NUCLEAR WAR IS NOT UNTHINKABLE; FOR THE PENTAGON IT'S AN OPTION:

A Documentary History of U.S. Nuclear Threats

Also in This Issue: Princeton University's CBW and Nuclear Weapons Research; CIA plans for Economic Subversion in Africa; World Bank and Urban Counterinsurgency in the Philippines; Reagan's Marching Orders for Honduras; British Government Admits IRA Is Anti-Colonialist Force; U.S. Nuclear Plans for the Pacific; World Bank Moves Against Tribal Peoples.
Editorial

First use of nuclear weapons has been an underlying premise of U.S. military policy since 1945. In a comment about nuclear weapons use by the United States, State Department spokesperson William Dyess told NBC-TV: "This terrible weapon has been dropped on human beings twice in history, and it was an American president who dropped it both times." But asked whether the Reagan administration was committed to not using "this terrible weapon" offensively, Dyess replied: "No, Sir."

Secretary of State Alexander Haig has announced that the U.S. might fire a nuclear "warning shot" in a U.S.-perceived crisis situation. Vice President George Bush, as a presidential candidate, claimed that nuclear war is "winnable" - even if only five percent of the people in the U.S. survive. President Reagan himself has implied that he thinks nuclear war can be "limited." Further, the U.S. government refuses to rule out nuclear weapons use against non-nuclear powers. In recent months, the administration has been forced to tone down its war rhetoric because of public pressure. But the President and his Secretary of State have not retracted their previous statements.

Nuclear weapons present the greatest danger to humanity. An all-out nuclear war would likely destroy life on earth. The Reagan administration, backed by a campaign of lies about "Soviet superiority," is engaged in a massive nuclear arms build-up centering around first strike weapons such as 572 cruise and Pershing II missiles for Western Europe and MX missiles for the United States. It is building neutron and other "tactical" nuclear weapons for use in the Third World and Western Europe.

To immediately freeze and reverse the nuclear arms buildup is among the most important tasks facing the peoples of the world. Time is short. The 572 missiles are scheduled for deployment by the end of 1983. If we do not prevent this deployment, the world will have taken a giant step toward nuclear holocaust.

However, the nuclear arms build-up cannot be fought separately from other Reagan administration policies. Nuclear arms escalation is closely linked to U.S. interventionism. As the article "A Documentary History of U.S. Nuclear Threats" (p.8) shows, U.S. military intervention, particularly in the Third World, has often been backed up by explicit threats to use nuclear weapons. In the past 37 years, the U.S. government has used threats to intimidate struggles for liberation and the establishment of economies independent from multinational corporations. U.S. nuclear policy has also been aimed at "containing" the Soviet Union and China and deterring them from aiding Third World struggles.

The Reagan administration's arms build-up is based on economic warfare at home. The administration is not cutting the budget: it is transferring tens of billions of dollars from social programs such as school lunches, health care and social security to the Pentagon. Cuts of these social programs are attacks on the livelihood of millions, particularly on Blacks, Latinos, American Indians and other oppressed communities as well as women. Therefore, the struggle for nuclear disarmament is integral with demands for social and economic equality. We must transform the economy of the U.S. from one which is centered on war production and profits for corporations into a peace economy.

To date, peoples movements against nuclear weapons and war, as we explain in "A Documentary History," have been essential to preventing nuclear war. Most recently, peoples resistance stopped the building of the MX missile "racetrack" system in Nevada and Utah, and U.S. polls show an overwhelming majority favors a nuclear weapons freeze. In Europe and Japan, millions are marching for disarmament. Third World countries have initiated the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament.

We must transform this broad sentiment into an increasingly militant movement. We must recognize the links between the struggle for disarmament and the fight against the Reagan administration's interventions in the Third World and its racist
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and sexist economic and social policies, and work accordingly. We must not settle for watered-down "freeze" resolutions that might take effect within a few years. We want a nuclear weapons freeze. Now. And we want it only as a first step toward complete nuclear disarmament.

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IF YOUR LABEL READS "R64" OR "L64", THIS IS YOUR LAST ISSUE OF COUNTERSPY
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U.S. Aids Miskitos

The Nicaraguan magazine Soberiania asserts in its April 1982 issue that the CIA is using a 60-foot houseboat operating under the cover of a hospital ship to provide arms for Miskito insurgents led by Steadman Fagoth and based at Puerto Lempira, Honduras. Soberiania reports that the boat is supposed to be a "clinic ship, donated by an anonymous 'corporation' to the executive board of the Panamerican Development Fund for use in Islas Bahia, Honduras." Formal delivery of the ship "was made by Mr. Merlan Deardin, president of the International Institute for Field Studies (IIFS), a nonprofit organization in Connecticut." The ship was reportedly anchored in Cayo Hueso, Florida, and sailed to Honduras in mid-March 1982. Soberiania claims, however, that the corporate donor of the ship is actually ITT, and that IIFS functions as a "phantom institute."

CounterSpy has not independently confirmed the Soberiania report, but it dovetails with other information coming out of Puerto Lempira. Nicaraguan exile groups are training with Miskito insurgents nearby. The U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa is in contact with Fagoth, who is with other Miskitos training 50 miles inland at the Honduran military camp near Ruf Ruf. Reportedly, U.S. military officers have been upgrading military communications facilities at the Honduran army command post at Puerto Lempira. An airfield nearby is also being improved to be used for airlifting troops and supplies in an emergency. Likewise, Argentine officers are working in exile camps, and, according to an NBC-TV report, at least one camp run by the Argentines was being supplied with arms by U.S. advisors.

CIA in Australia

Top secret CIA documents obtained by the Australian newspaper, National Times, shed new light on the CIA's involvement in the 1975 ouster of Australia's Labor Party Prime Minister Gough Whitlam. These documents, primarily copies of the CIA's National Intelligence Daily, illustrate the role the CIA played in Whitlam's ouster.

The background: In 1975, the Labor Party and the opposition Liberal and National Country Parties were engaged in a struggle for power. The Liberal-Country coalition, led by Malcolm Fraser - today Australia's Prime Minister and an ardent supporter of Ronald Reagan's military policy - was intent on bringing down the two-year-old Labor government by blocking all government appropriations. However, the strategy, promising in the beginning, began to backfire, and the CIA's top secret National Intelligence Daily reported on November 8, 1975: "The determination of the Australian Opposition to force a general election is weakening.... Disenchanted Australians are swinging... in support of Whitlam's Labor Party.... Some Liberals, worried by the strength of public reaction, are talking of replacing Opposition Leader Fraser."

The CIA was not willing to accept Whitlam's political victory. The Labor Prime Minister had dared to raise some questions about the role of CIA personnel in Australia. In particular, he accused one CIA officer of funding the Country Party. Whitlam was also intent on telling the Australian public about the interventionist nature of some U.S. intelligence and military facilities in Australia. For the CIA, this presented a problem.

It accused Whitlam, Australia's Prime Minister of being a "security risk" and openly threatened to cut U.S.-Australian intelligence ties. There are strong indications, writes the National Times, that the "only serious purpose served by the commotion created by the CIA" was to convince Australia's arch-conservative Governor General Sir John Kerr to dismiss Whitlam (by using an archaic constitutional power), thus turning the tide that was running against the CIA's favorite Fraser.

Kerr did dismiss Whitlam on November 11, 1975. By January 22, 1976, Fraser was in power again and the National Intelligence Daily reported contentedly that "the Fraser government has underscored the importance of Australia's ties with traditional allies, correcting what it saw as the tendency of the Labor Government to ignore such ties in the pursuit of Australian nationalism.... Canberra will push ahead with the construction of a new naval
base on the Indian Ocean coast of Western Australia. On the matter of port calls by U.S. nuclear-powered warships, Canberra is not expected to impose obstacles. Fraser's leadership was also seen as a plus for U.S. business interests. "Direct government involvement in the mineral and energy field will be greatly reduced by the Fraser Government, a development which will tend to reassure potential foreign investors. The Fraser Government has promised incentives for oil exploration and production."

Denton Disinforms

One of his main concerns, says Senator Jeremiah Denton, Chairperson of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, is disinformation. It is a technique with which the Senator is well acquainted: he uses it himself.

The published biographies of Denton's subcommittee witnesses conveniently leave out the intelligence connections of at least three persons. In his published introduction of Hoover Institution Senior Fellow Stefan Possony - who testified on "Historical Antecedents of Soviet Terrorism" - Denton failed to mention Possony's work as an Air Intelligence Specialist with the Department of Air Force in the 1950s. In 1955, Possony wrote a confidential study for the U.S. government entitled "General Guide Lines for an American Long Range Psychological Plan."

As part of an overall psychological warfare strategy, Possony advised that the U.S. government "should express its belief that the peoples of the world are not fundamentally unreasonable and that practically all nations, in time, can develop attitudes to political issues which characterize the common sense behavior of the Scandinavian peoples, the Swiss and the Anglo-Saxons." Possony advocated that people in "underdeveloped areas" be convinced "that their economic future is dependent upon close cooperation with the western world, including the... acceptance of foreign capital investment." Specifically, Possony said, "an effort will have to be made to show that neither Communism nor nationalism is liable to solve their problems and in addition to explain that some of the attitudes of the underdeveloped nations (in particular their abhorrence of work and work discipline) are at the root of many of their difficulties."

In introducing his star witness Robert Moss (Denton described him as "intellectually honest") the Senator mentioned many of Moss' activities and writings, but chose to ignore his book, Chile's Marxist Experiment, whose writing was reportedly supervised by and partly paid for by the CIA. The Chilean military junta liked it so much that they bought its complete second edition.

The one-page biography of witness James Billington, inserted in the published transcript of one of Denton's hearings, lists many of Billington's credentials - founder of the Wilson Quarterly, director of the Washington, D.C. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and so on. The biography, however, omits Billington's service in the CIA; instead, it says he "served in the U.S. Army, 1953-6." It also fails to mention his many years as a covert CIA consultant - now a matter of public record.

Senator Denton's omissions of crucial parts of his witnesses' careers are serious. CIA journalists and academicians have often played important roles in disinforming the U.S. public. But disinformation seems to be the purpose of Denton's committee.

Army Plans for Chemical Action

The Pentagon has had a tough time convincing the public and sectors of Congress of the need to vastly increase the Army's chemical arsenal. To overcome this opposition, the Army has initiated an "Army Chemical Action Plan." The Army, according to Defense Week, wants to neutralize public concern about "the immoral and inhumane nature of CW [Chemical Warfare];... and the fact that the principal target for the chemical weapons will be the civilian population since it cannot be protected." The Army's plan calls for improving con-
tacts with "media/journalists [and] persons who are influential in industry, academia, etc.," to "explain the need for increased chemical armaments.

If details of the Reagan administration's chemical warfare plans become known, the Army will have a lot of propaganda work on its hand. Reliable reports, pieced together by Defense Week, indicate that the total cost of the program could be $9 billion over the next decade. The Pentagon intends to produce 20,000 tons of chemical agents. In addition, the Pentagon is developing a new nerve agent, code-named EA5774. According to the Defense Department's "Annual Report on Chemical Warfare and Biological Research Programs," this new agent "will have an increased lethal agent effectiveness," attacking the skin and lung simultaneously. The Army propagandists are going to be severely taxed to come up with a saleable justification for $9 billion more in expenditures when the U.S. already has more than enough chemical agents to kill everyone on earth.

Belau: The People Say NO to Nuclear Weapons

It is a dramatic and vitally important struggle between the 15,000 residents of the Republic of Belau and the U.S. government. Belau (also Palau), a Pacific island nation - independent since January 1981 - is the only country in the world with a nuclear-free clause in its constitution. However, Belau's sovereignty is limited: the United States is still Belau's administrator in the United Nations Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia) and is in charge of defense, and, to a certain degree, of internal security (e.g., the FBI's jurisdiction includes Belau). Negotiations are presently going on which would remove Belau from U.N. Trusteeship.

The U.S. government has a particular interest in changing the present relationship. The Pentagon has plans to put a Trident submarine base on Belau and wants to station nuclear weapons there. Plans for a jungle warfare training center also are reportedly being made. At present, the U.S. is barred from using Belau for military purposes because it is a United Nations Trusteeship. Therefore, for more than ten years, the U.S. government has been negotiating a so-called "Compact of Free Association" to replace the trusteeship. As early as 1963, a confidential government report, dubbed the "Solomon Report" laid out what U.S. negotiations aimed to achieve: "Micronesia is not now a United States territory; we wish it to become so." To accomplish this, the U.S. must convince the U.N. and the people of Micronesia that "a measure of self-government will be given" to the island people.
To create such a facade of "self-government" for Belau, the Carter administration initiated a Constitutional Convention in early 1979. U.S. officials were convinced the convention would support the Compact of Free Association.

Things went differently. The convention drafted a constitution which outlawed nuclear as well as chemical and biological weapons from Belau. The Carter administration was stunned; U.S. Ambassador Peter Rosenblatt scrambled to change the constitution. Despite U.S. interference, the constitution went to a popular referendum and was approved by 92 percent of the voters. The U.S. managed to have Belau's legislature declare the referendum invalid, and another referendum was conducted without the anti-nuclear clause. Palau: Can it Stand up to the U.S.? charge that a number of events in Belau since early 1981 smack of outside destabilization. One anti-military organizer was assassinated in October 1981. His alleged murderer was whisked off to Guam, a U.S. territory, and released there on $6,000 bail. Similarly, an FBI "investigation" after the seizure of a mysterious ship with sophisticated communications equipment, weapons, and $1 million by Belauan police in early 1981 has brought no results. The boat was taken to Hawaii by the FBI and "sold" to the U.S. Navy.

In September 1981, a violent strike by some Belauan government workers and a bombing of the President's office prompted U.S. officials on Guam to offer to send in Marines to "stabilize" the situation. The offer was rejected by Belau's President Haru Remeliik, and many observers suspect that the strike itself was provoked from the outside.

Facing tremendous U.S. government pressure, the people of Belau are in the final months of a decisive struggle for true independence and a nuclear-free country. If they win, a big step forward will have been made for all peoples wanting to live in a safe and nuclear-free world.

The constitution has one loophole, though, which gives the U.S. government yet another chance to use Belau for military purposes. It allows any constitutional provision to be set aside if it conflicts with the Compact of Free Association. This Compact is still being negotiated and might be voted on within one year.

The Solomon Report recommended that "the plebiscite should be publicly announced only a few months in advance." This would "reduce the time in which any opposition... could campaign against any affiliation" with the United States in exchange for economic aid. Indeed, to date, very few details of the Compact to be voted on have been made known. It is apparent, though, that under such a Compact of Free Association, the U.S. would be able to set up its Trident base and a military base (dubbed "defense site") covering more than a quarter of Badeldaob, Belau's largest island. (See map.) The U.S. also wants to construct large oil storage sites and improve the Malakai Harbor and two airport runways. These could be used by Japanese planes in joint U.S.-Japanese anti-submarine warfare operations.

Belau is an area of strategic importance for the U.S. military. Pentagon planners see it as an ideal site for a forward base in the Pacific and a nuclear weapons depot. For the people of Belau, it is their homeland. In a fair election, chances are very slim that they would vote for a Compact of Free Association allowing the military bases.

The authors of Palau: Can it Stand up to the U.S.? charge that a number of events in Belau since early 1981 smack of outside stabilization. One anti-military organizer was assassinated in October 1981. His alleged murderer was whisked off to Guam, a U.S. territory, and released there on $6,000 bail. Similarly, an FBI "investigation" after the seizure of a mysterious ship with sophisticated communications equipment, weapons, and $1 million by Belauan police in early 1981 has brought no results. The boat was taken to Hawaii by the FBI and "sold" to the U.S. Navy.

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(Information for this article was drawn mainly from Palau: Can it Stand up to the U.S.? published by the Bay Area Coalition for a Nuclear Free Pacific, 2118 8th Street, Berkeley CA 94710. For more information also write to: Pacific Concerns Resource Center, P.O. Box 27692, Honolulu, Hawaii 96813.)

STOP NUCLEAR WAR - PROTEST AND SURVIVE

Edited by E.P. Thompson and Dan Smith, with contributions by Daniel Ellsberg, George Kistiakowsky, Ken Coates, Mary Kaldor, Jonathan Leonard and Henry Nash.

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I. U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY

"This is the greatest thing in history."

President Harry Truman on hearing of the atomic destruction of Hiroshima.

The government of the United States has initiated more than twenty first use nuclear threats since World War II, many of them against Third World countries. The use of nuclear weapons has been, and continues to be, an underlying premise of U.S. foreign policy.

A top secret, presidially-approved National Security Council memorandum (NSC-68) written in 1950 by Paul Nitze (today President Reagan's chief negotiator for nuclear arms control) outlined the purpose of nuclear weapons use: "Our overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish."\(^1\) With NSC-68, "tactical" nuclear weapons and strategic or all-out nuclear war joined conventional military force as integral components of the U.S. military and political strategy: to make the "American system... flourish," i.e. to establish and expand markets and multinational corporate investments. The U.S. armed forces were systematically and thoroughly nuclearized, and field commanders make no rigorous distinction between the use of conventional and nuclear weapons (see sidebar).

Since World War II, the main threat to the hegemony of the multinational corporations has arisen from the liberation struggles in the Third World, particularly those to establish economies independent of multinational corporations. Nuclear weapons, therefore, were primarily aimed at thwarting these struggles and at preventing the Soviet Union and China from aiding these movements for independence. This direction of U.S. nuclear policy - and indeed the entire foreign policy - was articulated in NSC-68:

Fostering a world environment in which the American system can flourish... embraces two subsidiary policies. One is a policy which we would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat. It is a policy of attempting to develop a healthy international community. The other is the policy of "containing" the Soviet system. These two policies are closely interrelated and interact on one another.\(^2\)

The existence of socialism in the Soviet Union was seen as a disease which would spread to the peoples of the rest of the world if it were not "contained" by a ju-

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\(^{1}\) THE COMMAND AND STAFF ACTIONS AND PROCEDURES INVOLVED IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE SEQUENCE OF COMMAND AND STAFF ACTIONS.... INASMUCH AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROVIDE A COMMANDER WITH THE MOST POWERFUL MEANS KNOWN TO DATE WITH WHICH TO INFLUENCE TACTICAL OPERATIONS, THE COMMANDER MUST DEVOTE PERSONAL ATTENTION TO THEIR EMPLOYMENT.... THE PRIMARY CONSIDERATION IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BE THE DEGREE OF TACTICAL ADVANTAGE RESULTING FROM THEIR USE [emphasis added]....

\(^{2}\) IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS THE MORE IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMMANDER ARE - (1) INTEGRATE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH NONNUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WITH THE SCHEME OF MANEUVER.... (5) MAKE DECISIONS TO FIRE OR NOT TO FIRE [THE NUCLEAR WEAPON].

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icious combination of foreign trade, foreign investment, conventional military threats and nuclear threats. This policy of containment required that the United States develop and be ready to use nuclear weapons in a massive first strike against the Soviet Union, not in response to nuclear threats from the Soviet Union but in response to challenges to the establishment of U.S. hegemony. NSC-68 was explicit:

The only deterrent we can present to the Kremlin is the evidence we give that we may make any of the critical points [in the world] which we cannot hold the occasion for a global war of annihilation.3

Today, Ronald Reagan's Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Eugene Rostow, asserts that "the nuclear weapon is a persuasive influence in all aspects of diplomacy and of conventional war." In a crisis situation, Rostow says, "we could go forward in planning the use of our conventional forces with great freedom precisely because we knew that the Soviet Union could not escalate beyond the local level."4

Rostow also notes that the strategic threat to the Soviet Union enables the United States to make nuclear threats against the Third World: "Our nuclear forces... must also provide a nuclear guarantee for our interests in many parts of the world and make it possible for us to defend those interests by diplomacy or by the use of theater military forces whenever such action becomes necessary." Rostow makes clear what he has in mind: "We carry on the foreign policy of a nation with global interests, and defend them if necessary by conventional means or theater forces."5

This "defense," which includes the first use of nuclear weapons, has been official U.S. government policy for the past 37 years. This policy has been put into practice by threatening countries with nuclear weapons whether or not they possess nuclear weapons themselves. As Daniel Ellsberg put it, nuclear weapons have been used in the way "a gun is used when you point it at someone's head in direct confrontation, whether or not the trigger is pulled."6

II. U.S. NUCLEAR WAR PLANS

"If the problem of the proper use of this weapon can be solved... our civilization can be saved."

Secretary of War Henry Stimson, pondering post-World War II nuclear policy.

