was publicly disclosed early this month by Barton Gellman of the Washington Post, used UNSCOM equipment throughout Iraq and UNSCOM office space in Baghdad. Ekeus's operation, revolving around a group of defectors from the raving Baathist Party in Iraq, was apparently tied to its efforts to bring about the long-awaited coup, which was scheduled to take place that summer. The plan ended in spectacular failure when one of Saddam's loyal officers contacted the C.I.A. station chief in Amman on a supposedly secure agency communications link and informed him that Saddam knew all the detailed plans of the coup and had rounded up and executed scores of those involved.

Ritter told me that he had eventually learned of the C.I.A.'s spring and had formally notified Charles Duelfer, the senior American in the UNSCOM chain of command. Ritter understood the seriousness of the issue: the C.I.A.'s intelligence-gathering, if it should be uncovered and made public by the Iraqis, would seriously erode UNSCOM's standing inside Iraq and among members of the international arms-control community. Ritter, who had been sharing everything he knew with Ekeus, did not share this discovery with him, and he acknowledged that it was not his finest moment.

"I was walking the line between being a good American, which I place above all else, and doing my UNSCOM duties with full integrity," he told me. "I knew that Charles was probably not going to tell Ekeus, but I—perhaps cowardly—had washed my hands of the affair."

When I talked to Ekeus, he derided "the stupidity of the C.I.A." in using a U.N. arms-control mission as a shield for collecting intelligence. "The political judgment is beyond contempt," he said.

Ritter feared that the illicit unilateral intelligence-gathering in Iraq would damage future multilateral arms inspections. "How can arms inspectors be trusted?" Ekeus asked. "It makes it difficult to reestablish arms control."

The collapse of UNSCOM has freed Russia, now the largest purchaser of Iraqi oil, from any constraints on the sale of arms and technology to Iraq. Saddam, with help from Moscow, is once again seeking to build up his strategic capabilities and his grandiose plans for domination of the Middle East. One U.S. arms-control expert says of him, "We're looking at a guy whose ambition is not defined by the Manhattan Project," which produced the two atomic bombs used during the Second World War. Saddam, he said, "wants to match the American and Russian bomb projects of the Cold War era."

ROLF EKEUS and Scott Ritter are not alone in their complaints about the C.I.A.'s operations in Iraq. The agency's inability to organize an effective coup against Saddam Hussein—Steven Rich-
ter's failure—is an open secret in Washington's foreign-affairs community. The major newspapers and the congressional intelligence committees are traditionally shy about publicly identifying senior officials of the Directorate of Operations, but Richter, in part because of his quarrel with Scott Ritter, has become a public figure.

Last October, Richard Perle, a foreign-affairs analyst who served as a high-level Defense Department official during the Reagan Administration, broke with tradition and publicly named Richter during a speech at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative Washington think tank. "Steve Richter," Perle said, "has an unbroken record of mismanagement and incompetence, and yet as far as I can tell there has been no effort whatsoever with failure following failure, to examine the internal effectiveness of Richter's organization. Perle concluded that Richter, "the head of the Near East Division at the Central Intelligence Agency, unless he's got a story to tell that justifies his continuation in that job, should be removed on grounds of incompetence and lack of fundamental qualification to hold that position."

Similarly harsh criticism was voiced in interviews with past and present White House and C.I.A. officials. "There is no line drawn in the D.O.," one retired intelligence officer told me. "I've been lied to by Steve Richter." Arms-control concerns about Iraq having nuclear bombs, he said, "are lost on the D.O." He added, "And we need their support. It was in our interest to take whatever information came along and get it to UNSCOM." The underlying issue is institutional, he said.

He urged that an effort be made by the agency's leadership to instill "some ethics" in the Directorate of Operations, "so other people"—in the C.I.A.—"can deal with issues on a basis of knowledge and trust."

Richter refused a request for an interview, but two of his superiors at C.I.A. headquarters agreed to meet with me to defend their subordinate. "Steve's a tough, no-nonsense officer who does his job well," one official said. "We have a lot of driven people here."

The official criticized Perle, saying, "I don't think we should have Richard Perle talking about what he thinks about Richter. Everybody thinks he can do our job better than most." The second official had praise for Scott Ritter, depicting him as a "folk hero" to many in the C.I.A., and described the dispute between Richter and Ritter as being equivalent to "two bulls in a pen." He said he wished that people could "get along or not get along, without it having international ramifications."

SADDAM HUSSEIN, confident after easily outmaneuvering the C.I.A.'s coup plotting, sought in the late summer of 1996 to derail the UNSCOM inspection schedule. Scott Ritter's unit, guided by its electronic intelligence, had targeted a cluster of Hussein's Special Republican Guard facilities that were believed to be shielding strategic materials. UNSCOM was getting close to the real thing, and Saddam provoked another crisis. Ritter's group refused to leave the entrances to inspection sites, and Iraqi guards refused to let them in. Ekeus flew to Baghdad. The White House had told him to get tough: Bill Clinton was ready to bomb. Ritter, in his recently published book "Endgame," depicts the trip as Ekeus's finest moment. Washington "might have intended for Ekeus to be a messenger," Ritter writes, "but Ekeus was his own man and knew he had a choice: be tough and lose the inspection process altogether, or seek a compromise and keep the inspection regime in place and functioning, even if flawed."

He chose compromise, and bombs did not fall. "Ekeus saw a fatal flaw in the Clinton policy, Ritter goes on to say. "Like the Bush Administration policy, it had no endgame. The Clinton team was willing to confront Iraq, but to what purpose?"

In an interview, Ekeus told me that one of his major concerns at the time was continued Russian cooperation with the U.N. disarmament process. The Soviet Union and Iraq had been trading partners since the early days of the Cold War, and Iraq owed Moscow at least seven billion dollars for its arms support during the eight-year war with Iran. It was understood by all that if Moscow lost faith in the integrity of UNSCOM it would begin to rearm Saddam. "Of course we had to have Russia satisfied," Ekeus said. "They had to be part of the process." As head of UNSCOM, Ekeus had successfully balanced concern about Russia, the unescalating pressure from the Clinton Administration, and the inherent risks in the ongoing SIGINT program.

Then, in July, 1997, Ekeus resigned— from the U.N. to become Sweden's Ambassador to the United States. He says he left behind one urgent recommendation: that UNSCOM "should not continue the SIGINT, because the return was not worth it."

Ekeus was among those who had enthusiastically endorsed Australia's Richard Butler as the new UNSCOM executive chairman. It was, Ekeus told me later, a terrible misjudgment. "Butler's lost control," he said. "He did not go into operations, and he wasn't interested in keeping the Iraqis on the defensive." Butler also failed to "see the warning signals" from Russia, Ekeus said. "If the Russians complain, he had to take it seriously." One of Butler's first acts was to formally create a Concessions and Investigations Unit—Ekeus had left matters informal—and put Ritter in charge. Butler also moved Charles Duelfer, the senior American UNSCOM
official, onto his management team, and, according to Ritter, began excluding Nikita Smidovich, the experienced Russian, from more sensitive matters. Butler has consistently maintained that he had “no knowledge” of an American turnover of UNSCOM’s intelligence operations in Iraq for its own purposes—a statement that was put into question by last December’s attempted assassination of Saddam. In an interview, one C.I.A. officer who worked closely with the UNSCOM intelligence operation agreed that Butler, unlike Ekeus, was not up to ‘challenging’ the Administration when it came to Iraqi policy. “He’s a great speaker,” the C.I.A. man said of Butler, with a shrug.

By the spring of 1998, the C.I.A. had taken Ritter and UNSCOM out of the loop on signals intelligence, but Ritter still had authority, subject to Butler’s approval, to initiate inspections anywhere in Iraq, and he continued to do so, with his usual aggressiveness. “That’s what finally turned the Administration around on Ritter,” a former C.I.A. official told me. “Ritter felt he needed the confrontations to provide intelligence. He wasn’t clearing them in advance; he was doing his job. But Sandy Berger and Madeleine Albright—the national-security adviser and the Secretary of State—couldn’t have their schedules dictated by when Ritter chose to have his confrontations with Iraq.”

Butler went along with the decision to rein in Ritter, and within months Ritter resigned. The U.N. inspection process began to unravel in public, and all that Saddam had to do to keep up with the story was to turn on CNN. There were immediate consequences. Intelligence reports began to pour into Washington describing the large volume of Russian arms and technical goods that were being trucked and flown into Iraq. The materials were believed to include spare parts for the surface-to-air missile systems that now defend Iraqi radar sites in the no-fly zones to the north and south of Baghdad, and also more sophisticated gear for Saddam’s missile systems.

The Russian involvement has raised questions in the C.I.A. about Yevgeny Primakov, the Russian Prime Minister, who is considered a potential successor to Boris Yeltsin. Primakov, an Arabist who in 1993 became the head of Russian foreign intelligence, had been posted to the Middle East in the nineteen-sixties as a Pravda correspondent, and he became friendly with Saddam Hussein. The two men grew closer after Saddam took over the Iraqi Presidency, in 1979. Just how close they remained became clear in 1996, when Ekeus attempted to enlist the help of Primakov’s Foreign Ministry in the gyroscope episode.

After the C.I.A. upset UNSCOM’s efforts to intercept the Russian gyroscope, Ekeus ordered the senior Russian on his staff, Nikita Smidovich, to present Primakov with a complete dossier of Russian front companies that were illegally trucking contraband goods into Iraq. Ekeus also saw to it that Primakov was informed; in writing, of “all the details” of how UNSCOM had learned about the firms—via intercepted telephone calls and other communications. Ekeus told me that he considered the material “proof of Russian smuggling to the Iraqi nuclear program,” but Primakov, he said, “insisted that there was no state organization involved”—that the shipping were operating on their own. What happened next, he said, was that “we requested that they conduct their own investigation, and UNSCOM never saw the results of that.” In a similar smuggling case involving a direct complaint to Primakov, he added with a wry laugh, “the Russians read the reports and, instead of arresting the guys, they changed their signals.”

In November of 1997, the American intelligence community was startled when a British intercept produced evidence of an eight-hundred-thousand-dollar payment to Primakov from Tanq Aziz, Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister. (Britain’s signals-intelligence unit shares even its most sensitive intelligence with its colleagues in the National Security Agency, under a liaison agreement dating back to the early days of the Cold War.) “It was a bank transfer that was electronically monitored,” one informed source told me. “They scoop these things up like a vacuum cleaner now.” It is not clear how the intelligence community was able to identify Primakov as the beneficiary. (It was unlikely that, as a former high-level intelligence official, he would accept Iraqi payoff funds in a named account.) Nonetheless, in interviews with me, two officials who were briefed on the British intercept deplored the information linking the Russian Prime Minister to the Iraqi funds as categorical. “A payment was made,” one informed American said. “This is rock solid—like John Gotti ordering a whack on the telephone. Ironclad.” A second official similarly recalled the intelligence as being of the highest quality. “There was a wire transfer to an account”—traceable to Primakov—“of eight hundred thousand dollars,” the official told me. He added that the report’s credibility was heightened by the fact that he and others in the intelligence community had heard “allegations” for years that Primakov had been paid big time by Iraq.

Intelligence officials said that earlier reports concerning Primakov had been discounted, including a specific allegation in September, 1993, from a secret informant in Moscow that Primakov, then the head of the Russian intelligence service, had received a $1.2-million payment from Iraq. The intelligence had been greeted skeptically at the time because of the unreliability of human sources. Nonetheless, one fully informed C.I.A. official told me, the senior leadership of the agency has “believed for the longest time” that Primakov was “getting payoffs” from the regime of Saddam Hussein. (A spokesman at the Russian Embassy in Washington vehemently denied all charges of corruption on Primakov’s part.)

The current standoff in Iraq, with no inspectors on the scene and American bombs falling daily in the no-fly zones, is a devastating setback for arms control—and the end of the dream for those who joined UNSCOM in the aftermath of the Gulf War. “There was a time when we thought this would provide a model for what you could do,” recalled Robert Gallici, dean of Georgetown University’s school of foreign service, who served as a deputy to Ekeus in 1991 and 1992. Now, he said, “there is no future for UNSCOM.”
SEE ATTACHED ARTICLE
A REPORTER AT LARGE

SCOTT RITTER'S PRIVATE WAR

Saddam Hussein charged that the aggressive U.N. arms inspector Scott Ritter was a spy. C.I.A. polygraph experts had their own doubts about Ritter. How did one marine, operating by his own rules, make himself the architect and enforcer of the effort to uncover Saddam's secret weapons?

BY PETER J. BOYER

LIKE many in Washington, Scott Ritter spent the weeks of late summer and early fall publicly questioning the truthfulness of the President, but Ritter's complaints had nothing to do with sex. Ritter is the Marine Corps reserve major who in late August quit his job as a United Nations arms inspector to protest the Administration's unspoken shift in policy toward Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Ritter's assertion—and it has not been refuted—is that in the last year the United States has futilely retreated from its stated policy of ridding Iraq, under threat of force, of its capacity to develop and employ chemical weapons, biological weapons, and nuclear weapons.

Since his resignation, Ritter has been praised by supporters, in the media and in congressional hearings, as a modest herald of the square-jawed truth. He is in fact a great deal more: someone who saw himself as the instrument of a radically new concept in disarmament—peacekeeping as a different kind of warfare. Within the United Nations special commission charged with disarming Iraq, Ritter helped to form and operate what amounted to a discrete intelligence operation, applying tradecraft to a task whose tools had always been a pen and a clipboard. His operation was not bound by the usual protocols of national security or, for that matter, by U.N. precedent. In the national-security offices of the White House, Ritter was sometimes referred to as Darth Ritter, and though the Administration denied charges by Saddam that he was a spy, some people at the Central Intelligence Agency apparently were not so sure. Polygraph experts there raised the prospect, after running extensive tests, that Ritter might have been working for Israel—or, at least, that he had inappropriately handed American secrets to Israeli intelligence agents. The degree to which these suspicions may have influenced policy decisions in Washington, if at all, is not known.

What is known is that in mid-September, after Saddam had accused Ritter of being a spy and blocked his team from a key site, President Clinton brushed the accusation aside and dispatched ships and troops to the Persian Gulf. War seemed imminent. "We have the authority to use military force," Secretary of State Madeleine Albright warned, referring to Iraq's obligation, under U.N. Resolution 687, to allow free, unfettered weapons inspections. "We are prepared to go unilaterally."

Then, in February, the crisis suddenly passed; the U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, mediated a deal that allowed inspections to resume. But Clinton continued to talk tough. In April, he declared that the standoff had ended only because of American and international "resolve to both use military force and impose the severest consequences on Iraq for any further transgressions."

Despite the brawny posturing, Ritter and his fellow-inspectors began to suspect that American policy had secretly changed. On six occasions, plans for aggressive U.N. inspections in Iraq were judged too combative by the United States and were modified or cancelled. Ritter's suspicion was borne out when, in August, Saddam once again refused to allow inspectors to carry out their task. This time, the United States hardly bothered to protest. Ritter, in a widely publicized letter of resignation, declared, "The illusion of arms control is more dangerous than no arms control at all."

Ritter's gesture struck a chord. Such individual moral certainty seemed almost startlingly out of time at a moment when Washington was focus-grouping the fate of a Presidency and the White House was opinion-polling contraction posture. Ritter now finds himself becoming a celebrity. Although he has no job (as his wife, Marina, has reminded him), he is a lecture agent, and his literary agent is entertaining offers for a book contract. Limousines pick him up for network morning news shows. The Washington Post published a series of articles, by Barnett Galatin, focusing on Ritter's activities in Iraq; last month he was flown to Aspen for the annual Forstmann Little & Company retreat, where Colin Powell, Sam Nunn, Henry Kissinger, and others took turns "monologuing" him a "great American."

Just after Ritter resigned, he agreed to be interviewed for this account. We met several times during the following weeks, mostly in the modest home in the Westchester County village of Hastings-on-Hudson where he lives with Marina, their twin daughters, and his in-laws. Ritter is a big man (six feet four, two hundred and ten pounds), and is polite in a military manner. His eyeglasses and easy smile suggest an ingenuousness that is more than balanced by an intensity that lies just beneath the surface. The intensity flares when conversation turns to his strained relationship with his government, which he insists has less to do with his own deeds than with the Administration's policy muddle regarding Iraq. "It's not a Scott Ritter issue," he says.

Perhaps, but it is certainly true that Ritter came to embody this country's

ILLUSTRATIONS BY DAVID LEVINE
Ritter on inspection protocol: "I am the alpha dog. I'm going in tail high. Gonna spray urine all over their walls."
THE NEW YORKER, NOVEMBER 9, 1998

"Why are they always pushing quality on us?"

hard-line policy toward Saddam’s weapons programs, and that Washington grew wary of the policy and of the man at once. By dint of his extraordinary resourcefulness, fervor, and willingness to stretch the rules, Ritter came to play a role that was, as Senator Joseph Biden sarcastically told him, “above your pay grade.” The war that this country almost found itself plunging into at the beginning of the year was, to some real degree, Scott Ritter’s war. By the time the Administration backed off, America’s Iraq policy had become no policy at all.

1. RIGHTEOUS ZEAL

The Gulf War did not end on a battlefield in Iraq. It ended in New York, at the United Nations Building, with the passage, in April of 1991, of Resolution 687, which allowed Saddam Hussein to remain in power, still heading an Army and a host of elite security forces. In exchange, the economic sanctions that the U.N. had imposed on Iraq before the Gulf War would largely stay in place, insuring that Saddam could not raise money for new militaristic ventures by selling oil abroad. In addition, Saddam agreed to accept the destruction of Iraq’s long-range missiles and of its nuclear, biological, and chemical arsenals, and to allow all facilities involved in the research and development of these weapons to be rendered harmless. A special U.N. commission—UNSCOM—was created to conduct the disarmament.

Although Iraq filed a disclosure report on its missile program within a few weeks of signing the U.N. resolution, this was revealed, over the next five years, to be mostly a fiction. Iraq vowed that it had no interest in germ warfare, but it has turned out that the country developed a pharmacopoeia of worth of killer biology. In addition to a microorganism called *Clostridium perfringens*, which causes gas gangrene (Iraq had produced ninety gallons of the stuff), Saddam’s forces also had more than two thousand gallons of anthrax (enough to kill millions); 5,125 gallons of botulinum toxin, a biological poison that paralyzes and starves its victims (enough to kill the world’s population several times over); and 2.7 gallons of ricin, a pesticide that causes death in humans within two days. And that is just the biological arsenal that Baghdad finally admitted to; UNSCOM suspects there is much more still hidden.

As for its chemical-warfare arsenal, Iraq reluctantly admitted that it had produced VX, the nerve gas infamous for its lethality—one drop kills—and had amassed four hundred metric tons of the chemicals needed to make it. Iraq also admitted producing between a hundred and a hundred and fifty metric tons of sarin gas, which causes spasms and frenzies and then death, and five hundred metric tons of mustard gas.

Iraq steadfastly claimed that it had never had a nuclear program, or any ambition to develop one. Rolf Ekeus, UNSCOM’s first executive chairman, says, “We soon detected that the nuclear file was a complete falsification.” Iraq’s nuclear program is now believed to be lacking only highly enriched uranium in order to detonate a twenty-kiloton bomb.

In September of 1991, a high-level Iraqi defector confirmed what was already becoming apparent to the disarmament team: Iraq had a vast program of illegal-weapons development, the documentation and components of which were hidden throughout the country. “I would say it was the equivalent to war, in arms control,” Ekeus says. “They were really not only denying but aggressively blocking and misleading and using all the tricks in the book to thwart us.”

It was obvious that if UNSCOM was going to succeed it would have to do more than try to verify passively that Iraqi declarations were provably untrue. In a noteworthy philosophical departure for the U.N., UNSCOM decided that if Iraq was going to wage the arms-control equivalent of war UNSCOM would do the same. A new tactic was conceived: the “inspection of discovery,” whereby an UNSCOM team would conduct inspections, often by surprise, at sites of its own choosing. This was an inherently confrontational approach, and—depending, as it did, upon logistics and intelligence—it was more like a military mission than like a traditional arms-verification exercise. An UNSCOM official suggested the recruitment of someone perfectly suited to the arms-control equivalent of war—a Marine Corps captain held known in Russia. One senior American official, looking back, says, “If there wasn’t a Ritter, he’d have to be invented.”

The quality that Scott Ritter brought to UNSCOM, in the early autumn of 1991, was righteous zeal. It was his defining characteristic, and always had been. Ritter was born in 1961, at the tail end of the baby boom, but he and three sisters managed to pass through adolescence nearly oblivious of the convulsions of the youth culture that
shaped their generation. Theirs was a military family, which for the children meant a life of relocation, sudden midterm transfers into and out of schools with names like Chester Nimitz Elementary and George C. Marshall High. William Scott Ritter, Sr., was an Air Force mechanic who went back to school to get an officer’s commission. He married an Air Force nurse, Patricia Folkmar, and they reared their family on military bases from Florida to Hawaii to Arkansas. It was a life with its own cadence and rhythms—a culture apart from the civilian America that was noisily remaking itself beyond the gates of the base. When Scott’s older sister, Shirley, attended Brown, in the nineteen-seventies, she was nonplussed after a friend asked her whether she had ever participated in the antiwar movement. “I had no idea about the peace movement,” she recalls. “We just knew that our friends’ dads were going to war.”

As a boy, Scott showed a talent for drawing and design, enough to encourage his mother’s hope that he might become an artist. The thought repelled him. “He wanted to go into the military ever since I can remember,” his father says. “He was very red-white-and-blue.” Scott’s sisters knew that if they really wanted to annoy their brother they could move the pieces of his carefully assembled toy-soldier battlefields, whose tiny infantrymen and cannons he spent hours deploying. Scott devoured history, especially the great military campaigns, and, even within the context of a military family, his obsessiveness seemed a little weird. “I was worried about that, to be honest with you,” the senior Ritter recalls. Many of the men Scott knew—his father and his father’s friends and colleagues—were attached to NATO, and Scott fashioned himself as a fierce junior Cold Warrior. He would talk of growing up to kill Russians, and when he embraced the jokey phrase “Kill a Commie for Mommy” it was not for its irony.

He was an indifferent student, but the United States Military Academy, at West Point, ran a prep school in New Jersey that offered a yearlong program of intensive study designed to help promising students reach the admissions standards. The price of the school was a service commitment to the Army. In 1979, Ritter jumped at it, signing a six-year enlistment obligation. “We ran a pretty tough program,” says Colonel Calvin DeWitt (Ret.), who was the commandant of the school when Ritter attended it. Scott adapted to barracks life at the school, but by the end of the year he had second thoughts about West Point: It wasn’t gung-ho enough for him. At the basic camp required by the prep school, Scott had met a young marine, a Semper Fi eulogist, who spoke of the corps in rhapsodic language derived from “The Sands of Iwo Jima.” Despite the six-year commitment to the Army, Scott, in a youthful display of the persuasive power that would shape his professional life, managed to talk his way into an “honorable discharge for the good of the service” by promising Colonel DeWitt that he would become a Marine officer.

In the winter of 1981, Scott enrolled at Franklin and Marshall College, in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, much to the relief of his father. The senior Ritter thought that life on a civilian campus would temper Scott’s fixation on the military—a career choice he considered beneath his son’s potential. But on the Lancaster campus, which didn’t even have an R.O.T.C. program, Scott’s military identity blossomed. A classmate named Bob Murphy recalls returning to school from Christmas break and seeing Ritter for the first time—a huge figure with a military haircut, curled on his dorm-room floor counting off a thousand situps. Ritter had enrolled in a summer Marine officer-training program. On the campus, he was called Sarge, and he played on the Franklin and Marshall football team. He wasn’t as talented as he was enthusiastic—voluntarily running extra wind sprints at practice—and he was made captain of the special-teams unit, also known in football as the “suicide squad,” for the head-on abandon required of its participants. Ritter studied Russian history and language (“Russia’s a threat, so I want to study ’em,” he told his parents. “Gotta know your enemy”) and became his department’s honors student. After graduation, he married his college sweetheart, Heidi Evans, and headed for the corps.

As a newly commissioned second lieutenant in 1984, Ritter was a marine in a hurry. At the basic-training school, in Quantico, Virginia, new officers are given pep talks by representatives of the service’s various specialties—artillery, logistics, and so on—and are asked to select a field of concentration. Toward the end of the presentation to Ritter’s class, the officer from Marine intelligence told the young men that an intelligence officer had to understand each of the disciplines, and Ritter decided that he’d found his calling. The standard route to intelligence required candidates to first complete a three-year tour learning to command a combat platoon. But Ritter had no patience for standard procedure. He wrote directly to the commandant
of the Marine Corps telling him that the corps was wasting a valuable intelligence asset by keeping Second Lieutenant Scott Ritter from his calling. "I speak Russian," Ritter recalls writing, "and I want to be an intelligence officer. That's what I want to do for the Marine Corps and I think it would be a waste of your time to put me through combat-officer training just so I can be an intelligence officer. I need to start now." Somehow, Ritter's request was granted; he was dispatched to Twenty-nine Palms, California, where he became the 7th Marine Amphibious Brigade's junior intelligence officer.

Ritter's superiors there gave him some books, pointed the way to the brigade's various units, and told him to go forth and become an intelligence officer. His captain, Dan Button, gave him one piece of advice: Learn to think "outside the box." It turned out that thinking outside the box was Ritter's default mode. The command staff had never seen anything like it from any junior officer. "Since his arrival... Lt. Ritter has shown non-stop initiative and desire," an early report from one of Ritter's superiors read. "His unbridled desire to learn and contribute... was exceeded only by his positive 'can-do' attitude."

Before long, he was editing and producing the brigade's weekly intelligence summary. By the time the Marine Corps got around to sending Ritter to intelligence school, in 1986, he had been awarded the Navy Achievement medal.

As Ritter was promoted through the ranks, he would perform his assigned tasks reliably and then dream up new projects and go off on his own. Occasionally, this tendency to independence caused problems, as when he contrived a plan to create a sort of spymobile for his unit. With the help of a staff sergeant, Ritter acquired a receiver, radios, and other gadgets from a Defense Logistics Agency warehouse in the California desert and transformed a standard-issue Humvee, with guidance from the vehicle's manufacturer, into an intelligence-downloading unit on wheels. When it came to light that Ritter had broken various laws and regulations (including a ban on direct contact with a defense contractor), he was chided by his superiors, but only gently. Ritter's bosses found the young officer's ingenuity impressive, and his fitness reports—a marine's equivalent of a report card—were unfailingly glowing. In January of 1988, just two years out of intelligence school, Ritter got the job of his dreams—a ticket to Russia.

The Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty, signed by Ronald Reagan in 1987, called for reductions in United States and Soviet arsenals of certain missiles, and led to the creation of the On-Site Inspection Agency (O.S.I.A.), a creature of the Department of Defense, to monitor the reductions. The agency allotted positions to each of the military branches, and Ritter—his candidacy no doubt enhanced by his background in Russian—was selected for one of the Marine slots, becoming the only lieutenant among a collection of majors and colonels. Before he got out of Washington, though, he was halted in the hallway of the agency's headquarters by a Marine colonel, who, Ritter recalls, began barking at him in a foreign language. Ritter scarcely understood a word of what he was saying; which was not good, because the colonel was the agency's Russian-language expert. The colonel declared Ritter's "fluency" in Russian a fraud, and kicked him off the team. But Ritter didn't give up. Having persuaded the officer in charge of monitoring missiles of the need for a counter-intelligence program, he found himself named the team's counter-intelligence officer.

So Ritter got to Votkinsk, a closed city in the heart of Russia, up against the foothills of the Urals. At the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Soviet technicians had formerly assembled SS-20s, intermediate-range nuclear missiles now banned by the treaty, and were continuing to assemble SS-25s, a type of ICBM. On paper, Ritter had a mundane monitoring job, but his secret task, the source of his enthusiasm, was intelligence. In this capacity, Ritter decided that his first mission was to figure out how, exactly, the Soviets were monitoring his team. This was a challenge for a novice American spy in a closed Soviet city—especially for one trying to get by with his limited Russian. "So I hang around Votkinsk and just observe," he recalls. "O.K., we're at the hotel. What kind of people live here at this hotel? Not too many people but Americans. But what about that guy who keeps going up to the fifth floor with the big briefcase? Well, I'm going to write that down and see what he does. And he has a friend—they meet. Well, I saw that guy downtown. He was over here with another guy. What kind of car does he drive? What's the license plate of the car? And you start putting it together and suddenly you realize there's a surveillance mechanism out there watching what you do. What I basically..."
did was start putting together a picture of how the Russians monitored us."

Ritter also discovered that the Russian escorts—university girls, who spoke flawless English—reported every conversation directly to the plant's First Department, a security unit associated with the K.G.B. The young women were attractive and intelligent, which to Ritter meant only one thing: "I wrote a report for the C.I.A.,” he recalls. "I said, 'Look, we've got a problem here. These girls are so smart, they speak English so well, and they interact with Americans so effectively that they have to be spies.’" It was an assessment that Ritter one day had reason to regret, but for the moment his characteristic self-certainty ruled.

Ritter found himself bracing against the O.S.I.A. chief, Army General Roland de Felice, who insisted that Ritter limit his efforts to the passive collection of information. Ritter was disappointed. "I had put in a whole bunch of aggressive plans on how to really rape the Russians, in terms of intelligence," he recalls. "Like building a desk that really is a radio antenna. I actually designed it, and had a plan on getting it in, but La-joie said no." Even constrained, Ritter was able to produce results. Ritter suspected that the facility was developing follow-on missiles to the SS-20 and the SS-25, which he believed the Russians were slipping past the inspectors. Devising an elaborate surveillance formula, derived from observing railcars that were used to bring parts into the plant and to transport completed missiles out, he was able to demonstrate his assertion. Such work—which in many respects prefigured his subsequent efforts in Iraq—won him notice in the intelligence community, and an invitation to a counter-intelligence conference at which his voluminous reports out of Votkinsk were roundly praised. His biggest reward was one that he was allowed to see but not to keep—a letter of commendation from the director of the C.I.A.

In 1990, after two years with O.S.I.A., Ritter became concerned about his marriage, which had suffered from his extended absence, and asked for some time to repair things at home. In September, he submitted his resignation to the Marine Corps. But that summer Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait, and to a marine, as Ritter puts it, "war is a good thing." He wrote another letter to the Marine Corps asking it to put a hold on his resignation, and the corps, building for was, agreed.

Desert Storm was the perfect test for Ritter's 'inside the box' orientation, and he landed in the perfect spot to demonstrate it. He was assigned to Central Command Headquarters, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where he was placed in the battle-damage-assessment unit, charged with the task of measuring the damage that coalition forces were inflicting upon Iraq's war machine. Mostly, that meant hunting for Scuds. If Iraq's Scud missiles hurtling toward Tel Aviv succeeded in drawing Israel into the war, Arab support for the coalition would be seriously weakened. For the coalition command, the finding and destroying of Scud-missile launchers became an important task, and one that seemed achievable.

Ritter felt otherwise. He had become familiar with mobile missiles in Russia, and knew that their portability made them difficult, if not impossible, targets. As reports came in from coalition fighter pilots claiming a mounting record of Scud "kills," he was skeptical, and he began writing analysis reports asserting that the bombing raids couldn't be destroying as many Scud launchers as had been claimed, if any were being destroyed at all. "The fact was that Iraq had only a limited number of Scud launchers," Ritter recalls, and we'd already killed four times more Scud launchers than they had, and they were still firing missiles.

Ritter theorized that the Iraqis were sending decoy Scud launchers into the field, and that the decoys were absorbing tons of coalition material. He wrote report after report saying so, but General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the coalition's commander-in-chief, needed to show that the Scud problem was being handled, and he had videotape from F-15 gun cameras that seemed to prove it. On January 30, 1991, Schwarzkopf held a press conference and played a tape of a Scud raid for a worldwide television audience, saying, "We knocked out as many as seven mobile erector-launchers in just that one strike."

The next morning, when Ritter was filling out the battle-damage report and came to the section for confirmed kills, he wrote "Zero." His superiors reminded him that Schwarzkopf had just announced seven Scuds hit. "And I said, 'Well, the general's wrong.'" Ritter recounts. "They said, 'What do you mean? You're telling the General that he's wrong?' I said, 'I'm the battle-damage-assessment officer, and I'm telling you that there aren't seven kills, and I'm not going to falsify a report.'" A panel of military analysts was assembled to settle the dispute. Not surprisingly, they decided for the General and against the Captain, and Ritter's tenure as battle-damage-assessment officer effectively ended. Nevertheless, Ritter held to his theory that Scuds weren't being hit and, characteristically, he devised a bold scheme to test it. In Saudi Arabia, he had met some members of the Delta Force team—the elite American special operations squad. When they didn't scoff at his idea that there were decoy Scud launchers in the desert, he told them his plan: a small force could slip into Iraq under cover of darkness, carve up a so-called Scud launcher with a power saw, and slip it back into Saudi Arabia. Then, if it was a decoy, the launcher could be shipped to the United States, and there its dimensions could be measured and a computerized profile could be programmed into allied radar, allowing bombers to recognize fake Scud launchers. The Delta Force team members considered Ritter's plan and told him to forget the power saw—they could lift the whole launcher with a helicopter.

With the plan now in place, Ritter flew out to the Delta Force's staging base, near the Iraqi border. But just before the mission was launched an emissary from command headquarters arrived and said that Ritter was under orders to return to Riyadh immediately. "Schwarzkopf had me detained," Ritter says. "He sent word down that Ritter is a defector. We're killing Scuds, and he's down there spreading bad juju with the boys. Put him in isolation. He can't talk to any of these people. Get him on the first airplane out of there, back to Riyadh. That's it. No more contact with Ritter." Schwarzkopf denies that he had any conflict with Ritter and says that he didn't know Ritter by name at the time. Ritter's theory about the Scuds eventually proved to be correct.
"We have the authority to use military force," Madeleine Albright declared. But she wouldn't go to war over Scott Ritter.
"launchers" were decoys and Jordanian oil tankers.) But, Ritter says, "I spent the rest of the war watching the ground war unfold—watching Scuds still landing on Israel, watching Scuds still hitting Saudi Arabia. Very frustrating."

II. ALPHA DOG

Ritter's dustup with the hero-general of Desert Storm was obviously not a good career move, and he was convinced that his earlier letter of resignation had hurt his chances for advancement as well. And so, after the war, he left the Marine Corps, and in the summer of 1991 he was plotting his uncertain future. While Ritter was considering a job offer from H. J. Heinz, which wanted to open a food-processing plant in the Caucasus, he got a call from Doug England, his supervisor from the Vietnam days, offering him a chance to return to the Middle East.

England was a former Army colonel who had been in charge of the monitoring teams in Votkinsk, and now he was the operations officer at UNSCOM. Ritter found England's offer—a chance to help rid Saddam Hussein of his deadly arsenals—enormously appealing. He saw it as a mission of thrilling absolutes: Saddam was the villain, the UNSCOM inspectors were the heroes, and if Iraq tried to stop them it would get hammered by a wrathful world, whose military might (led by American warships and planes) was ever at the ready. "It's the purity of the mission," Ritter says. "That's one of the things that made this so attractive. It's so black-and-white."

In hiring Ritter, UNSCOM confirmed its commitment to the arms-control "equivalent to war," as Ekeus, its former chairman, calls it, and took a long first step toward creating something that the United Nations had never before attempted—its own intelligence operation. This was an extremely difficult course, full of serious diplomatic risk. For good reason, the United Nations had never got involved in intelligence gathering; the U.N. depends for its resources upon member nations that have competing national interests. Israel, which is within a Scud-launch of Iraq, and Russia, which, because of the imposition of sanctions, hasn't been able to collect the billions it loaned Iraq, have each helped UNSCOM, but toward distinctly different ends. The United States energetically supported UNSCOM—indeed, helped to direct it; to a considerable degree—but the country had to protect its own intelligence secrets and also avoid appearing to make UNSCOM nothing more than an American cover operation. Intelligence is such a foreign concept to the U.N. culture that the word is not spoken. "Information" is the preferred term for the commodity in which UNSCOM had now begun to trade.

The diplomatic difficulties inherent in mixing arms control with intelligence gathering became apparent early. In the summer of 1991, United States aerial imagery had helped lead to the discovery of Iraq's nuclear program, and Ekeus knew that such information could be critical to UNSCOM's mission. What he wanted was the sort of information that can be obtained by a U-2 spy plane. Only the United States has the U-2, and that fact posed two problems. One was that every U-2 photograph is classified as an American secret; the other problem was a sensitivity inside the Security Council to American influence over UNSCOM's activities. Ekeus's solution was to get the United States to "lend" UNSCOM a U-2 plane, technically making it a piece of U.N. equipment while maintaining American control over the actual operation of the craft and over the image development, thus protecting American secrets (the photographs).

No one really knew who should direct a U.N. intelligence unit. Initially, UNSCOM's intelligence activities were supervised by a special multinational task force that had been created in Washington after the deflection of the high-level Iraqi, in September. According to Ritter, who had joined a special UNSCOM team called the Information Assessment Unit—"U.N.-ese for intelligence unit," as Ritter puts it—the Washington group took charge. "The United States would come in and they'd say, 'Here's the target, here's the people you need to use, here's the kind of expertise you need, we recommend you have this many nationalities, you'll use helicopters this day, drive this day,'" Ritter recalls. "And UNSCOM just sort of grabbed the folder and said, 'Oh, O.K.' And, basically, we were the tool of the United States." (Ekeus vehemently disputes this account of UNSCOM's origins, as he must—in his view, UNSCOM was always an independent entity.)

Ritter bristled at what he perceived as the U.N.'s subservience, and he lobbied Ekeus and England for more independence. He finally won that independence, Ritter believes, because he won the trust of Rolf Ekeus. "Once I established my credibility and credentials with Rolf, anything I wanted to do I got to do," Ritter says. "Anything."

What Ritter wanted first was more control over the U-2 operation. He wanted to have a say in directing it—"tasking" the plane, as the parlance had it—which had been one of his chores during the Gulf War. "It is meant to be the U.N.'s aircraft," Roger Hill, an Australian commander who worked with Ritter at UNSCOM, says. "So we should be directing its activities and targeting that aircraft in areas where we, the U.N., want to target it." In time, Ritter and his team did get greater responsibility for the U-2 missions, and gradually they gained more latitude in other areas.

The UNSCOM teams drafted specialists from around the world for their inspections. Over time, the team Ritter worked with included linguists, who could interpret documents; commandos, who specialized in rapid assessment; computer enhancers, who could resurrect deleted files from Iraqi hard drives; and even a specialist who was so adept at opening locked security boxes and doors that he was given the nickname Frank the Felon. On one occasion, when the team was told by the Iraqis that a locked door could not be opened, because no one had the key, Frankie took out his tools and produced a key on the spot, then offered to give it to his hosts.

Nevertheless, disarming Iraq became an excruciatingly frustrating cat-and-mouse game, which inevitably worked in favor of Iraq's strategy of outlasting the world's will to continue economic sanctions. Ritter believed that UNSCOM had to have some new advantage, and it struck him that the likeliest sources of useful information about Saddam were Saddam's most practiced enemies, Israel and Iran. In 1992, Ritter says, he asked Ekeus's permission to make contact with those two governments, and at first Ekeus said no. By the spring of 1994, though, Ekeus had made contact, through another channel, with Israel's military-intelligence service, Aman, and soon a stream of new information was flowing to Ritter and to Nikita Smi-
dozavich, a Russian former arms negotiator who had become Ritter's superior and partner at UNSCOM.

But then, just as Ritter began to glimpse the prospect of victory, there arose a complication of the most unexpected sort—one that would undermine his effectiveness, eventually to a crippling degree. His own government had begun to suspect that he was a spy.

By the time Ritter began dealing directly with the Israelis, in September of 1994, he was back on the payroll of the Marine Corps, detailed to UNSCOM. He had returned to the Marines in March, partly as a means of regaining his United States-government security clearance, which he had surrendered when he left the corps in 1991. But he eventually learned that he would not get a security clearance, and that was no small impediment for an intelligence officer. Ritter was angered by the denial—he felt he had been promised the clearance—but he should not have been surprised. He had set the trap for himself, in Russia.

By the end of his stay in Votkinsk, Ritter had decided that he'd been wrong about the young female translators whom he had reported to be spies. As he spent more time with them, he came to see them as guileless souls who were being used by the K.G.B. Later, when he heard that the women were on a C.I.A. list of suspected K.G.B. agents, he tried to persuade the agency to take their names off, but to no avail.

Ritter had developed a friendship with one of the young women, Marina Khatsiahvili, of whom he says, "She is the smartest woman I ever met in my life." She was beautiful, too—a pale, dark-eyed Georgian, whose English was impeccable. Ritter insists that there was no romance between him and Marina in Votkinsk, but he could hardly claim otherwise. American policy strictly forbade fraternization by Americans with Russians; indeed, inspectors were obliged to adhere to a "two-man rule," which prohibited anyone from venturing around Votkinsk alone. Ritter often obtained permission to ignore it—a fact that did not go unnoticed by an F.B.I. agent who visited the Votkinsk operation on a routine security check. The agent, Robert Sligh, sent a memorandum to Washington noting that Ritter had inappropriate contact with Russians. Ritter protested the memorandum, and so did his superiors, whose fitness reports on his performance contained the usual high praise. But the seed had been planted and a Ritter file begun. Just before leaving the Marines in 1991, Ritter mentioned to an acquaintance in the F.B.I. that he intended to return to Russia after he left the corps. He mentioned, too, that his marriage to Heidi had ended, and he implied that part of the reason for his return might be to court Marina Khatsiahvili. The agent warned Ritter, "Be careful." But Ritter figured that he was leaving the Marines, and that what he did as a civilian was nobody's business but his own.

Marina says that she took the job of translator-escort in Votkinsk because it seemed exciting—she'd get to meet Americans. And, as Marina tells it, when she arrived in Votkinsk the First Department, the factory's security arm, told the new translators that they were expected to file a report after every contact with an American; later, some of the escorts, including Marina, were offered the chance to undertake more active intelligence work, for the K.G.B., for money. Marina says she refused the offer. Instead, she returned to Georgia, where she became an English professor at a university.

That is where she was in June, 1991, when Scott Ritter arrived. At that point, Ritter had just completed service in the Gulf War, and was a civilian. His interest in Marina was obvious, and she agreed to his proposal that she visit the United States with him that summer, to meet his parents. In July, she and Scott went to New Mexico, where Ritter's parents were then living. In August, they were married.

Only later did Ritter begin to discover the degree to which his government questioned its faith in him. At some point after he left Votkinsk, the O.S.I.A. disassembled the counterintelligence program he had erected there. "They did away with it after I left, because I married Marina," Ritter says. "Immediately, they went into a defensive mode, saying, 'Well, hell, here's this guy sitting there with all his reports, and now he marries this Russian."

Russians must have had him the whole time." Ritter's view is that what really annoyed people in the intelligence establishment was that he had operated beyond their ken, and that made them nervous. "I was a cowboy," he says. "And when I left they killed the cowboy."

In April, 1995, the Office of Naval Intelligence informed Ritter that his marriage to Marina Khatsiahvili posed an unacceptable risk, which disqualified him from holding a security clearance. "The fact that this relationship developed despite strong cautions creates serious doubt about your dependability and trustworthiness," a Defense Investigative Service report said. Ritter strenuously objected, to no avail. Without security clearances Ritter could no longer be an intelligence officer, although he was welcome to remain with the Marines. The corps suggested a career in logistics. "I said, 'That's not gonna happen, that's disgrace,'" Ritter recalls. "I'm not going to allow the Marine Corps that I love to disgrace me like this." Soon after, Ritter resigned from the corps a second time.

Meanwhile, at the U.N., he had turned all his energies to exploiting the link to Israeli intelligence that Rolf Ekeus had created—a course that would, for the first time, give UNCSOM the advantage. Israel's first small gift of intelligence was a transforming one—a key that opened the door to a secret Iraq, which Ritter and UNCSOM hadn't even known existed. The Israelis hinted that UNCSOM should pay attention to something called the Special Security Organization, part of a coterie of intensely loyal and reflexively obedient forces that made up Saddam Hussein's personal security structure. At first, Ritter had no notion what to make of the information. He had always likened intelligence analysis to the process of writing, a task of making a coherent story of disordered facts, but what was the story of the S.S.O.? How did it relate to other units, the Special Republican Guards and the Special Presidential Guards? Ritter went home, turned down the lights, and sat alone in a room with his notes until the story came to him: Saddam's personal guards, trusted experts in the brute efficiencies of survival, had the dual mission of protecting Saddam and hiding Iraq's arsenal from UNCSOM.
UNSCOM eventually identified what came to be known as Iraq's "concealment mechanism"—clunky jargon for what was in fact a brilliantly executed game of hide-and-seek. UNSCOM was failing to find Iraq's vast array of weapons and components because they were always on the move. The special security forces, directed by Saddam's son and his personal secretary, ran this game of large-scale prestidigitation, commandeering a fleet of Mercedes trucks via a coded system of communications. More than once, the trucks and their illicit cargo—coolers of deadly germs, components of nuclear weapons, reinforcement rings for missile warheads, and the like—slipped away from a storage site's rear exit as an UNSCOM team approached the front gate. "I said, 'Well, these are the guys who are hiding stuff,'" Ritter recalls. "'We need to start going after them.'"

