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CSI News

Officers-in-Residence Honored

Two of CIA's Officers-in-Residence have received major awards. James Olsen, who teaches an honors seminar on "Cold War Intelligence" and a graduate seminar on "International Crisis Management" at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, was selected as outstanding faculty member by the student body. The award was announced during the May 1999 commencement ceremony. In addition to his classroom teaching, Olsen lectures frequently to university and high school groups as well as civic and veteran organizations. CSI Director Lloyd Salvetti noted that "Jim is a model of what we want in our Officers-in-Residence. He is active on campus, in the classroom, and in the community."

Dr. Thomas Ward, who teaches at the US Air Force Academy, received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service. The honor recognized Ward's "exceptionally meritorious service as Director, Threat and Countermeasures, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, from August 1988 to May 1999." The accompanying citation cited Dr. Ward's leadership style and management expertise as an "essential element in the successful development, testing, and deployment of national and theater missile defense capabilities." A 33-year CIA veteran, Dr. Ward served in the Directorate of Science and Technology, the National Photographic Interpretation Center, and the Intelligence Community Staff before his Pentagon assignment.

The Deputy Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, Dr. Richard Schroeder, administers the Officer-in-Residence program. CIA officers are currently teaching at Texas A&M, Georgetown, Marquette, Ohio State, George Washington, University of Maryland, the National War College, John Jay College/ City University New York, and the US Naval and US Air Force Academies.

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Historical Review Program News

The Historical Review Program (HRP) of the Office of Information Management is currently engaged in supporting CIA's effort to comply with the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. (See "CIA and the Search for Nazi War Criminals" below.) HRP review officers at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and at the CIA archives searching OSS and pre-CIA records have identified several thousand pages that may be relevant to the Act. HRP also is searching CIA operational records against a list of 60,000 German names provided by the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations. A preliminary search of DI records turned up hundreds of pages of potentially relevant records that will be reviewed. According to HRP, when the work is completed, the Agency's relevancy surveys and reviews, including electronic records searches, will have searched several million pages of records.

The HRP made a major contribution to the History Staff's volume *At Cold War's End: US Intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1989-1991,* which was prepared in conjunction with a conference at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. We are especially grateful to the Director, Office of Information Management and the Chief, Historical Review Program and his associates Howard Stoertz, John Vogel, and James Noren for their support in reviewing and redacting the National Intelligence Estimates and other Cold War records reprinted in the volume in cooperation with the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies of the Intelligence Community. Stoertz, Vogel, and Noren, all veterans of the national estimates process, provided advice and recommendations that were invaluable and more than welcome. Without their support, the job could not have been done.

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Conferences

Berlin: The Intelligence War, 1945-1961, The Teufelsberg and Allierten Museum Berlin, Germany 10-12 September 1999

From 10-12 September 1999 the Center for the Study of Intelligence and the Allierten [Allied] Museum of Berlin, Germany, co-hosted a conference on intelligence activities in the once-divided Cold War city from the end of World War II to the construction of Berlin Wall in August 1961. The first public conference ever hosted by CIA abroad, the event took place at the former US signals intercept facility on the Teufelsberg [Devil's Mountain], just outside Berlin. The conference was the result of a two-year cooperative effort by CSI and the Museum. Financial and logistical support was generously provided by the Investorengruppe Teufelsberg, which owns the site and plans to convert it into a conference center.

Berlin: The Intelligence War, 1945-1961, The Teufelsberg and Allierten Museum Berlin, Germany 10-12 September 1999

Welcome

- Claus Henning Schaper, State Secretary, Federal Ministry of the Interior
- Dr. Kuno Böse, State Secretary, Berlin Senate Office of the Interior
- John Kornblum, US Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany

The March Crisis and the Berlin Airlift

- Dr. Donald Steury, Chair
- Professor Ernest R. May
- Dr. Viktor Gorbarev
- Professor Wolfgang Krieger

Allied Military Intelligence in Berlin

- Dr. John Greenwood, Chair and Overview
- Dr. William Stivers
- Lt. Col. Daniel Trastour
- Col. Nigel N. Wylde

The Other Side of the Wall: KGB and Stasi

- Professor Christopher Andrew, Chair and Overview
- Dr. Richard Popplewell
- Mr. Benjamin B. Fischer
- Dr. Vladislav Zubok

Spying without Spies

- Dr. Gerald Haines, Chair
- Dr. Kevin C. Ruffner
- Dr. Donald P. Steury
- Dr. Vance O. Mitchell

Berlin in the Wilderness of Mirrors: Agents, Double Agents, and Defectors

- Dr. Richard E. Schroeder, Chair
- Ambassador Hugh Montgomery
- Mr. Nigel West
- Mr. Jerrold Schecter

Eisenhower, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Wall

- Ambassador Raymond L. Garthoff, Chair and Overview
- Professor Egon K-H. Bahr
- Dr. William Burr

Battleground Berlin: Veterans Remember

- Dr. Helmut Trotnow, Chair
- Mr. Burton L. Gerber
- Col. Oleg Gordievsky
- Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin
- Mr. Peter M. Sichel

From Dusk to Dawn: Berlin and the History of the Cold War

- Ambassador Vernon A. Walters, former US Ambassador to West Germany and former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Under the warm sun of a Berlin Indian Summer, some 150 Cold War intelligence veterans, historians, journalists, and other interested persons gathered in the shadow of the domed towers of the "T-berg" to relive some of the most critical years of the Cold War. Many were there just to see the Teufelsberg, a Cold War landmark in Berlin that has long been the object of wonder, curiosity, and controversy. The broad windows of the former dining hall, where the conference sessions were held, offered a panoramic view of Berlin and its surroundings. The mystery surrounding the installation was evident in the still-present security arrangements, the barbed-wire fences, and the silent, empty rooms that bore the marks of 30 years of intelligence activity.