Even before the "birth of a new age," as General Leslie Groves (head of the Manhattan Project that developed the atom bomb) called the moment of the explosion of the first atom bomb, he believed that for U.S. policy, "Russia was the enemy and the project was conducted on that basis." Indeed, it was with the idea of "controlling the peace of the world" as an aide to President Franklin Roosevelt put it, that British Premier Winston Churchill had insisted that neither France nor the Soviet Union - U.S. allies in the war against Nazi Germany - be told of the Manhattan Project. Roosevelt agreed, and in the context of planning the use of atom bombs wrote, "I just can not go along with the idea of seeing the British empire collapse financially...." On the contrary, historian Martin Sherwin concluded that Roosevelt wanted to make sure that "economically and militarily secure, and armed with atomic weapons, Great Britain would be America's CounterSpy -- July-August 1982 -- 9
outpost on the European frontier, the sentinel for the New World in the Old."

Accordingly, the nuclear war plans that the U.S. government formulated after World War II were blue-prints for an all-out destruction of the Soviet Union. Air Force Chief of Staff General Nathan Twining told a New York audience in March 1954, that "we simply have to depend primarily on the most powerful weapons we can create.... We must concentrate on building powerful weapons and powerful air forces that could be decisive against the sources of Communist power within the Soviet Union itself." Eisenhower's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles argued that the U.S. should "use the threat of aerial atomic retaliation of any size and in any place as a deterrent to Communist aggression or expansion."

How such a war against the Soviet Union might be conducted is described in two U.S. government documents recently made public by historian David Rosenberg. According to these documents, the decision on how to conduct a nuclear war was not the President's. Instead, the "exact manner" in which the U.S. would fight a nuclear war was "known only to General [Curtis E.] LeMay," the commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). After the President approved the use of nuclear weapons, LeMay was to "decide this matter at the moment, depending on the existing conditions."

Under an "optimum plan," envisioned by the U.S. government in the mid-1950s, SAC would drop 600 to 750 bombs on the Soviet Union in a simultaneous strike (about two-thirds of the U.S. stockpile; the Soviet Union was then estimated to have less than 300 bombs), and "virtually all of Russia would be a smoking, radiating ruin at the end of two hours."

President Truman seems to have had similar thoughts when he wrote in his diary during the Korea conflict in 1950, that "the proper approach now would be an ultimatum... informing Moscow that we intend to blockade the China coast... [and] if there is further interference we shall eliminate any ports or cities necessary to accomplish our peaceful purposes." This means, wrote Truman, "all out war. It means that Moscow, St. Petersburg [Leningrad], Vladivostok, Peking, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Dairen, Odessa, Stalingrad and every manufacturing plant in China and the

Soviet Union will be eliminated." Raving such as these by Truman, as well as actual nuclear war plans, never mentioned the fact that atomic explosions would annihilate not only buildings, military facilities and industrial plants, but entire populations. A former National Security Council nuclear strategist described how the job of targeting atomic weapons is done: "Add a pink pin for Minsk - another 200,000 dead...." The pink pin represents faceless statistics: here farmers do not plant, people do not cook, and children do not play. According to this former strategist, Roger Molander, such considerations do not enter into nuclear war planning.

III. NUCLEAR EXTORTION: CASE STUDIES

"I'll never forget being lectured by an Air Force colonel about how we should have 'nuked' the Soviets in the late 1940s before they got The Bomb. I was told that if SALT would go away, we'd soon have the capability to make them again - and this time we'd use it."

Roger Molander, former National Security Council nuclear strategist

According to a Brookings Institution study prepared in cooperation with the Department of Defense, the U.S. government threatened the use of strategic nuclear weapons no less than 18 times between 1946 and 1970. To complement these plans to convert the Soviet Union into a "smoking, radiating ruin," the U.S. also readied nuclear war plans against Europe and Third World countries.

In 1957, President Dwight Eisenhower asked Congress to "authorize" him to use the military "as he deems necessary" to
"defend" countries in the Middle East "against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international Communism."\(^\text{14}\) With minor changes, Congress passed this resolution which became known as the "Eisenhower Doctrine."

Eisenhower further outlined his military strategy in a secret meeting with Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford in May 1956: First, "we must concentrate on building up internal security forces and local security forces of the regions themselves," he said. Second, at "truly critical points," U.S. units were to assist these surrogate forces. Finally, "the support forces we provide would use the most efficient weapons, and over the past several years, tactical atomic weapons have come to be practically accepted as integral parts of modern armed forces."\(^\text{15}\) General Taylor replied that "if we proceed on the basis of needs for actually fighting atomic wars, the needs for atomic striking forces... are open-ended - practically limitless."\(^\text{16}\)

Yugoslavia, Uruguay and Guatemala

Only a year after the U.S. bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Truman threatened to use the bomb against Yugoslavia when, in November 1946, Yugoslavia shot down a U.S. military aircraft. Three months later, Truman sent seven B-29s, then part of the nuclear strike force, to Uruguay to emphasize U.S. readiness to keep the Americas free from "Communist subversion." In a similar move, SAC planes were sent to Nicaragua in May 1954 in connection with the CIA's overthrow of the democratically-elected government of Jacobo Arbenz in neighboring Guatemala.\(^\text{17}\)

Korea

During the Korean war the U.S. government worked out specific plans to use nuclear weapons against Korea, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

On November 30, 1950, shortly after signing NSC-68, Truman told a press conference that the United States would use every weapon in the arsenal to counter "Chinese aggression" in Korea, and a 1951 NSC document complained that on the military front in Korea, "the free nations are on the defensive because they are fighting the war... on the basis which most favors the Soviets.... We are attempting to match men for men and tanks for tanks, instead of fighting most effectively with those elements of military supremacy we now have in the Far East." The document continued: "On the political front the free nations are on the defensive everywhere.... The free nations do not in political discussion bring up their prime power advantage, the atomic bomb and the capacity to deliver it. That advantage now gives possible superiority of power in the free world."\(^\text{18}\)

General Omar Bradley, then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed in secret testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 10, 1953, that "we have discussed many times the use of the atomic bomb, tactically," in the Korean war. As soon as a "suitable target" in Korea was found, he added, the U.S. "would have to consider very seriously the use of the A-bomb."\(^\text{19}\) President Dwight Eisenhower apparently agreed with Bradley's assessment. Eisenhower told Bradley and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that "we should consider the use of tactical atomic weapons in the Kaesong area," an area that had been designated through armistice negotiations as a "sanctuary." Bradley told Eisenhower that this area, approximately 28 square miles, was now "chock full" of communist troops and materiel. Eisenhower concluded that the Kaesong area "provided a good target" for atomic weapons.\(^\text{20}\)

Eisenhower was somewhat worried about disagreements with his allies. (After all, U.S. troops were supposedly in Korea under a United Nations mandate.) Still, he felt strongly that it would be impossible for the United States to maintain its "military commitments" around the world if "we did not possess atomic weapons and the will to use them when necessary."\(^\text{21}\) NSC Secretary James Lay argued that the use of nuclear weapons in Korea would serve to "increase the deterrent effect of our atomic capabilities on the U.S.S.R., as pertains to both global and limited war."\(^\text{22}\)

CounterSpy is available in microfilm from: University Micorfilms International, 300 North Zeeb Road, Dept. PR, Ann Arbor, MI 48106; and 30-32 Mortimer St., Dept. PR, London W19 7RA, England.
The war against Korea and the nuclear threats which were a part of it were successful for U.S. policy in that revolution in Korea had been "contained."

Vietnam: Trying to Bail out French Colonialism

Less than a year after the Korea war ended, Eisenhower prepared for the use of nuclear weapons again. He offered Mark 21 tactical nuclear weapons to French Premier Joseph Laniel for use against the Vietnamese forces which had surrounded French colonial troops at Dien Bien Phu. One reason the weapons were not used, according to Aviation Week and Space Technology, was that French General Henri-Eugène Navarre, the commander-in-chief of French forces in Indochina, was afraid of unknown side effects on French troops.23

The Suez Crisis, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan

In October 1956, the Eisenhower administration directed an "overt and explicit threat" against the Soviet Union to prevent it from becoming involved in the Suez crisis. Two years later, the simultaneous political crises in Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq prompted Eisenhower to threaten again the use of atomic weapons. In July 1958, he sent 14,000 troops armed with nuclear-capable "Honest John" rockets to Lebanon. The Lebanese government claimed that internal unrest had been stirred up by the United Arab Republic (federation of Egypt and Syria). The United Nations Security Council sent an observer team to Lebanon but found no evidence to support that charge.24

In addition to sending the troops, Eisenhower ordered increased readiness for the Strategic Air Command to underscore U.S. "determination" and moved the Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers, which then played a key role in the U.S. strategic force, to Lebanon and Jordan, which was shaken by internal opposition. At the same time, Eisenhower wanted to intimidate Iraq's revolutionary leaders who, in July 1958, had overthrown the monarchy there before the U.S. Sixth Fleet could act.25 He ordered U.S. Marines stationed in Japan to move toward the Gulf area, purportedly to prevent Iraq from taking over Kuwait. In addition, he ordered the Air Force to be ready to use "whatever means might become necessary to prevent any unfriendly forces from moving into Kuwait."26

Risking Global War Over Taiwan

The Eisenhower administration risked global war over Taiwan and other offshore Chinese islands twice, in 1954 and in 1958. Both times, Eisenhower deployed strategic bombers in the Western Pacific to "reassure" the Taiwanese government in a conflict with the Chinese government.27 The 1954-55 conflict escalated, and Eisenhower sent the Seventh Fleet into the area. U.S. News and World Report wrote at the time: "If fighting starts in the waters around this island [Taiwan], the first atom-armed fleet in world history will bear the brunt of it. That is the role assigned to the U.S. Seventh Fleet." The article warned that "the entire China coast would be open to... attack by the Seventh Fleet's planes," and there would be no "privileged sanctuaries." In conclusion, U.S. News and World Report told its readers that "the Communist leaders are aware of the fleet's power," and are unlikely to fight against "an antagonist that so far overshadows any force they can throw against it."28

In the 1958 Taiwan crisis, in addition to deploying SAC planes in the Western Pacific, Eisenhower stationed nuclear-capable howitzers on Quemoy Island in order to protect the counterrevolutionaries on Taiwan and a few other islands. The howitzers were a clear message that Taiwan "could not be taken by amphibious assault, if the United States should decide to defend it by the use of tactical nuclear weapons."29 China eventually backed down, but only after several months of heightened danger of nuclear war. The Soviet government informed Eisenhower twice, on September 7 and 19, 1958, that the U.S.S.R. would come to the aid of the People's Republic of China in the event of a U.S. nuclear attack. In addition, a declassified State Department report of December 1958 confirms that the Soviet government "intimated that there would be retaliation in kind to any nuclear bombardment."30

At the same time, the Eisenhower administration was preparing for various scenarios in which nuclear weapons might be used. In November-December 1957, for example, U.S. forces conducted an amphibious exercise in the Philippines for which
"atomic play" was authorized. Nevertheless, some U.S. officials were not satisfied with preparations for nuclear war. The U.S. Commander in Chief for the Pacific area, for example, sent an angry telegram to the Chief of Naval Operations in August 1957, urging that the U.S. government "hammer away on vital need to stop pussy footing about use of atomic weapons." He criticized the "weak-kneed approach" to use of nuclear weapons in U.S. military exercises in South East Asian countries. "In my opinion the most important requirement in South East Asia today is strong assurance as positive as we can make it... openly proclaiming that the U.S. will act to give its full military support to any non-communist country threatened by communist aggression." The "clincher," according to the telegram, would be "the public announcement that we will use all necessary weapons as appropriate to the target."

Berlin

During the first crisis over Berlin in 1948, the U.S. government considered the use of nuclear weapons several times, according to the Brookings Institution's Force Without War. In that year, six B-29s of the SAC were deployed in Britain.

By the mid-1950s, it was clear that the United States would continue to insist that Germany would be reunified only if it were firmly a part of the capitalist economic system. This was unacceptable to the Soviet Union, partly for military reasons (the U.S.S.R. had been invaded twice by capitalist Germany). Nevertheless, the U.S. proceeded to promote the rearming of West Germany and West Germany's integration into NATO nuclear war plans.

This was the fundamental military background to the Berlin crises of 1958, 1959, and 1961. In response to Soviet demands on Berlin, the U.S. government threatened nuclear war, even as the two parties began to negotiate. In March 1959, U.S. Defense Secretary McElroy stated that "it would be impossible to limit war over Berlin, and raised the specter of a preventive war by the West if the U.S.S.R. was perceived as preparing an attack."

As negotiations over the status of Berlin were to begin on March 11, 1959, in Geneva, the U.S. went ahead with "stiff actions." Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers - a key component of the U.S. strategic force - were readied for redeployment in the Atlantic. Then, on May 5, the U.S. signed an "agreement on cooperation in the use of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes" with West Germany's Christian Democratic government.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

In 1961, after the U.S. government-sponsored invasion, Cuba turned to the Soviet Union for military help. The next year, the Soviet government decided to place nuclear missiles in Cuba. The Kennedy administration threatened an all-out war if the Soviet ships bearing the missiles continued to move towards Cuba. The Soviet government gave in, and the U.S., in return, undertook not to invade Cuba.

U.S. policy on the use of nuclear weapons remained unchanged. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara said in February 1963 that the United States "would propose to use nuclear weapons or any other weapon whenever we felt our vital interests required their use."

Laos

Escalation of the war in Indochina led successive U.S. governments to consider the use of nuclear weapons there. The first time was in 1961 in Laos. When a Pathet Lao offensive was underway at the end of April, President Kennedy was reluctant to intervene massively with conventional forces in support of the Royal Lao Army (which at the time had some 700 U.S. "advisors"). The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff "insisted on prior presidential assurances of rapid military escalation, including permission to use nuclear weapons, should North Vietnam or China respond to U.S. force." In the face of Pathet Lao military success, Kennedy sent the Seventh Fleet into the Gulf of Thailand and ordered the landing of 5,000 U.S. combat troops in Thailand. This prompted a rapid political settlement favorable to the U.S. (Laos remained a potential nuclear target for the Pentagon. In 1972, a former Air Force sergeant, James Walkley, testified that he previously worked on nuclear target planning at Hickam field in Hawaii. A Laos specialist, Walkley stated that contingency plans for nuclear bombings of Laos were constantly revised and updated.)

(Cont. on page 16)
The U.S. Navy is on the verge of implementing a communication system which would greatly enhance the first strike capabilities of submarine-launched nuclear missiles. The system is called ELF (Extreme Low Frequency), and it holds the potential for continuous communication with submarines while submerged at undetectable depths.

A HISTORY OF CITIZEN OPPOSITION

In 1969, after eleven years of research, the Navy constructed the first ELF testing installation, the Wisconsin Test Facility (WTF) at Clam Lake in the Northern Woods of Wisconsin. It then announced plans for "Project Sanguine." The construction of Sanguine, with its 6,000 miles, would have devastated northern Wisconsin, covering forty percent of the state. Scientific studies also revealed that exposure of humans to ELF signals could cause tumors, stress, altered growth levels, changes in the heart, blood pressure and functioning of the brain. Sanguine was blocked by outraged Wisconsin citizens and officials and abandoned in 1973.

Two years later, the Navy resurrected Sanguine under a new name, Project Seafarer. Seafarer, if constructed, would have covered a third of Michigan's Upper Peninsula. It was firmly rejected by Michigan's citizens. In 1978, Jimmy Carter, acting on a campaign promise made to Michigan's Governor Milliken, announced the demise of Seafarer.

REAGAN AND ELF

In 1979, the Navy announced yet another ELF gambit called Project ELF. ELF would use 28 miles of antenna at the WTF and 130 miles of antenna at Marquette, Michigan, as well as 3 million watts of power input. The Navy's projected price tag for Project ELF is $490 million. President Reagan - a strong backer of ELF - pressured Congress to appropriate $39.9 million for the Project in 1981 and is expected to ask for an additional $200 million this year. Reagan also ordered the resumption of testing at the WTF. Following Reagan's lead, conservative Wisconsin Governor Lee Sherman Dreyfus and new-right U.S. Senator Robert Kasten have thrown their support behind ELF construction in Wisconsin.

If Reagan can force the construction of Project ELF, the WTF will become the command center for an entirely new form of naval communications. The WTF is currently in operation, sending messages to submarines. The WTF transmits its ELF signals underground through an array of ground wires via a loop antenna system where a current establishes a very long and slow radio wave between the ground and the ionosphere. This wave then travels out through the earth-ionosphere over the ocean, where a phenomenon known as "wave tilting" allows it to bend and penetrate the ocean depths, establishing a continuous computerized communications link with submarines.

ELF VS. VLF

The Navy currently uses a vast network of large aboveground radio transmitters and antennas to reach its submarines. It is able to communicate with submerged submarines through the transmission of VLF (Very Low Frequency) radio waves. However, VLF transmissions can only be used to communicate with submarines at depths of 40 feet or less, requiring submarines to approach the surface at prearranged times to communicate by releasing a large buoyant antenna and trailing it near the surface.

The Navy normally operates its submarines at depths of under 120 feet, that is, beneath the thermocline layer; a temperature differential in the ocean usually existing at a depth of 60 to 120 feet. The submarines travelling beneath the thermocline are incomunicado until their next scheduled radio rendezvous near the surface: ELF waves can penetrate sea
waters at far greater depths than VLF signals, and this provides the Navy with the potential for continuous communication with its submarines that travel virtually detection free beneath the thermocline.

TECHNOLOGY FOR THE FIRST STRIKE

Trident submarines and missiles are an essential element in the Pentagon's quest for first strike capability. ELF will provide the United States with what nuclear weapons expert Robert C. Aldridge has dubbed a first strike "Trigger Finger," allowing the Navy to direct its submarines and their missiles in a coordinated effort uninhibited by the limitations of VLF communications.

Project ELF in its present form cannot be justified as "defensive" or serving retaliatory purposes. ELF's continuous communications link makes it particularly useful for a first strike by the U.S. It enables submarine-launched missiles to respond to rapidly changing first strike target priorities. From a single communications center, a war room commander could coordinate strikes on targets that are chosen on a time-sensitive basis, e.g. enemy missiles that could be launched in retaliation to a U.S. first use of nuclear weapons.

The ELF system, based in one unprotected command center (unlike the VLF and other communication systems whose transmitters are located in well over a hundred different places) is a prime target in any nuclear confrontation. ELF would be wiped out in an enemy strike, and therefore, would play no role at all in a retaliatory strike. While they can also be used for a first strike, VLF communications are equally suited to a retaliatory nuclear strike. In fact, in order to conduct a retaliatory strike, communication stations might not even be necessary: the Pentagon has developed contingency plans in which a submarine commander, in a retaliatory scenario, would fire his nuclear arsenal if unable to establish VLF communication over a prolonged period of time. This ensures a retaliatory nuclear strike in the event that VLF transmitters have been destroyed by an enemy first strike.

Again, the ELF system cannot be justified as an enhancement of this already existing second strike capability. ELF can only be seen as a preparation for a U.S. first strike.

THE "ELUSIVE VOICE": MOBILE ELF

The first strike technology of ELF systems may prove to be a precursor of a communications system to coordinate all U.S. nuclear forces. ELF waves have the capacity to penetrate the earth at great depths and may provide for a communications command post to be operated from a "doomsday center." Such a center to house and protect the "button-pushers" would have to be built deeper than a hydrogen bomb crater. This great depth would make normal radio communications virtually impossible, but with an ELF system, a communications link could well be developed between "underground" war executives and "aboveground" strategic nuclear forces. The technological potential exists for ELF to become the communications coordinator not only for submarines but also for the full complement of U.S. nuclear assault forces from MX and cruise missiles to B-1 Bombers.

The Navy is also conducting secret research into the establishment of mobile ELF systems or, as the Navy refers to them, "Elusive Voices." The "Elusive Voice" ELF concept operates from the already developed technology to package a small ELF system's components in a "ready-to-assemble" fashion and stow them in a transport vehicle. These vehicles would then be sequestered in secret "hardened" places. In the event of war, the vehicles would be withdrawn from their shelters and assembled in a few hours to send computerized ELF orders to submarines and "hardened" missile silos for a "third" or "fourth" nuclear strike.

The Navy, unless funding can be halted, will continue to use ELF technology as another stepping stone in the escalating U.S. preparations to fight a nuclear war, and to maintain U.S. political and economic dominance through the threat of nuclear destruction.