The discovery of the concealment mechanism inspired new tactics: UNSCOM didn't have to find buried Scuds scattered somewhere beneath the desert sands; it had only to discover proof of Iraq's secret plan to retain its weapons program. That evidence would ensure that the international community would continue to support UNSCOM's inspections and keep up the economic sanctions against Iraq. The new tactics meant a heightened emphasis on intelligence, and to Ritter, who directed the concealment-mechanism team, that meant going to Israel. "This was a new kind of warfare that we're fighting," Ritter says. "And I equated it with counter-terrorism... And the best counter-terrorist thinkers in the world are the Israelis."

In late 1994, accompanied by Nikita Smidovich and a second UNSCOM colleague, Ritter flew to Tel Aviv and was granted a meeting with Uri Savitch, then the chief of Israel's military intelligence, and his top aide. Ritter had big ideas about how to use Israeli intelligence against Iraq, and he wanted to start on them right away, but the Israelis told him to slow down, saying that their own security interests prevented them from simply opening their files to UNSCOM. The Israelis told Ritter that he needed to present his requests "in a context," and then, perhaps, they could help.

Ritter thought of a context: What if he brought U-2 film to Israel? Could the Israelis then process it and, applying their own information, help him to identify inspection targets in Iraq? "That we can help you with," Ritter recounts the Israelis as saying. "And I said O.K."

From one perspective, Ritter's deal with the Israelis could be seen as a naked intelligence tradecraft—American secrets (the photographs) for Israeli intelligence (photographic interpretation). But could Scott Ritter, who didn't even have a United States security clearance, pass along secret American imagery to Israel? Ritter knew that this was a problem, and he was also aware that his boss, Rolf Ekeus, had made a deal with the C.I.A. director when the U.N. received use of the U-2. "Our deal with the United States was that its photographs could be used only for the purpose of the monitoring and inspection of Iraq," Ekeus says. Ekeus promised that the plane's imagery would not leave New York, much less be sent to another country.

Ritter went to Ekeus with his Israel proposal. "I said, 'Here's the deal, boss,'" Ritter recalls. "I'm going to start doing intelligence with cooperation that is going to give us a whole new capability in terms of gathering information. We're going to get it from the Israelis. But in order to do this we have to go to Israel with the U-2 photographs."

Ekeus says he will not confirm "anything about any country that we worked with," but according to Ritter he, Ekeus, and the UNSCOM deputy executive chairman, Charles Duelfer, met at the Princeton Club in New York, to discuss the Israeli idea with one of their C.I.A. contacts, who did not object and specifically approved Ritter's role. There had to be safeguards, the agency man said, and an elaborate system was devised for the handling of the film. It was to be kept in a safe behind a locked door that could be opened only by a dual key that required the presence of Ritter and the Israelis. As Ritter describes it, the actual handoff of the film was borrowed from a compendium of spy-novel clichés. "You had these C.I.A. guys walking around the U.N. with a bag of film with them," he says. "And Charles went down the staircase and they came up the staircase, and they sort of stopped and then put the suitcase down and they walked away. And Charles picked up the suitcase and walked upstairs and gave me the material."

Giving American photographic imagery of Iraq to Israel was, of course, a highly sensitive matter. Theoretically, Israel could use the photographs for targeting purposes. But the undertaking had an aspect of farce, too. After the first exchange with the Israelis, Ritter returned the bag, which contained the original positive images, to the safe in New York, according to plan, and then flew to Washington with a bag of negatives, which were created when prints were made in Israel. He tried to tum in the negatives to the C.I.A. But no one at the agency wanted to accept them, because, Ritter says, that hadn't been...
planned for. According to Ritter, he was told only, "Do the right thing." He went home and stuffed the bag of negatives under his bed.

Ritter says that during his inspections he always formally respected the "dignity of Iraq's sovereignty," but his approach also had a leathernick quality. "It was certainly not routine," Chris Cobb-Smith, a former British artillery commander, who was one of Ritter's closest associates on the concealment-mechanism team, recalls. "You cannot go in acting, well, politically correct. You can't walk in dithering around."

This was an attitude that Ritter tried to instill in his team before every inspection. On a typical mission, about thirty team members would assemble early in the morning, and Ritter, wearing a light-blue UNSCOM baseball cap, would give them his "alpha dog" speech, an example of which he recently recounted:

The Iraqis, they're like sharks. Fear is like blood. They smell it and they'll come in at you, and they'll intimidate you. Once that game of intimidation starts, you're never going to win.

When I go into a site I am going to be polite, I am going to shake their hand, but I am the alpha dog. I am going in tail held high. If they growl at me, I'm gonna jump on 'em. I am gonna let 'em know who the boss is here. I'm in charge. They report to me, they do what I say.

You work for me, so every one of you are alpha dogs. When we go to a site, they're gonna know we're there, we're gonna raise our tails and we're gonna spray urine all over their walls—that's the equivalent of what we're doing. So when we leave a site they know they've been inspected.

"You should see some of the guys when they hear this thing," Ritter says, with a smile. "Especially the French. But they love it. It's called 'team building.'"

One of the curious aspects of Iraq's concealment mechanism was that Saddam's regime, although it denied having a secret-weapons program, maintained meticulous records of the program that it was denying it had. This vast archive, situated in factories and government offices across Baghdad, became an obvious UNSCOM target, and the object of much to-ing and fro-ing between UNSCOM and Iraqi authorities. In one case, UNSCOM knew that although it had found no contraband missiles, Iraq did have records of a ballistic-missile program, which was called Project 144. Ritter figured that one way of finding missiles was by going after the guidance systems needed to operate them, and that the archives probably held clues. He planned inspections at a series of electronics plants, including one that inspectors believed was involved in the production or acquisition of components used in missile computer simulations.

When the team arrived at the plant, officials there, of course, denied knowledge of Project 144. But the team's computer expert scanned one of the plant's hard drives and recovered a trove of data pertaining to the project. "It was a very successful inspection—considered to be the most successful," Ritter says. "We got computer data, documents—we just collected a whole bunch of information about the Iraqi ballistic-missile program, which Iraq had not declared to us."

But no single factor was as valuable to UNSCOM's mission as the assistance provided by Israel. By the summer of 1995, the range of the Israelis' assistance to UNSCOM had moved well beyond interpretation of U-2 photographs. "I'd start asking more detailed questions, and they'd put me in touch with their analysts," Ritter says. "So now it's not just photo interpreters—I'm getting access to their intelligence community."

The Israeli connection was directly responsible for an event that may have been the UNSCOM intelligence unit's biggest coup, and also its most bitter disappointment. The team discovered through an Israeli tip that Iraq had contracted for the purchase of a shipment of gyroscopes, used in missile guidance, and that this would be the first solid evidence of an ongoing effort to reconstitute Iraq's missile program. The shipment was to be delivered through Jordan by a Palestinian go-between. Acting on that information, UNSCOM

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CHIFFON MORNING

I am lying in bed with my mother, where my father seldom lay. Little poem, help me to say all I need to say, better.

Hair dyed, combed; nails polished; necklacelike scar ear to ear; stocky peasant's bulk hidden under an un feminine nightgown; sour-milk breaths rehearsing death—she faces me, her room a pill museum where orange tea bags draining on napkins almost pass for art.

Even the Christmas amaryllis sings under the weight of its blood-red petals, unfolding like a handkerchief.

From the television screen, a beauty-pageant queen waves serenely at me.

II

In the oily black barbecue smoke, in our blue Chevrolet station wagon, in a cottage at the sea, no one spoke but me to the nerveless God who never once stopped their loveless act:

cursing mouths, the shoving and choking, the violent pulse, the wrecked hair, the hunchbacked repirl, the suddenly inverted sky, the fiendish gasping, the blade that cuts all understanding, the white knuckles, the fly remarkably poised on a blue throat.

I try to pity them. Perhaps God did on those occasions when battle was a prelude to sex; and peace, like an arrow, found us.
planned to intercept the shipment, and Ritter approached the United States intelligence community for help. He was turned down. He then returned to Israel and, he says, told the Israelis that with some key additional information UNCOM could arrange the interception itself. That November, Israel provided the necessary information, and Ritter made his move. He travelled to Amman and met with Ali Shukri, a key aide to King Hussein, told him about the shipment of gyroscopes, and asked for help in the intercept. The Jordanian agreed. “That night, we got them,” Ritter says.

However, Ritter says, the C.I.A., having refused to help him, suddenly arranged to have the gyroscopes intercepted a second time, by the agency in Jordan; the shipment never reached UNCOM analysts in New York. Ritter, who had allies in the C.I.A. in both New York and Washington, blames the incident on territorial imperative. The C.I.A. official who directs Middle East operations, Ritter says, was “starting to view me as competition. He’s pissed off at me because I’m getting better access to Israel than he is.” Government officials decline to comment on the matter. Ritter does note that the C.I.A. later provided a report on the haul to UNCOM.

III. SHAKING THE TREE

PERHAPS the ultimate expression of UNCOM’s intelligence operation was a program conceived by Ritter in 1995 that he called Shake the Tree. The concept was simple, but its execution and its political implications were not.

Intelligence-gathering mechanisms provided by Israel, Great Britain, and, eventually, the United States allowed UNCOM to penetrate the operational command center of the Iraqis’ concealment mechanism by monitoring their concealment efforts almost as they occurred. On one occasion this year, for example, the UNCOM team scheduled an inspection and, as usual, met its Iraqi escorts at the team’s Baghdad headquarters, the Monitoring and Verification Center. But instead of proceeding to an announced inspection site the team headed around the corner and entered an adjacent building. Ritter told the startled Iraqis that he knew they were using electronic-surveillance methods to eavesdrop on the UNCOM staff, and his team began to search the room for bugs. It found none, but the real purpose of the surprise was to excite the people who were running the concealment mechanism, so that their responses could be observed, and learned from. “This is to shake the Iraqis,” Ritter recalled of the surprise mission. “And that makes them paranoid. Hopefully, they’ll react to that paranoia and we can detect their reaction. As I say, it’s very unconventional arms control. But people have to understand that this is the enemy. It’s not a cooperative venture here. These are people who will do anything to keep us away from these weapons.”

Shake the Tree was Ritter-style arms control at its most effective, but from its inception it put UNCOM on a collision course with the American-led policy of the time: backing inspections with the threat of force. It helped to draw UNCOM toward the secret corners of Iraq which Saddam most wanted to protect. This was, of course, its purpose, but the inevitable result was a series of crises that led to last winter’s militarized showdown, when the resolve to force inspections was finally spent.

The trouble began with the very first test of the system—an inspection called UNCOM 143, in March of 1996. The Iraqis partially blocked the inspection, prompting Washington to push the Security Council for a resolution denouncing the action as a “material breach” of Iraq’s obligation to allow inspections. In U.N. diplo-speak, “material breach” is a verbal trigger, meaning there are grounds for military action. But France and Russia did not yet want to pull the trigger, so a weaker resolution was passed. The United States, however, did win the promise for material-breach language the next time Iraq blocked an important inspection.

That occasion came in June, with an operation called UNCOM 150, which
tried to probe what Iraq said was a "sensitive site." The inspection was blocked, and the inspectors left Iraq. En route to Bahrain, the inspectors felt certain that they knew what was coming next.

"As we flew out, we were all waiting for the cruise missiles to come by us on their way in," Ritter recalls. "We knew for certain. I mean, this is the deal that we made: if they block us, they'd die." Indeed, when UNSCOM 150 was blocked, Madeleine Albright, then the United States Ambassador to the U.N., with the promise of material-breach language in her back pocket, tried to marshal support for military action, but France and Russia balked again. They insisted upon giving Iraq still another chance to comply, and Rolf Ekeus intervened personally. After a long negotiation, Ekeus won an Iraqi agreement to allow the inspection, but only, according to Ritter, after granting Baghdad a significant concession: the number of inspectors allowed to enter a sensitive site would be limited to four.

Ritter saw the agreement as a clear defeat, but he and his team looked for a way to find some advantage in it. UNSCOM believed that Iraq's concealment operation was run by the same security units that protected Saddam, and Ritter assumed that if they were pressed they would follow procedures similar to those designed to protect Saddam in an emergency. Israeli intelligence sources had told UNSCOM that when Saddam felt threatened his strategy was to move first from his Baghdad headquarters to a stronghold near the Baghdad Hussein International Airport and, after that, to a Presidential complex north of Tikrit, his home town and sanctuary of last resort. Part of the purpose of UNSCOM 150, in June, had been to test that theory; and in this respect UNSCOM 150 had not been a total loss. Using the observation mechanisms of Shake the Tree, UNSCOM discovered that the 2nd Company of the 1st Battalion of the Special Republican Guards was moving vehicles—and, presumably, key weapons materials—to a Republican Guard facility just south of the Baghdad Hussein airport. On the basis of this information, and as a test of the deal that the Iraqis had made with Ekeus in June, Ritter planned a July inspection at the airport facility. He knew that it would probably be provocative. The inspection was blocked at gunpoint. After a few days' delay, the team was finally allowed into the "sensitive site," but by then, not surprisingly, it had been swept of its contraband.

The course was thus set toward retreat, although this was not yet obvious. Within the Security Council, member nations began to question the new confrontational thrust of UNSCOM, and wondered what had happened to the more conventional approach, of reckoning Iraq's actual weapons of mass destruction. "Many members of the council said they had never authorized an UNSCOM that had a concealment team," a senior Administration official says, and that threat was sounding at every opportunity. Iraqi diplomats worked the Security Council skillfully and to great effect. Whether it was the product of statecraft or of other, less lofty motivations, the gathering consensus within the Security Council, beginning in the summer of 1996, was that UNSCOM's mission should start moving toward some conclusion.

In November of 1997, Iraq accused Ritter and his team of provocation, and Saddam expelled the American inspectors. In response, the entire force of UNSCOM inspectors withdrew, and the United States military buildup began. By the end of the month, a Russian-brokered deal allowed the inspectors back in, but only with more concessions to Baghdad, and the crisis smoldered. Then, last January, Iraq halted inspections again, and again Baghdad was candid about its reason. "Our only problem right now," Iraq's UN Ambassador, Nizar Hamdoon, told American television, "is with the current team of Mr. Ritter."

The Administration stiffened, and sent reinforcements to the Persian Gulf. President Clinton said that the latest Iraqi outrage warranted "strong and unambiguous action," and he even addressed the Iraqi complaints about Ritter: "Certainly Saddam Hussein shouldn't be able to pick and choose who does this work." Secretary of State Albright and other Administration officials were equally outspoken in their public pronouncements. But privately American policymakers were deeply ambivalent about the Iraq policy, and had been since the start of the crisis, in the fall. Since 1991, American policy had been to insist that Iraq comply with the U.N. resolution requiring complete dis-
armament under the threat of force. Now Saddam had obliged Washington to confront the root implication of that policy—a commitment to go to war over UNSCOM. That raised the question of degree: What offense against UNSCOM would trigger war? The shutdown of UNSCOM? The expulsion of American inspectors? The blocking of one inspection? "It was never really clearly established," says the senior official, who was involved in the debate, because until then "the President didn't have to make that decision."

This process of reductive reasoning eventually led to a bracing bottom line: America could find itself at war over Scott Ritter. By degrees, and quietly, American policy changed.

For a time, Washington tried to guide UNSCOM away from confrontation, weighing in on specific inspections. "In a couple of instances, we gave tactical advice," the Administration official allows, but the official also agreed that at least on one occasion the Administration's position was more hard-line than Ritter's. Whatever it was, Ritter called it "interference." Last November, after the Russian compromise put UNSCOM's inspectors back in Iraq, Ritter got approval for a surprise inspection at the headquarters of the Iraqi Republican Guards' 3rd Battalion—the heart of the concealment mechanism. Ritter says that the Americans intervened at the last minute, saying, "It would be too confrontational, and we shouldn't do it. Find another target."

In December, UNSCOM planned a series of inspections at the Special Security Organization's Baghdad headquarters, at the Presidential complex near Tikrit, and at other sensitive sites. According to Ritter, after the first inspection excited Iraqi indignation, Washington pressed UNSCOM to cancel the other controversial inspections, and it did. "They said if we confronted Iraq now the U.S. didn't have the domestic support for a war during Christmas," Ritter says.

Personally and symbolically, Ritter had become a handy device in Iraq's effort to isolate the United States in the Security Council. France, Russia, and China began to question the value of confrontational inspections. "Scott became a lightning rod for that," says the American official familiar with the Security Council debates. President Clinton may have proclaimed in the midst of
Ritter finally grasped Saddam's secret: The Iraqi leader had entrusted his deadly-weapons program to his personal guards, who moved containers of germs and components of nuclear weapons from site to site in a brilliantly executed game of hide-and-seek.
the January crisis that Saddam Hussein had no veto power over Scott Ritter, but as he spoke those words the United States itself was about to veto Ritter.

By January, Ritter was pursuing what he hoped would be an explosive U.N.-sponsored probe—evidence that Iraq had conducted biological experiments on political prisoners. On January 12th, he directed two portions of his team to prisons outside Baghdad, and he himself led the rest of the team into the day's big target: the General Security Directorate, Iraq's secret-police headquarters, in Baghdad. Once inside, Ritter went into his alpha-dog routine, saying to the Iraqis, "Look, I'm going to tell you right up front: you guys tested biological agents on humans in 1995—this is the organization that was involved." Ritter wanted to scorch the office of the minister of the directorate, but the Iraqis warned him that doing so might spark a crisis. "I'm dealing with the people who are responsible for killing these prisoners and doing these horrible biological experiments," Ritter recalls. "But I'm walking a thin line, because I have to be really careful not to overextend myself and hurt the executive chairman by opening U.N. charges on not respecting sovereignty. So what I'm trying to do is talk to them and get a story from them that I can then compare with the data I get out of the prisoners from my two teams. And, if I get a contradiction, then I'm going up to the minister's office and I'm going to basically rape his office. No, rape is a horrible thing. I'm going to take down his office and not be too circumspect about it.

Ritter never got inside the minister's office. Officials at the directorate explained to him that it was the evening before a holy day, and their families were expecting them home for a feast. They implored him to resume the inspection in the morning. Ritter agreed. "I have to admit that I fell into a trap," he says now, still plainly stung. "It's something that an alpha dog wouldn't have done." ("The bottom line is that the depiction of Scott Ritter as a trigger-happy guy is wrong," Bill Richardson, the former United States Ambassador to the U.N., says. "In a way, he was a diplomat.")

As Ritter returned to the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Center, the place was abuzz. The Iraqis had announced that they were suspending inspections. According to Ritter, he telephoned Richard Butler, the man who had succeeded James H. Lees as U.N.-nominated chief inspector in July, 1997. Ritter suggested that they try to profit from the standoff. He said he would gather his team the next morning and report to the directorate, as he had agreed, and if he and his team were refused entry the world press would be there to record Baghdad's recalcitrance. Butler agreed, and the next day Ritter's group made the journey to the directorate, and pictures of the Iraqi refusal were transmitted around the world. (In Washington, the national-security team watched the latest adventure of the man they'd come to call Darth Ritter with interest.)

But, as a sign of protest, he wore a black sweater and refused to appear before cameras wearing his UNSCOM cap. He read the statement, an innocuous recital of UNSCOM's mission, and then ad-libbed, "We will be back."

In fact, when Ritter left Baghdad he had no idea whether he would ever return, or why he had been withdrawn.

In Bahrain, Ritter ran into Charles Dusker, the UNSCOM deputy executive chairman, who had some disturbing news. "He pulled me aside," Ritter recalls, "and he said, 'Scott, you won't believe what's going on. You have no idea. Washington is going crazy, they're insane. When you get back to New York, some bad things might start happening.'"

When Ritter got to New York, he went to one of his sources in the intelligence community, who bent a rule and told Ritter what he'd heard. While the President's national-security team was in the midst of a fevered session about the implications of Ritter's planned inspection of the S.S.O. headquarters, debating when and how to strike if the inspection was blocked, someone dropped a bombshell: news that Ritter was under investigation by the FBI.


Ritter's first thought was about Marina. While Scott was out of the country on assignment, Marina, who speaks five languages, applied for a translating job at the FBI. After an interview, she was asked to take a polygraph test, and she agreed. She answered every question, but the agent administering the test kept returning to two queries, posing them in different phrasing: Had she ever shoppedlifted? And had her move to the United States been sponsored by any agency of another country's government? Marina firmly said no to the questions, but she later came to understand that the FBI had not been satisfied by the results of her polygraph, and that she would not be getting the job.

But the espionage investigation wasn't about Marina, Ritter's source told him. It was about Israel. Then the pieces came together. In the summer of 1996, when Shake the Tree really got going, Ritter had been approached by one of the covert types he'd been working with from the C.I.A., who suggested that he apply for a job at the
agency. There would soon be a position open, and Ritter could quickly make his way into the covert directorate. Ritter applied for the agency's elite career-training program and was selected to go to CIA headquarters, in northern Virginia, for an interview. Afterward, there was a polygraph examination.

According to Ritter (who is the sole source for this description), the CIA interviewer asked him mostly about Israel. He was surprised by the detailed nature of the questions and by the degree of knowledge about his activities which they implied. The interviewer kept returning to three questions, asking Ritter whether he had ever passed classified United States information to another government, whether he had received money or other compensation for doing so, and whether he had ever had secret, unauthorized meetings with Israeli intelligence agents. Ritter had passed what was ordinarily classified information—the U-2 photographs—to Israel, and he had secretly met with Israeli agents in Manhattan bars and in other sites in connection with his UNCOM work. "I really didn't want to get into it, because it's really none of their business," Ritter says. "It has nothing to do with United States classified information. It has everything to do with Israeli operational security and protecting lives." But the interviewer persisted, and Ritter reluctantly answered the questions. A couple of hours into the session, Ritter says, the interviewer stopped and said, "Look, I'm afraid I have to tell you that if we stopped this polygraph right now, if you walked out, I want you to know I'm going to have to turn this over as an espionage case. . . . What you're telling me disturbs me greatly."

Ritter says he asked the interviewer to turn off the polygraph machine and he then explained his relationship with Israel, and why he was sensitive about fully answering questions regarding every detail. After a break for lunch, another interviewer came in, a man identified to Ritter as a senior polygrapher, and the process started again. Ritter says he told the man everything—including the part about stuffing the bag of U-2 negatives under his bed. But it wasn't enough, and the polygrapher asked Ritter to "think about it overnight and come back tomorrow." Ritter did so. Again there were more questions, again

Ritter was told that the machine indicated he was holding back. After a time, the interviewer stopped and told Ritter to disengage himself from the polygraph monitors. "He says, 'Scott, look, we're wasting our time here. You've got problems, big problems,'" Ritter recalls. "The machine says you're not being forthcoming to us, you're not telling us the whole truth. This is serious, because we're talking about espionage." A month or two later, Ritter was notified that he did not get the job. Ritter says he thought, No big deal, and he returned to his work with UNSCOM and Shake the Tree.

Ritter's quandary was a perhaps inevitable result of his unique position—U.N. spy. His contacts at the CIA knew about his work for UNSCOM and his dealings with Israel and other governments, and he was reassured by two sources at the agency that the interrogation was just routine. It was "bullshit," one said, and would be over in six months.

The investigation did not end in six months. The agency turned over the results of his polygraph to the counterintelligence division of the FBI, which opened an investigation in 1997. That investigation was still under way during the crisis last January, when the national-security team gathered to consider the possibility of launching a war because Scott Ritter had been blocked from an inspection. No one at the bureau or at the CIA would comment for this story. A senior Administration official said that he could not specifically verify the events, or comment on the impact that the investigation of Ritter had had on

"Let's be reasonable. Just approve my client, and we'll all be spared a lot of nasty litigation."
the decision to withdraw him in January. This official did say, however, "What mattered to us in the fall and winter on this specific area is that if it were true... then one consideration for a responsible decision-maker would have to be: How exposed is he personally to risks? And how exposed are we to criticism for a decision that we would otherwise like to make? Those calculations would have to be made." Ritter says that in this context he "absolutely" understands the concern in Washington over his Israeli connections. Bill Richardson, whose intelligence sources vouched for Ritter, carried Ritter's brief in the Administration, and remained a consistently strong advocate of punishing Saddam. But for others the Ritter allegations seemed to crystallize anxieties inherent in the policy of forcing strict Iraqi compliance with Resolution 687, Saddam was accusing Ritter of being a provocateur. America could not go to war over Ritter unless it was sure that he wasn't.

IV. ANYBODY BUT RITTER

When Kofi Annan averted war last February, Ritter claims, Annan secretly promised Iraq that the confrontational inspections Saddam most resisted—the intrusions into the Presidential sites—would occur only once, and that they would all be conducted in four months. Timelines, in matters big and small, are Iraq's abiding desire in diplomacy, and those in the Administration who most forcefully favored the policy of compliance considered the Annan agreement little more than appeasement. If Ritter was right about Annan's secret deal, it couldn't have been good for UNSCOM, because it had the effect of creating untouchable sanctuaries for weapons components and documents once the sites had been inspected. But the Memorandum of Understanding brokered by Annan with Iraq provided the conveyance by which American policy moved from enforcing Iraqi compliance to mere "containment"—maintaining the status quo—and in political terms it was a godsend for the Clinton Administration. The compliance policy had, in its final throes, brought the United States to the edge of a war that wasn't selling, internationally or at home. The President's personal scandal, the Lewinsky affair, was still new and virulent at that moment, and made it extremely difficult for the White House to offer a case for Gulf War II even if it wanted to. (Protesters were already calling it "Monica's war.")

This was made painfully clear on February 18th, when Madeleine Albright, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, and Samuel R. (Sandy) Berger, the national-security adviser, were dispatched to Ohio State University for an international "town hall" meeting on Iraq, which was televised by CNN. Although Albright argued passionately for an America that was "the indispensable nation, willing to make the world safe"—the language of the muscular compliance policy—the story of the event was the disruptive protests it inspired from some members of the audience, which led the Administration to a policy of retreat. Five days later, Annan announced his agreement with Saddam. The Administration dearly wanted Annan's peace to hold.

Annan's agreement brought the inspectors back into Iraq, and that raised the question of Scott Ritter again. He was already planning an all-new "real in-your-face inspection," as he put it. Ritter's idea for UNSCOM's return, in March, was to go right back to the concealment mechanism, with a series of inspections at sensitive S.S.O. sites. Washington had its own suggestion—an inspection of the Iraqi Defense Ministry. Richard Butler approved it. But the real debate was over Ritter. The March inspections, which were called UNSCOM 227-B, would be a test of the Annan agreement, and Albright, reflecting the Administration's new turn, didn't want it derailed by Ritter's becoming an issue. On March 2nd, the Security Council passed Resolution 1154, vowing the "severest consequences" if Iraq blocked the inspections, and that same day Albright urged Butler to put anybody but Ritter at the head of the inspection team. The next day, Butler conveyed this message to Ritter, and asked him to step aside as chief inspector and to suggest other leadership options. Ritter wrote Butler a seven-page memorandum on what he called the "Ritter factor," which, not surprisingly, concluded that there was no reasonable leadership option for UNSCOM 227-B except Scott Ritter. More convincingly, the other leaders of the inspection team revolted over Butler's removal of Ritter. In an "Eyes Only" memorandum to the chairman on March 4th, the leaders said...
event, and he doesn't have to mobilize the United States Congress, and he doesn't have to look over his shoulder at the Security Council. And he doesn't have to pay attention to Iraq's neighbors, who, after all, constitute an important part of our national interest in maintaining all this. That's all the President's job."

Despite the trend toward retreat, the U.N. still won a few skirmishes. A team led by the Russian inspector Nikita Smidovich discovered a dump full of destroyed Iraqi missiles. The team suspected that an analysis of the missile parts would prove that Iraq had made a weapon of the chemical poison VX, despite its claim that it hadn't, and subsequent tests proved the team right.

Finally, in August, the breaking point arrived for Ritter. UNCSOM planned to inspect two "sensitive sites" that were believed to be hiding places for ballistic-missile components and related documents. It was generally agreed that the inspections might provoke a crisis, and Albright, fearing as much, urged that they be postponed. Butler agreed, and eventually cancelled the inspections. On August 5th, Iraq declared that it would no longer cooperate with such inspections of discovery. Diplomatically, Iraq pressed for a timetable on sanctions, and supported a proposal by the Secretary-General for a "comprehensive review" of Iraq's relationship with UNCSOM.

On August 25th, Ritter says, Butler, in the tortured middle, asked Ritter to consider "redefining" his team. Instead, Ritter submitted his resignation the next day, saying he would not be part of an American-endorsed U.N. policy that "constitutes a surrender to the Iraqi leadership."

Ritter, a man given to the dramatic gesture, hoped that his resignation might somehow reverse a policy trend. In the short run, it certainly has had some effect. It made America's changed Iraqi policy the subject of open debate in Congress and in the press. One high-ranking Administration official said that Ritter's resignation may even have "put force back on the table," at least as an option. This official said that, in the days after Ritter quit, the implications of his action were the subject at a meeting of Albright, Richard Holbrooke, Sandy Berger, and the C.I.A. director, George Tenet, and that the result was a policy paper sent to the President which proposed again considering force in seeking Saddam Hussein's compliance. And the Security Council, at America's urging, suspended the periodic reviews of sanctions against Iraq.

But Ritter's final volley will not change history, as he had hoped. Last month, Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, travelled from New York to Baghdad bearing Kofi Annan's latest offer to Saddam Hussein. It promised the comprehensive review of UNCSOM, which Ritter had opposed as being an invitation to investigate the investigators. That review, which may take place this month, would be followed by a review of the U.N.'s economic sanctions against Iraq, the last leverage (excluding the use of force) obliging Saddam to yield to the UNSCOM intrusions he finds so odious. There is also talk of attaching a timetable to the sanctions—the first step toward ending them altogether, Saddam's dearest wish. The United States is expected to oppose that proposal, but cannot rely on unified Security Council support.

The manner of Ritter's leave-taking caused much displeasure within the Administration, particularly at the State Department, where Madeleine Albright took Ritter's allegations of American duplicity personally. "He doesn't have a clue about what our over-all policy has been," Albright said of Ritter. Asked about Albright's words, Ritter bristled. "I not only had a clue," he said. "I might have had a better clue than she does."

But this swagger missed the point. Ritter did once have a special insight into American policy, and in a sense he was American policy, reduced to its elemental form: the alpha-dog inspector, who assumed there would be incoming missiles if his mission was frustrated. That policy changed. Scott Ritter didn't. In a more reflective moment, at his home a few days after he resigned, Ritter observed, "I have become a problem for the Americans." No one will dispute that. On the question of Scott Ritter, at least, the United States and Saddam Hussein have finally achieved accord."

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The paragraph above concludes with a question mark, suggesting an uncertain or unresolved situation. The context implies a critical moment in the relationship between the United States and Saddam Hussein, with implications for sanctions and military action.
See attached article.
A Futile Game of Hide and Seek; Ritter, UNSCOM Foiled by Saddam's Concealment Strategy
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By Barton Gellman

Washington Post Staff Writer

First of two articles

Scott Ritter had some experience with erased magnetic disks, and he knew what kinds of traces deleted files leave for skillful operatives to exploit. He had no intention of letting such clues survive on his laptop computer, and he devoted some thought to the best way of demolishing its hard drive.

He planned to remove the drive and smash the storage platters beyond repair. But that would amount, he decided, to unlawful destruction of government property. Like so much equipment in use by United Nations arms inspectors, the Dell machine belonged to the U.S. Defense Department. Ritter settled for erasing it with a large industrial magnet.

It was nearly 9 p.m. on Aug. 25. The following morning, Ritter planned to resign his post with the U.N. Special Commission, or UNSCOM, where he had helped lead the hunt for Iraq’s forbidden weapons since 1991. Alone in the commission’s nerve center on the 30th floor of the United Nations tower, crouching over files beneath a pin-studded street map of Baghdad, he made a final sweep for the most sensitive secrets of a job no person had held before: United Nations intelligence operative.

Ritter meant to take some of those secrets with him. He had kept U.N. superiors apprised, as best anyone knew, of everything he did. Still, much of his work was improvised and his most sensitive relationships built on personal trust. He did not feel free to share all his leads or sources with any one government, including his own, and certainly not with every member of the world body on whose behalf they had been collected.

The 37-year-old reserve Marine had cause to worry about the security of any records he left behind. The FBI had warned of Iraqi agents on the U.N. janitorial staff, and the panel’s leaders routinely left the building for their most confidential talks. Some of Ritter’s ostensible colleagues reported covertly to home capitals that were ambivalent at best about his work. In his heart of hearts, as he cleared his desk, Ritter did not believe the intricate system he had devised amid all this could long survive without him.
Into Iraq

No international arms control agency had ever tried to disarm a country against its will, but that is what the U.N. Security Council created UNSCOM to do under the terms that ended the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Other such bodies, like the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, worked on the basis of treaties and consent.

From the start, the inspectors -- a tight-knit group of chemists and rocket scientists, computer sleuths and biologists, trade experts and soldiers borrowed from contributing states -- were hated and harassed by the Iraqi government. But they made progress. They examined and verified Iraqi disclosures, on paper and in field expeditions that took them through bombed-out chemical bunkers in 120-degree desert heat. They demolished forbidden weapons with dynamite, or by cutting them to pieces with acetylene torches, or by burying them in pits of hardened concrete. They rid Iraq of far more unconventional weapons, as Western officials often recounted, than the allies had managed to destroy by ground or air in the war itself.

But UNSCOM soon discovered that Iraq ran shell games within shell games to hide the most deadly and sensitive weapons it was obliged to surrender. By 1994, the panel's active leads dried up with enormous gaps still remaining in its investigation. If the commission was to complete the work of the war, ridding a regional hegemonist of a biological and chemical arsenal and a nuclear program on the brink of success, its leaders concluded they would have to pierce what Ritter dubbed "the concealment mechanism" of the Baghdad regime.

With a few close colleagues in 1994 and 1995, Ritter led Rolf Ekeus, the commission's first executive chairman, to the unwelcome conclusion that he had no choice but to confront and defeat Iraq's secret services. Ekeus told CIA Director John M. Deutch in writing, while requesting assistance in September 1996, that "the best hope for the commission" to uncover stocks of illegal arms was a "concerted program . . . targeted against the Iraqi safeguarding mechanism."

Ekeus's decision meant UNSCOM was to play at a game of spy versus spy -- inspector versus spy, in legal terms -- that is normally the province of governments.

Ritter became the main figure in this risky enterprise, which he would call by a code name, "Shake the Tree." Its conception reflected his own outsized personality, skills and values. His own long journey into Iraq, which began before UNSCOM even existed and deepened as he rose from a junior UNSCOM hire to chief of its anti-concealment team, therefore became deeply entwined with the commission's.

Ritter brought skills to the job he had refined as a Marine "0202," an intelligence officer. Born in Gainesville, Fla., and schooled in Turkey and Germany during his father's Air Force career, he had helped police one of the last Cold War pacts as a 27-year-old lieutenant assigned to monitor intermediate-range nuclear forces in the former Soviet Union. According to Marine Corps records, Ritter received a classified commendation from the Central Intelligence Agency for his work in Votkinsk, the kind of letter that is presented to a young officer for perusal and returned to a vault at Langley.

Largely on the strength of that experience, government sources said, the CIA twice recruited him for employment, in 1991 and 1996. The agency rebuffed him in the end each time when questions arose about his marriage to a former Soviet interpreter.
Yet a Marine who once had and then lost the highest U.S. security clearances became entangled, at UNCOM, in some of the more sensitive work of the U.S. intelligence community. And as much as he and UNCOM came to rely on national governments -- above all the United States, Israel, United Kingdom and Netherlands -- they also struggled with some of those governments to maintain control of the information they needed to act.

Reliance on secret services, made inevitable by Iraq's resistance to full disclosure, held the keys to some of UNCOM's success but also to its undoing. It raised in the end a subtle question that had gone largely unexplored save in unsubtle Iraqi propaganda over the years: Who was really running the commission, and with what aims?

The diplomatic ripples from that question, and the effectiveness of Iraqi spy craft in holding inspectors at bay, combined this summer to bring UNCOM's remaining program to the brink of defeat. On Aug. 3, Iraq announced the end of its cooperation with the inspectors. More than two months later, despite protests by the Security Council and warnings from Washington, there is no prospect in view of the unrestricted access for inspectors that the council demanded of Iraq, on pain of "the gravest consequences," as recently as March.

The Clinton administration saw itself as fighting valiantly, and with skill, to stave off UNCOM's defeat. Ritter, disillusioned, read acquiescence in Washington's policy choices. His angry departure from the job made him a celebrity, wooed by congressional Republicans and talk show hosts and a speaker's bureau now trying to market his public appearances.

To others, his behavior harmed his reputation and his cause. Stung by criticism she thought unjust, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright charged that Ritter "doesn't have a clue" about the broader horizons of American policy, and she speculated privately that he must be planning to run for office, like Oliver North. His former boss, Richard Butler, accused him of unspecified errors of fact and of breaking the law by revealing confidential UNCOM data.

Scud Hunter

UNCOM was a product of the uneven conclusion of the Gulf War, which left the Iraqi regime defeated but still in power. The war also shaped Ritter's eventual role.

Ritter spent the conflict fixed on Iraq's special weapons as an intelligence analyst for the U.S. Central Command, responsible for watching Scud missiles. Like everything Ritter does, he took it personally. As a lowly captain, his stubborn intensity led him into career-endangering disputes with the allies' commander in chief, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf. These foreshadowed later battles in UNCOM with the French armed services chief, a senior British defense official, the director of the CIA's Near East operations and National Security Adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger.

Ritter "was a man who had not always toed the line," Ekeus said with a smile in the wood-toned office where he now holds court as Sweden's ambassador to Washington. When Ekeus first began recruiting for UNCOM, he heard about a young Marine who stuck to wartime judgments "that I don't think were popular at the time. I knew he was a man of his own opinions. I liked that. We wanted to have strong personalities, but the very best talent."

Ritter had been on his way out of the Marines when war came. He resigned in 1990 to try to save a
troubled first marriage to the former Heidi Evans, politely rebuffing a phone call to reconsider from the commandant, Gen. Alfred Gray. But Ritter changed his mind when President Bush began dispatching troops. "I can’t leave the Marine Corps when my country’s getting ready to go to war," Ritter said. "That’s a dishonorable thing to do."

As the war began, Schwarzkopf was eager to claim success in the Scud hunt, for fear that Israel, the missile’s main target, would enter the conflict. At a Jan. 30, 1991, news conference, the general displayed gun camera tape from an F-15E attack. "We knocked out as many as seven mobile erector-launchers in just that one strike," he declared.

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Alarms rang immediately for Ritter, who was bomb damage assessment officer in Centcom's J-2, or intelligence directorate. He told his colleagues -- in Centcom and at the Defense Intelligence Agency -- that the targets looked like fuel trucks. Frantic work ensued among analysts at the CIA and the Joint Imagery Production Center. Before long, Rear Adm. Mike McConnell walked into Gen. Colin Powell's Pentagon office and told the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff he had a problem.

"We don't think those were Scuds," McConnell said, according to Powell's memoirs. When Powell asked his source, McConnell replied, "A captain, an analyst, on Schwarzkopf's staff."

The following morning, when he prepared the daily bomb damage report for Schwarzkopf, Ritter refused to mark the Scuds as "confirmed kills." According to Brig. Gen. John A. Leide, Centcom's intelligence chief, Schwarzkopf "didn't want to hear" he had made a mistake. Three members of the intelligence staff said in interviews that Schwarzkopf sent word down the chain that he wanted Ritter to rewrite his report.

"I said, 'I'm BDA [bomb damage assessment] officer, and there is no criteria that says if the commanding officer says it's so, it's so,' " Ritter recalled. "They took it back, and Schwarzkopf blew up and they came back again and said, 'You have to change it.' I said I couldn't do that."

Ritter, meanwhile, had written a memorandum arguing that the allies were consistently striking decoys and not real Scuds. Even Delta Force commandos, running risky but, they thought, productive Scud hunts behind Iraqi lines, were blowing up the wrong targets, he wrote. Postwar analysis proved he was right. But when Maj. Gen. Wayne A. Downing heard the report, the former joint special forces commander said, "it made me irate."

"It probably took some personal courage, some intellectual courage and moral courage, to stand up and take that on because it certainly wasn't popular with the Air Force, it wasn't popular with General Schwarzkopf and it sure as hell wasn't popular with me," he said.

In another foreshadowing of his later role -- combining intelligence with secret operations and, some critics argue, overachieving -- wartime sources recounted that Ritter traveled to Ar Ar, a commando staging base in western Saudi Arabia. He proposed a plan to Col. Jesse Johnson, Centcom's special forces commander, for a covert team to infiltrate southwestern Iraq. Ritter would come along to select the debris of a bombed decoy, in hopes of developing a radar "signature" that could be used by Air Force bombardiers to distinguish fake Scuds from real ones.

Ritter refused to discuss Ar Ar or special operations in an interview. But he acknowledged that he was out of Riyadh one night, planning a reconnaissance mission, when an officer from Centcom headquarters arrived with a direct order from Schwarzkopf to abort his work and depart. "He said I was a defeatist, trying to ruin the morale of the operators, and two, I was trying to start my own war," Ritter
recalled.

The Cabbage Patch

Ritter got his own war at UNSCOM, or part of one. Hired in September 1991 as a U.N. employee and paid for his UNSCOM work at various stages by the Marine Corps and the Pentagon’s On-Site Inspection Agency, he received the assignment of writing a complete history of Iraqi ballistic missile development.

Like other experts on the commission, Ritter found gaps and inconsistencies in Iraq’s "full, final and complete disclosure" of capabilities. Using his wartime training and his recent knowledge of highly classified intelligence techniques, he began thinking of methods to test doubtful claims and alternate theories. With permission from superiors he began to play an entrepreneurial role with contributing governments, bluffing and bargaining for access to their most expensive and secret resources.

This kind of work was already beyond the broad consensus that created UNSCOM by a vote of the Security Council. France and Russia, which had supplied Iraq with many of its nonconventional weapons components and had aspirations for future diplomatic and commercial relations with the Baghdad regime, played important roles inside the commission but did not fully support the Anglo-American hard line. Although Ekeus inspired a team spirit that transcended some of these concerns, UNSCOM evolved into a fractious and internally distrustful coalition.

Protecting secrets was difficult at UNSCOM, whose headquarters resided in a 185-nation world body accustomed to access for all. To match and outmaneuver Iraq, with its own layers of secrets behind each public event, UNSCOM gradually came to mimic the Baghdad regime in one respect: It had compartments within compartments to obscure the details of what it knew and how.

In particular, Ritter distrusted the French, whom he came to regard as playing a double game: professing support for the commission, but positioning themselves for future influence in Iraq. Tim Trevan, a close British adviser to Ekeus who admired Ritter, said, "Scott is a Francophile, beyond the reasonable." But he also acknowledged it was "well understood that the senior French officer always" -- against UNSCOM's rules -- "reported to his embassy. If you bar all Frenchmen from the commission, you'd lose a permanent member of the Security Council's support." Ritter had back channels of his own, but he and his superiors said they were authorized and therefore different from those he criticized.

His suspicion boiled over in the spring of 1993, during planning for a high-technology surprise for Iraq. Based on a CIA estimate and UNSCOM's previous inspection results, the commission suspected Iraq had a hoard of Scud missile engines buried in desert weapons graveyards. Ritter helped lead the planning for Operation Cabbage Patch, which would fly over the suspected sites with ground-penetrating radar, a device Iraq did not know UNSCOM had available to it. The name came from the translation of the Russian town of Kapustin Yar, where UNSCOM hoped the Moscow government would help stage a rehearsal, burying missile components in the manner it had once taught to Iraq.

Cabbage Patch was a closely held secret in UNSCOM, but a French photo interpreter on staff could tell something was up and demanded to know. Ritter reluctantly filled him in but secured his word that he would report to no one. Soon afterward, he came across a letter in French briefing the Defense Ministry in Paris about "le Cabbage Patch."
"I got in his face," Ritter said, in what he described as a loud drill-field voice. "I started using every four-letter word I could think of, called him a coward, called him a dishonorable man, and I told him if he was in the American military he'd be court-martialed."

The secret out, Ekeus asked Ritter to fly to France and request support for Cabbage Patch. Ritter was characteristically blunt: He needed Puma helicopters, he told the French military chiefs, and if Paris would not supply them -- in the end, they did not -- he would ask for their equivalents from Washington.

Adm. Jacques Lanxade, the French chief of staff, complained afterward about "this young American who behaved like a general," according to a French account. And there was worse. Lanxade and his fellow four-stars hosted Ritter for lunch in a linen-and-silver Paris dining room, each selecting a wine and cheese from his home region. Ritter, no gastronome, flagged down a waiter and asked for Diet Coke.

"I just fill up the glass and I chug it and I say, 'Could I get another?'" Ritter said. "I think I drank four in a row, to try to get a caffeine boost. Well, you would have thought I had blown up the Eiffel Tower, these generals were so aghast."

Cabbage Patch went forward in November 1993, after rehearsals staged from Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., over a test site in Yuma, Ariz., on American Bell 412 helicopters nicknamed Beavis and Butt-Head. The operation learned a great deal, mostly in the negative. UNSCOM's estimates for Iraq's remaining operational ballistic missile force shrank from about 200 to two dozen or fewer. But finding the missiles themselves was another matter.