On the dais, the subject was intelligence. Featuring a mix of personal recollections and scholarly presentations, the conference took a broad view of Cold War intelligence operations in Berlin that

ran the gamut from agent operations to the Berlin tunnel to US Air Force reconnaissance missions. On the first panel Harvard diplomatic historian Ernest R. May joined Russian military historian Viktor Gobarev and German Cold War historian Wolfgang Krieger in a multifaceted overview of the Berlin blockade and the crises of 1948. On another panel chaired by Cambridge University intelligence historian Christopher Andrew, CSI historian Ben Fischer recounted CIA's penetration of East German foreign intelligence in the early 1950s. (See "Markus Wolf and the CIA Mole" below.) The first day of the conference concluded with a tour of the Teufelsberg and a reception hosted by the Investorengruppe.

The second day of the conference began with a panel on technical intelligence collection chaired by CIA Chief Historian Gerald K. Haines. This session was followed by one of the conference highlights: a roundtable discussion hosted by CSI Deputy Director Richard E. Schroeder, which featured veteran British historian Nigel West, author Jerrold Schecter *(The Spy Who Saved the World)*, Ambassador Hugh Montgomery, a veteran intelligence officer now serving as special Assistant to the DCI. The afternoon sessions began with a panel on the Berlin Crisis of 1958-61 in which Ambassador Raymond L. Garthoff led a discussion that included historians from the US and Russia along with Dr. Egon Bahr, who was an aide to West Berlin Lord Mayor Willy Brandt when the Berlin Wall went up in August 1961. Ambassador Garthoff presented new information on the "back-channel" contacts between US President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev at the height of the crisis.

Conference attendees next boarded buses that took them to the Alliierten Museum for a roundtable discussion on Cold War espionage in Berlin by former intelligence officers from both sides of the Iron Curtain. CIA was represented by Peter Sichel, who operated in Berlin during the 1940s and 1950s, and Soviet intelligence specialist Burton Gerber. The Soviet side was represented by former KGB officers Gen. Oleg Kalugin and Col. Oleg Gordievsky, who defected to the West in 1985 after serving as a British agent inside Soviet intelligence for 11 years. The roundtable was chaired by the Director of the Alliierten Museum, Dr. Helmut Trotnow. During and after the roundtable, attendees enjoyed an opportunity to tour the Museum itself, which features a comprehensive collection of exhibits on the Allied occupation of Berlin and the East-West struggle over the divided city.

On the morning of the third day, conference participants embarked on a tour of Berlin that included the former Normannenstraße headquarters of the dreaded East German intelligence and security service, the Stasi. Few could resist the opportunity to sit at the desk of the former Minister for State Security Erich Mielke, which is still adorned with Lenin's death mask. The tour also included visits to the original Berlin City Hall, the so- called Red Rathaus located in the city center, and the Schöneberg Rathaus, where President Kennedy delivered his famous "Ich bin ein Berliner" speech in June 1963. The tour included a visit to Berlin-Karlshorst as well as the former officers' casino in which the German high command surrendered to Soviet forces on 9 May 1945; the casino became the headquarters of the Soviet Group of Forces, Germany and still houses a fascinating museum dedicated to the Red Army's siege of Berlin. An adjoining compound served as the KGB *rezidentura*, the Soviet intelligence service's largest foreign post during the Cold War. Those who stayed to the very end were treated to a trip to the Glienicke Bridge, site of numerous Cold War spy swaps, in the company of Oleg Kalugin and Francis Gary Powers, Jr., whose father in 1962 crossed paths with Soviet "illegal" William Henry Fisher (alias Rudolf Abel) on the same span in the first US-Soviet prisoner exchange.

Ambassador Vernon Walters, who was US Chief of Mission in West Germany when the Berlin Wall fell, closed the conference. He praised the organizers of the conference and thanked the sponsors who had made it possible.

In conjunction with the conference, CSI released a collection of declassified intelligence records entitled *On the Front Lines of the Cold War: Documents on the Intelligence War in Berlin 1945 to 1961*. The volume includes National Intelligence Estimates, CIA current reporting, and field operational cables as well as "raw" intelligence messages. Two of the latter messages came from a CIA mole inside Markus Wolf's foreign intelligence service.

Donald P. Steury
Senior Historian

US Intelligence and the End of the Cold War, The Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, 18- 20 November 1999.

An unclassified conference on "US Intelligence and the End of the Cold War," sponsored by CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence and the George Bush School of Government and Public Service, took place on 18-20 November 1999 at the George Bush Presidential Conference Center on the Texas A&M University campus in College Station. The event drew some 400 attendees, including former President Bush; DCI George Tenet; former DCIs Richard Helms, William Webster, Robert Gates, and R. James Woolsey; other former senior intelligence officers from both sides in the Cold War; former senior US policymakers; academic specialists on the Cold War, and other interested citizens. This article presents highlights of speeches and synopses of panel presentations that'together with a book produced by the CIA History Staff specifically for this conference'formed the core of the three-day event. (The book is discussed further in a "Scholars' Roundtable" below.)