FOOTNOTES

3) Cf supra, #1.
5) Ibid.
Vietnam

In November 1961, Assistant Secretary of Defense William Bundy, an advocate of stronger U.S. "involvement" in Vietnam. He "considered it probable that the United States would have to take over the war from the South Vietnamese and possibly that it would have to go to war with China if it intervened militarily." According to Bundy, U.S. "punishment" of North Vietnam and possibly China - if it intervened - would include "at least" the threat to use nuclear weapons.38

President Lyndon Johnson began his preparations for overt war in Vietnam in the spring of 1964 with a massive CIA operation to deceive the U.S. Congress and the people. He used the "Gulf of Tonkin incident" to launch bombing raids on North Vietnam. In 1968, Johnson was advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he might have to order the use of nuclear weapons to free U.S. troops who were surrounded at Khe Sanh, about 25 miles from Quang Tri, and only a few miles south of the 1954 cease fire line. General William Westmoreland, then the commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam thought that the use of nuclear weapons might help end the war quickly. He stated in his memoirs that Khe Sanh would indeed have been an almost ideal occasion to use tactical nuclear weapons. "If Washington officials were so intent on 'sending a message' to Hanoi, surely small tactical nuclear weapons would be a way to tell Hanoi something, just as two atomic bombs had spoken convincingly to Japanese officials during World War II and the threat of atomic bombs induced the North Koreans to accept meaningful negotiations during the Korean War."39

On August 6, 1968, presidential candidate Richard Nixon told the Republican convention in Miami how to "get out" of the Vietnam war. "I'll tell you how Korea was ended. We got in there and had this messy war on our hands. Eisenhower let the word go out - let the word go out diplomatically - to the Chinese and North Koreans that we would not tolerate this continual war of attrition. And within a matter of months, they negotiated."40 Nixon was referring to Eisenhower's threat of using nuclear weapons.

In public, Nixon maintained that it was "ridiculous" to suggest that he was considering the use of nuclear weapons. But on July 15, 1969, he sent a message to Ho Chi Minh: "Unless some serious breakthrough had been achieved by the November 1 deadline," Nixon would "regretfully find himself "obliged" to have recourse "to measures of great consequence and force," i.e. the use of the atom bomb. A few weeks later, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger repeated that message to Vietnamese negotiators in Paris.41

(In 1969, Nixon also declared his "Doctrine" in Guam, announcing that from then on, the United States would make every effort to keep its troops out of Third World countries. Instead, the U.S. would provide military and economic assistance to "those nations willing to accept the responsibility of supplying the manpower to defend themselves." As Nixon describes it in his memoirs, the "Doctrine" included the possibility of the first use of nuclear weapons: "In case a major nuclear power engaged in aggression against one of our allies or friends, I said that we would respond with nuclear weapons."42)

The nuclear threat against Vietnam had a personal touch. It was made according to the "Madman Theory" described in the memoirs of Nixon's advisor, H.R. Haldeman. Nixon, confronted with massive opposition at home, would create the impression to the Vietnamese that he had "reached the point where [he] might do anything to stop the war." He told Haldeman, "we'll slip the word to them that, 'for God's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can't restrain him when he's angry - and he has his hand on the nuclear button.'"43

However, North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front did not give in. Their resolve was strengthened by the nuclear parity of the Soviet Union and the anti-war movement in the United States. Nixon acknowledged in his memoirs that his enemies knew that the U.S. President did not have the popular backing in the U.S. to drop the bomb.

Arab-Israeli War

The Nixon administration brought the world close to the brink again in 1973 during the October Arab-Israeli war. According to Kissinger's memoirs, a nuclear alert was issued for all U.S. forces under the di-
rection of Kissinger himself along with White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig. The two considered themselves to be in charge because the President was "too distraught" to make such decisions, and Gerald Ford had not yet been confirmed by Congress to replace Spiro Agnew as Vice President.

III. PARITY: PLANS FOR "FLEXIBLE" NUCLEAR WAR

Vietnam was a turning point: for the first time, a U.S. nuclear threat could not prevent the defeat of the U.S. military. Three factors were responsible: the determined resistance of the Vietnamese people, the anti-war movement in the U.S., and the achievement of rough strategic nuclear parity by the Soviet Union. (Strategic nuclear parity does not mean equal numbers of nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles: it means that each side would have enough nuclear weapons left after being hit by a first strike to retaliate massively.) It was under these circumstances that SALT I was negotiated.

At the same time, the U.S. government made plans to reestablish nuclear weapons as an effective instrument. "We are paying much more attention than previously to planning for the possibility of these kinds of selective strikes we have been talking about," said Defense Secretary James Schlesinger. In 1975 he sent a revision of the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP, "the blueprint to follow if the United States went to war") to the SAC ordering its pilots to undergo...
specific training for "limited" nuclear war.45

In 1974-75, there was also renewed discussion about U.S. nuclear strategy in Korea. U.S. nuclear weapons in Korea are only 35 to 50 miles from the Demilitarized Zone. In case of an armed conflict between North and South Korea, these weapons are so located that their use could be rationalized as necessary to prevent their capture by the North Koreans. "As the United States becomes less willing and able to provide manpower on the Korean front line... tactical nuclear weapons are seen by some as a logical, relatively inexpensive and powerful replacement,"46 according to the Washington Post. "We cannot foreclose any options," said Schlesinger. The nuclear option would be used "in a flexible way in our national interest."47

The realization of this doctrine of "flexible response" and the first use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. government was laid out in a September 1975 study commissioned by the U.S. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (see sidebar). The study "depicts a sequence of hypothetical strategic events which create an intense nuclear crisis in the summer of 1979." The Soviet Union is the "bad guy," in this scenario which centers around Warsaw Pact blockage of U.S. access to Berlin and a simultaneous Soviet-inspired Arab attack on Israel. The United States uses nuclear weapons first, thus unleashing nuclear war in Europe. Then the U.S. strikes "military targets" in the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons. Next, the U.S. government presents an ultimatum: Stop or mutually assured destruction! 48

IV. FOR THE U.S., PARITY IS NOT ENOUGH

Jimmy Carter's presidency began with vague promises of reductions in nuclear weapons, but ended with highly dangerous nuclear war plans. In one of his major military decisions, Carter signed Presidential Decision-18, "a five page memo classified 'top-secret' though the contents are well known in defense policy-circles." PD-18, in essence, was simply a restatement of Eisenhower's Middle East Doctrine. It formally widened U.S. "vital interests" to encompass "the major oil-exporting area, which geographically includes Israel." What that means in plain language, commented Fortune magazine, is that "the U.S.
would go to war... to keep the Persian Gulf from falling into the hands of the Soviet Union or its proxies."

In early 1978, Defense Secretary Harold Brown ordered an extensive study entitled "Capabilities in the Persian Gulf." It became the most extensive military study of the area ever done by a U.S. administration. The study envisioned the use of nuclear weapons in Iran. Setting a scenario in which Soviet troops would attack Iran, the report concludes that to "counter" that, "we might have to threaten or make use of tactical nuclear weapons." President Carter chose his 1980 State of the Union speech to announce his "doctrine" on the Middle East. He said it was needed to set the "Soviet invasion of Afghanistan," but he was merely seizing the occasion to announce a policy that had been decided on at least one year before.

In fact, the President was only "making public what the Soviets had undoubtedly always regarded as sufficiently obvious implicit nuclear threats of nuclear initiatives to preserve U.S. influence in the oil regions," explained Daniel Ellsberg. "Carter was also acting to legitimate such threats in future cases where the public was less likely to perceive either an urgent threat from a rival superpower or to a 'vital national interest.'"

Carter signed at least two other Presidential Decision Memorandums that heightened the danger of nuclear war. PD-59 changed many U.S. missile targets in the Soviet Union from urban centers to missile installations, thus enhancing the possibility of a U.S. first strike. PD-51 reportedly relates to a nuclear attack on

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### Table 1 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>EVENTS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Egypt and Syria launch drive into Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>First Soviet casualties among &quot;volunteers&quot; announced.</td>
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<tr>
<td>23-27</td>
<td>Soviet inspired harassments on autobahn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Arab-Israeli war of attrition begins as supplies pour in.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 2</td>
<td>U.S.S.R. proposes a new political conference to settle &quot;European Problems&quot;.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-16</td>
<td>autobahn and air corridor harassments increase; skirmishes on German border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Summit suggestion rejected. GDR closes autobahn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>U.S. tank convoy blocked on autobahn. Air corridor to Berlin declared closed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-26</td>
<td>Mid-East war settles into defensive stalemate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>U.S. tank force through autobahn barriers; GDR protests; U.S.S.R. announces military assistance on route to Berlin.</td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Tank battle begins. 104 U.S. casualties; U.S. forces retreat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>NATO defers decision to send reinforcements.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1</td>
<td>U.S. armored division moves to aid tank convoy; both sides mobilize.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>U.S. sends all STREICH units to Europe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>U.S.S.R. reinforcements moving through Poland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>U.S. offers to withdraw armored column for peace talks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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5 U.S.S.R. rejects offer and demands NATO garrison be removed from Berlin in 48 hours!

6 NATO halts autobahn retreat; reasserts Berlin rights.

7 U.S.S.R. & GDR press battle on autobahn.

8 GDR forces enter W. Berlin: NATO aircraft strike all East bloc airfields, except in U.S.S.R., with conventional weapons.

9 U.S.S.R. launches ground attack toward Hamburg; full-scale NATO mobilization and movement.

10 Major conventional ground and air battles develop.

11 Soviets begin evacuation of major cities.

12-14 Initial NATO successes offset by Soviet reinforcements.

14-19 American forces driven from E. Germany. Soviets regain air control. U.S. urban evacuation (spontaneous) reaches 30%.

23-30 Soviet drive takes Hamburg and Hanover.

August 1 U.S. orders evacuation of risk areas under CRF.

5 Relocation of U.S. civilian population 30% complete.

5-19 Full-scale conventional fighting; NATO forces retreating.

20 Soviet troops reach Rhine at Mainz & Cologne.

Tactical nuclear weapons used against Soviet spearheads and forward airfields.

22 Soviets airburst HVARs and IREMs on NATO airfields and employ tactical nuclear weapons east of the Rhine.

23 Residual NATO nuclear weapons and some Polaris missiles launched against U.S.S.R. airfields and HVAR/HAB sites.

24 U.S. sends Nuclear "Ultimatum" to U.S.S.R.

25 U.S.S.R. replies:
- a. Cease fire offer?
- b. Strategic nuclear attack?

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the Third World, specifically the Middle East. PD-51 ordered the Pentagon to formulate various military options to counter alleged Soviet aggression in the Middle East. One of these options was to use "limited strategic" nuclear weapons.

V. REAGAN: PUSH FOR SUPERIORITY

Candidate Reagan quickly assailed Carter's "Doctrine" on the Middle East as unworkable, but once he became President, he just as quickly proceeded along the same lines. Reagan urged a U.S. "ground presence" in the region. These troops, he conceded, would not be able to stop a "Soviet invasion." They have a different function, he said, and their stationing is based "on the assumption... the Soviet Union is not ready yet to take on that confrontation which could become World War III. They would like to be able to continue making gains without conflict. And I think that a presence there indicates that, all right, this is of interest to our national security.... And they're going to have to take that into their computations."53

Under Secretary of State Alexander Haig's direction, this tripwire strategy was in place by the end of 1981. The area to be "protected" by the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" includes not only pro-U.S. countries in the region but also the southern part of Iran. If the Soviet Union should move into Iran, the theory goes, the U.S. "will fly in 500 men [to] the oilfields and there they will stay. If any of our boys are shot, then the Russians know we will retaliate in any way we choose anywhere in the world." And: "If our troops get killed by the Russians anywhere in the world, it would be much easier to sell an escalation into nuclear war."54

The U.S. government hopes that it will be easier to "sell" such an escalation with the production of neutron bombs - which are hydrogen bombs euphemistically called "enhanced radiation weapons." These bombs are designed to maximize killing while limiting property damage. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger sees the neutron bomb as a "particularly useful weapon ... in several theaters of the world, including Europe."55 When the neutron bomb becomes part of the "regular" equipment of U.S. troops, the threshold of nuclear war will, once again, be considerably lowered.

VI. THE STUMBLING BLOCK

Even though the U.S. government has made numerous reckless and aggressive nuclear threats, nuclear weapons have not been exploded in war in the 37 years since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. People's resistance all over the world has been a basic impediment to the U.S. government's nuclear war policy.

In the United States, public resistance played a part in limiting the bombing of Japan in World War II. Secretary of War Henry Stimson told James Forrestal on August 10, 1945 - after atomic bombs had been dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki - that "we should now cease sending our bombers over Japan," because of the "growing feeling of apprehension and misgiving as to the effect of the atomic bomb" in the United States.56 Similarly, there was "wide opposition" in the U.S. to President Eisenhower's militaristic posture against China, and, later, during the second Taiwan crisis, the State Department was forced to admit that "80 percent of the letters received were critical or fearful about the Administration's stand."57

At the same time, the administration ordered the U.S. Information Agency to prepare a top secret intelligence estimate on possible response by other governments to the use of nuclear weapons against China.58 When Eisenhower considered the use of the atom bomb in Korea, the British government was pressured by a massive domestic outcry to argue against it.59 Finally, popular opposition to the U.S. war in Vietnam forced Nixon to admit "the fact that it [the opposition] had probably destroyed the credibility of my [nuclear]...
ultimatum to Hanoi. Dulles urged that the U.S. government should "break down this false distinction."

For U.S. government strategists, a way had to be found to explain the necessity of using nuclear weapons to the U.S. public. A 1951 NSC document suggests that, first of all, the U.S. should create a "moral justification" for using nuclear weapons. The document advocates that this be done by declaring that any attack on a certain area would be countered by U.S. nuclear weapons. (The Carter and Reagan policies on the Middle East follow this pattern.)

Several years later, Admiral Arthur Radford criticized a sentiment within the government that "it is possible to have a conventional force of large size, and to fight a sizeable war without using atomic weapons," and complained about the "whipped up concern over the use of atomic weapons." In the late 1950s, the U.S. government created a scapegoat to deflect from its nuclear war plans. The administration announced that the world wide anti-nuclear campaign was masterminded by the Soviet Union. A White House memorandum charged that "a prime Soviet objective of the moment is to stigmatize nuclear weapons, neutralize U.S. superiority in this field, and create in the public mind a moral and fearful distinction between nuclear and conventional forces. This works ... to our great disadvantage," the memorandum continued, "and must be countered by any means of education at our disposal."

This "educational campaign," after more than twenty years, has not succeeded. People in the United States are not less, but more outraged by the thought of the U.S. government using nuclear weapons. They know that their very survival is at stake.

VII. PROSPECTS

The U.S. government was fairly successful in "containing" socialism and liberation movements for the benefit of multinational corporations in the first two decades after World War II. But this required of the government and its client regimes an ever-increasing use of force and the threat of force, including the first use of nuclear weapons. This policy gave rise to the anti

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—war movement in the U.S., to the achievement of nuclear parity by the Soviet Union and to continuing liberation struggles which were never crushed. These three factors make the world today a fundamentally different place, militarily, from the world of the fifties and early sixties.

The response of the multinational corporations and the U.S. government to the crisis they face has been reactionary. It consists of trying to reestablish a domestic consensus for wars in the Third World ("ending the Vietnam syndrome"); of building up conventional and nuclear forces and of attempting to regain nuclear superiority and first strike capacity vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Thus the war in Central America, the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force, the production of the neutron bomb, the MX missiles, chemical weapons, the Pershing II and cruise missiles to be installed in Europe are all of a piece. They are the concrete manifestation of the reactionary strategy of attempting to regain U.S. hegemony over the world, even at the risk of nuclear annihilation.

But today, nuclear threats cannot be used to achieve foreign policy purposes as they were in the two decades after World War II. These threats were based on overwhelming nuclear superiority. The Soviet Union has announced that it will never allow the U.S. to achieve nuclear superiority again. The prospect is more nuclear armaments, whose hair-trigger response in times of growing tensions makes it ever more likely that nuclear holocaust may be brought upon us. An increasingly desperate and reckless U.S. government might succumb to the temptation of using nuclear weapons in the Third World or Europe.

It has come down to the survival of humanity — a fundamental issue around which the peoples of the world are uniting. The Third World has initiated the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament. In Europe and in the United States, the movement to stop and reverse the arms buildup is growing dramatically. Today, the peoples of the world are taking nuclear policy — which yesterday was the preserve of the Rostows, Nitzes and Haigs, and the generals — into their own hands.

It is in our awareness, our resistance, that hope lies. A people's movement that is cognizant of the dangers, a movement that has no illusions about the powerful minority which has wielded the nuclear threat for its own purpose, can not only stop the nuclear arms buildup — it can achieve nuclear disarmament.

FOOTNOTES:
2) Ibid., p.401.
3) Ibid., p.414.
13) Barry B. Blechman, Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War, The Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 1978, p.68. Writing of this book was "supported by the Advanced Research Projects Agency" of the Department of Defense and was reviewed by the Office of Naval Research under Contract N00014-75-C-0140.
14) Cf supra, p.117.
15) Memorandum of Conference with the President, May 24, 1956, 10:30AM, written by Col. A. J. Goodpaster.
16) Ibid.
18) Note by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council on Recommended Policies and Actions in Light of the Grave World Situation, Top Secret, Jan. 11, 1951.
20) Memorandum, Subject: Discussion of the 131st Meeting of the National Security Council on February 11, 1953, Top Secret.
22) Note by the Executive Secretary of the NSC on Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea, Top Secret, April 2, 1953.
25) Ibid., p.119.

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Princeton University would rather switch than fight - well, sort of. Rather than fight President Reagan's cuts in National Science Foundation (NSF) funding, Princeton is switching to the Pentagon - for whom it is happy to fight.

Going straight to the gravytrain, Princeton's Office of Research and Projects Assistance (ORPA) recently noted in inter-office correspondence1 - obtained by CounterSpy - that: "As you probably know, President Reagan has recommended substantial increases in the DOD [Department of Defense] budget for FY82.... For this reason, ORPA felt it would be useful to visit various DOD officials in an attempt to assemble facts and opinions on what might be expected in DOD research support at Princeton, particularly where NSF support is falling off, as in the social and behavioral sciences."

ORPA acknowledged, but was undeterred by "some concern about expanding university research in the face of possible student and faculty reaction if a U.S. military action becomes necessary in some part of the world."

(John Kelly is co-editor of CounterSpy and author of the forthcoming book, The CIA in America.)
of the world." ORPA officials met quietly on July 22-24, 1981 with DOD representatives: Colonel Elbert W. Friday and Dr. Jimmy Suttle; Navy representatives, Dr. Robert Ryan, Dr. Glen Byron and Dr. J. R. "Randy" Simpson (Princeton '41); Air Force representative, Colonel Richard Hartke; and Army representative, Dr. Robert Sasmor.

While disappointed briefly because most of DOD's increased funding will be for "hardware - the 600 ship Navy, the 1000 battle tank Army, and the MX missile system," the ORPA officials struck gold in chemical and biological warfare (CBW) research. The memo notes that "large amounts of new money will be available" in CBW research in FY82 and "much more" in FY83 with the "lion's share" (about 90 percent of $22 million) going to the Army. Emphasizing that CBW research is "the only major new initiative at DOD and hence is worthy of some separate amplification," the memo details DOD's CBW needs. "If faculty interests develop," the memo adds, "we can work out these contacts more precisely." The memo claims that the CBW research will be directed towards "defense against chemical and biological warfare agents (CBW programs)." To get the ball rolling, the Army held what the memo calls an "unclassified meeting" with some 250 academicians at Reston, Virginia on November 13-15, 1980, on "Defense Against Chemical Agents - Research Needs and Opportunities."

**CBW RESEARCH - "DEFENSIVE" ONLY**

The United States is a signatory of the 1925 Geneva Protocols prohibiting the use of poisonous and germ warfare. Yet in 1952, the Special Operations Division of the Army's biological research center at Fort Detrick, Maryland agreed to produce biological weapons for the CIA's Operation MKNAOMI. Like Princeton's ORPA, the CIA's Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, who directed many of these CBW programs, claimed they were for defensive purposes. Then CIA head of Clandestine Services, Richard Helms, made the same claim. The "development of a comprehensive capability in this field... gives us a thorough knowledge of the enemy's theoretical potential," Helms wrote to CIA Director Allen Dulles on April 3, 1953, "thus enabling us to defend ourselves against a foe who might not be as restrained in the use of these techniques as we are." Princeton's "defense" rationale for its CBW program harks back to MKNAOMI. In fact, the MKNAOMI Project, from the beginning, was prepared to use CBW offensively. A secret CIA memorandum summarized its purposes:

(a) To provide for a covert support base to meet clandestine operational requirements; (b) To stockpile severely incapacitating and lethal materials for the specific use of TSD [Technical Services Division]; (c) To maintain in operational readiness special and unique items for the dissemination of biological and chemical materials; (d) To provide for the required surveillance, testing, upgrading and evaluation of materials and items in order to assure absence of defects and complete predictability of results to be expected under operational conditions.

The Army's Special Operations Division developed, among other things, darts coated with biological agents and poisonous pills capable of incapacitating or killing humans. Also, according to a CIA memo, "three methods and systems for carrying out a covert attack against crops and causing severe crop loss have been developed and evaluated under field conditions." None of these CBW materials could be considered defensive.

**CBW'S "DEFENSIVE ASSASSINATIONS"**

One presumably "defensive" use of the germ weapons was the CIA/Pentagon plan to assassinate Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba of the Congo (now the Republic of Zaire) in 1960. On August 18, 1960, the CIA Chief of Station in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), Victor Hedgman, cabled CIA headquarters that the Congo under Lumumba was in imminent danger of a Communist takeover.