Rare Victories

For some years UNSCOM's leaders fought a paradox: The only doors Iraq would open were the ones that led inspectors to dead ends. Delays and refusals of entry became routine, and intelligence from defectors and signals intercepts disclosed that Iraq developed a 15-minute standard for evacuating evidence from a site or, if necessary, destroying it.

As Ekeus, the panel's first executive chairman, told a closed-door session of foreign policy experts on June 17, 1997, two weeks before he left his post, the inspectors had to halt when confronted by armed force. "We are nothing in Baghdad," he said. "We are at their complete mercy. They can just stop our work at any time."

Good luck and audacity sometimes gave UNSCOM a break. Diane Seaman, a University of Minnesota microbiologist, decided to go in the back door instead of the front at a Baghdad food laboratory on Sept. 25, 1997. One of two men holding briefcases literally ran into her on his way out. When he fled back inside and the scientist gave chase, the man was so flummoxed that he handed over his bag. Inside were documents on the letterhead of the SSO -- the service protecting the innermost secrets of the regime -- discussing Iraq's biological weapons program.

Such victories were unusual. More often the Iraqis succeeded, literally or figuratively, in taking the object of inspectors' interest out a back door. From its earliest days, UNSCOM tried to observe the methods of concealment at work.
In the beginning the efforts could be as simple as scaling a ladder. When David Kay, who worked jointly for UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency, showed up for a surprise search at the Al Fallujah army depot on June 28, 1991, the gate guard would not let him in but made what Kay called "a fatal mistake": The guard did not stop three of Kay's men from climbing a 50-meter water tower with cameras in hand.

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When the men spotted tank transporters beating a hurried exit from a side gate, one of the observers, Maj. Richard Lally, descended to a car. Driving alongside the convoy until Iraqis fired warning shots, he photographed doughnut-shaped machines that proved to be calutrons -- 20-foot electromagnets used to enrich uranium for an atom bomb. Before Iraqi soldiers pulled him over, Lally stuffed the film in his underwear.

As time went on, nerve and fast thinking seldom sufficed to bring such advances. And borrowed technology like the Cabbage Patch radar -- as well as FLIRs, or forward-looking infrared sensors, and high-altitude photographs taken by U-2 surveillance planes piloted by Air Force aviators -- could only take inspectors only so far.

Iraq’s shell game relied on movement and stealth -- a network of hiding places, fleets of trucks, and early warning of where inspectors meant to go. Frustration among the inspectors led to dawning recognition of what they were up against, and the appearance of a major break in 1995 shocked the commission with proof of its massive failures.

The shock came with the defection of Hussein Kamel, Saddim Hussein’s son in-law. Kamel’s revelations forced Iraq to "discover" 1.5 million new pages of weapons research documents at a chicken farm owned by Kamel. Still, the disclosures did not lead to the core of what UNSCOM sought. Internal evidence showed that Iraq had removed the most important documents. In ballistic missile files, for example, Iraq turned over component drawings made during development but not the "integration drawings" -- the only ones necessary to resume production.

In a grim Baghdad headquarters of Iraq’s National Monitoring Directorate, the bureaucracy set up to shadow UNSCOM’s inspections, Ritter tried to question Iraqi officials about the missing documents on May 5, 1996. Hossam Amin, a top official, read him a prepared statement. All he knew was that a girlfriend of Hussein Kamel -- Kamel was married to Saddam Hussein’s daughter, Raghad -- had phoned Amin after Kamel’s defection to say some boxes of "important things" were stored at the chicken farm. She hung up without giving her name. Iraq, Amin said, had now told everything it knew about the documents and would not answer further questions.

The "girlfriend story," as it came to be known in UNSCOM, was seen as preposterous. A few months later, on Aug. 16, Amin told Ritter to "forget this, as it never happened," according to notes made by another participant in the interview. Amin had been under instruction to terminate the conversation, he admitted, so he made the story up. He then provided a new explanation, more complex but equally implausible.

"It became blindingly obvious that not only were we missing a little bit, we were missing a lot," said Charles Racher, UNSCOM’s deputy chief. "We decided we had to take an active approach to go after their methods of concealment, and we turned our most creative minds to that task."
The inspectors became more convinced they had to pierce the secret services themselves, instead of discrediting their cover stories one by one. Here Ritter had an important partner — ironically, under the circumstances, a Russian.

Nikita Smidovich was another of Ekeus’ early recruits, a chain-smoking Soviet diplomat Ekeus first met when Smidovich helped represent his country at the Geneva talks on the Chemical Weapons Convention. Smidovich contributed impassivity to Ritter’s passion, tact and composure to Ritter’s hard charge, but instead of clashing “they just totally complemented each other,” said David Underwood, a retired Air Force colonel who was chief of the State Department’s UNSCOM support office and later director of operations for UNCSOM in Bahrain.

"While Ritter is Mr. Energy and Mr. Drive, Nikita has the patience of the millenia," Underwood said. "Ritter is not a great politician or diplomat. Well, I’ll tell you what: Nikita Smidovich is the ultimate diplomat."

The two of them worked hand in hand to win over Ekeus, and Smidovich smoothed feathers ruffled by his younger colleague, as when Ritter summarily fired a French colonel 10 years his senior. In Baghdad, Smidovich often served as chief interlocutor with Iraqi counterparts such as Lt. Gen. Amer Rashid, while Ritter ran the complex operations intended to expose the Iraqis’ words as lies.

Weapons and Power

In the early summer of 1994, Smidovich and Ritter received their first strong indications of who was behind Iraq’s systematic plan to thwart the commission’s work. It came from Israel’s Military Intelligence organization, which is known by its Hebrew acronym, Aman.

Trevan, Ekeus’ British political adviser, had made a chance contact with Israel at a January conference that year in Delphi, Greece. After a public argument with David Arri, a senior Israeli defense official, a mutual acquaintance pulled Trevan aside and introduced him to a broad man in civilian clothes, wearing a beard and skullcap. The man was Yakov Amidror, at the time the only strictly Orthodox Jew in Israel’s general officer corps, and, as it happened, the deputy director of Aman.

Amidror flew to New York in April for a meeting with Ekeus. By June, and again in August, his analysts began passing to Smidovich and Ritter early descriptions of an Iraqi secret agency that the inspectors had known nothing about.

From the Arabic, it was called the Apparatus of Special Security. Saddam Hussein’s younger son, Qusay, directed it. Reporting to the umbrella group were the inner core of the president’s protective agencies: the Special Security Organization, the Special Presidential Guard Unit and the Special Republican Guard. Saddam Hussein had long relied on this apparatus to maintain power. Now, the inspectors began to discover, he relied on it to help him preserve the special weapons he valued over all other national priorities.

As Ekeus would put it much later, in a June 1997 talk at Washington’s Carnegie Endowment, the weapons gave Saddam Hussein “this sweet, wonderful, fantastic power, and that is why Iraq won’t give them up.”
"These guys are great systems analysts and they have thoroughly studied the way we operate, and they can build a reactive model to that," Duelfer said. "We're outnumbered. There's a lot of Iraqis and there are not many of us. They've got thousands of motivated people, and it turns out they are not motivated to help us but to fool us."

Extraordinary challenges called for an extraordinary response. Ritter and Smidovich came to Ekeus in September 1994 with a proposal to travel to Tel Aviv and learn about Qusay Hussein's apparatus in further detail. They did so in October and December, bringing UNSCOM scientist Norbert Reinecke along. The Israelis responded warily, receiving the unusual trio -- a young Marine, a German and a one-time Soviet diplomat -- in a facility north of Herzliya instead of the inner sanctum of the defense establishment, the Kirya.

Before the inspectors left, however, they had secured a meeting with Maj. Gen. Uri Biton, the military intelligence chief. When Ritter came back, Ekeus put him in charge of an UNSCOM team that would think about Iraqi secret services as its central mission.

The new team, given the deliberately bland name of Capable Sites/Concealment Investigation, attracted political attack from its early days. Few nations on the Security Council looked with equanimity at probes into such sensitive territory -- as if, they sometimes argued, someone delved in the inner workings of the U.S. Secret Service and FBI. UNSCOM, with its American and British diplomatic backers, argued that it had no choice.

By this year, with Russia and China pressing attacks, France used its swing-vote in the Security Council to force UNSCOM to scale back the team and accept a French intelligence officer, Patrick Haimzadeh, as one of its members.

"This meant," Ritter said, "that we had to compartmentalize inside the team. We basically had to live a cover story in front of the Frenchman so he wouldn't know the full extent of what we were doing." In the files available to Haimzadeh, Ritter and his trusted lieutenants placed "fake mission requests." The real details of their plans were "handwritten on plain white paper and kept in a special folder that we would carry with ourselves." There was no special code name used for this information, he said; "we just called it 'NO FRENCH.'"

The phenomenon was hardly new, nor confined to France. Another senior inspector described it as UNSCOM's "ongoing problem of being eaten away from within." At one point UNSCOM received a specific warning that Russian eavesdroppers were listening to UNSCOM's telephone calls and passing some of the information gleaned to Iraq.

Another time, Duelfer arranged to meet Ahmed Chalaby, an Iraqi resistance leader, to receive information. Chalaby, who heads the Iraqi National Congress, said Duelfer described his own office as insecure and insisted on meeting across First Avenue, in a corner of the U.N. Plaza Hotel lobby. "One of my men notices these two Russians lurking behind a pillar, trying to listen," Chalaby said. Duelfer, Chalaby added, "recognized them and immediately bolted."

As far back as 1992, Roger Hill, an Australian inspector, had caught a French military attache helping himself to the commission's files and bringing them to the copy machine. He and Ritter complained to Jeff St. John, the Canadian chief of the Information Assessment Unit, UNSCOM's euphemism for an intelligence section. St. John replied they could not afford a diplomatic incident. "That's when both
Roger and I made the decision," Ritter said, "that anything we considered sensitive was not going in the file."

On the laptop computer he kept at home, Ritter maintained data he believed too sensitive to leave at the office, such as a complete log of his foreign contacts and notes describing evolution of the plan he called Shake the Tree. His deepest secrets lived inside a battered canvas briefcase, the olive drab model from Lands' End, that came as a 35th birthday present from his parents in 1996.

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"The really sensitive information was carried in my green bag, twenty four hours a day, with me," Ritter said. "I carried it around everywhere I went. I took it home at night, put it under the bed, woke up in the morning and carried it back with me into work."

The habit, if not the contents, persisted. Last month, when Ritter testified in Congress, a careful observer would have noted the bag on all three occasions, never once beyond the witness’s reach.

Tomorrow: The confrontation with Iraq.

(End)

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Arms Inspectors 'Shake the Tree'; UNSCOM Adds Covert Tactic
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By Barton Gellman

Washington Post Staff Writer

Second of two articles

In the last stage of the contest between U.N. arms inspectors and Iraq, the Iraqi secret services hardly bothered to disguise the nature of the game.

That became clear with the spectacle that met the U.N. Special Commission on March 7. Chief inspector Scott Ritter arrived that day on the first search for clues to Iraq's illegal arsenal since a crisis over access to 'sensitive' and 'presidential' sites had nearly led to war. He and his team drove to a field headquarters of the feared Special Security Organization, or SSO, a complex forbidden to them in the past.

The building went dark in an unexplained power failure, the kind that often marked the arrival of U.N. inspectors. Ritter and his inspection team moved by flashlight from room to room. In each one they found empty shelves, a bare desk and a man with a mustache. One after one, when asked, the men said they worked as marriage registrars.

"It almost showed a sense of humor," said Chris Cobb-Smith, a former British army major who took part in the inspection. "Each desk had its piece of paper and its sharpened pencil and five empty files, and every office was the same. They'd done a very efficient job of sanitizing, and they'd obviously made it obvious that they were sanitizing. Enraging? Yes, absolutely. They're no fools."

But there was another level of the game that day, and there the advantage was UNSCOM's. Ritter called it "Shake the Tree," an image meant to suggest falling fruit from branches too high to reach.

Ritter shook the tree at a second site, the SSO's transportation directorate, where Iraq did not expect him. There, according to accounts from UNSCOM and the U.S. government, inspectors deliberately triggered Iraq's defenses against a surprise search and used a new synthesis of intelligence techniques to look and listen as the Baghdad government moved contraband from the site.

It was the culmination of more than three years of work -- conceived by Ritter, executed episodically
from 1996, and relying at various stages on American, British and Israeli intelligence agencies. "Something very sensitive had been done to Iraq" without the knowledge of even most inspectors, as one senior U.S. official put it.

The inspectors believed Iraq held a technical reference library and some of the critical components to build or rebuild its nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, along with the ballistic missiles to carry them. Iraq had usually managed to move this material a step or two ahead of the inspectors. The ability to track Iraq's movements in "real time," the U.N. panel believed, set the stage for an accelerating campaign that would finally overtake the concealment efforts and put the hidden arms and documents in UNSCOM's hands.

That campaign did not take place and now appears unlikely. A struggle for control arose over the new intelligence technique, involving which country would conduct the most sensitive work and which individuals would have access to the results.

More fundamentally, UNSCOM's covert plan provoked diplomatic and military crises that passed the breaking point of its support on the U.N. Security Council. After attempting to back UNSCOM in this losing battle -- even pushing it, in 1996, more aggressively than Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus wished -- the Clinton administration shifted course. By April of this year, high-ranking U.S. officials said, an interagency review decided that Washington could no longer support the threat of war to compel UNSCOM's access to the inner sanctums of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's secret services.

Iraq halted all new inspections on Aug. 3.

In interviews, Ritter would not discuss the mechanics of the operation he created. The Washington Post agreed to U.S. government requests to withhold publication of operational details on national security grounds. But the broader story of Shake the Tree explains not only Ritter's angry resignation on Aug. 26 but the unraveling of what UNSCOM's leadership regarded as their best hope to complete Iraq's disarmament.

Weaving a Network

By late 1994, as the U.N. inspectors learned the extent of the Iraqi apparatus deployed to thwart their work, each of UNSCOM's subject teams -- chemical, biological, missile, import-export -- was working overtime to devise new methods of catching deception. One team, formed around Ritter, gave exclusive attention to what he called "the concealment mechanism."

UNSCOM had long relied on intelligence provided by sympathetic governments and even dissidents who sought the overthrow of the Baghdad regime. It had an international mandate to find Iraqi weapons under the terms that ended the Persian Gulf War, and it regarded assistance from any quarter as welcome.

"One of Rolf's great strengths and one of his brilliant insights was that from the very first American intelligence brief he realized UNSCOM could not afford to be totally dependent on one source -- or in those days two sources, the U.S. and the U.K. -- because it could be vulnerable to being manipulated on the basis of intelligence handed to it," said Tim Trevan, who was Ekeus's political adviser until late 1995.
Ekous, who now serves as Sweden’s ambassador to Washington, said in an interview that UNSCOM preserved its independence in part by combining information from many countries, not all of which spoke to one another or were willing to have their contributions known. In doing so, UNSCOM took on a role in consuming and acquiring intelligence that was unprecedented for an international organization.

"In the end we became the top guy on the block, knowing about Iraq's weapons, because we could investigate personnel, we could do physical inspection and control the results," he said.

But the story was not quite as simple as that, because mutually escalating efforts -- by Iraq to obstruct UNSCOM and by UNSCOM to pierce the obstruction -- led to growing demands by the U.N. panel on the most sensitive capabilities of its contributing governments. The means UNSCOM embraced to perform its mission entangled it in the agendas -- sometimes overlapping, sometimes not, and often opaque -- of others.

Vanishing Gyroscopes

In August 1995, UNSCOM learned from Israel’s Military Intelligence organization, Aman, that Iraq was expecting delivery of Russian-made precision gyroscopes and accelerometers. Salvaged from decommissioned submarine missiles, the components were among the few essentials for ballistic missile guidance that Iraq could not manufacture itself.

The tip was of some importance, if true, because it represented the first demonstrated Iraqi effort to acquire forbidden weapons during the period of U.N. disarmament inspections. The Central Intelligence Agency’s Nonproliferation Center, according to U.S. officials, passed a similar tip to the commission.

Ritter and Nikita Smidovich, a Russian diplomat who led UNSCOM's ballistic missile team, worked with Israel to track the whereabouts of a Palestinian middleman and his shipment of gyroscopes through Jordan.

In November, Ritter flew to Amman and met with Ali Shukri, private secretary to King Hussein. He set up a secure telephone link, and Ekous asked the king's confidant to find and seize the gyroscopes on UNSCOM's behalf. Jordan did so the same night. In New York, the U.N. panel's weapon scientists prepared for a treasure trove.

Accounts diverge on some of what happened next, but U.S. and UNSCOM officials agree that the CIA's Near East division chief dispatched a team to Amman to take the gyroscopes. Ritter later accused the agents of giving Jordan the impression they worked for UNSCOM. Ekous, in an interview, said only that he never received the gyroscopes as expected. He professed to have no idea why.

U.S. government officials described the CIA and UNSCOM efforts on the gyroscopes as parallel and essentially complementary. One knowledgeable official said Washington feared Iraq would steal the shipment back. "We wanted to get those gyroscopes out of Jordan as quickly as possible, and as I remember at that time we were in a better position to get them out than the UNSCOM people were," he said. A second official said the results of the U.S. government's "exploitation" -- or analysis -- were conveyed to the disarmament panel.

That raised the question of who did the exploiting and for what purposes. American analysts certainly shared an interest in disarming Iraq, but they may have had other interests as well, such as enhancing
their knowledge of Russian missile guidance or black market military sales. Ritter always -- and his supervisors usually -- took the position that UNSCOM should control the analysis of information acquired on its behalf.

"Ritter feuded with virtually everyone in the intelligence community," Trevan said, "because he's so passionate about things. He doesn't always know when to give up. If he's managed well, he's entirely a positive."

Over corn muffins and seven Diet Cokes, Ritter put it differently in a long interview last month at a coffee shop near Rockefeller Center.

"If somebody puts a roadblock in my way, I'll try to talk my way around the roadblock, but if I can't move the roadblock I'm going to run right through it," he said. "Now if that's a bull in a china shop, tough luck. It's about getting the job done. It's about mission accomplishment. I won't apologize for it."

Colliding Interests

By all accounts, the U.S. government gave unsurpassed support -- financial, technical, military and otherwise -- to UNSCOM. But there were also conflicts, and the gyroscope episode set the tone for what some people who know both men called a running feud between Ritter and his CIA Near East counterpart. By policy, The Post does not name covert agents.

(MORE)

05:14 EDT October 12, 1998

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Ritter told colleagues at UNSCOM and confidants in the U.S. government that the CIA's operations directorate seemed to fear he would get in the way of efforts to foment a coup against Saddam Hussein, which came to a failed crescendo in 1996. The same secret services protected the president and his weapons programs, and Shake the Tree amounted to a competing operation.

A senior official with knowledge of both programs denied this, saying Ritter's analysis had "only a passing plausibility." There was "no perception of conflict in any part of the U.S. government between whatever else the U.S. government was doing and what UNSCOM was doing."

Another source of tension was a misplaced -- or withheld -- piece of intelligence. It described an underground storage facility at Jabal Mokhul, one of Saddam Hussein's presidential complexes on the west bank of the Tigris River north of Tikrit. In the summer of 1994, the opposition Iraqi National Congress received a defector who had been site engineer at Jabal Mokhul. The defector said Iraq had built an underground hiding place at the junction of two tunnels there, and great quantities of weapons parts and documents in crates had arrived.

Sources at the Iraqi National Congress said the INC's intelligence chief, Ahmed Allawi, passed the tip soon after to the CIA's Near East division.

More than three years later, in November 1997, Ritter paid a call on the INC's president, Ahmed Chalabi, at his home in London's Mayfair district. "I mentioned Jabal Mokhul," Chalabi recalled in an interview. "He lighted up and said, 'What do you know about Jabal Mokhul?' I said, 'Didn't you get our report?' He said, 'What report?' I said, 'The report we gave Washington in '94.' " Ritter's reply, Chalabi said, was angry profanity about the Near East division chief.

American officials said any failure to pass the tip was "strictly an accident," one of "the vagaries of the business." For UNSCOM, it was a missed opportunity. In June 1997, inspectors had tried to inspect the 4th battalion headquarters of the Special Republican Guard at the same complex in Jabal Mokhul. The inspectors knew at the time, from an early exercise of Shake the Tree, that they were being held in place while material was evacuated to an adjacent hiding spot. Had they known of the underground facility, they could have moved there next.

More Than Ice Cream

UNSCOM's pursuit of Iraq's security system led it in some surprising directions. There was the trail, for instance, of the Baghdad ice cream trucks.

"The big thing with concealment was movement," Ekeus recalled. "Ritter excelled at his ability to penetrate organizational structures."
What he found, initially with Israeli help, was that the SSO used two dedicated fleets of vehicles to move weapons contraband. By day it used red-and-white refrigeration trucks painted with markings of the Tip Top ice cream company. At night, it used unmarked green Mercedes tractor-trailers from the fleet of Segada Transportation Co., named for the wife of Saddam Hussein.

The essence of the Iraqi shell game was this: The trucks shuttled from "storage sites," which were changed every 90 days in the early years and every 30 days after 1997, to a network of temporary "hide sites" when U.N. inspectors approached. Physical security for the hiding places fell to the 2nd and 4th Brigades of the Special Republican Guard, while other units performed related functions.

Shake the Tree was premised on the assumption that Iraqi guards would never let inspectors into storage sites until the trucks were gone, if at all. Inspectors wanted to put stress on the concealment system, forcing it to react in ways that could be observed. Those observations, in turn, would feed an accelerating campaign of subsequent inspections. Eventually, one UNSCOM official said, "You might get lucky. We tried to design something that would allow us to catch them on the rebound."

But just as UNSCOM tried to penetrate Iraq, Iraq tried to penetrate UNSCOM. Ritter and his superiors learned, to their disquiet, that the Baghdad government showed signs of having six to ten days notice of most surprise inspections. They responded by compartmentalizing information even more tightly, inventing classifications like "Code Green" to limit access to information.

Shaking the Tree

As early as 1994, after Ritter and Smidovich made informal proposals on Shake the Tree, the United States offered to provide the needed support in what one official called a "U.S. eyes only" operation. Apart from Ekeus, only security-cleared Americans would know of its existence. Ekeus broke that condition immediately in a U.N. rose garden stroll with two of his closest advisers, Trevan and fellow Briton John Scott. The three men considered the plan, but let it die.

What resurrected the idea was the 1995 defection of Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, Hussein Kamal Hassan Majeed. His debriefings, and the 1.5 million pages of new documents Iraq released in response, shocked Ekeus and UNSCOM with the enormity of what they had missed.

The first experiment with Shake the Tree began in March 1996, with the team designated UNSCOM 143. Thereafter UNSCOM began attaching a second designation to some of its inspections, in a numbered series beginning ASS-1 for the Apparatus of State Security, the organization run by Saddam Hussein’s son, Qusay. Asked about the acronym, Ritter replied, "I loved it. Like, ‘Kick your ass.’"

The experiment failed at first. The United States collected and processed a great deal of information about Iraq’s reactions to the inspectors, but it reported back to UNSCOM that it picked up nothing that helped. Again in June, and still again in July, the results were roughly the same.

Two crises of confidence ensued between Ekeus and Washington.

The first came over a compromise Ekeus agreed to make in the July inspection. Because of UNSCOM’s new interest in its security services, Iraq had invented a new designation, and new restrictions, on what it called "sensitive sites." UNSCOM’s position was that it could go anywhere it liked, but Ekeus agreed to special procedures. When Ritter tried to test them in July, he was turned away.
An atmosphere of military menace built in Washington, which had previously punished Iraqi defiance with cruise missile attacks. Ekeus later told confidants he was convinced the United States was looking for a showdown. The Clinton administration was busy lining up Security Council support for a resolution finding Iraq in "material breach" of its obligations, a legal justification for use of force to secure compliance.

Ekeus believed an American attack would be fatal to UNSCOM's long-term diplomatic support. Washington's strategy, he told aides, was deeply wrong. Against the advice of the administration -- and of Ritter, who was stewing in Baghdad -- Ekeus cut a deal by telephone with Iraqi Lt. Gen. Amir Mohammad Rasheed: Ritter would give Rasheed advance notice of the site he wished to visit, and Rasheed would escort him there.

In August, then-deputy national security adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger and others conveyed their disappointment to senior UNSCOM officials. Madeleine K. Albright, then U.N. ambassador, also protested. The administration was angry with Ekeus, and it wanted to know whether he planned to press ahead with the effort to probe Iraq's sensitive sites. After internal consultations, UNSCOM's answer was yes.

But there was another problem to resolve. Ekeus and his senior deputies were not convinced they were learning all they should from Shake the Tree. They were synchronizing their inspections with American collection efforts, and they expected to obtain detailed results.

In September 1996, Ekeus met with CIA Director John M. Deutch and complained to him in writing that "to date the Commission has been denied access to the data collected" in the operation. American officials were reluctant to discuss this dispute, but they said the commission's top leaders eventually were convinced that they were getting all the relevant "nuggets" that fell in Shake the Tree.

During the same meeting with Deutch, Ekeus emphasized the difficulty of cracking Iraq's concealment efforts and asked for new forms of technical help: the Predator surveillance drone and better sensors for the U-2 -- which the United States had publicly loaned the United Nations for overflights of Iraq -- including the high-resolution camera, infrared lens for night operations, synthetic aperture radar to track truck movement, and electro-optical imaging for real-time transmission of pictures. UNSCOM got some, but not all, of what he asked for, the exceptions being explained by scarcity.

With Ekeus's blessing, Ritter meanwhile went to London and Tel Aviv in an effort to secure more independence for UNSCOM on Shake the Tree. In effect, he displaced the United States as sole sponsor, and three sources said the commission got much more access to information as a result.

A Revealing Exchange

In June 1997, during an inspection in Baghdad, Ritter received a summons to the oil ministry. For nearly an hour, he held a stunningly frank verbal sparring match with Lt. Gen. Rasheed, the oil minister and, UNSCOM believed, a central figure in Iraq's weapons concealment.

"We are very concerned about exposing our security organizations to experts from outside of Iraq," Rasheed said. When Ritter justified the intrusion by alleging a coverup, Rasheed accused Ritter of "McCarthyism" and said, "I could say that I know your links to intelligence."
Ritter, according to notes taken by another participant, shot back: "I deal with governments for information. I deal with the people who handle this kind of sensitive information, not a bunch of tea-drinkers." Iraq had lied repeatedly about its weapons programs, Ritter said: "As such, we have no choice but to use the tools which we have available. . . . You brought this on yourselves."

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Rasheed demanded to know what Ritter thought he was hiding. Ritter replied in detail: VX nerve toxins in salt form for long-term storage; a mobile biological weapons production facility, including fermenters and a drying and grinding apparatus; dried anthrax; five to seven operational ballistic missiles and up to 25 in disassembled form; and possibly a nuclear weapon "minus the core of HEU," or highly enriched uranium that would make it a bomb.

"I'm sorry, I have to run," Rasheed replied, finally. "I would love to stay and talk to you for hours about your flawed concepts. However, I thank you for explaining the pretext for your inspection."

UNSCOM knew it was playing a very dangerous game. In February 1996, Ekeus received what he regarded as a credible intelligence tip that Iraq planned to kill him with slow-acting poison. The Swedish diplomat's family was frightened, and Ekeus confronted Nizar Hamdoon, Iraq's U.N. ambassador, with the report. Hamdoon replied that the notion was absurd, as Ekeus's murder would delay the lifting of economic sanctions. Ekeus found the answer somehow flattering, comparing the price on his head to a year's oil revenue.

Adding to the commission's anxiety was knowledge that should Iraq decide to take inspectors hostage or kill them there was no rescue force immediately at hand. For nearly two years after a September 1991 parking lot incident, in which inspector David Kay and his team were held at gunpoint for four days, the Army's Delta Force had deployed to Kuwait during UNSCOM inspections. When Shake the Tree began in 1996, it did so one last time, even staging an inspector rescue exercise first in Utah. But the U.S. military halted that support, and inspectors knew they were exposed.

Change of Commanders

When Ekeus left the commission on July 1, 1997, the political and operational questions around UNSCOM's use of intelligence were beginning to come to a head. The man who inherited them was a voluble Australian of large charms but blunt affect, little loved among the guardians of U.N. protocol.

Richard Butler, Ekeus's replacement, is the subject of several unadmiring stories told by confidants of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. One has it that Butler attended a dinner party hosted by then-U.S. Ambassador Bill Richardson, packed with ambassadors and international civil servants. The pleasant buzz of conversation ground to a halt at Butler's loud interjection: "Are you out of your bloody mind?" After an awkward silence, Annan's confidant recounted, someone piped in: "That's Australian for diplomacy."

But the real source of unease about Butler within the U.N. secretariat and Security Council was UNSCOM's provocative probing of Iraqi secret services. Annan -- his special envoy to Iraq, Prakash Shah, told Butler -- wants "peace at any cost."
On Aug. 4, barely a month after taking office as executive chairman, Butler called a 90-minute meeting to put his stamp on the commission's most sensitive work. Three others attended: Charles Duelfer, the deputy chairman; Rachel Davies, who leads the Information Assessment Unit, UNSCOM's euphemism for intelligence; and Ritter.

Butler knew there was nothing more controversial for UNSCOM than Ritter's efforts to probe Iraq's special security organs. But those organs were the center, he said, of "the defeat UNSCOM industry." The commission was entitled to "take a lively interest" in any activity aimed at thwarting its work. He put Ritter in charge of a new Special Investigations Unit, repackaging the team Ritter already ran, and gave his blessing to continued use of the Shake the Tree channels from London and Tel Aviv.

The Clinton administration was more and more worried about Ritter, and about Israel. During a polygraph examination in late 1996, taken as part of his application for a job at the CIA, Ritter was asked about his overseas work. "They ask, 'Have you ever had contact with a foreign intelligence agency?' " said one U.S. official. "You say yes and it sends these guys ... into orbit. Scott came in with a list."

Ritter's answers were referred to the FBI, which began a counterintelligence investigation. Among the concerns was his August 1991 marriage to Marina Khatsishvili, a former Soviet Georgian interpreter for the American team that had monitored an arms-control pact in Votkinsk. Ritter had been married when they met, and he and colleagues insist that his romance with Khatsishvili began after he left Votkinsk. But her job had required her to report to the KGB, and Ritter knew he was imperiling his security clearance by marrying her, even afterward. "I was in love with Marina," Ritter said.

Troublesome Link

The bigger problem for Clinton administration policymakers was Ritter's connection to Israel. Present and former officials at UNSCOM insisted that Ritter had authority for all he did there, and several U.S. officials agreed. But they said the mere fact of an FBI investigation involving Ritter and Israel raised unacceptable diplomatic risks if exposed.

"What you don't want is what the Iraqis are doing now, which is charging UNSCOM with having a secret Israeli connection," said one high-ranking official.

Twice this year, as Shake the Tree progressed, the Clinton administration asked Butler to remove Ritter from the spotlight. On Jan. 15, as a crisis over access to suspected weapons sites began to swell, and the administration oversaw a military buildup in the gulf, Washington asked Butler to withdraw Ritter from Baghdad and abort his planned search of the SSO headquarters the next day. And in March, when it came time to test an inspections deal by Annan that had narrowly averted massive U.S. airstrikes a month earlier, Albright and Berger, by this time respectively the secretary of state and national security adviser, pushed for UNSCOM to send anyone but Ritter for the job.

One U.S. official, explaining the efforts, said, "it could be in the national interest, to make UNSCOM work, but not in Scott Ritter's personal interest."

Richardson, who generally supported UNSCOM's arguments that Ritter was uniquely qualified, successfully outflanked efforts by Albright in the first days of March to persuade Butler otherwise. Butler had wrestled with the decision, finally permitting Ritter to fly to Baghdad for the inspections that
would bring him face to face with the marriage registrars. But on March 3, as the inspectors assembled, Butler telephoned to reliefe Ritter of command.

At the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Center, UNSCOM's forward headquarters, the remaining leaders of the team revolted. Cobb-Smith, Gabrielle Kratz-Wadsack, Cees Woltersbeek and Bill McLaughlin sent a "chairman's eyes only" fax back to Butler urging him to call off the whole inspection because, without Ritter, it would be a failure. They argued that Iraq, which had loudly accused Ritter of being a spy, would also see his removal as a victory for its approach of launching propaganda attacks on individual inspectors.

Richardson, in New York, got wind of the rebellion and set out frantically to find Butler at Time magazine's 75th anniversary dinner. He was determined to speak to him before Albright did, according to witnesses, and rushed through Radio City Music Hall past such celebrities as Mikhail Gorbachev and Lauren Bacall. Finally he found Butler and urged him to let Ritter keep the job. Then he flagged down President Clinton, who knew nothing about the dispute, and arranged for a congratulatory compliment for Butler on UNSCOM's work.

"I've talked to the president himself, and you're on," Ritter remembers hearing Butler say by telephone not long afterward.

The March exercise of Shake the Tree proved the richest haul yet of evidence on the manner in which Iraq moved its contraband, according to knowledgeable officials. Soon afterward, for reasons that remain hard to assess, the United States resumed its principal role in support of Shake the Tree and Israel and the United Kingdom withdrew.

Four people with knowledge of those events gave four different accounts of the reasons -- attributing the change, variously, to Butler's anxieties about the previous arrangement, the unwillingness of London and Tel Aviv to continue, American wishes to remove the risk of an Israeli role, and mere substitution of a superior technical approach.

Washington got much of the control it wanted in 1994: An operation supported under U.S. classification rules. Duelfer, the deputy chairman, has American security clearances. Butler is cleared through CANUKAUS, the intelligence-sharing arrangement among Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States. One result of the change, intended or not, is that Ritter was left out of the information loop.

In the shell within a shell that UNSCOM had become, Ritter had no way to be sure who had cut off his information supply. Some American officials said it was Butler. Butler, in an interview, said: "It was not my decision. It's an American one. I never lost confidence in Scott."

A Hero, to Some

In Ritter's celebrity since his resignation, he has been heralded as a hero and mocked as "Scotty boy," trying to make decisions "above your pay grade," as Sen. Joseph Biden Jr. (D-Del.) put it last month. Biden apologized afterward in private, but critics continue to doubt Ritter's motives and speculate about what drives the former Marine in his public campaign.

"Unfortunately, if UNSCOM is to succeed, it must, among other things, both be and be perceived to be
independent," Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk testified last month. "It is ironic that Scott Ritter and Saddam Hussein both argue that UNSCOM's independence is being compromised by the United States."

Ritter knows he is speaking aloud of things UNSCOM has long kept unspoken. He said he decided to do so because the commission was "terminal if something was not done," and "to go public you have to go all the way."

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"I feel very strongly about the concealment mechanism," he said. "You can’t find the weapons without defeating the concealment mechanism. One reason I feel comfortable talking about these [intelligence] liaisons is that it legitimizes the concealment investigation. If UNSCOM survives this, and I think they can, then it will add credibility to the charges and put the focus back on Iraq."

Those who know Ritter best, in and out of UNSCOM, are fiercely loyal, even if they are discomfited by impolitic talk of the commission’s inner workings. Others, who like his stand in principle, see hubris. "Wouldn’t you hate to share an office with him, though?" asked one pre-Ritter congressional staff member. "He’s totally driven, he’s self-righteous, and his way is the only way."

David Underwood, a retired Air Force colonel who was chief of the State Department’s UNSCOM support office, said Ritter is simply "red, white and blue, and it’s his culture. . . . His agenda, if I could speak for him, is that Saddam Hussein lives up to that [Security Council resolution], and that’s it."

At the state dinner for Czech leader Vaclav Havel on Sept. 16, Albright had another view in a conversation with former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, according to someone at the dinner.

"Is he going to run for office?" Brzezinski asked.

"I assume so. It certainly looks that way. It’s another Ollie North," Albright replied.

North, ironically, has left a number of unanswered phone messages for Ritter at the office of his lawyer, New York’s Matthew Litfin. He wants Ritter on his radio show. Ritter was reluctant to explain why he will not appear.

"I won’t go on his radio show because I don’t identify with his politics," he said finally, when pressed. "The man was a Marine Corps officer, testified in front of the Congress wearing his uniform, and pleaded the Fifth Amendment. And I just find something very wrong with that."

A New Strategy

In the policy review that came last spring, the Clinton administration concluded that a loss of diplomatic support left little room to back intrusive searches by threat of U.S. force. The best the government believed it could do for now is to maintain a broad consensus for economic sanctions. Without saying so much, Indyk acknowledged in his Sept. 9 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that U.S. policy in Iraq cannot be effective without the Security Council and "this fact has an influence on the tactical decisions we have to make."

A high-ranking U.S. official said the "conscious policy decision in April was to "take the trigger out of
Butler's hands for going to war" by slowing the pace of the commission's most controversial work. "It wasn't Ritter. Ritter thinks it was him. It was more Butler."

With inspections stopped since Aug. 3 and no prospect in view for their resumption, the administration now plays down their significance.

Defense Secretary William S. Cohen praised the inspectors in Senate testimony last Tuesday but counseled "not to overstate what their role is": "If you take a group of 20 or 30 people, and you put them in a country the size of all of New England, plus New York, plus Pennsylvania, plus New Jersey, and say, 'Go find evidence of chemical weapons,' you are asking a great deal of those inspectors."

One American official said as long as UNSCOM continues to function at all, "and as long as [the inspectors] don't report positively" that their work is done, "that's all we need" to keep the sanctions in place. In New York, one inspector said Iraq might yet overreach enough to swing world opinion back in UNSCOM's favor, perhaps by tearing down cameras or by expelling the last passive monitoring teams.

"I still think there's a beat in this body," the inspector said. "The Iraqis could save us, depending on what they do."

PH,,REUTERS; PHM,,FRANK JOHNSTON; PHM,,AP; MAP,,LOUIS SPIRITO CAPTION: At left, in September 1991 a bulldozer crushes cylinders of bombs that were designed to carry chemical weapons. Below, an UNSCOM photo from February 1998 shows the destruction of Iraqi rockets containing the chemical nerve agent Sarin. CAPTION: Ahmed Chalabi is president of the opposition Iraqi National Congress. CAPTION: Hussein Kamel Hassan Majeed, a defector, was killed in 1996. CAPTION: Iraqi U.N. envoy Nizar Hamdoon denied plot against UNSCOM chief. CAPTION: Above are four inspection targets for UNSCOM Mission 182, which focused on ballistic missiles and went forward after months of planning in March 1997. The Tip Top ice cream company, inspectors believed, was a front whose red-and-white trucks carried contraband arms between Special Security Organization hiding places. CAPTION: As a general method of operation, inspectors say, Iraq would move materials from the Baghdad Presidential Zone west to the Radwaniyah Presidential Zone then north to the Tikrit Presidential Zone to hide them from UNSCOM.

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Guess Who’s Back

"So you thought Saddam Hussein was out of your life? Sorry—he's back, manufacturing the weapons of mass destruction with which he threatens the Iraqi people, his neighbors and, by extension, the safety of the world.

Two separate developments have returned Saddam Hussein to the headlines. Earlier this month the administration revealed that its satellites had detected Iraq test-firing Al-Samoud missiles, home-grown, smaller versions of the Scuds last used against Israel during the 1990 Gulf War. The chief of U.S. Central Command, Gen. Tony Zinni, said that the range of the Al-Samoud easily could be increased.

The administration also revealed that Saddam Hussein has been hiding between 20 and 30 Russian Scuds as well as working through front companies outside Iraq to acquire the machine tools needed to build more missiles.

None of this is new. In my last report as executive chairman of UNSCOM, the agency charged with disarming Saddam, I warned the U.N. Security Council about Iraq's missile-development activities. That was almost two years ago, just before Iraq shut down all international arms control and monitoring efforts. I've also publicly detailed Iraq's refusal to yield or account for its holdings of at least 500 tons of fuel usable only by Scud-type missiles. Iraqi officials told me that a complete accounting for this fuel was unnecessary because, after all, Iraq had no Scud missiles. I disagreed, stating that the reverse was true! As long as Iraq refused to yield the fuel, it clearly had concealed Scuds or planned to acquire or build them.

Presumably unconnected with the administration's revelations, and simultaneous with it, former UNSCOM inspector Scott Ritter wrote in an article in Arming Control Today, that Iraq is "qualitatively disarmed." He failed to offer any new information or evidence to support this dubious concept.

There were two levels of deception in Iraqi dealings with UNSCOM: concealment and false declarations on the weapons Iraq was prepared to put in play in the disarmament process. When Ritter worked for me, he was in charge of the UNSCOM unit responsible for finding and destroying the concealed weapons, and he was vilified by Iraqi leaders as their major persecutor. Now he says he has had private conversations with unspecified Iraqi officials that have persuaded him they are "qualitatively disarmed" and will accept a new monitoring program if the Security Council first lifts all sanctions against Iraq.

The facts are clear and alarming, and they do not support this assertion. Iraq has been free of any arms control or monitoring regime for almost two years, a consequence of the breakdown of consensus among the permanent members of the Security Council. Now Saddam Hussein is reconstituting his capability to deploy weapons of mass destruction. I've seen evidence of Iraqi attempts to acquire missile-related tools and, even more chilling, of steps the Iraqis have taken to reassemble their nuclear weapons design team. After the Gulf War, experts assessed Iraq was only six months from testing an atomic bomb. It retains that know-how. It also has rebuilt its chemical and biological weapons manufacturing facilities.

If the United States is serious about addressing the threat current developments raise, it should insist to its fellow permanent members of the Security Council that there be a new consensus on enforcing arms control in Iraq. Selective revelations such as those recently issued by the administration need to be accompanied by a robust policy within the Security Council, making clear particularly to Russia and France that the United States is not prepared to accept their patronage of Saddam Hussein.

The writer, diplomat in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, was chairman of UNSCOM from 1997 to 1999.
In attached article.

Title: EX-U.N. INSPECTOR BITTER TO TOUR IRAQ MAKE DOCUMENTARY

Character:

Classification:

Submitting Office:

Indexing:
Ex-U.N. Inspector Ritter to Tour Iraq, Make Documentary Invitation Offered by Saddam Hussein

By Colum Lynch
Special to The Washington Post

UNITED NATIONS, July 27—Scott Ritter, the former U.N. arms inspector who badgered Iraq with his aggressive pursuit of hidden weapons, said he will return to Baghdad on Saturday at the invitation of President Saddam Hussein.

The Iraqi leader has agreed to provide Ritter and a documentary film crew access to weapons facilities throughout the country so that Ritter can judge whether Iraq has rebuilt its arsenal since U.N. inspectors left 19 months ago. Ritter said he is also hoping to get an interview with the Iraqi leader.

The trip comes weeks after Ritter published an article in an arms control magazine asserting Iraq has essentially disarmed and challenging speculation by the Clinton administration that Baghdad has the capacity to reconstitute its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs.

"My personal feeling is that Iraq is qualitatively disarmed and the Security Council should reassess its position," Ritter said in an interview. "This marks a bizarre turnaround for Ritter, who resigned from the United Nations almost two years ago in protest over the U.S. failure to support even tougher U.N. inspections. Iraqi leaders, having frequently accused Ritter of spying on Iraq for the CIA, seem to view their erstwhile enemy as an asset in their propaganda war against the United States."
Ritter said his reassessment of the danger posed by Iraq’s weapon programs was brought about by a change in his own job title. As a U.N. inspector, he was under orders from the U.N. Security Council to achieve 100 percent disarmament regarding prohibited weapons in Iraq, a standard Baghdad never met. As an independent observer, Ritter said he believes that Iraq’s military has been sufficiently degraded by the U.N. inspectors to prevent Saddam Hussein from threatening his neighbors. However, Ritter has not articulated a persuasive explanation of why he is convinced Iraq will not present a future threat to the region.

Under terms of the 1991 Persian Gulf War cease-fire, Iraq is required to forgo the development of medium- and long-range missiles, and all chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. But U.N. inspectors have not been allowed into Iraq to test whether the government has met its obligation since they left in December 1998, on the verge of a U.S. and British bombardment.

U.S. officials contend Ritter is naively allowing himself to be used by Baghdad to further its efforts to reconstitute its weapon programs and say his visit will be used to support Baghdad’s claim that it has abandoned its illegal programs.

“Having Iraq host Scott Ritter for a ‘thanks for the memories’ documentary is lovely, but it doesn’t substitute for full cooperation with the U.N. inspection regime,” said national security spokesman P. J. Crowley. “They had the opportunity to cooperate with Ritter when he was actually an inspector and didn’t.”

The documentary project has aroused the interest of federal law enforcement authorities. Ritter said that FBI agents have followed and questioned him and the film’s producer, Tom Osborne, about their contacts with Iraqi officials and warned that Baghdad would seek to manipulate them into joining the Iraqi cause or at least into presenting a more favorable portrait of the regime.

U.S. citizens are prohibited from traveling to Iraq under an embargo imposed after Iraq invaded Kuwait. Violators face up to 12 years in prison and $1 million in fines, though there is an exemption for journalists, which Ritter maintains he meets.

Ritter said he intends to interview Iraqi Deputy Defense Minister Tehcir Ariz and Oil Minister Amer Rashed and visit existing and destroyed weapon facilities where he will investigate claims by Western intelligence sources that Iraq is developing new viral warfare agents in an underground installation.

“I thought a documentary that went in and actually gained access to these sites and interviewed the Iraqis would go a long way toward dispelling some of the rumors about Iraq’s arsenal,” Ritter said. “But this isn’t going to be a patsy collusive thing.”