US Intelligence and the End of the Cold War, The Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, 18-20 November 1999
Welcome Robert Gates, Interim Dean, George Bush School of Government and Public Service **Panel I: Predicting the Collapse of the Soviet Union** Gerald Haines, Chair; Bruce Berkowitz, Charles Gati, Douglas MacEachin, Thomas Powers, and Charles Wolf **Panel II: Intelligence and the Arms Race** Howard Graves, Chair; Stephen Hadley, Arnold Kanter, Ronald Lehman, and James Woolsey **Panel III: Espionage and Counterintelligence** James Olsen, Chair; Oleg Kalugin, Paul Redmond, and Allen Weinstein **Panel IV: Providing Intelligence to Policymakers** Lloyd Salvetti, Chair; Robert Gates, David Jeremiah, Richard Kerr, Robert Kimmit, and Paul Wolfowitz **Panel V: The Use of Intelligence by Policymakers** George C. Edwards III, Chair; Richard Cheney, Brent Scowcroft, and William Webster **Memorial Ceremony** President George Bush, DCIs George Tenet, Richard Helms, Robert Gates, William Webster; and Col. Ryszard Kuklinski **Scholars Roundtable** H. W Brands, Chair; Benjamin Fischer, Lloyd Gardner, Melvyn Leffler, and John Prados

Keynote Speeches

President George Bush
In his luncheon remarks on 19 November, former President Bush looked back at the turbulent and far-reaching changes in the world order that occurred during his presidency. He reiterated his admiration for the contributions of CIA and the rest of the Intelligence Community to US national security, and for the courage and resourcefulness of America's intelligence officers. He credited his brief tour (1976-1977) as DCI as having underscored for him the value of intelligence and the need for it.

Excerpts:

- *There can be no substitute for the President's having the best possible intelligence in the world, which means we still must rely on CIA and indeed the entire Intelligence Community.*
- *I wouldn't have wanted to try tackling any of the many issues we confronted without the input from the Intelligence Community. Not for one second.*
- *The PDB, the President's Daily Brief, was the first order of business on my calendar. I made it a point from day one to read the PDB in the presence of the CIA officer and either Brent [National Security Advisor Scowcroft], or sometimes his deputy. This way I could ask the briefers for more information on matters of critical interest, and consult with Brent on matter affecting policy.*
- *Conferences like this one, I believe, can serve a very useful purpose: The give and take on display here this week is exactly the kind of big-picture, long-range thinking we need to solve the many new questions that have emerged in the wake of the Cold War.*

Judge William Webster: Former DCI, Former FBI Director
Judge Webster, in delivering his speech at the conference's opening dinner, refuted charges that US intelligence had failed to anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union. He credited the now-declassified National Intelligence Estimates with having played a "vital role" in helping several presidents maintain strong US defenses while also reaching satisfactory agreements with the USSR on arms control.

Excerpts:

- *The evidence refutes the common charge, a charge that regrettably has already made its way into some history books'that US intelligence failed to apprise policymakers of the Soviet Union's grave economic problems.*
- *[National Intelligence Estimates] also refute the allegations that US intelligence failed to anticipate the collapse of Soviet power in eastern and central Europe, and then in the USSR itself.*
- *By early 1989, CIA was warning policymakers of the deepening crisis in the Soviet Union and the growing likelihood of an implosion of the old order.* Perestroika *meant* "katastroika" *for the Soviet system. In other words, Gorbachev's reforms were creating the opposite of their intended result.*
- *I believe a careful examination of newly released documents shows that US intelligence contributed new information and insights that helped American policymakers bring the most protracted and most dangerous conflict of the 20th century to a peaceful end.*

Robert Gates: Interim Dean, The George Bush School of Government and Public Service
Former DCI Gates, the dinner speaker on 19 November, also rebutted charges that CIA failed to alert policymakers to indications of Soviet weakness and incipient collapse. In addition, while acknowledging shortcomings, he outlined some of the Agency's many successes and achievements during that period.

Excerpts:

- *CIA's [analytical] work on growing Soviet internal problems stands up far better in hindsight than criticism suggests . By 1987 CIA was warning policymakers of the deepening crisis in the Soviet Union and the growing likelihood of the collapse of the old order.*
- *Preventing surprise was CIA's mission, and with respect to the Soviet collapse, it fulfilled that mission more than two years ahead of time.*
- *I sent a memo to President Bush on July 18, 1989, based on reporting from CIA. It said, "The odds are growing that in the next year or two, there will be popular unrest, political turmoil, and/or official violence [that may include] significant political instability." With President Bush's express approval, that fall Brent [Scowcroft] and I established a contingency planning effort to prepare for the possibility of a Soviet collapse.*
- *[CIA analyst] Kay Oliver, briefing President Reagan in November 1985, [told him that] "we cannot foresee the time, but we can see the tendency eventually to confront the regime with challenges to its political control that it cannot contain."*
- *My most memorable memory of that briefing was during my conversation with the President I heard this incredible noise whrrrr and the President adjusted his hearing*

aid. [A short time later, the noise recurred] ◆ and he plucked his hearing aid out of his ear and pounded it in his hand and then leaned over to me and whispered: "It◆s my KGB handler trying to reach me."

Gerald Seib of the Wall Street Journal spoke at the conference◆s 20 November luncheon. Asked how well the press had performed in foreseeing the end the Cold War, he said: "I don◆t think we did all that much better, and maybe not all that much worse than anyone else did." He noted some advantages◆such as greater freedom of movement◆that journalists often have over intelligence officers, as well as some disadvantages, such as generally weaker language skills.

Panel Discussions

Panel I: Predicting the Collapse of the Soviet Union
A common theme among presentations by most members of this panel consisted of their challenges to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan◆s claims that the CIA and the rest of the US intelligence community failed to anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union, resulting in a costly and unnecessary US defense buildup. Thomas Powers took a somewhat different approach, contending that most observers (including those at CIA) "understood that the unequal [East-West] struggle could not go on forever," but they "thought it would end in a war," not a Soviet collapse. Because such a war was anathema to most people, psychologically we had a very deep investment in believing that nothing was going to happen◆forever."

