EFFORTS TOWARD
U.S. - MEXICAN
AIR DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS

(HISTORICAL
REFERENCE PAPER
NO. 4)

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DATED 10 OCT 2012

CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
ENT AIR FORCE BASE, COLORADO

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EFFORTS TOWARD U. S.-MEXICAN AIR DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS

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PREFACE

It is the responsibility of the Continental Air Defense Command to assist in the defense of Mexico against air attack in accordance with approved plans and agreements. But, as of the end of 1960, CONAD could do nothing more toward carrying out this responsibility than to state its requirements to U. S. higher authority.

This paper provides the record of U. S. efforts toward achieving air defense arrangements with Mexico since World War II and of CONAD's specific efforts and requirements in regard to Mexico.

The views expressed or implied herein are those presented by the historical evidence as evaluated by the author and are not to be construed as those of Headquarters NORAD/CONAD.
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THE JOINT MEXICAN-UNITED STATES DEFENSE COMMISSION

Early in World War II, the United States and Mexico established an agency to attend to matters of mutual defense. This was the Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission (JMUSDC), which was set up on 27 February 1942 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and President Manuel Avila Camacho.* Its stated purpose was:

To study problems relating to the common defense of the United States and Mexico,

To consider broad plans for the defense of Mexico and adjacent areas of the United States, and

To propose to the respective governments the cooperative measures which, in its opinion, should be adopted.

The first U. S. members were Lieutenant General Stanley D. Embick, USA (Retired), Chairman, and Vice Admiral Alfred W. Johnson, USN (Retired). Mexico's first members were Major General Miguel S. Gonzales Cadena and Brigadier General Thomas Sanchez Hernandez.

When the JMUSDC was formed, Mexico was not at war. Mexican declaration of war on Germany came in May 1942; however, following attacks on Mexican ships by German submarines in the Gulf of Mexico. Throughout the war, the JMUSDC was the center of mutual defense assistance

* See Appendix I for the Executive Order.
and planning. One of its first acts was to draw up a plan for integral defense that brought a working relationship between the U. S. Fourth Army and the Mexican Pacific Command. The JMUSDC also set up reciprocal training arrangements and handled the military side of Lend Lease to Mexico.

The Mexican Army got about $18,000,000 worth of equipment from the U. S. during the war. Included were three radar sets for sites in Lower California. These radars were wanted by the U. S. Western Defense Command to extend coverage to protect California's southern flank.

II

THE U. S.-MEXICO EMERGENCY DEFENSE PLAN
MEXUS 100/1

The JMUSDC was retained after the war. In 1947, the U. S. section was placed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Before, it had been directly under the President. The U. S. Air Force Air Defense Command, in its early plans for air defense, laid down requirements for liaison and coordination with Mexico.

In August 1951, the Air Force told ADC that an ad hoc committee of the JMUSDC was going to write an outline emergency defense plan for the two countries. This plan was to have an annex on air defense. In later detailed planning, ADC would be asked to participate. In the meantime, what were ADC's needs, USAF asked.

ADC replied that only the possible extension of the Ground Observer Corps into Mexico was being considered. But it was not sure that even this was necessary. The strategic position of Mexico, ADC stated, was relatively minor in continental defense. ADC was more concerned about getting air defenses extended into Canada through the Radar Extension Plan (the Pinetree Plan). ADC felt that anything like this for Mexico could not be supported at that time.
The Air Defense Command did not rule out completely any future need for Mexican-U. S. air defense arrangements. ADC pointed out that the possibility of missiles launched from submarines in the Gulf of Mexico or the Gulf of California might later become a serious threat.

At any rate, the requirement for a joint defense plan was given to the JMUSDC in 1951. The planning directives sent to the commission charged it with insuring:

- the uninterrupted exchange of materials essential to the common war effort, and
- that the territorial security of each country is enhanced by the proper execution of defense measures in the other country and by measures of cooperation in appropriate military matters.

The commission approved a plan for this purpose at its 60th meeting on 15 September 1951. The plan was then approved by the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 December 1951 and by the Mexican General Staffs on 25 September 1952.

But following this, the plan was revised and the round of approvals started all over again. The JMUSDC approved on 19 November 1952, the General Staffs of Mexico approved at the same time, and the JCS approved in February 1953. The final plan, the Mexico-United States Emergency Defense Plan (MEXUS 100/1), was dated 19 November 1952. As it turned out, the plan was little more than a general statement of good intentions.