Ritter said he was first invited to Baghdad last year by the Iraqi government after the publication of his book “Endgame,” which argued that the continuation of economic sanctions on Iraq was more “evil” than doing business with Saddam Hussein. “They were shocked by my position in the book,” Ritter said.

Ritter said that several months later, at a hearing on Capitol Hill, he met Iraqi-born American businessman Shahir Alkajiji, who had heard Ritter attack U.S. policy toward Iraq. Alkajiji asked what Ritter could do to end the sanctions and break the impasse in relations between the United States and Iraq. "I said I could do a documentary," Ritter answered.

Alkajiji, who is accompanying Ritter as a “translator and cultural adviser,” secured the travel visas for the crew and agreed to put up a $400,000 line of credit to finance the documentary.
See attached article.
The Case for Iraq's Qualitative Disarmament

Scott Ritter

If the Security Council were to redefine Iraq's disarmament obligation along qualitative standards, UNMOVIC should be able to come to closure on all outstanding disarmament issues.

Resolution 1284 reduced Iraq's incentive to cooperate, stating that the Security Council would only suspend sanctions once Baghdad had complied with inspections, rather than lift them as agreed in Resolution 687. Iraq has made clear that it will never agree to anything less than the lifting of sanctions.

As the situation stands today, Iraq and the Security Council are deadlocked. There is no hope for the return of inspectors to Iraq anytime soon. With each passing day, concern increases over the status of Iraq's WMD programs because there are no inspectors in place to monitor them. Unless the Security Council can come up with a compromise, the situation will continue to deteriorate.

What is often overlooked in the debate over how to proceed with Iraq's disarmament is the fact that from 1994 to 1998 Iraq was subjected to a strenuous program of ongoing monitoring of industrial and research facilities that could be used to reconstitute prohibited activities. This monitoring provided inspectors with detailed insight into the capabilities, both present and future, of Iraq's industrial infrastructure. It allowed UNMOVIC to ascertain, with a high level of confidence, that Iraq was not rebuilding its prohibited weapons programs and that it lacked the means to do so without an infusion of advanced technology and a significant investment of time and money.

Given the comprehensive nature of the monitoring regime put in place by UNSCOM, which included a strict export control regime, it was possible as early as 1997 to determine that, from a qualitative standpoint, Iraq had been disarmed. Iraq no longer possessed any meaningful quantities of chemical or biological agent, if it possessed any at all, and the industrial means to produce these agents had either been eliminated or were subject to stringent monitoring. The same was true of Iraq's nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. As long as monitoring inspections remained in place, Iraq presented a WMD-based threat to no one.

The success of the UNSCOM monitoring regime may hold the key to unlocking the current stalemate between Iraq and the Security Council. The absolute nature of the disarmament obligation set forth in Resolution 687 meant that anything less than 100 percent disarmament precluded a finding of compliance. There was no latitude for qualitative judgments. As such, the world found itself in a situation where the considerable accomplishments of the UNSCOM weapons inspectors—the elimination of entire categories of WMD and their means of production—were ignored in light of UNMOVIC's inability to verify that every aspect of those programs was fully accounted for. Quantitative disarmament (the accounting of every last weapon component, or bit of related material) took precedence over qualitative disarmament (the elimination of a meaningful, viable capability to produce or employ weapons of mass destruction).

If the Security Council were to redefine Iraq's disarmament obligation along more meaningful—and politically and technically viable—qualitative standards, UNMOVIC should be able to reconstitute UNSCOM's monitoring program and rapidly come to closure on all outstanding disarmament issues. If such a disarmament program is...

Verifying Iraq's complete disarmament was complicated by the fact that in the summer of 1991, Iraq disregarding its obligation to submit a complete declaration of its WMD programs, undertook a systematic program of "unilateral destruction," disposing of munitions, components, and production equipment related to all categories of WMD. When Iraq admitted this to UNSCOM, it claimed it had no documentation to prove its professed destruction.

While UNSCOM was able to verify that Iraq had in fact destroyed significant quantities of WMD-related material, without any documents or other hard evidence, it was impossible to confirm Iraq's assertions that it had disposed of all its weapons. UNSCOM's qualitative mandate had become a trap. However, through its extensive investigations, UNSCOM was able to prove that the vast majority of Iraq's WMD arsenal, along with the means to produce such weaponry, was eliminated. Through monitoring, UNSCOM was able to guarantee that Iraq was not reconstituting that capability in any meaningful way.

Ballistic Missiles

UNSCOM achieved its most dramatic success in the field of ballistic missiles. In his December 1992 report to the Security Council, then-Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus noted:

All ballistic missiles and items related to their production and development, identified as requiring destruction...have been destroyed...considerable progress has been made in obtaining information from Iraq about its operational use of missiles since 1980 and the importation of missile components, and hence in establishing a material balance for these missiles. If analysis of this data does not reveal inconsistencies and if the information provided is not refuted by new evidence from reliable sources, the Commission would appear to have a practically complete picture of Iraq's past SCUD-derivative missile programs.

Over the next six years, UNSCOM continued to investigate Iraq's proliferated missile programs, and while much new information was obtained, nothing ever altered the final conclusion of Ekeus' report.

Because of its success in tracking down Iraq's proliferated missile program, UNSCOM was able to turn its attention toward monitoring Iraq's indigenous missile research, development, and manufacturing capabilities a full year before any of the other weapons disciplines. As a direct result of this early foray into monitoring, UNSCOM was able to fully assess Iraq's capabilities in the field. The March 1993 inspection report of the first monitoring team spelled out the true extent of Iraq's capabilities.

There was a capability to mass produce missiles at the Centre and very little capability to produce prototypes--lack of missile design and testing experience, qualified personnel, raw materials and equipment will significantly delay the near-term development of an Iraqi produced missile system.

The team predicts that even under conditions in which they would have sufficient amount of raw materials and necessary equipment, it will take several years for the Centre to successfully design, produce and test a prototype missile system (solid- or liquid-fuelled) in preparation for mass production.7

Over the years, Iraq made several efforts to acquire the additional technology needed to improve its ballistic missile capabilities. Secret deals with Russia on guidance and control equipment, with Ukraine on rocket-propulsion technology, and with Romania on guidance and control and rocket-propulsion technology were all uncovered by UNSCOM before reaching fruition. All of these covert procurement efforts, although illegal, were in support of a permitted missile system, the 150-kilometer-range Al Samoud, rather than a reconstruction of Iraq's prohibited long-range missile programs. UNSCOM's ability to detect and interdict these transactions only underscores the viability of its monitoring regime. Of note is the fact that once sanctions were lifted, such transactions would be legal as long as they were declared under the provisions of the export-import control regime set forth in Security Council Resolution 1051. Iraq would then have no reason to continue to pursue such covert (and illegal) procurement routes.

Chemical Weapons

Through its inspection activities, UNSCOM obtained reasonable information concerning Iraq's chemical weapons (CW) activities from 1981 to 1987, with the exception of data on the use of CW against Iran. Iraq consistently refused to provide detailed to UNSCOM regarding such use, probably because of the political fallout that such an admission would cause. While this refusal prevented a full accounting of Iraq's CW, Iraq could not still have viable CW from that period because the chemical agent would have long since deteriorated.

As an internal UNSCOM working paper noted, an Iraqi declaration of CW use during the war with Iran was not required for any meaningful verification: "Taking into consideration the conditions and the quality of CW agents and munitions produced by Iraq at that time, there is no possibility of weapons remaining from the mid-1980s."9

The same level of confidence did not exist concerning Iraq's CW activities during the last three years of its chemical weapons program, 1988-1991. The Iraqi leadership took a strategic decision in 1988 to improve its CW capabilities, resulting in the reconstitution of the CW program. Iraq transferred precursor-chemical and CW-agent production capability from its premier production site, the Muthanna State Establishment, to alternative civilian sites in an effort to conceal its continued CW activities within Iraq's legitimate civilian chemical industry.

At the inception of the UNSCOM weapons inspection regime, Iraq put forward inaccurate and misleading declarations concerning this latter phase of CW activity. These false declarations were designed to underscore the actual level of CW activity that transpired in Iraq from 1988 to 1991 and enable Iraq to retain a significant CW production capability regardless of its disarmament obligation.

UNSCOM inspectors were eventually able to uncover Iraq's incomplete declarations and track down much of the missing information regarding this critical period of Iraq's CW program. However, according to an UNSCOM presentation to the Security Council in early June 1998, there remained several priority issues that needed to be addressed before UNSCOM could issue a judgment on Iraqi compliance:

- the accounting for CW warheads for the Scud missile;
- the material balance for other CW munitions;
The key to the qualitative argument is that individual pieces of CW production equipment are worthless unless they are assembled in a specific configuration, a unique combination that would be readily discernible to weapons inspectors.

Iraq that was not backed up with documents or other verifiable evidence. The fact that Iraq maintained it did not have such documents meant that UNSCOM was faced with trying to prove a negative, which in and of itself is an almost impossible task.

What was overlooked in 1998 was the extent to which UNSCOM had actually eliminated Iraq's CW capability. The Muthanna State Establishment and most of Iraq's associated production equipment had been destroyed, either through aerial bombardment during Operation Desert Storm or under the supervision of UNSCOM inspectors. Iraq's stockpiles of CW agent had either been destroyed in the same manner or could be assumed to have deteriorated.

The two potential exceptions were VX nerve agent and mustard agent that had been loaded into 155 mm artillery shells. Iraq declared to UNSCOM that it had a stockpile of 13,500 such shells on the eve of the Persian Gulf War. UNSCOM supervised the destruction of 12,747 of these shells, and Iraq declared that the remaining shells had been destroyed by aerial bombardment of two storage sites during Desert Storm. UNSCOM could find no evidence of any destroyed 155 mm shells at the main storage area, but it did discover four intact artillery shells lying on the ground in one of the storage sites. The mustard was tested and found to be 94-97 percent pure—a viable weapon. Given the purity of the mustard, UNSCOM made finding the remaining shells a priority.

Iraq denies having retained these shells; but regardless a few hundred 155 mm mustard shells have little military value on the modern battlefield. A meaningful CW attack using artillery requires thousands of rounds. Retention of such a limited number of shells makes no sense and cannot be viewed as a serious threat.

For more important to assuring Iraq's qualitative disarmament is disabling its production capability—a task that at first glance seems almost impossible. A 1998 UNSCOM document laid out all the possible ways Iraq could conceal a CW production capability. The document noted that Iraq could either bury precursor chemicals or distribute them throughout its commercial chemical industry to disguise their true use. Likewise, it could distribute empty dual-use munitions to depots under the cover of legitimate use, bury them, or continually move them around in trucks. The documents required to resumption CW activity could, if microfilmed, be stored in a single briefcase.

Even more disturbing, the 1998 UNSCOM document noted that Iraq could readily distribute the main pieces of equipment needed for CW production throughout its commercial facilities, meaning that equipment that had a legitimate use in commercial chemical-related activity could also be used for CW manufacture. As long as this equipment was maintained at legitimate facilities, any hidden intent by Iraq to use it for illicit purposes would go undetected. "There is no single-use CW equipment, all pieces are dual use and could be justified at different locations," the document noted.

There was absolutely no evidence that Iraq was attempting to hide CW production equipment. In its monitoring capacity, UNSCOM carried out extensive inspections of all of Iraq's civilian chemical manufacturing infrastructure and found no evidence of illicit stores of CW precursor chemicals. Precursor chemicals are difficult to hide from inspectors because the minimum amount required for any viable CW-agent production run is several hundred tons. Inspections of dozens of Iraqi munitions depots by UNSCOM also failed to turn up any illicit unfilled munitions.

However, the key to the qualitative argument is that individual pieces of CW production equipment are worthless unless they are assembled in a specific configuration, a unique combination that would be readily discernible to weapons inspectors: "Only the proper combination of different pieces of equipment in a particular configuration gives to... these pieces of equipment the status of a CW production facility," the UNSCOM document noted. The point is that all of UNSCOM's speculations concerning reinforcement of an Iraq CW capability can be laid to rest as long as a viable monitoring regime, one that would detect any specialized configuration of dual-use equipment, is in place—the kind of regime that existed prior to the withdrawal of inspectors in December 1998.
Biological Weapons

Perhaps the most misunderstood member of Iraq's WMD family, the biological weapons (BW) program has been described by Richard Butler, UNSCOM's executive chairman from July 1997 to June 1999, as "a black hole." One of the principal reasons for such a bleak assessment is the prevailing atmosphere of mistrust that has clouded the issue from the start. Iraq denied having a BW program until June 1998, when UNSCOM confronted Baghdad with evidence of massive procurement of growth media that could not otherwise be explained. Even so, Iraq refused to admit it had an offensive BW program until after the 1998 defection of Hussein Kamal, the son-in-law of Saddam Hussein and former head of Iraq's WMD programs. At that time, Iraq admitted to having weaponized 25 Scud warheads and 157 bombs.

Despite the fact that UNSCOM destroyed the totality of Iraq's declared production facilities, equipment, and raw material associated with BW, in 1996, UNSCOM experts identified by panels of qualified scientists from around the world, found Iraq's declarations regarding BW to be inadequate "scientifically, technically, militarily, and managerially." The primary point of contention was the inability of the experts to verify, based upon the available documentation, most of the declarations made by Iraq concerning both the scope of the Iraqi BW program and the weapons themselves. It was left to Iraq to verify its declarations, which it did not. Inspectors could not account for the material balance for supplies, equipment, and material for the BW program, the production of BW agent, and the production of munitions (i.e., the filling of empty munitions with BW agent). The most frustrating aspect of this issue was that unlike the CW inspectors, who had hard facts contradicting the Iraqi position on VX, the BW inspectors had no evidence of Iraqi non-compliance; they simply refused to accept the Iraqi declaration as valid without records, documents, and physical evidence.

Because of this lack of substantive information, the BW inspection group implemented the most extensive of all UNSCOM's monitoring regimes, drawing in dozens of slots ranging from those involved in vaccine and pharmaceutical work to university-level research laboratories to beer-brewing factories and animal-feed production plants (which could conceivably be converted to mass-produce BW agent). Detailed protocols for each site were developed, and teams of highly trained biologists combed these sites repeatedly for any sign of wrongdoing by Iraq. But while UNSCOM and Iraq faced off over the inadequacies of the Iraqi BW declaration, the biologists responsible for monitoring Iraq's compliance found exactly that—compliance. In all of their inspections, the monitors could find no meaningful evidence of Iraqi circumvention of its commitment not to reconstitute its BW program.

Even "spectacular" finds, such as the widely publicized surprise inspection of the National Food and Drug Examination Laboratory in September 1998, which resulted in exposing the existence of "Staff 7" (also known as the Biological Activities Staff) of the Special Security Organization, turned out to be more ordinary than originally thought. "Staff 7" was responsible for testing the food and other material brought into contact with Saddam Hussein and other senior government officials, nothing more.

One of the conclusions drawn from the extensive monitoring of Iraq's biological capabilities carried out by UNSCOM was that the overall level of Iraq's biological capabilities, in terms of available infrastructure, was very low. Vaccine and pharmaceutical development and manufacture had deteriorated dramatically because of the continued economic sanctions, and without a massive infusion of money and technology, they would continue to do so. The reality of the situation was that, regardless of UNSCOM's ability to verify Iraq's declarations regarding its past BW programs, the major BW production facility at Al Hakum had been destroyed, together with its associated equipment, and extensive monitoring of Iraq's biological infrastructure could find no evidence of continued proliferation activity. If weapons inspectors were once again allowed back into Iraq to resume monitoring along the lines carried out by UNSCOM, there is no reason to doubt that similar findings would be had, with the same level of confidence.

Nuclear Weapons

Under the arrangements set forth in Resolution 687, responsibility for monitoring the disarming of Iraq's nuclear weapons capability was given to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Often overlooked in the debate about Iraq's nuclear capabilities is just how effective the IAEA was at destroying, dismantling, or rendering harmless Iraq's nuclear weapons capability. Despite every attempt by Iraq to retain a leader or a program, the massive infrastructure had been dismantled by 1991 to produce a nuclear bomb had been dismantled by 1995. At Al Asheer, the nuclear weaponization facility, had been destroyed—blown up under IAEA supervision—and all other major facilities related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program had also been dismantled or were subjected to the most stringent forms of ongoing monitoring and verification inspections ever implemented under a disarmament accord.

An UNSCOM inspector is decontaminated with water after taking samples from 155 mm mustard shells. UNSCOM made CW destruction a priority because of Iraq's highly sophisticated CW agent.
By 1996, the IAEA had established a seamless monitoring-based inspection regime that provided absolute certainty Iraq would not be able to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program short of acquiring a complete nuclear weapon abroad. While black-market transactions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons material is a serious issue, it is well beyond the mandate of IAEA inspections inside Iraq. There has been no evidence provided of any attempt by Iraq to acquire a nuclear weapon or related components since 1991. Iraq has attempted to acquire some dual-use items, fueling speculation about its intent, but all items were minor and would not have had any meaningful impact on a full-scale nuclear weapons effort. Furthermore, given the high quality of the IAEA monitoring approach in Iraq, any such items, if not detected outright by IAEA inspectors, would have to be hidden by the Iraqis in a fashion that would preclude their use in any covert rearmament activity because any such attempt at rearmament would be discovered by the monitoring inspections.

Despite the effectiveness of the IAEA at eliminating Iraq's nuclear capabilities, rumors of Iraq possessing a nuclear device persist. The main cause of such speculation is information provided by an Iraqi defector in security services in the mid-1990s and came to the attention of UNSCOM in early September. The defector, whom UNSCOM gained access through cooperation with supporting governments, possessed information pertaining to the means and methods used by Iraq to conceal its retained proscribed weapons from UNSCOM and the IAEA.

This information, especially as pertaining to the Military Industrial Commission Security Service, proved to be unerringly accurate and established the defector as a valid and potentially valuable source. Based upon the defector's proven credibility, he later provided UNSCOM with a detailed description of the vehicles, including color schemes and license plate numbers, as well as information on convey movement of the vehicle makeup of convoys associated with the movement of the bomb.

Rolf Ekeus decided the defector's report should be thoroughly investigated. At the same time, the IAEA was involved in ongoing technical discussions with their Iraqi counterparts about gaps in the information provided by Iraq concerning its nuclear program. It was thought that the defector's report might also help answer some of the IAEA's remaining questions.

Of particular concern was incomplete information concerning the status of the final Iraqi design for a nuclear bomb and the disposition of design drawings and molds for the manufacture of the high-explosive lenses needed for an implosion device. The IAEA noted that several critical drawings were missing and that there was an inconsistency in the technical story about the lens program. Iraqi authorities at first stated that, because their final nuclear weapons design called for the outer dimensions of the device to be reduced from 120 centimeters to less than 80 centimeters (in order to fit in the warhead of a Scud-type missile), the effort never went beyond the design stage as Iraqi engineers struggled to shrink the weapon. The Iraqis then conceded that they had in fact cut some lenses for testing purposes, and the IAEA and UNSCOM speculated that it was possible Iraq had manufactured three or four sets of high-explosive lenses.

Coordination between UNSCOM and the IAEA on this issue during the summer of 1997 resulted in the dismantlement of the basic premise that Iraq had a "20-kiloton nuclear weapons program". All evidence, including testimony from Hussein Kamal, clearly established that Iraq had not manufactured a nuclear weapon by the time of the Gulf War. In response to a question from the IAEA as to whether Iraq had tried to produce a bomb and whether such efforts were ongoing, Hussein replied, "Yes, but not now, before the Gulf War. They had a bomb too, but they did not have a bomb and nobody has a bomb and they did not have anybody to deliver the bomb. They only delivered it to themselves."

Nevertheless, continued inconsistencies in the Iraqi story, combined with the refusal of the Iraqi side to provide the IAEA with an overall design concept of the nuclear device, made it prudent to examine every report that hinted at continued concealment activities on the part of Iraq. However, both UNSCOM and the IAEA were in agreement that for the defector's report to be credible, the material in question could only be components of a 20-kiloton device, not an actual bomb. Since 1998, the IAEA has gained access to additional documentation in the form of file books pertaining to the production of high-explosive lenses, that further clarifies the issue of high-explosive lens manufacture by Iraq. Thus eliminating one of the main concerns fueling speculation that Iraq continued to possess major nuclear weapon components.

In conclusion, it is highly unlikely that the defector's claims concerning an Iraqi nuclear bomb are accurate. Unfortunately, speculation that Iraq has retained some nuclear capability simply will not go away. It is conceivable that Iraq could have retained certain components of a nuclear device. However, there is no credible evidence of this, and if such material were retained, it would be of no use to Iraq, given the extent to which Iraq's nuclear program was dismantled by the IAEA. The best way to ensure that Iraq does not reconstitute its nuclear weapons program is to get IAEA inspectors back into Iraq, where they can resume their task of monitoring Iraqi compliance.
Iraq Today

The absence of weapons inspectors in Iraq since December 1998 has created a vacuum of available data on which to base an assessment of Iraq's current activities. Rushing to fill this void have been a series of speculative reports that have attributed certain capabilities to Iraq that are incompatible with what UNSCOM learned from eight years of experience with Iraq's WMD programs. The truth of the matter is, devoid of weapons inspections, no one knows for sure what has transpired in Iraq since the last inspectors were withdrawn. Conjecture aside, however, there is absolutely no reason to believe that Iraq could have meaningfully reconstituted any element of its WMD capabilities in the past 18 months.

From a WMD perspective, Iraq today is not the Iraq of 1991. What took Iraq decades to build through the expenditure of billions of dollars could not, under any rational analysis, have been reconstituted since December 1998. Iraq's nuclear enrichment infrastructure has been reduced to zero, and Iraq lacks the funding, technology, and time required to reconstitute it. In theory, some practical work could have been carried out in the field of high-explosive lens development, but any serious effort would require the diversion of controlled stocks of specialized explosives that had been used for manufacturing the lenses, something that would be readily discerned once IAEA inspectors return to work.

In addition to the fact that UNSCOM was thoroughly monitoring all activity related to the Al Seead missile project, the major facilities related to the development efforts of this program were bomb-damaged during Operation Desert Fox. When, in the summer of 1999, the CIA detected signs of reconstruction at these facilities, the Clinton administration immediately warned of an imminent threat. However, such assessments were not shared by the scientists and technicians of UNSCOM, who knew Iraq's capabilities better than anyone. One study, prepared in July 1996 by a British missile expert, set the tone for all reports that followed:

"Even given a relaxation of the sanctions program, if there are no quantum jumps in the level of technology available to Iraq, it should be many years before an Indigenously designed, 150 kilome-
within the framework of the Security Council to formulate a policy that results in the rapid reintroduction of meaningful, monitoring-based weapons inspections into Iraq.

That will require lifting, not simply the suspension, of sanctions. While it is true that the sanctions have retarded Iraq's ability to acquire technology that could aid any WMD reconstitution effort, Resolution 687 stated that a finding of compliance would trigger the lifting of sanctions. Sanctions are thus not an open-ended option. At some point, they must be lifted, and if a finding of qualitative disarmament, backed by the implementation of viable monitoring-based inspections, can be had, then there is no reason to keep sanctions in place.

The Security Council must also follow through on the promise it made in paragraph 14 of Resolution 687, which speaks of regional disarmament. While monitoring-based inspectors in Iraq must be expected to last indefinitely, they cannot be expected to last in a vacuum. Unless arrangements are made to address WMD programs in Iran and Israel, as well as the regional proliferation of advanced conventional weaponry, Iraq will never accept perpetual disarmament.

What is needed is a Security Council resolution that concludes Resolution 687, supersedes Resolution 1284, and redefines the disarmament obligations of Iraq to meet more realistic qualitative benchmarks. In addition to verifying Iraqi compliance with these new benchmarks, the resulting inspectors, whether a revamped UNMOVIC or a new agency, would be tasked with implementing a monitoring regime similar to the one UNMOVIC had in place prior to its withdrawal from Iraq. Once Iraq's disarmament along clearly defined qualitative standards that had been verified by weapons inspectors, and after a viable monitoring regime was in place to detect and deter any attempt at reconstituting its WMD programs, the Security Council would lift, not suspend, economic sanctions.

Reformulating inspection goals and objectives would not only capitalize on UNSCOM's many accomplishments in rooting out and disposing of Iraq's prohibited weapons, it would also help the Security Council regain some of its lost credibility and reassume its role as a viable overseer of international peace and security. It also meets the original intent of the Security Council to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, not its leadership. Such a policy, built on the precepts of diplomatic engagement, would promote peace and security more than any other alternative policy currently being considered. And that, of course, is what arms control and disarmament are all about.

NOTES
2. The Iraq Al Haytham Missile Research and Design Center, which took over responsibility for Iraq's permitted ballistic missile programs in the aftermath of the Gulf War.
4. Resolution 687 permits Iraq to possess ballistic missiles with a range of 1,500 kilometers or less, as well as the means to produce them.
7. Mitrokhin, op. cit.
10. The Military Industrial Commission Security Service, also known as the Amu al Tanou, is responsible for military-industrial facility and personnel security.
11. "Conversation for a while with Lieutenant General Hussein Kamal Hassan al-Majid, 22 August 1993, 1:00-3:00 p.m., Amman, Jordan," UNCOM internal document, p. 4.
12. A separate investigation concerning the existence of a hide site near the Iraqi city of Najaf used to store materials relating to Iraq's dismantled centrifuge enrichment program was carried out by the IAEA and UNSCOM using information from the same defector—information that was, if anything, more detailed than that of the truck convoy. This investigation refuted the defector's information, casting a shadow over the viability of his other information.
14. Operation Desert Fox made extensive use of information gleaned from UNSCOM inspections in targeting presidential palaces and security and military facilities throughout Iraq.
On December 11, 2004, JACK KEMP was interviewed at his residence in Bethesda, Maryland. In attendance were Special Agents and Assistant United States Attorneys of the Southern District of New York, and. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents, KEMP voluntarily provided the following information.

KEMP wrote a column in 1997 or 1998 about the situation in Iraq where he suggested that the weapons inspectors should be allowed back in to conduct a robust mission of unencumbered spot checks. If nothing was found in six months, the sanctions against Iraq could be lifted. KEMP "covered his butt" by also suggesting that if the Iraqis did anything negative towards another country, the sanctions would be back on.

KEMP reported that knew and KEMP might have met several times after he wrote the column but had no meetings of any importance with . The idea of a trip to Iraq was brought up by and told KEMP to "back off the idea" and "do not touch this with a ten foot pole."

As far as how KEMP initially became aware of KEMP stated that told KEMP that he knew a businessman who agreed with him on Iraq. KEMP learned that knew contacted KEMP after seeing his column and the two met for coffee in New York. The meeting was not arranged by .

In late 1999, asked KEMP if he wanted to go to Iraq and also spoke with about the trip. KEMP responded that he would love to go and went to with the idea. About three months later, and turned the trip down. KEMP told that the trip was not a good idea and it was not right to go against the Clinton administration. was aware that KEMP knew a lot of people in the US government. traveled back and forth to Iraq and KEMP knew that would take his letter to TARIQ AZIZ. KEMP went to before writing the letter to AZIZ. The purpose of the letter, as encouraged by , was to
see if there was any interest by the Iraqis in allowing the inspectors back in with the ultimate goal of having the embargo lifted and implementing KEMP's idea of an Islamic Marshall Plan. Mentioned that AZIZ would be interested in this move and was more moderate than SADDAM HUSSEIN. AZIZ might be the one who could convince Baghdad to make foreign policy changes. KEMP told "if they are interested, I'll take it to and " Opinion leaders such as wanted to avert war with Iraq but told KEMP, "Drop it!" KEMP met AZIZ in New York and took a picture with him but did not have much time to engage AZIZ in conversation.

When questioned about a document previously provided to the interviewing agents by KEMP, KEMP stated that when he wrote "one opportunity," he was referring to the new Bush administration and the new approach on foreign policy. When KEMP wrote, "godspeed," he stated that he always used that term when anyone would be traveling.

When questioned about a letter from dated February 29, 2000, KEMP stated that he never told any names of individuals with whom he discussed the Iraq issue; he did not name drop. KEMP told that "my friends" said that it was not a good idea to travel to Iraq. KEMP knew KEMP had friends in the government. KEMP was concerned about having discussions concerning Baghdad and US government officials over an international telephone line.

When questioned about KEMP telling "Do not give up," KEMP responded that this was a typical comment by KEMP and he continued to say that talking was better than war.

When questioned about a timeline of calls and meetings with KEMP stated that the entry of a 1:00 A.M. telephone call must be a typographical error on the part of his secretary for he might have spoken with while was in Iraq but KEMP reiterated that he was careful not to speak with on an overseas line for fear of being monitored by the NSA. KEMP did not recall a telephone call from about how his trip to Baghdad was going.

When questioned about notes from a February 22, 2000 meeting with KEMP, KEMP stated that CSIS does not refer to the Canadian Secret Intelligence Service but the Center for Strategic
told KEMP that he would see if there was any interest.

came back and told KEMP to drop the idea which KEMP did.

KEMP corrected himself by stating that this conversation was before

KEMP mentioned name to and mentioned name and the inspector issue to in informal, non-
organized, serendipitous meetings. KEMP did not raise name with but did raise his name with KEMP told
that was a businessman in the US who had access in Iraq. KEMP asked if there was anything KEMP should pass on to
said no without asking any questions. KEMP responded, why don’t we talk to the Iraqis?

responded, "There is talk already. The diplomatic option is still open and you are not going to be part of it."

In January 2003, KEMP met with and

knew that KEMP communicated with people in the US
government but KEMP did not tell with whom he met. KEMP
simply stated that the trip to Iraq was not a good idea. KEMP
stated that and did not know name and
believes that they never met. KEMP
never mentioned name to in an overt,
official way but might have never asked KEMP to send a
message to. Before told KEMP to drop the idea of a
trip to Iraq, KEMP told that he had a friend who traveled
back and forth between Baghdad and the US and asked if there was
any attempt or would it be a good idea if we could find out if the
Iraqis would let the inspectors in without a carrot at the end.

told KEMP that he would check and one or two months later,
telephoned KEMP and told him to drop the idea. During that
time, between the conversations with KEMP never told
about talking with but was sure that told people about KEMP’s connection to the US government.
During an October 2001 meeting with Kemp had no recollection and added that it was not possible that he told Kemp that he asked about him and probably surmised that Kemp was talking to and had that Kemp was talking to Aziz. Kemp never wanted his name discussed on the telephone and thought that exaggerated regarding his contacts in Iraq. Kemp reiterated that he would not mention and to Kemp.

Regarding notes from a November 2001 meeting, Kemp stated that he never said to that Iraq was in no danger, never referred to "people who count" and did not provide a "rebuttal letter" to Kemp also stated that he never delivered meeting notes to or but might have to.

When questioned about whether Kemp considered writing an op-ed article to the New York Times in response to comments made by James Woolsey about Iraq's connection to the September 11th terrorist attacks, Kemp stated that he had no recollection of this and added that he would not attack Woolsey.

In the time leading up to war with Iraq, Kemp had fewer discussions with told Kemp that he had a request from high levels in Baghdad to find out if there was anything they could do to avert war. Kemp did not deliver the response he had received because he thought it was too sensitive to share. The response had been that there was nothing the Iraqis could do short of Saddam Hussein stepping down. never gave Kemp an understanding of the US policy towards Iraq; he was simply not privy to this information.

When asked if told that Kemp was speaking with Kemp responded that he might have. Kemp was leery because he did not want to give the impression that Kemp's messages came from the US government.

Kemp saw and article about the United Nations (UN) Oil-for-Food (OFF) program and reported that said the Iraqis asked to do something, grease somebody's palms, and then he would get an oil allocation. told Kemp that he never did this "something." When Kemp asked if had registered with the Department of Treasury, told Kemp that had.
To: Counterterrorism
From: [Blank]
Re: [Blank]

ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI [Blank]

X
X
X
X
X
X
To: Counterterrorism
From: 
Re: 

Set Lead 1:

(U) AT 

X Information is being provided to for whatever investigative merit deems appropriate.

Set Lead 2:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) Read and clear.

**

SECRET / KNONEN
Iraqi President Warns
Of Intervention in War

BAGHDAD, Iraq, June 26 (Reuters) - President Saddam Hussein called today for new efforts to end Iraq's war with Iran, saying there was a risk of foreign intervention in the conflict.

Mr. Hussein, in a message to a Soviet-sponsored anti-nuclear conference in Prague, said, "The war provides pretexts for armed foreign intervention, which may turn the Gulf into an area of confrontation and collision."

He appealed for "any new initiative or proposal that would bring a speedy end to the war."
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: FBIHQ
New York

Attn: NSD, NS-3A
SSA
Attn: Newburgh R/A, I-5
SA

From: NSD-4
Contact: SA Ext

Approved By: (S)
Drafted By: (S) ae

Case ID #: (S)
Title: (S)

Synopsis: (S)

Classification: This Document is classified SECRET in its entirety unless otherwise marked.

Details: (U) CAVEAT: Part of the information set forth in this communication was furnished by highly sensitive, reliable and singular in nature source reporting. Extreme caution should be utilized in the reporting of this information to protect and maintain the continued operation of the source. Dissemination

Classified by: 6-3
Reason: 1.5C
Declassify on: X-1

SECRET
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: 1-40

Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: lkb

Case ID #: (SECRET)

Title: (SECRET)

Date: 04/27/2000

DATE: 05-02-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/1Sc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2036
The source advised that the IMUN will host a celebration in honor of SADDAM HUSSEIN's birthday on Friday, 4/28/2000, at 8:00 p.m. Many members of the Iraqi community in the New York area are invited to attend.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/16/2001

To: ____________

From: I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By: ____________

Drafted By: ____________

Case ID #: ____________

Title: (X)

SECRET
(S) To: [Blank] From: [Blank]

Re: [Blank]

(S) Synopsis: (X) Results of asset contact

(U) Derived From: C-3
Declassify On: X1

Administrative: (X) ASSET:
DATE OF CONTACT: [Blank]
CONTACTED BY: SA

RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable information in the past.

(U) Details: (X) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTE TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI

(S) the latest offer by SADDAM HUSSEIN of 100 million Euros to Americans living below the poverty level.
Synopsis: (X) Summary translation of 08/16/2000 "Al-Jezira" interview of Scott Ritter in New York in English.

(U) (X) Derived From: G-3
Declasify On: X1

Details: (X) On 08/16/2000, "Al-Jazira", satellite TV station from Doha, Qatar, conducted an interview in New York of Scott Ritter, the former UN American weapons inspector.

(U) (X) As per Detroit Language Specialist the dialog of the interview is as follows:

(U) (X) The following is a summary translation of the "Al-Jazira" Arabic channel program "Bila-Hodood" (Without Borders), that was aired on Wednesday August 16th, 2000, at 14:05 hrs. The program is hosted by Mohammed Kreishan and featured an interview with Scott Ritter.
newspaper had reported that this documentary was financed by an Iraqi businessman, Shaker Al-Khafaji. He added that Khafaji had placed the sum of $400,000.00 in Ritter’s account to produce this documentary. Ritter answered that Khafaji is an Iraqi American and holds the U.S. citizenship and that the money is of American origins. He added that he challenges anyone to prove otherwise. Ritter said that this documentary needed financing and no one was brave enough to supply the cash except Khafaji. Ritter is worried about Khafaji who still has a family in Iraq. He added that Iraq is not responsible for this film and the money to finance it was a loan and not a grant.

(5) In the past, while a member of the inspection team, Ritter delivered some harsh statements against the Iraqi leadership. The interviewer asked Ritter whether he noted any changes during his last trip to Iraq in the opinions of the Iraqi leadership with Scott Ritter. His answer was that his interactions with the Iraqi leadership while an inspector for the UN was minimal and any interviews were arranged by the inspection committee. He believes that Tariq Aziz represented the Iraqi viewpoint and their meetings were filled with animosities. Even though Ritter did not agree with Aziz on several issues, none of them tried to overcome the other. He described Aziz as intelligent, emotional, and an educated man.

(6) In regard to any feelings of fear upon his return to Iraq to film his documentary, Ritter claims that his trip was sanctioned by Iraqi officials and he will not apologize for his past statements or actions regarding the Iraqi Government. This film is not about the Iraqi leadership or the politics of that region, it is about the weapons of mass destruction and the Security Council should not condemn 22 million people based on the actions of their government. Ritter added that his return to Iraq was a dangerous venture that no one is willing to take, however, he was greeted with respect and cooperation.

(7) In order to remove the dark cloud placed upon the Iraqi regime, Ritter believes that his trip was essential to change the world’s opinion of Iraq. Ritter claims that he tried to arrange for an interview with Saddam Hussein to include in the documentary, however, was not successful. If he was able to
interview the Iraqi leader, Ritter believes that Western political figures would have given this film much more importance.

In regard to Ritter’s past statements about Iraqi officials’ misleading actions while the inspectors were in place, he said that he does not allow anyone to mislead him and his resume speaks for itself. The film is centered around the truth and relays the opinions of many. It is made for educational purposes and targeted to the American audience.

Ritter’s conscience is clear and he had performed his UN task with honesty and was controlled by the Security Council. He believes that the inspection effort had lost its integrity due to outside interference.

Ritter believes that Richard Butler’s statements regarding the presence of weapons and the capability to produce these weapons was an irresponsible act. He testifies that Iraq does not have the capabilities nor the weapons any longer and Butler’s statements were like fuel to the fire to keep the sanctions against 22 million innocent Iraqis in place.

Ritter believes that the current American policy calls for Saddam’s ousting to facilitate removal of sanctions and that Butler was a tool for the U.S. to implement its decisions.

Ritter believes that as long as the U.S. is part of the Security Council, no decision to remove sanctions will be achieved as long as Saddam remains in power. He adds that some persons within the CIA know the truth about Iraq, however, no one in his right mind will support Iraq as long as the current American policies are in place against Iraq.

At this point, the interviewer started accepting telephone calls.

Saleh Hasan from Sweden said the following:

Shaker Khafaji lives in the U.S. and it is the right of every Iraqi to finance a film in support of Iraq.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Counter terrorism

Attn: SSA

Attn: I-40

Attn: NS-15, SA

From: CI-1

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: gjs (S)

(U) Case ID #: (S)

(S) Title: OO: NY

Synopsis: Asset reporting.

(U) (S) Derived From: G-3

(U) (S) Declassify On: X1

(S)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: Squad I-40
Contact: SA 

Approved By: 

Drafted By: dkk

Case ID #: 

Title: 

Synopsis: (X) Results of asset contact

(U) Derived From: G-3

.Administrative:

(S) ASSET: 

(S) DATE OF CONTACT: 

(U) CONTACTED BY: SA 

(S) RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable information in the past

(U) Details: (X) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF

SECRET

(S)
(S)  
To:  
Re:  (S)  

SECRET  

THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH  

b1  
b7D  
b7E  
b3  

2
Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Counterterrorism
   Atlanta
   Boston
   Detroit
   Honolulu
   Houston
   New York
   San Juan
   CTD
   Squad 3
   CT-1
   Squad CT-1
   Squad 7
   CT-1
   Squad I-40
   CT

From: Newark
   Squad C-10/JTTF

Attn: CTD

CTD

Date: 02/14/2001

Secret

Approved By:

Drafted By: hcf

Case ID #: (S)

Title: (S)

Synopsis: (U) To provide receiving field offices with background information and to set leads for ELSUR references to be reviewed.

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X1

(U)
To: Counterterrorism
From: Newark
Re: (S)
02/14/2001

Reference:

Administrative: (X) Attached to this E/C are results of ELSUR checks conducted by FBI HQ as referenced above.

(X) Receiving field offices are requested to review attached ELSUR results and related files and report any relevant information, regarding ( ), to Newark.

(X) Newark notes that some of the ELSUR information is dated and may not be available.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: 1-40

Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: dkk

Case ID #: (S)

Title: (S)

Synopsis: (X) Results of asset contact

SECRET
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: dkk

Case ID #: 

Title: 

Date: 

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc bsw/sab/lsd
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2036
Synopsis: (S) Results of asset contact

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Administrative:

(S) ASSET:

(S) DATE OF CONTACT: 

(S) CONTACTED BY: 

(S) RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable information in the past

Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE
To: 
From: I-40
Contact: SA

Approved By: 
Drafted By: dkk
Case ID #: (S)

Title: (X)

Synopsis: (U) Results of asset contact
Derived From: G-3
Declasify On: X1
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: SSA

Attn: CI-2

Attn: I-40,

Attn: NS-15

From: CT-1/JTTF

Contact: SA

Approved By: [Blank]

Drafted By: tam

Case ID #: [Blank]

Title: [Blank]

Synopsis: [Blank]

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X1

Reference: [Blank]

Administrative: [Blank]
To: From:
Re: (x)

Synopsis: (x) To report results of Asset contact.

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Administrative:

ASSET: SA SA and
DATE OF CONTACT:
CONTACTED BY:
RELIABILITY:
A CONTACT WITH INDIRECT ACCESS WHO SPOKE IN CONFIDENCE BUT DOES NOT HAVE AN ESTABLISHED REPORTING RECORD.

Details: (x) Advised that the Intelligence Services in Iraq can be cruel and are used against people who speak out critically of SADDAM HUSSEIN or the regime. People have been murdered for making negative statements.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: Squad I-40
Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: 

Case ID #: (S)

Title: (S)

Synopsis: (U) Results of asset contact
Synopsis: (X) Results of asset contact

(X) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Administrative:

(X) ASSET: ________________________________

(X) DATE OF CONTACT: ________________________________

(X) CONTACTED BY: SA

(X) RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable information in the past

Details: (X) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTE TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH ________________________________
Source said that some of the signals from Iraq are mixed concerning the terrorist incidents. For example, TARIQ AZIZ has sent condolences to pro-Iraqi groups and individuals such as VOICES IN THE WILDERNESS and former US Attorney General RAMZY CLARK. On the other hand, SADDAM HUSSEIN has been gloating over the attacks. According to
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE
To: 
From: I-40
Contact: SA
Approved By: 
Drafted By: dkk
Case ID #: 

Title: 

(U) Synopsis: X Results of asset contact
(U) X Derived From: C-3

Declassify On: X1

SECRET
HUSSEIN'S newspaper, 'The Babel', is putting forth its own theory on the 11 September 2001 attacks. The newspaper reported that the Israeli Mossad and a bunch of rogue Israeli officers were behind the attacks. The article also said that a bomb went off inside the Pentagon and that it was not hit by a plane.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: I-40
Contact: SA

Approved By: 
Drafted By: dkk

Case ID #: 

Title: 

(U) Synopsis: (X) Results of asset contact

(U) (X) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Administrative:

(S) (X) ASSET:

SECRET
IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 

To: 

From: 
Squad 1-40
Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: 

Case ID #: 

Title: 

(U) Synopsis: Results of asset contact

(S) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1
IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH
The source added that the primary goal of the TIS is to protect SADDAM HUSSEIN.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: I-40
Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: dkk

Case ID #: (S)
B1
B6
B7C
B7D
B7E
B3
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)

Title: (S)

(U) Synopsis: (S) Results of asset contact

SECRET
Synopsis: Results of asset contact.

Details: IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH
(U) Source provided a copy of the AL-MAHJAR newspaper, volume 9, 26 April 2002, which contained an article covering SADDAM HUSSEIN'S birthday party, held at the Ambassador's residence on 28 April 2002. Included in the article were photographs taken at the party of the following attendees:
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To:      

From:   I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:      

Drafted By:      dkk

Case ID #:      

Title:  

(U) Synopsis:  

(U) Derived From: G-3

Admin:  

DATE: 05-04-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-04-2036

SECRET
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: SSA
IOS
SSRA
North County RA

From: Squad I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: kyb

Case ID #: 

Title: 

SYNOPSIS: (X) NF Results of source reporting on a U.S. citizen.

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

WARNING: IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THESE SOURCES AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS INFORMATION. ESPECIALLY THE ENCLOSURES, MUST BE COORDINATED WITH IF DISSEMINATED. THE MATERIAL MUST BE SUITABLY PARAPHRASED TO PROTECT THE SOURCES.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE
Date: 

To: 
From: I-40
Contact: SA

Approved By: 
Drafted By: dkk

Case ID #: 
Title: 

Synopsis: (X) Results of asset contact
February).

(U) Derived From: G-3
Declassify Qu: X1

(U) Administrative:
(%) ASSET:
(%) DATE OF CONTACT:

(%) CONTACTED BY: SA and SA

(%) RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable information in the past

(U) Details: (X) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH 

SECRET
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: [Blank]

From: I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By: [Blank]

Drafted By: dkk

Case ID #: [Blank]

Title: [Blank]

Synopsis: (X) Results of asset contact

(X) Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X1

Administrative:

(X) ASSET:

(X) DATE OF CONTACT:

(X) CONTACTED BY: SA and SA [Blank]

(X) RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable information in the past

Details: (X) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH [Blank]
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: [I-40]

Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: [nd]

Case ID #: [S]

Title: [S]

Synopsis: [S] Results of asset contact.

Derived From: [G-3]

Declassify On: [X1]

Administrative:

Asset: [S]

Date of Contact: [U][S]

SECRET
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 
From: 

Approved By: 
Drafted By: hkk

Case ID #: 
Title: FCI-IRAQ

Synopsis: (S) Results of asset contact.

