CENTER for the STUDY of INTELLIGENCE
NEWSLETTER

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In This Issue:

- Bill Colby Remembered
- Releasing Cold War Documents
  - DCI Letter to *The New York Times*
  - DCI Historical Advisory Panel Convenes
  - Interagency Panel on Historical Declassification
- Conferences
  - CIA Hosts Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History
  - VENONA Conference Scheduled for October
  - CIA Museum
- Review Essay: *The Secret Channel: Moscow, the KGB, and Bonns Eastern Policy*
- New Center Publications
- *Studies in Intelligence*
- Harvard University Intelligence and Policy Program
- Publications and Videos
- CSI on Internet

Other Issues | Previous Issue | Next Issue

The Center for the Study of Intelligence supports research and publishing on the intelligence profession and its various disciplines and declassifies historical records related to US intelligence operations during the Cold War. Center Fellows write on theoretical, practical, and historical intelligence issues. Historians write histories of the CIA and publish collections of declassified documents. The Academic Coordinator promotes exchanges with academic institutions and scholars through conferences and seminars and by arranging guest speakers and sponsoring CIA Officers-in-Residence at several universities. The Historical Review Group conducts declassification reviews of documents on subjects of historical interest. Monographs and videos prepared under Center auspices are listed elsewhere in the *Newsletter* and are available from the National Technical Information Service. Declassified Cold War Records are available at the National Archives. The Center welcomes inquiries from intelligence professionals and scholars about its programs and publications.

Table of Contents

Bill Colby Remembered

It would be difficult to improve on the characterization Sally Shelton Colby has made of the life and contribution of Bill Colby: he left the world a better place than he found it.

Many of us who worked with or knew Bill, this quiet professional, respected him deeply. Behind his reserved, all-business exterior lurked a relaxed, dry sense of humor. He was a tough, brave leader--qualities he had evidenced long ago behind enemy lines in World War II--and which in different contexts he continued to display throughout his professional intelligence career. He was unquestionably brilliant. He was master of the big picture and detail alike. He had very broad interests that reached beyond the world of intelligence. Not least, he appreciated that changing times necessitated a CIA more aware of and more in tune with the rest of American life.

Yet substantial difficulties buffeted him, some self-generated, some not of his making; he overcame some; he was stymied by others. He was not one of the Agency's original inner circle of leaders, who for some time looked on him as somewhat of an outsider, mainly a paramilitary man, not a professional intelligence officer. This caused much turmoil when later he became DCI. He was the target of extreme criticism, left and right, some of which still abides. And certain of the decisions he took remain open to question.

Nonetheless, Bill Colby's leadership potential was recognized early on and was especially reflected when in 1960, a decade after he had joined the Agency, he was moved from deputy chief to chief of station, Saigon, an almost unprecedented promotion in the field. There, not without static from Military Assistance Commands in Vietnam (MACVs) and US Embassy missions, he and his colleagues expanded earlier CIA paramilitary projects that sought to create more effective, more spirited military-political means by which the South Vietnamese could combat the enemy.

His underlying conviction was essentially a political one, that the war had to be won primarily in South Vietnam's countryside by the South Vietnamese themselves, that only through such "nation building" efforts could the situation be saved, and that growing participation in the war was bringing a traditional military cast to it no better suited to Vietnamese realities than the failed French effort had been. Modest in comparison to US military projects, CIA's programs brought definite gains in the field. They did not do as well inside the Washington combat zone. The military took over the Agency's programs, which never again achieved the same success they had under Bill Colby and other CIA officers, who had shown how to fight and win against the enemy in Vietnam.

Some years later, when as Ambassador he became head of Civil Operations and Rural Development (CORDS), in charge of conducting the political side of the Vietnam war, Bill stressed the necessity of combating the enemy's extensive political-subversive infrastructure throughout the South. Here again he met adversity. Well intentioned as an effort by the total US team in Vietnam, this Phoenix Program suffered a sad fate. Neither Colby nor the US team proved able to control the program tightly; many of its South Vietnamese officers used Phoenix to do away with domestic enemies, Communist or not; a number of atrocities were committed; Phoenix came to be seen, incorrectly, as a wholly CIA program, and, worst of all, radical types in America vilified Bill Colby as a murderer.