Panel II: Intelligence and the Arms Race
Members of this panel examined the Intelligence Community◆s performance in providing intelligence on the former USSR to support US arms control negotiators. Panelists concluded that the intelligence agencies hadperformed well in covering most Soviet weapons systems; chemical weapons were cited as an exception. Panel members also gave recognition to the value of satellite imagery to US arms control strategists, particularly in the negotiations that resulted in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement. Former DCI and CFE negotiator Woolsey discussed the tactics he used to enable the US position to prevail in these negotiations. Mr. Woolsey also maintained that the ABM Treaty needed to be re-negotiated because one of the two nations to which it was to be applied no longer existed.

Panel III: Espionage and Counterintelligence
This panel focused on Soviet and US Cold War intelligence and counterintelligence operations against each other. Panelists Paul Redmond, former CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Counterintelligence, and retired KGB Gen. Oleg Kalugin exchanged good- humored boasts, barbs, and loaded questions about their services◆ counterespionage activities against one another, prompting panel member Allen Weinstein to quip, "I did not realize I would be mediating a CIA-KGB Gong Show." Other subjects included the KGB◆s allegation that US intelligence organizations had pursued a program to kidnap and murder Soviet operatives.
Mr. Redmond replied, "we weren◆t, and we probably couldn◆t have pulled it off anyway." Gen. Kalugin observed that "the Soviet mentality and experience shaped [Moscow◆s] view of the world◆kidnapping, murder, lies; we thought the other side was no better." Redmond spoke of a Soviet plan to kidnap US intelligence officers in Lebanon; Gen. Kalugin conformed that there had been such a plot, but he said that at the last moment, then-Soviet leader Andropov "shouted into the telephone, ◆Listen, stop it! Stop it! They will do the same to us, resulting in warfare among the intelligence services, and they [the West] have an advantage over us in many parts of the world.◆" Other subjects discussed included Radio Liberty, which Gen. Kalugin characterized as "great;" Amnesty International, which the Russians had
claimed was run by CIA (Mr. Redmond emphatically denied this); and whether Russian "re-defector" Vitali Yurchenko had been a genuine defector. (They concluded he was in fact a real defector.)

Panel IV: Providing Intelligence to Policymakers
Lloyd Salvetti, in introducing the panelists, noted that this panel was, in effect, a re- creation of the Bush Administration◆s Deputies Committee. The panel consisted entirely of former members of that Committee, which was chaired by the deputy national security adviser (Dr. Gates held the post from 1989-1991). Other members included the number-two or number-three officials of four entities◆the State and Defense Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CIA. Additional departments and agencies participated if topics on the agenda necessitated their presence.

The panelists identified a variety of factors◆ including those related to intelligence◆that made the Deputies Committee a critical forum in national security decisionmaking during President Bush◆s tenure. Dr. Gates noted, for example, that the panel consisted of people who respected, trusted, and could speak frankly with one another, and who approached the Committee◆s work in a collegial spirit. These were very senior people who could commit their department or agency and its leader, had the trust of and easy access to that leader, and could, in Dr. Gates◆s words, "strip away all of the bureaucratic baloney and get down to what was the really key issue" that the Committee and/or the President had to decide.

Panel V: The Use of Intelligence by Policymakers
The three panel members all commented favorably on the overall utility of intelligence to US policymakers. They also identified some weak spots. Secretary Cheney noted that "when I arrived at the Defense Department ◆ the floodgates had opened. There was this enormous volume of material, and I had to find some way to ◆ reduce it to manageable proportions." Although CIA◆s reports were "very good," according to Mr. Cheney, he also valued *briefings* from experts in the academic world as well as from CIA and other intelligence agencies on "what does this mean ◆ [and] what should we be thinking about, and so forth." He added, "I think [the Bush Administration] was very, very well served on balance◆that we got a lot of excellent analysis, a lot of it thought-provoking, that required us to really think about what we were doing and why."

General Scowcroft observed that decisionmakers often are faced with "ambiguity and lack of hard data;" thus, a key purpose of intelligence is to provide some key "concrete facts." And, he added, while consumers generally have confidence in intelligence experts◆ facts and interpretations of those facts, they tend to be more skeptical when it comes to intelligence officers◆ *predictions*. Judge Webster made a related point, noting that policymakers may be interested in our predictions but often will give preference to their own. Partly for this reason, according to the Judge, he found "a very clear preference among policymakers for current intelligence rather than Estimates." Judge Webster also noted that it can be very difficult to obtain the human intelligence that is often the only way to get at our adversaries◆ intentions. Gen. Scowcroft identified some other problems, such as analysts◆ "mind-sets" and the tendency to assume that foreign leaders reason as we do. These phenomena, he indicated, caused US intelligence to fail to forecast the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

Scholars◆ Roundtable
The purpose of this final session was to have several scholars reflect on the entire conference, including speeches, panel discussions, and the conference volume titled *At Cold War◆s End: US Intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1989-1991*, prepared for the conference. Benjamin B. Fischer of the History Staff compiled and edited the book and wrote the Preface, which provides context for the book and the conference. The rest of the book consists of 24 declassified and released National Intelligence Estimates and CIA papers on the USSR that were written between 1989 and 1991.

The scholars on the panel, while praising the book and commending the CIA for making these documents available, urged that Intelligence Community agencies now move quickly to declassify and release additional material on this and other topics. They contended that such action is essential for scholars seeking to address such controversial matters as the intelligence agencies◆ performance in forecasting the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some panel members and other participants in the conference singled out the tightly controlled *President◆s Daily Brief*, the CIA◆s daily analytical report to the President, as a document that needs to be made available to scholars trying to gain an accurate, comprehensive understanding of the intelligence agencies◆ performance in anticipating the historic events of 1989-1991. Professor Melvyn Leffler contended that the CIA◆s self-image of its openness is not widely shared in the scholarly community or among the public at large.