Derived From: G-3

Administrative:

(S) ASSET:
(S) DATE OF CONTACT:
(S) CONTACTED BY: SA and SA
(S) RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable information in the past

Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH

SECRET
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 

To: 

From: I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: dkk

Case ID #: 

Title: 

Synopsis: Results of asset contact.

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X1

ASSET: 

DATE OF CONTACT: 

CONTACTED BY: SA and SA

RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable information in the past

Details: IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH

SECRET
Source stated that on a recent television broadcast from Iraq, DR. MUNA KHANJAN was seated next to SADDAM HUSSEIN. Source believes her to be associated with issues dealing with depleted uranium and its alleged effects on Iraqi children. Source views the television broadcast as another indication of her good access to SADDAM HUSSEIN.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE  Date: 05/30/2004

To: Counterterrorism  Attn: ITOS II
       SC M. Chris Briese
       ASC
       UC

From: Counterterrorism
       Baghdad Operations Center
       Contact: SSA

Approved By: Piro George

Drafted By: tmi

Case ID #: (U) 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending)

(U) Title: (X) DESERT SPIDER
       IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: (S)

(U) Derived From: G-3
Declasify On: XL

Details: (S/OR/NF)
0/3/04

حماس البلس : حاس امانة القابا

HAAS

إي week, the rest of my

show me

لا نستطيع أن ننظر إلى

هذا، نحن نعرف أن هذا

غير صحيح.

لا يمكن أن نتذكر

بأي حال من الأحوال

هذا.

لا يمكن أن نتذكر

بأي حال من الأحوال

هذا.

لا يمكن أن نتذكر

بأي حال من الأحوال

هذا.

لا يمكن أن نتذكر

بأي حال من الأحوال

هذا.

لا يمكن أن نتذكر

بأي حال من الأحوال

هذا.

لا يمكن أن نتذكر

بأي حال من الأحوال

هذا.
File Number 315E-HQ-1448534
Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBI BAGHDAD
Serial # of Originating Document
Date Received 4/24/04
From
(FBI OPERATIONS CTR.)
(Address)
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
(City and State)
By
To Be Returned □ Yes □ No
Receipt Given □ Yes □ No
Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure □ Yes □ No
Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI) □ Yes □ No
Title:
DESSERT SPIDER,
1T-IRAQ
Reference: ______________________________________________________________________
(Communication Enclosing Material)
Description: □ Original notes re interview of
SADDAM HUSSEIN
SADDAM'S statements
he direction changed from
dialogue to questions. I
realized the were being
asked in an intelligence
and gut-wrench form

I Am a captive
Please I am completely
truth when I say I
am peace I my country
selected by my people.
Therefore, the wording of
this statement the question
have been

All information contained
herein is unclassified
Date 05-13-2009 by 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

Bush is a president
should not have been
accused
Don't have to do my name, the name.

Based on this, I have what we have discussed has been sufficient.

Therefore, for historical purposes I have discussed them to continue would create a conflict I do not want.

Anyone I think we should stop at this point.

What I'd like you to think about one next few days in the presence of.
The speaker's path for history benefited again.

Co. until my first opinion I found myself in the same, profound

But what do I mean do I sign my name I am one of the

Look and recognize on his side there are not a lot of years on the

from the oldest to the worlds
Go! I'd like to think about this and my idea can address this in the near future.

At David's request,

Geneva

Think about this discussion, my answers will help in this context.

E M C

4156
Field Office Acquiring Evidence
Serial # of Originating Document
Date Received
From Saddam Hussein
(Address)

By
(City and State)

To Be Returned □ Yes □ No
Receipt Given □ Yes □ No
Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (c) □ Yes □ No
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
□ Yes □ No

Title:

Reference: EC-TMI 05302004
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: □ Original notes re interview of

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-13-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs
File Number: 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence: 

Serial # of Originating Document: 

Date Received: 5/19/04

From: Saddam Hussein

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

Baghdad, Iraq

(City and State)

By: 

To Be Returned: ☒ No

Receipt Given: ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): ☒ No

Title: Operation Desert Spider

Reference: 315E-HQ-1448534 - 73

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of
File Number: 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence: [Blank]

Serial # of Originating Document: [Blank]

Date Received: 5/19/04

From: Saddam Hussein

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

Baghdad, Iraq

(City and State)

By: [Blank]

To Be Returned: [ ] Yes [x] No

Receipt Given: [ ] Yes [x] No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (c)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: [ ] Yes [x] No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): [ ] Yes [x] No

Title: Operation Desert Spider

IT-IRAQ

Reference: 315E-HQ-1448534 - 73

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: [ ] Original notes re interview of

[Blank]
Field Number: 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence: 

Serial # of Originating Document: 

Date Received: 5/19/04

From: Saddam Hussein

(Address)

Baghdad, Iraq (City and State)

To Be Returned: [ ] Yes [X] No
Receipt Given: [ ] Yes [X] No

Grand Jury Material – Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: [ ] Yes [X] No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): [ ] Yes [X] No

Title: Operation Desert Spider

IT-IRAQ

Reference: 315E-HQ-1448534 -73

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: [ ] Original notes re interview of
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<tr>
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<th>Date Filed</th>
<th>To be returned</th>
<th>Disposition</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3-28-04</td>
<td>OB Rom labeled copy, monitor #1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Interview of Saddam Hussein</td>
<td>1</td>
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FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534-36E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence BAGHDOAD

Serial # of Originating Document 29

Date Received 3/26/04

From SSA

FBI OPERATIONS CENTER
(Address)

BAGHDOAD, IRAQ
(City and State)

By SSA

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☐ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ☐ Yes ☐ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI) ☐ Yes ☐ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER

LT-FILARE

Reference: (Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

1) CD ROM LABED "COPY, MONITORE#1, 3/28/04, 315E-HQ-1448534"

DEPICTING INTERVIEW OF SAADAM HUSSEIN

2) CD ROM LABED "COPY, MONITORE#2, 3/26/04, 315E-HQ-1448534"

DEPICTING INTERVIEW OF SAADAM HUSSEIN
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Date Filed</th>
<th>To be returned</th>
<th>Disposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CD Rom labeled copy monitor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534 - 30

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FSS BA6 HUDO

Serial # of Originating Document 80

Date Received 3/28/04

From SSA

(Office of Commodity/Recever)

FRS OPERATIONS CENTER

(Address)

BA6 HUDO, IRAQ

(City and State)

By SSA

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☐ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ☐ Yes ☐ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI) ☐ Yes ☐ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER

IT - IRAQ

Reference: ________________________

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of 3/30/04,

1) CD Rom labeled copy, Monique 3/15E-HQ-1448534, DEDICATING INTERVIEW OF SADDAM HUSSEIN

6) CD Rom labeled copy, Monique 3/29/04, 315E-HQ-1448534, DEDICATING INTERVIEW OF SADDAM HUSSEIN
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 07/19/2005

To: Counterterrorism Attn: ITOS II/ISLU

From: Charlotte
Squad 6
Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By:

(U) Case ID #: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending)

(U) Title: (S) Desert Spider;
IT - Iraq

Synopsis: (U) To cover lead.

(U) Classified By: 11109, ITOS II/CTD
Reason : 1.5(c)
Declassify On: X1

(U) Reference: (X) 315E-HQ-1448534 Serial 9

Details: (S) The above referenced EC requested all Field Offices to review interviews and canvass all logical sources for any information regarding potential war crimes committed by the former Hussein Regime. The request was disseminated to all agents/TFOs working CTD matters within the Charlotte Division.

Charlotte considers leads 9.1 and 9.2 covered.
LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1:  (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ITOS II

(U)  Read and clear.

**
BARZAN IBRAHIM HASAN AL-TIKRITI (Blacklist #38), Presidential Advisor and former Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), was interviewed at his place of residence, a U.S. military detention facility in Baghdad, Iraq.

Prior to any questions being asked, BARZAN was advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and told they were from Washington, D.C. BARZAN was informed that the interviewers were interested in obtaining additional information regarding former Iraqi President, SADDAM HUSSEIN, who is his half-brother. Before any questions could be asked, however, BARZAN stated that he had been interviewed a hundred times. He began asking a number of questions and making several comments indicative of his anger at being confined in the military detention facility. He claimed that he has been cooperative and was not hiding anything.

Concerning HUSSEIN’s general behavior while serving as President of Iraq, BARZAN characterized it as “bad.” However, rather than volunteering examples, he told the interviewers to ask him specific question and he would answer.

BARZAN acknowledged he was the former Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) between 1979-82. He recalled that in 1979, he was present at a meeting of Ba’ath Party officials presided over by HUSSEIN. During the meeting, HUSSEIN announced that a coup had been uncovered and that several members of the Ba’ath Party had conspired with individuals from Syria to overthrow him. HUSSEIN directed a staff member to read the names of the conspirators. BARZAN acknowledged that when the names were read, the guards escorted the individuals out of the room. He was emphatic in his assertions that these individuals were actually involved in an authentic conspiracy to assist Syrian president, HAFFEZ ASSAD, to overthrow the Iraqi regime. He was, however, unable to provide any details to support this assertion, claiming that the service he was in charge of dealt with foreign intelligence exclusively, not domestic issues.
When BARZAN was asked about the disposition of the conspirators, he advised they were tried, convicted and sentenced to death. At first, he denied being present during the executions. However, after continued discussion, BARZAN finally disclosed that HUSSEIN had directed that a Ba'ath Party member from each of the conspirators' districts be present at the executions which were conducted at the Ba'ath Party office in the Mansour district of Baghdad. After initially leading the interviewers to believe that he knew little about these executions, BARZAN acknowledged he had witnessed approximately 20-30 of them. However, he adamantly denied participating in these executions, despite witness accounts to the contrary. Although BARZAN claimed to know little about the executions, he was convinced that they were not unlawful. He reiterated his opinion that all the conspirators, including ABU KHALAD al-SAMMARI, who was in prison at the time of the alleged plot, were guilty. When the interviewers suggested to BARZAN that he may have taken part in these executions out of fear of HUSSEIN or out of a desire to ingratiate himself with him, BARZAN reiterated that he was not involved in the executions, and he was not afraid of HUSSEIN.

BARZAN characterized his relationship with HUSSEIN as official in nature. He stated that HUSSEIN was careful not to allow either him or his half-brother, WATBAN, any "margin." By this, he meant that HUSSEIN wanted to avoid granting them special privileges, since it might encourage them to expect or request more.

BARZAN recalled that

After completing his assignment as the Director of the IIS in 1982, BARZAN retreated to a farm where he ran a lucrative business selling chicken eggs. In 1988, HUSSEIN appointed him to be the Iraqi Ambassador to Switzerland, a position he held until 1998. BARZAN claimed that shortly after HUSSEIN appointed him to this post, he (HUSSEIN) regretted it because he realized he could not easily control BARZAN.
When BARZAN subsequently wrote an article for a newspaper in Baghdad (owned by OUDAY HUSSEIN) offering suggestions on how Iraq could become a better country, he was rebuked by OUDAY and others and accused of having become too Westernized. HUSSEIN asked BARZAN if he had been brainwashed. Later, HUSSEIN attempted to lure BARZAN back to Baghdad with the promise of becoming either a Minister of Intelligence or Minister of Foreign Affairs. When BARZAN declined the offer, HUSSEIN requested an explanation. BARZAN responded that he simply wanted to be left alone. In reality, BARZAN was skeptical of HUSSEIN’s motives. He believed that HUSSEIN perceived him as a threat because of his close relationship with the Swiss, the U.S. and with members of the Revolution Command Council (RCC). BARZAN believed that if he accepted a Minister’s position in Baghdad, HUSSEIN would find a reason to remove him. Accordingly, BARZAN decided to remain in Switzerland.

After 1979, HUSSEIN’S personality changed significantly. Many of HUSSEIN’s “mistakes” occurred after he began avoiding the RCC. Although HUSSEIN had previously been fair, patient and polite, he became increasingly impatient and was often in a hurry. If a subordinate was working on a task for HUSSEIN which required eight hours to complete, HUSSEIN wanted him to complete it in half that time. BARZAN pointed out that HUSSEIN did not travel, nor did he appear to read newspapers. He surrounded himself with “hypocrites and yes men” such as ALI HASSAN AL-MAJID, aka “CHEMICAL ALI.” As a result, HUSSEIN received poor information and advice. BARZAN claimed he was very direct with HUSSEIN in pointing out mistakes. However, HUSSEIN ignored BARZAN’S advice.

BARZAN stated he has not committed any crimes, nor has he directed others to do so. He denied taking part in any executions. He further denied having any knowledge or involvement in conducting experiments on prisoners using biological or chemical substances. He stated that prisons were never an area of his responsibility.

Although BARZAN repeatedly denied committing crimes against anyone, he claimed that his life would be in jeopardy if he were released and had to live in Iraq. He feared that Iraqi citizens might falsely accuse him of committing atrocities and kill him. When asked to explain why Iraqi citizens would target him specifically, BARZAN intimated that
his connection with the Ba'ath Party and prior government service would be enough for Iraqis to seek revenge against him. He added that it is not uncommon for some angry and emotional Iraqis to kill innocent people, only to discover later they made a mistake.

At the conclusion of the interview, BARZAN stated that he has long been a friend of the U.S. He added, "you (meaning the U.S.) need a friend." He made it clear, however, that to be of service, he would have to be provided a safe refuge outside of Iraq.
File Number: 315E-HQ-1148574

Field Office Acquiring Evidence: Rulon Balkh AO

Serial # of Originating Document: 

Date Received: 6/09/04

From: FAST Balkh AO Operations Center

Balkh AO, IRAQ

By: SCA

To Be Returned: Yes
Receipt Given: Yes

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Yes
Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): Yes

Title: DESERT SPIVER

Reference: (Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of Barzan Ibrahim Hasan al Tikriti (Blacklist #38)
SHEIL 2012
SHAR MUKHERJEE
ask vs rule at school

83 = 10 TIMES
after all disaster, long and still
like how others are pretty good

SATHI ALL MISTAKE not those of CS
S. "MISTAKE # 1
D. # 2, Dec 26, 27-2003
TO CHANGE DATE?

ALWAYS IN HURRY, NO PATIENCE TO TAKE CARE
on time / provision

Not enough preparation as takes a lot
report, Foundation, etc.

Close 1/4 PUNISH + YES MAN
- CASE RILD RUN
CSM
- MORE DRUG MORE CHAIN

VERY OFFICIAL / MARKING_ with GUN.
Protocol
Subject: New MAP

French

Germany - West
Australia
British Arab
Mal

907

Paris C322

Mr. X

Urgent: Inefficient All GLASS
(200, AL.D.N.)

VO4Y

NEDNI MUSLAMIC BELLY DANCE

DIAM message
0015

Passion too them to organize
a small dance for a
Republican Center
Neither nor salaries
Never succeed.

Return to CASSAVA; else, another
If I succeed and postpone if

Pass

Val Sheik

Wasted: Failing proper and faithful

Didi go to work define.

Seven Memos of He's gone to Max Lewis in
Europe, Brown Chill
Assassinate 7/10 1/8/72
She/H12g Damn
Show two.
And be quiet.

HIV/AIDS news are not by
100s of people 74 of 17 2005-
17 is a huge act

Can order gas not more than 1 week

All my son's clothes, the new ones

Because he is now size 7

Present to 7th
SILENCE NOT OPTIR IRIAI PEOPLE CAN'T ACCOM.

DON'T DIRECT BUT I DON'T EXPLAIN

WAS SMART

- CIA GAVE INFO

- TELL US TEAM TO EX EJ

APPLIED R ESSENTIAL FIRST TEAM

M.I. CAP ROLL OUT

WILLING TO GIVE

\[ \text{\underline{\text{\underline{}}} \quad \underline{\text{\underline{}}}} \]

\[ \text{\underline{\text{\underline{}}} \quad \underline{\text{\underline{}}}} \]
USE THIS:
90°.

ERI E. IN SAME POSITION. ACCEPT PROPOSAL OR
AGAIN THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE NOT THEN
RECEIVE PROPOSAL AND WITH THE FUTURE.
AND PASS THROUGH THE CORE AS I OTHER THAN
SAME AS THEN.

GENERAL: AND MIGHTY
- NOT TRUE - DIDN'T WANT
- NOT SURE. AT LEAST QUITE
- CAN ATTEMPT TO LEARN
- SEE FROM AWAY
+ GIVE ASSISTANCE TO ANY

"SAME COLOR AS THEN?"

WARNING THEM

INTERIOR MINISTRY. TELECOMMUNE TO ACTION
WEAPONS REFUSE MERCY I MAKE FOR THE
COLOR THE FIRE
COME ON MAKE AT ONCE
WILL TELL YOU AND SEND YOU

2 AUGUST MAY 1900: SHOCK JAPANESE PLUNGE OR
CONTRA, RESOLVE IN THE VILLAGE.
 gala MEDIC, NICE WILL,
THE QUESTIONS MUST BE IT!
LET 10 DEC WHEN BAZAAR MAOS
MENTION OF MICE

- POLICE
- MOSS
- SPICE
- COBE CIVIL
- HUGS
- WINE

CHANGE CREDITS

#2 ACC

JUL 31

SODA, BAZAAR WERE COME HOME

2a year Blvd Steget poluti
-
knew pet X
- cold clean even morning
- respect came 11:17 am
Defining Moment (Beth 38)

Ask Hussein why he brought Husein to an airport, and give him highest position that he wasXX

SADDAM disagreed.

Hussein said he would feel shame if the airport stayed open.

I wrote

they solidarity to

he forgets see the good

I gave him.

All my SADDAM behavior was bad.

Mr. Mousa's agree.

US said to Iran 8
1979

Something different then
I was scared
I didn't know anyone
I saw the execution @ 20-20
but didn't participate.

Story about T-72

15 friends of Sherie favorite

Humor

Soul
If someone knows a decent law doesn't matter - Acts 5

President is his responsibility

Mark and make decisions in his name.

Halabja is the darkest point in Iraq's history.

It's a human rights, patriotic, yes against innocent people.

Protection when? Was in Switzerland.
Samir was in a hurry — analogy of a dead, dried-up tree.

Samir had no patience and was impatient.

Raj's module was inaccurate and false.

He didn't travel.

He didn't read newspapers — no satellite.

He chose hypnosis-type men like Ali Hassan Majid.

Abdul Rani.

Girish (former and current) had no dates.

She made it clear.

Foreign Ministry.

I told Sir.

He asked why I refused.

I said, please leave me alone.
I did not work for SAAAAM.

I was a RCC over 2 37s member.

SAAAAM's Achilles.

My relationship with official - no
margin - he was adept to take (on
and a mile) advantage.

If I send no to my son many SAAO clays
If I refused, I would be killed —

Shortly after SAAAAM fate me to surf
be knew I had made a mistake
he wanted to keep me far away from
RCC ble I would melt with them —

By I develop a good relationship with
SAAAAM.

May 2001 This present at last
needy Bath 04.
To make an article?

His next entry: for IQ.

I sent it to a museum.

I found it. Subsequent to the President.

What happened to you.

Mr. Senior. Middle. Brainwash you.

Saturday night I was at the U.

Dreams!

Spent what I like.

To commerce. Make an effort. To make a big.

Health to urge.

The ICU. Pilot. 125! Fine a child.

Go to asking.
4th
like 6.

After this I stopped but
want me to visit don't

I know me but ask
other about me

Example
Random mistakes occurred when he began at the REC. He used to be polite - like a sponge. When 2nd in command, he was fair and inclusive. As officer, he doesn't like to work with a team.
While in Syria?

Press Sec'y sent me a

helping from S.Y.M.A.

asking why in a TV inter-

I didn't.

...Barack afraid that he will

not be safe if reelected

here in Iraq.
On 06/03/2004 ABD AL-TAWAB MULLAH HUWAYSH was interviewed at a detention facility in Baghdad, Iraq by Special Agent [REDACTED] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Observing the interview were US Government representatives [REDACTED]. After being advised of the purpose of the interview, HUWAYSH provide the following information:

When SADDAM was under stress, it would affect the way he interacted with others. If he was afraid or fearful of an outcome, he could make severe decisions. When he was under this type of pressure, those around him did not like it at all. He became much less controllable. He would make decisions based not on the actual situation, but rather on personalities. The exercise of his maximum authority could be influenced positively by people whom he liked, such as Husein Kamel. Or, conversely, it could result in Ministers being thrown out of meetings. These strong judgements were not reflective of a man in control.

In 1987, HUWAYSH had a construction company within his Ministry called Al Fao, which was named after the inspiring battle of the Al Fao peninsula during the Iran-Iraq war. There was already an Al Fao company within the Ministry of the Interior and another within the Ministry of Irrigation. HUWAYSH had taken the initiative to organize the changing of his Al Fao construction company to Dar es Salaam (Realm of Peace). This change was listed as an agenda item on a Ministerial meeting over which SADDAM was presiding. The meeting started off with SADDAM commenting on the company name change. There was threatening tone in his voice. HUWAYSH asked to speak in order for him to clarify a mistake that had been made. HUWAYSH understood well SADDAM's character, and explained how this was an oversite that was not supposed to be there. SADDAM cautioned not to let it to go again.

SADDAM did not like any Arab leader of king having anything better than he had. With everything, SADDAM was determined to be the best. HUWAYSH speculated that this could have been related to some suffering in SADDAM's childhood.
SADDAM himself was not an especially attentive father to his sons. He was fond of saying 'even if my own arm were hurting me, I would it off'. This was to let others know that he had the nerve to do whatever it took to preserve himself over others, no matter how close they were to him.

HUWAYSH was surprised that SADDAM allowed himself to be captured rather than martyring himself. It was understood that Uday and Qusay had C-4 belts with them when they were killed. For sure SADDAM must have had one with him too. SADDAM had invited other Ba'ath members to fight the Americans in a sacred resistance. New groups could have been planned during the secret war of resistance and the party could have been rebuilt. SADDAM had proven himself in the overthrow of the Kasim Regime. HUWAYSH did not believe SADDAM was isolated in this effort, as he was clever and had thugs. To give up would mean he would have to face only bad things. Because of all this, HUWAYSH did not respect SADDAM for surrendering.

In captivity, it should be expected that SADDAM will review his life. He had a stronger binding to life and earthly things, even more so than he did to heaven and God.
File Number: 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence: FBI HQ

Serial # of Originating Document:

Date Received: 06/03/04

From: ABD AL-TAWAB MULLAH HWAYSH
        (Name of Contributor/Interviewee)
        TsAchDab, IRAQ
        (Address)

By: SA

To Be Returned: Yes [ ] No [ ]
Receipt Given: Yes [ ] No [ ]

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Title: DESERT SPIDER
        IT - IRAQ

Reference:__ (Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Yes [ ]
Original notes re interview of

Abd al-Tawab Mullah Huwayshe
1969
5/15/69

Arabia, several occasions

Hussein came to talk with
me in secret.

Visa processes, due in 1/25/77

lip contamination, not declared according

to regulations, has authority not

maximum. Human rights. Legal

- illegal

- impassable, not; REFERENCE Caspian 1987

IN 40

CIA

This area 1976, 1977, 1978

Police in area

CLAYTON


Charles

Dont call Arabia king better than him from

the others! childish and stupid. Crazy.

New position. Arabia internal 1/47

His other friend. "I didn't use civil service
to be in the army."

two fathers

"One of my uncles, 1931."

10/27/69
Khalil

IRAN

Givan Very

Shaheed High Opinion

Music Sacred Resistance

New Changes Secret are Required

Presidency

Clever

Has good to bad things

Has to fix bad things

He will review his life

Brought to life not to disappear or go
To: Counterterrorism  From: Counterterrorism
Re: (U) 315E-HQ-1448534, 05/30/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON DC

(U) For information.

++
Records Section

Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
Service Unit - Room 6524
Forward to File Review
Attention
Return to Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:
- Regular Request (Analytical Search)
- All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
- Subversive References Only
- Nonsubversive References Only
- Main References Only

Type of Search Requested:
- Restricted to Localities
- Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
- Buildup
- Variations

Subject

Birthdate & Place

Address

Localities

Res. Date 6/6

Searcher

Initials

Prod.

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL
CAPTIONED VISITOR AND PARTY, BRIEFED USDS SECURITY SUPERVISOR,
HANDLING DETAIL COVERING VISIT, ON FBI'S
INTEREST IN POSSIBLE SEPARATE ACTIVITY OF
IS ALERT FOR POSSIBLE
SEPARATE ACTIVITY BY THESE INDIVIDUALS AND ADVISES THAT,
TO DATE, NONE HAS BEEN OBSERVED.

LEAD: WFO, AT WASHINGTON, D.C.
DISCREETLY CONTACT USDS SECURITY SUPV.

VIA COMMAND POST TO BE SET UP AT GOREHAM HOTEL, WASHINGTON,
D.C., FRIDAY, JUNE 21, 1974, FOR USDS PROTECTIVE SECURITY
OF CAPTIONED VISITOR AND PARTY. VERIFY CONTINUED PRESENCE
OF
WITH PARTY. ESTABLISH
LOCAL PROCEDURE WHEREBY USDS SECURITY MAY REQUEST BUREAU
SURVEILLANCE OF
SHOULD
THOSE INDIVIDUALS SEPARATE FROM CAPTIONED VISITOR.
PRIOR TO RETURN OF PARTY TO NYC, JUNE 23, 1974.

END
CODE

TO SAC NEW YORK

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

SECRET

REBUTELCALS TO NEW YORK, JUNE 7, 1974.

BY COPY OF A COMMUNICATION CLASSIFIED "CONFIDENTIAL;"
SUBJECT BE PLACED UNDER SURVEILLANCE DURING HIS STAY IN THE
UNITED STATES.

IT IS OUR RECOMMENDATION THAT

RE:

TELETYPE TO NEW YORK

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
NEW YORK SHOULD ESTABLISH LIAISON WITH STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY, AT NEW YORK, WHO MAY REQUEST BUREAU SURVEILLANCE OR SEPARATES FROM SUBJECT. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES ARE SUBJECT OR TO BE PLACED UNDER SURVEILLANCE. BECAUSE OF DELICATE RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND IRAQI GOVERNMENTS, UTMOST DISCRETION MUST BE UTILIZED. INFORMATION RE VISIT SHOULD BE ON A NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS. PERSONNEL HANDLING MUST BE THOROUGHLY AWARE OF PROVISIONS OF CURRENT BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS RELATING TO ACT FOR PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS VISITING THE U.S.

CLASSIFIED UNTIL 2125, PGPS 2 AND 3, DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE.

SECRET
REBUREAU TEL, JUNE 10, 1974.

CAPTIONED INDIVIDUAL AND PARTY ARRIVED AT NYC VIA AIR FRANCE, FLIGHT 607, ON TUESDAY, JUNE 11, 1974, AT 3:50 PM. PROCEEDED TO RESIDENCE AT WALDORF HOTEL, UNDER PROTECTIVE SECURITY OF U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT (USDS).

NYO CONTINUING TO FOLLOW ACTIVITIES OF WITH USDS SUPERVISOR REG-112 CLASSIFIED BY 4339, XGDS 2 AND 3, DATED DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE.

END

PLS HOLD AND ADD TIME TO LAST TEL 11:09 P.M. TKS
PAGE TWO

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED BY 4339. XGDS 2 AND 3. DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION

INDEFINITE.

END

GHS FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE CLR
ON JUNE 20, 1974, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE IS

FOR THE INFORMATION OF WFO, AS SET FORTH IN REBUTEL,

FBI OFFICIAL INTEREST IN CAPTIONED VISITOR AND HER PARTY

IS BASED ON FOLLOWING:

END PAGE FOUR
IN VIEW OF CAPTIONED VISITOR'S STATUS AS AN OFFICIAL GUEST OF THE U.S., AND THE ASSUMPTION BY USDS SECURITY OF PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HER DURING HER STAY IN THE U.S. FBIHQ INSTRUCTED THE NYO TO ESTABLISH LIAISON WITH STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY, AT NEW YORK, WHO MAY REQUEST BUREAU SURVEILLANCE

SUBSEQUENT TELEPHONIC INSTRUCTIONS FROM FBIHQ TO THE NYO EXTENDED THIS PROCEDURE TO

IN REBUTEL, THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS WERE SET FORTH CONCERNING CAPTIONED VISITOR: "UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCE ARE SUBJECT OR TO BE PLACED UNDER SURVEILLANCE. BECAUSE OF DELICATE RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND IRAQI GOVERNMENTS, UTMOST DISCRETION MUST BE UTILIZED. INFORMATION RE VISIT SHOULD BE ON A NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS. PERSONNEL HANDLING MUST BE THOROUGHLY AWARE OF PROVISIONS OF CURRENT BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS RELATING TO ACT FOR PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS VISITING THE U.S."

IN VIEW OF ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, NYO ON ARRIVAL OF
SECRET

PAGE SIX

CAUGHTIONED VISITOR AND PARTY, BRIEFED USDS SECURITY SUPERVISOR
HANDLING DETAIL COVERING VISIT, ON FBI'S
INTEREST IN POSSIBLE SEPARATE ACTIVITY OF

LEAD: WFO, AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

DISCREETLY CONTACT USDS SECURITY SUPERVISOR VIA COMMAND POST TO BE SET UP AT SHOREHAM HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D.C., FRIDAY, JUNE 21, 1974, FOR USDS PROTECTIVE SECURITY OF CAUGHTIONED VISITOR AND PARTY.

ESTABLISH LOCAL PROCEDURE WHEREBY USDS SECURITY MAY REQUEST BUREAU SURVEILLANCE SHOULD THESE INDIVIDUALS SEPARATE FROM CAUGHTIONED VISITOR.

PRIOR TO RETURN OF PARTY TO NYC, JUNE 23, 1974.

END

SLP FBI HQ CLR

SECRET
CLASSIFIED BY FOUR THREE THREE NINE, XGDS TWO AND THREE,
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE
ADMINISTRATIVE

(s) CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE IS
(SENSITIVE SOURCE).

END

HOLD
NR 036 NY CODE
11:52 PM NITEL 6/27/74 JJB
TO DIRECTOR
FROM NEW YORK (105-137661) (C)
CONFIDENTIAL
ATTN: INTD

CLASSIFIED BY 4339; XGDS 2 AND 3; INDEFINITE.

ADMINISTRATIVE
RENYNITEL TO BUREAU, JUNE 24, 1974. NR
NO LHM Follows.
END
LRF FBHQ CLR AND TU

SECRET
MESSAGE RELAY

Date: JUNE 27, 1974

Transmit in CODE via teletype the attached message.

FROM: Director, FBI

TO: RUEADWW/. The President
RUEADWW/. The Vice President
RUEADWW/. Att.
RUEADWW/. White House Situation Room
RUEHOC/. Secretary of State
RUEAIHA/. Director, CIA
RUEKJCS/. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
RUEACSI/. Department of the Army
RUEBGF/. Department of the Air Force (AFOSI)
RUEOLKN/. Naval Investigative Service
RUEADSS/. U.S. Secret Service (PID)
RUEBWA/. Attorney General (By messenger)
RUEBWA/. Deputy Attorney General (By messenger)
RUEBWA/. Assistant Attorney General (Criminal Division
and Internal Security Section)
RUEBWA/. and General Crimes Section
RUEBWA/. Immigration & Naturalization Service
RUEOIAA/. National Security Agency (DIHNSA/NSOC (Att.: SO00))
RUEOGBA/. Federal Aviation Administration

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 27 1974

TELETYPE

Classification: SECRET

SUBJECT:

INTERNAL SECURITY - IRAQ
PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS - SYMPATHETIC

PLM

LEBD

MAIL: 50 Q 17A
TELETYPEN UNIT

EX-11

REC-3
NR 021 NY CODE
6:25 P.M. NITEL 6-2674 PLQ
TO DIRECTOR
FROM NEW YORK (10-137661) (P)
SECRET
ATT: INID

CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED], CATEGORY 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.

ADMINISTRATIVE

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE IS NY 23463 (SENSITIVE SOURCE).

END

FOR ONLY
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO (105-125083) (RUC)

DATE: 8/9/74

SUBJECT: ReNYnitel 6/20/74.

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 01-27-2009

Upon receipt of above communication, liaison was established by WFO with the Office of Protective Security, Department of State (USDS), Washington, D.C., and with USDS protective detail at the command post at the Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C.

During stay of captioned individual and her party at Washington, D.C., the Washington Field Office was advised of no incidents of a security nature.
MESSAGE RELAY

Date: June 25, 1974

Transmit in CODE (plaintext or code) via teletype the attached PRIORITY message.

FROM: Director, FBI

TO: RUEADWW/ The President

RUEADWW/ The Vice President

RUEADWW/ White House Situation Room

RUEHOC/ Secretary of State

RUEAIIA/ Director, CIA

RUEKJCS/ Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

RUEACSI/ Department of the Army

RUEBGFA/ Department of the Air Force (AFOSI)

RUEOLKN/ Naval Investigative Service

RUEADSS/ U.S. Secret Service (PID)

RUEBWJA/ Attorney General (By messenger)

RUEBWJA/ Deputy Attorney General (By messenger)

RUEBWJA/ Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division

RUEBWJA/ and Internal Security Section

RUEBWJA/ and General Crimes Section

RUEBWJA/ Immigration & Naturalization Service

RUEOIAA/ National Security Agency (DIRNSA/NSOC (Att.: SOO))

RUEOGBA/ Federal Aviation Administration

Classification: SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

SUBJECT: INTERNAL SECURITY - IRAQ

PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS - SUBVERSIVE

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

SECRET

T3p/SSM

LEB

mww
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE IS

(SENSITIVE SOURCE)

END

HOLD
MESSAGE RELAY

Date: JUNE 18, 1974

Transmit in [C O D E] (plaintext or code) via teletype the attached [P R I O R I T Y] (preference) message.

FROM: Director, FBI

TO: RUEADWW/ The President
    RUEADWW/ The Vice President
    RUEADWW/ White House Situation Room
    RUEADWW/ [Att.]
    RUEHOC/ Secretary of State
    RUEAIIA/ Director, CIA
    RUEKJCS/ Director, Defense Intelligence Agency and National Indications Center
    RUEACSI/ Department of the Army
    RUEBGFA/ Department of the Air Force (AFOSI)
    RUEOLKN/ Naval Investigative Service
    RUEADSS/ S. Secret Service (PID)
    RUEBWJA/ Attorney General (By messenger)
    RUEBWJA/ Deputy Attorney General (By messenger)
    RUEBWJA/ Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division and Internal Security Section and General Crimes Section
    RUEBWJA/ Immigration & Naturalization Service
    RUEOIAA/ National Security Agency (DIRNSA NSOC (Att.: SOO))
    RUEOGBA/ Federal Aviation Administration

FIELD DISSEMINATION

SACS:

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDELINES
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 01-27-2009

LEG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 18 1974
1-08-74
TELETYPE

Foreign Liaison Unit
□ Cleared telephonically
with
□ 2450a 2-15

58 AUG 20 1974
MAIL ROOM
TELETYPE UNIT
SECRET

PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS
(Text of message begins on next page)

Confidential
EX-101

AUG 14 1974

58 AUG 20 1974
CLASSIFIED BY AGDS 2 AND 3. DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE.

END

AODE

GWS FBHQ ASK FOR ONE CLR
MESSAGE RELAY

Date: June 21, 1974

FROM: Director, FBI

TO: RUEADWW/ ☑ The President
    RUEADWW/ ☑ The Vice President
    ☐ Att.: ________________________________
    RUEADWW/ ☑ White House Situation Room
    ☐ Att.: ________________________________
    RUEHOC/ ☑ Secretary of State
    RUEAIA/ ☑ Director, CIA
    RUEKJCS/ ☐ Director, Defense Intelligence Agency and National Indications Center
    RUEACSI/ ☐ Department of the Army
    RUEBGF/ ☐ Department of the Air Force (AFOSI)
    RUEOLKN/ ☐ Naval Investigative Service
    RUEADSS/ ☑ U. S. Secret Service (PID)
    RUEBWJA/ ☑ Attorney General (☐ By messenger)
    RUEBWJA/ ☐ Deputy Attorney General (☐ By messenger)
    RUEBWJA/ ☑ Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division
    ☑ and Internal Security Section
    ☑ and General Crimes Section
    RUEBWJA/ ☑ Immigration & Naturalization Service
    RUEOIAA/ ☑ National Security Agency (DIRNSA/NSC/JSOC) 105
    ☐ National Intelligence
    RUEOGBA/ ☐ Federal Aviation Administration
    ☐

Classification: (Classify if to other than Bureau Office) SECRET

SUBJECT: Protection of Foreign Officials

INTERNAL SECURITY-IRAQ

people
SECRET

MARCH 1974

TO DIRECTOR
ATT.AI

WASHINGTON FIELD

FROM NEW YORK (125-137661)

SECRET
IT IS OUR RECOMMENDATION THAT SUBJECT BE PLACED UNDER SURVEILLANCE DURING HIS STAY IN THE UNITED STATES.

IN VIEW OF CAPTIONED VISITOR'S STATUS AS AN OFFICIAL GUEST OF THE U.S., AND THE ASSUMPTION BY USDS SECURITY OF PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HER DURING HER STAY IN THE U.S., FBIHQ INSTRUCTED THE NYO TO ESTABLISH LIAISON WITH STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY AT NEW YORK, WHO MAY REQUEST BUREAU SURVEILLANCE OF SUBJECT. SUBSEQUENT TELEPHONIC INSTRUCTIONS FROM FBIHQ TO THE NYO EXTENDED THIS PROCEDURE TO

IN REBUETEL, THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS WERE SET FORTH CONCERNING CAPTIONED VISITOR: "UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCE ARE SUBJECT TO BE PLACED UNDER SURVEILLANCE. BECAUSE OF DELICATE RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND IRAQI GOVERNMENTS, UTMOST DISCRETION MUST BE UTILIZED. INFORMATION RE VISIT SHOULD BE ON A NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS. PERSONNEL HANDLING MUST BE THOROUGHLY AWARE OF PROVISIONS OF CURRENT BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS RELATING TO ACT FOR PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS VISITING THE U.S."

IN VIEW OF ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, NYO ON ARRIVAL OF END PAGE FIVE
Source, who is not in the position to testify, provided the following information:

Source was advised the following information:

Investigation on at
File # Date dictated 12/17/2003
by

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
Chalabi Aides Suspected of Spying for Iran

Raid at Leader's Home Targeted His Associates

By Scott Wilson
Washington Post Foreign Service

BAGHDAD, May 21—Members of the political organization led by Ahmed Chalabi, a suspected of providing information to Iran on U.S. troop positions in Iraq and of kidnapping a prominent physician from his home, according to U.S. and Iraqi officials familiar with investigations into the group the Bush administration once favored to run postwar Iraq.

On Thursday, Iraq's police, backed by U.S. soldiers, raided Chalabi's home and the state of the Iraqi National Congress, a coalition of parties that oppose the government of Saddam Hussein. Until recently, the group received $335,000 a month from the Pentagon to help in gathering intelligence about Hussein's government and for finding his biological agents used during the invasion.

Chalabi, a longtime foe of Saddam, was once the Pentagon's preferred choice to run Iraq's postwar leader, characterized his raid as retaliation for his criticism of U.S. policy in Iraq.

Iraq's U.S.-appointed Governing Council, of which Chalabi is a member, met Friday in an emergency session to discuss how to respond to the raid, which many of its members blamed on the U.S. occupation authorities.

In interviews Friday, INI members, senior officers of the Iraqi police force and U.S. officials outlined three distinct investigations into the INC, which in addition to Defense Department funding received $33 million from the State Department over the past four years.

The inquiries are focusing on allegations of corruption, kidnap- ping and robbery, and on a U.S. suspicion of referring to, said Daniel Senor, Bremer's spokesman.

A senior Iraqi police officer involved in the case said most of the eight suspects the police sought Thursday were involved in an armed robbery and kidnapping last month that was allegedly carried out by INC members.

The officers, who declined to be named for fear of losing their jobs, said their office had received complaints for months about INC members impersonating police officers, breaking into homes and carrying out robberies. He said police officers had warned the INC offices several times about the allegations. In the past three months, he said, police have arrested four INC officials on robbery charges.

"They knew all about this," the officer said.

An Iraqi soldier keeps watch as demonstrators march in Baghdad to show support for Ahmed Chalabi.

Support among ordinary Iraqis who never embraced the long-time exile as a potential leader. A small protest gathered Friday in front of the Green Zone to condemn the occupation authorities.

"It took them four years to discover he was a spy," said Ali Hashem Ali, 46, a mechanic. "And it took us two days to discover he was a thief and a liar."

But Brooke said the fallout has had political benefits, particularly in galvanizing council support for Chalabi.

"This has been wonderful for..."
In April, a suspected heart surgeon from Baghdad Medical City filed a criminal complaint alleging that he was kidnapped by men he identified as INC members. Chalabi is not wanted for arrest.

One of Chalabi’s advisers said Friday that INC officials received advance notice of U.S. plans to search the INC Intelligence building and recovered flash drives weeks ago. The adviser, Francis Brooke, said "nothing of any intelligence value" was recovered in the raids.

With the United States preparing to transfer limited power to an interim Iraqi government in a little more than a month, the move against the INC has been portrayed by Chalabi as a U.S. effort to isolate him before the new government is named.

The Bush administration once regarded Chalabi, a moderate Shiite Muslim businessman who spent decades in exile, as a leading candidate to be Iraq’s leader after Hussein was toppled. But over a difficulty year of U.S. occupation, Chalabi has accused U.S. officials of failing to move quickly enough to transfer power and has criticized U.N. involvement in the process.

At a hearing on Capitol Hill, some Democratic members of the House Armed Services Committee expressed puzzlement over the latest turn of events regarding Chalabi.

"We support our troops, and we support you gentlemen—it’s your civilian bosses in the Pentagon I’m increasingly worried about," Rep. Jim Cooper (D-Tenn.) said to Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and two other senior officers testifying before the panel. "This seems to be a substantial development in the war, when one of the most highly paid and trusted advisers may have deliberately misled our nation for months and years and some of our officials may have swallowed it hook, line and sinker."

Myers said he knew very little about Chalabi, despite the Iraq’s close relationship with the Pentagon.

"If this man was on the U.S. payroll until last week, what has changed in the last few days to make him the subject of a raid of this type?" Cooper asked.

"That I can’t tell you," Myers responded. "What I can tell you is that the organization that he is associated with has provided intelligence to our intelligence unit there in Baghdad that has saved soldiers’ lives."

Myers was pressed again on the issue by Rep. Timothy J. Ryan (D-Ohio), who asked, "Have we been duped by a con man?"

"I don’t have the information that can allow me to make that judgment," Myers said. "I think that remains to be seen, probably. But I just don’t know."
Chalabi's Fall

The story passed around by military officers at the Defense Department is that Ahmed Chalabi, outraged by the arrest of his associates and the raid on his home by U.S.-authorized Iraqi police, quickly got on the phone to the Pentagon. "Get me Wolfowitz!" Chalabi is alleged to have demanded. But it was too late for Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz or anybody else to save the erstwhile American favorite in Iraq.

In fact, Wolfowitz, widely identified as a leader of Pentagon "neonics" who sponsored Chalabi, had signed off on cutting ties with the designated leader of a future democratic Iraq. Defense Department civilians had brought Chalabi to power there against the wishes of the State Department, the CIA, prominent Republican senators and the king of Jordan. Nearly two weeks ago, Chalabi's sponsors gave up on him and quietly canceled his U.S. subsidies.

Iraqi police raids were sanctioned by the Pentagon-sponsored Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Baghdad.

Satisfaction among senior officials in the American high command over Chalabi's fall signifies deepening hostility between uniformed officers and suits at the Pentagon. The uniforms have been humiliated by the televised spectacle of generals in the dock, taking the fall for the Iraqi prisoner-abuse scandal. They now enjoy a measure of revenge in witnessing the fall of the questionable exile anointed by Pentagon civilians.

The last straw for Chalabi, according to intelligence sources, was the discovery of his contacts with the Iranian regime. The same sources say the wealthy Iraqi Shiite had sent armed agents to harass private citizens. Now that Iraq's National Congress (INC) has lost its $335,000 monthly intelligence subsidy, Chalabi has dispersed his agents around Iraq, according to U.S. military sources.

Chalabi was a CIA resource many years ago, but the agency dropped him as unreliable. He then was picked up by the neonics as their man in Iraq to replace Saddam Hussein. Richard Perle, who became a leading adviser to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld after 2000, for years had claimed the INC had the ability to smoothly grasp power in Iraq. On Feb. 16, 2001, on CNN's "Crossfire," he told me Hussein could be driven from power without U.S. troops by the INC's "political challenge to Saddam [that] will lead ultimately to piercing the veil of his invincibility.

When it actually was an American expeditionary force that placed the veil, Rumsfeld launched a coup demanoeuring Chalabi in Iraq without Secretary of State Colin Powell's knowledge or approval. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was particularly opposed to bringing the INC to Baghdad so early, giving them an advantage in the struggle for power.

There was no lack of warning to the Pentagon about its commitment to Chalabi. Jordan's King Abdullah told senators that he informed the Bush administration that Chalabi, wanted on criminal charges in Jordan, was "a thug."

The two leading Republicans on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sens. Richard Lugar and Chuck Hagel, issued similar warnings. The CIA informed President Bush that the INC's intelligence about Iraq was unreliable and often just plain wrong. Powell and Armitage were precise in their forecasts of the embarrassments ahead.