Meanwhile, he had run the Far East (FE) Division with a strong and effective hand. He drove FE's officers to concentrate on the really important targets, not just on what their stations were traditionally able to do. He strengthened stations that needed strengthening; he cut back other stations where earlier emphases had become passé. He knew the details of his stations and his FE units at Headquarters often as well or better than those officers working in them. And in the process he became an articulate and respected Agency voice in Washington's senior policymaking circles. Those accomplishments, together with his unique experience as COS, Saigon, helped make him chief of all CIA's operations and then a right-hand man to a new DCI, James Schlesinger.

Some months following Schlesinger's departure to become Secretary of Defense, Bill Colby became DCI in 1973, the second Director to have risen from CIA's ranks. This promotion was not without a price, for in some respects Bill had been dealt a bum hand, his initiative and influence constrained on various sides. He became DCI at a time of rising public charges of illegal intelligence practices, together with increasing pressures for more effective Congressional oversight of CIA and the Intelligence Community. There were suspicions--ill founded, as it turned out--that the Agency had somehow been officially involved in Watergate. Colby's boss, President Nixon, was extremely critical of CIA and harbored deep suspicions about it. He never admitted DCI Colby to any function other than that of senior staff officer. Nixon's eminence grise, Henry Kissinger, was not only sharply critical of CIA, especially its analyses and National Intelligence Estimates, but in many respects became Nixon's de facto director of American intelligence. Colby's predecessor, Schlesinger, had long enjoyed Nixon's confidence and now sat atop the lions share of the Intelligence Community's people and budgets.

Moreover, Schlesinger bequeathed various disruptive inheritances to Colby. One was a sharp, shocking cutback of CIA officers. Another was a plan to kill CIA's once-prestigious Office of National Estimates. Still another was a tough decision of how to handle the disruptive leader of an entrenched CIA within the CIA, counterintelligence chief James Angleton. The toughest inheritance, however, was a long, long list of earlier illegal or questionable CIA endeavors Schlesinger had ordered drawn up, known collectively as The Family Jewels--a gift of fateful consequences for Colby.

Bill's directorship got off to a wobbly start when, just days after becoming DCI, he and the Intelligence Community did not alert policymakers that Syria and Egypt were about to invade Israel. It was no help to Bill that the Israelis themselves had not expected this sudden Yom Kippur war. Or that there was, in effect, no effective national estimating system in place at the time, CIA's Office of National Estimates being in process of dissolution. Subsequently, bringing about that needed change of estimative systems proved to be one of Bill Colby's principal initiatives as DCI, the substitution of expert National Intelligence Officers for the earlier generalists of the Office of National Estimate's Board, a change intended especially to bring intelligence estimators closer to policymaking officers and their needs. Bill made numerous other administrative improvements during his term as DCI, showing always the same initiative, drive, and attention to detail he had displayed in Vietnam and as Chief, FE.

Troubles, nonetheless, multiplied and began to come to a head in late 1974, when three coincident administrative crises crowded in on Colby, his responses to which generated widespread, continuing anger among some Agency officers more attuned to traditional CIA ways and means than he was. One of these crises stemmed from the easing out of Jim Angleton, a move Colby took because Angleton's super-suspicions were greatly harming the Soviet Division's efforts to recruit Soviet Bloc targets, Angleton's dominance of Israeli matters was disrupting the Near East Division, and Angleton himself had become a very difficult personnel issue. Previous DCIs had been aware of those problems but had ducked them. Bill did not. But because he fired Angleton in a somewhat preemptive manner and then substituted for Angleton's counterintelligence system a shaky new one, many of Angleton's faithful have never forgiven Colby. Bill generated still other critics within CIA when he decided not to impede Congress's charges that former DCI Dick Helms had misled Capitol Hill committees about certain of CIA's earlier covert operations in Chile.

Bill Colby's most difficult and most debatable decision, however, the one that has generated the most criticism from some of the Agency's old hands, was the extremely open manner in which Bill responded to the charges the Church (Senate) and Pike (House) intelligence committees leveled that CIA and US intelligence had indeed been guilty of past illegal undertakings. Here Bill's candor was unprecedented--and debatable. Many Agency officers, then and now, believe Bill went much too far in revealing The Family Jewels and other CIA secrets and in so doing permanently harmed the Agency and created an unwanted degree of continuing Congressional scrutiny.