Memorial Ceremony
The culmination of the conference was a memorial service "In Memory of Those Who Died That Others Might Be Free," which honored foreign agents who had lost their lives in the Cold War◆s "silent intelligence war." DCI George Tenet delivered the eulogy. The service was organized and conducted by the Texas A&M University Corps of Cadets, Band, and Singing Cadets. The ceremony also honored the memory of the Texas A&M students who died in the bonfire accident that occurred on the eve of the conference.

Also present at the memorial service as a speaker and honoree was Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, a Polish army officer who provided crucial information on Warsaw Pact military plans to the West during the 1970s and early 1980s. (He escaped from Poland in late 1980.) DCI Tenet called Col. Kuklinski a "true hero of the Cold War, a man who risked great danger to work for us ◆. It is in great measure due to the bravery and sacrifice of patriots like Col. Kuklinski that Poland and the other once-captive nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are now free." In his brief but moving response, Col. Kuklinski responded that he was "deeply honored to represent my many, anonymous comrades who served on both sides of the front line. I am pleased that our long hard struggle has brought peace, freedom, and democracy not only to my country but to many other people as well."

Henry R. Appelbaum
Editor

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Featured Articles

Markus Wolf and the CIA Mole
East Germany is long gone, but the feats of its foreign intelligence service, the *Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung* (HVA), live on as Cold War legend. Former Soviet intelligence officer Oleg Gordievsky conceded that the HVA was the best service in the Warsaw Pact◆ "even better than the KGB."[1] Spymaster Markus Wolf "had so deeply penetrated the West German government, military, and secret services that about all we had to do was lay back and stay out of [his] way," exclaims ex-KGB Gen. Oleg Kalugin.[2]

But in the beginning things were different. As two intelligence reports reveal in the new CSI book *On the Front Lines of the Cold War: Documents on the Intelligence War in Berlin, 1946 to 1961* edited by Donald P. Steury, the fledging service was struggling to survive in the early 1950s. To make matters worse, it had a mole in its midst. Gotthold Krauss was a CIA "agent in place" employed at the so-called Institute for Economic Research (IWF), the innocuous cover name for East German intelligence.[3] Thanks to his information, CIA was the first Western intelligence service to learn about the covert role of the mysterious IWF and that Moscow had given command of East German intelligence to a 29-year-old prodigy named Markus (Mischa) Wolf.

Krauss was an unlikely spy. A banker by profession, he had been hired to prepare the IWF◆s annual budget. But his superiors recognized his aptitude for intelligence operations and even made him a deputy chief of a key espionage department. What they didn◆t know was that Krauss was an avowed anti-communist, who hoped to strangle the neophyte East German service in its cradle. In September 1950 he contacted CIA◆s Berlin Operations Base (BOB) and offered to work in place to earn his passage to the West. He didn◆t have much information to offer at that point, but BOB took a chance, not knowing there would be a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. Even as late as March 1952, after Krauss, by pure serendipity, had been recruited by the IWF and had begun supplying information on its operations in West Germany, the BOB and CIA Headquarters were not certain where the operation would lead. Some thought BOB had bought a pig in a poke, but one officer in Washington observed that this was "an unusually valuable operation."[4] He was right. Krauss was so aggressive that at one point the chief of the East European Division, in a cable to BOB, cautioned Krauss "to be highly selective in the material he furnishes and to refrain from taking risks to obtain information not normally available to him."[5]

One of Krauss◆s reports in *On the Front Lines of the Cold War* (Document IV-6) is a detailed report of the very first staff meeting Markus Wolf conducted. Wolf◆s lengthy harangue revealed the service◆s weaknesses, but a pep talk by the chief Soviet adviser showed that Moscow entertained great hopes for the HVA that, over the years, would actually exceed all expectations. (German counterintelligence experts estimate that the HVA, by itself, may have produced 80 percent of all Warsaw Pact intelligence on NATO and the West.)

A second document (IV-7) recounts an emergency meeting Wolf convened on 7 March 1953◆just after Stalin◆s death. The Soviets put the service on alert, tasking it to acquire information on the West◆s reaction to the dictator◆s death, on the successor government headed by Georgi Malenkov, and on a possible Western provocation or even military action against East Germany. The Soviets were especially concerned over a request from the West Berlin Senat for military transport aircraft to shuttle East German refugees from the divided city to West Germany; Moscow suspected that this was a cover to bring US forces up to the frontlines of the Cold War. Krauss reported that the Soviets were very nervous and believed that this explained why they had recently shot down a US and a British military aircraft.

In the fall of 1952 Krauss learned that Soviet counterintelligence had discovered the presence◆but not the identity◆of a CIA penetration in one of the East European intelligence services. IWF launched its own molehunt, and Krauss knew his days were numbered. CIA had hoped Krauss would remain in place until the end of the year, but the molehunt was taking its toll on his nerves. He crossed over to the French sector of pre- Wall Berlin on Good Friday, 3 April 1953, taking advantage of the long Easter holiday. The IWF had closed down the day before and would not reopen until the following Tuesday, giving Krauss a head start. He arrived in the French sector of divided Berlin with his wife, daughter, and two fox terriers and was quickly moved to Frankfurt and then to a safe house under US military guard. On 6 April, Easter Monday, his mother, his in-laws, his wife◆s sister and brother and their families◆nine persons altogether◆followed.

Krauss brought documents and notes containing detailed information on the IWF◆s organization, personnel, operations, residenturas, and agents. He identified 135 staff officers and other personnel who had been recruited during the rapid buildup, including in some cases their photos. He also

provided information on accommodation addresses, safe houses, telephone numbers, IWF staff vehicle license plates, and Soviet advisers and their vehicles—in other words, a treasure trove of counterintelligence information.

Krauss reported rumors—confirmed 38 years later—that in 1952 East German leaders wanted to build a barricade or "Chinese Wall" between the Soviet and Western sectors of Berlin. In a memoir completed before his death in 1997 (and still not published), he speculated that his defection may have postponed the decision to erect the Berlin Wall until August 1961.