Perle continues to defend Chalabi as the victim of a disinformation campaign by the State Department and the CIA, but Chalabi's previous government sponsors developed instant antipathy. Rumsfeld's comment last week, after the Chalabi raid displayed the master of obfuscation at his best: "Certainly was not aware there was going to be a raid on a home, if in fact there was one. My understanding is that the Iraqis are involved in this, and you'd best ask them."

Will George W. Bush ask uncomfortable questions about how this man ended up wielding authority over Iraq despite multiple criticisms in the administration and its congressional allies? Republican senators, who do not want to be quoted by name, fear there must be some accountability for this massive blunder, as there must be for the prison abuse scandal. They want the president at least to consider whether Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and others should put their jobs for putting Ahmed Chalabi in power.

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Chalabi Denies Charges He Spied for Iran

A19
The Washington Post
Washington, DC

Title: Chalabi Denies Charges He Spied for Iran

Character: 65D-WF-229053

Classification: WFO

Indexing:
AHMED CHALABI
IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS
GEORGE J. TENET
VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY
SADDAM HUSSEIN
IRAQI GOV'T. COUNCIL
AKAS HABIB
IRAQIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS
LAKHDAR BRAHIMI
L. PAUL BREMER
ROBERT D. BLACKWILL

Chalabi Says CIA Chief Is Responsible for 'S lur, Off'

Washington Post [Washington, Dist. of Columbia] 05/24/2004 Home Postwar Iraq

Chalabi denies charges he spied for Iran

In his first public statement about the charges, Chalabi said he will cooperate with the Justice Department, but that he has not been notified of any charges. He said he has not been notified of any charges and that he has not been asked to turn over any documents.

Chalabi, who was a key figure in the Bush administration's effort to build a case for war, has consistently denied any role in the information that led to the invasion of Iraq. He has said that the Bush administration's claims about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction were not based on intelligence but rather on speculation.

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Chalabi Denies Charges He Spied for Iran
Iraqi Says CIA Chief Is Responsible for ‘Smear,’ Offers to Testify Before Congress

By Peter Slevin
Washington Post Staff Writer

Chalabi, once the choice of leading Defense Department civilians to run Iraq, said his calls for Iraqi sovereignty and an end to the U.S. occupation have made him unpopular with the Bush administration, which he said is running a failed occupation.

"This charge is put out by George Tenet," Chalabi told ABC's "This Week." "Let Mr. Tenet come to Congress. And I am prepared to come there and lay out all the facts and all the documents that we have, and let Congress decide whether this is true. Or whether they are being misled by George Tenet."

A U.S. intelligence official described Chalabi's allegations as "absurd."

"We would welcome hearing from him before Congress under oath," said the official, who requested anonymity. A suitable line of questioning, the official said, would be the allegation "that Tenet and the CIA had trumped up these charges against him."

Chalabi has been a controversial figure in the Bush administration and Congress, bitterly opposed by influential players in the CIA and the State Department who mistrust him. The debate over his future was one of the administration's most contentious political battles before the March 2003 invasion of Iraq.

His strongest backers before the war could be found in the office of Vice President Cheney and the Defense Department, where leading postwar planners wanted to establish a transitional government with Chalabi in the lead.

After the U.S. military toppled Saddam Hussein, Chalabi became a member of the U.S.-appointed Iraqi Governing Council and served a month-long term in the rotating presidency. Four months ago, he sat behind Laura Bush in the gallery of the House of Representatives for President Bush's State of the Union address.

Chalabi is not wanted for a crime, although the government in Jordan, where he was convicted in absentia of embezzling bank funds, reiterated yesterday that a jail cell awaits him.

In the Iraq case, INC members are suspected of providing information to neighboring Iran about the occupation of Iraq, including sensitive intelligence about U.S. troop positions. A warrant has been issued for the arrest of Arsam Habib, Chalabi's top intelligence adviser.

U.S. authorities suspect Habib is a paid agent of the Iranian intelligence service. Chalabi, a regular visitor to Tehran before the war, made no secret of his ties to Iranian intelligence, but he denied delivering secrets.

Chalabi told George Stephanopoulos of ABC News that the United States gave him no classified information. An Iranian government spokesman told reporters yesterday that Chalabi provided no clandestine intelligence.

Chalabi and the INC routed Iraqi defectors to U.S. intelligence agencies, where their reports about Hussein's weapons programs often turned out to be false or unconfirmable. He said yesterday that the INC presented three defectors to U.S. agencies but never vouched for their credibility.

"We gave no information about weapons of mass destruction," Chalabi said. "It was up to them to analyze this. And the responsibility for reporting to the president after analyzing the information is not mine, neither is it the INC's."

Chalabi has spoken increasingly firmly on the need for Iraq to be run by Iraqis, not by the U.S.-led occupation. Yesterday he predicted that an interim government being negotiated by U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi and U.S. diplomats L. Paul Bremer and Robert D. Blackwill will fail.

A better solution, Chalabi said, would be for Bush to invite the Iraqi leadership to the presidential retreat at Camp David and "iron out the formation of a new government there, with them directly."

Ahmad Chalabi, on a TV monitor during an interview from Rustoss, left, was once the choice of top Pentagon civil servants in Iraq, not by the U.S.-led occupation. Yesterday he predicted that an interim government being negotiated by U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi and U.S. diplomats L. Paul Bremer and Robert D. Blackwill will fail. A better solution, Chalabi said, would be for Bush to invite the Iraqi leadership to the presidential retreat at Camp David and "iron out the formation of a new government there, with them directly."
ties Charges He Spied for Iran
Responsible for 'Smear,' Offers to Testify Before Congress

Ahmed Chalabi, a TV monitor during an interview from Baghdad with Tim Russert, left, was once the choice of top Pentagon civilians to run Iraq.

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Shown in opinion polls to be unpopular in Iraq, and considered undesirable by Brahimis, Chalabi may believe that his chances of winning a significant role in the next Iraqi government would be strongest if Bush took command. But, for reasons of domestic politics and the legitimacy of the future government, the White House has made clear that it does not want the president to play such a role.
Obsessed With Iran

George Shultz says that life in official Washington isn't one damn thing after another. It's the same damn thing over and over again. A sudden lurch by the Bush administration to seize Iraq's banks in an effort to contain Iran's Shi'ite rulers shows that the former secretary of state is, or at least has been, somewhat correct.

Bush policymakers and spies have made Iranian a driving—and highly disorienting—force in the continuing war in Iraq. They now resemble the LBJ-era Cold Warriors who were so intent on defeating China and the Soviet Union in Vietnam that they lost sight of the scales and dynamics of the real war they were fighting.

Iraq today is not the same as the Iran of Khomeini's time. The Iraqi military is not the same as the army that fought Iran in the 1980s. The country itself is not the same as the one that Iran tried to destroy. And the Iranian regime is not the same as it was when Iraq was a communist state.

In the closed world of smoke and mirrors that cooperate with intelligence agencies inhabit, Shahristani was a source on Hussein's weapons programs for U.S. government agencies and journalists, as were Chahabi, Ayad Allawi and many others. Shahristani was convicted by the television program "60 Minutes" one month before the post-Iraq invasion.

The ongoing Chahabi-CIA struggle, essentially over who will control an independent intelligence service, and how it will ultimately be used to destabilize Iran, is a topic for another day. The immediate problems belong to Brahimi, who now must publicly deny that the United States is vetting and then passing or blocking his choices for prime minister and other diplomatic posts.

That this administration would insist on retaining such power in a rebellious country it spent American lives to occupy is one of those obvious power realities that diplomacy was invented to obscure. As in a Hemingway short story, what is important is what is left out, both in Brahimi's public statements and the latest Security Council draft resolution on Iraq.

The U.S.-British draft is silent on command arrangements and other vital topics. It is intended to maximize U.S. power while seemingly pass authority to a group of mostly political unknowns led by Brahimi.Iraqi leaders well known in the West, such as Massoud Barzani or Jalal Talabani, would not get significant jobs.

The premature leak by U.S. officials of Shahristani's name as a candidate backed by All-Sistani has embarrassed the Shi'ite grand ayatollah and makes it even harder for him to work with Brahimi, a Sunni Arab whose daughter is to be married on Sept. 7 to the son of King Abdullah of Jordan.

The Iraq, a CIA favorite, is cast, as diplomatic as his future is. Asked recently by the New York Times who should rule Iraq, Abdullah replied: "I would probably imagine somebody with a minimal background who has experience of being a tough guy who could hold Iraq together for the next year."

Or in Shultz's terms, the same Saddam thing over again.

jimhoagland@washpost.com
Making Do With Lemons

If you're stuck with lemons, make lemonade. That folk wisdom applies to U.S. policy in Iraq, which is as seedy and sour as any foreign policy challenge America has encountered in decades. We certainly aren't making champagne there, but how are we doing in the lemonade business?

As we head into the final month before the handover of sovereignty to the Iraqi people, I'd like to offer the contrarian thought that the Bush administration in the past few weeks has been making the lemonade test fairly well. It is correct at earlier errors of judgment and putting policy on a reasonable glide path. That doesn't mean the plane won't crash after June 30. But President Bush's recent moves haven't been so foolish or reckless as some commentators have suggested.

The best example is the decision to jettison the Pentagon's former darling, Ahmed Chalabi. The longtime Iraqi exile is a remarkable man—one of those stubborn, self-motivated missionaries who by the force of their personalities bend the shape of history. Without his advocacy for regime change in Iraq, I suspect Saddam Hussein would still be in power.

But watching Chalabi on the TV talk shows last weekend after his headquarters had been raided in Baghdad, indignantly denouncing a congressional showdown between himself and CIA Director George Tenet, it seemed that his ambitions had overwhelmed his judgment. He apparently believed he could mobilize his supporters in Washington to attack the administration that had helped fund his operations but had now turned against him.

Chalabi posed three problems for U.S. lemonade makers. The first was that by steering many economic portfolios to his allies, he had gathered too much power over the nascent Iraqi economy.

The second problem is Chalabi's Iranian connection. He has never made any secret of his close ties with Tehran, but the issue became more serious after reports that Chalabi's intelligence chief, Aras Habib, was suspected of being an Iranian agent.

Support for this allegation comes from former CIA officer Bob Baer, who told me that he was informed by colleagues in 1994, when he was part of the agency's Iraq Operations Group, that the U.S. government had solid intelligence that Habib was being paid and controlled by the Iranians and was informing them about American covert activities in Iraq. Baer said that in 1999 he passed a warning about Chalabi's Iranian connections to Douglas Feith, who later became the Bush administration's undersecretary of defense. Chalabi has denied providing intelligence to Tehran, and Habib has disappeared.

You have to wonder what Chalabi's neoconservative enthusiasts were thinking backing a man who had been so closely aligned with an Iran that arguably poses the biggest strategic threat to Israel. If there's a logic here, it eludes me.

I suspect that Chalabi's ultimate transgression was pushing to position himself as the political representative of Iraqi Shiites—the key constituency in the new Iraq. That was a sensible strategy for Chalabi, but it increasingly put him at odds with U.S. policy—and made him a kind of up-market, secular version of the hotheaded young Shiite mulah, Moqtada Sadr.

Heading toward the June 30 transition, U.S. officials apparently felt it was important to let Iraqis know that Chalabi wasn't America's man. By cutting off his Pentagon funding (and denying him in the raid on his headquarters) they probably hoped to open space for other Shiite leaders who will emerge in the transitional government to be named soon by U.N. special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi.

The secret to making Iraqi lemonade is maintaining Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani's support for a transition jointly supervised by the United States and the United Nations. Despite Chalabi's efforts to derail that process, both Brahimi and U.S. occupation chief L. Paul Bremer seem to be making the relationship work. The best evidence has been Sistani's acquiescence while U.S. troops pummeled his enemy Sadr.

Iraqi lemonade will be a mix of different flavors and local solutions. It will mean adapting U.S. policies to the political realities of Sunni Faulahah and Shiite Najat. It will mean including recycled lemons who served in the old Iraqi army and bureaucracy; it will mean accepting advice from lemonade tasters in France, Germany and elsewhere.

The concoction won't be sweet, and it may yet explode in the bottle. But this is the messy art of the possible, and the Bush administration at least is learning from its mistakes.
An individual who is not in a position to testify provided the following information by telephone on

The source knows

The source knows of

While the source was

11/21/2005 Falls Church, Virginia

Investigation on Sub B, 281D-WF-C229021-302 N/A

File # SA Date dictated

by j_r050343.302

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TEXT:

SD00017 2390424

PP HQ DE LA NY WF LEGAT BONN

DE SD

P 152015Z OCT 87

FM SAN DIEGO (163D-NEW)

TO ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI PRIORITY

ATTN: ROOM 4235, TL-242

ATTN: INTERPOL/FPC UNIT, ROOM 7458

LEGAT BONN PRIORITY

DETOUR (INFO) ROUTINE

LOS ANGELES (INFO) ROUTINE

NEW YORK (INFO) ROUTINE

WFO (INFO) ROUTINE

BT

RYY'ADH FPC: FCI-IRAQ; O#: SAN DIEGO

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY

UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.

THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS FURNISHED FOR INFORMATION OF

REGARDING

LOCATED IN THE UNITED STATES.
OF INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT IS A HIGHLY SENSITIVE FOREIGN COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (FCI)/INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (IT) SOURCE OF THE FBI WHO HAS FURNISHED ACCURATE, RELIABLE AND VALUABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST AND WHO
Memorandum

To: (P)

From: SA (CT-3/TTF)

Subject: IRAQI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE MATTERS;
FCI-IRAQ;
OO: WMFO

DATE: 05-18-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC baw/sab/lac
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-18-2036

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

On an asset with the following information:

Asset reported that Iraqi

President SADDAM HUSSEIN, in a public speech after the conclusion of Ramadan stated that "if the United Nations (U.N.) continues the heavy sanctions against the people of Iraq, he will be forced to use whatever resources necessary to combat those devils from the west." Asset said that the leaders of the Kurdish people believe that SADDAM will carry out his threat. Asset said that SADDAM needs to start another conflict to regain support of the Iraqi people and to get their minds off the internal problems which they are facing (i.e. lack of food, lack of electricity and water).

SADDAM HUSSEIN has experienced internal pressure from the Iraqi people for his continuous intimidation tactics against the Kurds in northern Iraq. Recently SADDAM brought two divisions of The Republican Guard Army into Karkuk, Iraq, to intimidate the Kurds. U.N. observers reported these actions, and the U.N. cited IRAQ for violating U.N. Resolution 688.

6-WMP0

(1) 199M-WF-C-164993 SUB B
(1) 199M-WF-C-162409
(1-SA)
(1-SA)

JHS: jhs
(6)

SECRET
According to the asset, the Kurdish people are facing a dilemma because they failed to select a single leader during their last election, which lasted several months. Although the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) won the election by a 55 to 40 percentile in the polls, the People United for Kurdistan (PUK) shared 50/50 in their presumed democratic process. A new election has been proposed in 1994, although no date has been set. The people of Kurdistan will be seeking outside support from the U.N. and the U.S. to assist in monitoring the election.

In January, 1994, the PUK and the Islamic Movement (IM), a group that received 5% of the popular vote in the last election, were fighting on the Iraqi/Turkish border and 200 lives were lost. The KDP caused a truce by yielding one vote in the Kurdistan Congress to the IM. The PUK and KDP agreed that the IM will also be on the next electoral ballot.

Asset reported that

Asset reported that
Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: Squad CT-1
Contact: SA ext. 

Approved By: 

Drafted By: MCM: mcm

Case ID #: (X) 

Title: (X) 

Synopsis: (X) Asset reporting.

Details: (X) On SA's information: Asset provided the following
To: [Blank]  From: [Blank]  09/16/2002

He showed asset of a picture of a man standing with SADDAM HUSSEIN claims that the man with SADDAM information if there is re-contact. Asset will provided further

**
Precedence: ROUTINE
To: FBIHQ
From: WFO

Date: 01/10/1997
Attn: SSA NS-3A NSD, CTMBS

NSI-1
Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: wgp

Case ID #: (x)

Title: (x)

DOB
POB
A#

CO: WFO

Synopsis: (x)

Classified By: 15545, NSI-1/WFO
Reason: 1.5(c)
Declassify On: X-1

Enclosures: (x)

Administrative: (x) This interview was conducted
The interview was managed in two separate intervals lasting
approximately six hours total. The interpreter, a native
speaker, was

SECRET
Synopsis: (x) To summarize a Washington Times news article by James T. Hackett entitled, "Latest Challenge from Iraq."

Details: (x) The article states that since the United States elections, Saddam Hussein has been threatening a holy war against Israel. On December 31, 2000, Iraq staged the biggest show of military force since the 1991 Gulf War. Saddam stood on the reviewing stand firing a rifle into the air during a four-hour military parade as more than one thousand Russian-made tanks, artillery, infantry units and new surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles rolled by with jet fighters and sixty helicopter gun ships flying overhead. On December 31, 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Barak said Israel was in a state of strategic alert facing the possibility of war.

(x) The article states that Saddam Hussein is using the situation to try to foment a new Arab war against Israel. He announced in January the establishment of a military command for the special forces he created to support a Palestinian revolt. He also announced the deployment of the Republican Guard's
Hamorabi tank division toward the Jordanian border. With a population that is more than half Palestinian, Jordan would have trouble preventing Iraqi volunteers from crossing its soil to fight a war against Israel.

The article stated that the Iraqi military parade showed off new and improved weapons and equipment. The well-dressed troops wore uniforms and boots imported from Syria, while new Mercedes and Renault trucks reportedly imported under the UN oil for food program were used to carry troops and tow artillery. The one thousand tanks on display, with new engines and parts from Ukraine, showed Saddam has been able to modernize his military despite his UN sanctions. New Russian-made SAM 8 and SAM-9 surface-to-surface missiles were shown as were several new models of surface-to-surface missiles. One missile was described by Iraqi television as similar to the banned al-Hussein. A chemical weapons unit marched with the missiles, underscoring that there have been no inspections of Iraq's weapons program since Saddam threw out the UN inspectors more than three years ago.

The article stated that this display of missile comes just weeks after Khidir Hamza advised that Iraq was close to producing nuclear weapons. Khidir Hamza was a top nuclear advisor to Saddam Hussein until his defection in 1994.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: NS-15
Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: 

Case ID #: 

Title: IRAQI INTERESTS SECTION

Synopsis: (X) To report information from both reliable.

(U) (X) Classified By: G-3, NS-15/WF
Reason: 1.5(c)
Declassify On: XI

(U)

Details: (X) On May 21, 2000, reliable, stated that

(X) On May 22, 2000, reliable, stated that

SECRET
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 11/06/2000

To: [Blank] Attn: SA [Blank]

From: NS-15 Contact: SA

Approved By: [Blank]

Drafted By: ras

Case ID #: (W) 199E-NO-65498 (Pending)

Title: (X) aka

(U) IT-IRAQ

(S) [Blank]

(U) Synopsis: (X) Reporting information regarding captioned subject,

(U) [Blank] Derived From: S=3 Declassify On: XI

(U) Reference: (X) 199E-NO-65498 Serial 6

Details: (X) Referenced communication requested that

provides support for its statement in an earlier communication

that captioned subject, is a zealous supporter of Iraqi President, SADDAM HUSSEIN

(S)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/18/2000

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: SSA IOS Room 5437

From: NS-15

Contact: SA

Approved By: ras

Drafted By: ras

Case ID #: (X)

Title: (X)

Synopsis: (X) Setting lead to regarding possible Saddam Hussein sympathizer.

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X1

2 - Counterterrorism (Attn. SSA IOS Room 5437)

2 -

1 -

RAS/ras (EO50200.BC)
An ACS check on [redacted] was negative; however, a review of prior ELSUR material revealed that [redacted] may be a zealous supporter of Iraqi President, SADDAM HUSSEIN.
On [__] SA [__] met with a collaborative source with good access whose reporting has not been previously corroborated, at a predetermined location.

The Source provided the following information:

On [__] a source in a position to testify has provided the following unsubstantiated information with regard to [b1 b6 b7C b7D b7E b3]

Investigation on [__] at [__] 199P-WF-C-216258 Date dictated [__]

by SA

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
Chalabi Aides Suspected of Spying for Iran

Chalabi Aides Suspected of Spying for Iran

Raid at Leader's Home Targeted His Associates

By Scott Watanabe
Washington Post Foreign Service

BAGHDAD, May 21—Members of the political organization headed by Ahmed Chalabi are suspected of providing information to Iran and U.S. troop positions in Iraq and of kidnapping a prominent physician from his home, according to U.S. and Iraqi officials familiar with three investigations into a group the Bush administration once favored to run postwar Iraq.

On Thursday, Iraqi police, backed by U.S. soldiers, raided Chalabi's villa and the offices of the Iraqi National Congress, a coalition of parties that opposed the government of Saddam Hussein. Until recently, the group received $335,000 a month from the Pentagon for helping gather prewar intelligence about Hussein's government and find his top lieutenants after the invasion.

An Iraqi soldier keeps watch as demonstrators march in Baghdad of referring it,” said Daniel Senor, Bremer's spokesman.

A senior Iraqi police officer involved in the case said most of the eight suspects the police sought Thursday were involved in armed robbery and kidnapping last month that was allegedly carried out by INC members.

The officer, who declined to be named for fear of losing his job, said his office had received complaints for months about INC members impersonating police officers, breaking into homes and carrying out robberies. He said police officers had warned the INC offices several times about the allegations. In the past three weeks, he said, police have arrested four INC officials on robbery charges.

"They knew all about this," the officer said.

And referring to the incident with 65D-WF-229053 - NC
8/4/82

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DIRECTOR FBI
TO FBI CHICAGO ROUTINE
FBI DALLAS ROUTINE
FBI DENVER ROUTINE
FBI DETROIT ROUTINE
FBI HOUSTON ROUTINE
FBI INDIANAPOLIS ROUTINE
FBI KANSAS CITY ROUTINE
FBI LOS ANGELES ROUTINE
FBI MILWAUKEE ROUTINE
FBI NEW YORK ROUTINE
FBI OKLAHOMA CITY ROUTINE
FBI PITTSBURG ROUTINE
FBI PORTLAND ROUTINE
FBI SACRAMENTO ROUTINE
FBI SALT LAKE CITY ROUTINE
FBI SAN DIEGO ROUTINE

DATE: 05-02-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAM/RS/LSC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X.3(1)
05-02-2033

CONFIDENTIAL
C G=3, B OADR.
DE0015 23020000
RR HQ
DE DE
R182000Z AUG82
F0M DETROIT (199-1640) (CI-1) (RUC)
TO DIRECTOR (ROUTINE)

SECRET
UNITED STATES VISIT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S SON; FCI-IRAQ- TERRORISM

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED SECRET IN ITS ENTIRETY.
REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPING DATED AUGUST 4, 1982.

FOR INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU, CONTACT WITH DETROIT ASSETS FAMILIAR WITH THE ACTIVITIES OF THE IRAQI BA'ATH PARTY (IBP) WERE NEGATIVE REGARDING VISIT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S SON TODAY TO THE U.S.

DETOIT WILL REMAIN ALERT FOR ABOVE VISIT AND WILL ADVISE BUREAU AND INTERESTED OFFICES IF POSITIVE INFORMATION RECEIVED.

C & E G3, REASONS (2)(3), DRD OADR.

DE-21
Restrictions on Use

1. Only incoming teletype messages within the categories listed in MIOG Section 16-1.7 pages 1251 & 1252 may be prepared using form 0-73.

2. Use of Form 0-73 is restricted to incoming teletype messages received at FBLHQ Communications Center within the last 72 hours.

3. Addressees must be Bureau Offices (LEGAT/Field) or other Government Agencies. **Geographical location must be indicated if other Government Agency is located outside the Washington, D.C. area.**

4. Editing of message text is restricted to typed or printed changes of a word or two. Changes to the existing text involving more than a word or two will require the originator to initiate a new message using Form 0-93. Administrative data may be added immediately following the text and must be identical for all addressees.

5. Teletype messages received by the Communications Center that do not meet the above criteria shall be returned to the originator for preparation using Form 0-93.

Preparation of 0-73 Form (Yellow)

1. **Date & Precedence** - Type or print date and indicate precedence by checking the appropriate box.

2. **Addressee(s)** - Type or print addressee(s) immediately following the "TO:" or place a check mark in the appropriate box. Note: When using block "Other," indicate geographical location if addressee(s) is located outside Washington, D.C. If addressee(s) is a military installation, the name of the base, fort, or station must be listed to ensure delivery.

3. **Classification** - Type or print the classification and if appropriate the caveat and warning notices.

4. **Addressee Internal Distribution** - Complete when the originator wishes the message to be distributed to a known entity within a Headquarters Agency (i.e. Division, Section, Unit, etc.). List the addressee(s) abbreviation and the internal distribution, i.e. a message to Dept. of State, Dept. of Justice, and Defense Intelligence Agency; list on the "For" line(s) as follows:

   **Example:** For: DOS For SY/TA; DOJ for Asst. AG Criminal Div.; DIA For DSOP.

   Messages which do not list internal distribution shall be delivered to the agency headquarters where their analyst will effect in-house distribution.

5. **Subject** - Type or print the subject in the space provided or check "see attached" if subject is identical to attached message.

6. **Originator's Boxes** - Type or print the originator's name, telephone extension, room number, and division.

7. **Approved By Box** - Indicate approval for transmission by initialing the approved by box. Note: The person approving the message is solely responsible for assuring all necessary editing changes are accurate and are legible.

Preparation of Message To Be Transmitted

1. **Duplicate Copy & Notations** - Xerox 1 copy of the incoming teletype message. A notation shall be made on the original incoming teletype indicating one copy made for relay to SACS ________, (or LEGATS) ________, (or Government Agencies) ________.

2. **Editing of Duplicate Copy (Heading)** - Using a lead pencil ONLY draw single lines through the first and last lines of the message heading; connect these lines from top right to bottom left forming a "Z" figure. **(Do Not Obliterate the Heading)**

3. **Editing Changes to the Text** - (See Restrictions on Use, item 4)

4. **Administrative Data** - Type or print administrative data immediately following the text.
SECRET

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
28 Aug 90 0840

FBI LOS ANGELES (199E-WF-396) (P)

TO DIRECTOR FBI/IMMEDIATE/
FBI NEW YORK/IMMEDIATE/
FBI WASHINGTON/IMMEDIATE/

SECRET

CITE: //3410:CT-1//
PASS: SSTU, SSA

SUBJECT: EMBASSY OF IRAQ, IT-IRAQ, UOY-WMFO

WARNING: FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE; THIS COMMUNICATION IS
CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.


COUNTRY: IRAQ.

SUBJECT: (S)

(S)

SECRET
REFERENCE LOS ANGELES TELCALL TO SSA BUREAU, AUGUST 27, 1990; AND LOS ANGELES TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU, AUGUST 16, 1990 (90 LA 169/8759/7355/7).

CLASSIFIED BY: 8759 DECLASSIFY ON: DAAD.

BT: CLAS BY G-3

#0017 DECLAS: 04/12
MESSAGE RELAY VIA TELETYPING

DATE: 08-20-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 wc baw/rs
REASON: l4 (c, d)
DECLASSIFY ON: 08-20-2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FM: DIRECTOR, FBI

TO:  

☐ White House/WH/
☐ Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms/BATF/
☐ CIA DCD/CD/
☐ Dept. of Energy HQS/DOEHQ/
☐ Dept. of Energy Germantown Div/DOE/
☐ Dept. of Justice/DOJ/
☐ Dept. of State/DOS/
☐ Dept. of the Army/DA/
☐ Dept. of Treasury/DOT/
☐ Defense Intelligence Agency/DIA/
☐ Director National Security Agency/NSA/
☐ Director Naval Investigative Service/DIRNAVINSERV/
☐ Drug Enforcement Admin./DEA/
☐ FAA Washington HQ/FAA/
☐ HQ AFOSI Bolling AFBDC/AFOSI/
☐ INSCOM Ft. Meade/INSCOM/
☐ Nuclear Regulatory Commission/NRC/
☐ U.S. Customs Service/UCS/
☐ U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service/INS/
☐ U.S. Secret Service/USSS/
☐ Other: ________________________________

BT

Classification: Secret / Declassified

Addressee Internal Distribution

For: 1106511/  

See Attached

Approved By: \DA/

Tele:  

Room/Div.: 510C/6

DO NOT FILE WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS STAMP
USE AND PREPARATION OF FORM 0-73

Restrictions on Use

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3. Editing Changes to the Text - (See Restrictions on Use, item 4)

4. Administrative Data - Type or print administrative data immediately following the text.
SECRET

DATE: 05-05-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAM/PS/LSC
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-05-2033

SECRET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503-0004

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3) It has been announced to the Iraqi population by representatives of Saddam Hussein that Iraq is recruiting Palestinians to commit terrorist acts against United States targets in and about Saudi Arabia.
6) TELEPHONE CALLS FROM THE UNITED STATES ARE GETTING THROUGH TO BAGHDAD, IRAQ.

ADMINISTRATIVE
FULL INVESTIGATION COLLECTED JULY 29, 1970.
RE: LOS ANGELES TELCAL TO MEMING, SEPTEMBER 12, 1969.
FR UTD

☐ Name Searching Unit, 4989, TL# 121
☐ Service Unit, 4654, TL# 225
☐ Special File Room, 5991, TL# 122
☐ Forward to File Review, 5447, TL# 143
☐ Attention
☐ Return to

Supervisor, Room, TL#, Ext.

Scope of Search: (Check One)
☐ Automated Data Base - 5 & 20
☐ Automated Data Base - 5 & 30
☐ Unrestricted (ADB & Inactive Index)

Type of Search Requested:
☐ All References (Security & Criminal)
☐ Security Search
☐ Criminal Search
☐ Main

Special Instructions:
☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations

Subject
AKA(s)

Birthdate & Place

SSAN

Localities

R# Date Searcher Initials
Prod.

File Number Serial

Ident ADB Inactive Date of Ref M/Y

AFR

SECRET

FBI/DOJ
Classification of Mail:

- Unclassified
- Confidential
- Secret
- Top Secret
- SCI
- Other

Mail Category:

- Letter
- Airlift
- LHM
- Memo
- Report
- Other
- Teletype

Date: 3/28/07

Description of Material: 199-440355

This serial has been removed and placed in:

Special File Room, Room 5991, FBIHQ

This action taken based upon authority of:

- TS/SCI, FBIHQ, 62-116065
- Field Office Manager - __________________________
  File and Serial number

(Signature and Title of Approving Official)

Date

*requires special handling

SECRET
PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

FBI/DOJ
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-02-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC EAM/R3/LSC
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2033

Director, FBI

SAC, Cleveland
WMFO

UNSUBS
THREAT TO KILL IRAQI PRESIDENT
SADDAM HUSSEIN
SEPTEMBER 14, 1990
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM - IRAQ
OO: CLEVELAND

This communication is classified SECRET in its entirety.

Enclosed for receiving offices is one photocopy of a letter from the U.S. Department of State and the attachments thereto.

FBI Headquarters records indicate a reference to one

(3)

Receiving offices should conduct appropriate indices checks for individuals mentioned in the attached letters and advise FBI Headquarters whether any confirming information is available regarding the plot mentioned therein.

Enclosure
0167 MRI 01001
00 RUCNFN BON FBIWMO
DE FBINY #0014 2472005
ZNY SSSS
D 0420042 SEP 90
FM FBI NEW YORK (199H-BN-10153) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR FBI/IMMEDIATE/

LEGAT BONN/IMMEDIATE/

FBI WMFO/IMMEDIATE/

BT

SECRET

CITE: //3540//

PASS: HQ FOR BRUSSELS.

(S) SUBJECT:

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.


REFERENCED COMMUNICATION DETAILED INFORMATION PROVIDED BY
NEW YORK WAS REQUESTED TO CONDUCT INDICES CHECKS ON THE FOLLOWING:

NEW YORK INDICES, HOWEVER, REVEAL NO INFORMATION RELATIVE TO

BT
#0014
0043 MRI 01865
RR SIOC FBIJN
DE FBIME #0004 0392013
ZNY SSSSS
R 0820062 FEB 91
FM FBI MEMPHIS (199E-HQ-24472) (P)
TO FBI SIOC/ROUTEINE/
FBI JACKSON/ROUTEINE/
BT
SECRET
CITE: //3440//

{S}

SUBJECT	00: FBHQ;

INFORMATION CONCERNING SADDAM HUSSEIN; IT - IRAQ.
THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET".

IN REFERENCED COMMUNICATIONS, MEMPHIS WAS INSTRUCTED TO IDENTIFY AND INTERVIEW [REDACTED] ON FEBRUARY 6, 1991;
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, WAS
CONTACTED AND COULD PROVIDE ONLY GENERAL PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT INFORMATION. REQUESTED CONFIDENTIALITY.

ACCORDING TO
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, WMFO (199E-CV-43856) (RUC)

SUBJECT: UNSUBS;
THREAT TO KILL IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN
SEPTEMBER 14, 1990;
IT-IRAQ;
OO: CLEVELAND

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

Reference Bureau airtel to Cleveland and WMFO, dated 10/15/90.

All logical inquiries were made regarding the aforementioned individuals, and WMFO has no additional information regarding captioned matter.

Inasmuch as WMFO is conducting no further investigation at this time, this case is being placed in RUC status.

CLASSIFIED BY: G-3
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

2-Bureau
1-Cleveland
1-WMFO

ABH: hm
(4)
To: DIRECTOR, FBI
From: SAC, CLEVELAND (199E-CV-43856) (P)
Subject: UNSUBS;
  Threat to Kill Iraqi
  President SADDAM HUSSEIN
  September 14, 1990
  IT-IRAQ
  OO: CV

This airtel is classified "SECRET" in its entirety.

PII on 10/15/90, and will expire on 2/11/91. (Presumed
USPER)

Rebuairtel to CV and WMFO, 10/15/90.

The Cleveland, Ohio area telephone directory
contains no listings for anyone surnamed
Inquiry with the Ohio Bell Telephone information operator determined
no listing for above surnames.

Inquiry regarding Ohio driver's license and auto
registration determined no listing for anyone surnamed

Cleveland has received no additional information to
confirm that available regarding captioned matter.

199-3551-13

Approved: ___________________________
Transmitted ___________________________
(Number) (Time) Per ___________________________
Complete investigation as outlined in reairtel and furnish results to Bureau and Cleveland so this matter may be brought to a logical conclusion.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-02-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2033

0084 MRI 02189
PP SIOC FBIME
DE FBIJN #0003 03221
ZNY SSSS

P 0121232 FEB 91
FM FBI JACKSON (199E-HQ-24472) (P)
TO FBI SIOC (199E-HQ-24472)/PRIORITY/
FBI MEMPHIS/PRIORITY/
BT
SECRET
CITE: //3320:SQ2//

SUBJECT:
INFORMATION CONCERNING SADDAM HUSSEIN; IT - IRAQ; OO: BUREAU.

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY AT 10:30 A.M., 2/1/91.

OF MISSISSIPPI,

TELEPHONICALLY ADVISED SAC, JACKSON OF A TELEPHONE CALL HE JUST RECEIVED FROM WHOSE CREDIBILITY IS WELL KNOWN TO TOLD OF A RECENT CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH A FEMALE CLIENT CONCERNING
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE. THE CLIENT (NAME NOT PROVIDED) IS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF [ ] AND DESCRIBES HIM AS VERY "PRO U.S." AND AN INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS STATED HE FEELS HUSSEIN IN CRAZY.

REPORTEDLY [ ] ACCORDING TO COMMENTS MADE TO [ ] CLIENT,

THIS INFORMATION IS BEING PROVIDED TO MEMPHIS IN ORDER THAT [ ] (PHONETIC) MAY BE FULLY IDENTIFIED AND CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO HIS INTERVIEW IN VIEW OF HIS ALLEGED "PRO U.S." ATTITUDE.

BT

#0003

NNNN

1991 3551-14
FM FBI SIOC

TO FBI JACKSON/PRIORITY/

FBI MEMPHIS/PRIORITY/

BT

SECRET

CITE: //0651//

(S)

SUBJECT:

INFORMATION CONCERNING SADDAM HUSSEIN; IT-IRAQ.

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET".

REFERENCE JACKSON TELETYPETO FBI SIOCDATED 2/1/91.

MEMPHIS IS REQUESTED TO IDENTIFY AND INTERVIEW

MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE TO OBTAIN ANY INFORMATION THAT WOULD BE

RELEVANT TO CAPTIONED INVESTIGATION, AND PROVIDE RESULTS TO

FBI SIOC AND JACKSON DIVISION.

C BY G-3; D ON: OADR

199 3551 15

Approved: T

Original filename: NJ05300-035

Time Received: Telprep filename: NH05306-035

MRI/JULIAN DATE: 270/036 ISN: 003

FOX DATE & TIME OF ACCEPTANCE: 0243 57691
SECRET

CITE: //3510:C-10//

PASS: FBIHQ, CID/CTS, IT-SSTU, SSA

SUBJECT: IRAQI INTELLIGENCE MATTERS; IT-IRAQ; OO: NK.

SECTION ONE OF THREE

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

REQUEST OF FBIHQ:

FBIHQ IS REQUESTED TO DISSEMINATE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO THOSE U.S. AGENCIES DEEMED APPROPRIATE.

DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION, IT IS SOURCE SENSITIVE. DIVULGENCE OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, WITHOUT ADEQUATE
PARAPHRASING WOULD RESULT IN THE COMPROMISE OF THIS SOURCE.

SERIAL: 90 NK 507/3353/6616/4
COUNTRY: IRAQ

SUBJECT: PERSONALITY PROFILES AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REGARDING IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN, FAMILY MEMBERS AND THOSE IRAQIS INVOLVED IN THE INNER CIRCLE OF POWER IN IRAQ.


REFERENCE: REFERENCE IS MADE HEREIN TO A PRIOR NK TELETYPE TO FBIHQ, DATED 9/26/90, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

UDAI AL-TIKRITI, (DOB: 6/18/64) SON OF IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN AND PRESIDENT OF THE IRAQI SPORTS FEDERATION IS PORTRAYED AS A RUTHLESS EGOTIST WHOSE MAIN HOBBIES INCLUDE SPORTS CARS AND THE PROCUREMENT OF BEAUTIFUL WOMEN.

A PAINFULLY SHY INDIVIDUAL THROUGHOUT HIS EARLY LIFE UDAI
TOOK ADVANTAGE OF HIS FATHER’S ELEVATED STATUS TO PRESIDENT IN 1979 TO ACCRUE UNTOLD WEALTH GAINED FROM BLACK MARKETING AND KICKBACKS FROM IRAQI COMPANIES.

UDAI, A MEMBER AND OFFICER OF THE EXCLUSIVE RASHID CLUB IN MANSOUR CITY, BAGHDAD IS DESCRIBED AS A SADIST WHO DERIVES GREAT PLEASURE IN CONTROLLING PEOPLE AND EVENTS. UDAI ATTACHED HIMSELF TO A COTERIE OF IRAQI PLAYBOYS WHO SPENT MOST EVENINGS SEEKING OUT BEAUTIFUL WOMEN IN THE NIGHTCLUBS AND HOTELS OF BAGHDAD. UDAI PROCURES WOMEN THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES AND FRIENDS.

IF AN APPROACH WOULD FAIL, UDAI WOULD SUBJECT THAT PERSON OR INTERMEDIARY TO HUMILIATION AND EVEN TORTURE. UDAI EMPLOYED A NUMBER OF ARTIFICES TO ADMINISTER PUNISHMENT INCLUDING JAILINGS, BEATINGS, WHIPPINGS AND OTHER METHODS. ON CERTAIN OCCASIONS HE WOULD SHAVE PEOPLE’S HAIR AND SUBJECT THEM TO FIERCE GUARD DOGS AND ELECTRIC CATTLE PRODS. UDAI HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS EXTREMELY POSSESSIVE AND JEALOUS. ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO DARED TO BREAK HIS/HER FRIENDSHIP WITH UDAI WAS SEVERELY BEATEN AND PARALYZED.
UDAI MAINTAINS A DISTANT RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS FATHER, SADDAM HUSSEIN, WHO PUT HIM UNDER HOUSE ARREST AND EXILED HIM TO SWITZERLAND FOR A SHORT PERIOD IN 1988–89 FOR THE DEATH OF SADDAM’S BODYGUARD. SADDAM HAS BEEN VERY STRICT WITH UDAI HAVING BEEN PLACED IN A PRECARIOUS POSITION WHEN UDAI MURDERED HIS (SADDAM’S) VALET AND BODYGUARD, KAMAL HANNA.
IN 1988, UDAI AND HIS CLOSET FRIENDS WERE CELEBRATING HIS WEDDING ENGAGEMENT AT HIS VILLA IN HABANIYA. AT THE TIME, HOSNI MUBARAK'S WIFE WAS VISITING BAGHDAD AS A GUEST OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND WAS STAYING AT A NEARBY GUEST HOUSE.

IN CELEBRATION OF HIS ENGAGEMENT, UDAI AND HIS ENTOURAGE FIRED THEIR GUNS INTO THE AIR ONLY TO OBSERVE TRACER FIRE COMING FROM A NEIGHBORING VILLA. UDAI DETERMINED THAT THE SHOOTING WAS COMING FROM THE VILLA OF KAMAL HANNA, THE PERSONAL VALET AND BODYGUARD OF SADAM HUSSEIN.

UDAI WARNED HANNA TO DESIST FROM FURTHER SHOOTING BUT HANNA REPLIED BY ASKING UDAI TO JOIN IN HIS FAMILY'S CELEBRATION. HANNA WAS INTOXICATED AT THIS POINT. UDAI RETURNED TO HIS VILLA AND A BRIEF PERIOD OF QUIET ENSUED. HOWEVER, SHORTLY THEREAFTER, HANNA'S PARTY RESUMED THEIR SHOOTING.

UDAI BECAME FURIOUS AND RETURNED TO HANNA'S RESIDENCE. UDAI SCREAMED AT HANNA THAT HE WAS INSULTED AND THAT MUBARAK'S WIFE
WAS STAYING NEARBY. HANNA IGNORED HIM. UDÁI SEIZED A WOODEN CANE AND IN FRONT OF A HORRIFIED GROUP OF HANNA’S FAMILY MEMBERS (40 TO 50 PEOPLE) STRUCK HANNA ON THE BACK OF THE HEAD. HANNA COLLAPSED TO THE FLOOR.
DE FBINK #0004 0421512

ZNY SSSSS

P 111510Z FEB 91

FM FBI NEWARK (199E-NK-2377) (P)

TO FBI SIOC/PRIORITY/

BT

SECRET

CITE: //3510:C-10//

PASS: FBHQ, CID/CTS, IT-SSTU, SSA

($) SUB: IRAQI INTELLIGENCE MATTERS; IT-IRAQ; OO: NK.

SECTION TWO OF THREE
SADDAM KEPT HIS SON UNDER HOUSE ARREST BUT RELENTED UPON THE PLEADINGS OF HIS WIFE AND OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS. UDAI WAS SENT PACKING INTO EXILE TO GENEVA, SWITZERLAND AT THE IRAQI MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

IN THE SPRING OF 1990, UDAI RETURNED TO BAGHDAD, IRAQ, FROM GENEVA SWITZERLAND. HE HAS TRAVELLED TO THE UNITED STATES ONLY ONCE IN 1981.

SADDAM HUSSEIN, THE PRESIDENT OF IRAQ, IS DESCRIBED BY T-1 AS AN EXTREMELY STRONG FIGURE. SADDAM WAS BORN IN OUDJA, TIKRIT. HE IS A VERY SERIOUS AND PRIVATE PERSON. HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS FAMILY, IS ON THE WHOLE, GOOD. AS
PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED, HE MAINTAINS A DISTANT RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS SON UDAI. HUSSEIN IS THE FATHER OF UDAI, KUSAI (DOB 1966), T-1 DESCRIBES HUSSEIN AS EXTREMELY DEVOTED TO HIS FAMILY. SADDAM HUSSEIN IS A NATIVE OF TIKRIT AND ENJOYS HORSEBACK RIDING, HUNTING AND FISHING. SADDAM UTILIZES A PRIVATE HELICOPTER IN WHICH TO HUNT BIRDS (USUALLY IN TIKRIT). SADDAM HAS A NAGGING BACK PROBLEM AND HAS NO REGULAR PHYSICAL EXERCISE SCHEDULE. HE DOES HOWEVER, SCRUPULOUSLY WATCH HIS DIET AND DOES NOT DRINK. HE ENJOYS A GOOD HAVANA CIGAR FROM TIME TO TIME.

HE IS A SUNNI MUSLIM AND IS RELIGIOUS. ALTHOUGH HE IS NOT FREQUENTLY SEEN IN THE MOSQUE, HE PRAYS FIVE TIMES DAILY.
SECRET

CITE: //3510:C-10//

PASS: FBIHQ, CID/CTS, IT-SSTU, SSA

($) \text{b6 b7c}

SUBJECT: OO: FBIHQ
IRAQI INTELLIGENCE MATTERS; IT-IRAQ; OO: NK.

SECTION THREE OF THREE \text{b7d}
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: Squad I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: 

Case ID #: 

Title: 

(U) Synopsis: (X) Results of asset contact.