Many of us other observers, in and out of the Agency, give Bill Colby high marks for his conviction that he had to level with the Congress, even if he may have overdone it to some extent. We respect his underlying motivation; that it is contrary to the Constitution for any unit of the US Government to become a state within a state. In Bill's view, CIA simply had to change its tactics and its relationship to American life, even if this did unveil some of the Agency's long-husbanded mystique. Also to his credit is the fact that in his active retirement years Bill continued to hold this respect for the Constitution, often taking stands more progressive than was necessarily popular. During those years, too, he remained prominent among those experts who appreciated how the dissolution of the USSR and the Soviet Empire had changed the world, but how our world now contains dangerous new hazards that necessitate strengthened new American intelligence approaches.

All in all, however he may have handled certain of his challenges, Bill Colby was a person of integrity, not afraid to tackle tough problems others would avoid, and certain that intelligence will remain an honorable and needed profession. Above all, he is to be remembered for this conviction that we Agency people are American citizens first, and must be responsive to Constitutional demands more than to any self-created CIA code of separateness. We are all fortunate to have had and to have known this honorable colleague. He will be missed, but his integrity and broad vision will remain models for the rest of us intelligence officers and our successors.

Hal P. Ford

Table of Contents

Releasing Cold War Documents

The Center for the Study of Intelligence is continuing to review and declassify Cold War-era intelligence records. Records chosen for declassification are then released to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), where they are available to researchers and the general public.

One of the Center's priority projects is the declassification of National Intelligence Estimates on the Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In February we released 59 more NIEs, among them intelligence assessments of Soviet general purpose forces and strategic air and missile defense systems. With the latest release of declassified documents, more than 450 NIEs on the USSR and international Communism are now available. More will be released by the end of the year.

At the specific recommendation of the newly reconstituted DCI Historical Review Panel (see next article), the Center is

examining two major intelligence records collections for declassification review. The first collection includes records from the Office/Director of Central Intelligence dating from 1946, when the first DCI was appointed. The second collection includes CIA intelligence analysis and assessments on the Soviet Union that key components of the Directorate of Intelligence, including the Office of Soviet Analysis, the Office of Current Intelligence, and the Office of Economic Research, produced from 1947 to 1991.

Work continues on reviewing records related to the 1954 CIA covert operation against the Arbenz government in Guatemala and the 1961 Bay of Pigs operation. The Center hopes to complete review of all records on Guatemala and Bay of Pigs later this year.

The Center is working closely with the Department of State to make requested intelligence records available for publication in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) series. State has received some 700 pages of documents in recent months. Among the declassified records are documents concerning developments in Africa and East Asia during 1962-68. One forthcoming FRUS volume on Cuba contains 442 newly declassified and released documents, of which 109 are original CIA records that have been deposited at the National Archives. A third volume, tentatively entitled *The Emergence of the Foreign Intelligence Structure, 1945-1950*, includes some 435 previously classified records; more than half of them are from CIA files. In addition, the State Department is preparing a microfiche supplement that will include some 400 additional documents. On July 24, 1996 the Center, NARA, and State will hold a ceremony and panel discussion at the National Archives to celebrate the publication of this pioneering work on the origins of the US Intelligence Community.

The Center has completed its review of documents requested by the Presidential Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (ACHRE). CIA made the documents available to assist ACHRE's research, which concluded, among other things, that the Agency "did not sponsor or conduct" any human radiation experiments during the Cold War. The Center has placed some 1,000 pages of documents in a publicly accessible online data base.

The Historical Review Group continues working with the presidentially appointed Assassination Records Review Board to declassify records related to the John F. Kennedy assassination. Additional information from CIA files has just been released, adding to the some 227,000 pages released earlier to the Board and NARA. The Center expects more information to be released in the coming months, including records located in the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.

The following letter appeared in *The New York Times*,
May 3, 1996:

To the Editor:

An April 29 letter, an April 19 Op-Ed article and, especially, your April 20 editorial refer to declassification of records pertaining to covert operations during the cold war, which you say has not proceeded as quickly as envisioned in 1993.