On August 25, 1960, the Special Group
(for planning covert operations) of the National Security Council (NSC) - which included two Princeton men, Allen Dulles and Livingston Merchant - met. Planning for the Congo, they concluded, "would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba."7 The next day Dulles wired Hedgman that "high quarters" had concluded that Lumumba's "removal" was "an urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditions this should be a high priority of our covert action."8

Former CIA Deputy Director of Plans Richard Bissell later testified before Congress that the August 25 Special Group minutes indicated that the assassination of Lumumba was part of a general NSC strategy. "The Agency [CIA] had put a top priority, probably, on a range of different methods of getting rid of Lumumba in the sense of either destroying him physically, [or] incapacitating him.... When you use the language that no particular means were ruled out... [assassination] is obviously what it meant, and it meant that to everybody in the room...."9

Whatever the Special Group's precise meaning, it is known that Bissell ordered Sidney Gottlieb to make all preparations necessary for having biological materials ready on short notice for use in the assassination of an unspecified African leader. Gottlieb reviewed a list of biological warfare materials available at the Army Chemical Corps installation at Fort Detrick which would, in his words, "either kill the individual or incapacitate him so severely that he would be out of action."11 Among the materials reviewed were tularemia (rabbit fever), brucellosis (undulant fever), tuberculosis, anthrax, smallpox, and Venezuelan equine encephalitis (sleeping sickness).

Gottlieb selected one which, he said was "indigenous to that area [Africa] and that could be fatal."12 He also testified to preparing "a packet of... accessory materials" such as hypodermic needles, rubber gloves and gauze masks "that would be used in the handling of this pretty dangerous material."13 On September 26, 1960, Gottlieb met with Victor Hedgman in Leopoldville to deliver the poison. According to Gottlieb, he was under CIA orders to instruct Hedgman "to mount an operation, if he could do it securely... to either seriously incapacitate or eliminate Lumumba."14 Gottlieb also testified that he was to provide technical support for Hedgman's assassination attempt. The assassination attempt went ahead even though Lumumba, by the time, had been dismissed as Prime Minister and had placed himself under United Nations custody.

Not for lack of desire, Lumumba's poisoning did not transpire. Gottlieb reportedly "destroyed the viability" of the poison, and threw the substance into the Congo River before departing for the U.S. on October 5, 1960.15 As noted, Gottlieb gave the CBW program a defensive rationale. "I think that my view of the job at the time," he testified about the Lumumba operation, "and the responsibilities I had was in the context of a silent war that was being waged."16 Contrary to this defensive rationale, Gottlieb, a supposed neutral scientist, admitted to supporting an offensive, criminal application of CBW.

When asked to justify the Lumumba operation, Gottlieb invoked the Nuremberg "Nazis' defense:" "I felt that a decision had been made... at the highest level that this be done and that as unpleasant a responsibility as it was, it was my responsibility to carry out my part of that."17

PRINCETON'S RESEARCH: TO WHAT END?

Regardless of the intent of the Princeton researchers, there is reason to believe that their CBW work (a la Gottlieb) will have an offensive (therefore criminal) use. The products of their work will be going to the Pentagon which used CBW offensively on a small scale in the case of Lumumba and on a massive scale during the Vietnam War. The Pentagon also presumably still has an arrangement to provide CBW materials to the CIA which has no qualms about using them. Indeed, the CIA once kept highly toxic CBW materials even after President Richard Nixon had ordered their destruction.

The unquestioning willingness of Princeton to consider CBW research as well as its tradition of being dominated and used by "good soldier" types from Allen Dulles to Livingston Merchant to William Colby to Frank Carlucci also argue against a strictly defensive application of its CBW work. Even the wording of some of the proposed CBW research can be interpreted as offensive as well as defensive. The

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memo says that the Air Force seeks "research which will provide fundamental information on the mechanisms of biological action of chemical warfare agents and the interaction of agents with material as necessary to devise novel methods for the protection of Air Force personnel." More specifically, the Air Force wants research to understand the agent/material-interfacial phenomena which are fundamental to transport, partitioning, degradation and catalyst aspects of agent properties... and (3) establish the mechanisms for agent transport across skin, lung and eye surface.... The internal dynamics of both chemical agents and potential antidotes [emphasis added] should be studied to determine their metabolic pathways, alterations in chemical composition, residence times in various target organs and ultimate biological effect."

In a request that could also be read both ways (defensive/offensive), the Air Force wants "neurotransmitter systems" to "be studied in vitro and in vivo to determine fundamental mechanisms of action of nerve agents utilizing novel approaches in neuropharmacology and physiology." In vivo studies raise the possibility of the use of human subjects. The Pentagon and the CIA have horrendous records of experiments on unwitting human subjects. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Human Resources concluded that:

"In the Army's tests, as with those of the CIA, individual rights were also subordinated to national security considerations; informed consent and follow-up examinations of subjects were neglected in efforts to maintain the secrecy of the tests."18

The Committee also found that in at least one CIA program testing chemical and biological agents on humans, the CIA's own Office of Medical Services was excluded from involvement. This, according to the CIA's Inspector General, was because "some of the activities of Chemical Division are not only unorthodox but unethical and sometimes illegal."19

**OTHER STRIKING OPPORTUNITIES**

In addition to CWB funding, the ORPA memo details other "possibilities for expanding our [Princeton's] support from DOD during FY82." These possibilities range from laser weapons to nuclear submarine warfare research and development. DOD research in the physical sciences, says the memo, presents "some of the most striking opportunities for research which can effect significant changes in our military capability." Hardly able to restrain itself, the memo continues that:

Atomic and molecular physics provide significant opportunities for military applications based on detailed knowledge of atomic and molecular structure and the interactions of individual atoms and molecules with other species and with electromagnetic fields. These interactions are basic to understanding the transmission of radiation in the natural and disturbed atmosphere, and...

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**DEFENSE RESEARCH CONTRACTS SERVICED BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY**

© "Airborne Detection of Underwater Targets" (For U.S. Navy by Professor S. C. Schwartz)
© "Improved Sensor for Belly Attack Anti-Tank Mines"
© "Joint Army/Navy Point Detonating Delay Fuze [sic] for Artillery Guns"
© "AF [Air Force] FUNCTION Weapon Delivery and Defense: Advanced Air-Breathing Engines and a Aircraft Vulnerability"
© Princeton University's Professor Curtis for three years studied the aerodynamics of "Design 698" V/STOL (Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing) aircraft at Princeton for the Grumman Aerospace Corporation. The "Design 698" V/STOL will, according to Grumman, "provide the Navy with a utility craft for early warning and anti-submarine warfare, Marine Corps assault-transport, and cargo delivery."

**PRINCETON PERSONNEL WHO HAVE DONE CLASSIFIED RESEARCH INCLUDE:**

© Klaus Knorr (Professor of Political Affairs, served on a committee reviewing naval technology at the National Academy of Sciences.)
© Jerome A. Smith (consulted for the Navy's Office of Naval Research.)
© Earl H. Dowell (Professor, Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering)
© William A. Sirignano (Visiting Professor, MAE)
© Enoch J. Durbin (Professor, MAE)
© David T. Harrje (Senior Research Engineer, MAE)
© Courtland D. Perkins (Professor, MAE, consulted at the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board.)
© H. C. Curtis (Professor, MAE, works for the Army Scientific Advisory Panel.)
to developing new laser candidates. This research area is also applicable to the development of accurate navigational aids, infrared emitters and detectors, and energy systems...." Research on more effective propellants and explosives is of great interest.... Related programs involve combustion dynamics, power sources, laser chemistry, and improved obursants.

The rest of the memo reads as if science's raison d'etre is to conduct war. Virtually all areas of scientific research are discussed in terms of their military application - from the development and use of weapons systems to an "increased need to elucidate the epidemiology of wounding and the physiology of wound healing."

Completing its catalogue of Pentagon needs for which Princeton might put its scientific expertise on sale, the memo says there is money available for research about recruitment, selection, organizational effectiveness, morale and cohesiveness, military training, and computer/human interfaces. More specifically, the memo notes that the DOD is "concerned with the interactions of a somewhat poorly educated volunteer force with sophisticated weapons systems." "Perhaps," says the memo, "some of our psychology and sociology faculty may be interested in pursuing this area for research support."

PRINCETON'S TRADITION

Princeton Researchers have conducted DOD research in the past - sometimes in violation of University regulations. For instance, the dean of Princeton's Engineering School, Robert G. Jahn, a recipient of the ORPA memo, conducted $123,200 worth of rocket research for the Rocket Propulsion Laboratory of Edwards Air Force Base in 1979-80. Princeton's regulations require that the "primary goal" of sponsored research "should be a significant contribution to knowledge rather than product development," i.e., basic research. Jahn, who has a Pentagon security clearance, undertook this weapons related research even though he was told by the ORPA that "the Rocket Propulsion Laboratory has no authority to sponsor 'basic research.'"

Princeton University regulations also require that the University, except under extraordinary circumstances, "not as a matter of policy, accept any contracts or grants for the support of classified research." The rationale for this regulation is evident in the case of Jahn, who apparently lied about a recent DOD assignment. In January 1980, Jahn visited the DOD's Ballistic Missile Defense Advanced Technology Center in Huntsville, Alabama for four days of secret discussions concerning psychokinesis and its possible use in ballistic missile defense. When asked by the alternative Princeton paper Forerunner about this assignment, Jahn stated "that he had had no discussions with military personnel about parapsychology, and affirmed that he had never gone to a military establishment to discuss this subject."

Princeton Professor D. C. Hazen undertook a 1979 study, "Long Endurance High Capability Aircraft" sponsored by the Navy Air Development Center. According to the original proposal, this was to research "ballistic, or cruise missiles" and "particle beam weapons to attack incoming missiles." After Princeton University's Research Board (URB) reviewed the original research proposal, this wording was changed to "high energy lasers and particle beam devices," but the objectives of...
the study were the same.

Another example of hiding weapons development research involved the "Small Grain Propellant Burning Rate Measurements" study in 1976-78 by Professors L. Caveny and M. Summerfield of the Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering (MAE) Department. The unnamed "propellant" was cannon propellant though all references in the research contract to the word "cannon" were deleted at the request of ORPA, the administrative arm of the URB. The May 10, 1976 request admits that "these changes in no way affect the objective or scope of work." For this study, the Army supplied samples of M-1 cannon propellant. Caveny and Summerfield were to develop "an on line rapid functional test to... assure acceptable product." This was clearly product development and not basic research. Caveny and Summerfield used some 1,358 classified reports for the study.

Additional applied military research (identical in nature to that mentioned in the ORPA memo) was a 1978 evaluation of the curriculum of the U.S. Naval Test Pilot School. This evaluation, by D. C. Hazen, was "concerned with the relevance and quality of the instruction, both academic and flight, as related to the specific requirements of the Naval Air Test Center." Hazen was chairperson of the Naval Research Advisory Committee which analyzes long-term combat capability concerns for the Navy and Marine Corps. For this work, which used classified information, Hazen received the Navy's Distinguished Public Service Award in 1977.

Additional reports for the study included research on cannon propellant development and a 1978 study of the MX missile system employing small submarines to hold the missiles instead of the "race-track" system. Francis W. Perkins of Princeton's Astrophysical Sciences Department and Roger F. Dashen of the IAS have researched the application of technology to anti-submarine warfare for JASON.

More recently, Dyson's JASON work included researching shallow underwater missiles, which are a new version of the MX missile system employing small submarines to hold the missiles instead of the "race-track" system. Francis W. Perkins of Princeton's Astrophysical Sciences Department and Roger F. Dashen of the IAS have researched the application of technology to anti-submarine warfare for JASON.

JASON

Princeton researchers have even been directly involved in nuclear war preparations. Freeman Dyson of Princeton's Institute for Advanced Studies (IAS) participated in a study of the feasibility of using tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam during the war. He told the Forerunner that the study arose in dismayed reaction to a "certain gentleman's" suggestion that "we drop a nuke on them occasionally."

Dyson's work was for a JASON project. Jason, according to the Institute for Defense Analyses, "is an unusual organization with a special role in the defense community." During the 1960s the Jasons researched anti-ballistic missiles and strategic policy and helped design the electronic battlefield - used in Vietnam and today in the Western Sahara. Founding members of JASON included then-Princeton faculty members Marvin Goldberger, Eugene Wigner, John A. Wheeler, and Oskar Morgenstern. Princeton University Physics Department chairperson, Val Fitch, co-authored a 1967 JASON study entitled "Air Sown Mines for Specialized Purposes."

CONCLUSION

In sum, Princeton University has personnel who have done (and are doing) DOD research in all of the areas mentioned in the ORPA memo. Secondly, the URB and the ORPA have countenanced and covered-up DOD research in violation of Princeton's regulations. In addition, certain powerful University officials seem to have difficulty interpreting the most basic Princeton guidelines. Professor Robert M. May, chairperson of the URB, for example, told the Forerunner that he cannot define what "basic" research is. "He explains that decisions on acceptability are reached by 'consensual case law' - 'where to draw the line varies from person to person' but for each individual project, the URB reaches a consensus by discussion."

Seymour M. Bogdonoff is chairperson of Princeton's Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering Department and a member and former chairperson of the Science and Technology Advisory Group of the Air Force Scientific
Advisory Board. He has carried on a series of aerodynamic experiments for over 30 years. One such recent study (done with I. E. Vas and other Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering Department professors) using classified material was the "Blunte Fin-Induced Shock Wave Boundary Layer Interactions" sponsored by the Navy's Surface Weapons Center and Naval Air Systems Command from 1975 to 1980. In 1969, Bogdonoff received the Air Force's highest civilian award for supervising "studies on such Air Force planes as the C-5, B-52, F-11, advanced manned strategic aircraft, V/STOL aircraft and air-to-air missiles, among other projects."

In 1981, Bogdonoff taught a Princeton University graduate course studying the design of "various classes of propulsion devices for aircraft and missiles" - weapons development in the classroom. Still, Bogdonoff stated that his studies are fundamental research. "We don't work on application. But what we do has a lot of applications... We don't do anything unless we think there are important applications. The thing that I do, I do to benefit my society in some way." Concluding, Bogdonoff asserted that "I like working for the DOD - and you can write that if you like. They've supported us in basic research for years." Similarly, Princeton's Francis Perkins said: "Consulting for the DOD is a benefit to society."

With such a tradition and attitude, there can be little doubt that Princeton will gladly service the Pentagon's desires - from CBW to nuclear war - as articulated in the ORPA memo. Contrary to this tradition, many members of Princeton's student body and faculty are protesting against Reagan's policies ranging from nuclear war strategy to U.S. intervention in El Salvador. Halting Princeton University research which provides the underpinning of everything from nuclear weapons to U.S. intervention in El Salvador, is a logical step.

FOOTNOTES

1) Princeton University; Department: ORPA; To: Distribution; From: J. Anderson and M. Sittig; Subject: DOD Basic Research Report; 27 August 1981. (Copies of this memo are available from Counterspy for $1.50.) Unless otherwise signified, all quotations in the article are from this memo.
2) U.S. Senate, Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification, Joint Hearing, Select Committee on Intelligence and Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Committee on Human Resources, 95th Congress, 1st Session, GPO, 96-408, Washington, D.C., 8/3/77, pp. 68-69.
4) Cf supra, #2, p. 68.
5) Ibid., p. 69.
8) Ibid., p. 52.
9) Ibid., p. 61.
10) Ibid., p. 21.
11) Ibid.
12) Ibid.
13) Ibid.
14) Ibid.
15) Ibid., p. 29.
16) Ibid., p. 22.
17) Ibid.
18) Cf supra, #2, p. 91.
19) Ibid., p. 90.
20) "Princeton Inextricably Connected with Military, Industrial, Nuclear Interests," The Forerunner, 2/10/81. This well-documented examination of Princeton University's military research and development programs was prepared by Princeton Math Professor Laurie Kirby and the Forerunner staff. This issue of the Forerunner, a now-defunct alternative, independent student newspaper, is available from Counterspy for $1.00.

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CIA Targets African Economies
by Konrad Ege

We're pleased, says the CIA, with the "exceptional" quality of the information provided on military corruption in Zaire. "Keep it flowing," but "supplement" it with reporting on "civilian corruption, including names and positions." The CIA is also curious about who can be bribed in the Liberian government, and asks for details about "corruption and graft" in Nigeria which are said to be "a part of daily business and government activity" there. The present situation in Zaire - increasing impoverishment of the mass of the population and mounting wealth of a ruling elite - underscores that government corruption maintains poverty in Africa. Nonetheless, the CIA continues to use corruption for its own ends since it is the cheapest way to sustain U.S. corporate profits.

The CIA's requests for a virtual "Who's Who" in corruptability are only a fraction of the revealing questions contained in the CIA's Economic Alert List (EAL) for Africa, a confidential document prepared by the Chairperson of the Subcommittee on Requirements and Coordination of the Director of the CIA's Economic Intelligence Committee. The Africa EAL is published twice a year; the one obtained by CounterSpy covers the period from October 1981 to March 1982.

EAL's, which are prepared for each of eight regions of the world, highlight the "current economic information needs" of the "Washington economic Community." They serve as guidelines for "field reporters" of all the agencies participating in the Combined Economic Reporting Program (CERP). CERP is responsible for coordinating all economic intelligence gathering done by the U.S. government. The "Washington economic Community" includes the Departments of State, Labor, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Energy, Interior and Transportation; the Export-Import Bank, the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of Management and Budget and the International Trade Commission; but also the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency; and the Army, Navy and Air Force as well as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

To supplement this intelligence gathering, CIA economists, according to CIA Director William Casey, now meet "regularly" with "groups of scholars, advisors and practitioners in international business." Undoubtedly, these meetings are also used to tailor the CIA's tasks according to U.S. corporate objectives. Soon after taking office, Casey ordered the head of the National Foreign Assessment Center, John McMahon,* to make sure that "our intelligence collection, analysis, and estimating is augmented, checked and evaluated in every possible way by knowledgeable people and institutions in the private sector."

Economic intelligence gathering, said Casey, is "increasingly important." The Africa EAL (which covers all African countries except Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and the Western Sahara) emphasizes that the continent is an area "of high interest to the economic community." The reasons are obvious. Africa has tremendous mineral and oil wealth. Many of the EAL questions focus on these resources: oil production in countries such as Nigeria, Cameroon, the Ivory Coast and Sudan; uranium production in Niger, Chad and Mali; and mining in Southern Africa. While the EAL expresses concern about the "Communist role," the CIA is equally worried about competition from U.S. allies for African markets.

The CIA began to focus on economic issues in Africa only in the 1960s. A CIA-censored history of the CIA prepared for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reports that: "With the emergence of independent African nations in the early 1960's, and the view that the U.S.S.R.

* After Bobby Inman announced his resignation, McMahon was appointed Deputy CIA Director.

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CERP
COMBINED ECONOMIC REPORTING PROGRAM

Economic Alert List

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREWORD

The Economic Alert List (EAL) highlights the current economic information needs of all members of the Washington economic Community.* It is intended to be a current guidance document for use by field reporters of all agencies participating in the Combined Economic Reporting Program (CERP). Individual collectors may determine in view of their local situation the manner and extent to which they respond to EAL items in their formal program of reporting. When field reports are prepared in response to EAL items, however, the EAL should be shown as a reference. Department of State posts are reminded that telegrams and airgrams prepared in response to EAL guidance should show the reference tag EALR.

The Africa EAL is published semiannually. Items are classified separately and bear the classification (C) CONFIDENTIAL or (U) UNCLASSIFIED.

The EAL is coordinated and produced by the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Requirements and Coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI) Economic Intelligence Committee. Overseas distribution is made through the auspices of the Department of State as executive manager of the Combined Economic Reporting Program. Comments and suggestions are encouraged and should be directed to:

Chairman, EIC Subcommittee
Room 3E 58
CIA Headquarters Building
Washington, D.C. 20505
Telephone 351-5396

would engage in political and economic penetration of the fledgling governments, demands for information on the economies of these countries developed." At the same time, "the growing economic strength of Japan and the other countries of Western Europe produced a related decline in the U.S. competitive posture and reflected the growing inadequacy of the dollar dominated international monetary system. Economic analysts found themselves called upon for detailed research on these countries as trading partners and rivals of the United States." In 1967 the CIA set up a special office, the Office of Economic Research, to deal with competition from U.S. allies.

Economic intelligence gathering, conducted by overt and covert means, is not limited, though, to obtaining information

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for the immediate benefit of U.S. corporations. A 1964 Industrial College of the Armed Forces textbook bluntly describes a broader application of EAL-type operations: "Economic intelligence has had a close historical relationship to economic warfare." The conduct of economic warfare, used frequently as a tool of U.S. foreign policy, includes the creation of what the textbook calls "blacklists" of merchants "discovered to be doing business with unfriendly countries" and imposing export controls. Economic intelligence "is called on to assist in the selection of products whose export would be to the strategic advantage of unfriendly countries."