(U) Derived From: C-3

Declassify On: X1

Administrative:

SECRET
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE  Date: 

To: 

From: I-40
Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: np

Case ID #: (S)

Title: (S)

Synopsis: (U) Results of asset contact

(U) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Administrative:

(S) Asset: 
Date of Contact: SA
Contacted by: SA

SECRET
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: I-22

Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: np

Case ID #: 

Title: 

Synopsis: Results of asset contact.

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X1

Administrative:

Asset: 

Date of Contact: 

Contacted by: SA

SA
Reliability: As yet to be determined

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: I-40
Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: dkk

Case ID #: 

Title: 

Synopsis: Results of asset contact.

ASSET:

DATE OF CONTACT: 

CONTACTED BY: SA

RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable information in the past

 hành động
Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: ____________________________

From: __________________________

Squad 1-40
Contact: SA

Approved By: ____________________
Drafted By: _____________________

Case ID #: ______________________

Title: __________________________

Synopsis: (X) To report asset contact on ____________________________

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Administrative: (X) ____________________________ ARE HIGHLY
SENSITIVE AND RELIABLE SOURCES WHOSE INFORMATION HAS BEEN
CORROBORATED IN THE PAST.

SECRET/NOFORN
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Counterterrorism
Attn: SSA
Attn: IOS

From: I-22
Contact: SA

Approved By: 
Drafted By: dkk

Case ID #: (S)

Title: (X)

Synopsis: (S) Results of asset contact regarding fax.

(U) (X) Derived From: C-3
    Declassify On: XI

Administrative:

(S) ASSET:
(S) CONTACTED:
(S) CONTACTED BY: SA
(S) RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable information in the past

Enclosures: (X) One copy of a fax

Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO
ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: Squad I-22
Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: 

Case ID #: 

Title: 

Synopsis: (S) Results of asset contact

(U) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Administrative:

(S) ASSET:

(S) DATE OF CONTACT:

(U) CONTACTED BY: SA

(S) RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable information in the past

Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI

SECRET
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: ___________________________

From: ___________________________

I-22
Contact: SA ___________________________

Approved By: ___________________________

Drafted By: dkk ___________________________

Case ID #: (S) ___________________________

Title: (S) ___________________________

(U) Synopsis: (X) Summary of asset contact ___________________________

(U) Derived From: C-3
Declassify On: X1 ___________________________

Administrative:

(U) (X) ASSET: ___________________________

(X) CONTACTED: ___________________________

(X) CONTACTED BY: SA ___________________________

(X) RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable information in the past ___________________________

Details: (U) (X) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF ___________________________

SECRET
THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI
Synopsis: Report of asset contact.

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Administrative:

Asset: SA
Contacted: Has provided reliable information in the past

Contacted By:

Reliability:

Details: IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI.

Source stated that on 28 April 2002, a reception was held at the residence of the Ambassador to the Iraqi Mission.
to the United Nations (UN), MOHAMMED AL-DOURI, in honor of Iraqi President SADDAM HUSSEIN'S birthday.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE  Date: 

To: Counterterrorism  Attn: MEU, SSA 

From: Squad 1-22  Contact: SA 

Approved By:  (S) 

Drafted By: 

Case ID #: (S) 

(S) Title: (X) 

(U) Synopsis: (X/NF) Results of asset contact. 

(U) (X) Derived From: G-3 

Declassify On: X1 

Administrative: (X) 

(S) Asset: 

Date of Contact: 

Contacted by: SA 

Reliability: Has provided reliable information in the past 

WARNING: IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS SOURCE. FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH THE
referendum in question, was the one that took place in Iraq on or about 10/16/2002. The referendum asked the Iraqi people to vote whether they wanted to keep Saddam Hussein as their leader for another seven years.

(U) (S/NF) No further information was provided.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 

To: 

From: I-22
Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: kyb

Case ID #: 

Title: 

Synopsis: (x) Results of asset contact.

(U) (x) Derived From: G-3
Declasify On: X1

Administrative: (x)

Asset: 

Date of Contact: 

Contacted by: SA
Reliability: Has provided reliable information in the past

(U) WARNING: IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS SOURCE. FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH THE

SECRET/NOFORN
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

precedence: routine

to:

from:

i-22

contact:

approved by:

drafted by:

case id #:

(s)

title:

(s)

(u) synopsis:

(u) derived from:

declassify on:

SECRET

summary of asset contact.

declassify on: xl
IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI.

Source stated that STEPHEN PELLETIERE of the New York Times wrote an op-ed piece clearing SADDAM HUSSEIN of gassing the Kurds.
IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI.
Synopsis: To report on asset contact.

Administrative:

Asset: SA
Contacted by: SA
Date of contact: 
Reliability: Has provided reliable information in the past

Details: In view of the sensitivity of the source, extreme caution must be exercised in the handling of any information.
IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Counterterrorism

From: CD 22

Contact: SA

Approved By: (S)

Drafted By: dkk

Case ID #: (A)

Title: (X)

Synopsis: (X) To report on asset contact.

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X1

Administrative:

(S) ASSET:

(S) CONTACTED BY: SA

(S) DATE OF CONTACT:

(S) RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable information in the past

(U) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERTED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI.

(SECRET)
Precedence: PRIORITY

To: Counterterrorism
Attn: SSA

From: New York
I-40
Contact: SA

Approved By: (S)
Drafted By: kyb

Case ID #: (S)

Title: (S) 56TH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY;

Details: (S) Derived From: G-3
Declasify On: XI

(U) (S) The New York Field Office (NYO) is requesting that FBIHQ contact the United States Department of State (USDOS) immediately and ask the USDOS to deny Iraqi government official a United States (U.S.) entry visa.

(S) (S) On a highly sensitive and very reliable source, informed

SECRET/NOFORN
To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (X)

The NYO is therefore requesting that FBIHQ contact the USDOS immediately and ask the USDOS to deny a U.S. entry visa or to revoke the visa if they have already issued it.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

To: FBIHQ

New York

Tampa

From: C-10/JTTF

Contact: SA

Attn: NS-3B, SSA

IOS

Attn: I-40, SSA

Attn: Sq 6, SSA

Date: 

Approved By: 

Drafted By: jha

Case ID #: 

Title: HARD THYME;

AOT-IT;

OO: NEWARK

Synopsis: Cooperating Witness (CW) reporting.

Details: On [ ] author debriefed

ARMED AND DANGEROUS
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: I-40
Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: lkb

Case ID #: 

Title: 

(U) Synopsis: (SECRET) Results of asset contact.

(U) (SECRET) Derived From: G-3
Declasify On: X-1

(S) Administrative: 

ASSET: 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: 1kb

Case ID #: (SECRET)

Title: (SECRET)

Synopsis: (SECRET) Results of asset contact.

(U) Derived From: G-3

Administrative: (S)

Asset: 

Date of Contact: 

Contacted By: SAs

SECRET
RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable information in the past.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: lkb

Case ID #: (SECRET)

Title: (SECRET)

(Date: [blank])
Synopsis: (SECRET) Results of asset contacts.

(SECRET) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Administrative: (SECRET)

ASSET: [Redacted]

DATE OF CONTACT: [Redacted]

CONTACTED BY: SAS

RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable information in the past.

Details: (SECRET) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH FBI.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: CI-2
Attn: SA
Attn: I-40

From: CT-1/JTTF
Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: tam

Case ID #: 

Title: (S) IMPORT INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Synopsis: (U) Asset debrief.

(U) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Details: (S) On the asset, reliable, was interviewed by the writer and provided the following information:

(SECRET)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To:

From: Squad I-40
    Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: klk

Case ID #: (SECRET)

Title: (SECRET)

Synopsis: (SECRET)

(U) Derived From: C-3
    Declassify On: XI

(U)

(S) Details: (SECRET)
DATE: 05-31-2011
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-31-2036

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 
From: Squad I-40
Contact: SA

Approved By: 

(S) Drafted By: pg

Case ID #: 

(S) Title: 

(U) Synopsis: (X) Asset debriefing

(U) Derived From: G-3

Declasify On: X1

Administrative:

(S) Asset:
Date of Contact: 
Contacted by: SA and SA
Reliability: An asset with indirect access whose information
has been corroborated in the past.

DUE TO THE SINGULAR NATURE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, EXTRATION OR DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI.

(U) Enclosures: (x) This communication contains the following items stored in a 1A envelope:

(S) Daily News article dated 8/22/2002, page 8, titled “Planning to Hit Iraq.”
a newspaper article from the Daily News titled "Planning to Hit Iraq" dated August 22, 2002. This article was regarding ABU NIDAL who, according to the Iraqi Government, recently committed suicide. In a photograph displayed at the top right of the article, there is a figure of what the newspaper states is the Iraqi Intelligence Chief. According to the paper, the IIS Chief's name is TAHER JALEEL AL-HABOUSH. The asset advised

The asset recalled that
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

To: Counterterrorism
Attn: SSA
Attn: IOS
Attn: SSA

From: I-22

Contact: (S)

Date: 

Approved By: 

Drafted By: dkk

Case ID #: (S)

Title: (S)

Synopsis: To provide reporting on

Derived From: G-3
Declasify On: X1

Administrative:

ASSET:

DATE OF CONTACT:

CONTACTED BY: SA and SA

RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable information in the past
Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

To: Counterterrorism
Counterintelligence

Attn: SSA
Attn: IOS
Attn: SSA
Attn: SA

Date: 

From: Squad I-22
Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: kyb (S)

Case ID #: (S)

Title: (S)

CO: 

(U) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: XI

WARNING: IN VIEW OF THE EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THESE SOURCES AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH THE IF DISSEMINATED, THE MATERIAL MUST BE SUITABLY PARAPHRASED TO PROTECT THE SOURCES.
In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

26 Federal Plaza
New York, New York 10278
March 18, 2003

This document is classified "SECRET/NOFORN" in its entirety.

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: NEW YORK

\( x/NF \) Iraq is considered a threat country under the National List. The definition of a threat country is a foreign government or entity activities are hostile and pose a threat to the security of the United St
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Counterterrorism

From: [Redacted]

Date: 03/02/2003

Attn: MEU, SSA

IOs

Contact: SA

Approved By: [Redacted]

Drafted By: [Redacted]

Case ID #: (X)

Title: (X) CHANGED

SYNOPSIS: (X) To inform FBIHQ that a

(U) (S) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Previous Title: (X) Title marked "changed" to reflect previous

(U) Title previously carried as

(U) Enclosure(s): (S)

Details: (X) This EC is to inform FBIHQ that

(S)
(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [Blank]
Re: [Blank] 03/02/2003

(U) (S) The sources utilized for the information which comprise enclosed LHM are characterized by "T" designation and are designated as follows:

1. T1 is [Blank] (sensitive and reliable)
2. T2 is [Blank] (sensitive and reliable)

LEAD(s):

SECRET
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: New York

From: New York
I-22
Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: np

Case ID #: 

Title: 

Synopsis: (x) Interview of captioned subject, request case be placed into a closed status and to claim a statistical accomplishment.

(U) (x) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: XL

(U) Details: (x) (x) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED WHEN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE SOURCE. ANY DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION FROM THE SOURCE MUST BE COORDINATED WITH THE IF DISSEMINATED, THE MATERIAL MUST BE SUITABLY PARAPHRASED TO PROTECT THE SOURCE.

(S) On (extremely sensitive and reliable source who was in a position to know). provided squad I-22 with a list
RESULTS OF AN INTERVIEW WITH

ON REQUEST TO PLACE CASE IN CLOSED STATUS, AND TO CLAIM STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENT.

DEPENDING ON TELEPHONE NUMBER

CURRENTLY RESIDES AT DATE OF BIRTH (DOB)

AND A SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NUMBER (SSAN)

INTERVIEWING AGENTS EXPLAINED TO THE REASON FOR THE INTERVIEW, STATED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 
From: I-40
    Contact: SA

Approved By: 
Drafted By: lkb

Case ID #: (SECRET)

Title: (SECRET)

Synopsis: (SECRET) Results of asset contact.

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Administrative: (SECRET)
IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECEPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH FBI.
Synopsis: (X) Results of asset contact

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Administrative: (X)

Asset:

Date of Contact:

Contacted By:

Reliability: Has provided reliable information in the past.

Details: (X) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECEPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI.
(S) The source stated that SADDAM HUSSEIN recently made a speech calling for a Holy Jihad against the US including all Zionists and the US administration. HUSSEIN also told the Iraqi Foreign Minister to tell the United Nations (UN) that he will offer money to poor Americans.
source that one could only imagine how embarrassing it would be to the US if Iraq was to actually send money to Americans. The source added that the UN refused HUSSEIN's offer. The source also commented that any group in Iraq or abroad could take HUSSEIN's statements for a Holy Jihad literally and proceed to carry out a destructive plan. The source believed that a group would anticipate being regarded as heroes by HUSSEIN.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

Attn: SA

From: 1-40

Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: cr

Case ID #: 

Title: 

(U) Synopsis: (X) Results of asset contact.

(U) Derived From: C-3

Declasify On: X-1

(U) 

Administrative: (S)

(S) ASSET:

DATE OF CONTACT: 

CONTACTED BY: 

RELIABILITY: SA 

Reliability has yet to be determined


SECRET/NOFORN
Details: (S/NF) On [redacted] source was debriefed by [redacted] Special Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State, and the writer at an undisclosed location.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: New York

From: New York
   Squad I-40
   Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (S)

Title:

Date: 10/04/2001

SYNOPSIS: X/NF Meeting between

(U) (X) Derived From: G-1
    Declassify On: X-1

Details: (X/NF) On Special Agent

The main topic of discussion was the recent terrorist attacks on
the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and United Airlines Flight 93.

Uploader: [Signature]

Uploaded with Text:

Downloaded By: [Signature]

Downloaded On: [Date]

OCT 04 2001

File: NEW YORK
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: js

Case ID #: (x)

Title: (x)

Synopsis: (x) Summary of asset reporting.

(U) Derived From: 0-3

Declasify On: X-1

(U) Enclosures: (x) Source provided materials from

Details: (x)

ASSET:

CONTACT DATE: 

CONTACTED BY: SA

RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable information.
The purpose of the conference was to discuss "Iraq After Sadaam Hussein, 2020." The conference invited various scientists to discuss rebuilding Iraq after Hussein's regime fell. There were people invited from the fields of economy, agriculture, education, and engineering. They were concerned with recruiting people of higher education who had left Iraq because of Saddam to return after his fall.

There was another meeting of the INA/INC in New York City during the last week of September. Secretary of State Madliene Albright addressed a coalition of the Iraqi Oppositionists.

The source provided materials.
On (PROTECT IDENTITY), DOB: _______________ POB: _______________ Social Security Account Number: _______________ U.S. Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Alien Registration Number: _______________ was interviewed in the vicinity of _______________ was advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview. He provided the following information:

N/A
Hidden bin Laden plotting attacks: U.S.

By NILES LATHEM in D.C. and URI DAN in Jerusalem

U.S. and Israeli policymakers believe Islamic terror chief Osama bin Laden has fled his mountain base camp in Afghanistan and gone underground to launch new attacks on American targets.

The fanatic Saudi billionaire left his camp in the Kandahar region of Afghanistan last week and is believed to have moved north to a more remote region and may be preparing to leave the country altogether.

Bin Laden, who has his own personal jet, is said to be traveling with his four wives and his military commanders. His possible destinations include Chechnya and Somalia, where he has extensive ties with Islamic militias that could provide a safe haven.

Saddam Hussein has also offered him asylum in Iraq.

Reports from the Taliban, the Islamic militia that controls much of Afghanistan, that bin Laden disappeared because he had a falling out with his hosts are being dismissed by U.S. officials as "disinformation."

"We believe that he is cooking up something big and he didn't want the Taliban, with whom he has very good relations, to pay the price of American retaliation," said Yousuf Bodansky, staff director of the House Task Force on Terrorism.

Although the U.S., in the six months since the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, has put tremendous pressure on his organization, the Clinton administration believes that much of bin Laden's

See bin Laden on Page 24

New York Daily News
U.S. Bin Laden secretly plotting

BIN LADEN from Page 2

worldwide infrastructure remains intact and ready to strike.

"There is not the slightest doubt that Osama bin Laden and his worldwide allies and sympathizers are planning further attacks against us," CIA Director George Tenet warned Congress earlier this month. "I must tell you that one or more of bin Laden's attacks could occur at anytime."

Another U.S. counter-terrorism specialist noted, "The impression is that he's on the run, he needs something big to demonstrate to his constituency that he's still a player."

Bin Laden's vanishing act came 10 days after Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth met with Taliban leaders and demanded that they expel the terrorist leader, so he could stand trial in New York for the East Africa embassy bombing that killed 289 people.

The U.S. warned the Taliban that it reserves the right to launch new missile strikes to prevent terrorist attacks or in retaliation to terrorist attacks.

Last Wednesday, in the wake of bin Laden's disappearance, Inderfurth summoned Abdul Hakim Audahwallah, the Taliban's representative to the United Nations, to Washington to demand information on bin Laden's whereabouts and was told "he is not in the area in control of the Taliban."

The Taliban, desperate for international recognition and foreign investment, may be technically correct in that statement. The region where bin Laden is believed to be hiding is controlled by former Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's militia, the Hezb-I-Islami, which is allied with but not part of the Taliban.

"I think it's not a secret that bin Laden continues to threaten Americans, American interests and therefore his presence anywhere but in the hands of justice is unacceptable to the U.S," said State Department spokesman James Foley.

The massive U.S. effort to neutralize bin Laden since the East African bombings has produced mixed results, say terrorism experts.

While dozens of bin Laden operatives have been arrested, U.S. officials note that they may be only scratching the surface of a massive worldwide crusade of terror.

Intelligence experts say that most of the bin Laden operatives who have been arrested are "foot-soldiers and messenger boys" for the network of Afghan war veterans known as al-Qaeda.

"The inner circle remains intact," said Bodansky.

Last month's arrest in India of Sayed Abu Nafis, with 2 kilograms of a powerful explosive known as RDX, highlights the difficulty the U.S. faces in confronting this shadowy, highly compartmentalized enemy.

Nafis was part of a seven-member bin Laden cell plotting to blow up the U.S. embassy in New Delhi. While his arrest was hailed as a victory, U.S. officials noted that the rest of the cell, including the actual bombers and bomb makers, escaped.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE       Date: 03/24/2003

To: New York       Attn: INTEL DESK
LEAD DESK
INV. DESK
SQUAD I-4
SQUAD I-22

From: New York
Squad I-21
Contact: SA ext

Approved By: SSA
Drafted By: eso

Case ID #: (Pending)

Title: (x) HANDWARMER;
IT-IRAQ
CO:NY

Synopsis: (x) To set lead in captioned matter.

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Details: (x) On at approximately hours,
telephone number

See attached ACS check on the subject’s name.

JTTF LEAD#: 
Priority: Routine
Received Date/Time: hours
Complaint taken by:
Individual, who is in a position to testify, provided the following information:

(S

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

To: All Field Offices

Attn: ADICs/SACs/ASACs
FIG Supervisors
JTFs
Field Reports Officers

Attn: Legal Attaches

All Legats
Counterterrorism

Attn: SC

International Operations

Atttn: SAC

Intelligence Directorate

Attn: SC

From: Counterterrorism

Contact:

Approved By: 415X- NY-

C232251

Ser. 030

Drafted By: (U) 315-HQ-C1275509-282

Title: (S)

Synopsis: (X) This Electronic Communication (EC) establishes
ad-hoc requirements for assessing

(U) Derived From: G-3

Declassify Gr: X1

Reference: (X) 66F-HQ-A1433808-E Serial 94

SECRET//NOFORN
To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism

Administrative: These ad-hoc intelligence requirements were developed by Counterterrorism Division. This EC was also reviewed by National Security Law Branch Attorney and relevant FBI standing requirements. These ad-hoc intelligence requirements will remain in effect for 90 days.

Details: The Counterterrorism Division (CTD) requests that all divisions

Background: On November 5, 2006, former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was found guilty of crimes against humanity and sentenced to death by hanging. Saddam Hussein, a Sunni Muslim, was convicted for the killing of 148 men and youths in the predominantly Shia town of Dujail, Iraq, in 1982 in retaliation for an assassination attempt against his life. Saddam Hussein's half brother Barzan Al-Tikriti and former Chief Judge Awad Hamed Al-Bandar were also sentenced to death. Former Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan received a sentence of life imprisonment. Two other senior Ba'ath Party officials, Abdullah Kadhem Ruaid and Abdullah Rawed Mizher, were found guilty and each sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Ba'ath Party official Muhammad Azawi Ali was acquitted of all charges.

As of 29 December 2006, the exact date of Saddam Hussein's execution remains unknown.

Intelligence Target
To: All Field Offices  From: Counterterrorism  

Reporting and Requests for Assistance

(U) Any potential threat information developed relative to these requirements, and not listed under the Urgent Report Guidelines on the Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) website should be immediately forwarded to

Threat information that IS listed under SIOC’s Urgent Report Guidelines should be disseminated via the instructions located on SIOC’s website.

(U) Responses should be prepared in electronic communication (EC) format and submitted to the appropriate investigative and analytical units in the Counterterrorism Division (CTD). In addition, responses should also be prepared in Intelligence Information Report (IIR) format by the Field Intelligence Groups (FIG) and submitted to the Counterterrorism Division, via FIDS. When responding to this requirement set, please note the identifier following each requirement:

(U) Information developed from these collection requirements (including threats) and requests for assistance should be forwarded by email or phone to each of the following units:

1. (U) FBI HO, Counterterrorism Division.

SIA
NOTE: Hand print names legibly; handwriting satisfactory for remainder.
indices:  □ Negative  □ See below

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject's name and aliases</th>
<th>Character of case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sadam Hussein</td>
<td>Sadam Hussein/Osama Bin Laden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osama Bin Laden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Complainant  □ Protect Source

Complaint received

□ Personal  □ Telephone  Date 8/5/03  Time 11:30 AM

Address of Subject

Complainant's address and telephone number

Complainant's DOB

Sex  Female

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Height</th>
<th>Hair</th>
<th>Build</th>
<th>Birth date and birth place</th>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Eyes</th>
<th>Complexion</th>
<th>Social Security Number</th>
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<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>

Scars, marks and other data

Employer

Address

Telephone

Vehicle Description

Facts of Complaint

called and said that

Do not write in this space.

62-0

(Complaint received by)

917 YD01 71

BLOCK STAMP
A source, who is in a position to testify, provided the following information to Special Agent (SA) and told the source he was male, who is in
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

To: Counterterrorism

From:

Date: 

To: 

Attn: 

From: Squad NS-6

Contact:

Drafted By: cdd

Case ID #: 

Title: IRAQ INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

ET AL;

NOT: IT

Synopsis: To provide additional information regarding upcoming interview of

Due to the below described details, requests be interviewed at

and in the presence of all pertinent national security issues involving

(U) Derived From: 8-3

Declassify On: 08/22/2002

Reference:

SECRET
(S) To: Counterterrorism From: 

Re: (U)

Administrative: ( ) Re EC to and receiving offices, dated August 16, 2002 and EC to and receiving offices, dated July 16, 2002.

(U) Details: ( ) On resident, advised that could provide relevant information pertaining to also provided information which indicated that may have relevant information regarding individuals

(U) ( ) On was contacted by regarding his detailed knowledge of stated that wants to provide current and historical information regarding numerous national security matters pertaining to Iraq and President HUSSEIN. first met

(U) 

(U) 

(U)
To: Counterterrorism
From: 
Re: (x)

(U) (x)

(U) (x)

(U) (x) For information of receiving offices, and as detailed above, all of statements are hearsay. is awaiting to be contacted at his home address and telephone number (previously provided to requests conduct the interview at and in the presence.

(S) (x) is willing to travel outside of to be interviewed, if deemed necessary.
FBI Miami received uncorroborated information from an individual whose reliability is undetermined. This information is that...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject's name and aliases</th>
<th>Character of case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JABER A. ELBANEH;</td>
<td>265-T-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAMA BIN LADEN;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADAM HUSSEIN;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Complainant: ☐  Protect Source

Complaint received: ☒ Personal  ☐ Telephonic

Date: 6/30/03  Time: 10:30 am

Complainant's address and telephone number

Complainant's address and telephone number

DOB: 12/11/44  Sex: Male

Race  ☐ Male  ☐ Female  Height  Hair  Build  Birth date and birth place

Age  ☐ Female  Weight  Eyes  Complexion  Social Security Number

Scars, marks and other data

Employer:  Address:  Telephone: b1 b6 b7c b3

Vehicle Description:

Facts of Complaint:

Complainant, states that he has

rza

(1)

(Complaint received by)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

To: Director

WFO
Los Angeles
Canberra
Miami

Attn: Executive AD Dale Watson
CT Unit Chief
SAC
SAC
SAC Hector M. Pesquera
A/ASAC
ASAC

Date: 07/06/2002

From: Miami
NS-6
Contact: SA
SA

Approved By: [Blank]

Drafted By: blm

(S) Case ID #: (x) 163A-CN-2324 (Pending)

(S) Title: AKA;

(S) ACT - IT
CO: MIAMI

(S) CO: CANBERRA
(163A-MM-2324)
To: Director  From: Miami  
Re:  07/06/2002

Synopsis: (X) To O & A a captioned matter, to provide results of investigation conducted to date, and to set appropriate leads.

(U) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

(U) Administrative: (X) Reference Los Angeles EC to Counterterrorism and Miami, dated July 03, 2002; Miami EC to Counterterrorism and receiving offices, dated July 02, 2002; and Canberra EC to Counterterrorism and receiving offices, dated July 02, 2002.

Details: (X) Per the referenced EC from Legat Canberra, information was provided that captioned subject date of birth reportedly

(U) Investigation conducted by the Miami FBI

The above information was provided to the INS Miami and the FBI Los Angeles Division and on July 02, 2002, at the request of Miami; agents from the Los Angeles Division interviewed and advised that confirmed that and denied any relationship to President SADDAM HUSSEIN.

(U) (X) was interviewed by FBI Miami SA

and SA prior to was cooperative with the interviewing agents and stated that

SECRET
At approximately 6:00pm on July 03 2002, Special Agents (SA) and members of the Joint Terrorism Task Force, (JTTF) assisted Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) SAs, and INS Section Chief William West voluntarily provided the following information:

emphatically expressed that

HUSSEIN, Traci President SADDAM

Investigation on 07/03/02 at Miami, Florida

File # 163A-CN-2324 Date dictated 07/04/02

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Date of transcription 07/10/2002

Date of birth was advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and of the nature of the interview. He then provided the following information at the

Home address is and his home telephone number is father, currently lives in home telephone number is where he lives is married to mother, date of birth lives with can be contacted at home telephone number

reiterated that he has never been approached by anyone in the Iraqi Government, to include both Iraqi military and intelligence officials. Additionally, has no known acquaintances who are Iraqi intelligence officials or are associated with any Iraqi intelligence officials. indicated that in the future, should he ever encounter any problems with the Iraqi Government, he would definitely contact the appropriate

Investigation on 07/05/2002 at

File # 163A-CN-2324 Date dictated 07/10/2002

by

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STRICTLY CONTROLLED
DO NOT DUPLICATE OR DISSEminate

Precedence: IMMEDIATE
To: Counterterrorism
Attn: UC, SSA, Legat

From: Squad NS-6
Contact:

Approved By: (S)
Drafted By: cdd

Case ID #: (S)
Title: (X) IRAQ INTELLIGENCE MATTERS (S)
ET AL;
AOT: IT

Synopsis: (X) third party provided intelligence regarding

(U) Derived From: G-3
(U) G-3
(U) Declassify On: XI

Reference: (S)

Administrative: (X) Re: Telcalls to Counterterrorism, SSA

on October 07-08, 2002 and EC to Counterterrorism and receiving offices, dated August 22, 2002.
The document contains redacted text and secret classification markings. However, the information that can be discerned is as follows:

To: Counterterrorism
Date: 10/28/2002

From: Squad NS-6

Case ID #: [redacted]
Title: IRAQI INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Synopsis: Per previous administrative coordination between London and Miami, London is requested to have Conduct a second interview of [redacted]

Reference: [redacted]

Administrative: Re EC to [redacted] and receiving offices, dated October 21, 2002 and EC to [redacted] and receiving offices, dated October 18, 2002.
SECRET

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/07/2003

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: SSA

Miami

From: Miami

Squad T-3
Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted By: cdd

(U) Case ID #: 199E-MM-C101114 (Pending)

(U) Title: 2002 CONFLICT WITH IRAQ - MIAMI;
IT - IRAQ
DARKENING CLOUDS;
IT - IRAQ

(U) Synopsis: To provide information to Detroit regarding who possibly resides in Division.

(U) Derived From: G-3, T-3/JTTF/Miami
Reason: 1.5(c)
Declassify On: X1

References:

(U)

(U)

(U)

(U)

(U)

(U)

Enclosure(s): Enclosed for as attachments are the following:

1. One colored State of Driver's License photograph of

SECRET
PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

Date: 03/14/2003

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: SSA
SSA
IOS

From: T-3
Contact: SA
JTF/SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

\{U\}
Case ID #: \(\) 199E-MM-C101114 (Pending)
\(\) C101114 (Pending)

\{U\}
Title: \(\checkmark\) 2003 CONFLICT WITH IRAQ-MIAMI;
IT - IRAQ
DARKENING CLOUDS;
IT-IRAQ

\{U\}
Synopsis: \(\checkmark\) To report results of Asset debriefing.

\{U\}
Classified By: G-3, T-3/JTF/MIami
Reason: 1.5(c)
Declassify On: XJ

\{S\}
Details: \(\checkmark\) On [hereinafter referred to as Asset], who has provided information, some of which has been corroborated, met with SA a member of the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTF) and SA and provided the following information:

Note that elements of the information contained herein are singular in nature and their disclosure will compromise the source of this information.

SECRET
On March 20, 2003, was interviewed in his home. Also present throughout the entire course of the interview were Special Agent from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and Special Agent from United States Customs (USC). After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents as well as the nature of the interview, provided the following information:
denies having any foreign property or business interests.

has never been associated with the BAATH or any other political parties. When questioned, described the BAATH party as Hussein's personal political party.

denies ever having been in Tikrit, Iraq.

did not have any evident tattoos or other physical deformities.

does not have a current passport.

When asked about the current war in Iraq, stated he hoped Hussein and his followers would be ousted permanently. believed this would be best for all of the Iraqi people.

described Hussein as a master of propaganda.

also stated the people of Iraq live in constant fear of Hussein and his regime.

is willing to speak to Agents of the government at any time and encouraged us to recontact him if necessary.
(U) On March 21, 2003, date of birth was interviewed at . Also present throughout the entire course of the interview were Special Agent from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and Special Agent from United States Customs. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents as well as the nature of the interview, and after having Special Agent (SA) read the FD-395 Advice of Rights Form in its entirety and having sign this form, provided the following information:

(U) was born in has lived in for approximately

(U) 

Investigation on at
(U) File # dictated by

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
(U) On 03/27/2003 telephonically contacted the writer at the Miami Headquarters Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. After being advised of the identity of interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, provided the following information:

(U) was born in

No member of his family has personally met Saddam Hussein.

(U) he never had direct contact with Saddam.

Investigation on 03/27/2003 at Miami, Florida (telephonically) by SA

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Continuation of FD-302 of __________________________________ , On 03/27/2003 , Page 3

(U) ________________________________________

(U) are not in favor of what Hussein has
done to Iraq since coming to power.

(U) has openly

(U) voiced his dislike of Hussein.

 agreed to re-contact at the writer discretion.

(U) provided the following contact
information: primary residence is

SECRET
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SECRET

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

(U) date of birth

(U) home address

(U) home telephone number

(U) driver's license number

(U) State of

(U) work telephone number

(U) was advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and of the nature of the interview. He then provided the following information at his work address:

(U) insisted that he made no false statements to Special Agent (SA) and SA during his January 29, 2003 interview.

(U) stated he had no relatives who were formerly Iraqi scientists who worked on Iraqi President SADDAM HUSSEIN's weapons of mass destruction programs. emphasized he had no relatives who currently reside in Switzerland or Sweden.

(U) stated he is not a current or former participant in any international heroin distribution network.

(U) explained that he could not possibly be involved in an international heroin distribution network because he does not use heroin.

(U) said he knows nobody who lives in Malaysia or China.

(U) maintained that he knows nobody who was ever arrested and successfully prosecuted for distributing heroin.

03/06/2003

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/10/2002

_ also known as (aka) _

_ was interviewed at _ by Special Agent (SA) _...

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) and NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE (NCIS) provided Arabic/English translation.

_ voluntarily provided the following information:

---

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HUSSEIN wants to be the next "Arab Emperor". HUSSEIN wants to be the leader who revives Babylonian culture (an infidel culture) and applies it to all Muslims. HUSSEIN uses the Baath Party and western technology in order to secure
greater power in the region believes that if HUSSEIN were deposed, Iraq would “break up”.

believes HUSSEIN spends more than 70-80% of Iraq’s wealth on the military stated HUSSEIN unsuccessfully attempted to separate religion from politics within the country. He held summits with competing parties and other Arab nations in order to cement his hold on power.

was asked to compare HUSSEIN’s ideas for the Arab world with those of USAMA BIN LADEN, but he refused to do so. When the comparison was made, stated BIN LADEN’s views on Iraq and HUSSEIN are best represented in the USS Cole video, which he created refused to answer any questions concerning his opinion on the matter, but admitted BIN LADEN wanted the specific footage of HUSSEIN and his treatment of children in Iraq, included in the video believes the message of the USS Cole video is very clear and the subsequent reaction of the world is a political, military, and religious victory for Islam.

admitted to investigators that he was also known by the name
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/15/2002

interviewed on November 14, 2002, at _________. The interview was conducted by Special Agent (SA) _________. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), SA ________, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), and Contract Linguist _________. The interview was conducted in Arabic. _________. provided the following information:

Investigation on 11/14/2002 at _________. Date dictated 11/14/2002

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said everyone knew that Saddam Hussein was selling a lot of oil and that 70-80% of the profits were going towards building weapons, instead of going back into the economy. He does not have any direct knowledge of any weapons of mass destruction. All he knows is what he saw on the news.
On 07/31/2002 interviewee was contacted for interview at by Special Agents Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Additionally, Technical Sergeant (T/Sgt) U.S. Air Force Language Specialist, was present for the duration of the interview and provided Arabic-English translation.

1994 which was the same year that SADDAM HUSSEIN threatened to invade Kuwait a second time.

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was interviewed on 07/07/2002 at 1620 hours. The interview was conducted by SA [Farsi translator] and another U.S. government official. The interview began at approximately 1620 hours. [Redacted] provided the following information:

Investigation on 07/14/2002 at [Redacted] by [Redacted] Date dictated 07/07/2002
On September 4, 2003, [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] by Special Agents (SA) [redacted] and [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The interview was conducted in English and some Arabic. Linguist [redacted] was present during this interview for translation.

The purpose of this interview was to ascertain [redacted] information on [redacted] was initially shown a photo line-up consisting of seven (7) photographs. [redacted] positively identified the photograph of [redacted].

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/24/2002

Investigation on 10/24/2002 at

File #

by SA sjb

Date dictated 10/24/2002

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: National Security Miami
Attn: NS-2B, IOS SSA

From: NS-2 Contact: SA

Approved By: 
Drafted By: dm dm

Case ID #: 

Title: IRAQI INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Synopsis: To provide FBIHQ with copies of documents provided by for review and dissemination as appropriate.

Derived From: G-3
Reason: 1.5c
Declassify On: X1

Enclosures: Enclosed for FBIHQ are copies of documents provided by and an English summary translation prepared by the FBI, as set forth in the Details Section of this communication.
Сотрудник назвал его именем свою собачку чтобы огрызать Сергея Бунин.

настоящее имя коллекционера

Конечно, при отсутствии непосредственных доказательств, эти обвинения выглядят довольно слабо. Однако, несмотря на это, в прессе был поднят вопрос о том, что подобное поведение может быть связано с организацией преступных групп, которые занимаются незаконной торговлей работами искусства. В этом контексте, дальнейшее расследование является неотложной задачей.

Джордж Бунин, директор музея, подчеркнул, что его учреждение прилагает все возможные усилия для выявления подобных ситуаций и предотвращения их повторения. Он также призвал всех, кто обладает информацией о подобных преступлениях, обратиться в полицию с целью обеспечения справедливости и защиты интересов искусства.

Таким образом, данная ситуация подчеркивает необходимость усилений в области борьбы с незаконной торговлей предметами искусства и подчеркивает важность ежедневно обновляемых баз данных для идентификации и слежения за такими преступлениями.
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Director National Security Agency/NSA/
Director Naval Investigative Service/DIRNAVINSERV/
Drug Enforcement Admin./DEA/
FAA Washington HQ/FAA/
HQ.AFOSI-Bolling/AFBDC/AFOSI/
NSCOM/Bolling, Meade/NSCOM/
Nuclear Regulatory Commission/NRC/
U.S. Customs Service/UCS/
U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service/INS/
U.S. Secret Service/USSS/
Other:

For: _____________________________

Subject: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - 1980

Approved By: ___________________  Originator: MORGAN

Tele Ext: 4646  Room/Div: 7084/INTD

DO NOT FILE WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS STAMP
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTN: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION,

SSA

FROM: SAC, PHILADELPHIA (199K-WF-3078) (ARA) (P)

SUBJECT: OO:PH

OO:WMFO
(199K-WF-3078)

OO:WMFO

OO:WMFO

This communication is classified "SECRET" in its entirety.

1 - Bureau (RM)
   1 - TRAC
2 - Boston (SQ C-7) (RM)
2 - Detroit (RM)
2 - Houston (RM)
2 - Newark (RM)
2 - New York (SQ IT-2) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (RM)

DAR: rmd
(24)

1cc RM 5436
1cc TRAC

Transmitted

199-12033

(09-16-92)

Approved: 

(Handwritten Approval)

(Received Date)

stated that he has never been interviewed or contacted by the Iraqi, Yemeni, Soviet, or Polish Intelligence Services, or received pressure from any country for extraordinary cooperation. He stated that he is not here on any type of hidden agenda and asserted that he had been completely candid during the interview.

He is not a member of the Iraqi Baath Party, does not agree with the activities and behavior of the current regime of Saddam Hussain, and is a non-practicing Moslem.

agreed to further interview contacts as necessary and agreed to notify the interviewer if he receives any type of pressure for extraordinary activities directed against the United States on behalf of Iraq, Poland or any other country.
0002 MRI 01703
PP SIOC FBIBA FBIDN FBIDE FBIJN FBILA FBINY FBIWMFO
PAR
DE FBINK #0018 1071318
ZNY SSSSS
P 162102Z APR 91
FM FBI NEWARK (199E-LA-115677) (P)
TO FBI SIOC/PRIORITY/
FBI BALTIMORE/PRIORITY/
FBI DENVER/PRIORITY/
FBI DETROIT/PRIORITY/
FBI JACKSON/PRIORITY/
FBI LOS ANGELES/PRIORITY/
FBI NEW YORK (199E-NY-271)/PRIORITY/
FBI WMFO/PRIORITY/
LEGAT PARIS (199M-PA-7660)/PRIORITY/
BT
SECRET
SECTION TWO OF THREE SECTIONS
CITE: //3510:C-10//
PASS: SIOC, CID/CTS, SSA SSA SSA
PTU, SSA OLIA.
SECRET

This entire document is classified secret unless otherwise noted.

Date of birth

was interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on September 20, 1990 and the following information was obtained.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY 2627
DECLASSIFY ON OADR

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0001 MRI 01702

PP SIOC FBIBA FBIDN FBIDN FBILN FBILY FBIWMFO PAR

DE FBINK #0017 1071317

ZNY SSSSS

P 162102Z APR 91

FM FBI NEWARK (199E-LA-115677) (P)

TO FBI SIOC/PRIORITY/

FBI BALTIMORE/PRIORITY/

FBI DENVER/PRIORITY/

FBI DETROIT/PRIORITY/

FBI JACKSON/PRIORITY/

FBI LOS ANGELES/PRIORITY/

FBI NEW YORK (199E-NY-271)/PRIORITY/

FBI WMEO/PRIORITY/

LEGAT PARIS (199M-PA-7680)/PRIORITY/

BT

SECTION ONE OF THREE SECTIONS

CITE: //3510:C-10//

PASS: SIOC, CID/CTS, SSA SSA SSA

PTU, SSA OLIA.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Date Filed</th>
<th>To be returned</th>
<th>Disposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interview Notes of:

Jaham Hussein
We had no goal to keep fighting, so cease fire okay.

6. But we had some requests we will draw from.

6. What were other requests I kept during the peace agreement?

5. I don't remember any larger but kept points made by delegation.

6. One request by the UN was the authority of the OS. That was asked by Gen. Schwartzkopf — does it render?

S = No.

SIGNED BY THE BELL

[Leaving word]

[Scratching head with the back of hand]
3/10/14 Interview

Concerned about his at home exercise

Wants a harvest
Wants writing material

"I don't want a advet" 
"You force me to have to repeat myself many times
This I don't like for myself"

G. Respond - It's not that I want you to ask

It's a matter of priorities
To get your summer
To get your dentist
To get your table

I don't forget anything he asks

5. What priorities?
   My vision

6. Sunday for Eye Doctor  Laughing

[Paper clip]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-12-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC
5. What did you gain by destroying grave of dead man...
   - Michel Angel's tomb - we paid for it.
6. Don't know why tombs damaged. - I'll check to see if rumors are true.
   (show him pictures of statues being pulled down)
   (He concerned about this...)
5. It was also said that some statues were destroyed.

6. I'll try to look into this - see if the rumors are true because I have not heard that.

5. To tell the truth, I was very surprised!
   (Even though I dug was the worst)
   (Rubbing wet face - playing with hands in front of face)
S.: I did hear it on ABC western radio.

G.: Any other Q. before we begin?

S.: In the last meeting,
    I did not want to (move on) or finish.

G.: re: K prenatal invasion by DQ - this cost
    of damage was estimated to be 150 million.
    Are you surprised by that?

S.: Where is the neutral entity coming with that thinking?
    when a prosecutor makes a claim, the accused is asked
    otherwise, to a matter of the world returning to the
    law of the jungle. That the strong apply to laws
    one may say we are talking about Kwant
    and DQ, so why is America being thrown
    in the middle?

G.: I will answer that the entire area is at
    risk.

S.: Therefore, when I ask why is America
Isn't America

Is the one using them 100 billion
Is he going to flag tonight?

The hatred of the Kuwaiti royal
has made them stupid - Just
as their arrogance made them
stupid.

And now will they (Kuwait)
be able to insist on isolation
& be deadly that and

My keep reminding I do on a
very basis ----
by returning twist to its

The isu being deducted from
milk for their babies, daily break
education, schools from health
S. it maybe easy for America a country across Atlantic to say we'll make it to soon.

But what about Kuwait? Like of the thought that they are living right next to a hungry country.

Are you are among the few. In our world society, the US is the recognized first body

Birth of all sovereign body

These are times you may disagree with (An).

Persons are expected to abide by law.

K. had been recognized as a sovereign country in the example in court, K would have made of case in court for the loss billion

Apologies caused
Go. Known in best possible estimate damage.

5. I would like pen & paper so I can record my answers to we can be precise.

(He is handed paper & pen)
and begins writing.

5. When someone who goes into your house & takes property - Who is the best one to describe the loss?

That is how I went to pay the 150 billion.

However, when accurate people have right to defend homes
5. What is the neutral and legal entity that asked for Kwawak to explain how they came up with this figure?

Therefore, the farmers can say anything, and no one will correct them.

Claim: Do soldiers brief alive in their invaded by Waterman themselves.

Amerika did not deny.
Q: The figures not that big.

Bc k. are not acting

for restitution

But k. wanted action taken. 

They should be done by a court and a neutral entity.

But k. not pursuing

compensation from DA.

But k. intended it

So k. nationals who 

are POWs and missing 

allegedly they were taken 

by IR army and not returned.
Claim: Le Malagasy est un certain issue, i.e., REC.

A: And to Human Rights Watch, I.e., used human shields.
   What was the goal?

S: What do mean by human shield? (Legality)
G. I'll have my translator read letter to you

S. I have no information on this. That was recorded in one file for FBI. It is a legit file.

I answered (looking down)

S. Answered, waterless.

G.

Were the experts asked to testify were put in a situation

G. Were there touch copies?

S. We released them.

From here on up...

S. This letter was dated 2002.

G. After the war

Dit is a forgery, it's impossible

S. This is impossible, a forgery

G. Thought this over 1991

S. Recorded by our military. This is a forgery.
If there is something that is wrong.

S: It's not my handwriting.

G: Why didn't you turn it down?

S: I answered with 'maybe, I wasn't you asked me.'

Don't you think it is strange that we are asked why we didn't use it, not our policy to use chemical weapons against coalition forces.

G: Why do you think this is strange?
Don't you think it is strange at this point setting?

I didn't think it was strange that George

why we are asked if didn't use chem weapons

Does note mention on

policy to use chem weapons against Coalition Forces.

3. Emery also ask Q

6. Why do you think this is strange?

5. Of course it is strange.

By strange, I didn't mean strange that George was asking

by a strange if I have anything before

5. How would I have used

If they had used WMD, would they have been stopped?

Lice discussed history not unreal or opposite
5. If we are to be asked then I must be able to ask.