Annex B was the air defense portion. It stated that air defense would be provided by increasing: (1) the state of readiness of air defense forces under national plans to areas agreed upon, and (2) the capability of these forces to cooperate by standardizing procedures, setting up liaison, and harmonizing efforts. Air defense operations were to be carried out by the commander of ADC in the U. S. and the National
Defense Secretary of Mexico. Cooperation would be accomplished by direct liaison, when authorized, and through other detailed plans which might be developed.

III

ATTEMPTS TO REVISE MEXUS 100/1 (MEXUS 100/2)

At the JMUSDC 63d Plenary Session of July 1954, Major General Robert W. Douglass, Chairman of the American Section, explained to Lieutenant General Cristobal Guzman Cardenas, and his staff, the U. S. views on MEXUS 100/1.

The U. S. felt that the plan was outdated and inadequate to cope with the threat. Douglass said that the U. S. Section had no ready answers to solve the problems. But the U. S. was ready to sit down and make a full and frank discussion of every item that had a bearing on improving the old plan. He then offered the following resolution to the Commission:

That the Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission undertake the preparation of a draft revision of the Mexico-U. S. Emergency Defense Plan, for submission at an early date to the appropriate military authorities of both countries for comment and approval.

That work on preparation of a draft of a revised Mexico-U. S. Emergency Defense Plan be initiated without delay and in a manner that shall be agreed upon by the Chairman of the Mexican and United States Sections.

The resolution was approved. The JMUSDC then decided that the U. S. Section should prepare a draft
revision. The draft was ready for review in December 1954.

The 64th Plenary Session, held in Mexico City in September 1955, was devoted to getting Mexican approval on the new plan -- MEXUS 100/2. At the close of the session, about 85 per cent of the U. S. draft had been agreed upon. The principal points of diversion were reciprocal use of facilities, areas of responsibility, and direct liaison between U. S.-Mexican forces.

But after the close of the 64th Session, hope faded for any further agreement.

As USAF advised CONAD in July 1956:

The factors which have deterred agreement by Mexico result primarily from constitutional limitations and an acute awareness of the probable reaction of Mexican pressure groups against any proposed military agreement or pact with the U. S. However, it is possible that Mexico will accede to U. S. requirements provided some tangible benefit will accrue to Mexico from such action. Upon resolution of certain aspects of this matter now being considered by the JCS it is anticipated that efforts will be renewed toward reaching mutually satisfactory agreements with Mexico.

Earlier, in May 1956, the Chairman of the U. S. Section had turned to the JCS for help. He summarized the JMUSDC efforts on MEXUS 100/2 and pointed out that every time the plan came up, all the Mexican Section would do was ask what military aid they might get from the U. S. He recommended that the JCS let the U. S. Section explore this to see just what Mexico wanted and what the U. S. might get in return.

* See Appendix II
The JCS agreed and at the end of October 1956, the U. S. Section asked the Mexican Section to join in determining each country's needs and how they could be satisfied. The Mexicans accepted the proposal in January 1957. But at that time, the Mexicans said they considered that while the first plan, MEXUS 100/1, was not in itself a U. S. promise of aid, it was a basis for the purchase of equipment by Mexican forces to fulfill their part under the plan. And shortly thereafter, the Mexican Government asked the U. S. to set up a credit to meet defense needs. This was agreed to by the U. S. and on 10 May 1957, a credit of several million was established for use by the Mexicans to buy military equipment.

But discussions on the new defense plan, MEXUS 100/2, were not held again by the JMUSDC; in fact, meetings of this group became exceedingly rare and stopped almost completely after early 1958. After that time, insofar as air defense is concerned, the only discussions were on the control of electromagnetic radiations, and on aircraft identification along the Mexican-U. S. border.

IV

CONTROL OF ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATIONS

In April 1951, the U. S. asked Mexico to join in exploratory talks on CONELRAD. The following July, the U. S. plan for CONELRAD was given to General Alberto Salinas Carranza, the Chairman of the Mexican Section, JMUSDC, for study. On receiving the plan, General Salinas remarked that he saw no reason why Mexico could not participate and that he had been told by Mexico's President to cooperate in every way possible in mutual security and defense.