Krauss's final encounter with the IWF was ironic. On a Thursday evening, April the second, as he was preparing to defect the next day, he met Gerhard Heidenreich, head of the cadre section, in the parking lot. The old-line Stalinist wished him a "Happy Easter" and then said that he wished he "had five more like you" and that "you have an excellent future ahead of you."

On 10 April 1953, West German Vice- Chancellor Franz Bücher announced the arrest of 35 suspected East German agents. Krauss's defection had triggered Operation Vulkan (volcano), the codename for the spy roundup. Bonn had to move quickly, anticipating that once Wolf and company realized Krauss had bolted they would have to get their residents and agents out of harm's way. But, thanks to assistance from CIA, Bonn was able to act quickly. Krauss remained in West Germany until May 1953, when he and his family moved to the Washington, DC area. But he returned to West Germany several more times for debriefings and trials in which he provided critical testimony that resulted in several espionage convictions.

Krauss came close to wrecking what *US News & World Report* would later call the Cold War's best spy agency. Vulkan was the "first bombshell of my career," Markus Wolf writes in his autobiography. "I took it as a heavy personal blow, and it made me realize that our young service was still far from secure." He added that "Gotthold Krauss's betrayal cost us dearly."[6] A top-to-bottom in-house investigation followed, and the IWF was disbanded, decentralized, and dispersed to separate locations.

Wolf lost face but not his job or Soviet patronage, and eventually he pulled off operations that made the HVA (and Wolf himself) legendary. In 1959 the second East German intelligence defector, Max Heim, told West German security officers who debriefed him that the HVA was on its way to becoming the premier service in the Soviet bloc.[7] The East German tail was waging the Soviet dog, as he put it. He claimed that the HVA had 2,000 to 3,000 agents in the West. But Western services disregarded Heim's; it did not seem credible, given East Germany's "junior" status and weak economy. It would take almost 30 more years and the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War, and the revelations from the Stasi files, before the West realized that these early defectors were more right than wrong. The HVA, the KGB's stealth weapon in the Cold War, had gone undetected until it was too late to matter.

Benjamin B. Fischer
CIA History Staff

CIA and the Search for Nazi War Criminals

Stories of Nazis escaping the defeated Third Reich in order to regroup and create underground organizations have long gripped novelists and Hollywood screenwriters, as was evident in such bestsellers-turned-into movies as *Boys from Brazil* and *The ODESSA File*. In 1977-1978 and again from 1982 to 1985, the US Congress's General Accounting Office (GAO) investigated US Government agencies to determine if any of them had assisted Nazi war criminals after World War II. In addition to the GAO investigations, Congress has held several hearings on the issue of Nazi war criminals in the United States. Since 1979, the Department of Justice's Office of Special Investigations (OSI) has worked with CIA's Office of General Counsel and other Agency components to investigate individuals suspected of committing war crimes from 1933 to 1945. CIA has assisted in the investigations of such major cases as those of Klaus Barbie, Robert Jan Verbelen, Josef Mengele, and Kurt Waldheim.

Since the end of the Cold War, many nations have expanded their search for Nazi war criminals. Argentina, for example, launched a major review of its official records, looking for Nazis and collaborators who immigrated to South America after World War II. Other countries, including Croatia, France, Italy, and Great Britain, have held highly publicized trials of World War II-era war criminals. The field of Holocaust research has also moved into new areas, such as the theft by Nazi Germany and its allies of money and assets from victims and how the Axis Powers used these resources to pay for their war efforts. Worldwide interest in the role that governments, banks, insurance companies, and businesses played during the war is clearly growing.

In the United States, President Clinton signed the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act (NWCDA), Public Law 105-246, in October 1998. This measure established the Nazi War Crimes Interagency Working Group (IWG) and directed it to "locate, inventory, recommend for declassification, and make available all classified Nazi war criminal records, subject to specified exceptions." The law requires Federal agencies to "locate bodies of records that can reasonably be believed to contain information that:

1. *Pertains to any individuals who the US Government has grounds to believe ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion, during the period of Nazi rule in Germany (1933-45); or*

2. *Involves assets taken, whether or not under color of law, during the period from persons persecuted by the Nazi regime or governments associated with it."*

The IWG is composed of the heads of several Federal departments and agencies, including the Director of Central Intelligence, and meets monthly under the chairmanship of Michael J. Kurtz, Assistant Archivist of the United States. The president appointed three public members—Thomas Baer, Richard Ben-Veniste, and former Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman, to serve on the IWG. Kenneth Levit, Special Counsel to the DCI, is the Agency's representative to the IWG.

In February 1999, the White House issued a directive calling for the survey of all Federal records to "include any bodies of records that are likely to contain information on war crimes, war criminals, acts of persecution, or assets taken by, under the direction of, or in association with the Nazi government of Germany or any government of a European country allied with, occupied by, or established with the assistance or cooperation of Nazi Germany." The White House directive also stated that "agencies should take an expansive view of the act in making this survey and in subsequent identification of records and declassification review. Special efforts should be made to locate records that may shed light on U.S. Government knowledge about, policies toward, and treatment of Nazi war criminals, especially during the Cold War years."

Even before the passage of the NWCDA in 1998, the CIA History Staff was already involved in researching the Agency's role during and after World War II. For example, historian Kevin C. Ruffner's unclassified article, "CIA's Support to the Nazi War Criminal Investigations," was published in the 1997 unclassified edition of *Studies in Intelligence*. (The article is on CIA's and IWG's homepages.) Senior historian Donald P. Steury contributed major sections to the 1997 and 1998 State Department reports coordinated by Under Secretary Stuart E. Eizenstat on Nazi looting of gold and assets as well as gold expropriated by the Ustashi (Croatian fascists) in Yugoslavia.