Other economic warfare measures include freezing funds and preclusive buying, which "involves the purchase of items for the sole purpose of preventing their procurement by the enemy." The decision to engage in "preclusive buying," a rather expensive operation, "depends on a determination by economic intelligence that the product is in short supply and is extremely vital for enemy war production."

U.S. economic warfare operations also include withholding food aid, pressuring international lending institutions not to make loans to countries "hostile" to U.S. policy (Vietnam and Grenada are recent examples), trade blockades (Cuba and Libya, for instance) and the destruction of key sectors of the economies of so-called unfriendly nations (examples: forcing down the price of copper to destabilize Salvador Allende's government in Chile, and introducing biological agents to destroy crops and livestock in Cuba). To conduct these economic warfare operations effectively, good economic intelligence is a must.

Clearly, the Africa EAL asks for information applicable to economic warfare. In addition, it demands reports assessing the investment climate for U.S. corporations and prospects for certain types of industries and mining in Africa. EAL questions on countries "friendly" to the U.S. government are concerned with measures the U.S. should take to shore up their economies, thus stabilizing pro-U.S. governments and maintaining these countries as profitable markets.

The desire to manipulate African societies particularly through corruption is a key reason for the existence of the EALs. In addition to Liberia, Zaire and Nigeria, as mentioned above, the CIA requests information on corruption in Cameroon, Chad, the Congo, Kenya ("We are interested in attempts by any members of the government to gain personal economic advantages through their positions."); Malawi, Sierra Leone, Senegal ("We need continued reporting on the details of corruption and graft in Senegalese business and government...,"), and Niger. Detailed intelligence on corruption in government, especially on a name-by-name basis, is obviously crucial for the CIA's recruitment efforts and for manipulation of African governments.

A country-by-country analysis of the Economic Alert List illustrates the CIA's primary intentions to be served by these guidelines: promote U.S. corporations and increase U.S. government influence in Africa.
Angola: The most detailed questions in the EAL are about Angola. Keep up the good work, says the CIA: "Reporting on economic policy, oil, diamond, and coffee production, food shortages and labor problems has kept us abreast of economic trends in Angola despite the cutoff of official data. Our requirements are for more of the same." The EAL demands precise information on President Dos Santos' "role and influence on economic policy" and wants to know who the "principal Angolan economic decisionmakers" are. Likewise, the CIA is concerned about Angola's economic collaboration with other African countries, Brazil and Western Europe. On the issue of oil, the CIA wants to be informed about Angola's petroleum reserves and the potential for expanding the role of U.S. companies in exploiting the oil resources.

Benin: "Development of the Seme oil field is underway. Report on any service contracts and marketing arrangements signed by the government and anticipated production levels."

Botswana: The CIA notes that activity in the "minerals, mining and petroleum sectors... is increasing rapidly." The CIA is also interested in "prospects for changes in domestic economic policy" and wants to know "how an oil embargo or other economic sanctions against South Africa would affect Botswana."

Cameroon: Cameroon, with its newly found oil wealth (production is expected to be 200,000 barrels a day by 1985) is on its way to becoming a country of special interest for U.S. corporations. Exxon, Gulf, Mobil and Texaco are already involved in Cameroon's petroleum business. Asks the CIA: "Report on continuing government efforts to acquire equity shares in foreign oil companies." And, the status of "liquefied natural gas export projects is of considerable interest."

Central African Republic: The CAR, economically dominated by France, appears to be a country where the U.S. sees the potential for increasing U.S. influence. "Report on Bangui's changing relations with France under Mitterand [sic]. Is French economic aid on the decline? Are other nations moving to replace the French influence by increasing their own levels of assistance to the CAR?"

Chad: A key section of the EAL's request on Chad is information on corruption. "Continue reporting on corruption and graft in Chadian business and government, especially names and positions of officials and groups, amounts siphoned abroad, and economic impact." Chad is a country where the power structure is not well established. The potential for an organized takeover of power by persons friendly to U.S. interests is great. Identifying Chadian officials or political leaders likely to be responsive to U.S. payoffs can be an important step in that direction.

Comoros: The CIA demands "basic economic and financial data," and is "concerned principally with the nation's ability to grow on its narrow resource base." The CIA is also interested in "any initiative for an economic pact between the Comoros, Seychelles and Mauritius."

Congo: The Congo is another country where the U.S. government appears to see a chance to increase its economic leverage. "Continue to report on efforts to attract foreign investment and increase Western and Chinese aid. How are these efforts affected by and how do they affect the Congo's relations with France and the Soviet Union?" The CIA also expresses concern for the well-being of U.S. oil corporations in the Congo (Mobil and Texaco): "Report on government efforts to acquire equity shares in foreign oil companies."

Djibouti: The CIA wants to know about "any economic trade or aid agreements" between Djibouti (which harbors a vital naval base for the West, see CounterSpy, vol.5 no.4) and Ethiopia, Libya and Somalia.

Equatorial Guinea: In addition to interest for oil production in Equatorial Guinea, the CIA wants to know how "Soviet efforts to reestablish the fishing base at Luba" can be thwarted. "Are other alternatives available to Equatorial Guinea in getting much needed technical assistance in the fishing sector or is the government likely to turn back to Moscow for aid? Spain has offered some assistance in this regard but appears to be experiencing problems."

Ethiopia: The CIA requires detailed information on the role of Soviet and Cu-
ban advisors in Ethiopia and economic problems, "particularly shortages in urban markets." It also wants to know about "mineralogical surveys and exploration for deposits..., especially in the Ogaden," an area in dispute between Ethiopia and U.S.-backed Somalia.

Gaben: Concluding that the government of Gabon has "poorly handled oil revenues" the CIA asks for reports on "continuing problems, including corruption." The CIA also requests reports on oil exploration efforts, timber production and manganese, uranium and iron exploitation.

The Gambia: The EAL asks about Gambia's agricultural problems, fishing industry, and "economic costs and benefits of the Senegambia Confederation" which became effective on January 1, 1982.

Ghana: The CIA is interested in prospects for the recovery of Ghana's gold industry, developments of the oil industry, the "effects of any labor action on workers, individual companies, or the general economy," and in Ghana's relations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which has just dictated an austerity program for that country. "Is there other bilateral aid available with or without an IMF agreement?"

Guinea: The CIA wants reports about Liberian-Guinean maritime collaboration and "any port/terminal construction designed for the export of bauxite or iron ore."

Guinea-Bissau: Previous reporting on this country appears to have been sketchy, since the CIA asks for "all basic economic data," as well as information about Spanish, Portuguese and Soviet influence on Guinea-Bissau's economy.

Ivory Coast: The Ivory Coast, hosting 100 U.S. companies (some 20 were set up in 1980 alone), is of great interest to the U.S. The CIA is especially concerned with the exploitation of Ivorian oil which might make the Ivory Coast the second largest African producer by 1988 with 400,000 barrels a day. Much of the oil and natural gas production in the Ivory Coast is controlled by Exxon, Mobil and Texaco. Asks the CIA, "We need continuing reporting on recent oil discoveries, production and trade." But the U.S. is also worried about the high foreign debt of the Ivory Coast and Ivorian "compliance with IMF [International Monetary Fund] standby agreements and the economic impact of the fiscal austerity program."

Kenya: The U.S. government is worried about domestic unrest in Kenya, which harbors U.S. military bases and has been one of the most loyal U.S. allies in Africa. "Kenya continues to experience temporary shortages of food for both humans and livestock, report on food supply problems and the effect of shortages on the stability of the government." And, "how are foreign investors and bankers reacting to the Moi government's inability to resolve the country's economic problems?"

Lesotho: The U.S. still needs "basic statistical information on the economy of Lesotho," and wants reports about "changes in economic relations with South Africa" and Lesotho's diamond industry. The CIA also asks for an assessment of "foreign investors' interest in setting up production centers in Lesotho geared mainly for the South African market." Finally, the EAL wants reports on "any moves by South Africa against ANC [African National Congress] movements in Lesotho."

Liberia: While asking for reports on "any corrupt practices by the new leaders" (the government of U.S.-trained Samuel Doe), the CIA wants to know about the viability of Liberia's iron ore industry and "the dependability of Liberia's oil supply, particularly the relationship with... Saudi Arabia."

Madagascar: The CIA wants information on "the extent of Soviet influence in the economy" and asks for reports on "the general outlook by the citizens of Madagascar on economic policies and their reactions to the failure of [President Didier] Ratsiraka to solve the country's economic problems."

Malawi: Reports on foreign trade, agricultural production and "on all aspects of Malawi's transport links to ocean ports and Zambia, with particular reference to the railroad through Mozambique" are requested, as well as updates on "Malawian laborers in South Africa, i.e., numbers, wage remittances, contract terms, etc."

Mali: The most recent Commerce Depart-
ment International Marketing Information Series issue on Mali warns that there are still considerable obstacles for U.S. investment in Mali, and the CIA wants to know about the possibilities for U.S. companies in Mali's uranium exploration activities. In addition, it asks for reports "on the investment climate and the warmer economic relations with the West, especially France."

Mauritius: The CIA wants to know about Soviet fishing in Mauritius, Mauritius' attitude toward the law of the sea, balance of payment problems and "any economic policy issue proposed by the Mauritius Militant Movement... to increase its chances of replacing [Prime Minister Seewoosagur] Ramgoolam's administration." The MMI wants the Indian Ocean to be a zone of peace, while the Ramgoolam government, backed financially by South Africa, opens Mauritius' ports to the U.S. Navy.

Mozambique: The CIA's questions about Mozambique are perhaps the most indicting section of the Africa EAL. The CIA raises questions about the success of Mozambique's moves to sever economic ties with South Africa. It asks for reports about Mozambique's growing ties with other countries in the region, "especially highlighting ability to provide a viable alternative to South Africa's transportation network for South African states," mainly Zimbabwe and Swaziland. The CIA wants information about "foreign aid agreements designed to upgrade the ports, roads and railroads." In addition, the CIA asks for reports about South African reactions and a "possible increase" in Mozambican Resistance Movement (MRM) activities "as a result of this important move for economic independence." In other words, the CIA admits that the MRM (a Jonas Savimbi-type movement) is an instrument of South Africa. In fact, the South African military set up this movement in 1977, consisting of South Africans and a few disgruntled Mozambicans. With the active assistance of the South African military, this movement has since terrorized the population in one of Mozambique's provinces, and has carried out attacks specifically against the transportation system. (See CounterSpy, vol.6 no.2.)

Namibia: The CIA's questions about Namibia indicate that the U.S. is apparently counting on a "resolution" of the Namibia problem that favors South African interests. The CIA, for example, asks about "South African economic planning for Namibian independence" and wants an examination of "the importance of a South African controlled Walvis Bay to an independent Namibia." Walvis Bay is, of course, Namibia's most important port, and the South African apartheid regime insists that it will remain South African even after independence. For SWAPO, Namibia's liberation movement, such a demand is absolutely unacceptable. Nevertheless, the CIA does not ask for economic intelligence on the importance a Namibian controlled Walvis Bay would have for an independent Namibia. On economic matters, the EAL asks for information about uranium mining and "production and prospecting of other minerals such as diamonds and base metals."

Niger: Niger's economy "is becoming more dependent on uranium mining as a source of revenue." A Commerce Department report says that "the most promising field for American investors and export-minded manufacturers remains in the mineral sector." Presently, Conoco and Marathon Oil are engaged in uranium prospecting in Niger; Exxon, Fluor Corporation and Davy-McKee are likewise involved in the exploitation of Niger's resources. For these reasons, the CIA asks for detailed information on Niger's uranium development.

Nigeria: The EAL demands continued reports on "Nigeria's growing leadership role in Black Africa, particularly with..."
respect to trying to force a Southern African settlement." A major section of the CIA's requests is devoted to Nigeria's oil industry. In addition, the CIA states that the Washington economic community "is often engaged in projecting balance-of-payment positions of OPEC countries. Nigerian forecasts could benefit from periodic Embassy estimates of import and non-oil export growth and service payments." This request is interesting in light of efforts by U.S. oil companies (Mobil, Texaco and Gulf Oil) and foreign oil companies in the spring of 1982 to force down the Nigerian oil price. In a concerted move, these companies have drastically cut their buying from Nigeria because it refuses to lower its oil price below the OPEC level of $34 per barrel. The sudden loss of revenue is aggravating Nigeria's balance-of-payment problems.

If the oil companies succeed in driving down Nigeria's oil price, the country would have to produce 2.2 million barrels a day, as compared to 1.3 million now. Walter McDonald, a former Director of the CIA's Energy Operations, thinks that Nigeria wouldn't be able to do that for very long. Certainly, advance information, such as that demanded by the CIA's EAL, on Nigeria's balance of payment and other economic problems, would help in strategizing to bring down Nigerian oil prices. After all, Nigeria is considered the "weakest link in OPEC."

Sao Tome and Principe: The CIA still needs basic data on this island nation's economy. Specifically, "more information is needed on Sao Tome and Principe's plans to develop its fishing industry. What is the potential for Soviet exploitation of the local industry?"

Senegal: In addition to information about "corruption and graft" in Senegal, the EAL praises past economic reporting on Senegal as "excellent," and urges a continuation of "the high standards and volume of reporting on all aspects of fiscal and monetary developments, balance-of-payments, agriculture, industry and mining."

Seychelles: The CIA wants to know about fishery agreements "between the Seychellian [sic] and Communist nations" and about "government intervention in the economy."

Sierra Leone: "Economic reporting on

Sierra Leone has been excellent. Please continue the high standards and volume of reporting on all aspects of fiscal and monetary developments, balance-of-payments, agriculture, industry and mining."

This "excellent economic reporting" on Sierra Leone is reflected in a U.S. Commerce Department report for potential U.S. investors in Sierra Leone. It states that "there are some attractive prospects" for U.S. investors in mining, agriculture and manufacturing. However, the Commerce Department warns, the "political stability" of the Sierra Leonian government is questionable. "Since its independence in 1961, Sierra Leone has had three successful coups and a number of unsuccessful attempts."

Somalia: The CIA is primarily interested in "increases in military and economic aid from the West, from OPEC nations, and the People's Republic of China" and in the "exploitation of Somali uranium deposits [and] oil drilling by Western companies."

South Africa: The CIA wants to know primarily how the South African regime deals with problems resulting from its international isolation. For example, "we continue to need detailed information on oil imports... and on alternative measures spawned by oil shortages--rationing, coal liquefaction, ethanol, etc." South Africa's gold marketing strategies, production of uranium, platinum and chrome are other areas of interest. "We also continue to need reporting on... the progress of South Africa's nuclear program...; scientific and technical exchanges in nuclear fields (travel of delegations, etc.); and, especially the source of enriched fuel for Koeberg."

Finally, the CIA takes a great interest in "the development of a black middle class and increasing numbers of blacks in skilled and semiskilled jobs." The development of this Black middle class is an important tool - used simultaneously with brutal repression against the majority of Blacks - in an effort to divide the South African liberation struggle. A fairly wealthy Black middle class, no matter how small it might be, also provides good ammunition for South Africa's propaganda campaign abroad.

The CIA is satisfied with information it has on Black trade unions. "Reporting
on black labor activities has been very good." However, the CIA still needs "statistics, research, or reporting on the black consumer market and/or the black contributing to GDP [Gross Domestic Product]."

The CIA appears to be worried about the possibility that all Organization of African Unity (OAU) members will make good on their pledge to bar South African planes from landing and flying in their air space. Presently, in violation of an OAU resolution, Malawi, Ivory Coast, Mauritius and Botswana allow South African planes to land. The blockade of the other OAU members is already creating considerable difficulties and much prolonged flight routes for South Africa. The CIA wants to be informed whether the rest of Africa "could successfully blockade South Africa's international air corridor." In addition, the CIA wants to be kept up-to-date about the decreasing transportation dependence on South Africa by the Frontline States.

Sudan: The CIA wants continued reports "on Sudan's labor movement and the impact of the June 1981 railroad strike ... on labor's activities and ambitions." Other EAL questions are directed toward Sudan's economic problems ("Report details of the current balance-of-payments situation and... report on the effect of IMF mandated agricultural policy reforms.") and the potential of Sudan's oil industry: "Report on senior officials who are responsible for petroleum production and/or policy. Will Sharif al-Tuhami, Minister of Energy and Mining, be the chief policymaker for petroleum, or will another cabinet-level position (such as Minister of Petroleum) be formed? Biographic information on Umar Haj al-Shaykh, Director of the General Petroleum Corporation, is needed."

U.S. interest in Sudan's oil reserves is no surprise. The U.S. government, as illustrated by the EAL, is well aware of Sudan's economic problems (a Commerce Department report predicts that Sudan "will experience serious difficulties throughout the 1980s.") Oil is seen as the only way out for Sudan's pro-U.S. regime. An official of Chevron Overseas Petroleum Inc., which along with Mobil is exploring Sudanese oil reserves, stated that exporting oil "is the only way Sudan can turn its economy around." So far, it is not assured that Sudan's oil reserves will do more than just cover that country's domestic consumption requirements.

Swaziland: The CIA wants to know what measures the government is taking "to shift from South Africa as the sole supplier" of oil, and what problems Swaziland is encountering "in shipping its international trade through Maputo, Mozambique."

Tanzania: The EAL asks for information about food problems and Tanzania's "acrimonious relationship with the IMF and its possible effect on the international donor community." Finally, "as [President Julius] Nyerere and his advisors grapple with the failure of the economy, continue to report on individuals involved in economic policy and planning and the debate on economic reform."

Togo: The CIA is interested in phosphate mining, uranium development and Togo's balance-of-payments, foreign debt and budgetary problems.

Uganda: In addition to general reporting on Uganda's "financial and budgetary problems," the CIA wants reports on military costs and "on all aspects of Uganda's military and economic relationships with neighboring countries."

Upper Volta: Reports on "the magnitude and sources of foreign aid, particularly from France and OPEC," and on "the status of mineral exploration efforts--gold, uranium, and nickel" are requested.

Zaire: The EAL questions about Zaire reflect U.S. government concern about the stability of the Mobutu government. The
CIA wants to know about "Zaire's progress in maintaining the guidelines of the IMF Extended Fund Facility." It also asks for reports on "individuals involved in Zaire's economic policy and planning. Of particular interest are real influence on [President] Mobutu and positions in the power structure, including technical expertise." The CIA also wants detailed information about Zaire's mineral production and the development of an oil industry in Zaire.

Corruption in Zaire is no secret. Former Prime Minister of Zaire, Nguza Karl-I-Bond, for example, gave a detailed report in a hearing before the House Subcommittee on Africa in September 1981. The CIA, as the EAL illustrates, has its own independent confirmation of corruption in Zaire's military; nevertheless, U.S. support for Mobutu, put in power by the CIA in 1965, continues unabated.

Zambia: Zambia's economy, says the CIA, has come to a "virtual standstill." Therefore, the CIA wants reports on "continuing economic problems and their effect on the political stability/instability of the country." In addition, information on Zambia's copper, uranium and cobalt mining is requested. As with other Frontline States, the CIA wants information on the status of outlets other than South Africa for Zambia's products.

Zimbabwe: The CIA's key question: "Is [Prime Minister Robert] Mugabe likely to continue the moderate conciliatory policies that he has pursued since independence, particularly in land reform, staffing of civil and military services, education and health, and general economic reconstruction?" The CIA also wants information on foreign aid needs and the possibility that the government will expand "ties with Socialist countries should [its] aid expectations not be met by Western donors." The EAL also expresses concern for "white morale and emigration" and demands information about the number of "applications for emigration allowances pending with the Reserve Bank," airline bookings, "liquidation and/or smuggling of assets by white families," and the "backlog of local moving companies for overseas shipment." Finally, the CIA wants "manpower information in order to evaluate the capabilities of an independent government," and reports on "foreign business response to the government's desire to become more involved in strategic sectors, particularly mining."

RESOURCE WARS

In an appearance before the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee soon after taking office, Secretary of State General Alexander Haig announced that "the era of the Resource War has arrived." In this war, the U.S. government is using a range of weapons: covert operations to overthrow governments, supporting "rebel movements" against "hostile governments," backing ruthless dictators with arms, training and economic aid (Zaire and Morocco, for instance), heavy economic pressure through international lending institutions, and giving or withholding "aid."

A main target of General Haig's Resource War is Africa, a continent of vast wealth, and a continent that has been systematically underdeveloped by colonial powers for centuries. The U.S. and certain European countries are still exploiting African resources, and deliberately preventing the establishment of economies that would serve the interests of all African people. To intervene effectively and at strategic points for the profit of the U.S. and its multinational corporations, the CIA urgently needs information about resources and African economic policies. And the purpose of the EAL is to systematize and improve the gathering of this intelligence.
Honduras is the springboard for U.S. intervention in Central America. This suddenly strategic U.S. ally of some four million people, however, has feet of clay. With a per capita income of $390, Honduras has been characterized by the World Bank as "one of the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere and predominantly a land of small farmers obtaining a meager living by primitive methods." With the prices of its two key exports, coffee and bananas, plummeting in the current international recession, the country's Gross National Product (GNP) growth rate last year was zero.