We intend to do more without compromising the Central Intelligence Agency's responsibility to protect sources and methods. We have, however, accomplished a great deal.

We have doubled the resources devoted to the agency's declassification of historically valuable records. In addition, I have formed a staff responsible for implementing the automatic declassification requirements of Executive Order No. 12958. The staff will review for declassification more than 40 million pages that are more than 25 years old.

Over the last few years, unprecedented quantities of intelligence-community records have been declassified--more than in all of the preceding decades.

Additional perspective on the cold war and the intelligence contribution to understanding that period is now available as a result of declassification of more than 450 National Intelligence Estimates on the former Soviet Union and international Communism, a vast quantity of film shot by the Corona reconnaissance satellites and many of the Venona project translations of decrypted Soviet intelligence cables that led to some of the big espionage trials in the 1950s.

In addition, we have declassified more than 200,000 pages of C.I.A. records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. And a major effort is under way to declassify records relating to Persian Gulf war illnesses.

As your editorial points out, we have also promised to review records of 11 covert actions of the cold war era. The Bay of Pigs and the 1954 Guatemala covert actions are being reviewed; we expect to declassify many of these records this year, and more will follow.

While there is room for improvement, I take issue with your assertion that a large obstacle to declassification review is the "bunker mentality of keepers of the secrets." It is clear that we got out [of] the bunker a while ago, and we are committed to staying out of it.

John Deutch
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, DC, May 1, 1996

Table of Contents

DCI Historical Review Panel Convenes

The new DCI Historical Review Panel held its first meeting on February 5, 1996 at CIA Headquarters. The panel is comprised of leading historians and scholars who advise the DCI on historical research and systematic declassification.

CSI Director Brian Latell, who coordinates the Panel's activities for the DCI, opened the session with a presentation on CIA's program and how the panel might assist the Center. Chief of the History Staff Kay Oliver and Chief of the Historical Review Group John Pereira reviewed their current activities. Director of Information Management and Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs, also made presentations. DDCI George Tenet and CIA Executive Director Nora Slatkin also participated.

During an afternoon session, the Panel went into executive session to formulate its conclusions and recommendations, which were briefed to DCI Deutch and later submitted in writing. Among other things, the Panel recommended that the Center formulate a master plan establishing priorities and a timetable for releasing CIA records and that it give first priority to transferring records from the CIA early days to the National Archives, making them available to researchers. The Panel urged the Agency to proceed with declassification with a "top-down" and "oldest first" approach, suggesting the files from the DCI Office for the period 1947-61 and all finished intelligence documents 35 years old or older, including analytical studies on the Soviet Union prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence from 1947 to 1991, be reviewed with an eye toward declassification and release to NARA. Another recommendation was for the Center to continue working on the 11 CIA covert action operations that DCIs Gates and Woolsey have publicly acknowledged and committed the Agency to review for declassification.

The Panel is scheduled to meet again in August.

Members of the DCI Historical Review Panel

George Herring / University of Kentucky

Lewis Bellardo / National Archives

John Lewis Gaddis / Ohio University

Robert Jervis / Columbia University

Ernest May / Harvard University

Page Putnam Miller / National Committee for Promotion of History

Robert Pastor / Emory University

Harry Rowen / Stanford University

Gaddis Smith / Yale University

Frederick Starr / Aspen Institute

Table of Contents

Interagency Panel on Historical Declassification

The Center is beginning new efforts to coordinate the Intelligence Community's work on systematic--that is, historical--declassification. A new unit called the Community Coordination Group has been formed within the Center to undertake this task. It will serve as the focal point for the Intelligence Community on declassification issues.

Bob Leggett, who recently joined the staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, will be heading up the Center's effort to manage the Community's efforts in the area of systematic declassification. Bob is a Ph.D. economist with extensive experience in the Directorate of Intelligence and in Community assignments. His most recent assignment was as Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Global and Multinational Issues, where among other things he managed Community efforts to assess the global threat from organized crime, the terrorist threat to the United States, and global humanitarian emergencies.