In March 1999, DCI Tenet directed that Agency components identify all records relevant to the Act. He also assigned the Special Collection Division of the CIA's Office of Information Management (OIM) to manage the project's overall tasking in coordination with various CIA Directorates. OIM provides guidance concerning search, relevance, and review standards throughout the Agency for records pertaining to Nazi war criminals.

OIM has assembled a staff of researchers and declassification experts with authority to task all CIA offices that may have relevant records in their possession. With the assistance of the History Staff, OIM has also prepared a search- and-retrieval guide for research on Nazi war criminals and collaborators for the IWG that is being used by other agencies. It issued a "watch list" to the staff of the Automatic (25- year) Declassification Program to be on the lookout for records pertaining to World War II. Representatives of OIM's Special Collections Division participated in the monthly IWG meetings and the public meetings in Washington and New York, and the DCI's special counsel represented the Agency at a session in Los Angeles.

DCI Tenet met with the Interagency Working Group in July 1999 to brief its members on CIA's efforts to comply with the Act, which calls for a three year declassification schedule. The DCI sent letters to Agency retiree organizations to ask for the assistance of former intelligence officers who may have information about the Agency's involvement with Nazi war criminals during and after World War II. He also has written several foreign intelligence services to advise them of the Act's requirements and to seek their assistance in declassifying liaison material from World War II that is still among the remaining classified records of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

During the year the Act has been in effect, OIM has assigned eight officers to review classified material at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and another three officers to do the same at CIA's own classified records center. Representatives from all of the Directorates are also involved in the search and review of relevant records. OIM has already recommended the declassification of some 10,000 pages of captured German records at the National Archives. Declassification of a substantial amount of withheld OSS material in NARA's Record Group 226 is also expected in the near future. The Agency is conducting name traces through its records systems on nearly 60,000 SS officers, convicted war criminals, and "notorious" Nazi leaders and other collaborators. These searches and others are expected to result in the review of some four million pages of records.

The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act may prove to require an effort equal to such resource intensive projects as the declassification of OSS records and those related to the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination. The CIA History Staff and the Office of Information Management are working together with other Federal agencies (including the Presidential Holocaust Assets Commission) and the Interagency Working Group to ensure that this long-awaited project is successful. New chapters in the history of the Second World War and the Cold War may yet be written using formerly classified records of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Kevin C. Ruffner
CIA History Staff

Preparing To Blow Up the Bolshoi Theater

Five times Aleksandr Bogomolov signed secrecy agreements before accepting dangerous assignments from the NKVD, Stalin's secret police. And five times he promised to pay with his life if he failed to honor them. But in January 1999, Bogomolov finally broke his silence after almost six decades, revealing for the first time that the Kremlin was prepared to blow up major cultural and historical sites in Moscow if Hitler's forces, already in the suburbs, had succeeded in seizing the Soviet capital.

Bogomolov was only 17 when he joined the NKVD's Special- Purpose Motorized Brigade (OMSBON0).[8] The brigade itself came under the Fourth Directorate, which handled "special tasks," including partisan operations, sabotage, and assassination behind enemy lines. OMSBON was virtually unknown in the West until former KGB assassin Pavel Sudoplatov's controversial memoir appeared in 1994, and the elite unit has received only passing attention in Soviet military histories.[9]

OMSBON was formed in October 1941 after Hitler had launched Operation Barbarossa, the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, the previous June. The Communist Party's Central Committee and the Comintern joined efforts to recruit volunteers, especially foreign communists living in Soviet exile. The first recruits included more than 1,000 veterans of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Many women joined, and practically every European country was represented in OMSBON's ranks. Brawn was more important than brains in operations at the front and behind German lines. More than 800 athletes, including boxing and track champions, joined.[10] Bogomolov himself was studying at the Institute for Physical Culture when he volunteered. OMSBON was reorganized and renamed in October 1943 as the Independent Detachment for Special Operations of the NKVD.

The *omsbonovtsevi*, as the brigade members called themselves, played an important and little-known role in the life-and-death battle for Moscow during the fall/winter of 1941. Seventy-five of them received medals and awards for their role in halting the German advance long enough for Gen. Georgi Zhukov, who ordered OMSBON into action, to regroup his forces and receive reinforcements from Siberia.

Bogomolov was a member of an eight-man team of hastily trained demolition experts assigned to plant explosives in the center of Moscow in such places as the National and Metropole hotels, the Cathedral of the Epiphany, the orchestra pit of the Bolshoi Theater, the residence of the Soviet foreign minister, and other sites where the German occupiers were expected to congregate or set up living and working quarters. The team also mined VIP homes and dachas, but not Stalin's—presumably because the dictator's paranoia would not permit it. But in a January 1999 interview, Bogomolov claimed that OMSBON had mined Stalin's dacha and the Livadia Palace in the Crimean city of at Yalta and had to clear both sites of explosives before the Big Three conference held in August 1945.[11]

The German failure to take Moscow spared some of the city's most famous structures. Elsewhere, however, where OMSBON detonated pre-positioned explosives, attempts to kill German troops and destroy their morale often boomeranged and brought harsh reprisals. In September 1941 in Kiev, for example, a local detachment blew up an entire block of apartment buildings, killing several hundred German soldiers. But the explosion left some 25,000 homeless and gave the Germans a pretext to shoot 33,771 Jews in a ravine outside Kiev called Babi Yar—the signature atrocity of the Holocaust on Soviet soil.