The following year, in April 1952, Mrs. Ruth Hughes, a State Department representative, asked General Salinas about Mexico's CONELRAD plans. He replied that the sequential scheme of operation proposed by the U. S.
would not work in Mexico. It was too costly and there was no way to control the sequence of emissions. The only way Mexico could participate in a joint program was to shut down all its stations in an emergency.

At the 62d Plenary Session of the JMUSDC in July 1953, the Mexican Section outlined Mexico's plans for CONELRAD operations and asked that the U.S. draw up a draft agreement on CONELRAD for study. The requirement came to USAF, which asked ADC to draw up the draft and comment on Mexico's proposed plans.

ADC approved of the Mexican plans and sent in the draft agreement in August 1953. ADC said that Mexico would be alerted by means of a long-distance toll telephone call from ADC's Combat Operations Center to the contact point in Mexico -- Nuevo Laredo. The alert, ADC continued, would begin at the discretion of the Commander ADC, when attack by enemy aircraft was imminent.

ADC stated later that it was ready to discuss a series of joint tests with Mexican representatives whenever Mexico was ready. When this information was passed on to the Mexican Section, a new barrier came up.

The new chairman of the Mexican Section, Lieutenant General Cristobal Guzman Cardenas, replied that his section had acted in haste. There were various "legal impediments" that had to be overcome before Mexico could conduct joint tests. Until these were solved, Mexico could not appoint representatives to meet with ADC.

Soon after, Mexico again changed its mind and sent five officers to ADC Headquarters. It was thought at first that they came to discuss CONELRAD. But it was found that they did not have the authority to discuss CONELRAD. ADC's report to the U.S. Chairman of the JMUSDC, Major General Robert M. Webster, pointed out this fact.

Anyway, the draft CONELRAD agreement was presented to the Mexican Section by Major General Webster, at the 63d Plenary Session of July 1954. General Webster asked whether the legal problems had been ironed out. The
Mexican Chairman, Lieutenant General Guzman, said they had. The agreement, Annex B of MEXUS 100/2, was approved by the JMUSDC in September 1955. Soon after, joint tests were carried out.

But this was about as far as the joint program went. For one thing, MEXUS 100/2 never received governmental approval, only JMUSDC approval, so its Annex B never had government sanction. Mexico apparently lost interest in CONELRAD rapidly after this. USAF declared later that "although the Mexican Government conducted some CONELRAD tests during 1955, their activity and interest in the program appears to have been extremely limited after that time." Lack of a joint program was a big problem during U.S. civil defense tests. While U.S. stations along the border were shutdown or operating under CONELRAD rules, Mexican stations continued to operate on full power nearly always.

During 1958 and 1959, several inquiries were sent by Congressmen to the Department of State on the failure of Mexico to join in the tests. The Department of State advised the Defense Department that it would reopen CONELRAD negotiations if there was a requirement. In July 1959, USAF told NORAD of the State Department offer and asked if a joint program with Mexico was needed. NORAD replied that it was. The effectiveness of the U.S. program in the border areas depended upon Mexican participation, NORAD said.

V

OVERFLIGHT

In 1953, ADC asked USAF if it could get permission for Air Force planes to overfly the Mexican border. Air space across the border was needed to position fighters for gunnery and rocketry training at the Williams Bombing and Gunnery Range at Yuma, Arizona.

The request was put before the Mexican Section of
the JMUSDC in July 1953. It was turned down. The Mexicans said that their constitution prohibited overflight.

USAF was still hopeful, however, and in October 1953 told ADC it might be possible to reopen talks on overflight after a favorable climate had been set up on other air defense matters that had no bearing on Mexican sovereignty. The U. S. Section of the JMUSDC, USAF said, would start talks on revising the defense plan of 1952.

ADC went along with this and replied that it was ready to develop detailed procedures on air defense with the Mexicans. In January 1954, USAF sent a draft of a proposed agreement on intercept and engagement over Mexico. ADC concurred in the draft in February 1954. Nothing ever resulted from this, however, and the matter had gone no further by the end of 1960 than JMUSDC discussion.

VI

CONAD'S RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARD MEXICO

The Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) was established in September 1954 by the JCS as the joint command responsible for air defense of the U. S. Included in its responsibilities was the requirement to coordinate plans with appropriate Mexican commanders. But there was no coordinating that CONAD could do.