Honduras is thus a central concern of the "Caribbean Basin Initiative" which President Reagan is setting into motion. Under the plan, Honduras is slated to receive $15.3 million in military aid and $63 million in economic assistance in the coming year. But official aid will not suffice to gear up the Honduran economy to support the counterrevolutionary military role that the U.S. government wants the country to play. Huge infusions of foreign capital will clearly have to come from the multinational corporations and private banks.

This will not be easy, since Honduras not only suffers from the reluctance of the big banks to sink more capital into the debt-strapped Third World, but its government is also embroiled in major conflicts with U.S. business interests. There is, for instance, the bitter struggle with Texaco. Presently, practically the whole country is united against the oil giant, which is seeking to raise the prices of gasoline and other oil products to offset what it claims to be losses incurred in refining oil purchased by the government in bilateral agreements with Mexico and Venezuela. In a power play, Texaco withheld supplies in 1981, causing shortages in many parts of the country. In response, representatives of various social groups raised the cry for nationalization, forcing the government to come up with a plan to buy the Texaco refinery.

The other major tangle involves the Central Bank and the U.S. creditors of an investment bank, Banfinan, which collapsed in 1980. U.S. banks like the First National Bank of Boston and the Citizens and Southern International Bank of New Orleans are fighting to free some of the assets of the bankrupt institution from the control of the Central Bank.

The Reagan administration has now forcefully stepped into the fray and told the newly installed government of President Roberto Suazo Cordova that, in the interest of regional security, Honduras must make peace with Texaco and the banks. A remarkably direct secret State Department memorandum handed to the president at his inauguration in late January 1982 instructs him, "as an early priority, to seek negotiations with Texaco with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement that allows the refinery to operate at a reasonable profit...." On the Banfinan controversy, the directive leaked to Counterspy magazine by a high-level Honduran government source states:

*The failure of Honduran financial institutions and treatment of foreign investors has complicated relations with foreign banks and inhibited the flow of commercial credits. We support early consultations with the affected banks to seek a mutually agreeable solution to the problem.*

The State Department memorandum, however, goes beyond ordering the Honduran government to mend its fences with specific corporations and financial groups and to develop "an aggressive program to attract new investment." It represents an effort to transfer Reagan's austerity program for the United States to a Third World country. Some of the guidelines, in fact, leap right out of Adam Smith, such as the instruction to "strengthen and streamline the public administration by reducing the functions of the Government to only those

*As asked to comment on the document, Honduran desk officer Manuel Roche of the State Department admitted that the contents of the document were "in line with the spirit of the administration's approach to Honduras."

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Groups are usually reserved for the larger
Philippines, and India, which receive much
prized
however, provide a multilateral smoke­
that is at the moment needed by U.S. pol­
policy in the region,
40
greater
screen for bilateral aims - something
order priorities in a way that would maxi­
mized by the World Bank, which would help
Third World countries like Indonesia, the
socialism, the Reaganites' bogeyman:
Divestiture of non-productive enter­
prises and extraneous activities of
such... agencies as BANADESA [National
Agricultural Development Bank], CONADI
[National Industrial Development Cor­
poration] and INA [National Agrarian
Reform Institute], COHBAANA [National
Banana Corporation], and COHDEPOR
[National Forestry Development Corpo­
rations] headed by the Bank, which would help
new government ownership commitments
of this sort.
The two agencies which will supervise the
implementation of Reagan's Honduran plan
are the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) - supposedly apoliti­
cal institutions which are now being bra­
zenly employed by the United States gov­
ernment to achieve its bilateral foreign
policy aims.
We're being sucked into the Central
American conflict," complains an officer
of the World Bank's Latin America country
programs division. Indeed, the State De­
partment bluntly informs the Honduran gov­
ernment that "we would support the forma­
tion of a Consultative Group for Honduras
headed by the World Bank, which would help
order priorities in a way that would maxi­
imize the quantity and effectiveness of
foreign donor assistance."
This plan to create a Consultative
Group - an informal body composed of most
countries and agencies that provide eco­
omic assistance - has apparently sur­
prised many at the Bank since Consultative
Groups are usually reserved for the larger
Third World countries like Indonesia, the
Philippines, and India, which receive much
greater quantities of foreign assistance.
Consultative Groups headed by the Bank,
however, provide a multilateral smoke­
screen for bilateral aims - something
that is at the moment needed by U.S. pol­
icy in the region.
While World Bank aid is offered as the
carrot, the Bank's sister agency, the IMF,
is mandated to wield the disciplinarian's
stick. Honduras is currently under a
stringent IMF "stabilization program" con­
sisting of a wide range of tax increases
in return for a credit of $55 million to
tide the country over its balance of pay­
ments difficulties. Despite the wide­
spread public opposition to the ongoing
"cure," the State Department recommends
another IMF standby credit - this time in
exchange for "a realistic monetary and
fiscal framework of government budget con­
rol.
Both the Bank and the IMF are to coop­
erate in weaning Honduran industry away
from an "import substitution" strategy di­
rected at satisfying domestic demand to a
program of "export-led industrialization"
aimed at producing labor intensive light
manufactured commodities for the U.S. mar­
et.
If the U.S. objective is the creation
of a stable counterrevolutionary base, it
seems fairly clear that the Reagan econom­
ic blueprint for Honduras is guaranteed to
fail. Lifting the ceilings on basic neces­
sities and cutting government social
spending will increase the already wide­
spread unrest among the peasantry and ur­
ban labor. Giving foreign investors even
more favorable incentives and intensifying
the IMF program of tax increases will only
further alienate the fragile national in­
dustrial elite, some of whom are already
in open rebellion against the Fund. Fos­
tering a development strategy of export­
led growth at a time of deepening interna­
tional recession is nothing short of sui­
cidal - as many Asian countries who have
adopted the World Bank-IMF prescription
have learned, bitterly. In short, Dr.
Reagan's preventive medicine might actual­
ly bring about that which it is designed
to ward off: the making of another El Sal­
vador. - by J. Cavanagh and W. Bello

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40 -- CounterSpy -- July-August 1982
Decimation and extinction have often been a "by-product of development" for tribal peoples. Unless they "acculturate... they will disappear." This, according to a confidential World Bank report, is the underlying approach the Bank takes towards the question of the "development" or areas inhabited by tribal peoples.* The Bank report admits that in the past, "little or no systematic attention has been given to tribal peoples per se in Bank-assisted projects" even though such projects often "influence" tribal peoples in Asia, the Pacific area, Africa and Latin America. In Bolivia, for example, 15 percent of all loans directly affect the lives of tribal peoples; in Venezuela it is 30 percent, and in Paraguay, 38 percent.

Entitled Economic Development and Tribal Peoples: Human Ecologic Considerations, the report is circumspect about indicting Bank-assisted development projects. Instead, it uses largely historical examples to show that "development" can mean the destruction of a tribal society. One example pointed out by the Bank's Office of Environmental Affairs, which produced the report, is how the incursion of Mennonite settlers destroyed the economy and social structure of the Nivakle Indians in the Paraguayan Chaco.

Still, the report cannot ignore completely the ways in which the Bank's disregard for and lack of knowledge about tribal peoples in areas affected by Bank projects have created problems: The Bank's Kenya Forest Plantations Project forged ahead without ever taking into account that some 5,000 acres of affected land was communally owned by local people. In Cameroon, "although the tribal group within the project [SOCOPALM II] area was identified... no measures are provided for directing project benefits to the group or for alleviating the potential harm that rapid social change could cause." In arranging the Beef Cattle Development Project in Madagascar, the World Bank conveniently assumed that certain land was uninhabited, and that local "villagers had grazing rights." This "assumption," says the report, "proved expensively erroneous."

Now, after some 30 years, the World Bank is concerned about tribal peoples. It says that it "accepts that entire tribes of human beings must not be sacrificed for a goal of economic development." This stance is at least partly due to economic and project-efficiency reasons. The report points out that tribal societies are often the only ones able to live and work in certain environments. Agroindustrial groups and farmers new to tropical regions, for example "have shown themselves almost totally unable to manage sustainably and produce effectively." In a Swiss-Peruvian government-financed project at the Yavari River in Peru, for instance, "colonists... often run short of food between deliveries, because the project still cannot grow enough. Project officials and colonists nominally barter, but more usually purloin food" from the Mayo-runa tribal people. The report states that the Mayaruna live "in precisely the same environment but even with primitive tools and no outside inputs... they thrive enough to tolerate the demands of the much better equipped colonists."

The Bank also warns that "tribal groups may... resort to legal action to claim reinstatements of their original territories or compensation for the loss of these lands." The question of land, recognizes the Bank's report, is central to tribal peoples. And for the Bank, that is a problem: In tribal societies, "modern legal...

*According to the World Bank report, the term "tribal people" is "employed... to characterize a specific type of population. Such groups typically have stable, low-energy, sustained-yield economic systems. More specifically, the people may be hunter-gatherers, shifting agriculturalists, herders, simple farmers or fisherfolk. The populations included in this terminology exhibit many, if not most, of the following characteristics: (a) geographical isolation...; (b) unacculturated or only partially acculturated into the national society; (c) non-literate...; (d) non-monetized, or only partially monetized; largely or entirely independent of the national economic system; (e) ethnic distinctiveness from the national society; (f) linguistic difference from the national society; (g) possessed of a common territory; (h) economic base more tightly dependent on their specific environment; (i) possessing leadership, but no national representation, and few, if any, political rights."
Approved For Release 2010/06/15 : CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140002-0

The concepts of 'private' property are inapplicable to tribal land-use patterns since the land is owned in common. One way to solve the land question is the establishment of reserves "which should function as secure base[s] providing the tribe time and space to make its own adaptations."

But the Bank has little to offer to tribal peoples in spite of its moralistic statements. All the Bank's proposals - which are quite limited from the start - depend on cooperation from the borrower nations' governments. And the report admits that while "many nations have enacted legislation... providing for special protection of tribal areas... breaches of tribal rights regularly occur and enforcement of rights has been slow." The report makes no proposals to deal with that problem. Instead, it advocates that Bank policy should be to facilitate the "development" of the tribes "in a way which enhances their welfare and to the extent desired by the beneficiaries and the nation [emphasis added], preserves their identity."

That statement says it all. The "welfare" of the tribes is less important than the policy of the borrower government. In many countries, that "desire" of the national government has been the destruction of tribal economies and social structures. It has been genocide. In Brazil, for example, after 400 years of "development," out of an estimated six to nine million Indians, barely 200,000 survive.

Today, according to the Bank, tribal peoples constitute about four percent of the world's population, or 200 million. Increasingly, the Bank says, these people are directly affected by World Bank "development" programs. And Economic Development and Tribal Peoples makes clear that, in spite of sweet-sounding phrases and moralistic statements, World Bank-type "development" and tribal societies are diametrically opposed. Since the Bank and most of its beneficiary governments will forge ahead, tribal societies are forced to resist to survive.

Treasury Report on World Bank: A Double-Edged Sword?

The release a few weeks ago of the landmark Treasury Department report on the multilateral banks evoked a sigh of relief from World Bank President A.W. Clausen and other senior Bank officials who have spent the last year fending off right-wing attacks on the world's largest development institution.

United States Participation in the Multilateral Banks in the 1980s concludes that the Bank and other multilateral aid agencies "have been most effective in furthering our global economic and financial objectives." The long-awaited study also asserts that, in fact, "neither bilateral assistance nor private sector flows, if available, are as effective in influencing LDC [less developed country] economic performance as the multilateral development banks." In a triumphant memo addressed to the agency's 6,000 staff members, the World Bank leadership stated that "there should be general satisfaction with the assessment" that Bank policies "are consistent with the best interests of the United States and should be supported."

A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD?

But the Treasury Department report may prove to be a double-edged sword. Many European and Third World technocrats at the Bank cringe at the candid characterization of their work as furthering U.S. economic aims. "It confirms just about everything that Third World critics have said about..."
the Bank," said an official of the East Asia division. What particularly galls these in-house critics is the study's claims that the Bank not only does a good job of promoting strategic U.S. economic goals, but also performs well in advancing short-term "political/strategic objectives." Examining the fourteen "most significant" political disputes over Bank policy that arose in the last few years, the report happily notes that the United States prevailed in twelve of these. Among other things, the U.S. succeeded in stopping aid to the Allende government in Chile in 1971, blocking the granting of observer status to the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1980, and terminating loans to Vietnam and Afghanistan in 1980. Interestingly, on one of the two issues where the U.S. view, according to the study, failed to carry the day - the promotion of human rights as a consideration in granting loans - the outcome stemmed from the U.S. government's sabotaging of its formal policy. For instance, at no time during the Carter "human rights" presidency did the U.S. ever cast a "no" vote on World Bank loans to the Marcos regime in the Philippines, a well-known violator of human rights, despite the fact that the Human Rights Amendment to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act requires a negative vote on aid "which does not directly benefit needy people."

"BILATERALIZING" THE BANK

"And now, we're being sucked into the conflict in Central America," commented one middle-level bureaucrat. The Reagan administration has not been as subtle as its predecessor in its effort to employ this supposedly politically neutral agency for bilateral foreign policy aims in Central America. The U.S. controls about 23 percent of voting power at the Bank, and it has wielded this to try to block loans to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The Bank is also being groomed by the State Department for a major role in Honduras as part of the administration's "Caribbean Basin Plan." In a recent memo to newly-elected Honduran President Roberto Suazo Cordova, the U.S. stressed "the formation of a Consultative Group for Honduras headed by the World Bank, which would help order priorities in a way that would maximize the quantity and effective-

SETTLING THE DEBATE

The Treasury report, in effect, settles a debate which has raged over the last year on the World Bank's place in U.S. foreign policy. While conservatives, through their organ, the Wall Street Journal, accused the Bank of "encouraging socialism" in the Third World or serving as a welfare agency, liberals were forced to defend the Bank by resorting to arguments usually advanced as criticisms by the left. Thus Robert Ayers of the influential Overseas Development Council asserted that the World Bank "has forestalled and preempted revolutionaries." This is "obviously congruent with any realistic conception of American national security interests in the developing world."

But the debate did not hew to a classical liberal-conservative split. For instance, the Journal of Commerce, whose conservative credentials are unquestionable, staked out a position diametrically opposed to the Wall Street Journal: "What is undeniable is that the World Bank and the IDA [International Development Association] have made life easier for U.S. investment in developing countries.... It is paradoxical and senseless for conservative Republicans to take action which runs counter to the interest of American business." Indeed, the argument took on a bizarre and comical twist: while the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal attacked the Bank for harming U.S. interests, its news section ran stories - based on confidential Bank documents leaked by the Bank's critics on the left - showing the Bank closely supporting U.S. aims in Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, China and other countries. At which point, Human Events, President Reagan's "favorite newspaper," jumped in and assaulted the "red faces at the Journal" who were being "manipulated by dedicated enemies of the United States."

SLASHING CONCESSIONAL AID

But while the Treasury report gives liberals the assessment they want, it provides the right with the recommendations it demands. "In view of real budgetary constraints," the study suggests that U.S. contributions to the Bank's concessional

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(below-market rates of interest) lending window, the IDA, be reduced in real terms by 30 to 45 percent of the current allocation of $1.9 billion. Even as it protested that this move would constitute "a severe blow to the poorest developing nations," the Bank has already warned India, the largest recipient of IDA funds, that it will have to "graduate" to taking out loans at market rates of interest. Even the smaller, dirt-poor countries, like the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, will suffer slashes of up to 50 percent of their current pittance.

The cutback in IDA funding is part of a larger effort, spurred by the Reagan administration, to orient Bank development policy more decisively to "market signals and incentives." Co-financing of projects with private firms and banks - the approach promoted by the Bank's formerly neglected affiliate, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) - is likely to be the wave of the future. Since private firms prefer projects with high rates of return of capital invested, the Bank's co-financing approach to development is likely to ignore unprofitable but socially necessary projects like low-cost urban housing or popularly-priced irrigation services.

Another emerging thrust of the Bank lending policy is the allocation of more funds to structural adjustment loans (SALs). Unlike traditional project loans, SALs seek to restructure whole sectors of the economy, like industry and the trade regime. SALs - for which Turkey, Kenya, and the Philippines served as guinea pigs - have been heavily criticized by many Third World governments as ill-disguised efforts to subject their economies more decisively to the United States. To receive a SAL, a country usually must agree to lift nationalist controls on foreign investment, lift protectionist barriers to imports, and push an industrialization strategy geared toward export markets rather than the domestic market. As Bank Vice President Shahid Hussain has admitted, SALs "do go to the heart of the political management of an economy."

The rhetoric of meeting the "basic human needs of the 800 million people living in absolute poverty" associated with former president Robert McNamara has been quietly but definitely shelved. Symbolic of the end of the Bank's desultory and cautious attempt to formulate a more liberal approach to Third World development is the sad fate of McNamara's elite unit, the Development Policy Staff, which spawned the basic needs, anti-poverty approach. The unit is being dismantled and its two top theoreticians, Vice President Hollis Chenery and Policy Review Director Mahbub ul-Haq (labelled the "resident Maoist" by the right) have been forced to resign. - by W. Bello and J. Kelly

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CORRECTION: We regret an error in vol. 6 no. 2. The sentence on page 53 beginning with "Journalists Andy Weir, Jonathan Bloch, and Mike Rossiter revealed that their compilation of the Guardian articles on the ISC...." should have read: "Journalists... revealed that their [Peter Chippindale and Martin Walker's] compilation...."
COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE CITY: The World Bank and the Urban Problem by Walden Bello

(The following article is an abridged version of a chapter of the book Development Debacle: The World Bank in the Philippines, a joint publication of the Institute for Food and Development Policy and the Congress Task Force of the Philippine Solidarity Network. Authors are Walden Bello, David Kinley, Elaine Elinson, Robin Broad, David O'Conner and Vincent Bielsky. Footnotes have been eliminated in this version but can be found in the book, available from the Institute for Food and Development Policy, 2588 Mission Street, San Francisco, CA 94110.)

Che Guevara once compared Havana to the swollen head of the sickly infant that was pre-revolution Cuba. This metaphor, which distills the demographic lopsidedness that comes with underdevelopment, can likewise be applied to Manila, which contains about six million people or about 12 percent of the Philippines' population of 48 million.

A substantial number of Manila's teeming masses are former peasants ejected from the countryside by worsening conditions of poverty or by landlords and foreign agribusiness enterprises which have brutally robbed them of their lands. About 34 to 40 percent, according to a recent West German government mission, are "squatters" who dwell in burgeoning settlements of tin-and-cardboard shacks.

One of these settlements is Tondo, which is reputed to be Asia's biggest slum. Tondo exhibits not only the Philippines' worst housing conditions but also the most appalling conditions of malnutrition and disease. A 1975 government survey produced the startling finding that while infant mortality from the country as a whole was 68 to 80 per 1,000 births, in Tondo the figure reached 130 per thousand.

THE WORLD BANK AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

The explosive mixture of poverty and rising expectations characteristic of urban life in the Third World has greatly worried the World Bank, which made the Philippines the site of one of its most ambitious efforts in "development planning" after the imposition of martial law by dictator Ferdinand Marcos in September 1972.

When then-World Bank President Robert McNamara first laid out the Bank's strategy for urban development in the Third World at the annual International Monetary Fund-World Bank Conference in September 1975, he revealed that counterinsurgency was the primary motivation of his proposals.

Historically, violence and civil upheaval are more common in cities than in the countryside. Frustrations that fester among the urban poor are readily exploited by political extremists. If cities do not begin to deal more constructively with poverty, poverty may well begin to deal more destructively with cities.

McNamara's concern was echoed in the discussion of the Philippine urban situation in a controversial confidential Bank document leaked to the press in December 1980, the "Ascher Memorandum":

While the population shift to the cities (particularly Metro Manila) has created a much larger labor pool to fuel industrial expansion, the constellation of urban unemployment, urban slums, and labor unions of growing size has shifted government concern considerably toward the metropolis and away from the countryside.

The Bank warned that "a politically sensi-
tive economic strategy cannot ignore the fact that it is in the urban areas where the level of political awareness is highest and the possibility of new sources of disruption the greatest." Urban housing projects such as those which Marcos and the Bank were jointly pushing, admitted the memo, were meant "to palliate urban dissatisfaction."