A DCI Directive is being drafted on implementing an Intelligence Community historical review program. The DCID directs that a Community Historical Review Advisory Committee (CHRAC) be created and chaired by the Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence, or his representative. The Committee will serve as a vehicle for jointly identifying topics of historical and scholarly interest and for coordinating historical review programs that exist in the Community.

The CHRAC is already up and functioning; the first meeting was held on 9 May 1996. The next session is tentatively scheduled for 20 June at which time work will begin on selecting historical topics for records declassification. The Committee will consult with the DCI Historical Review Panel on these issues and report at least annually to the DCI on the status of the historical review process throughout the Intelligence Community.

Table of Contents

Conferences

CIA Hosts Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History

The Center for the Study of Intelligence hosted more than 650 scholars who attended the 63rd annual--and largest ever--meeting of the Society for Military History on 18-21 April 1996 in Rosslyn, Virginia. The Society is an international organization of some 2,000 professionals interested in military history. In previous years, federal agencies, including the Army War College and the National Archives and Records Administration, have cosponsored the Society's annual meetings. Staff Historian Kevin C. Ruffner served as Program Coordinator for the conference. Carole Minor, CSI's Academic Coordinator, and Sara Lucas, Special Assistant to the Director, played a key role in the administrative and logistic arrangements.

With the theme of "Intelligence and National Security in Peace, Crisis, and War," the meeting included 42 panels on a variety of military and intelligence historical topics ranging from ancient Rome to Desert Storm. A number of active and retired CIA officials participated in the conference as chairs, panelists, or commentators. Chief Historian Kay Oliver, for example, moderated a panel on declassification and its impact on US military and intelligence records in which the Agency's director of Information Management, served as a panelist. Among the many popular panels at the conference, a member of the National Intelligence Council organized a panel on "Intelligence, Strategy, and Military Deception: Lessons From History for the 21st Century." This panel, and Hans Heymann's panel on "Intelligence on Soviet Defense: Assessing the Magnitude and Cost of Defense Programs," drew large crowds on the morning of the conferences last day.

In addition to Chief Historian Kay Oliver's role in the conference, the entire CIA History Staff also participated in the Society's annual meeting. Kevin C. Ruffner chaired a panel on the early Cold War in Austria. Michael Warner and

Donald Steury presented papers on the Strategic Services Unit and the Enemy Objectives Unit, while Steury also chaired a panel on the Missile Gap. Gerald K. Haines organized a panel that discussed Congressional oversight of the CIA and he presented a paper on the Church and Pike Committees. Scott Koch headed a panel that looked at the intelligence role of military attaches in which Russell Weigley, noted military historian and SMH Keynote Speaker at the Opening Plenary Session, provided the commentary.

The Society's annual meeting had several high points. On Friday afternoon, 350 Society attendees visited CIA Headquarters for an address by Maj. Gen. John R. Landry, USA (Ret.), National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces. General Landry briefed the Society about the growing role that the Intelligence Community plays in US military operations. The Society then took a tour of the first floor of Headquarters, including the Exhibit Center, and had a reception in the courtyard. The following evening, A. Denis Clift, President of the Joint Military Intelligence College, presented a formal address at the Society's annual banquet.

The conference drew attention from the media. C-SPAN recorded not only General Landry's remarks at Headquarters but also a panel that featured Ambassador Richard Helms and a number of senior CIA officials from the Agency's early years. In addition, C-SPAN covered a panel on US activity in Laos. These were to be aired in late May, according to C-SPAN. The Society for Military History's annual meeting was a great success due to the cooperation and teamwork that the Center for the Study of Intelligence received from offices throughout the Agency.

Kevin C. Ruffner,
History Staff

VENONA Conference Scheduled for October

The Center for the Study of Intelligence, the National Security Agency, and the Center for Democracy will sponsor a conference on VENONA--the US codebreaking success against Soviet intelligence--and Soviet espionage in the United States. The conference will be held 3-4 October 1996 in Washington, DC. If you want registration information, please write or fax the center, providing your name, organizational affiliation, fax number, phone number, and address.

Robert Louis Benson of the National Security Agency and Michael Warner of the CIA History Staff are preparing an unclassified publication on VENONA that will be presented at the conference. It includes dozens of declassified VENONA documents and some 100 of the most significant Soviet intelligence cables the United States was able to decrypt. In their introduction, Benson and Warner outline the history of VENONA and assess its unique contribution to US counterintelligence in the 1940s and 1950s.