However, CONAD went through the motions of carrying out its Mexican responsibility and in 1955 gave its western regional command, Joint Western Air Defense Force (JWADF), the task of coordinating with Mexico on air defense matters. JWADF turned right around and asked CONAD for help:

...this command is temporarily unable to carry out the assigned task without further assistance from your Headquarters.
CONAD told JWADF to let the matter drop for the time being.

In September 1956, CONAD received new terms of reference which, among other things, broadened its responsibilities toward Mexico. CONAD was now to assist in the air defense of Mexico in accordance with approved plans and agreements. There was still nothing that CONAD could do, however, but state requirements.

In its first air defense objectives plan, which covered 1956 to 1966, issued in December 1956, CONAD asked for six prime and 41 gap-filler radars in Mexico. The prime radars were needed, CONAD said, to increase the depth of radar coverage from Western Texas to the west of Guadalupe Island. The gap fillers would extend low altitude coverage to provide better use of weapons along the border.

These requirements for radar were never restated in later plans. The requirements were dropped in an effort to get Mexico's consent to the setting up of an air defense identification zone along the border.

A third set of terms of reference for CONAD, dated 31 December 1958, repeated the 1956 requirement to assist in the air defense of Mexico in accordance with approved plans and agreements. There was still nothing CONAD could do but state its needs.

VII

IDENTIFICATION ALONG THE U. S.-MEXICAN BORDER

The first Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) along the Mexico-U. S. border was set up on 1 October 1951. Called the Mexican Boundary ADIZ, it ran along the California-Mexico border and closed the southern approach to California.

On 15 January 1953, the ADIZ was expanded to a point near Yuma, Arizona, along the common border and renamed the Mexican (International) Boundary ADIZ.
1 August 1954, it was moved a little further eastward. It was again expanded on 1 December 1955 to run from the west coast of California to the east coast of Texas. It was just a thin line, however, running along the U. S. border.

Not long after this, ADC and CONAD started a program to improve all the ADIZ's including the one along the Mexican border. At first, in September 1957, CONAD asked for extension of low altitude radar coverage south of the border in addition to overflight authority and timely flight plans and air movements data. CONAD dropped the radar and overflight requirement, however, deciding that if it was to get an ADIZ set up, the best approach was to ask only for an air traffic control system to get flight information. The latter was in line with the ADC approach and in March 1958, CONAD told USAF that it backed the ADC proposal which should be used as a basis for talks with the Mexican Government.

As it turned out, negotiations with Mexico got nowhere. The Mexican Section of the JIMUSDC refused to discuss the ADIZ. For the time being, the Mexican border ADIZ was to remain as it had been -- a line with no depth.

In the meantime, the Mexican ADIZ problem was put before the JCS by the Chairman of the U. S. Section of the JIMUSDC. In October 1958, General White, the Air Force Chief of Staff, proposed to the JCS that the Secretary of Defense be told of the breakdown of talks and that he take the matter up with the Secretary of State so that the urgent need for the ADIZ could be brought to the attention of the Mexican Government. The JCS agreed and a memorandum, dated 22 October 1958, with General White's recommendations, was sent to the Secretary of Defense.

NORAD later learned that the OSD asked the State Department for its help and the latter instructed the U. S. Ambassador to Mexico to discuss the ADIZ at foreign minister level. This instruction was carried out in late March 1959. Although the matter was favorably received, nothing more was done until late 1959.
Meanwhile, a major problem was arising along the Southern Border ADIZ because of jet traffic from Mexico. Western Air Defense Force complained to ADC that high altitude civil jet flights were entering the ADIZ before their flight plans were received. This made it necessary to label these planes unknown and send up interceptors to make visual identification.

NORAD told ADC on 25 February 1959, that it was getting many complaints from the field on this same problem. The only way to solve it was to set up the Mexican ADIZ in depth. NORAD told ADC to restate the need for the ADIZ to USAF.

But ADC said that USAF was aware of the problem and that the matter had been taken up with Mexico's foreign minister. The only thing left to do was await the outcome of these higher level talks.

Mexico had no government-operated air traffic control system. Flight plans were filed and sent by the Mexican Aeronautical Radio Incorporated, which, although government-approved, was a civilian corporation.