**SLUM-UPGRADING: THE WORLD BANK ALTERNATIVE**

Until the mid-seventies, the Marcos government's principal method of controlling the restive urban population was simply to bulldoze the shacks of the urban poor and relocate them to four barren sites at the edge of the metropolitan area. This was in line with the "beautification program" promoted by Metro-Manila Governor and First Lady Imelda Marcos. The program is designed to provide facilities and infrastructure for multinational corporations and banks on the former slum sites. "Results have been poor," noted a World Bank report, "largely because inadequate consideration was given to employment opportunities, which resulted in the resettled squatters returning to the city core area...." But the more important reason was the resistance of the urban poor, who formed themselves into the militant ZOTO-Ugnayan. By 1976, ZOTO-Ugnayan had become a metropolitan-wide super-federation of shantytown federations in Tondo and the adjoining areas of Malabon and Navotas.

To defuse the growing urban opposition, the Bank elaborated the strategy of "slum-upgrading in situ." Slum-upgrading was packaged by the Bank as a novel approach to mass housing that consisted of "re-blocking" squatters' sites (i.e., bulldozing down haphazardly organized shacks and marking off rectangular plots for new house sites), providing basic housing infrastructure and access to water and electricity, then renting or selling the sites to the beneficiaries. On paper, upgrading appeared to be a more humanitarian approach than relocation. There was, however, a contradiction that lay at the very conception of the program. On the one hand, the Bank claimed that slum-upgrading projects were directed at the "very poor people;" on the other hand, they were economically predicated on "recovery of full costs from beneficiaries." This was a serious contradiction, but in the early seventies, the Bank confidently ignored it in its efforts to persuade the Marcos regime to adopt this general approach to mass housing.

"Upgrading is accomplished with an absolute minimum of relocation," asserts a Bank policy authored by Edward Jaycox, former director of the Bank's Urban Projects Department. In practice, however, the Tondo Foreshore project, the Bank's first upgrading effort, directly contradicted this policy: this model project involved the relocation of about 4,500 squatter families to provide space for the expansion of international port facilities servicing foreign firms. The Bank claimed that it was not encouraging displacement because it was not financing the international port expansion, which was being partly funded by the West German government. Such denials were unconvincing, however, since the government had always seen squatter relocation and port expansion as two components of the general redevelopment plans for the Foreshore.

Of the 4,500 families to be relocated, 2,000 were to be provided sites in the adjoining area of Dagat-Dagatan. Those who moved into the Foreshore after the project began in 1976, estimated at 2,500 families by 1980, faced relocation to the distant site of Dasmarinas, Cavite. Those not targeted for relocation, about 160,000 persons, were supposed to benefit directly from the "reblocking" and upgrading of their residential sites and access to newly provided water, electricity and health services.

**PRICING OUT THE POOR**

Relocating thousands of individuals constituted a major political and logistical problem. Equally formidable was the task of convincing the remaining residents of Tondo to pay rent for sites they had occupied for years. "Many Tondo residents feel very strongly about the question of land ownership and tenure," warned one Bank memo. The Tondo Foreshore area "is mostly inhabited by squatters, who, after years of residence feel entitled to full legal ownership at a nominal price compared with the current market value of the land." In fact, residents had already been given the legal right to purchase their sites by legislative acts passed in 1956 under the pre-martial law Republic. Repub-
lic Act 1597, later amended to Republic Act 2438, for instance, "provided for the subdivision and sale of part of the Tondo Foreshore area at P5 [Pesos, P8.33 equals $1] per square meter, a fraction of the current market value."

For the Bank, this earlier legislation smacked of a "giveaway," and that grated against its nature as a bank. A Bank mission in the summer of 1975 therefore proposed: "Due to past governmental promises and conflicting legislation on the subject of land tenure in the Tondo area, a Presidential Decree apparently will be required to implement any proposal." In November, following the Bank's recommendation, the government issued Presidential Decree 1314 repealing the pre-martial law acts and requiring residents to lease their sites from the National Housing Authority (NHA) under 35-year leases at the rate of P6.40 per month for a 48-square-meter plot. Those who wished to buy their lots could do so only after five years of leasehold, when the sites would be sold at their market value at the time of purchase.

The presidential decree provoked angry resistance in the community. ZOTO denounced the arbitrary revocation of the previous laws and asserted that the proposed rental rates would not be affordable to most Tondo residents. A West German government mission investigating the possibility of bilateral aid to the project in 1979 bluntly contradicted the World Bank's claim that the rental rates could be afforded by 75 percent of Tondo residents. According to the mission report, authored by urban expert, Dieter Oberndorfer, the actual figure was much lower, around 30 percent.

Taking into account that according to official statistics 38 percent of the Tondo Foreshore population lives below the "nonstarvation" level... it seems highly improbable that this 38 percent of the population can pay the rents foreseen by the NHA. The number of households which cannot afford the rental to be paid after the reblocking has been completed must be even much higher. Looking at the data available on income distribution... only 30-40 percent of the squatter households can afford to pay regularly the rents foreseen under PD 1314, this means that 60-70 percent cannot pay the rentals.

The provision in the presidential decree requiring the eviction of any resident who was in arrears of three months rent was especially onerous, the report added, since "about two-thirds of the households have highly irregular sources of income: as a result they will have great difficulties to pay their rent regularly on a monthly basis as required in PD 1314."

Confronted with the detailed German critique, the Bank's Urban Division Chief, Anthony Churchill, was forced to admit that "survey data on income are notoriously poor whenever squatters are interviewed about their monthly earnings." But Churchill made an even more damaging concession: "The government's provision of shelter for the urban poor with which the World Bank has been associated benefited fewer people than ultimately need assistance, and cannot necessarily benefit the very poorest segments of society."

Nonetheless, cost recovery from beneficiaries had to be maintained as a principle, Churchill argued:

A policy of housing subsidy for the poor which does not contain a repayment element, requiring comparable repayments among residents of a given new or upgraded settlement would, we believe, eventually be unworkable and socially deceptive in the communities to which assistance is directed.

In short, housing would only be provided to those who could afford it. Despite their differences in approach, there was a
meeting of minds at this basic philosophical level between the World Bank and the Marcos government.

A middle-level Urban Division official with considerable experience in upgrading projects in Asia, Africa and Latin America expressed the proposition more candidly than Churchill: "The Bank is a bank, so the emphasis [is] on cost-recovery. But generally, our experience has been that the poverty focus and cost-recovery components of Bank projects contradict each other. Personally, I would be for straight subsidization of upgrading projects."

In many ways, he continued, basic affordability is not the issue. "It's simply difficult to demand rent from people who're not used to paying rent for their sites. When the Bank comes in with an SIR [Slum Improvement and Resettlement program], what you get is a 'Thank you effect.' But it'll be difficult to convince them to pay for water services and other improvements because they have other priorities. They'd rather spend on better food than rent. In Tondo and other places, we've constantly come up against the reality that poor people and the Bank have different priorities."

DENYING DEMOCRACY

The "affordability" question was not, however, the only one that incensed Tondo residents. The slum dwellers were irate about the way they were excluded from making decisions about their homes and lives. While the urban projects policy paper stated that in upgrading projects, it is "essential that they [the beneficiaries] participate in the decisions in planning and implementing the project," the Tondo project was marked by a high degree of authoritarianism in both planning and implementation.

The West German mission, in a blistering assessment, concluded, "One of the causes of the slow progress of upgrading ... has also been the lack or almost total absence of genuine cooperation and communication between the implementing authorities and the squatters." Key to the World Bank's plan to get the community "involved" were the government's barangay, or ward leaders. The Germans, however, found that barangay leaders: were not very effective in their official role as a communication agency for informing the population on the overall planning and implementation procedures of NHA and vice versa informing NHA on local conditions, basic needs, and aspirations of the people.... About 50 percent of the barangay officials did not even know the existence of three possible different options for reblocking despite... the fact that all barangay officials were informed by sheets handed out to them by the NHA. These sheets contained all the relevant information on reblocking and explains the possible three options. The ignorance of the barangay officials can only be explained by a high degree of carelessness for the lot of the people affected by the various upgrading measures. Other studies show that the barangay officials consider themselves to be implementing agents of the authorities and only to a very limited degree as representatives of the people.

In his confidential response, Urban Division chief Churchill admitted that "many barangay chairmen were confused in the beginning stage of the project and in some cases pushed more expensive options over ones cheaper to barangay residents."

But expecting the Bank to promote democracy was perhaps asking for the impossible as the middle-level Urban Division officer cited earlier commented: "Tondo reflected a more general problem," he continued,

Except in one-party states like Zambia, where the government has some grassroots organization, we haven't been successful in generating community participation. It's just something we're not structured to do. We've even tried working through voluntary organizations. We even tried to get a religious group involved in El Salvador, but they hesitated to work with us.

The people of Tondo themselves had no illusions. The government, they knew, wanted to shut out community groups like ZOTO from the decision-making process. As a 1977 Bank assessment confirmed: "The issue [of community participation] is made more difficult because the NHA considers ZOTO/Ugnayan to be antigovernment and does not want to enhance their credibility in the community." They also knew that, though it might be more liberal than the regime, the Bank itself was an authoritarian institution that was fundamentally unsympathetic
The regime's principal method of excluding critical voices from decision-making was the periodic repression of ZOTO/Ugnayan and its sympathizers. At a "People's Conference" called to air popular grievances about the Tondo project in 1976, 7,000 residents were arrested. ZOTO leaders were periodically driven underground. Many, unable to escape the clutches of the authorities, were subjected to torture. One of the unlucky ones, a frail woman in her forties, told a human rights investigating mission of "nine straight hours of interrogation and forced 'Russian roulette' after her arrest."

The most notorious case of government brutality was that of popular ZOTO president Trinidad Herrera. Arrested by security forces in April 1977, Herrera was subjected to weeks of imprisonment without trial, electric shock torture, and sexual indignities, out of which she emerged "able to merely sit and stare blankly with tears rolling from her eyes." Herrera's tribulations did not end with torture. To calm the international controversy created by the incident, the government staged a showcase trial for two of Herrera's military torturers. The accused were declared innocent by a military court which strongly implied that Herrera had inflicted torture marks on herself.

Faced with savage repression, in 1977 the community opposition shifted from mass protests to more indirect, but equally effective ways of slowing down the project. Threatened by two big bureaucracies, the Bank and the regime, ZOTO/Ugnayan resorted to the time-honored tactic of divide and conquer. By demanding alternative, cheaper reblocking plans and closer community consultation at each stage of the upgrading effort, the organization was able to sow division between the hardline government authorities and the more liberal Bank staff.

The consternation of the Bank over the methods of ZOTO/Ugnayan is evident in a confidential Bank memorandum. On the one hand, it asserts that "as far as Bank staff are concerned, relations with all community groups, including ZOTO/Ugnayan, have been good; during one of the missions, ZOTO even referred to the Bank as its 'hero.'" On the other hand, the Bank was worried that "the exact position toward the Project of some of the more radical groups within the area, such as ZOTO/Ugnayan, is unclear at this time. They seem to be supportive when Bank missions discuss the project with them but on other occasions they are alleged... to be lobbying against the project."

The "War of the Flea," as the Vietnamese would call it, succeeded to some degree. A government threat to unilaterally set the price of rent, for instance, was stopped when fishermen used their boats to "blockade" the waterfront entrance of the presidential palace on the Pasig River. Indeed, the community prevented a definite determination of rent for the upgrading sites. Reblocking, checked by close community surveillance, became what the Bank described as a "time-consuming process."

As of late 1979 - more than four years after the launching of the Tondo project - only 25 percent of the reblocking was complete. A World Bank mission registered its frustration that for most of that year, "no significant progress has been achieved." Moreover, "practically all the contracts under the project have had serious time overruns."
other Bank mission gloomily projected that the conclusion of the project would have to be set back about a year and a half, from March 1981 to September 1982.

The vicissitudes of the project sparked sharp internal conflicts within the Bank. Gregory Votaw, director of urban projects at the Philippine desk, was fired by Bank director McNamara in 1977 under pressure from the Marcos government. Regime officials were enraged by Votaw's meeting with representatives of ZOTO/Ugnayan during the IMF-World Bank conference in Manila in October 1976. The Bank's Urban Division began to divide into those "who felt we're in a hell of a mess here and wanted to withdraw" and others "who admitted we made major mistakes but wanted to hang tough. They saw it as a learning experience."

The World Bank and the government have made it clear that they intend to complete the upgrading and relocation effort. As one Bank officer put it: "There was no question all along that senior management was backing those who wanted the Bank to stay in there. My own opinion is that we made mistakes, but hell, admit them and go on with the project. The alternative is the bulldozer and that's worse. Of course, there's the question of bad press. But if Tondo proved anything, it's that we can survive international headlines." Thus, the slum dwellers' resistance had its limits. The most that the community has been able to accomplish is slowing down of the project and softening its most repressive aspects.

UPGRADING THE UPPER CRUST

When the project is finally completed, a new period is likely to begin in the history of the Tondo Foreshore Area: its transformation into a middle-class community. World Bank officials, in their more candid moments, now see this development as inevitable. One official of the Bank's Urban and Regional Economics Department admitted:

In Tondo and everywhere else, in terms of accessibility, the original assumption was that all the beneficiaries were poor. But now we see that a wide range of income groups - including the top 30 percent of Manila - are among the beneficiaries. So we always find that lots of people getting the project benefits are quite wealthy.

Putting the best possible interpretation on an outcome that directly contradicted the Bank's initial rhetoric, he rationalized that the presence of upper-income groups would make the Tondo Foreshore "an economically dynamic area." A foreign consultant attached to the NHA was more blunt:

The intentions of these projects are excellent.... But there is no way that the lowest or marginal income groups will receive all the benefits intended. It's inevitable that the higher-income groups, though still fairly poor - higher and lower is all relative - will buy out the lowest once the improvements have been made. The poorest families will be unable to maintain the payments and find it profitable to sell out. The laws are set up to prevent these transfers, but laws like these are circumvented all the time.... I think these people will be back in the shacks in five or ten years. But the program is still a good thing. At least, it's expanding development of needed housing.

The final outcome of the World Bank's urban strategy in the Philippines is thus indistinguishable from the results of Imelda Marcos' "beautification projects" - removal of the poor from the choice parts of the city. The difference lies only in the means of reaching this end: in place of the First Lady's method of coerced and immediate dislocation, the Bank offers indirect and gradual uprooting, accomplished with the indispensable assistance of the real estate market.

CONCLUSION

As with its rural development program, the underlying concern of the World Bank's urban development effort was the pacification of a restive population. From its pacification perspective, the Bank realized the brutal relocation efforts of the regime were counterproductive. Yet the Bank's alternative housing program, slum upgrading, suffered from a number of major contradictions. While Bank rhetoric claimed that the projects were aimed at the very poor, the Bank's principle of full cost recovery from beneficiaries effectively priced out not only the very poor but the "ordinary poor" as well. The social consequences of Bank projects, therefore, were
indistinguishable from those associated with the First Lady's middle class-oriented housing schemes. To explain results strikingly different from the Bank's initial rhetoric, technocrats quietly dropped claims about benefitting the very poor and began to articulate the concept of building "economically dynamic areas" to justify the inclusion of upper-income groups as beneficiaries in slum-upgrading schemes.

While Bank rhetoric paid lip service to democratic participation in project decisions, the upgrading efforts were actually implemented in a highly authoritarian fashion by government bureaucrats. Though it tried to project a more liberal image than the regime's, the Bank was itself a highly authoritarian institution that recoiled against democratic controls on its projects. In almost every instance, then, the Bank's pacification objective was contradicted by its dogmatic adherence to cost recovery and other principles of capitalist finance and by its distaste for democratic decision making. The result was that, by the end of the 1970s, the Bank was inexorably associated with the government in the popular mind and powerful urban opposition had been forged to its program.

DOCUMENT 37:
British Admit IRA is Anti-Colonialist Force

On a recent "60 Minutes" (CBS-TV) special on the Irish Republican Army (IRA), moderator Ed Bradley presented Claire Sterling, author of The Terror Network. Sterling claims that the IRA is part of a worldwide, Soviet-Libyan-directed terrorist network for converting Ireland into a "Soviet satellite." This was also the thrust of Bradley's report.

Bradley did not mention Document 37, a "SECRET" British Military Report entitled: "Northern Ireland Future Terrorist Trends" which is being distributed in the United States by the Irish Northern Aid Committee. Document 37's self-declared purpose was to "examine the likely trends in the tactics and weaponry of Irish Republican terrorists up to the end of 1983." Prepared by informants in Northern Ireland for Brigadier General J.M. Glover, current commander of British land forces in Northern Ireland, Document 37 contradicts Sterling's characterization of the IRA.

"Although the 'Official' IRA adheres to orthodox Marxism," says Document 37, "there are no indications of any substantial link between the Soviet Union and either wing of the IRA. Nor do we anticipate any links developing in the next five years.... We doubt whether the Provisional IRA (PIRA) receives aid from Libya or any other overseas government." The goals of the IRA, according to Document 37, include no desire to become a "Soviet satellite."

"The Provisional [IRA] Movement is committed to the traditional aims of Irish nationalism, that is the removal of the British presence from Ireland.... Mean-

While the U.S. government claims to be neutral on the question of the British occupation of Northern Ireland, the FBI has a training relationship with the British police in Northern Ireland. According to U.S. government documents, Daryell Beaney, a Chief Inspector of the Ulster Constabulary attended an FBI training course at Quantico, Virginia, from March 30 to June 18, 1980.

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while, their immediate aims are to achieve: a. A declaration of intent by the British to withdraw from Northern Ireland. b. An amnesty for all 'political' prisoners, including the release of all PIRA prisoners in gaol on the mainland. c. The recognition of the right of the Irish people to decide their own destiny, free from British interference."

Document 37 refutes the highly-publicized British Information Service charge that the IRA is a gang of common criminals. It is on this basis that the British government denies political status to IRA prisoners. Document 37 states that "our evidence of the calibre of rank and file terrorists does not support the view that they are merely mindless hooligans drawn from the unemployed and unemployable."

Document 37 reports that IRA bombings are primarily directed at economic targets and security forces and that a code of ethics exists which mitigates against attacks on families of soldiers and Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) members. The British government apparently considers Document 37 to be quite accurate - it was distributed to many British Army Chiefs including the heads of: Headquarters in the North of Ireland; Land Forces in Britain; the Rhine Army in Germany; and Army training and technical intelligence. The Document has also been circulated to the heads of establishments such as the National Defense College; the Staff College; the Joint Defense Staff College; the Royal College of Defence Studies, and the Intelligence Centre. It was also sent to the joint warfare establishment, atomic weapons research, chemical defence, military vehicles and engineering.

Any occupying force sees a need to conduct worldwide propaganda operations - often outright lies - to justify its occupation. The British government is no exception. CounterSpy is publishing major excerpts of Document 37 - although it contains many inaccuracies about the IRA - because its general thrust refutes Britain's own official propaganda about Northern Ireland.

- by John Kelly -
NORTHERN IRELAND FUTURE TERRORIST TRENDS

INTRODUCTION

1. Throughout the present Northern Ireland campaign there have been many changes in both the tempo and nature of terrorist activity. A variety of causes, political, operational and logistical have precipitated these fluctuations which frequently have also been forced upon the terrorists by Security Force action. But beneath the changes a definable process of evolution has been taking place.

2. The paper [D/DINI/2002/N dated 28 Feb 78] which examined the Future Organisation of Military Intelligence in Northern Ireland saw the need for a study to identify future trends in terrorist tactics and weaponry for the guidance of combat development and operational requirements staff.

3. In its study of the Threat the same paper assessed that the Provisional leadership is deeply committed to a long campaign of attrition. The Provisional IRA (PIRA) has the dedication and the sinews of war to raise violence intermittently to at least the level of early 1978, certainly for the foreseeable future. Even if 'peace' is restored, the motivation for politically inspired violence will remain. Arms will be readily available and there will be many who are able and willing to use them. Any peace will be superficial and brittle. A new campaign may well erupt in the years ahead.

4. In 1977 PIRA adopted the classic terrorist cellular organisation in response to their difficulties. But at other times their tactics and weaponry have changed for reasons that cannot be forecast, much as the influence, often transitory, of individual leaders and the professional ability of key terrorists. Also an isolated incident, such as "Bloody Sunday", can radically alter support for violence. Thus forecasting has often to be based on speculation rather than hard intelligence. Nevertheless there are trends in terrorist weaponry and tactics which can be identified. We need to project these as best we can if we are not to fall behind in devising counter measures.

5. In the paper we have focussed on the Republican threat which is harder and more sophisticated than that posed by Loyalist paramilitaries. It follows that we do not consider the implications of a resurgence of serious inter-sectarian strife.

AIM

6. The aim of the paper is to examine the likely trends in the tactics and weaponry of Irish Republican terrorists up to the end of 1983.

SCOPE

7. We consider first the aspirations of the Republican terrorists with a brief examination of the political changes which might affect their campaign. We next examine their resources and the main constraints under which they operate. We then, after discussing the terrorists' organization, seek to determine the strategy they are likely to adopt and consequently the targets they may select. Terrorist weaponry and tactics are then examined with a view to assessing the likely developments during the next 5 years.