CIA Museum

On 29 March 1996, while Vice President Al Gore addressed Agency employees in the Headquarters Auditorium, his son, Albert III, was given a tour of the Exhibit Center by Curator Linda McCarthy. Young Mr. Gore was intrigued by the OSS artifacts and enjoyed hearing Linda's stories about Moe Berg, the baseball player-turned-spy.

On 25 April 1996, the Agency hosted "Bring Your Child to Work Day," and one of the major attractions for children and parents alike was the Exhibit Center. Linda and Assistant Curator Beth Bruins spent the afternoon answering questions and pointing out the more interesting artifacts in our collection. Some of the most popular items included a large piece of the Berlin Wall, a support structure from the US Embassy in Moscow that was embedded with listening devices, a Civil War-era fiddle owned by one of Robert E. Lee's bodyguards, and various gadgets and weapons used by the OSS.

Table of Contents

Review Essay

The Secret Channel: Moscow, the KGB, and Bonns Eastern Policy [in German] by Vyatcheslav Kevorkov, Rowholt, Berlin, 1995. 285 pages.

Soviet-West German rapprochement--the other East-West détente of the early 1970s--is still shrouded in secrecy and surrounded by controversy. This is the first inside account from the Soviet side. Kevorkovs **(1)** book, a bestseller in Germany, sheds new light while stirring up old arguments over *Ostpolitik*. The author, a former senior KGB officer, ran the so-called back channel in which negotiations were conducted that led eventually to the dismantling of the postwar diplomatic constellation created at Yalta and paved the way for German unification.

Officials in Bonn and Washington saw sinister, not to say subversive, motives at work when it was revealed that the KGB was managing the secret talks with Chancellor Willy Brandt and his aide Egon Bahr, the creator of *Ostpolitik*. But the decision to use intelligence officers as surrogate diplomats was simply pragmatic. Brezhnev and company wanted to shield their controversial initiatives from the Soviet bureaucracy, which was dead-set against a West German-oriented policy, and protect the negotiations from a leak-prone West German Foreign Ministry and nosy media. Moreover, as Kevorkov reveals for the first time, KGB chief Yuri Andropov was the real architect of Soviet policy toward Bonn--"We must build our house in Europe, and that cant be done without Germany"--and his main protagonist was Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who opposed Andropov at every turn with help from the military high command. (According to Andropov, Gromyko could see the world "only through American stars and stripes.")

The back channel produced spectacular results. In three years Bonn signed agreements on cooperation and nonaggression with the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia and established diplomatic relations with the latter two countries plus East Germany **(2)** Hungary, and Bulgaria. This opened the way for the 1974 four-power agreement on Berlin and the 1975 Helsinki conference on European security and cooperation.

Revelations about KGB operations are selective but nonetheless interesting. In 1972, Kevorkov offered Bahr "enough money for four parliamentarians" to defeat a no-confidence vote on Brandt and win approval for the West German treaties in the Bundestag. Bahr refused the money. **(3)** Kevorkov claims that Brezhnev was furious when Brandt fell from power in 1974 after his staff chief Günter Guillaume was arrested as an East German illegal. Brezhnev allegedly held Andropov accountable for two reasons: He was the senior manager for all Warsaw Pact intelligence and the overseer of policy toward West Germany. But this is clearly a revisionist interpretation. Guillaume was key to the success of Soviet policy, allowing the Kremlin to monitor what was going on inside the West German Government and in NATO councils as well. This high-risk operation was worth it--until Guillaume got caught.

The back channel survived, however, and Helmut Schmidt continued using Kevorkov and his assistant Valery Lednev to conduct relations with Moscow. Schmidt and Brezhnev became very good friends, a bond forged by their common experiences on the Eastern front! In fact, Soviet relations with Bonn had become so close by the end of the 1970s that Brezhnev dispatched Kevorkov to alert Bahr in advance of Soviet plans to invade Afghanistan. **(4)**

Kevorkovs book is more than a memoir. It aims at influencing contemporary German policy and perceptions and moving Bonn closer to Moscow and away from Washington, Paris, and London. Kevorkov:

- Defends Brandt and Schmidt--and by extension their SPD successors--as German patriots against conservative charges that *Ostpolitik* was a sellout to Moscow.
- Portrays Brandt and Bahr and, therefore, the SPD as the real godfathers of German unification, not the CDU's Konrad Adenauer or Helmut Kohl.
- Appeals to the idea of a Soviet-German "community of fate" and "common historical destiny" and, therefore, a loosening of Germany's Atlanticist ties to the United States and NATO.