Flight plans were sent over the various company radio teletypes to a U. S. FAA Air Movement Identification Section in Miami, Florida, Los Angeles, California, and Brownsville, Texas. The plans were then screened and sent to the concerned radar sites. But by the time this procedure was carried out, the jets were already in range of the air defense radars and labeled "unknowns".

A second problem concerned the traffic that came within range of the radars and seemed about to cross the border. Just when it appeared that these flights would have to be intercepted, they landed at border towns on the Mexican side. Both problems made for tense working conditions at the radar stations.

General Earle E. Partridge, then CONAD Commander-in-Chief, realized that because the ADIZ proposal had to go through diplomatic channels, it might be months before any agreement could be reached. Something had to be done to help take part of the strain off of the field
units. So in May 1959, he asked Mr. Elwood R. Quesada, FAA Administrator, to take what steps he could to help.

After outlining the problem areas, General Partridge asked Mr. Quesada to see if flight plans on civil carriers entering from Mexico could be speeded up, to arrange for flight plans on traffic that was to land just south of the border, and to try to shorten communications time.

The FAA Deputy Administrator, Mr. James P. Pyle, had already talked to the Mexican Director General of Civil Aviation on some of these problems in 1958. But he had not had any success.

In 1959, Mr. Pyle again talked to the Director General, a different individual who had come into office following the election of 1958. Mr. Pyle advised CINCONAD his mission had been "reasonably successful in that found a favorable environment in which to work." However, he said that any progress would come slowly and that all that could be done was to wait to see if there were any results. He also said that the FAA regional offices had been told to study the flight plan problem to find solutions for temporary relief.

An exchange of visits between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and President Adolfo Lopez Mateos seemed to clear the way for further talks on the ADIZ problem in the JMUUSDC. Also, a visit by the Chief of Staff of the Mexican Air Force, Lieutenant General Roberto Fierro Villalobos, to the U.S., where he was briefed on air defense, may have helped.

At any rate, in November 1959, the Mexican Section of the JMUUSDC agreed to the setting up of a working group (two officers from each country) to assemble data on the ADIZ project. Once this data was assembled, it would be presented for study to the JMUUSDC.

* Selected for the U.S. Section were Lt Col L. W. Myers, CONAD, and Maj P. H. Hansen, USAF. Representing Mexico was Lt Col Jose Figueroa Inclan, Air Force, and Capt Carlo Gonzalez Montensinos, Army.
On 28 December 1959, the working group held its first meeting.\textsuperscript{35} The U. S. members were instructed before the meetings not to bring up any other item than the ADIZ. No mention was to be made of overflight, radars, or air traffic control. And they were to make clear to the Mexicans that the U. S. was not offering equipment or money for setting up the ADIZ.

The working group finished the ADIZ report by mid-January 1960, and presented it to the JMUSDC.\textsuperscript{*} At the JMUSDC meeting, Brigadier General Alfonso Gurza Falfan, Mexican Chairman, said that the report would need "very careful study" to make sure that all the required information was in it. The U. S. Section tried to set a date for another meeting at which an agreed position on the proposal could be made.

But the Mexicans would not set a date. In July 1960, Major General Thomas C. Darcy, a JMUSDC member,\textsuperscript{**} reported that all attempts to set up a meeting had failed. He said that "in each case the Mexican Chairman indicated that he had 'not yet received instructions' from his government."\textsuperscript{36}

NORAD/CONAD units were left to make do with whatever solutions came to mind in solving the Mexican border identification problem. The 28th NORAD Region had one solution.

The 28th told NORAD in November 1960 that the percentage of unknown aircraft that began in the Southern Border ADIZ area of the Los Angeles Air Defense Sector (LAADS) and faded before intercept was rising. It had jumped from 9 per cent of the sector's total southern border unknowns in 1959 to 39 per cent in 1960.\textsuperscript{37}

Some of the causes were: an increase in the number of high-speed aircraft that while taking-off and

\begin{itemize}
  \item See Appendix III.
  \item See Appendix IV.
\end{itemize}
landing at Tijuana, Mexicali, and Nogales, crossed the border while flying the traffic pattern; mistakes by AC&W personnel and aircrews; and atmospheric conditions that made it look to the radar as if the aircraft had crossed the border.