5. How would it be described if it was won? Wouldn't it be called stupid?

Maybe Israel would have liked

Israel like destruct. If it had a chance it'll all
Arabs, if it will do so, it wishes Arabs hated by whole world
If Arabs were weak

G. Who represented DO during cease fire agreement?

G. What were their positions during ceasefire?
Universal Case File Number 315E-HQ-4/18534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

Serial # of Originating Document

Date Received 3/10/2004

From SSA (Name of Contributor)

FBI-BOC (Address of Contributor) b6

BAGHDAD, IRAQ (City and State) b7C

By SSA (Name of Special Agent)

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☑ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☑ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ☐ Yes ☑ No

Title

DESERT SPIDER

Reference: (Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☑ Original notes re interview of

SADDAM HUSSEIN

INTERVIEW CONDUCTED ON 3/10/04
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED

INTERVIEW OF

was contacted by Special Agent (SA)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI), Atlanta Division, Columbus Resident Agency, and Special Agent in Charge (SAC) MARC T. ZEIDER, United States Army Intelligence, 902nd Military Intelligence Group, Fort Benning, Georgia. was advised of the interviewing agents' identity via the exhibition of their FBI and Military Intelligence credentials. was advised of the purpose and nature of the interview and specifically advised that this interview was totally voluntary, and he was not suspected of any wrong-doing. noted he would cooperate and thereafter voluntarily advised as follows:

was born on

Investigation on 03/25/2003 at

File #: Date dictated 04/04/2003

by SA

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
On Monday, [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]. The interview was conducted at the request of [redacted]. Present at the interview were [redacted] and [redacted] who had to leave after a short time due to [redacted]. Also present were Assistant United States Attorneys [redacted], Interviewing Agents were [redacted], and [redacted].

It should be noted that [redacted] was interviewed.

There are two previous 302s written to the file. [redacted] started with [redacted] wanting to explain or clarify several previously addressed topics which are detailed below:

[Redacted text]

Investigation on [redacted] at [redacted]

File # [redacted] Date dictated [redacted]

by [redacted] [redacted]

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has toppled. [Redacted] cited this skepticism and unwillingness to provide cooperation as being based upon the above situation that occurred in 1991 with the Kurds.

[Redacted] was specifically asked if he had ever been recruited by Iraqi intelligence agents while in the United States to provide information, and [Redacted] answered in the negative. [Redacted] noted that at no time has he ever been contacted by any person who asked him to do anything that was illegal or improper. [Redacted] was cautioned by the interviewing agents to reflect upon his answer, noting that he should take a moment to review his memory, as this was a question that included the entire time frame from 1989 to the present. [Redacted] reflected and noted that he has never been contacted by anyone whom he believed to be an Iraqi intelligence agent or any person, who has ever asked him to provide information, identification of individuals, telephone numbers, or other contacts of any person within the United States or in Iraq, in an effort to assist the SADDAM HUSSEIN regime.

[Redacted] noted he would cooperate fully with the United States Army, and the FBI, and provide any and all assistance necessary to assist in the removal of SADDAM HUSSEIN's regime.

SA [Redacted] inquired of [Redacted] if he had ever suffered any discrimination or persecution at any time in the United States and specifically, in the recent past. [Redacted] noted that he had not, and found almost all Americans to be friendly and easy-going. [Redacted] was invited to contact the FBI should he become a victim of a perceived or actual hate crime in the future.

[Redacted] provided the following background information regarding himself and family:

Full name:
Race: White

SECRET
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

social security account number [redacted] currently residing at [redacted] telephone number [redacted] (cellular), was interviewed at the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI), 219 S. Dearborn, Room 205, Chicago, Illinois. Also present for the interview of [redacted] law office is located at [redacted] telephone number [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Officer and Agent, and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

Investigation on 01/30/2006 at Chicago, Illinois

File # 87-CG-124896; TFO [redacted] Date dictated b7A
by SA [redacted] b6 b7C

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KHALED DUMEISI, who had been prosecuted by the United States for being a spy for SADDAM HUSSEIN. (unknown correct spelling).
TOUJAN AL-FAISAL, born in 1948, was a former television and cyber journalist as well as a women's rights advocate. She also was Jordan's first female Member of Parliament being elected in 1993 and serving until 1997. In 1996 she was also elected to the INTER-PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL which is the governing body of the INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION.

In 1996 AL-FAISAL was a keynote speaker for the BIRZEIT SOCIETY CONVENTION. BIRZEIT is a town in the WEST BANK and every two years PALESTINIANS, whose origins come from BIRZEIT, gather for a convention. The convention was held at the ANAHEIM MARIOTT HOTEL in Anaheim, California. In an interview she claimed to be one of 22 opposition members in the 80-seat JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT. She became critical of the JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT for approving a peace treaty with Israel as well as lifting an embargo on Israel.

In March 2002 AL-FAISAL published a letter criticizing some members of the JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT. This letter was posted on the Houston-based ARAB TIMES website. AL-FAISAL was convicted of slandering the JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT and sentenced to 18 months in jail. She eventually received a royal pardon however this did not annul her conviction. AL-FAISAL attempted to run for reelection to the JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT in 2003 but her application was rejected on the grounds that she had previously committed a non-political offence.

AL-FAISAL was also suspected of profiting from Iraqi oil sales that SADDAM HUSSEIN's regime had allegedly offered her in exchange for cultivating political and popular support in her country. It is alleged that AL-FAISAL received 3 million barrels of oil from the UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM then selling same for profit. It is alleged that she was known for her support of SADDAM HUSSEIN and his regime.
It shall be noted that all above information was solely derived from reports on different internet websites and none of the information has been verified.

Information obtained from following websites:

- www.answers.com
- news.bbc.co.uk
- www.ipu.org
- www.washington-report.org
- www.dawn.com
- www.defenddemocracy.org
- www.globalpolicy.org
- old.krg.org
- www.memri.org
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/15/2003

All information contained herein is unclassified.

FID-362 [Rev. 10-6-95]

Serial No. 35

97A-CG-118544-302

License number: [Redacted]

Driver’s license number: [Redacted]

Was interviewed at 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois. After being informed of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [Redacted] provided the following information:

Investigation on 05/13/2003 at Chicago, Illinois

File # 97A-CG-118544

Date dictated

by [Redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
This insert is classified "SECRET".

The following investigation was conducted by SAs [redacted] at [redacted] on [redacted].

An asset who has provided reliable information in the past, and who is in a position to know, advised as follows:

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)
On source provided the following information to Special Agent (SA)
The following investigation was conducted by SA

(S)

On ________________ an asset who has provided reliable information in the past and who is in a position to know, advised as follows:

(S)

(S)

(S)

Asset remains reliable and stable.
SECRET

SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS

ITE: //3410:0670//

SUBJECT: 

CO: LOS ANGELES.

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

U.S. PERSON.
INVESTIGATION AT LOS ANGELES HAS ALSO REVEALED THAT ORGANIZATION IS TAKING AN ACTIVE ROLE IN ORCHESTRATING ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, JOINING VARIOUS COALITION GROUPS THAT ARE OPPOSED TO U.S. INTERVENTION IN THE GULF. ALL ACTIVITIES IN THIS REGARD APPEAR TO BE PEACEFUL WITH NO INDICATIONS OF PLANNED VIOLENCE.

ORGANIZED EFFORTS TO ORCHESTRATE PEACE DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES INCLUDE ATTEMPTS TO MOBILIZE THE PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY AGAINST U.S.
INTERVENTION IN THE GULF, AS WELL AS ESTABLISH LINKAGE BETWEEN SADDAM HUSSEIN'S INVASION OF KUWAIT AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE OUTSTANDING PALESTINIAN HOMELAND ISSUE, VIS A VIS PRESSURE ON ISRAEL.
The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent (SA) [Redacted] on [Redacted] asset who has provided reliable information in the past and who is in a position to know, advised as follows: [Redacted]

[S] Advised that RAMSEY CLARK will be speaking at the Jerusalem Center in Chicago, Illinois, on March 10, 1991.

Asset remains reliable and stable.

Information herein obtained confidentially; informant's name is not to be disclosed in a report or otherwise unless it has been decided definitely that this person is to be a witness in a trial or hearing.
To date, source remains stable and reliable.
On February 10, 1991, at the University of Illinois at Chicago, Illinois Hall. Approximately 120 people were present. A majority of the people present were Arab women.

Most of the discussion was centered on gaining support for Iraq and Saddam Hussein among Palestinians in the United States.

Mary Diab, of the Union of Palestinian Women Association in North America, spoke briefly about women's role in Palestine and how they can take an active part in the Palestinian uprising/Intifadah. Camila Odeh spoke about the Palestinian women's role in the United States and their need to show strong support for Saddam Hussein and his quest to free Palestinians from Israel's occupation. Odeh feels the strongest show of support for Iraq is via massive demonstrations throughout the United States.

The keynote speaker was Maha Khouri, a PLO representative to the United Nations and Executive Committee member of the Palestinian Women's Union in the United States. Khouri was very much against the war and felt that Iraq was completely justified in its "annexation" of Kuwait. Khouri stated that Israel was the "instigator" of the violence in the Middle East. Khouri stated that the war was just an excuse to push the Palestinian issue out of the spotlight where it will again be ignored by the United States.

Also present at the meeting/lecture were and and another man named (LNU).
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE
Date: 06/12/2001

To: Chicago
From: CI-2
Contact: SA

Approved By: (S)
Drafted By: mkc

Case ID #: (Pending)

Title: TRAOI INTELLIGENCE MATTERS;

Synopsis: Information provided by Asset.

(U) Derived From: C-3
(U) Declassify On: X1

Details: (S) On an asset with excellent access whose reporting, though limited, has been corroborated provided the following information:
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Chicago

From: Chicago
Squad CI-2
Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: ab

Case ID #: (X)

Title: (X) CHANGED aka

OO: CHICAGO

Synopsis: (X) Closing of captioned investigation.

(U) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Previous Title: (X) Title marked "Changed" to reflect alias of
Title previously carried as

OO: CHICAGO.

(U) Details: (X) Investigation was initiated on captioned subject
based upon Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) file
review information which identified subject as

Investigation was initiated to fully identify

(U) Background checks were conducted to include the following: FBI/ACS, ELSUR, Confidential Indices, FBI Global
Search, FOIMS, Illinois Drivers License, and NCIC. No derogatory
information could be ascertained for subject
(U) Internet Searches were positive for identifying subject in Google and associated web sites, and LexisNexis:

(U) On 2/7/03, an interview was conducted of

(U) wherein he divulged the following:
believed everyone in Iraq had the capability to rise to whatever rank he aspired, even if he were Assyrian, Christian, Kurd, or Muslim minorities. Subject cited Tariq Aziz, Saddam Hussein's Deputy Prime Minister, how he rose through the ranks even though he was Chaldean Christian.

Subject discussed Saddam Hussein and called him "wickedly smart" in that he kept competent people around him and "purchased his way out" or "eliminated" the mistakes he made. Subject had no respect for either of the Hussein sons, Uday or Quasay and believed they had caused more harm to Hussein's rein than public opinion knew in their exploits. Subject advised he was not a member of the Ba'ath Party. Subject admitted he kept track of Arab events as he subscribed to the Al Jazera News station via cable television.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE
Date: 04/17/2003

To: Chicago

From: Chicago
Squad CI-2
Contact: SA

Approved By: ____________________________  (S)
Drafted By: tmd  (S)

Case ID #: ____________________________  (U)

Title: ____________________________  (S)

Synopsis: (X)  To report results of interview of captioned subject.

(U)  (X)  Derived From: 3-3
Declasify On: X1

(U)  ____________________________

(U)  Details: (X)  social security number    address
DOB    cellular telephone
number

(U)  (X)  On ____________ Chicago interviewed ____________ at his
place of business

telephone number

provided the following information:

(U)  ____________________________
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE
Date: 10/10/2002

To: Counterintelligence
San Francisco

Attn: CD-1B
Squad 16-C

From: Cincinnati
Squad 4/Athens RA
Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: dtm

Case ID #: (X)

Title: (X)

Synopsis: (U) Cincinnati has initiated an investigation targeting captioned subject.

(U) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: XL

Reference: (X)

Details: (X)
provided his opinion regarding the Kurdish people and the other general Iraqi populous. ______ noted that in his opinion, "99 percent of the Kurds" wished to topple SADDAM HUSSEIN and "hate him." ______ cautioned, however, that many of the Kurds feel betrayed by the United States, due to its military stance in 1991. ______ elaborated, noting that signals were sent by the United States government that the Kurdish uprising would be supported to topple SADDAM, and that several people were subsequently killed fighting SADDAM and his regime; however, no United States assistance actually followed. ______ noted, in summation, in his opinion, that the average person in Iraq will be glad when SADDAM HUSSEIN's regime ends. They will also be skeptical to provide any assistance until it is certain the regime
Memorandum

To: SAC Los Angeles
From: SA
Date: 1/24/97
Subject: 

Dates of Contact

File #: on which contacted (Use Titles if File #s not available)
46E-LA-162960

Purpose and results of contact

☐ NEGATIVE
☒ POSITIVE
☐ STATISTICAL

Description of Statistical Accomplishment

Title of Case

File No.
b6
b7c
b7d

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/20/99 BY SMC/PAH

Information contained herein was obtained confidentially. The informant's name is not to be disclosed in any form unless a conscious decision has been made to disclose his/her identity by an appropriate FBI official.

PERSONAL DATA

Init. SMC/PAH

***see reverse side for statistics***
Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Little Rock

From: Little Rock
Squad 5
Contact: SA

Approved By: ________________________

Drafted By: ejt

Case ID #: 315S-LR-42585 (Pending)

Title: IT - PALESTINIAN REJECTIONIST ORGANIZATIONS;

Synopsis: Summary of case file and general information
contained in

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Enclosure(s): Select references taken out of
and author’s time line for subject.

Details: A search for subject resulted in numerous positive hits including the discovery of five separate case numbers of past FBI cases on the subject and associates. These cases are as follows:

315S-LR-42585
Serial 9

A review of the above cases and other miscellaneous documents found on was conducted and the following information was obtained. In addition to the
On [date of birth] [place of birth] [son of] and [current residence], was advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview. The translator was [then provided the following information:]

[did not speak English and the entire interview was conducted in [was very cooperative and spoke freely about]]

[Immediately upon initiation of the interview, indicated his appreciation for being called and clearly indicated that]

[indicated that]

[indicated that he never liked Saddam Hussein]

[then agrees to future interviews]

______

Investigation on at

File # 315D-LA-226986-DEF [LV] Date dictated

by [SA]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency, it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
was advised of the identity of the interviewing agents as well as the purpose of the interview. He provided the following information:

[Handwritten notes]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
On 03/11/2004, [date of birth], [place of birth] was interviewed by Special Agent [SA], FBI, at Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Language Analyst, FBI. The interviewing agent told the purpose of the interview and provided the following information:

AND THE INTERVIEW

IN THE UNITED STATES

Investigation on 03/11/2004 at

File # 315D-LA-226986 Date dictated 03/11/2004

by SA

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
MEK DEFECTORS

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MEK AND SADDAM HUSSEIN

The MEK and SADDAM HUSSEIN both wanted to overthrow the Iranian government through armed struggle.

LOS ANGELES PHOTO SPREAD

was shown six photo spreads with six photos per page. The six subjects were FBI Los Angeles subjects. did not recognize any picture in the spread.
On 3/7/2002 at approximately 3:40pm, SA received a telephone call from (previously identified). Agent was paged to telephone number. The latter phone number was said to be at the subject's work location. Voluntarily provided the following information:

Investigation on 3/8/2002 at

File # 265A-LA-C229604

by SA

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

On 03/05/2004, the date of birth, place of birth, United States (U.S.), Alien Registration Number, current residence, was advised of the identity of the interviewing agent, the identity of the Language Analyst, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the purpose of the interview. The individual provided the following information:

**FAMILY**

Parents are __________________________

Place of birth ________________________________ father, and ________________________________ mother.

Age and lives in ____________________________ years of age and lives in ____________________________ is between ________ years of age and lives in ____________________________

Investigation on 03/05/2004 at __________________________

File #: 315D-LA-226986

Date dictated ________________

by __________________________

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/11/2004

On 03/11/2004, [Date of Birth] was interviewed by SA [Name] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Language Analyst [Name]. The interviewing agent told [Name] the purpose of the interview, and [Name] provided the following information:

FAMILY

IN THE UNITED STATES

Investigation on 03/11/2004 File # 315D-LA-226986
at

by SA [Name]

Date dictated 315D-LA-226986

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to you agency, it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MEK AND SADDAM HUSSEIN

The MEK and SADDAM HUSSEIN were both against the Khomeini regime. HUSSEIN said the MEK were "his guests."
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/04/2004

(W/F, DOB_______) was interviewed at _________.

The interview was conducted in _________. Translated by SA_______.

After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and
the nature and purpose of the interview, _________. provided the
following information:

__________

was born on _________. in _________.

__________

__________

__________

__________

Investigation on 3/3/04 at _________.

File # 315D-LA-226986 _________.

by SA_______

Date dictated 3/4/04

315D-LA-226986

Sec. 405

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
said that the mujahedin organization in Iraq was independent from the government of Saddam Hussein.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/14/2004

[W/M DOB] was interviewed at

After being advised of the identity of the interviewing
agents, and the nature and purpose of the interview, [ ] provided
the following information:

started the interview by saying that

said he was born in [ ] on [ ] He

Investigation on 3/14/04 at [ ]

File # 315D-LA-226986 Date dictated 3/14/04

by [ ]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
was asked if the mujahedin organization had a relationship with the government of Saddam Hussein and he replied that he did not know.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/05/2004

[(W/M DOB) was contacted at _______]

The interview was conducted by SA [_______] and SA [_______]. The interview was conducted in [_______]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature and purpose of the interview, [_______] provided the following information:

At the onset of the interview, [_______] voluntarily provided his identification documents, which were reviewed by the interviewing Agents and are summarized as follows:

- U.S. Department of Justice Permit to Reenter the United States: contains Immigration # [_______] DOB [_______] issued [_______] expired [_______] shows one stamp from [_______].

- U.S. Resident Alien Card: [_______] DOB [_______]

Alien Registration Number [_______] was born in [_______].

Investigation on 3/3/04 at [_______]

File # 315D-LA-226986 Date dictated 3/5/04

by [SA] [_______]
was asked to describe the relationship of the mujahedin organization to the former Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein. He said that the mujahedin organization was totally independent from Hussein's government.

provided no further information.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

On an individual, who has agreed to testify, provided the following information:

315E-LA-234234

File # 315E-LA-234234 Date dictated

by SA

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
Individual (source), who has agreed to testify, provided the following information.

Investigation on [ ] at [ ]

File # 315N-LA-242579-CRIM; [ ] Date dictated [ ]

by SA [ ]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

On 03/02/2004, [DOB] was interviewed at [POB]. After being advised of the nature of the interviewing agents, and the nature of the interview, provided the following information:

[Redacted]

stated that the MEK had no relationship with the former Iraqi Government or Saddam Hussein. The MEK and the Iraqis were totally separate and independent.

[Redacted]
did not appear to have any intention of providing any substantive information, and the interview was terminated.

Investigation on 03/02/2004 at [Redacted]

File #: 315D-IA-226986

Serial 496

by [Redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
Hussein, Saddam Al-Tikriti
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE
Date: 01/29/1998

To: NSD
Attn: NS-3B
UNIT CHIEF
ROOM 5437

Portland
Attn: SA
TPA

From: Portland
Squad 4
Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: jaw

Case ID #: (X) 199E-PD-39233

Title: (X)

Synopsis: (X) Interview of captioned
subject conducted on

(X) Classified By: 4863, 4/PD
Reason : 1.5
Declassify On: X1

Details: (X)

(X) FBI, Portland learned from
that captioned subject

(X) SAC, Portland earlier had provided authority to
interview subject via EC dated 12/16/1997. Because
a decision was made after
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

Title:

Synopsis: To report debriefing of asset.

Details: was debriefed on and provided the following information:

SECRET
SECRET

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: National Security

Bangkok
Chicago
Cleveland
Copenhagen
Dallas
Denver
Detroit
London
Los Angeles
New Haven
New York
Omaha
Phoenix
Portland
Riyadh
San Antonio
San Francisco

Date: 10/21/99

Attn: NS-3A, SSA
Attn: SA

From: Houston
CT-1
Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: dj

(U) Case ID #: 199M-HO-31400-27 (Pending)

(U) Title: SAYED MUHAMMED ZAKY, AKA ET AL; IT-HIZBALLAH

(U) Synopsis: Weekly EC reporting source information.

(U) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X-1

(U) Administrative: Sayed Muhammed Zaky Al-Swij is believed to
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: SSA

From: Philadelphia
Squad 17

Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: km1

Case ID #: (S) 315D-PH-95916 (Pending)
(S) 315E-PH-94983 (Pending)

Title: (S) IT-IRAN

Synopsis: (X) Source reporting on captioned investigations to include the

(S) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Enclosure(s): (X)

Details: (X) (hereafter SOURCE) was interviewed by
SA and Det. on

DATE: 05/24/2004

315E-PH-94983
Ser. 45

SECRET
Details: (x) For the information of Counterterrorism, the following information was obtained during the Philadelphia Iraqi initiative interview on 315E-PH-C93865- A (Pending) 11/26/2010 of (x) drivers license number was interviewed at telephone number resides at telephone number. Also present during the interview was

Synopsis: (x) Interview of
Precedence: ROUTINE
To: Counterterrorism  Attn: 4383
From: Squad 127 DLU IJTU
Contact: SA
Approved By:
Drafted By: egw

Case ID #: (X) 199E-HQ-1404383-PH (Pending)
(X) 199E-PH-C93865-A (Pending)

Title: DARKENING CLOUDS IT-IRAQ

Synopsis: Interview of Asset.

Details: For the information of Counterterrorism, the following information was obtained during the interview of an Asset or. Also present during the interview was Special Agent (Treasury Department).

Asset has been

Asset believes that
SECRET

Document Details

Classification: S
Authority: G3
SCI Flag: 
IRS Tax: 
FD 501:

Serial Number: 59
Serial ID: 315E-PH-C93845-B

Duration: X1
Rule(s): Handling Caveats: Secure Doc:

Case ID: 315E-PH-C93845-B
Serial Number: 59

Additional Serialized References
Case ID 12:
Serial Number: 43

SECRET

Drivers license number was interviewed at telephone number
Also present during the interview was

All information contained herein is unclassified except where shown otherwise. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, provided the following information:

SECRET

https://sentinel.fbi.net/sentinelweb/cases/documentView.action?document.caseId=315... 12/14/2010
Secret

315E-PH-C93865-A
Serial 8

Precedence: ROUTINE
Date: 03/27/2003

To: Counterterrorism
Attn: 4383

From:
Squad 12/DL/JTTF
Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: bgw

Case ID #: (X) 199E-PH-C93865-A (Pending)

Title: DARKENING CLOUDS
IT-IRAQ

Synopsis: (X) Interview of

Reference: (X) EC dated Initial interview of

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Details: (X) For the information of Counterterrorism, the following information was obtained during the Philadelphia Iraqi Initiative interview on

(S) protect identity, born

Interviewed at

resides at

Also present during

SECRET

https://sentinel.fbinet.fbi/sentinelweb/cases/documentView.action?document.caseId=315... 12/14/2010
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE
Date: 11/04/1999

To: NSD
Attn: NS-3B
Attn: International Terrorism

From: International Terrorism
Contact: SA Ext.

Approved By:
Drafted By: gl

(U) Case ID #: (X) 199-0

(U) Title: (X) INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
CO:

Synopsis: Asset provided information on

Enclosure(s): Enclosed for are copies of

(U) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X-1

Details: (X) ASSET:

(S) CONTACT DATE:
CONTACT: SA

RELIABILITY: Provided accurate and reliable information in the past.

(S) On provided information on

SECRET
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 03/31/2003
To: Counterterrorism Attn: SSA

From: [Redacted] Contact: Joint Terrorism Task Force

Approved By: [Redacted] Drafted By: [Redacted]st

Case ID #: (S) 199E-DL-97498 (Closed)
Title: (S) TT-IRAQ

Synopsis: (X) To advise Counterterrorism of closure of regarding captioned subject.

(U) Derived From: G-3
Declassify Gr: X1

Outside the Scope

Details

(U) Pursuant to the Iraqi interview initiative, on conducted an extensive interview with and was able to obtain the following information.
(U) Ninety percent of Iraqis are against the government. This belief crosses religious affiliations, but Sunnis will cooperate more with HUSSEIN. The Shi'a will welcome US ground troops because the Shi'a need someone to help them. Iraqis know what they see on government TV is not true because knowledge of America is more widespread now than during the Gulf War. If Iraqis get the chance to leave Iraq, they will leave.
People in Baghdad will likely leave, but those in the south are more apt to remain. Iraqis living in the United States feel safe from HUSSEIN.

There is no indication of civil unrest in Iraq, people are united against HUSSEIN. Most people in southern Iraq were not exposed to the UN. The current standard of living in Iraq is very poor, however, many consumer goods are available to buy, but no one has money to buy them. People who don’t have family members sending them money from outside Iraq, do not have enough money to live. Since 1991, electrical systems have been broken. There is power rationing and many people have generators. The phone systems are good, but as of today they are not working.

HUSSEIN has chemical weapons and used them during the Iran-Iraq War.
Precedence: PRIORITY

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: 5437

From: Squad 14, JTTF

Contact: SA

Drafted By: frh

Case ID #: 199E-DN-61784 (Pending)

Title: IT-IRAQ

Synopsis: Report on interview of captioned subject.

Derived From: G-3

Declasify On: XL

Details: On captioned subject each called SA

SA interviewed SA

Land Language Specialist

Captioned subject advised the following:

In a follow-up to information he provided on

SECRET/NOFORN
Individual, who has agreed to testify, provided the following information to SA [redacted]

Date of transcription 03/21/2003

Investigation on 03/21/2003 at [redacted] (telephonically)

File # [redacted]

by SA [redacted]: mac

SECRET

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Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: JTF IT-1
Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: 

Case ID #: 

Title: 

(U) Synopsis: [X] Asset reporting.

(U) [X] Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

(U) 

Details: (U) On [ ] an Asset who has reported reliably in the past provided the following information:

(S)
Precedence: PRIORITY

To: Counterterrorism

From: TTE, IT-1

Date:

Attn:

Contact: SA

Approved By:

(U) Drafted By:

(U) Case ID #: 199E-DL-98862 (Pending)

(U) Title: FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING PROJECT; IT-IRAQ

(U) Synopsis: To provide foreign intelligence for possible dissemination.

(U) Derived From: C-3

(U) Declassify On: X1

(U) Reference: 199E-DL-98862 Serial 115

(U) Details: On an Asset who has reported reliably in the past, provided the following information (all names contained herein are phonetic):

(U)

(U)

(U)

SECRET
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

To: Dallas Counterterrorism

From: Dallas
CT-FW / Fort Worth RA

Date: 03/07/2003

Attn: SSA

Synopsis: (X) To report investigation and claim statistical accomplishment.

Details: (X) 

- was identified in as an individual from Iraq, a country with a known nexus to terrorism.

- Interview authority was obtained from SSA

- On was interviewed without appointment at his residence, telephone number cell

Secret
SECRET

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 02/17/2004

To: Records Management

Attn: Record Mgmt Center Unit

A/UC

From: Counterterrorism

Iraq/Syria/Libya Unit

Room 4383

Contact: SSA

Approved By:

Drafted By: sasj

Case ID #: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534-10

(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-1A-

(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-1B-

(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-302-

(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-BC-

(U) 315E-HQ-1448534-CE-

(U) 315E-HQ-1448534-ELA-

(U) 315E-HQ-1448534-EL1-

(U) 315E-HQ-1448534-EL1A-

(U) 315E-HQ-1448534-EL1B-

(U) 315E-HQ-1448534-LAB-

(U) 315E-HQ-1448534-NC-

Title: (X) DESERT SPIDER

IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: (X) Opening of subfiles for captioned matter. AD authority to restrict subfile 302.

(S) Classified By: 11109, ITOS/CTD

Reason: 1.5(c)

Declassify On: XI

(U) Full Field Investigation Instituted: 05/04/2004 NONUSPER

(U) Administrative: (X) Per all SAC, EC from CTD dated 12/25/2002, no case restrictions in ACS or

SECRET
To: Records Management  From: Counterterrorism
Re: 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/17/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

RECORDS MANAGEMENT

AT WASHINGTON, DC

RMD will ensure the aforementioned subfiles will be opened and that access to sub 302 will remain restricted to the above mentioned personnel.

**
To: Records Management  From: Counterterrorism
Re: 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/17/2004

restricted in the Automated Case Management System (ACS). Access will be granted to the following individuals:

UC
UC
SSA George Piro
SSA
SSA
SSA
SSA
IA
IA
IA
IA
RO
ITOS II Deputy Section Chief
ITOS II Section Chief
D/AD Counterterrorism Division
AD Counterterrorism Division
EAD Counterintelligence Division
OSC Baghdad Operations Center
D/OSC Baghdad Operations Center
may be made without the approval of the Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division.

Details: The captioned investigation was opened to capture intelligence and evidence as it relates to the national security investigation targeting Saddam Hussein. This EC establishes the subfile system for capturing information regarding Hussein. The following subfiles will be established:

1A - Will be a repository for all contemporaneous notes and items which will need to be retained that are not evidentiary in nature.

1B - will document FD-192 bulky records and will be a repository for evidentiary material.

302 - will be a repository for FD-302's, inserts and classified LHM's which document interviews conducted of captioned subject and additional High Value Detainees.

BC - will be a repository for background information on captioned subject and his closest associates.

CE - will be used maintain all records regarding expenditures of case funds in captioned matter.

ELA - will be used to maintain all documents regarding the administration of electronic surveillance in captioned matter.

EL1 - will document all original elsur logs developed or maintained in captioned matter.

LAB - will be a repository for all laboratory requests, reports and findings in captioned matter.

NC - will be a repository for all pertinent newspaper clippings deemed of significant value that they will add to the overall progression of the investigation.

This EC also documents the fact that due to the sensitive nature of the interviews of captioned subject, and the request of the Department of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General [noted in immediate EC from Counterterrorism to General Counsel, dated 02/06/2004] the 302 subfile will be
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Albany

Counterterrorism

Baghdad

Date: 06/05/2007

ATTN: FIG, Squad 9 SSA

ATTN: Albany JTTF SSA

ATTN: Legat

From: Albany

Squad 3 @ Ithaca Resident Agency

Contact: SA Cell

Approved By:

(U) Drafted By: dls

Case ID #: (x)

(S)

Title: (x) Albany Field Intelligence Group

Intelligence Production

(U) (x) Foreign Visitors/Workers In Albany Territory;

FCI-FIA (Subjects Not Under Active Investigation)

(U) Synopsis: (x) To provide intelligence regarding arrival and

extended stay of

(U) Derived From: FBI SEC #3

Declassify On: 25X1-human

Enclosure(s): (U) Attached to this communication are copies of

passports and United States Department of State J-1
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 03/05/2004

To: 

From: Squad 3
Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: 

Case ID #:  AL 315D-0

Title: 

Synopsis: Results of contact with asset on

(U) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Details: On who continues to provide valuable and reliable information, contacted. It was advised that asset

(U) On met with During the course of the meeting, asset provided information pertaining to

SECRET

315-0-152
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE                           Date: 01/30/2003

To: Counterterrorism                           Attn:

From: Atlanta
       Squad 13 / JTTF
       Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted By: tjr

(U) Case ID #: 199D-AT-90661 (Pending)
     199D-AT-C86509 (Pending)

(U) Title: aka:

IT-IRAN
USPER

(U) MUJAHEDIN EL KHALQ (MEK)
    IT-IRAN

(U) Synopsis: To document results of interview with captioned subject.

(U) Derived from: G-3
    Declassify on: X1

(U) Details: On writer and SA interviewed at his place of residence, The premise for this interview was a follow up of an interview that WFO SA conducted with at. The interview at was conducted due to
male born on [illegible] Social Security Account Number [illegible] was interviewed at [illegible] After being advised of the identity of Special Agent (SA) [illegible] and SA [illegible] and advised that the purpose of the contact was to follow-up on the interview conducted on [illegible] provided the following information:
AL-Dawa is the opposition party in Iraq, and in the 1970s, it was the group that killed the leadership of Iraq. When Saddam Hussein came into power, he rounded up members of AL-Dawa and executed some of them and imprisoned others as a warning to the people of Iraq. AL-Dawa is not loyal to Iran and does not believe in the teachings of Khomeini. The organization does not obtain support for the Iranian Government. AL-Dawa believes in educating the people to make their own decisions about what happened in Iraq. AL-Dawa was formerly based in Iran, however, most members of the organization are now living in Syria.
(U) To: ?? From: 

Re: (X) AL 315D-0  

(X) AL 315G-0  

03/05/2004  

(S) Saddam Hussein numerous references with the primary file number HO 58-11887.

(S)  

(U) This was the extent of assets’ report concerning captioned matter. The asset was thanked for this information and his continuing assistance.
NOTE: Hand print names legibly; handwriting satisfactory for remainder.
Indices: □ Negative □ See below

DATE: 05-17-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/ls
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-17-2036

Subject's name and aliases
SADDAM HUSSEIN

Character of case

Complainant □ Protect Source

Complaint received
□ Personal □ Telephonic Date [ ] Time 9:00 am

Complainant's address and telephone number
(work)

Complainant's DOB
Sex
Male

Race □ Male Height Hair Build Birth date and birth place
Age □ Female Weight Eyes Complexion Social Security Number

Scars, marks and other data

Employer
Address Telephone

Vehicle Description

Facts of Complaint

PROTECT SOURCE

Complaint [ ] advised he works as [ ] had

[ ] stated that

Do not write in this space.

dgb

SA [ ]
(Complaint received by)

BLOCK STAMP

SECRET
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/21/2003

All information contained herein is unclassified except where shown otherwise.

Last, First, Middle), was contacted on

Her date of birth is

Social Security Account Number

Driver's License Number

Passport Number which was issued on

Her Passport expires on

After being apprised of the reason for contact, and identities of the interviewing agents she provided the following information:

nor are SADDAM HUSSEIN sympathizers. When asked this question she responded, "absolutely not." She is not aware of anyone who may be planning to strike against the U. S. or U. S. targets. She, nor

Investigation on 3/20/2003 at Texas

File # (A) by SA

Date dictated 3/21/03

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Houston

From: Houston
CT-3
Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: gag

Case ID #: 315-HO-C61622 (Pending)

Title: THREAT ASSESSMENT; TERRORISM MATTERS; AOT-IT

Synopsis: Houston documents threat assessment reference

Reference: 315-HO-C61622 Serial 3451

Attachment(s): Texas Driver's license photographs for 
and

Details: By way of background, on complainant, advised FBI Houston (phonetic), who works

Houston has been unable to contact reference stated information. Complaint duty personnel advised they believe though that was never confirmed. Investigation reveals


Precedence: ROUTINE                          Date: 12/08/2004
To: Houston

From: Houston
       CT-3
       Contact: SA

Approved By: gag
Drafted By: gag

Case ID #: 315T-HO-C61622 (Pending)

Title: INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ACTIVITY REPORTING
       THREAT ASSESSMENT;
       AOT-IT

Synopsis: Houston documents threat assessment of captioned subject.

Reference: 315T-HO-C61622 Serial 2837

Attachment(s): [ ] driver's license photograph and background checks for

Details: By way of background, on [ ] an anonymous complainant advised FBI Houston that

According to

Houston investigation reveals that
serves/served in the Iraqi military or intelligence. She has no contact or ties with members of the Iraqi military or intelligence.

(U) She does not recall

(U) indicated that no one in her family likes SADDAM HUSSEIN and she feels the war situation is terrible.

Further added, SADDAM HUSSEIN has made it bad for everyone (Iraqi nationals), including those in the U.S.
### Complaint Form

**NOTE:** Hand print names legibly; handwriting satisfactory for remainder.

**Indis: **☐ Negative  ☐ See below

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject's name and aliases</th>
<th>Character of case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saddam Husane/Iraqi Military</td>
<td>Terrorism</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complainant</th>
<th>☒ Protect Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Complaint received**

☐ Personal  ☒ Telephonic

Date:  

Time:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address of Subject</th>
<th>Complainant's address and telephone number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(business)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complainant's DOB</th>
<th>Sex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject's Description</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Height</th>
<th>Hair</th>
<th>Build</th>
<th>Birth date and birth place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>☐ Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>☐ Female</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Eyes</th>
<th>Complexion</th>
<th>Social Security Number</th>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employer</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Telephone</th>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vehicle Description</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b7c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b7d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Facts of Complaint**

**PROTECT SOURCE**

called the FBI from  

and advised  

Do not write in this space.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>abm</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sq 7</th>
<th>BLOCK STAMP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Complaint received by)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
No SCI information contained in document
UC-Baw 60324 3/2/2011
On [ ] Individual who has not agreed to testify, provided the following information:

Individual stated that he/she had no first hand knowledge of atrocities conducted by the regime of former Iraqi leader SADDAM HUSSEIN. Individual commented that [ ]

Investigation on 03/23/2004 at [ ]

File #: [ ] Date dictated [ ]

by [SA] [ ]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; if and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/07/2004

To: San Juan

From: San Juan

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: dmk

Case ID #: 315E-SJ-C37938 (Pending)

Title: UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS (USVI);
JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ANNEX
315E-SJ-C37938

Synopsis: To document Source reporting.

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Details: On an Individual, who is not in the position to testify, provided the following information to this writer:

He/She advised that
(protect identity), born __________, Social Security Account Number ________, Alien Identification Number ________, phone number ________, was interviewed at __________, Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding his knowledge of criminal and terrorist activities. Language Specialist ________, Chicago Division, assisted with translation. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, ________, provided the following information:

Investigation on 04/25/02 at __________.

File # 265-SI-C52334-G Date dictated 04/26/02

by __________

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
File Number: 315E-HQ-1448534

Date Received: 6/4/04

From: Saddam Hussein

(Address)

City and State: Baghdad, Iraq

To Be Returned: No

Receipt Given: No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): No

Title: Operation Desert Spider

Reference: 315E-HQ-1448534 - 78

Description: Original notes re interview of
To: Counterterrorism  From: Counterterrorism
Re: (U) 315E-HQ-1448534, 06/14/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON DC

(U) For information, read and clear.

★★
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ITOS II
SC M. Chris Briese
ASC
UC

From: Counterterrorism
Baghdad Operations Center

Contact: SSA

Date: 06/14/2004

Precedence: ROUTINE

Approved By: Piro George

Drafted By: tmi

Case ID #: (U) 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending)

(U) Title: DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

(U) Synopsis:

(U) Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X1

SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN
On 06/02/2004, [redacted] was interviewed at a detention facility in Baghdad, Iraq by Federal Bureau of Investigation Supervisory Special Agents [redacted] George L. Piro and Special Agent [redacted] After being explained the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:
Date Number: 315 - HQ - 1448534
Field Office Acquiring Evidence: FBI HQ (18144043)
Serial # of Originating Document:
Date Received: 6/2/04
From:

(Address)
(City and State)

By

To Be Returned: Yes
Receipt Given: Yes

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Yes
Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI): No

Title: DESERT SPIDER

Reference: (Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of
On 06/02/2004, interview that began mid-morning, resumed after had eaten his lunch. Federal Bureau of Investigation Supervisory Special Agent who took part in the earlier 06/02/2004 interview, did not participate in this afternoon session. During the afternoon interview provided the following information:
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE       Date: 02/21/2003

To: Newark                Attn: Command Post

From: Newark
      C-9
      Contact: SA

Approved By: _________________________
Drafted By: ck

(U) Case ID #: (X) 199E-NK-109094 (Pending)

(U) Title: (X) IT - IRAQ

(U) Synopsis: (X) To report investigation conducted by SA in furtherance of Iraqi Asylum Seekers interview initiative, particularly the interview of

(U) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

(U) Reference: (X) 199E-NK-C108526 Serial 32

(U) Enclosure(s): (X) Enclosed For Newark are the following:

   1. 1A envelope containing the following items:
      a. Original interview questionnaire.
      b. CCH, DMV,
      c. INS Photo of interviewee.
      d. INS applications.
      e. Interview notes.

(U) Details: (X) On 02/20/03, Special Agent (SA) and (SA) interviewed __________________________ at his place of residence ________________

   provided the following information:

SECRET/NOFORN
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: Squad C-20
    Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: jaj

Case ID #: (A) 
    (U) 315Q-NK-105283 (Pending)

Title: (A) 
    (S) IT-IRAQ

Synopsis: (A) Debrief of Asset

(U) Derived From: G-3
    Declassify On: X1

Details: (X) this writer debriefed captioned Asset and received the following information:

(SECRET)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: Squad C-20
Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: jaj

(S) Case ID #: (X) 

(U) 199Q-NK-105283 (Pending)

(S) Title: (X) IT-IRAQ

(U) AOT-IT-3C;

(U) Synopsis: (X) Debrief of captioned Asset.

(U) Derived From: G-3

(U) Declassify On: XL

(U) 

Secret
Precedence: ROUTINE

To: 

From: Squad C-20
    SA

Contact: 

Approved By: 

Drafted By: jaj

Case ID #: (S) 1999-NK-105283 (Pending)

(S) Title: IT-IRAQ

(U) Synopsis: (X) Debrief of captioned Asset.

(U) Derived From: C-3
    Declassify On: X1

(U) Details: (X) On writer debriefed captioned Asset who provided the following information:

(S)
FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

Serial # of Originating Document

Date Received 5/19/04

From Saddam Hussein

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

Baghdad, Iraq

(City and State)

By

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI) ☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: Operation Desert Spider

IT-IRAQ

Reference: 315E-HQ-1448534-73

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 07-09-2009 BY uc/baw 60324
Individual, who is in a position to testify, provided the following information:

Individually advised

is maintained in the FD-340 section of this case.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
"All information contained herein is unclassified except where shown otherwise."

Lead Control Number:

In order to obtain information regarding 1) force protection of U.S. troops, 2) possible terrorist attacks against the U.S., and 3) potential civil rights violations and/or hate crimes, [Redacted] was contacted by Special Agents (SAs) of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

[Redacted] date of birth (DOB) [Redacted] SSAN home telephone number [Redacted] was advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the inquiry, [Redacted] provided the following information:

At the beginning of the interview, [Redacted] showed a valid driver's license to the interviewing agents.

[Redacted] was born in [Redacted] and [Redacted]

Investigation on [Redacted] at [Redacted] (telephonically)

File # [Redacted]

TPO [Redacted] dictated 03/21/2003

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
Individual, who is in a position to testify, provided the following information regarding a previous interview:

Individual advised
This communication is classified "SECRET" in its entirety. The Boston Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been regularly apprised of information pertaining to certain principals associated with captioned This information has been furnished by an individual hereinafter referred to as T-1, who may be characterized as an established source with good access whose reporting has been evaluated as consistently reliable. Information reported by T-1 will be prefaced below by the date in which T-1 initially furnished same.

(Date of information (DOI): _______)

(On _______ a second individual, hereinafter referred to as T-2)

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is issued only to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
Source, who is in a position to testify, provided the following information:

There is no concentrated community of Iraqis living in Maryland, such as the Russian-Jewish community concentrated in the Pikesville/Owings Mill/Reisterstown Road area of Baltimore City/County. In fact, because of the current world situation involving Iraq and the United States, most Iraqis will claim to be from other countries such as Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, in order to avoid any stigma attached to being an Iraqi.

Just like there is no area with a concentration of Iraqis living in it, there are no leading Iraqi civic/community groups, nor any recognized spokesmen for the Iraqi emigres in Maryland. Any such civic leaders would be found in the leaders of various mosques, though the Source is not aware of any exclusively Iraqi mosques in Maryland.

However, the Source is aware of several mosques with either a significant Iraqi presence in its membership or Iraqis who hold leadership positions within the mosque.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: Routine

To: National Security Division

Attn: SSA

Date: 01/19/2000

New York

From: New York

I-40

Contact: SA

Ext.

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (X)

Title: (X)

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY J563580541/NSICG
REASON: 1.4 (C.D.)
DECLASSIFY CN: 01-15-2039
DATE: 01-15-2014

OGA info classified per letter dated 12/07/12
To: NSD  From: New York
Re: [Blank]  01/19/2000

O0: NY  CO: NY

Synopsis: (S)

Classified By: G-3  T=40/1
Reason: 1.5(c)
Declassify On: X-1

Details: (S)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE
To: Omaha
From: Omaha
Approved By: 
Drafted By: mhg
Case ID #: 265A-OM-49003 (Pending)
Title: IT MATTERS;
OMAHA DIVISION

Date: 04/07/2003

Synopsis: Complaint call received on

Details: On writer received a complaint call from cellular phone number who provided the following information:

stated that he was

A check of indices for met with negative results.
Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 03/31/1998

To: Omaha

From: Omaha

Squad 4

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: rmk

(U) Case ID #: (X) 199-0 (Pending)

(U) Title: (X)

(U) Synopsis: (X) Results of interview with

on 3/23/98.

(U) Derived From: G-3

(U) Declassify On: X1

(U) Details: (X) On __________ writer conducted an interview of

in regards to a telephone call she had placed to the Omaha Division on __________. This interview took place at the residence of __________ noted as __________. The purpose of the interview was based on a referenced telephone call that revealed __________ is concerned about __________ said that __________. She also noted that

(U) __________ voluntarily provided her date of birth as __________ a place of birth as __________ and a Social Security Account Number as __________ stated

SECRET