This fascinating book contains facts and insights that are still important for understanding Russian policy, and it deserves to be translated into English.

Ben Fischer

Ben Fischer is a Fellow of the Center for the Study of Intelligence.

Table of Contents

New Center Publications

Getting To Know the President: CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates, 1952-1992. By John L. Helgerson. With a Foreword by Christopher Andrew. 165 pages.

John L. Helgerson, a former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, has written a concise history of Agency briefings for presidential candidates and presidents-elect since Harry S. Truman inaugurated these briefings in 1952. Helgerson used official records and interviewed Presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton as well as former directors of the CIA, presidential briefers, and other senior intelligence officials to compile this unique book. Intelligence professionals and scholars alike will find this a worthy addition to the literature on modern intelligence.

Getting To Know the President is available from the National Technical Information Service or via Internet.

John L. Helgerson headed President Bill Clinton's briefing team during the 1992 national election campaign and transition. Christopher Andrew of Cambridge University is the author of *For the Presidents Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush*.

"*Our First Line of Defense": Presidential Reflections on US Intelligence*. Edited by Scott A. Koch, CIA History Staff, and Brian D. Fila, Defense Intelligence Agency. 59 pages.

This publication contains selected statements by US presidents from George Washington to Bill Clinton on the role of intelligence in war and peace. It includes numerous photographs from presidential libraries as well as from CIA collections. "*Our First Line of Defense"* is available from the CIA Office of Public Affairs and via Internet on the CSI home page (see page 10 for Internet address).

Scott A. Koch is a member of the CIA History Staff.

Intentions and Capabilities: Soviet Strategic Forces Estimates, 1950-83. Edited by Donald P. Steury. 450 pages.

Plotting the growth and development of Soviet intercontinental range strategic forces was one of the most important, difficult, and controversial intelligence problems faced by US intelligence throughout the Cold War. National Intelligence Estimates on Soviet strategic forces drove the entire strategic analytical process within the American Intelligence Community and played a major role in the great strategic debates affecting US behavior. Drawn from some of the most sensitive intelligence sources available to the United States, these important documents were highly classified and strictly controlled by the Intelligence Community. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, it became possible to declassify and release these Estimates to the general public for the first time. Excerpts from 41 of the most important Estimates are included in this volume, a sampling of the much greater volume of material that has been released to the National Archives.

The CIA History Staff is publishing these excerpts from the declassified Estimates as the fifth volume in its Cold War Records Series. The declassified Estimates were released in their entirety in conjunction with the conference "Estimating Soviet Military Power, 1950-1984," cosponsored in December 1994 by the Center and Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Donald P. Steury is a member of the CIA History Staff.

Table of Contents

Harvard University Intelligence and Policy Program

Founded in 1987 in cooperation with CIA, this project conducts research and training on the role of intelligence in policymaking. The project includes an annual executive program for intelligence professionals held at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and preparation of case studies that illustrate the role of intelligence in national policymaking. The case studies are available for purchase from Harvard and are being used in many college and university courses. Titles include:

- *The Fall of France: Germany, 1939-1940*
- *The Fall of France: France, 1939-1940*
- *The SS-9 Controversy: Intelligence as Political Football*

- *The Fall of the Shah of Iran*
- *Sunshine and Shadow: The CIA and the Soviet Economy*
- *The Reagan Administration and the Soviet Gas Pipeline*
- *Lebanon and the Intelligence Community*
- *What the Market Will Bear: The CIA and the International Debt Crisis*
- *The Fall of Marcos*
- *Taking Toshiba Public*
- *The INF Treaty*
- *Policing Northern Ireland*
- *Prelude to War: US Policy Toward Iraq, 1988-1990*
- *The CIA and the Fall of the Soviet Empire: The Politics of Getting It Right*
- *Persuading a President: Jimmy Carter and American Troops in Korea*
- *Black Wednesday: The Bundesbank Connection* (in preparation)
- *Black Wednesday in Britain: The Politics of the ERM Crisis* (in preparation)
- *The Suez Crisis* (in preparation)