The 28th said that it had let the LAADS set up a buffer zone 15 nautical miles wide on both sides of the border and running parallel to it. All tracks starting in the buffer zone were classified friendly. Tracks starting in Mexico and south of the zone were labeled "pending" and were carried as such as long as they stayed south of or in the zone. Setting up the zone, the 28th said, cut down the number of interceptor scrambles to identify civilian traffic and cut the cost of policing the ADIZ. The region pointed out that it did not feel that an attack would start within 15 miles of the border because the area was under constant surveillance both by radar and visual means. But, just in case, upon declaration of an Air Defense Emergency the zone would be abolished.

NORAD approved this procedure on 6 December 1960.

An interesting sidelight to the border problem was a consideration by USAF of asking for assignment of a Mexican officer to one of CONAD's units. In December 1959, USAF asked CONAD what it thought of having a Mexican as an air movements officer. CONAD replied that it would welcome assignment of a Mexican officer and suggested putting him at the Albuquerque Air Defense Sector.

Nothing more was heard from USAF on this, however.
For years, NORAD/CONAD had been seeking to improve its identification capability along the U.S.-Mexico border. However, no agreement had been achieved between the U.S. and Mexico to establish an identification zone with some depth. The existing zone, the Southern Border ADIZ, was just a thin line. Further, the exchange of flight plan data was inadequate.

On 8 April 1961, USAF told CONAD that although no progress had been made in negotiations, recent developments made necessary another evaluation of the ADIZ requirement. CONAD replied on 12 April, emphasizing that, along with the establishment of an ADIZ, there were two other essential requirements. There had to be a capability for both nations to exchange timely flight plan data. Also, permission for overflight of the U.S.-Mexico border by air defense interceptors to a reasonable depth was required for visual identification. CONAD said that without an overflight agreement the ADIZ would serve only as an alerting area.

As to the requirement for the ADIZ itself, CONAD told USAF that the Southern ADIZ was now a less probable avenue of enemy approach than before. So CONAD said that the requirement remained, but it was of lesser significance than earlier.

In June 1961, the Secretary of Defense issued a directive to the JCS on survivable air defense system planning which included the statement that "The air defense system must have an effective capability to defend the hardened ICBM sites in the center of the country and to defend against end-run attacks from the south." The JCS asked CONAD in September if there was still a requirement for a widened ADIZ on the Mexican border and exchange of flight plan data. CONAD replied that this was a firm requirement since the effectiveness of the air defense system against end-run tactics depended in part on the exchange of flight information and accompanying identification procedures that the ADIZ would provide.
In February 1962, CONAD learned that the U.S. members of the Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission wanted negotiations for an ADIZ handled through diplomatic channels. Therefore, CONAD was advised to take no further action.

Since September 1956, CONAD's Terms of Reference have included the responsibility for assisting in the air defense of Mexico in accordance with approved plans and agreements. But there have never been any approved plans or agreements. This responsibility was repeated in the 1958 Terms of Reference and in the Unified Command Plan, 4 February 1961.* The latest Unified Command Plan, 20 November 1963, included this same statement of responsibility as part of the CONAD mission.

As of January 1965, there was no agreement between the two countries and action on the establishment of a U.S.-Mexican border ADIZ in depth or exchanging of flight information had progressed no further.

* CONAD's Terms of Reference were rescinded in 1961 and its mission statement provided by the Unified Command Plan.
EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 9080

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and as President of the United States, and acting jointly and in full accord with His Excellency, the President of the Republic of Mexico, I hereby authorize, on the part of the Government of the United States, the creation of a joint commission to be known as the Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission.

The purpose of the Commission shall be to study problems relating to the common defense of the United States and Mexico, to consider broad plans for the defense of Mexico and adjacent areas of the United States, and to propose to the respective governments the cooperative measures which, in its opinion, should be adopted.

As United States members of the Commission I hereby appoint the following:

Lieutenant General Stanley D. Embick,
United States Army, Retired, Chairman

Vice Admiral Alfred W. Johnson,
United States Navy, Retired.

The Commission will convene initially at a time and place agreeable to both governments, and may thereafter proceed at any time with its professional and clerical assistants to such place or places in Mexico, with the approval of the Government of Mexico, or in the United States as it may consider desirable or necessary to visit for the accomplishment of its purposes.

The United States members of the Commission, in agreement with their Mexican colleagues, may prescribe their own procedure. They are also empowered to employ
such professional and clerical assistants as may be deemed necessary, and to incur such expenses for travel, services, supplies, and other purposes as may be required for the accomplishment of their mission.