Ironically, Bogomolov's secrecy agreement may have saved his life. Those with knowledge of secret operations were not permitted to go to the front or operate behind enemy lines for fear they might be captured and interrogated. But the mining operations almost cost Pavel Sudoplatov, Bogomolov's boss, his life. In 1953, when Stalin's successors arrested Sudoplatov as part of a larger purge intended to neutralize secret police chief Lavrenty Beria and his minions, Sudoplatov was charged with mining roads leading to Moscow and VIP dachas and then leaving the explosives in place as part of an anti-government plot. He spent 15 years in prison, was "rehabilitated" in 1992, and died in 1996.

There is only one memorial to the *omsbonovtsevi*. A small, hard-to-find plaque decorates the north wall of Moscow's Dynamo soccer stadium. That is where the first volunteers gathered in 1941. Surviving veterans meet there every VE Day (the 9th of May in Russia) to reflect on the good old days and pay homage to departed colleagues. Bogomolov never once considered breaking his vow of silence and sharing his secret even with other veterans. "That subject was taboo. Each of us carried the secret deep in our hearts for more than half a century, more precisely for 57 years."

Benjamin B. Fischer
CIA History Staff

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Exhibit Center: New Offerings Unveiled

In conjunction with the History Staff, the Exhibit Center has developed an historical survey exhibit entitled "Presidential Reflections on US Intelligence." Since the creation of the CIA in 1947, a succession of US Presidents have described their view of the role of intelligence in the American system of government. Selected Presidential statements addressing US intelligence activities have been included in the exhibit panels. Photographs on each panel reflect key events from the past 53 years when the Intelligence Community, led by the Director of Central Intelligence, presented crucial intelligence that helped shape policymakers decisions. The exhibit was inspired by the CSI's 1996 publication "Our First Line of Defense Presidential Reflections on US Intelligence". The exhibit will unfold panel by panel over the next two months after which CSI and the Fine Arts Commission will dedicate the President's Gallery at Headquarters as the exhibit's permanent venue.

The Center for the Study of Intelligence's Exhibit Center and the Agency's Fine Arts Commission are co-sponsoring the following exhibits:

"Images from the Revolutions of '89 and the Collapse of Communism" an exhibition loaned courtesy of The Gelman Library Special Collections Department of The George Washington University presented from 1 February-31 March, 2000 in the Fine Arts Exhibit Hall 1A OHB. A collection of approximately 45 political posters donated to The Gelman Library by Professor James G. Hirschberg, Assistant Professor of History and International Affairs at GWU, which presents a visual record of some of the people and ideas which helped topple the Soviet Empire.

"Stasi Documents and Memorabilia" an exhibition loaned through the courtesy of private collector Ralph Pickard presented from 7 February-31 March, 2000. A collection of approximately 450 Stasi medallions, documents, plaques, badges, commemorative coins and uniforms which presents an historical reflection of the items a clandestine intelligence organization generated to recognize its own accomplishments. (The exhibit coincides with the 50th anniversary of the East German Ministry for State Security but does not celebrate the Stasi's founding.)

Curator, Exhibit Center

Footnotes

1. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *MORE Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Global Operations 1975-1985* (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1992), p. 37.

2. Oleg Kalugin with Fen Montaigne, *The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 171.

3. The first public revelation of a CIA penetration appeared in David E. Murphy, Sergei Kondrashov, and George Bailey, *Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 135-141. The authors did not, however, identify Krauss by name. We are revealing here for the first time that he was the source of the two documents included in *On the Frontlines of the Cold War.*

4. Comment by East European Division desk officer in a memorandum dated 14 March 1952.

5. Official Dispatch, Chief, East European Division to Berlin Operations Base, 17 September 1952.

6. Markus Wolf, Man Without a Face: *The Autobiography of Communism's Greatest Spymaster* (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1997), p. 63.

7. See Richard Meier, *Geheimdienst Ohne Maske: Der ehemalige Chef des Bundesamtes f r Verfassungsschutz berichtet ber Spione, Agenten und einen gewissen Herrn Wolf* (Bergisch Gladbach: Gustav L bbe Verlag), pp. 197- 203.

8. Stalin feared all partisan and irregular units, seeing them as a potential threat to his personal security, and therefore kept them under rigid control of the Communist Party and the intelligence services. Several of the leading Red Army commanders executed during the Great Terror of 1937-1938 had been deeply involved in planning for partisan warfare in the early 1930s and were accused of plotting to use trained personnel and weapons caches to overthrow the Soviet government. See Colonel I.G. Starinov, Over the Abyss: *My Life in Soviet Special Operations* (New York: Ivy Books, 1995), p. 34.

9. See Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov, Special Tasks: *The Memoirs of the An Unwanted Witness-A Soviet Spymaster* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1994), pp. 126-127, 129, and 133. This memoir has been the target of much criticism, both because of moral repugnance at the author-one of Stalin's top assassins and the organizer of Leon Trotsky's murder-and its sensational allegation that several prominent American scientists gave atomic secrets to Soviet intelligence. The most extensive discussion of OMSBON is in Andrei Sudoplatov, The Secret Life of General Sudoplatov: *The Truth and Distortions about My Father* (Moscow: OLMA- Press, 1998), Volume 2, Chapter 15 ("OMSBON in the Line of Fire"), pp. 3-27. The latter book, written by one of the Soviet spymaster's sons, has not been translated into English.

10. On the role of athletes in spetsnaz units and the close connection between sports and military training in the USSR, see Viktor Suvorov, Spetsnaz: >*The Inside Story of Soviet Special Forces* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1988), Chapter 6 ("Athletes"), pp. 56-66 and Appendix E ("The Part Soviet Athletes Play"), pp. 197-199.

11. Aleksandr Bogomolov, "Assignment: Blow Up the Bolshoi Theater," *Rossiyskiye vesti*, 20-27 January 1999, p. 7. See also Fritjof Meyer, "Bomben unter Stalins Datscha," *Der Spiegel*, 20 September 1999, p. 222. The American delegation resided in the Livadia Palace during the summit.

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