8. We have imposed the following limitations on the paper:
   a. Irish terrorism in Great Britain is outside its scope.
   b. Its technical content does not go beyond that needed to formulate the broad parameters of equipment which may lie within the terrorists' grasp.
   c. It stops short of examining possible countermeasures demanded by the developing trends.

TELEORIST ASPIRATIONS AND LINKS

THE PROVISIONAL IRA

9. The Provisional Movement is committed to the traditional aim of Irish nationalism, that is the removal of the British presence from Ireland. The PIRA leadership is dedicated to the belief that this can only be achieved through violence. It follows that the Provisionals will strive to continue the struggle in some form or other while the British remain in the Province. Meanwhile their immediate aims are to achieve:
   a. A declaration of intent by the British to withdraw from Northern Ireland.
   b. An amnesty for all "political" prisoners, including the release of all PIRA prisoners in gaol on the mainland.
   c. The recognition of the right of the Irish people to decide their own destiny, free from British interference.

THE OFFICIAL IRA

10. The traditional aims of the Official IRA (OIRA) are similar to these of the Provisionals. But the Officials are Marxists whereas the Provisionals are motivated by an inward looking Celtic nationalism. The Officials' political stance appeals more to middle class and intellectual groups than that of the Provisionals. OIRA has preserved a cease fire since 1972 and has striven, with a modicum of success, to expand its influence through legitimate political activity under the names "Sinn Fein The Workers Party" and "The Republican Clubs". It devotes much effort to maintaining links with left wing subversive organisations in Europe. Although there is no sign that OIRA will alter its stance during the next 5 years, it is nevertheless ready to re-enter the campaign.
EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE POLITICAL CHANGE

11. In considering the will of the Republican terrorists and their supporters to continue the present struggle, we need to examine the likely developments in the political life of the Province. The following are perhaps possible scenarios.

a. The present form of government may continue. We would then expect there to be a general atmosphere of political calm, though politicians would be frustrated. Government policy would be principally one of containment and the underlying problems would remain unsolved.

b. The current system of direct rule may be modified by introducing another elected upper tier of local government.

c. The Government may achieve its aim of restoring devolved government in the near future, although this seems unlikely.

d. The concept of independence might take firmer root. But the 2 communities interpret the objective differently.

e. A new party based on socialist policies transcending sectarian barriers may emerge. But similar attempts since 1922 have always ended in failure. In Ireland the appeal of sectarian and nationalistic sentiment has always been stronger than that of left wing ideology. The continuing polarisation of the population on sectarian lines only emphasises the improbability of such an initiative.

12. Only the first alternative, continued direct rule, offers any real prospect of political calm and hence waning support for the terrorist [sic] during the next 5 years. Under any other scenario Republican fears of a Protestant ascendancy being re-established would enable PIRA to pose as the defenders of the minority interest. Even if the present system of government is maintained the current muted support for the forces of law and order will remain delicately balanced and susceptible to any controversial government decision on Security Force action. We see no prospect in the next 5 years of any political change which would remove PIRA's raison d'être.

FUTURE TERRORIST GROUPINGS

13. We expect the Provisionals to remain the dominant terrorist organisation throughout the next 5 years. PIRA may well gain further support from the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP), the splinter group from OIR, which has recently been trying to improve its operational capacity. If the Provisionals and Officials combined to form an active alliance not only would they pose a far more powerful threat but they would also probably attract more tangible support from international terrorist groups. However there are fundamental political differences between the 2 movements and bitter animosity between individuals and family groups.

Rivalry is sharp and they are unlikely ever to settle their differences. The prospect of the Provisionals substantially increasing their strength through alliances with other groups in Ireland is thus remote.

14. The Provisionals have some elusive links with overseas terrorist movements, notably the PLO, and possibly other European groups, which are built up on a mutual interest in weapons and in violence for its own sake. These contacts provide a potentially rich source of weapons and of an exchange of ideas on terrorist techniques. However there are no signs that PIRA has either the intention or the ability to foster them.

TERRORIST RESOURCES

MANPOWER

15. The Provisionals cannot attract the large numbers of active terrorists they had in 1972/73. But they no longer need them. PIRA's organisation is now such that a small number of activists can maintain a disproportionate level of violence. There is a substantial pool of young Fianna aspirants, nurtured in a climate of violence, eagerly seeking promotion to full gun-carrying terrorist status and there is a steady release from the prisons of embittered and dedicated terrorists. Thus, though PIRA may be hard hit by Security Force attrition from time to time, they will probably continue to have the manpower they need to sustain violence during the next 5 years.

16. Calibre of Terrorist

a. Leadership. PIRA is essentially a working-class organisation based in the ghetto areas of the cities and in the poorer rural areas. Thus if members of the middle class and graduates become more deeply involved they have to forfeit their life style. Many are also deterred by the Provisionals' muddled political thinking. Nevertheless there is a strata of intelligent, astute and experienced terrorists who provide the backbone of the organisation. Although there are only a few of these high grade terrorists there is always the possibility that a new charismatic leader may emerge who would transform PIRA yet again.

b. Technical Expertise. PIRA has an adequate supply of members who are skilled in the production of explosive devices. They have the tools and equipment and they have the use of small workshops and laboratories.

c. Rank and File Terrorists. Our evidence of the calibre of rank and file terrorists does not support the view that they are merely mindless hooligans drawn from the unemployed and unemployable. PIRA now trains and uses its members with some care. The Active Service Units...
much of the spontaneous backing they enjoyed ists tempered experience.

activists face continued for instance the leading bomb makers, are usually sufficiently cunning to avoid arrest. They are continually learning from mistakes and developing their expertise. We can therefore expect to see increased professionalism and the greater exploitation of modern technology for terrorist purposes.

17. **Popular Support.** Republican terrorists can no longer bring crowds of active sympathisers onto the streets at will as a screen for gunmen. Indeed there is seldom much support even for traditional protest marches. But by reorganising on cellular lines PIRA has become less dependent on public support than in the past and is less vulnerable to penetration by informers. The hardening segregation of the communities also operates to the terrorists' advantage. Although the Provisionals have lost much of the spontaneous backing they enjoyed early in the campaign, there is no sign of any equivalent upsurge of support for the Security Forces. There are still areas within the Province, both rural and urban, where the terrorists can base themselves with little risk of betrayal and can count on active support in emergency. The fear of a possible return of Protestant repression will underpin this kind of support for the Provisionals for many years to come. Loyalist action could quickly awaken it to a much more volatile level.

**FINANCE**

18. PIRA is probably now more dependent on a steady source of income than it was when mass popular support provided a momentum of its own. Activists expect regular pay and are not content with low quality weapons. But we cannot accurately judge the extent to which they line their own pockets. However, recently a much firmer discipline has been exercised and we expect this to continue. Although we have but fragmentary knowledge of income and expenditure we can draw more deductions on PIRA's financial state.

19. **Income**

a. **Commercial Activity.** Incompetence and dishonesty have been hallmarks of the Provisionals' commercial undertakings. The Eire Nua Cooperatives, which started in 1974/75, have been unprofitable and drinking clubs have been little better. None of PIRA's numerous commercial ventures seem to bring in much income with the possible exception of the "Black Taxis". But Police activity is now inhibiting the use of the latter.

b. **Theft.** Armed robbery within Ireland is almost certainly the greatest source of income for PIRA. In the North since 1971 thefts have been running at some £500,000 per year. In the South up to 1976 the annual loss was about £700,000 but in 1977 it was over £900,000 and the figure for 1978 was already close to £1M by mid-June. The proceeds of the theft of readily marketable goods also sometimes go to the Provisionals. We estimate that income from theft is running at least £550,000 per year and that occasional spectacular raids will provide additional infusion of ready cash.

c. **Racketeering.** The main continuing forms of racketeering are protection payments from shops and businesses and fraud involving dole money and [illegible] pension books. We estimate that the annual income through this is about £250,000. Unless PIRA step up extortion and terrorism we would expect this figure to decline over the next 5 years in the face of RUC countermeasures.

d. **Remittances from Overseas.** The Provisionals have had some success in obtaining funds from overseas groupings of people of Irish descent. The Irish Northern Aid Committee (INAC) in the USA, with a subsidiary in Canada, is the largest source. It currently declares support (for prisoners' aid) at a rate of £55,000 per year. Actual remittances are probably at least 25% higher. Some aid is also received from Australia and New Zealand. We doubt whether PIRA receives financial aid from Libya or any other overseas government. We assess that the total income from overseas is about £20,000 annually.

e. **Green Cross.** Green Cross is the name given to aid for Republican prisoners and their families. Much of the money from overseas is raised on this pretext. Collections for it in Great Britain, the Republic and Roman Catholic areas in the Province probably amount to £30,000 annually.

20. **Expenditure**

a. **Pay.** The largest item of expenditure is probably pay for terrorists and for those who work full or part time for Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF). A report of June 1978 indicates that normal terrorist pay is now £20 per week (as a supplement to the dole). We estimate that some 250 people would draw this and perhaps 60 would get £40 per week (£7,500 per week, £400,000 per year).

b. **Other Costs.** Apart from arms expenditure the Provisionals have to bear the cost of their prison welfare work including payments to prisoners' dependants, travel and transport costs and propaganda expenses especially the Republican newspapers whose sale does not cover their cost.

21. **Tentative Balance Sheet.** Despite our scanty knowledge we suggest the following bal-

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a. Income

- Theft in Ireland: £550,000
- Racketeering: £250,000
- Overseas Contributions: £120,000
- Green Cross UK and Eire: £30,000

Total Income: £950,000

b. Expenditure

- Pay (@ £7,500 per week): £400,000
- Travel and Transport Costs (@ £1,000 per week): £50,000
- Newspapers and Propaganda: £150,000
- Prisoners, dependents welfare: £180,000

Subtotal: £780,000

- Available for arms, ammunition and explosive: £170,000

22. Future Finance and Capacity for Arms Purchase. In the years ahead the Provisionals will probably have difficulty in maintaining some of their sources of income. We do not expect them to be able to make good any deficit from overseas. They may well therefore have to rely increasingly on armed robbery. However, if they are forced to make economies the Provisionals would only cut back on arms expenditure as a last resort. Indeed we believe that the purchase of arms will continue at roughly its present level. Acquisition, possibly even through gift, of a few costly prestige [sic] weapons such as surface to air missiles cannot be ruled out.

EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM OTHER THAN FINANCE

THE REPUBLIC

23. Republican sentiment and the IRA tradition emanates from the South. Although the Fianna Fáil Government are resolutely opposed to the use of force, its long term aims are, as Mr. Lynch himself admits, similar to those of the Provisionals. Any successor to Lynch in the ruling party will probably follow at least as Republican a line of policy. Fine Gael, though traditionally less Republican, is also now committed to a roughly similar line. We have no reason to suspect that PIRA obtains active support from government sources, or that it will do so in the future, but the judiciary has often been lenient and the Gardai, although cooperating with the RUC more than in the past, is still rather less than wholehearted in its pursuit of terrorists.

24. The headquarters of the Provisionals is in the Republic. The South also provides a safe mounting base for cross border operations and secure training areas. PIRA's logistic support flows through the Republic where arms and ammunition are received from overseas. Improvised weapons, bombs and explosives are manufactured there. Terrorists can live there without fear of extradition for crimes committed in the North. In short, the Republic provides many of the facilities of the classic safe haven so essential to any successful terrorist movement. And it will probably continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

UNITED STATES AND CANADA

25. Supporters of Republicanism in Ireland have exploited the fact that the Irish/American vote is important to United States politicians. Although by no means all expatriate Irish are sympathetic to the Provisionals, powerful lobbies have been built up to give political encouragement to Republicans in Northern Ireland and to criticise British policy. Propaganda is eagerly exploited to gather support for the Provisionals in both the USA and Canada. Since 1972 the United States has become PIRA's main weapons source, either through purchases or through thefts. Despite several successful prosecutions arms are still reaching the Province; we do not know whether in a steady trickle of small consignments or whether in bulk, but suspect the former. We believe that the Provisionals will be able to maintain political, financial and material support from North America at about the current level.

SOVIET BLOCK

26. Although the Official IRA adheres to orthodox Marxism there are no indications of any substantial link between the Soviet Union and either wing of the IRA. Nor do we anticipate any links developing in the next 5 years. However we expect arms of Soviet origin to continue to arrive in the Province through various proxy sources.

THE MIDDLE EAST

27. The Middle East terrorist organisations, notably the PLO have such a wealth of arms available that they could easily supply PIRA without detriment to their own capability and without necessarily obtaining the support of their sponsor governments, such as Syria and Libya. The 'Claudia' shipment of March 1973, involving some 5 tons of arms of largely Soviet origin, did not implicate the Soviet authorities. Further proof of Middle East involvement was given when the 'Towerstream' (ex-Cyprus) was intercepted in Antwerp in November 1977. The weapons, though mainly old, were serviceable and of types still very much in demand by terrorist groups. They included RPG7 anti-tank

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rockets, mortars and military explosives. The Middle East is a potentially valuable source of weapons in the years ahead.

FUTURE EXTERNAL SUPPORT

28. For future political support and encouragement the Provisionals will continue to look mainly to the United States. There are signs that they are also working up support from people of Irish extraction in Australia and New Zealand. PIRA will probably also try to extend their links to subversive groups in Europe and the Middle East. But the Provisionals fear that close association with other political ideologies would tarnish the essential Irishness of their movement. They will therefore probably refuse any material support which comes with political strings attached. To sum up, a shortage of arms has never inhibited PIRA and is unlikely to do so in the future....

TERRORIST STRATEGY AND TARGETING

BACKGROUND

33. From the start of the present campaign to about the end of 1973 much of the terrorist violence was indiscriminate. Large blast bombs were often detonated in shopping areas causing heavy civilian casualties. There were frequent "cowboy" shootings and sectarian attacks. But recently there has been a marked trend towards attacks against Security Force targets and away from action which, by alienating public opinion, both within the Catholic community and outside the Province, is politically damaging. It is also arguable that PIRA still sees itself as an 'Army' and clings to the remnants of what they believe to be a military code of ethics. This constraint is often blurred and its force will probably continue to decline but, there have, for example, been few attacks on the families of either soldiers or RUC.

34. PIRA strategy is based on the premise that a campaign of attrition, with its attendant costs in both lives and money, will eventually persuade HMG [Her Majesty's Government] to withdraw from Northern Ireland. The Provisionals probably aspire to raising the tempo of their operations to such a level that the normal processes of administration and government break down. But having failed to achieve this in the earlier part of the campaign, they probably realise that they now have little hope of success. Indeed, they may accept that to raise the level of activity beyond a certain point would evoke such intense response from the Security Forces that their organisation would suffer disproportionately to the success achieved. Irish terrorists have usually been careful to preserve their personal safety, and the strength of the organisation during the next 5 years is likely to remain such that the leadership will wish to avoid action that could put large numbers of its men at risk. A further influencing factor is that the PIRA leadership appreciate that their campaign will be won or lost in Belfast. Although operations elsewhere are important, and in the Border area easier to achieve, success in Belfast is critical.

PROPAGANDA

35. Propaganda has an important bearing on PIRA strategy. The leadership is becoming increasingly sensitive of the need to avoid alienating support not only in the Roman Catholic areas of the Province but also in the Republic and among those of Irish extraction overseas. The Provisionals continue to justify their activities by claiming that they are merely reacting to the Security Forces and that violence is the only response to the repression of the Catholic community in Northern Ireland. In the interests of publicity PIRA may well stage a few spectacular attacks to indicate that their normal lower posture stems from restraint rather than weakness. On the other hand, we cannot exclude the possibility that PIRA, like terrorists in West Germany and Italy, might reject the fruitless quest for popularity and accept that they can achieve more if unfettered by pursuit of a favourable public image. The balance of probability however is that propaganda will continue to influence strategy and the selection of targets....

LIKELY TRENDS IN STRATEGY AND TARGETING

43. Although PIRA is likely to follow an erratic path in the years ahead we expect to see a continuation of the general trend towards more precise targetting and greater expertise. Propaganda considerations will probably still influence targetting. But a change in leadership might radically alter this. We expect PIRA to attempt to acquire the skills and weaponry needed to refine their attacks on:

a. Members of the Security Forces.
c. Public utilities, communications, government offices and transport.
d. Any other targets specifically linked with British rule in Northern Ireland.

TACTICS AND TYPES OF ATTACK

MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF PIRA TACTICS

44. The principle that the terrorist must have a safe method of escape is the dominant feature of PIRA tactics. PIRA very seldom plans operations that involve high risk and if in doubt they abort the mission. Shooting attacks are mainly conducted on the "shoot and scoot" principle. Indeed there is a discernible pattern in PIRA activities. Successful techniques are fre-
We expect the Provisionals' organisation ever thbt there is little risk of any foreign maintaining some of their other sources of in­
creasingly on armed robbery. The purchases of arms will continue to command a priority call on funds. But they will probably be unable to afford extravagant weapons, although we cannot exclude the possibility that they make a few prestige purchases such as the RPG-7 and SA-7. (Paragraphs 18-22).

We believe there is little chance of the Provisionals receiving increased financial aid from overseas. They may have difficulty in maintaining some of their other sources of income and they will probably have to rely increasingly on armed robbery. The purchases of arms will continue to command a priority call on funds. But they will probably be unable to afford extravagant weapons, although we cannot exclude the possibility that they make a few prestige purchases such as the RPG-7 and SA-7. (Paragraphs 18-22).

We believe that the Republic will continue to act as a heaven for terrorists and that they will continue to receive arms through Eire, particularly from the USA and through contacts with overseas terrorist groups. We believe however that there is little risk of any foreign government giving active support to PIRA. (Paragraphs 23-28).

We expect the Provisionals' organisation to retain its current higher command structure in the Republic, its "Northern Command" and its increasingly professional ASUs. The middle level of leadership is likely to remain unstable and the link between the top leadership in Dublin and the active terrorist groups on the ground may weaken. (Paragraphs 29-32).

The Provisional campaign over the next 5 years will probably be one of attrition rather than of intense activity, though the tempo of operations will fluctuate as in the past. (Paragraphs 33-34).

CONCLUSION

64. The Provisionals' campaign of violence is likely to continue while the British remain in Northern Ireland. During the next 5 years we see little prospect of change in the inter-re­
relationship between the various terrorist groups in Ireland but we expect PIRA may become gradu­ally more influenced by overseas terrorist groups. We see little prospect of political de­
velopment of a kind which would seriously un­
dermine the Provisionals' position. (Paragraphs 9-14).

65. PIRA will probably continue to recruit the men it needs. They will still be able to at­
tract enough people with leadership talent, good education and manual skills to continue to enhance their all round professionalism. The movement will retain popular support sufficient to maintain secure bases in the traditional Re­
publican areas. (Paragraphs 15-17).

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69. The Provisional campaign over the next 5 years will probably be one of attrition rather than of intense activity, though the tempo of operations will fluctuate as in the past. (Paragraphs 33-34).

70. Propaganda considerations will frequently dictate PIRA strategy both in avoiding action that would alienate public opinion and in mounting spectacular attacks that would capture the Press headlines. (Paragraph 35).

71. We foresee a continued trend towards greater professionalism and selectivity in tar­
getting. We believe that PIRA will concentrate its attacks on members of the Security Forces and their bases and at the infrastructure of Government including the public utilities. (Paragraphs 36-43).

72. The desire to save their own skins domi­
nates PIRA tactics.Nevertheless there are trace­
able patterns of terrorist activity including a tendency to resort to methods that have been successful in the past. The Provisionals are probably content with their current armory but they may attempt to acquire machine pistols. We expect to see improved sniper techniques using advanced weapon sights. PIRA will continue to use improvised mortars at infrequent intervals and may also endeavour to obtain standard mili­
tary mortars. There will be a strong incentive to acquire anti-tank and even anti-aircraft rockets. (Paragraphs 44-52).

73. The well tried methods of attack using im­
provised explosive devices will continue. The variety of victim operated devices may increase by the use of commercial intruder alarm sys­
tems. We would also expect to see more emphasis on radio controlled devices, improvised explo­
sive methods for cutting steel and long delay electronic timers. (Paragraphs 53-60).

74. We believe that Irish terrorists are un­
likely to use chemical, biological or nuclear methods of attack during the next 5 years. (Paragraphs 60-63).

RECOMMENDATIONS

75. We recommend that the findings of this pa­
per be used as the basis for further study aimed at:

a. Developing concepts of operations that will enable us to keep ahead of the terrorist.
b. Identifying any hitherto unforeseen gaps in our current equipment holdings and equipment development programme.
c. Identifying areas in which further analy­
sis both of terrorist techniques and of the degree of success of our own countermeasures could usefully be undertaken.

76. We further recommend that this paper should be reviewed and updated annually to pro­
vide continuing guidance to interested depart­
ments.

2 November 1978 SECRET J M G

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