Each of the United States members of the Commission and each of their professional assistants, including civilian advisors and any United States Army, Navy, or Marine Corps officers so employed, detailed, or assigned, shall receive, in lieu of subsistence while outside of the continental limits of the United States in connection with the business of the Commission, a per diem allowance of ten dollars.

All expenses incurred by the United States Section of the Commission shall be paid by Army disbursing officers from allocations to be made to the War Department for that purpose from the Emergency Fund for the President.

/s/t/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE

February 27, 1942
AMENDMENT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 9080 TO PROVIDE FOR THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS OF THE JOINT MEXICAN-UNITED STATES DEFENSE COMMISSION BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (EXECUTIVE ORDER 10692)

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States it is ordered as follows:

Section 1. The third paragraph of Executive Order No. 9080 of February 27, 1942, authorizing the creation of the Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"The United States membership of the Commission shall consist of an Army member, a Navy member, and an Air Force member, each of whom shall be designated by the Secretary of Defense and serve during the pleasure of the Secretary. The Secretary shall designate from among the United States members the chairman thereof and may designate alternate United States members to the Commission."

Section 2. The amendment made by Section 1 hereof shall not be construed as terminating the tenure of any person who is a member, chairman, or alternate member of the United States Section of the Commission on the date of this order, but such tenure may be terminated by the Secretary of Defense.

/s/t/ DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE
December 22, 1956
PORTIONS OF THE AIR DEFENSE ANNEX TO MEXUS 100/2
APPROVED BY THE JMUSDC IN SEPTEMBER 1955*

ANNEX B, MEXUS 100/2
DEFENSE AGAINST AIR ATTACKS

IV. COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO ENEMY AND FRIENDLY FORCES

5. 

a. 

b. 

* These portions of MEXUS 100/2 never received approval of either government.
V. IMPLEMENTATION

7. Specific measures which will require implementation within each country and cooperation between the two countries are as follows:

a. Control of electromagnetic radiations (CONELRAD). Each country will develop a system for CONELRAD which is most effective and practical for its own use and will take the necessary steps to harmonize its CONELRAD systems with that of the other country for the area included within this plan.

b. Security control of air traffic. Each country will accomplish the security control of all air traffic, including aircraft in the air and on the ground, within its territory. For periods of air alert, the security control of air traffic will include measures for requiring airborne traffic to land or be diverted to selected airfields and for preventing non-essential air traffic from becoming airborne. Both countries will cooperate in the control of international air traffic within the areas of this plan and with respect to other essential measures of control of air traffic. Such cooperation will embrace the
exchange of information on air traffic and will stress the reporting of movements of unidentified aircraft.

f. Illumination control. Each country will harmonize with the other the procedures which will be adopted in the two countries for the control of illumination during the hours of darkness.

8. Operations and Command. Air defense operations will be under the following national commanders within their respective territories:

a. United States.

Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command,
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

b. Mexico

Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional
Lomas de Sotelo, Distrito Federal
Mexico

APPENDIX I, ANNEX B

CONTROL OF ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATIONS (CONELRAD)

IN TIME OF WAR OR EMERGENCY

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose. To provide for the control of electromagnetic radiations (Hertzian Waves) abbreviated title: CONELRAD, in order that the USSR and her allies may be denied navigational aid in attacks on Mexico or the United States of America.
2. Statement of the Situation.

a. Enemy Capabilities.

(1) The USSR has the capability for producing equipment to and locate the sources of electromagnetic radiations throughout the frequency range of 10 kc through 10,000 mc.

(2) Through utilization of this capability the USSR could use electromagnetic radiations (Hertzian Waves) within the above frequency range to assist them in attacks on Mexico or the United States.

b. Capability of Mexico and the United States.

(1) Mexico and the United States are capable of denying or minimizing navigational aid to the enemy by silencing electromagnetic radiations (Hertzian Waves) or operating them in such a manner as to render them useless for navigational purposes.

3. Mission. Within the framework of the over-all mission, to form the basis and guiding principles of a detailed plan or plans to deny the enemy the use of our electromagnetic radiations as navigational aids, in accordance with the Mexico-United States Emergency Defense Plan.