For information regarding price and availability, contact:

Case Program
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
Telephone: (617) 496-6255
Fax: (617) 495-8878

The CIA Cold War Record Series

CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
Edited by Mary S. McAuliffe
1992. 376 pages

Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union, 1950-1959
Edited by Scott A. Koch
1993. 297 pages

The CIA Under Harry Truman
Edited by Michael Warner
1994. 473 pages

CORONA: Americas First Satellite Program
Edited by Kevin C. Ruffner
1995. 360 pages

Intentions and Capabilities: Soviet Strategic Forces Estimates, 1950-83
Edited by Donald P. Steury
1996. 450 pages

Table of Contents

Studies in Intelligence

The 1995 unclassified version of the Intelligence Community's professional journal *Studies in Intelligence* is now available in print as well as on the Center's Internet home page and includes the articles and reviews listed in the inset.

Please note that copies of *Studies in Intelligence* are available*only* from:

Document Expediting (DOCEX) Project
Exchange and Gift Division (subscriptions)

or

Photoduplication Service (individual copies)
Library of Congress
Washington, DC 20504

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National Technical Information Service
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Springfield, VA 22161
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Table of Contents

Studies in Intelligence
Vol. 38, No. 5
1995

Studying and Teaching Intelligence
Ernest R. May

A Policymaker's Perspective on Intelligence Analysis
Jack Davis

British and American Policy on Intelligence Archives
Richard T. Aldrich

Honoring Two World War II Heroes
R. James Woolsey,
Maj. Gen. Doyle Larson,
and Linda Hall

Some Lessons in Intelligence
R. V. Jones

The Komsomolets Disaster
George Montgomery

Fifteen DCI's First 100 Days
CIA History Staff

Truman and Eisenhower: Launching the Process
John Helgerson

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James C. Linder

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William M. Leary

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Scott A. Koch

Historical Intelligence Documents

General de Gaulle in Action
Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters

Of Moles and Molehunters
Cleveland Cram

Table of Contents

Publications and Videos

The following CSI publications and videos are available from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) of the Department of Commerce.

CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
NTIS Order Number: PB 92 927 906
Price: $49.00

Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union, 1950-1959
NTIS Order Number: PB 93 928 112
Price: $28.50

The CIA Under Harry S. Truman
NTIS Order Number: PB 94 928 005
Price: $31.50

The Origin and Development of the CIA in the Administration of Harry S. Truman: A Conference Report
NTIS Order Number: PB 95 928 006
Price: $21.50

Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 36, No. 5
NTIS Order Number: PB 93 928 013
Price: $28.00

Studies in Intelligence Index, 1955-1992
NTIS Order Number: PB 93 928 014
Price: $21.50

Cleveland Cram, *Molehunters: A Review of Counterintelligence Literature, 1977-1992*
NTIS Order Number: PB 93 928 019
Price: $22.50

Symposium on the Cuban Missile Crisis (video)
NTIS Order Number: PB 94 780 186
Price: $ 22.50

Symposium on Teaching Intelligence, October 1-2, 1993: A Report
NTIS Order Number: PB 94 928 008
Price: $17.00

Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays
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Getting To Know the President: CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates,1952-1992
NTIS Order Number: PB 96 928 003
Price: $24.95

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The CSI home page address is: www.odci.gov/csi.

Table of Contents

Footnotes

(1) This is a Russianization of the Armenian name Kevorkian.

(2) Bonn did not want to extend full diplomatic recognition of East Germany under international law. so it agreed only to exchange "diplomatic representatives" rather than ambassadors.

(3) East German intelligence, however, bribed and blackmailed two members of the opposition CDU, and the anti-Brandt motion failed by exactly two votes.

(4) Schmidt and Bahr repaid the Soviets' trust by not passing this information along to the United States or other NATO allies. The Carter administration, for its part, did not share early warning and indications intelligence with Bonn.

Other Issues | Previous Issue | Next Issue