4. Concept.

a. Non-military electromagnetic (Hertzian Wave) facilities will either cease transmission or operate in such a manner that their use for navigational purposes is minimized.

b. Military transmissions will be restricted to those essential to the conduct of the
mission assigned to the particular services concerned during conduct of an alert.


a. Mexico-United States cooperation will be effected primarily through direct liaison between the following authorities or by their duly appointed representatives, and through detailed plans which may be developed:

(1) United States.

*Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

(2) Mexico.

Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional
Lomas de Sotelo, Distrito Federal
Mexico.

b. Each country will promulgate such orders

* The U. S. Secretary of Defense has the responsibility for U. S. military CONELRAD matters. The U. S. Air Force is action agency for the Department of Defense in carrying out the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense on CONELRAD matters, and the Continental Air Defense Command is responsible for the dissemination of CONELRAD alerts in the Continental United States. Therefore, the Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command is designated the representative of the U. S. Secretary of Defense for all Mexico-United States CONELRAD matters in order to insure expeditious handling of alerts.
as are required for the control of electromagnetic radiations (Hertzian Waves).

c. Alerts for CONELRAD will be disseminated in accordance with procedures as agreed by the authorities designated in 5a above.

II. IMPLEMENTATION


   a. FM and television broadcasting stations will go off the air and remain silent until the alert is cancelled.

   b. Standard band broadcasting stations will either:

      (1) Go off the air and remain silent until the alert is cancelled, or

      (2) Operate as planned to deny usefulness of their transmissions as aids to navigation.

7. Military Operations. Equipment capable of emitting electromagnetic radiations (Hertzian Waves), which is owned and operated by military agencies, will be operated in each country in a controlled manner during periods of probable or imminent air attack when an alert is established. Therefore, to minimize the navigational use that may be obtained from electromagnetic radiations (Hertzian Waves) one or more of the following general methods of control will be employed by the military. Facilities will:

   a. Go off the air.

   b. Operate with secret call signs.

   c. Shift to other than a normal frequency (if practicable)
d. Transmit only high precedence operational traffic (all urgent navigational information, i.e., beacon signals, etc.)

e. Discontinue radiations during "no traffic" periods.

f. Handle traffic in such a manner that it will not divulge the location of the station.

8. Other Operations. All other electromagnetic radiating facilities not covered above, which are useful for navigational purposes by the enemy and are not essential for defense of Mexico and the United States, will be controlled during periods of alert as far as practicable.
APPENDIX III

CONAD/ADC PROPOSED COORDINATES FOR THE RECOMMENDED MEXICAN-U. S. BORDER ADIZ -- DECEMBER 1959

An area bounded by the following coordinates:
Starting at 32°16'N 117°08'W - north to the western edge of the California-Mexico border, east along the California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas-Mexico border to 31°23'N 106°00'W - east to 30°20'N 101°30'W - south-east to 29°22'N 101°00'W - southeast along the Texas-Mexico border to 27°30'N 99°30'W - southeast to 26°05'N 98°16'W - east along the Texas-Mexico border to the Gulf of Mexico - east to 25°58'N 96°35'W - south to 24°00'N 97°00'W - west to 24°00'N 98°30'W - northwest to 27°20'N 101°00'W - west to 29°00'N 106°00'W - west to 29°20'N 111°00'W - west to 29°00'N 114°51'W - north along the eastern boundary of the Pacific ADIZ to point of origin.

NOTE: To facilitate presentation of the area primarily involving Mexican territory, the following coordinates are given:

An area bounded by the following coordinates:
Starting at 32°16'N 117°08'W - north to the western edge of the California-Mexico border, east along the California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas-Mexico border to the Gulf of Mexico - east to 25°58'N 96°35'W south to 24°00'N 97°00'W - west to 24°00'N 98°30'W - northwest to 27°20'N 101°00'W - west to 29°00'N 106°00'W - west to 29°20'N 111°00'W - west to 29°00'N 114°51'W - north along the eastern boundary of the Pacific ADIZ to point of origin.

NOTE: To facilitate presentation of the areas primarily involving United States territory, the following coordinates are given:

An area bounded by the following coordinates:
Starting at 31°23'N 106°00'W - east to 30°20'N 101°30'W - southeast to 29°22'N 101°00'W - northwest along the Texas-Mexico border to point of origin.

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An area bounded by the following coordinates:
Starting at 27°30'N 99°30'W - southeast to 26°05'N 98°
16'W - northwest along the Texas-Mexico border to point
of origin.
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